[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 137 (Monday, October 5, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H9486-H9492]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      IRAQ LIBERATION ACT OF 1998

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 4655) to establish a program to support a transition to 
democracy in Iraq, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 4655

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Liberation Act of 
     1998''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting an 
     eight year war in which Iraq employed chemical weapons 
     against Iranian troops and ballistic missiles against Iranian 
     cities.
       (2) In February 1988, Iraq forcibly relocated Kurdish 
     civilians from their home villages in the Anfal campaign, 
     killing an estimated 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds.
       (3) On March 16, 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons against 
     Iraqi Kurdish civilian opponents in the town of Halabja, 
     killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds and causing numerous birth 
     defects that affect the town today.
       (4) On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and began a seven month 
     occupation of Kuwait, killing and committing numerous abuses 
     against Kuwaiti civilians, and setting Kuwait's oil wells 
     ablaze upon retreat.
       (5) Hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February 
     28, 1991, and Iraq subsequently accepted the ceasefire 
     conditions specified in United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) requiring Iraq, among other 
     things, to disclose fully and permit the dismantlement of its 
     weapons of mass destruction programs and submit to long-term 
     monitoring and verification of such dismantlement.
       (6) In April 1993, Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to 
     assassinate former President George Bush during his April 14-
     16, 1993, visit to Kuwait.
       (7) In October 1994, Iraq moved 80,000 troops to areas near 
     the border with Kuwait, posing an imminent threat of a 
     renewed invasion of or attack against Kuwait.
       (8) On August 31, 1996, Iraq suppressed many of its 
     opponents by helping one Kurdish faction capture Irbil, the 
     seat of the Kurdish regional government.
       (9) Since March 1996, Iraq has systematically sought to 
     deny weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special 
     Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) access to key facilities and 
     documents, has on several occasions endangered the safe 
     operation of UNSCOM helicopters transporting UNSCOM personnel 
     in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and 
     concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass 
     destruction programs.
       (10) On August 5, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with 
     UNSCOM, and subsequently threatened to end long-term 
     monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency and UNSCOM.
       (11) On August 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Public 
     Law 105-235, which declared that ``the Government of Iraq is 
     in material and unacceptable breach of its international 
     obligations'' and urged the President ``to take appropriate 
     action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws 
     of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its 
     international obligations.''.
       (12) On May 1, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 
     105-174, which made $5,000,000 available for assistance to 
     the Iraqi democratic opposition for such activities as 
     organization, training, communication and dissemination of 
     information, developing and implementing agreements among 
     opposition groups, compiling information to support the 
     indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes, and for related 
     purposes.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY 
                   TOWARD IRAQ.

       It should be the policy of the United States to support 
     efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from 
     power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
     government to replace that regime.

     SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Authority To Provide Assistance.--The President may 
     provide to the Iraqi

[[Page H9487]]

     democratic opposition organizations designated in accordance 
     with section 5 the following assistance:
       (1) Broadcasting assistance.--(A) Grant assistance to such 
     organizations for radio and television broadcasting by such 
     organizations to Iraq.
       (B) There is authorized to be appropriated to the United 
     States Information Agency $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to 
     carry out this paragraph.
       (2) Military assistance.--(A) The President is authorized 
     to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of 
     the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department 
     of Defense, and military education and training for such 
     organizations.
       (B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 644(m) of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided 
     under this paragraph may not exceed $97,000,000.
       (b) Humanitarian Assistance.--The Congress urges the 
     President to use existing authorities under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to 
     individuals living in areas of Iraq controlled by 
     organizations designated in accordance with section 5, with 
     emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled 
     to such areas from areas under the control of the Saddam 
     Hussein regime.
       (c) Restriction on Assistance.--No assistance under this 
     section shall be provided to any group within an organization 
     designated in accordance with section 5 which group is, at 
     the time the assistance is to be provided, engaged in 
     military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime.
       (d) Notification Requirement.--The President shall notify 
     the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at least 15 days in advance of 
     each obligation of assistance under this section in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under such section 634A.
       (e) Reimbursement Relating to Military Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--Defense articles, defense services, and 
     military education and training provided under subsection 
     (a)(2) shall be made available without reimbursement to the 
     Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are 
     appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal 
     years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to 
     reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for 
     the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act if 1961) of defense articles, defense 
     services, or military education and training provided under 
     subsection (a)(2).
       (f) Availability of Funds.--(1) Amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under this section are authorized to remain 
     available until expended.
       (2) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this 
     section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for 
     the purposes described in this section.
       (g) Authority To Provide Assistance.--Activities under this 
     section (including activities of the nature described in 
     subsection (b)) may be undertaken notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law.

     SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF IRAQI DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION 
                   ORGANIZATION.

       (a) Initial Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the President shall designate 
     one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that 
     the President determines satisfy the criteria set forth in 
     subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance under 
     section 4.
       (b) Designation of Additional Organizations.--At any time 
     subsequent to the initial designation pursuant to subsection 
     (a), the President may designate one or more additional Iraqi 
     democratic opposition organizations that the President 
     determines satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) 
     as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.
       (c) Criteria for Designation.--In designating an 
     organization pursuant to this section, the President shall 
     consider only organizations that--
       (1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, 
     or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and
       (2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for 
     human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to 
     maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering 
     cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein 
     regime.
       (d) Notification Requirement.--At least 15 days in advance 
     of designating an Iraqi democratic opposition organization 
     pursuant to this section, the President shall notify the 
     congressional committees specified in section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of his proposed designation in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under such section 634A.

     SEC. 6. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ.

       Consistent with section 301 of the Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
     102-138), House Concurrent Resolution 137, 105th Congress 
     (approved by the House of Representatives on November 13, 
     1997), and Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, 105th Congress 
     (approved by the Senate on March 13, 1998), the Congress 
     urges the President to call upon the United Nations to 
     establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose 
     of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and 
     other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against 
     humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of 
     international law.

     SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM 
                   HUSSEIN REGIME.

       It is the sense of Congress that once the Saddam Hussein 
     regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States 
     should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing 
     immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the 
     Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to 
     Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by 
     convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral 
     response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's 
     regime.

     SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or 
     otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces 
     (except as provided in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this 
     Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to inquire whether or not either 
gentleman is opposed to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from Indiana opposed to the 
bill?
  Mr. HAMILTON. I support the bill, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I request the time in opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Paul) will control 20 minutes in opposition and the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman) will control 20 minutes in support of the bill.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. Gilman asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I introduced H.R. 4655, the Iraq Liberation 
Act of 1998, in late September in order to give our President 
additional tools with which to confront the continuing threat to 
international peace and security posed by Saddam Hussein.
  For almost 8 years, since the end of Operation Desert Storm, we have 
waited for Saddam Hussein's regime to live up to its international 
obligations. After dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
compromise after compromise, we have too little to show.
  The dilemma of current U.S. policy is dramatically illustrated by the 
events we have witnessed this past year. In January and February, our 
Nation was on the verge of launching massive military strikes against 
Iraq in order to compel Saddam to afford U.N. weapons inspectors access 
to certain sites that he had declared off-limits. Our Nation stood down 
after U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan brokered a deal in which Saddam 
promised to behave better in the future. But, our leaders said, if 
Saddam violates his agreement with Kofi Anan, we will retaliate swiftly 
and massively.
  After spending over $1 billion to build up U.S. forces in the Persian 
Gulf earlier this year, those additional forces were slowly drawn down 
and brought home. And then, of course, Saddam reneged on his 
commitments once again.
  Today is the 61st day without U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq. The 
situation as regards weapons inspections is far worse today than it was 
back in January and February when our Nation was threatening military 
action.
  One of the reasons our Nation did not undertake military action in 
February, and one of the reasons our leaders are not today delivering 
on their threats of swift and massive retaliation, is that the kind of 
military action they have in mind just might not work. Certainly we can 
inflict massive damage on Saddam with air strikes. But what if he 
simply absorbs the damage and continues to defy the U.N.?
  As things stand today, we would have only three alternatives in such 
a situation. First, we could forge ahead with our air strikes, bouncing 
the rubble in Baghdad, but increasingly making it

[[Page H9488]]

appear to the world that we are the aggressor, not Saddam. Second, we 
could mount a second invasion of Iraq by U.S. ground forces. Or, third, 
we could admit failure and give up.
  Of course, none of these alternatives have been considered 
acceptable. And so today we find our Nation paralyzed by indecision. 
Saddam has never before been in such clear violation of his 
international obligations. Our government has never before been so 
obviously unwilling to do anything about it.
  The purpose of the Iraq Liberation Act is to try to break this 
logjam. It creates a fourth alternative, an alternative that meets both 
our short-term and our longer-term requirements with regard to Iraq. In 
the short term, we need to be able to bring more effective pressure to 
bear on Saddam in order to force him to comply with his international 
obligations. In the longer term, we need to remove his regime from 
power.

                              {time}  1815

  Let there be no mistake about it. Saddam is the problem, and there 
will be no permanent solution as long as his regime remains. The Iraq 
Liberation Act gives the President tools that he should find useful in 
designing a comprehensive strategy to deal with Saddam both in the 
short term and over the longer term. The legislation does not require 
the President to equip a rebel army in Iraq, but it gives him all the 
authority he needs to do so. If he uses that authority, it will cost 
money, perhaps as much as $99 million that the bill authorizes, perhaps 
ultimately more, but whatever the cost, it will be far less than the 
$1.4 billion supplemental appropriation we provided this year alone for 
unbudgeted U.S. military operations against Saddam Hussein.
  Since this bill was introduced, Mr. Speaker, we have been working 
with the administration to try to refine it in order to make it most 
useful to the President. At their suggestion we have incorporated a 
number of changes at our committee markup last week to improve the 
legislation, and as a result of our work with the administration I have 
been informed the administration does not oppose enactment of the bill.
  With regard to one technical matter, I note that the criterion in 
Section 5 (c)(1) for designation of Iraqi opposition organizations is 
intended to ensure that only broad based organizations are designated. 
They may be broad based by having a broad spectrum of groups 
cooperating within one organization. In the case of organizations 
composed primarily of one ethnic sector such organizations may also be 
designated if they include a broad spectrum of individuals within the 
sector. In any event, I would expect the designation issue to be the 
subject of dialogue and accommodation between the Executive Branch and 
Congress as required by the notification provision contained in section 
5(d).
  Mr. Speaker, this bill will give our government additional tools with 
which to confront the threat to international peace and security posed 
by Saddam Hussein, and for this reason I believe it deserves the 
support of our Members. Accordingly, I urge our colleagues to vote in 
favor of H.R. 4655.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, understand this legislation came before the committee on 
Friday, one legislative day prior to today. There has been no committee 
report filed, and it was brought up under suspension. And I believe 
this legislation is very serious legislation. It is not a casual piece 
of legislation condemning a leader in another country that is doing 
less than honorable things.
  I see this piece of legislation as essentially being a declaration of 
virtual war. It is giving the President tremendous powers to pursue war 
efforts against a sovereign Nation. It should not be done casually. I 
think it is another example of a flawed foreign policy that we have 
followed for a good many decades.
  For instance, at the beginning of this legislation it is cited as one 
of the reasons why we must do something. It says on September 22, 1980, 
Iraq invaded Iran starting an 8-year war in which Iraq employed 
chemical weapons against Iranian troops, very serious problems. We 
should condemn that. But the whole problem is we were Iraq's ally at 
that time, giving him military assistance, giving him funds and giving 
him technology for chemical weapons.
  So here we are now deciding that we have to virtually declare war 
against this individual. It is not like he is the only hoodlum out 
there. I could give my colleagues a list of 15 or 20. I do not like the 
leadership of China. Why do we not do something about China? I do not 
like the leadership of Sudan. But all of a sudden we have to decide 
what we are going to give this President to pursue getting rid of 
Saddam Hussein.
  Just a few months ago, or last November, we passed a resolution, and 
the resolution was H.R. 137. It sounded very general and very benign, 
and it talked about the atrocities caused by Saddam Hussein, and we 
asked to condemn and also to set up a U.N. commission to study this and 
give the U.N. authority to pursue arrests and convict and try Saddam 
Hussein. So this is not something we are doing for the interests of the 
United States. We are doing this under the interests of the United 
Nations, but we are the spokesperson for them.
  Not too long ago, a few years back, in 1980s, in our efforts to bring 
peace and democracy to the world we assisted the freedom fighters of 
Afghanistan, and in our infinite wisdom we gave money, technology and 
training to Bin Laden, and now, this very year, we have declared that 
Bin Laden was responsible for the bombing in Africa. So what is our 
response, because we allow our President to pursue war too easily? What 
was the President's response? Some even say that it might have been for 
other reasons than for national security reasons. So he goes off and 
bombs Afghanistan, and he goes off and bombs Sudan, and now the record 
shows that very likely the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was precisely 
that, a pharmaceutical plant.
  So I say we should stop and think for a minute before we pursue and 
give the President more authority to follow a policy that to me is 
quite dangerous. This to me is equivalent to declaring war and allowing 
the President to pursue this.
  Another complaint listed on this legislation: in February 1988 Iraq 
forcibly relocated Kurdish civilians from their homes. Terrible thing 
to do, and they probably did; there is no doubt about it. But what did 
we do after the Persian Gulf war? We encouraged the Kurdish people to 
stand up and fight against Saddam Hussein, and they did, and we forgot 
about them, and they were killed by the tens of thousands. There is no 
reason for them to trust us. There is no reason for the Sudanese people 
to believe and trust in us, in what we do when we rain bombs on their 
country and they have done nothing to the United States. The people of 
Iraq certainly have not done anything to the United States, and we 
certainly can find leaders around the world that have not done equally 
bad things. I think we should stop and think about this.
  Just today it was announced that the Turks are lined up on the Syrian 
border. What for? To go in there and kill the Kurds because they do not 
like the Kurds. I think that is terrible. But what are we doing about 
it? Who are the Turks? They are our allies, they are our friends. They 
get military assistance. The American people are paying the Turks to 
keep their military up. So we are responsible for that.
  This policy makes no sense. Some day we have to think about the 
security of United States. We spend this money. We spent nearly $100 
million bombing nobody and everybody for who knows what reason last 
week. At the same time our military forces are under trained and lack 
equipment, and we are wasting money all around the world trying to get 
more people, see how many people we can get to hate us. Some day we 
have to stop and say why are we pursuing this. Why do we not have a 
policy that says that we should, as a Congress, defend the United 
States, protect us, have a strong military, but not to police the world 
in this endless adventure of trying to be everything to everybody. We 
have been on both sides of every conflict since World War II. Even not 
too long ago they were talking about bombing in Kosovo. As a matter of 
fact, that is still a serious discussion. But a few months ago they 
said, well, we are not

[[Page H9489]]

quite sure who the good guys are, maybe we ought to bomb both sides. It 
makes no sense. Why do we not become friends to both sides?

  There are people around the world that we deal with that are equally 
repulsive to Saddam Hussein, and I believe very sincerely that the 
founders of this country were on the right track when they said stay 
out of entangling alliances. And we should trade with people; we would 
get along with them better. We have pursued this type of policy in Cuba 
for 40 years, and it has served Castro well. Why do we not go down and 
get rid of Castro? Where do we get this authority to kill a dictator? 
We do not have that authority, and to do it under one day of hearings, 
mark it up, bring it up the next day under suspension; I do not 
understand why anybody could vote for this just on the nature of it.
  We should not be doing this. We should stop and think about it and 
try to figure out a much better way.
  I, for instance, am on a bill to trade with Cuba. Oh, how horrible, 
we should not trade with Cuba, they are a bunch of Commies down there. 
But we should be selling them rice and we should be selling them our 
crops. We should not be bombing these people.
  As my colleagues know, at the end of this bill I think we get a hint 
as to why we do not go to Rwanda for humanitarian reasons. Now there is 
some atrocities. Why do we not clean that mess up? Because I believe 
very sincerely that there is another element tied into this, and I 
think it has something to do with money, and I think it has something 
to do with oil. The oil interests need the oil in Iraq, and he does 
not, Saddam Hussein does not, comply with the people of the west. So he 
has to go.
  But also at the end of this legislation it tells us something about 
what might be going on. It is they are asking to set up and check into 
the funds that Saddam Hussein owes to the west. Who is owed? They do 
not owe me any money. But I will bet my colleagues there is a lot of 
banks in New York who are owed a lot of money, and this is one of the 
goals, to set up and make sure Saddam Hussein pays his bills.
  All I do is ask my colleagues to think about it, urge them to go 
slowly. Nothing is so pressing that we should give the President this 
much authority to go to war.
  Under the appropriations it is endless, it is open, endless, and here 
we are concerned about saving Social Security. Any amount of money 
spent on this bill comes out of Social Security. Yes, there was yelling 
and screaming about a tax cut. Oh, it is coming out of Social Security. 
Well, this money is not appropriated, and it is such sums as necessary 
for military and economic benefits. After we get rid of one thug, we 
are going to have it in. I hope we make a better choice than we did 
with Bin Laden. I mean he was our close ally.
  Please think twice, slow up, vote against this bill. We do not need 
this.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Hamilton), and I ask unanimous consent that he be 
permitted to control this time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Miller of Florida). Is there objection 
to the request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for this generous 
grant of time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bill, but I do have some 
concerns about it. The bill appears to be simple. It authorizes U.S. 
assistance for Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein. There are very good 
intentions behind it. Almost all of us oppose Saddam Hussein, and we 
would like to see him out of power. We all want to support a viable 
Iraqi opposition.
  Having said that, the bill does have some serious implications for 
United States efforts to retain the sanctions on Iraq and maintain 
strong international support for our policies toward Iraq.
  My understanding is that U.S. policy toward Iraq since the Gulf War 
has been a policy of containment. We have pursued that policy now for 
over 2 administrations. That policy has been reasonably successful at a 
price that we are willing to pay. We have protected fundamental 
American national interests in the region, stability, the free flow of 
oil, the security of friends and allies. We have specifically rejected 
an invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Such an invasion would 
take several hundred thousand troops. There is no guarantee that we 
would get Saddam Hussein or that his successor would be any better.

                              {time}  1830

  Having rejected an invasion of Iraq, but still seeking to get rid of 
Saddam, we now come to this bill. The policy message that Congress 
sends with this bill is different than the stated policy of the United 
States.
  This bill states that it should be the policy of the United States to 
seek to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. What is striking 
about the bill is the United States, the most powerful nation in the 
world, would depend on third parties, not even third countries, to 
carry out its policy objectives.
  Let me state several concerns about the bill even though I support 
the bill. First no one should underestimate the difficulties of uniting 
the Iraqi opposition. It includes some 70 groups and at least three or 
four major groups.
  We have tried over many years to unite the Iraqi opposition, and it 
has not happened. There is, however, modest reason for encouragement. 
The two main Kurdish groups have a fragile agreement with each other, 
but they don't want to work with Ahmed Chalabi.
  We have aided some of these opposition leaders since the early 1970s. 
We have worked hard since 1991 to bring them together. Success has been 
limited. Any program for unifying the opposition and turning it into a 
viable alternative through the current Iraqi regime is a long-term 
proposition.
  Second, I am concerned about creating false expectations. Iraqi 
opposition leaders may misinterpret this bill as an open-ended U.S. 
commitment to their cause.
  When the Kurdish leaders were in town last week, they talked about 
security assurances from the United States. It is apparent from their 
comments that they expect very substantial support from the United 
States, including air power.
  We have to spell out very carefully and in writing what the United 
States is prepared and not prepared to do. On at least three occasions, 
Iraqi opposition leaders felt that the United States broke its 
commitments, and we should not contribute to false expectations again.
  Third, there is a wide gap here between means and objectives in this 
bill. When we declare that our policy is to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power, we raise the objectives of our policy very high. Yet we provide 
modest means to achieve what has proven to be a very difficult 
objective. When you have a gap between goals and means, that often 
leads to trouble in the conduct of American foreign policy.
  Fourth, I wonder whether the bill is at all workable, whether it is 
possible for the administration to implement a program of military 
assistance. For example, can we identify any country that is prepared 
to accept military equipment in the presence of armed Iraqi opposition 
groups on its territory? I am not able to do that as of now.
  Finally, the bill could harm the ability of the United States to keep 
U.N. sanctions in place against Iraq. If it becomes the public policy 
of the United States to remove Saddam Hussein, as this bill seeks to 
do, then there will be less unity in confronting Baghdad, more 
criticism of the United States, and probably more difficulty in getting 
support for sanctions and for U.N. weapons inspections among Arab 
States and among Security Council members.
  Under present circumstances, it is hard to name one Arab country or 
one Security Council member that would support a U.S. program to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power.
  I understand that some Members question how well the sanctions are 
working, but we should not throw out one of the key elements of our 
strategy.
  No Member should think that by supporting this bill, we are 
strengthening sanctions against Iraq. We risk the opposite.

[[Page H9490]]

  To conclude, this is a very serious piece of legislation the 
committee has produced. I will not oppose the bill, because I, like 
most of us, feel the opposition should be supported, and Iraq and the 
world would be better off without Saddam Hussein.
  But we should have a clear idea of what we are doing. We are making a 
down payment on support for the opposition. We should have no illusions 
about the bill.
  Uniting the opposition will take a long time. The bill could create 
false expectations. There is a wide gap between means and objectives in 
this bill. There is plenty of doubt whether the bill is workable. The 
bill does risk the weakening of sanctions against Iraq.
  Let us be very clear about what the bill does and does not do. The 
bill states the sense of Congress. It does not change U.S. policy. The 
bill does not compel the provision of military assistance to Iraqi 
opposition groups. The bill leaves the administration flexibility in 
carrying out U.S. policy toward Iraqi opposition groups. I understand 
that the administration does not oppose the bill.
  So despite some of my concerns, I support the bill. As the 
legislative process moves along, I hope improvements can be made in the 
bill.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Miller of Florida). The gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Paul) has 10 minutes remaining. The gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Hamilton) has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Indiana makes some very good points 
indicating that he is not convinced that this is workable. So back to 
the practicality of the bill. Even though one might argue there is a 
lot of good intentions here, even a Member that is supporting the bill 
is very uncertain whether it is workable.
  In some ways, even if it is workable, it is going to be working 
against us and working against the United States and working against 
the taxpayers of this country.
  But I would also like to challenge the statement that this does not 
change policy, because on section 3, it says it should be the policy of 
the United States to seek to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein 
from power in Iraq and promote the emergence of a democratic government 
to replace that regime.
  That sounds pretty clear to me. As a matter of fact, I think it 
sounds so clear that it contradicts U.S. law. How do you remove 
somebody without killing them? Is it just because we do not use our own 
CIA to bump them off that we are not morally and legally responsible? 
We will be.
  So we are talking about killing Saddam Hussein, a ruthless dictator. 
But how many ruthless dictators do we have? We have plenty. So how many 
more should we go after?
  So the real question is, why at this particular time, why would we 
give our President more authority to wage war? He has way too much 
authority already if the President can drop bombs when he pleases. This 
of course has occurred not only in this administration but in the 
administrations of the 1980s as well where bombs were dropped to make 
some points. But generally speaking, the points are not well made. They 
usually come back to haunt us.
  This is more or less what has happened. This is part of a policy that 
we have been following for quite a few decades. Yet, the problems 
continue to emerge.
  We can hardly be sympathetic to the Kurds who are being punished by 
the Iraqis at the same time we are paying the Turks to do the same 
thing to the Kurds. So there is something awful inconsistent about 
this.
  There is nothing wrong with a policy of trying to maintain friendship 
with people, trying to trade with people and influence them that way 
rather than saying, if you do not do exactly as we tell you, we are 
going to bomb you.
  This is a policy we have been following for way too long. It costs a 
lot of money. It costs a lot of respect for law because, technically, 
it is not legal. Waging war should only occur when the Congress and the 
people decide this. But to casually give more and more authority to the 
President to do this and encourage him to bump off dictators is a 
dangerous precedent to set.
  I think there is no doubt in my mind what is best for the United 
States. We should not pass this resolution. If there need to be more 
efforts made, do it some other way. But, obviously, this is not a good 
way to do it. It is sacrificing the principle of law. It is sacrificing 
the Constitution. It is sacrificing the practicalities of even the 
people who are supporting it are not quite sure it is going to work.
  So I would say give serious consideration to not supporting this 
bill. We need a ``no'' vote on this.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) a member of our committee.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4655, 
and I would like to applaud the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), 
chairman of the committee, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) 
for what I consider to be a well thought out, both philosophically and 
practically, plan that will get our country out of a situation in which 
we are now in jeopardy unless we do something.
  The only thing coming back to haunt us now is that, when the Gulf War 
was going on, we did not dispatch Saddam Hussein from this planet. We 
did not finish the job. We should not have gotten involved in that war 
unless we intended to finish it. Unfortunately, we did not do so, and 
now we will live with that decision not to finish that job.
  There is a symmetry to the affairs of State. There can be no peace 
without freedom, and there can be no prosperity without peace. Our 
failure in the Gulf War was in not supporting those who oppose Saddam 
Hussein's tyranny and not to finish the job on Saddam Hussein himself 
back when we had the power to determine the course of events in the 
Persian Gulf.
  Our willingness not to finish the job, our unwillingness, I should 
say, to finish the job and to stand for our ideals, which are to 
support those elements in their area who believed in freedom or at 
least some degree of freedom and were not aggressing upon their 
neighbors, were opposed to aggression, that is the decision that haunts 
us today.
  Saddam Hussein now has a blood feud with us, and he will murder if we 
give him the opportunity to do so with weapons of mass destruction. He 
will murder millions of Americans. So like it or not, America's safety 
is now tied to events in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf. We cannot turn 
our backs on that region, or we will risk the death of millions of 
Americans, not to speak of just those people in the Persian Gulf 
itself.
  But it is not too late to get ourselves out of this dilemma by 
supporting the people in the region and in Iraq itself who oppose 
Saddam Hussein's aggression and his dictatorship.
  This resolution is exactly the right formula, and we should have used 
it long ago. If we would have used it while we were there in the Gulf 
during the Gulf War, we would not have the problems and the threat to 
our well-being that we face today.
  Support democracy. Oppose tyranny. Oppose aggression and repression. 
That is what America's policy should be based on. We should strengthen 
the victims so they can defend themselves. These things are totally 
consistent with America's philosophy, and it is a pragmatic approach as 
well.
  Furthermore, this resolution calls to hold Saddam Hussein himself 
accountable. The man is a murderer. The man has murdered large numbers 
of his own people. The man has invaded his neighbors. It is the 
dictatorship in Iraq, not the people of Iraq, who are the enemies of 
the United States and threaten our well-being.
  That is what this resolution is all about. It is not a declaration of 
war. It is a declaration that we are on the side of the Iraqi people 
and the other people of that region who believe in freedom to some 
degree, whatever degree that is, more than what they have today, and 
oppose aggression.
  Let us stand up and stand by our ideals, because we did not do that 
before, and we left the practical planners to say do not eliminate 
Saddam Hussein, and now we face this threat.
  Our support for the Mujahedin collapsed the Soviet Union. Yes, there 
was

[[Page H9491]]

a price to pay, because after the Soviet Union collapsed, we walked 
away, and we did not support those elements in the Mujahedin who were 
somewhat in favor of the freedom and western values.
  With those people who oppose this effort of pro democracy foreign 
policy, a pro freedom foreign policy rather than isolation foreign 
policy, they would have had us stay out of that war in Afghanistan. 
They would never have had us confronting Soviet aggression in different 
parts of the world.
  Would the world be a better place today? No. But our problem, again, 
was not in supporting the Mujahedin, not supporting those people who 
oppose Soviet tyranny, but our failure was not supporting those people 
who believed in democracy and following through with them to see that 
the pro freedom elements were supported.
  That is what this resolution is all about, making sure that we 
support those people in that region, in the Gulf region, and in Iraq 
itself who are our natural allies. Let us hold Saddam Hussein 
accountable rather than putting ourselves in a place where we let the 
situation go to such a degree that we end up having to kill hundreds of 
thousands of people in the regions, Iraqis who are not even our 
enemies.
  So let us support those people in Iraq who are our friends and in the 
region who are our friends, and let us push for democracy.
  Even in Kuwait today, we can be proud that there has been some 
democratic reform as compared to what the system was before when we 
were there. So I stand in support of this resolution.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California makes a very good point, 
that sometimes we get involved in these battles and we never fight to 
complete victory. He argues the case for pursuing it and always winning 
and take out the dictator that we are opposing.

                              {time}  1845

  There is some merit to that argument, but there is also a very good 
reason why that does not happen and will not happen. It is because when 
we fight a war for non-national security reasons, when it is limited to 
protecting oil or some other interest, then there is a limitation, 
there is no wanting to expand it.
  When we fight a war for national security reasons, we declare the 
war, the people join, they are willing to support it financially, they 
volunteer to go into the military, and they fight to win. But we have 
not done that since World War II, precisely because we have this namby-
pamby foreign policy of being everything to everybody and we do not 
even defend our national security adequately enough.
  The gentleman from California makes a good point also. He is 
concerned that somebody like Saddam Hussein may attack us with weapons 
of mass destruction. He is precisely right. I am concerned about that 
too. But I would say that our exposure is about 100 times greater 
because of our policy. Why is it that the terrorists want to go after 
Americans? Because we are always dropping bombs on people and telling 
people what to do; because we are the policemen. We pretend to be the 
arbitrator of every argument in the world, even those that have existed 
for 1,000 years. It is a failed, flawed policy.
  So I would say I have exactly the same concerns, but I think the 
policy that we follow has generated this problem, and it will continue.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just close by talking a little bit about this 
authorization. It says, there are to be authorized appropriations, such 
sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation 
funds. This is what the money is to go for: Defense articles, defense 
services, military education, and training. Sounds like getting ready 
for the Bay of Pigs. That is exactly what we did. And then we backed 
off, we were not doing it for the right reason, and of course we have 
solidified for 40 years the dictatorship in Cuba.
  So do my colleagues think our policy over the last 10 years has 
actually helped to weaken Saddam Hussein? Every time he comes out of it 
stronger. And then those who say, ``Well, we should march in,'' we 
should all question. Those of us here in the Congress who are so 
anxious to take out this dictator, they should be willing to march 
themselves, or send their children and send their grandchildren. Is it 
worth that? No, no, we would not want to do that, we have to keep our 
troops safe, safe from harm, but we will just pay somebody to do it. We 
will pay somebody to do it and we will make wild promises. Promise the 
Kurds something. They will take care of Saddam Hussein. And sure 
enough, the promises never come through.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PAUL. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman does not think it is 
proper for us to offer those people who are struggling for freedoms in 
Iraq against their dictatorship a helping hand?
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I think it would be 
absolutely proper to do that, as long as it came out of the gentleman's 
wallet and we did not extract it from somebody in this country, a 
taxpayer at the point of a gun and say, look, bin Laden is a great guy. 
I want more of your money.
  That is what we did in the 1980s. That is what the Congress did. They 
went to the taxpayers, they put a gun to their head, and said, you pay 
up, because we think bin Laden is a freedom fighter.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if the gentleman will further yield, it was 
just not handled correctly.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, again reclaiming my time, the policy is 
flawed. The policy is flawed.
  I think the conclusions we have today are logical. I do not think 
they lack logic. I think that if one decides that we are fighting for 
our national security reasons, we never stop short of victory. So this 
would go along with the gentleman's argument that we stopped too soon 
in Iraq. But we were not there for national security reasons. They were 
not about to invade us, and they are not about to invade us. The only 
way we should fear an invasion by these hoodlums is if we incite them 
to terrorism.
  We should consider this a very serious piece of legislation. This is 
a vote for virtual war and giving more power to the President. It has 
an open-ended appropriation, and if we spend one nickel on it, we are 
going to take it out of Social Security, the way the budget works 
around here.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton).
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I have 2 minutes remaining under my time 
as yielded by the chairman.
  Let me just make this observation, if I may. I think the gentleman 
from Texas questioned my statement a moment ago in which I said that 
the bill states the sense of Congress, it does not change U.S. policy. 
I believe my statement is correct for a couple of reasons. The language 
in the bill is only sense of Congress language. It does not say what 
the policy is; it says what the policy should be.
  More importantly, perhaps, is that we in this body cannot set policy 
without the approval of the executive branch. The President is the 
chief foreign policymaker, of course, and it is my understanding that 
the policy of the United States Government is and will remain, after 
passage of this resolution, a policy of containment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  In closing this debate I want to respond to a few of the points that 
have been made by other speakers. First, the bill does not make an 
open-ended financial commitment. It does not authorize an unlimited 
expenditure of funds; it authorizes such sums as may be necessary, 
subject to a cap of $97 million.
  On the contrary, the purpose of the bill is to save money. We had to 
pass a $1.4 billion supplemental appropriation earlier this year to pay 
for U.S. military deployments to confront Saddam Hussein. We are going 
to have to spend that kind of money over and over again, unless we try 
something new, because today Saddam is far from complying with his 
international commitments than he was 9 months ago.

[[Page H9492]]

  Second, this bill does not force the President to do anything that he 
might deem unwise. Rather, it gives him additional options for 
defending our national interests in the Persian Gulf region. 
Accordingly, I urge support for this measure and I urge my colleagues 
to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 4655.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Miller of Florida). The question is on 
the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the 
House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4655, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I, and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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