[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 136 (Friday, October 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11328-S11330]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[[Page S11328]]
KOSOVO
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is increasing concern within the
United States, and quite properly, for the fate of the people of
Kosovo. I wish to address my concerns, in what I deliver to the Senate
this afternoon, in what are entirely my remarks. I take full
responsibility for the views and opinions that I express. I have,
however, availed myself of every opportunity to learn firsthand about
the critical nature of this problem, including a visit several weeks
ago to this region which included a trip to Bosnia, thence to Belgrade,
thence to Macedonia, and then into Kosovo. I commend the Ambassadors
from the United States to Macedonia and--he has the rank of DCM--to
Serbia for their very diligent and hard work in representing the
interests of our Government and, indeed, those of our principal allies.
That is Ambassador Hill and Ambassador Miles. I spent a considerable
time with both.
Likewise, I was given the opportunity in Kosovo to visit with a group
known as KDOM, which is an unusual group constituted following
negotiations between our Ambassadors and, as I understand, their
counterparts in Belgrade whereby this group of U.S. military and
diplomatic, Russian military and diplomatic, Canadian military and
diplomatic and, indeed, some of the EU nations, are given the
opportunity to travel without weapons into certain regions of Kosovo
for the purpose of observing--and I repeat--observing the tragic
unfolding of atrocities throughout that country. I joined them in their
armored cars for the purpose of this visit and then had the opportunity
to be debriefed extensively by these individuals.
They are doing a remarkable job taking personal risks and providing
the free world with an inside examination of this serious and critical
problem. I wish to pay them tribute. I also was able, when I returned,
to visit with the NATO commander, General Clark, to get them some
additional equipment to carry out their missions.
I have also, like most Senators, availed myself, since 1992, of the
opportunities to visit in Bosnia and to study the complex issues that
brought about that tragic period of hostilities, which hostilities now
have been brought to some measure of conclusion, largely because of the
allied forces that are in there providing the security so that the
Dayton accords can be implemented.
In this entire region, referred to as the Balkans, you cannot touch
one spot without affecting, in my judgment, the others.
Now NATO, the United Nations, the United States--all of us --are
faced with the following situation: Repeatedly in Kosovo atrocities are
taking place against innocent human beings, largely innocent. We have
no way of judging their culpability in the separatist movement
initiated sometime ago by the forces known as the KLA, but while I was
there, I saw the houses being burned, I saw armed people, I saw the
hopeless refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands who had been
driven into the hills and wanted to do the right thing, to alleviate
the human suffering. That is the main threshold.
Also, our Nation and our allies have put a very considerable
investment, first, of the risks taken by our military and diplomatic
people and the NGOs--those of nongovernmental organizations who have
brought relief to this region--we have put an enormous investment of
time and effort to bring about a cessation of those hostilities. In my
judgment, unless this situation in Kosovo is likewise secured, it could
undermine such advances, although modest, in my judgment, that we have
made collectively as nations in this region. First is humanitarian
concern for the people; second is to prevent instability as a
consequence of this conflict, erasing some of the gains that we have
had there.
Lastly, our Nation is proud of the fact that we are the leader, in my
judgment, in NATO. Only NATO is the only military force that can and,
indeed, should be employed if it is necessary to bring about the
cessation of hostilities in Kosovo.
The administration has made efforts, I think many bona fide efforts,
through the diplomatic chain--speaking directly with Milosevic in
Belgrade. We have been joined by other nations, referred to as the
``contact group.'' I think every effort has been made diplomatically in
the past that could have been made, and now that effort is strengthened
by a degree day by day of the assertion by the United Nations with
regard to their growing concern about the humanitarian problems taking
place in Kosovo.
But in no way should the military option, which has to back up
diplomacy--diplomacy can be no more effective than the credibility of
the willingness of certain nations to back up that diplomatic effort--
in no way should the United Nations, in my judgment, have any veto over
the decision of the collection of nations--the United States being one,
Great Britain, France, Germany and others--to take such action as they
deem necessary to bring about a cessation of the tragic situation in
Kosovo.
I want to repeat that. Never should the United Nations be put in the
position, nor NATO allow itself to be put in a position, where the
United Nations has a veto power over the decisionmaking of NATO. But I
think the annunciations by the Security Council recently give adequate
cover for those nations who wish to collectively act, if necessary, to
back up their diplomacy with military action.
That military action, in my judgment, has very severe consequences. I
want to make it clear, speaking for myself, that I support the use of
force if diplomacy fails, and that is a tough position to take, because
I have had grave reservations through these many years about our
continued participation and expenditure and deployment of troops in
Bosnia, but in the final resolution of the Dayton accords, I felt that
I would lend my support, and did, for the putting in of the SFOR and
IFOR forces. They have, as I say, to some modest degree, achieved the
milestones set out in the Dayton accords. But, in my judgment, of
course, we took a step backward, regrettably, as a consequence of the
recent elections. Nevertheless, always focus on the considerable
investment we have put in that region and how that investment can be
jeopardized unless the Kosovo situation is stopped in terms of the
atrocities.
How do we do it? My concern is the discussion in the open thus far--
and I have availed myself of classified sources and I will only address
the open discussion--is that the use of air power will bring about a
situation whereby Milosevic in Belgrade will cease the directions and
cease sending the Serb Army and the police associated with the Serb
Army to stop perpetrating these atrocities. I think if that air power
were absolutely and unequivocally of a magnitude that could get that
attention, then it would work. But, in my judgment, air alone will not
satisfy the situation.
There is a very interesting fact of Kosovo that is well known: that
the Kosovar Albanians number about 90 percent of the population, and 10
percent are of Serb ethnicity. Yet, for the past several years, ever
since Milosevic I think wrongfully stripped Kosovo province of a
certain degree of its autonomy years ago, the Serbians have pretty well
controlled that region. And they have used repressive forces against
the Kosovars for years.
This insurrection did not happen overnight. It has been coming on for
many years. I visited Kosovo in 1991 with Senator Dole, with Senator
Nickles, and others. We went into that region. And we saw with our own
eyes the tension that was developing. But the point I wish to make, the
air operation, I am confident, could be of such a magnitude as to seal
off and stop the flow of supplies, the professional Army and, indeed, I
think many of the supplemental police forces that have come down from
Serbia to perpetrate these atrocities. That can be done.
But then we leave a region which is affiliated largely 90 percent
with the Kosovar Albanians pitted against the 10 percent remnants of
the Serbian force. And it is my judgment that that situation would
quickly destabilize and you would experience atrocities of a greater
magnitude than are taking place in the recent weeks and, indeed, for
many, many months in that region.
I want to point out these atrocities, the greater proportion of the
atrocities, I think, are directly linked to Milosevic and the Serbian
interests. But there have been instances where the Kosovar Albanians
have perpetrated atrocities of a comparable
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magnitude in viciousness, but of course not in a magnitude of totality
of loss of life in that region. So both sides come to this problem not
with clean hands at all, in my judgment.
The Kosovar Albanians have as one of their objectives a greater
Albania. You have virtual anarchy now in Albania. You have large
populations of the refugees that have left Albania in Montenegro. That
is destabilized. You have some in Macedonia. Indeed, these refugees are
throughout this region. And in the event that force has to be used as a
consequence of the failure of diplomatic efforts, my concern is that
the KLA will view that as the allies, the nations of NATO, coming to
their aid and supporting their long-term goal of a greater Albania.
That is very troublesome, Mr. President, very troublesome.
That is why I believe--and, again, it is my judgment--that any
military action to bring about a cessation of the current level of
atrocities in Kosovo has to be associated with what I call a ground
element or a stabilizing force that would prevent a greater level of
insurrection amongst the populations of predominantly 90 percent
Kosovar Albanians and 10 percent Serbs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has only a few
seconds left of his 15 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Fine. I ask unanimous consent for additional time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I see that my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma is
here. I could finish in 6 or 7 minutes.
Mr. NICKLES. No. Go ahead and finish.
Mr. WARNER. Fine. I will resume my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much more time does the Senator seek?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I go back to the situation and recap
quickly. As I look at what is in the open, as I say, reported in the
New York Times, the Washington Post--and recently we have had some
excellent reporting about the military options being examined by NATO--
they either intentionally or otherwise leave out any reference to a
stabilizing force and the need for that force in Kosovo. And that is
the basic reason why I take the floor of the Senate today, to express
my own professional judgment that any air operation to alleviate the
suffering here has to have, very speedily, a follow-up ground presence
in Kosovo to prevent what I predict would be an increased clash among
these peoples with the absence of a stabilizing force.
I think it is very important that the President, if he is
contemplating the use of force, together with the heads of state of
other nations, come to the Congress, come to the American people and
point out--if I am wrong, point it out. But I have consulted a great
many people about this situation. As I say, I saw it myself weeks ago.
The hatred between the Kosovar Albanians and the remnants of the Serbs
that are still there is incredible. It is beyond the ability of anybody
really to explain it. They will fall upon themselves as they come down
out of these hills.
There are maybe as much as a quarter of a million people--refugees--
in these hills. When they return to their villages and homes, which I
saw, which are burned and destroyed, and see the looting and the
destruction, both of human beings and property, they will be incensed,
and I think they will turn to fighting themselves. And that is a
situation we cannot allow to happen as a consequence of an air
operation there and in other areas of that region.
It would bring about greater instability, in my judgment, in Bosnia,
that sort of insurrection. It could bring it about in Macedonia. It
could feed into the instability here. Montenegro is an integral part of
Serbia. There is a good deal of competition between the head of state
and government in Montenegro and Milosevic in Serbia. And that
situation would be exacerbated.
You must always remember, if airstrikes go against the Serbs, Greece
historically has had long relationships with Serbia, as has Russia.
Russia now has a very important part of the military that is stationed
in Bosnia. What are the consequences that will flow with those two
nations if we strike against Serbia?
So I basically conclude my remarks by saying that I think that any
operation will have to explain why it is the judgment of those
preparing this operation that the ground element is not necessary
before this Senator is going to sign off and lend his support.
In my judgment, it is an essential part of any operation to prevent
what I predict would be a greater increase of tragedies there.
Nevertheless, with the absence of the Serbian Army and the police,
other fighting would quickly fall behind.
Furthermore, if you are to help these quarter of a million refugees,
you have to bring in food, medicine, supplies and shelter. How could
these be brought in if there is a virtual civil war going on?
Therefore, without a stabilizing force, you are not going to be able to
get the NGO support and such other support that is essential to be
brought to bear in that region in the coming weeks, as weather closes
in on these hopeless, hapless people who are now confined in the hills.
Furthermore, if you start bombing in this region, that will create
another group of refugees who will begin to flee from the sites that
either have been bombed or sites that are likely to be bombed if the
first raid or the second raid doesn't succeed. So the quarter million
down here will grow in number by many more refugees in this situation.
Then they will start, in my judgment, flowing across the borders.
I do not believe to the extent this plan has been discussed in the
open--largely by the press--that this is a workable operation. At this
time I could not lend my support, although I support a plan that would
bring about the cessation of this tragic killing that is going on in
Kosovo. The likely and precipitous undermining of what progress we have
made in Bosnia and the fact that NATO would be viewed as not fulfilling
its mission under the leadership of the United States are the reasons
compelling us to look at this operation.
If we are going to do it, let's make certain we do it properly to
achieve the goals of humanitarian relief and the lessening of the
killings.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I wish to congratulate and
compliment my colleague from Virginia for a very thoughtful speech, and
also for his homework in this area, and the fact that he spent some
time traveling to this troubled region of the world.
I had the pleasure of traveling with Senator Warner and Senator Dole,
I believe in 1991. We met with Mr. Milosevic and we traveled into
Kosovo. I became convinced that Mr. Milosevic was a tyrant. I still
believe he is. He needs to be stopped. We need to have affirmative
action to stop him. We have had strong words from this administration.
We have had very little action. I am not convinced they have a plan
that will fully complement their desires, so I am concerned about that.
But I am also working with other colleagues in this body to try to
see that the United States and NATO stand up to Milosevic and try to
develop a plan that is workable. I appreciate the fact that my
colleague from Virginia is willing to speak out and lend his experience
and education in this area. Maybe together we can come up with
something that will work and stop the atrocities, but also avoid some
of the pitfalls that could easily have happened in Bosnia, where some
of us were concerned about the cost and the expense.
Some of us felt misled by this administration when they said we would
only be in Bosnia for a short period of time. We stated that wasn't the
case. We knew that wasn't the case. We knew we wouldn't be limited to 1
year. Frankly, they misled Congress and they misled the American people
as far as the commitment in Bosnia. I want to avoid that repetition of
that as it pertains to Kosovo.
I appreciate my colleagues' comments.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague and
friend. I wish to commend the leadership of Senator Lott and yourself,
Senator Helms, Senator Thurmond, Senator Domenici, Senator McCain, and
many of us who have quietly begun to try to
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look at this situation, to give constructive advice to Senator Lott and
yourself. I think that, hopefully, that message will get to the
administration.
At the moment, I am expressing my own view. I am not satisfied with
what I have seen in the open about this plan. I think it has to
incorporate pieces which will bring about a stabilization of the
potential conflict that could take place in the aftermath of an
airstrike.
The Senator rightly points out we had the Joint Chiefs before the
Armed Services Committee the other day seeking additional funds for
critical needs in our forces, and we have now expended by our Nation up
to $9 billion in Bosnia--much of that coming out of the military
budget. It is unprogrammed, unbudgeted. We are taking funds out of R&D,
operation and maintenance accounts. That has a direct adverse effect on
the readiness and the lifestyle of our men and women in the Armed
Forces.
We will take steps to correct that, but I think the Senator is
absolutely right. I thank the Senator and the distinguished majority
leader for the work they have done.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, to conclude the dialog on Kosovo, the
administration gave most Members of the Senate a briefing yesterday,
but they have a lot of work to do. They have a lot of work to do if
they are going to convince the Congress, if they are going to convince
the American people. They have a lot of leveling with the American
people as far as the expense, as far as the obligation, as far as what
the next step is after the first phase. They haven't answered those
questions.
That is not exactly what I call ``consulting with Congress.'' Maybe
we had a little dialog with the administration, but we have a lot of
work to do yet.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague for bringing that up. I
participated, of course, in those briefings.
I am not here to advocate the U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. It seems
to me if there is an air operation that the United States--because of
its particular type of aircraft and munitions--would have to take a
lead in that and then the role of the stabilization force should fall
to other allies, in my judgment. I think you can't have one without the
other.
I thank my colleague.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for an
additional 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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