[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 136 (Friday, October 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11328-S11330]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S11328]]
                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is increasing concern within the 
United States, and quite properly, for the fate of the people of 
Kosovo. I wish to address my concerns, in what I deliver to the Senate 
this afternoon, in what are entirely my remarks. I take full 
responsibility for the views and opinions that I express. I have, 
however, availed myself of every opportunity to learn firsthand about 
the critical nature of this problem, including a visit several weeks 
ago to this region which included a trip to Bosnia, thence to Belgrade, 
thence to Macedonia, and then into Kosovo. I commend the Ambassadors 
from the United States to Macedonia and--he has the rank of DCM--to 
Serbia for their very diligent and hard work in representing the 
interests of our Government and, indeed, those of our principal allies. 
That is Ambassador Hill and Ambassador Miles. I spent a considerable 
time with both.

  Likewise, I was given the opportunity in Kosovo to visit with a group 
known as KDOM, which is an unusual group constituted following 
negotiations between our Ambassadors and, as I understand, their 
counterparts in Belgrade whereby this group of U.S. military and 
diplomatic, Russian military and diplomatic, Canadian military and 
diplomatic and, indeed, some of the EU nations, are given the 
opportunity to travel without weapons into certain regions of Kosovo 
for the purpose of observing--and I repeat--observing the tragic 
unfolding of atrocities throughout that country. I joined them in their 
armored cars for the purpose of this visit and then had the opportunity 
to be debriefed extensively by these individuals.
  They are doing a remarkable job taking personal risks and providing 
the free world with an inside examination of this serious and critical 
problem. I wish to pay them tribute. I also was able, when I returned, 
to visit with the NATO commander, General Clark, to get them some 
additional equipment to carry out their missions.
  I have also, like most Senators, availed myself, since 1992, of the 
opportunities to visit in Bosnia and to study the complex issues that 
brought about that tragic period of hostilities, which hostilities now 
have been brought to some measure of conclusion, largely because of the 
allied forces that are in there providing the security so that the 
Dayton accords can be implemented.
  In this entire region, referred to as the Balkans, you cannot touch 
one spot without affecting, in my judgment, the others.
  Now NATO, the United Nations, the United States--all of us --are 
faced with the following situation: Repeatedly in Kosovo atrocities are 
taking place against innocent human beings, largely innocent. We have 
no way of judging their culpability in the separatist movement 
initiated sometime ago by the forces known as the KLA, but while I was 
there, I saw the houses being burned, I saw armed people, I saw the 
hopeless refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands who had been 
driven into the hills and wanted to do the right thing, to alleviate 
the human suffering. That is the main threshold.
  Also, our Nation and our allies have put a very considerable 
investment, first, of the risks taken by our military and diplomatic 
people and the NGOs--those of nongovernmental organizations who have 
brought relief to this region--we have put an enormous investment of 
time and effort to bring about a cessation of those hostilities. In my 
judgment, unless this situation in Kosovo is likewise secured, it could 
undermine such advances, although modest, in my judgment, that we have 
made collectively as nations in this region. First is humanitarian 
concern for the people; second is to prevent instability as a 
consequence of this conflict, erasing some of the gains that we have 
had there.
  Lastly, our Nation is proud of the fact that we are the leader, in my 
judgment, in NATO. Only NATO is the only military force that can and, 
indeed, should be employed if it is necessary to bring about the 
cessation of hostilities in Kosovo.
  The administration has made efforts, I think many bona fide efforts, 
through the diplomatic chain--speaking directly with Milosevic in 
Belgrade. We have been joined by other nations, referred to as the 
``contact group.'' I think every effort has been made diplomatically in 
the past that could have been made, and now that effort is strengthened 
by a degree day by day of the assertion by the United Nations with 
regard to their growing concern about the humanitarian problems taking 
place in Kosovo.
  But in no way should the military option, which has to back up 
diplomacy--diplomacy can be no more effective than the credibility of 
the willingness of certain nations to back up that diplomatic effort--
in no way should the United Nations, in my judgment, have any veto over 
the decision of the collection of nations--the United States being one, 
Great Britain, France, Germany and others--to take such action as they 
deem necessary to bring about a cessation of the tragic situation in 
Kosovo.
  I want to repeat that. Never should the United Nations be put in the 
position, nor NATO allow itself to be put in a position, where the 
United Nations has a veto power over the decisionmaking of NATO. But I 
think the annunciations by the Security Council recently give adequate 
cover for those nations who wish to collectively act, if necessary, to 
back up their diplomacy with military action.
  That military action, in my judgment, has very severe consequences. I 
want to make it clear, speaking for myself, that I support the use of 
force if diplomacy fails, and that is a tough position to take, because 
I have had grave reservations through these many years about our 
continued participation and expenditure and deployment of troops in 
Bosnia, but in the final resolution of the Dayton accords, I felt that 
I would lend my support, and did, for the putting in of the SFOR and 
IFOR forces. They have, as I say, to some modest degree, achieved the 
milestones set out in the Dayton accords. But, in my judgment, of 
course, we took a step backward, regrettably, as a consequence of the 
recent elections. Nevertheless, always focus on the considerable 
investment we have put in that region and how that investment can be 
jeopardized unless the Kosovo situation is stopped in terms of the 
atrocities.
  How do we do it? My concern is the discussion in the open thus far--
and I have availed myself of classified sources and I will only address 
the open discussion--is that the use of air power will bring about a 
situation whereby Milosevic in Belgrade will cease the directions and 
cease sending the Serb Army and the police associated with the Serb 
Army to stop perpetrating these atrocities. I think if that air power 
were absolutely and unequivocally of a magnitude that could get that 
attention, then it would work. But, in my judgment, air alone will not 
satisfy the situation.
  There is a very interesting fact of Kosovo that is well known: that 
the Kosovar Albanians number about 90 percent of the population, and 10 
percent are of Serb ethnicity. Yet, for the past several years, ever 
since Milosevic I think wrongfully stripped Kosovo province of a 
certain degree of its autonomy years ago, the Serbians have pretty well 
controlled that region. And they have used repressive forces against 
the Kosovars for years.

  This insurrection did not happen overnight. It has been coming on for 
many years. I visited Kosovo in 1991 with Senator Dole, with Senator 
Nickles, and others. We went into that region. And we saw with our own 
eyes the tension that was developing. But the point I wish to make, the 
air operation, I am confident, could be of such a magnitude as to seal 
off and stop the flow of supplies, the professional Army and, indeed, I 
think many of the supplemental police forces that have come down from 
Serbia to perpetrate these atrocities. That can be done.
  But then we leave a region which is affiliated largely 90 percent 
with the Kosovar Albanians pitted against the 10 percent remnants of 
the Serbian force. And it is my judgment that that situation would 
quickly destabilize and you would experience atrocities of a greater 
magnitude than are taking place in the recent weeks and, indeed, for 
many, many months in that region.
  I want to point out these atrocities, the greater proportion of the 
atrocities, I think, are directly linked to Milosevic and the Serbian 
interests. But there have been instances where the Kosovar Albanians 
have perpetrated atrocities of a comparable

[[Page S11329]]

magnitude in viciousness, but of course not in a magnitude of totality 
of loss of life in that region. So both sides come to this problem not 
with clean hands at all, in my judgment.
  The Kosovar Albanians have as one of their objectives a greater 
Albania. You have virtual anarchy now in Albania. You have large 
populations of the refugees that have left Albania in Montenegro. That 
is destabilized. You have some in Macedonia. Indeed, these refugees are 
throughout this region. And in the event that force has to be used as a 
consequence of the failure of diplomatic efforts, my concern is that 
the KLA will view that as the allies, the nations of NATO, coming to 
their aid and supporting their long-term goal of a greater Albania. 
That is very troublesome, Mr. President, very troublesome.
  That is why I believe--and, again, it is my judgment--that any 
military action to bring about a cessation of the current level of 
atrocities in Kosovo has to be associated with what I call a ground 
element or a stabilizing force that would prevent a greater level of 
insurrection amongst the populations of predominantly 90 percent 
Kosovar Albanians and 10 percent Serbs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has only a few 
seconds left of his 15 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. I ask unanimous consent for additional time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I see that my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma is 
here. I could finish in 6 or 7 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES. No. Go ahead and finish.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. I will resume my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much more time does the Senator seek?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I go back to the situation and recap 
quickly. As I look at what is in the open, as I say, reported in the 
New York Times, the Washington Post--and recently we have had some 
excellent reporting about the military options being examined by NATO--
they either intentionally or otherwise leave out any reference to a 
stabilizing force and the need for that force in Kosovo. And that is 
the basic reason why I take the floor of the Senate today, to express 
my own professional judgment that any air operation to alleviate the 
suffering here has to have, very speedily, a follow-up ground presence 
in Kosovo to prevent what I predict would be an increased clash among 
these peoples with the absence of a stabilizing force.
  I think it is very important that the President, if he is 
contemplating the use of force, together with the heads of state of 
other nations, come to the Congress, come to the American people and 
point out--if I am wrong, point it out. But I have consulted a great 
many people about this situation. As I say, I saw it myself weeks ago. 
The hatred between the Kosovar Albanians and the remnants of the Serbs 
that are still there is incredible. It is beyond the ability of anybody 
really to explain it. They will fall upon themselves as they come down 
out of these hills.
  There are maybe as much as a quarter of a million people--refugees--
in these hills. When they return to their villages and homes, which I 
saw, which are burned and destroyed, and see the looting and the 
destruction, both of human beings and property, they will be incensed, 
and I think they will turn to fighting themselves. And that is a 
situation we cannot allow to happen as a consequence of an air 
operation there and in other areas of that region.
  It would bring about greater instability, in my judgment, in Bosnia, 
that sort of insurrection. It could bring it about in Macedonia. It 
could feed into the instability here. Montenegro is an integral part of 
Serbia. There is a good deal of competition between the head of state 
and government in Montenegro and Milosevic in Serbia. And that 
situation would be exacerbated.
  You must always remember, if airstrikes go against the Serbs, Greece 
historically has had long relationships with Serbia, as has Russia. 
Russia now has a very important part of the military that is stationed 
in Bosnia. What are the consequences that will flow with those two 
nations if we strike against Serbia?
  So I basically conclude my remarks by saying that I think that any 
operation will have to explain why it is the judgment of those 
preparing this operation that the ground element is not necessary 
before this Senator is going to sign off and lend his support.
  In my judgment, it is an essential part of any operation to prevent 
what I predict would be a greater increase of tragedies there. 
Nevertheless, with the absence of the Serbian Army and the police, 
other fighting would quickly fall behind.
  Furthermore, if you are to help these quarter of a million refugees, 
you have to bring in food, medicine, supplies and shelter. How could 
these be brought in if there is a virtual civil war going on? 
Therefore, without a stabilizing force, you are not going to be able to 
get the NGO support and such other support that is essential to be 
brought to bear in that region in the coming weeks, as weather closes 
in on these hopeless, hapless people who are now confined in the hills.
  Furthermore, if you start bombing in this region, that will create 
another group of refugees who will begin to flee from the sites that 
either have been bombed or sites that are likely to be bombed if the 
first raid or the second raid doesn't succeed. So the quarter million 
down here will grow in number by many more refugees in this situation. 
Then they will start, in my judgment, flowing across the borders.
  I do not believe to the extent this plan has been discussed in the 
open--largely by the press--that this is a workable operation. At this 
time I could not lend my support, although I support a plan that would 
bring about the cessation of this tragic killing that is going on in 
Kosovo. The likely and precipitous undermining of what progress we have 
made in Bosnia and the fact that NATO would be viewed as not fulfilling 
its mission under the leadership of the United States are the reasons 
compelling us to look at this operation.
  If we are going to do it, let's make certain we do it properly to 
achieve the goals of humanitarian relief and the lessening of the 
killings.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I wish to congratulate and 
compliment my colleague from Virginia for a very thoughtful speech, and 
also for his homework in this area, and the fact that he spent some 
time traveling to this troubled region of the world.
  I had the pleasure of traveling with Senator Warner and Senator Dole, 
I believe in 1991. We met with Mr. Milosevic and we traveled into 
Kosovo. I became convinced that Mr. Milosevic was a tyrant. I still 
believe he is. He needs to be stopped. We need to have affirmative 
action to stop him. We have had strong words from this administration. 
We have had very little action. I am not convinced they have a plan 
that will fully complement their desires, so I am concerned about that.
  But I am also working with other colleagues in this body to try to 
see that the United States and NATO stand up to Milosevic and try to 
develop a plan that is workable. I appreciate the fact that my 
colleague from Virginia is willing to speak out and lend his experience 
and education in this area. Maybe together we can come up with 
something that will work and stop the atrocities, but also avoid some 
of the pitfalls that could easily have happened in Bosnia, where some 
of us were concerned about the cost and the expense.
  Some of us felt misled by this administration when they said we would 
only be in Bosnia for a short period of time. We stated that wasn't the 
case. We knew that wasn't the case. We knew we wouldn't be limited to 1 
year. Frankly, they misled Congress and they misled the American people 
as far as the commitment in Bosnia. I want to avoid that repetition of 
that as it pertains to Kosovo.
  I appreciate my colleagues' comments.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague and 
friend. I wish to commend the leadership of Senator Lott and yourself, 
Senator Helms, Senator Thurmond, Senator Domenici, Senator McCain, and 
many of us who have quietly begun to try to

[[Page S11330]]

look at this situation, to give constructive advice to Senator Lott and 
yourself. I think that, hopefully, that message will get to the 
administration.
  At the moment, I am expressing my own view. I am not satisfied with 
what I have seen in the open about this plan. I think it has to 
incorporate pieces which will bring about a stabilization of the 
potential conflict that could take place in the aftermath of an 
airstrike.
  The Senator rightly points out we had the Joint Chiefs before the 
Armed Services Committee the other day seeking additional funds for 
critical needs in our forces, and we have now expended by our Nation up 
to $9 billion in Bosnia--much of that coming out of the military 
budget. It is unprogrammed, unbudgeted. We are taking funds out of R&D, 
operation and maintenance accounts. That has a direct adverse effect on 
the readiness and the lifestyle of our men and women in the Armed 
Forces.
  We will take steps to correct that, but I think the Senator is 
absolutely right. I thank the Senator and the distinguished majority 
leader for the work they have done.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, to conclude the dialog on Kosovo, the 
administration gave most Members of the Senate a briefing yesterday, 
but they have a lot of work to do. They have a lot of work to do if 
they are going to convince the Congress, if they are going to convince 
the American people. They have a lot of leveling with the American 
people as far as the expense, as far as the obligation, as far as what 
the next step is after the first phase. They haven't answered those 
questions.
  That is not exactly what I call ``consulting with Congress.'' Maybe 
we had a little dialog with the administration, but we have a lot of 
work to do yet.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague for bringing that up. I 
participated, of course, in those briefings.
  I am not here to advocate the U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. It seems 
to me if there is an air operation that the United States--because of 
its particular type of aircraft and munitions--would have to take a 
lead in that and then the role of the stabilization force should fall 
to other allies, in my judgment. I think you can't have one without the 
other.
  I thank my colleague.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for an 
additional 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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