[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11170-S11177]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STROM THURMOND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1999--CONFERENCE REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The committee on conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
3616) have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their
respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the
conferees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will proceed to the consideration
of the conference report.
(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the
Record of September 22, 1998.)
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as the Senate takes up the conference
report on the national defense authorization bill, it brings to an end
a process that began in February with the introduction of the
President's defense budget by Secretary Cohen. During the intervening
months, the committee conducted more than 50 hearings which identified
the declining readiness status of our military. In response, the
committee formulated a bill that addressed these issues and garnered
the support of both the civilian and military leadership of the
Department of Defense.
The committee completed the markup of the defense bill in mid-May.
However, due to the intervening debate on the tobacco bill, the Senate
took more than four weeks to complete action on the bill. Although the
floor debate was protracted, I want to thank my colleagues for their
overwhelming 88 to 4 vote in favor of the bill, and for their
contributions during the floor debate.
The Senate's strong support of the bill was a key factor during the
difficult conference with the House. When we began the conference to
resolve the differences between the House and Senate bills, we faced a
veto threat on four provisions. I am pleased to report that we were
able to mitigate each of these objections. At this point, I am not
aware of any remaining veto issues, and expect that the President will
sign this bill.
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Mr. President, tomorrow prior to the vote on final passage, Senator
Levin and I will provide specific details on the conference report.
Suffice it to say that this is a very good bill and contains vital
provisions necessary for the security of our nation. However, like all
compromise bills it does not please everyone and, unfortunately, one
Senator has objected to provisions in the bill and delayed action on
the report despite the fact that all members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the House National Security Committee signed the
conference report and despite the fact that the House passed the bill
by a vote of 373 to 50. I am disappointed that it took until today to
get the report to the floor, but am certain that the Senate will show
its strong support for the bill when we vote tomorrow.
Mr. President, I want to emphasize again that this is a sound bill.
It provides the best possible outcome for our national security while
complying with the guidelines established in the balanced budget
agreement. I recommend the conference report on the national defense
authorization bill for fiscal year 1999 to the Senate and urge its
adoption.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe my friend and colleague--and I
wish to thank him very much for his cooperation in assisting Senator
Thurmond, myself, and others to bring up this bill--has a matter of
great importance to the Senator which he wishes to address, and at this
time I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL. I thank Senator Warner. I thank Senator Thurmond, the
chairman of the committee, as well.
As the Senator knows, I have raised an issue with the tritium
provisions included in the fiscal year 1999 National Defense
Authorization Act conference report. And I would be happy to engage in
this colloquy with respect to that issue.
As the Senator knows, the conference report provision regarding
tritium states, among other things, that ``the Secretary of Energy may
not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise available to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1999 to
implement a final decision on the technology to be utilized for tritium
production, made pursuant to section 3135 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998.''
I am concerned that the administration will use this provision to
continue to delay progress on this important program and build in a
one-year delay in meeting DOD requirements.
Can the Senator please explain the intent of this provision?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, again, I worked very closely with Chairman
Thurmond throughout the conference, and I can reply to my colleague's
question. I would be pleased to explain the impact of this provision.
The intent of the proposed compromise is to keep the Department of
Energy tritium program moving forward. The proposed conference
agreement would require the Secretary of Energy to select his preferred
tritium technology not later than December of this year, consistent
with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1998. Although the Secretary would be prohibited from
spending any money in fiscal year 1999 to implement the selected
technology, he would not be prohibited from completing research,
development, demonstration, or design activities, and, indeed, we
strongly encourage him to do so.
I would like to call on the Senator from New Hampshire, Strategic
Forces Subcommittee chairman Bob Smith, for a few comments on this.
Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator. I share the concern of the Senator
from Arizona about tritium. We must have a new source of tritium to
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As chairman of the subcommittee
that is responsible for this issue, I can assure all of my colleagues
that I am fully committed to ensuring that the Department of Energy
meets DOD's requirement for new tritium production.
I have made timely restoration of tritium production one of my
highest priorities as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
For the past 3 years, the committee has taken action to accelerate
DOE's tritium selection process. We have accelerated the Secretary's
decision date twice and increased the DOE tritium budget three times.
This year, we added $60 million to the tritium program in the
committee's markup. The conference outcome reflects a $20 million
increase to the tritium program because that was the highest amount
included in the energy and water appropriations bill.
The committee has taken these actions to ensure that the tritium
program continues to move forward and we will continue to do so in the
future.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the committee has a long history of
keeping the Department of Energy focused on restoring tritium
production to meet defense needs.
Unfortunately, we found that the Department of Energy had not
requested adequate budget authority nor developed sufficient plans to
effectively implement a tritium production source decision, which the
Secretary is required to make in December of 1998. The conference
report requires the Secretary of Energy to submit with the President's
fiscal year 2000 budget request a comprehensive plan on how he would
implement his preferred technology. The plan would include a proposed
implementation schedule, annual funding requirements for the life of
the project, any legislation needed to implement the technology
selected, and an assessment of the viability of purchasing tritium, if
necessary for national security purposes, on an interim basis.
By requiring the plan to be submitted with the President's budget,
Congress can act if we find the selected technology cannot reliably
meet defense requirements, the implementation schedule is too lax, or
funding is inadequate.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
Is it the Senator's understanding that, should the Department of
Energy submit a deficient plan or fiscal year 2000 budget request, the
committee will take action to rectify the problem?
Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, in brief, the answer is yes.
Consistent with the committee's previous actions, we would address any
schedule our funding shortfalls identified in the Secretary's plan and
budget request. We fully expect that Secretary Richardson will submit
the required plan on time and that the plan will include a credible
budget request for this important program.
Mr. KYL. Is it further the Senator's understanding that the
Department of Energy may reprogram funds to implement its December 1998
tritium production decision?
Mr. WARNER. In response, Mr. President, the Department is not
restricted by this legislation from requesting permission to reprogram
funds to implement its December 1998 tritium production decision. We
expect the Secretary to take all actions necessary to restore a
permanent and reliable tritium production source in time to meet
established DOD requirements, and that includes reprogramming funds if
necessary.
The comprehensive tritium implementation plan required by this bill
requires the Secretary to submit a life-cycle plan to fully fund and
implement whichever technology is selected. We intend to review that
plan very closely to ensure that it can be implemented and that it will
result in the delivery of tritium by the date required by the
Department of Defense.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
I hope the Department does submit a reprogramming request to
implement the December decision.
Is it the committee's intent to indicate in any way to the Department
or other parts of the Federal Government that the committee expects DOE
to defer selection of a preferred tritium source in December of this
year?
Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, as I stated previously, the
legislative provision included in this conference report requires the
Secretary to select his preferred option not later than December 31 of
this year.
Mr. KYL. The Senator from Virginia and Chairman Thurmond have been
strong and consistent proponents of the tritium production program.
What is the Senator's view about how we should proceed at this point?
Mr. WARNER. First, I would say we should ensure that the Department
of Energy's fiscal year 2000 budget request be adequate to ensure
delivery of tritium on a schedule that meets the Department of Defense
requirements defined in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
[[Page S11172]]
Second, it is the responsibility of the Armed Services Committee,
working with other committees of the Senate, to ensure that the program
plan and budget laid out by the Secretary of Energy in January of 1999
are credible and will allow the Department to meet the requirements of
the Department of Defense. This means, among other things, that the
Department of Energy is going to have to submit more credible budget
requests than it has in the past.
Third, we are prepared to consider reprogramming requests or other
actions DOE believes necessary to meet tritium production requirements
on the schedule identified by DOD.
Mr. SMITH. I agree. As Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
I wish to emphasize to the Department of Energy and the administration
that the President's fiscal year 2000 budget request includes
sufficient funds for a tritium production source.
Mr. WARNER. I agree. As a senior member of the Armed Services
Committee, I fully expect Secretary Richardson to submit a budget in
fiscal year 2000 and the outyears that includes adequate funding for
our tritium source.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I too am concerned about the tritium
production decision and its future funding. My position over the last
several months focused on the debate to retain the decisionmaking
authority of DOE so that the Department might be free to make the most
technically feasible, cost-effective decision to meet our national
defense needs. I share the concerns of my colleagues about the delay of
implementation and the need for adequate funding, and I am hopeful that
DOE will include full funding for a tritium production source, not only
in fiscal year 2000, but in the outyears as well.
Mr. WARNER. If I can say further, the Senator's colleague, the senior
Senator from Alabama, likewise worked with the Armed Services Committee
in the course of this very important resolution of this issue. That is
Senator Shelby.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the commitment that Senator
Warner and other members of the Armed Services Committee and Senator
Sessions have expressed regarding this program. I look forward to
working with my colleagues to ensure that a new tritium source is
implemented on schedule meeting DOD requirements.
Again, I thank Senator Warner for his cooperation in helping to bring
this matter to the floor at this time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague.
This is a subject that would not ordinarily attract the attention of
a great many because it is a very complex and technical one. But this
fine Senator, Senator Kyl, has devoted much of his career to working
with strategic programs. For that, I express my gratitude and, indeed,
on behalf of most, if not all, of our colleagues for his very
industrious and thorough work for many, many years as relates to the
Nation's strategic programs.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise at this time to express my opposition
to specific language in the defense authorization conference report
prohibiting the use of fiscal year 1999 funds to implement the decision
of the Department of Energy regarding a production source for tritium.
Specifically, the language states as follows:
The Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise available to
the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1999 to implement a
final decision on the technology to be utilized for tritium
production, made pursuant to section 3135 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 . . . until
October 1, 1999.
Mr. President, anything that might delay implementation of a tritium
production program ought to be of great concern to all of us. Tritium
is the key to maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.
Without a reliable source of tritium, our nuclear forces could become
impotent, thereby undermining the very essence of a deterrent that has
kept the peace for more than 40 years.
Mr. President, for the benefit of those who are not as familiar with
the program, tritium is a gas that is injected into a nuclear warhead
to boost its yield. Once it is produced, however, tritium begins to
decay at a rate of approximately 5 percent per year, therefore it must
be replenished constantly.
The United States has not produced tritium since 1988 when the Bush
administration made the decision to shut down the K-reactor at the
Savannah River site. Since that time, replenishment of tritium in the
stockpile has continued only by recycling it from dismantled nuclear
warheads.
When the Bush administration made the decision to shut down the K-
reactor, it immediately embarked on a new production reactor program
with the purpose of identifying and selecting a new production source
for tritium.
Mr. President, I should say at this point that I have no parochial
interest in what type of technology the Department of Energy selects to
produce tritium. I favor only the option that will provide an assured
source of tritium in the timeframe necessary to meet the requirements
set by the Department of Defense. My interest in tritium dates back to
the 1988 decision by the Bush administration when I was the ranking
minority member of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel of the House
Armed Services Committee.
It is because I have no parochial interest and that I have had such a
longstanding interest in ensuring a reliable source for tritium in the
United States that I rise in opposition to the actions taken by the
conferees in the fiscal year 1999 defense conference report.
For 10 years, the Congress has been on record as encouraging DOE to
make a decision on a tritium production source. A report issued by
former Senator Sam Nunn in 1990 said:
The committee strongly supports the acquisition of a new
production reactor, believing an assured supply of tritium is
the highest nuclear material priority in support of the
nation's nuclear deterrent forces.
A 1992 defense authorization report from the Senate stated:
As long as the United States maintains a nuclear deterrent
it will need a reliable supply of tritium to retain the
viability of the stockpile.
A 1995 House report stated:
The Committee is deeply concerned about the lack of
progress by the department in establishing a long term source
of tritium, which is necessary to maintain the nation's
nuclear deterrent.
And section 3135 of the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill
required the Secretary of Energy to select a production source for
tritium not later than December of this year.
For 10 years, Congress has been on record as pushing the Department
of Energy to select among all of the technologies once thought to be
optimum to produce tritium. First, there was the heavy water option,
then the modular, high temperature gas cooled reactor, then a triple
play reactor. Even the heavy metal reactor came under consideration.
The Fast Flux reactor was next, and then the commercial lightwater
reactor and finally the accelerator. Now DOE is selecting between the
TVA reactor option--a civilian lightwater reactor that may include
irradiation services only, and building a particle accelerator at the
Savannah River site.
For ten years, Congress has pushed and pulled DOE along to make a
decision on a production source for tritium. Until now. This year,
inexplicably, just three months before the Secretary of Energy will
make a decision Congress has been waiting for ten years to hear, the
conferees decided to stop the DOE from expending or obligating any
funds to implement its December decision. Why?
I certainly do not intend to criticize any individual Senator on the
Armed Services Committee. Certainly they have all acted with deep
concern for the national security of the United States. Senator Bob
Smith, the chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over DOE
nuclear matters and a strong advocate for a new production source,
attempted to add $60 million to the budget line for tritium. He was
thwarted for a variety of reasons.
Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the full committee, has always
fought hard to protect the interests of his state; but he has fought
equally hard for the interests of all Americans in national defense
matters. And Senator Warner, with whom I just had a colloquy, attempted
to do his best in this regard, as well.
So why did the Congress prohibit the Department of Energy from
spending or obligating funds to implement the tritium production
decision? The answer is: politics. This conference compromise, I am sad
to say, is all about
[[Page S11173]]
politics. In the House, anti-nuclear foes teamed up with Members
promoting one of the options under consideration by DOE, forming a
coalition that threatened to jeopardize the entire defense
authorization bill. Senate conferees had to find a ``compromise'' just
to get the bill out of the conference committee. And the only
compromise the House would agree to was calculated to allow advocates
for the losing production option to challenge the Secretary's decision
for a year, in effect, without prejudice.
I would be remiss in my duty if I did not express my strong
opposition to this language, because I believe it is tragic that a
matter of this magnitude--literally going to the viability of our
strategic stockpile--might be influenced by parochial interests.
I can assure my colleagues that one of my top priorities from this
point forward will be to ensure that the Department of Energy selects a
tritium production source, that the Department requests adequate funds
to implement its decision in fiscal year 2000 and beyond, and that the
Department be allowed, indeed required, to proceed with the production
of tritium without hometown politics or anti-nuke groups stopping it or
slowing it down.
Force level requirements will dictate when the United States needs
tritium. If START I levels are maintained, the United States may need
tritium as early as 2005. Since it will take several years to complete
TVA's Belefonte reactor or to build an accelerator, two of the options,
we are already bumping up against the deadline to begin producing
tritium for the active stockpile. We already know that tritium will not
be available for the inactive stockpile. That means if there's a
crisis, the United States will not be able to bring the inactive
stockpile into the inventory.
Many hope that the United States and Russia will reduce their
strategic forces to START II levels; however, there is no evidence that
the Duma in Russia is inclined to ratify START II. And, U.S. law
prohibits U.S. forces from being reduced beyond START I levels until
START II enters into force. The Resolution of Ratification for the
Start II Treaty states, ``The START II Treaty shall be binding on the
United States until such time as the Duma of the Russian Federation has
acted pursuant to its constitutional responsibilities.'' At the START
II level, the United States must make a decision on a tritium
production source without delay.
So, I support the requirement that Secretary Richardson make that
decision this December, and I pledge to work as hard as I can to ensure
that the decision is carried through to the actual timely production of
tritium. I urge my colleagues, including those in the House, to put the
nation's interests first, and support a timely implementation of a
tritium production facility decision.
I appreciate that the majority leader will make a strong statement
tomorrow making clear his commitment to provide the leadership to
ensure the achievement of that goal. And, the colloquy with Senator
Warner and Senator Smith of the Armed Services Committee and Senator
Sessions should make it clear that the Senate leaders on this issue are
all strongly committed to seeing that the DOE follow up the Secretary's
Decision with everything necessary to meet our tritium production
requirements.
With these assurances strongly asserted here today, I am hopeful the
congressional majority will hereafter present a united front, leaving
no doubt that the administration must move with dispatch to implement
the tritium production decision. As a result, I will support the
conference report.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, earlier today, my good friend, the
junior Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, entered into a colloquy with
Senator Warner and others regarding the tritium provisions included in
the Defense authorization conference report. Senator Kyl later made a
statement about the agreement we negotiated in conference on the
tritium issue. While I appreciated the kind words he said about me, I
was somewhat surprised by some of his comments made about the tritium
agreement we negotiated in conference. I'm reminded of something my old
friend, Will Rogers used to say, ``It's not what he don't know that
bothers me, it's what he knows so well, that ain't so.''
I want to take this opportunity to clarify what the conference
agreement actually does. The tritium provision included in this bill
will not cause any meaningful delay in the resumption of tritium
production. Let me repeat that so all of my colleagues are clear about
this point--our conference provision on tritium does not cause any
meaningful delay in the Department of Energy's tritium production
program.
Energy Secretary Richardson stated this fact in a letter dated
September 24, 1998, in which he said that the conference provision will
have a ``minimal impact'' on DOE's tritium program.
Just so all Senators will understand the compromise agreement we made
on the tritium issue, I want to take a few moments to explain it.
First and foremost, we require the Secretary of Energy to select his
preferred technology on time, in December of this year. Second, the
Department of Energy is prohibited from spending only about 5 percent
of the overall tritium program budget in fiscal year 1999. The
conference agreement does not, however, limit the DOE from spending
funds for design, research, or demonstration activities. These design,
research, and demonstration activities account for approximately 95
percent of the program that DOE presented to Congress this year, which
the Congress authorized. Thus, virtually all of those activities which
the Department intended to conduct in fiscal year 1999 are authorized
to be conducted by the conference agreement and the conferees expect
the Secretary to complete those activities in fiscal year 1999. This
includes much of the work to be conducted on the tritium extraction
facility, which would be constructed regardless of which technology
were selected by the Secretary. Third, and most importantly, we require
the Secretary of Energy to submit a comprehensive plan in January,
1999--just 20 days after he makes his preferred technology selection--
on how tritium production will be restored. Such a plan does not exist
currently, nor has one been proposed by the administration. This
comprehensive implementation plan goes to the very issue raised by the
Senator from Arizona.
So I hope all Senators can readily see that we managed to achieve a
compromise on this very difficult issue, with virtually no adverse
impact on the tritium program, while avoiding a veto threat, and
satisfying most of the desires of most members.
This is a very strong bipartisan bill. Every member of the conference
committee--both Democrats and Republicans--have indicated their strong
support the conference agreement by signing the conference report,
which as many of my colleagues know has not happened in many years.
This is a good conference report and it should be passed with unanimous
support.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to address the importance of
bringing up the defense authorization bill. I first commend my
distinguished friend, long-time friend, Senator Thurmond, and our
ranking member, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and all members
of our committee, together with staff, for a very hard job throughout
the year to put together the bill and now the conference report which
Chairman Thurmond worked out with his counterparts on the House Armed
Services Committee.
These are very difficult times in the history of our Nation. I look
back over my lifetime when in World War II and the very closing days of
that war I served briefly in the U.S. Navy. There was absolute clarity
in the minds of all who served in uniform, in the minds of every
citizen of the United States. We knew who the enemy was, what they
stood for, what their capabilities were, and there was no doubt as to
what this Nation should do to bring that conflict to an end, and,
indeed, it was done.
Subsequently, in the Korean war, President Truman made a very bold
and correct decision to draw the line in the face of communism. Again,
it was understood, understood by all of us in uniform. I happened to
have served a second tour in the Marines in that conflict. All of us
understood that as well as the people back home. Through his courage,
he did draw that line against communism.
[[Page S11174]]
In subsequent conflicts, indeed in Vietnam, there was a measure of
clarity. I wish to stress, that clarity does not exist today. Today,
the problems confronting the security of this Nation, as well as that
of our allies and friends, lack clarity. It is very difficult, in many
instances, to determine who is the enemy, what are their capabilities,
and, most important, Mr. President, what are their intentions to
inflict harm on this great Nation or the nations of our allies or,
indeed, the free peoples of the world.
That is why yesterday we had a historic meeting of the Armed Services
Committee. Before that committee appeared the chiefs of the several
services, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps,
together with General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was
a very important meeting.
Reports today in the press describe, and, indeed, we had strong
differences of views, but the issues are so serious, they merited
nothing less than strong expressions of opinion by Members of the
Senate, and, indeed, the members of the Joint Chiefs, I think in a very
steadfast and credible manner, stated what their positions are today
and for the future. There is no doubt in my mind that those fine
individuals, all of whom I know very well, have foremost in their
hearts the interests of this Nation and the people, the men and women
who proudly wear the uniform of this country and the thousands of
civilians who dedicate their careers to work in the Department of
Defense or other agencies directly related to our national security.
Yesterday was a landmark hearing. We, as a matter of practice, in the
Armed Services Committee, whenever these men--hopefully someday women--
come before that committee seeking confirmation of the U.S. Senate to
become a chief of staff, it is a long tradition of our committee that
we obtain from them their commitment, at any time the committee so
desires, to have them present to testify and to give their personal
opinions regarding the state of the Armed Forces of the United States
and the need for the President and for the future.
They did that yesterday in a very forthright and courageous manner.
They had consulted with the President, they had consulted with the
Secretary of Defense, and they came before the Senate Armed Services
Committee and laid down with specificity the respective needs of their
departments. Those needs, in my judgment, should be addressed as
quickly as possible by the Senate, then by the Congress, and those
dollar needs authorized and appropriated so that we can restore the
full confidence of those who proudly wear the uniform today in their
ability to endure the hardships and the risks associated with military
service and to having nothing less than the best equipment to carry out
their respective missions proudly as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines.
I commend the chiefs for their testimony yesterday. I think our
colleagues, in the course of the hearing, elicited, by way of questions
and other colloquy, important facts which make an irrefutable case to
bring before this body in the very near future requests for immediate
funding to take care of certain needs and then, in the next fiscal
year, considerable sums of money, Mr. President, for each of the
military departments and, hopefully, lay down the foundation for the
outyear budgets to be increased in amounts comparable to those in the
year 2000 budget so that, once again, America can avoid, in the words
of the respective members of the chiefs, a hollow military force.
I remember so well that period when General Shy Meyer, then Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army, used the phrase ``a hollow army.'' It resonated
not only in the Department of Defense and in the Halls of the Congress
and not only in the United States, it resonated all over the world,
that America, the superpower--at that time there was a second
superpower, the Soviet Union--but the superpower acknowledges that its
army was hollow, that they lacked the quality and the quantity of
personnel, that they lacked the equipment to defend the security
interests of this country and to associate with our allies wherever it
might be in the world in the cause of freedom.
It was a real bugle call. And this Nation responded, largely through
the leadership of President Reagan, to build back America's military
strength. Well, we did not reach, in the judgment of the Chiefs--and I
concur in that judgment--we did not reach that bottom that would in any
way reflect back on the hollow Army of the early 1970s, fortunately,
because the Chiefs have come to the Congress and stated their case.
Now I am absolutely confident--and indeed I hope for the
participation of the President and the Secretary of Defense--that the
Congress will begin to do the necessary authorizations and the
appropriations to pull, in the very words of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, that aircraft which is nosed over in the dive, pull it
out and to bring it back up to that level of readiness, that level of
quality of life that the men and women of the Armed Forces deserve--
that level of a military that will leave in the minds of Americans and
people all over this world no doubt that the United States has behind
it, the military power to support its foreign policy and to preserve
the cause of freedom here at home and wherever we are challenged
throughout the world.
I thank the Chair.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I first commend the Senator from Virginia for
his eloquent remarks, highlighting the result of the very important
hearing yesterday before the Senate Armed Services Committee and
calling all of us to the challenge of providing the adequate resources
necessary for our armed services to carry out their mission in the
defense of the security interests of the United States of America. It
was an eloquent statement, and I think it is something that all of us
need to take to heart.
Again, I want to thank Senator Warner for his efforts, largely I
suspect unappreciated, because they are behind the scenes to deal with
all of the myriad of problems in putting together a defense conference
report and assisting the chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond,
and working with our House colleagues as well. The colloquy that we had
a moment ago was, in significant respect, to the result of his efforts.
And I appreciate that.
juniper butte range withdrawal act colloquy
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like to inquire of
the managers as to the intent of the conferees with respect
to the issuance of grazing permits for lands withdrawn and
reserved under Title XXIX of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 in the event that the
Air Force relinquishes such withdrawn lands. As the managers
know, the Juniper Butte Range withdrawal under title XXIX,
would withdraw certain public lands for use by the Air Force
as a training area. The lands are withdrawn from the existing
Juniper draw allotment managed by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in an area south of the Mountain Home Air
Force Base, Idaho. The withdrawal is from the center of the
allotment, leaving approximately 6,000 perimeter acres of the
allotment still under a grazing permit and the jurisdiction
of the BLM. It is my understanding that, at such time as the
Air Force relinquishes its use of the withdrawn lands and
returns jurisdiction to the Department of the Interior, the
holder of the grazing permit for the Juniper draw allotment
at that time should have an opportunity to obtain a grazing
permit for the relinquished lands in the center of the
allotment.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, would my colleague yield the
floor?
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I would be pleased to yield to my friend.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I appreciate the leadership that
my friend and colleague, Senator Kempthorne, has shown on
this legislation. He has raised a very important point here
today. Anyone familiar with ranching in the West knows that
an economically viable ranch requires access to large blocks
of land to raise livestock in an environmentally sound way.
With the intermingling of federal, state, and private lands
in our state of Idaho, access to BLM land is essential for
ranchers. Any time 12,000 acres are withdrawn from an
existing BLM allotment, it will dramatically impact the
rancher who holds the permit for that allotment. Blocked up
land is more easily and economically managed. Scattered
parcels have the opposite effect. There may come a time, as
contemplated by the legislation, when the Air Force would
relinquish its control over these lands. While Air Force
relinquishment of the withdrawn lands may not occur for what
would be considered a long time by most people, members of
the ranching community measure such events by the passing
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of generations, and that end result can reasonably be
anticipated. And so, I seek clarification for the inquiry
initiated by my colleague from Idaho. The answer to his
question will be vitally important to whoever holds the
permit surrounding the withdrawn land at such time as the Air
Force would, in fact, relinquish it to the Department of the
Interior. I thank my colleague for yielding.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would tell my able friends
and colleagues from Idaho that I concur with their assessment
of the intent of the conferees following relinquishment of
the Juniper Butte Range to the Department of the Interior.
The conferees are mindful of the impact this withdrawal will
have upon the surrounding BLM lands and the use of those
lands by current and future grazing permittees.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank the Chair and I thank the managers
of this important legislation for their response to our
inquiry. Mr. President, I wish to determine whether the
managers of the legislation agree with my understanding as to
one additional provision. Section 2917(b)(3) of the Juniper
Butte Range Withdrawal Act provides for delegated authority
and approvals granted by the Bureau of Land Management
pursuant to the decisions of the Secretary of the Interior,
or the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management.
Section 2907(b)(1) specifically refers to the authority of
the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals
Management to grant rights-of-way and approvals must be
granted by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land
and Minerals Management. This is as it should be. Mr.
President, I ask the managers of this legislation if my
characterization is accurate?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho has
correctly interpreted the intent of the conferees as to the
authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land
and Minerals Management. It is the intention of the conferees
that the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and
Minerals Management shall grant rights-of-way and approvals
and take such actions as are necessary under Section
2907(b)(1).
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have been listening to the
discussion of the Juniper Butte Range Withdrawal as it
pertains to grazing permits and the delegation of authority.
As to the relinquishment of withdrawn lands to the Department
of the Interior for grazing use, I fully agree with the
statements of the Senators from Idaho. I also agree with the
need to clarify the congressional intent regarding the
delegation of authority, as stated by my friend, the junior
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, again, I wish to thank the
managers of the bill and the senior Senator from Virginia for
their cooperation in clarifying the congressional intent.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the fiscal year
1999 Defense authorization conference report.
This bill emerges in the turmoil of a post-cold-war world--one
demanding a U.S. military that can face transnational developments such
as weapons proliferation, regional tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, and
emerging powers such as China.
As a result, the authorization cycle of the last few months allowed
Congress to bring the Pentagon's budget into alignment with the
changing Armed Services on which the nation will rely to deter a broad
and unpredictable spectrum of global threats to U.S. national security.
The conference report emphasizes a type of warfare that will loom
large in future defense planning: littoral operations near coastal
plains. Accordingly to the Navy's official definition, littoral
engagements require forces to maneuver ``close enough to influence
events on shore if necessary.''
This post-Soviet mission connects our force structure to our security
interests since 80 percent of the world's population lives near the
shorelines and waterways that open into the littorals.
The priorities established by the conference report demonstrate how
littoral concepts have started to displace more conventional ideas of
weapons development.
Major research and modernization programs, for example, share the
common goal of delivering increased firepower, speed, and precision at
a lower cost.
Ship and aircraft architectures have sacrificed the hard angles prone
to enemy detection in favor of modular composite materials that leave
smaller signatures on a radar screen.
Smaller crews will maintain more advanced command an control systems
configured for instant data transmission.
And self-guided missiles now assume the targeting role that
concentrated divisions of heavy armor had to bear in the past.
In addition to high technology hardware, Mr. President, efficient
training programs remain critical to the evolution of the military. I
am therefore pleased that the bill allows the Armed Services to manage
their gender-integrated training policies as commanders and instructors
have designed them.
The new international security environment gives us new guidelines to
measure the readiness of the Total Force. Active duty men and women
must subsequently continue to train as they will deploy to accomplish
the gender-neutral task of supporting our war fighters.
Common sense means that recruits destined to repair fighter-bombers,
frigates, submarines, and missile launch tubes should train the same
way, under the same standards, and at the same time.
Common sense means that radar operators, quality assurance engineers,
and military police should follow universal rules of engagement for
males and females who wear identical uniforms.
Yet we would suspend our common sense by pretending that the solution
to workplace harassment means the segregation of enlistees into
isolated training components.
We have to move beyond the charge that integrated training fosters
sexual misconduct to ask how the men and women of the All-Volunteer
Force can each play a decisive role in support of combat readiness.
It is for this core mission purpose, rather than the testing of
social policy theories, that the armed services unite men and women to
acquire the skills expected of all soldiers.
Gender-integrated training maximizes the return on the taxpayers'
defense investment in making all service members accountable for a
range of logistical, medical, and technical jobs that sharpen the
ability of the Defense Department to protect both our homeland and the
country's core interests abroad.
Finally, Mr. President, both the House and Senate defense authorizing
committees struggled this spring with the nation's incoherent
contingency operations policy. By the end of the coming fiscal year,
the taxpayers will have devoted $9.4 billion to the maintenance of our
Bosnia mission since the conclusion of the Dayton peace agreement in
November 1995.
But the administration has requested this enormous sum of money in a
vacuum of silence about our strategic purpose and an aura of deception
about the length of our commitment.
Officials perpetuate their failure of leadership with the assumption
that Congress supports the Bosnia deployments simply by funding them.
This assessment, however, only uncovers the cynicism of the
administration's foreign policy.
Neither the House nor the Senate, as the President knows, would
intentionally place our overseas forces in a position of jeopardy by
depriving them of money for daily operations and self-protection.
At the same time, the Pentagon cannot continue to hold the safety of
our troops hostage to unjustified budget requests for keeping between
6,000 and 8,000 military personnel in a country struggling to restore
its political institutions.
The confusion underpinning U.S. policies toward Bosnia led Senator
Cleland and I to draft an amendment requiring the submission of
statutory reports to Congress on the purpose and potential endpoint of
military contingency operations involving more than 500 people in
uniform. The reports must accompany all budget requests made for such
operations.
Our amendment, including in the Senate's version of the bill and
approved by the authorization conferees, reflects the lessons that the
Bosnia experience teaches us about the interaction between the
executive and legislative branches on the Defense Department's non-
wartime deployments.
Congress must insist on a regular process under which we can match
the administration's own peacekeeping policy arguments with its ongoing
budget demands.
We need to determine more definitively if the Pentagon has a
contingency operations strategy that advances the security interests of
the United States rather than the false hope of relying on our military
presence to solve the domestic political, economic, and cultural
problems of other nations.
[[Page S11176]]
The Snowe-Cleland amendment, I believe, will equip Congress with the
tools necessary to exercise aggressive oversight of the
administration's peacekeeping initiatives.
The fiscal year 1999 Defense authorization conference report, Mr.
President, foreshadows both the challenges and the phenomenal
capabilities that the Armed Forces will manage in the new century. I,
therefore, urge the Senate to uphold its tradition of bipartisan
support for the military by adopting this responsible legislation.
ALABAMA SPACE SCIENCE EXHIBIT COMMISSION LAND CONVEYANCE
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks concerning
a specific land conveyance provision in the DoD Authorization Bill
(section 2837). I am pleased that the conferees were able to make these
technical, but necessary changes to the conveyance terms of real
property from the Army's Redstone Arsenal to the Alabama Space Science
Exhibit Commission.
Section 2837 of the Bill ensures that the future development of the
U.S. Space & Rocket Center property previously conveyed by the Army to
the appropriate agency of the State of Alabama will remain consistent
with the long term master plan for the use of that property as agreed
upon by the Center, Redstone Arsenal, and Marshall Space Flight Center,
and that present financing arrangements and mortgages relating to new
and existing facilities at the Space and Rocket Center are preserved,
and appropriate coordination of further financing initiatives,
mortgages and other debt society arrangements in accordance with the
agreed-upon master plan is assured.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, permit me to quote from the Armed Services
Committee's report accompanying the Senate-passed version of the fiscal
year 1999 defense authorization bill:
The Committee views with concern the slow progress of the
C-130J program, the increased expense of developing the
aircraft . . . and notes the Department's failure to provide
a report on the remanufacture of existing C-130 airframes . .
. Development costs were initially estimated at $350 million
and introduction of the new model forecast to begin in mid-
1997 . . . However, it has been estimated that the program
has cost more than $900 million and is over two years behind
schedule.
To the objective observer, this language would indicate a certain
frustration or disenchantment with the developmental history of the C-
130J airlifter. Indeed, cognizant as we are of the Air Force's enormous
surplus of C-130s and the fact that, of the 256 such planes funded by
Congress since 1978, only five were actually requested by the Air
Force, one could reasonably conclude that Congress would not be in a
hurry to expend scarce financial resources for additional planes. Yet,
that is precisely what we continue to do, every year, to the tune of
literally billions of dollars.
Let me see if I can summarize the situation. We are concerned about
enormous cost overruns associated with the C-130J's development and
with the degree to which that development has fallen behind schedule.
The Air Force has far more C-130s than it needs. So our response is to
spend hundreds of millions of dollars per year to purchase more.
Over the last two weeks, the Senate Armed Services Committee, on
which I serve, has devoted considerable time and energy to the issue of
military readiness. My office has only recently received the responses
of the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff to a number of questions I had
submitted in an effort to ascertain to the extent possible the true
state of military preparedness. Indeed, I have for the past six years
spent a great deal of time tracking preparedness trends in the military
in order that we might prevent the resurgence of the kind of
preparedness problems that plagued our armed forces during the 1970s. I
warned in the early 1990s that if we continued on our then-current
path, the ability of our military to respond to crises and to prevail
in the major regional contingencies for which they exist would
eventually reach crisis proportions. As the train advanced down the
track, those of us who did advance such warnings were categorized as
Cold War anachronisms. As the train neared over the past two years, our
numbers increased somewhat, but the President and many in Congress
continued to ignore the growing problem. And now the train has arrived.
The United States Armed Forces are the finest in the world. No one
would deny that basic fact. The quality of intellectual discourse on
the subjects of force posture and military preparedness, however, has
been disappointingly shallow. How often, Mr. President, have we heard
critics of defense spending argue that the United States spends more on
defense than the sum of its potential adversaries combined? Do such
individuals honestly believe that the subject lends itself to such
simplistic equations? Has history taught them nothing?
The United States military, alone in the world, is tasked by this
country's civilian leadership to be prepared to respond to crises
anywhere in the world, on short notice, and with sufficient strength to
defeat aggression with a minimal loss of life. No other country bears
that burden.
We have serious problems afflicting our armed forces that six years
of presidential rhetoric to the contrary could not deny, although the
Administration did its best to ignore it. So how do the committees with
oversight of U.S. defense policy react to the current confluence of
budgetary restrictions and historically high operational tempos? With
the aforementioned C-130s, with a $1.5 billion ship not requested by
the Department of Defense, with the continued acquisition of
unrequested C-35 passenger jets, with the exasperatingly constant
tendency to send hundreds of millions of dollars a year to National
Guard units whether it is needed or not, and with the repeated
acquisition of rockets and grenade launchers solely because contractors
have convinced, with little effort, their congressional representatives
to continue the flow of money for unneeded weapon systems. I fully
support and encourage the allocation of additional funding to address
legitimate readiness concerns, which we have in abundance. The
programmatic and highly questionable operations and maintenance
expenditures that are included in the lists I am submitting, however,
do not qualify.
It has been said that a million dollars here, and a million dollars
there, and pretty soon we're talking real money. The list I am
submitting pretty much fits that category. It is composed of hundreds
of Member-adds. They range from half-a-million dollars to $94 million,
not including the ship and airlifters, which are in a category all
their own. The total dollar amount of the list from the defense
authorization bill is $4.5 billion.
The continued practice in the defense appropriations bill of
restricting procurement of major weapon system components to United
States manufacturers at the expense of more cost-effective options--
and, I should point out, at the expense of other U.S. companies that
benefit from the cooperative arrangements we maintain with allied
countries and are consequently threatened by these ``Buy America''
provisions--represent a throwback to an earlier time when defense
budgets allowed for such congressionally-mandated inefficiencies.
Similarly, prohibitions and restrictions on the Department of Defense's
ability to manage itself in order to protect hometown contractors and
civil servants, such as are included in the appropriations bill are
reaching ever-more multifarious levels that would make Rube Goldberg
proud. I invite my colleagues to read Section 8071 of the bill for one
such example.
I am also concerned about the precedent set by Section 8125 of the
appropriations bill, which intervenes in the relationships between
Federal agencies, prime and subcontractors. The ramifications of that
effort to benefit specific subcontractors will redound to the Federal
government's misfortune in complicated contractual matters involving
primes that go out of business, leaving their subcontractors in the
lurch. Obviously, we are all sympathetic to those subcontractors'
plight, but intervening in bankruptcy proceedings like this provision
does is not good government.
At a time when our declining force structure is stretched virtually
to the breaking point; when our most skilled personnel are leaving the
service in droves for better paying, less stressful jobs in the private
sector; when front-line aircraft are routinely cannibalized so that
squadrons may deploy and equipment and personnel are cross-decked to
the long-term detriment of
[[Page S11177]]
both, it is disheartening in the extreme to still witness the scale of
unnecessary and wasteful spending represented in these bills.
The airplane mechanic having to remove parts from one fighter in
order to repair another can be excused for not understanding why $5
million is diverted from the defense budget to the public school system
in the state of a senior member of the Armed Services Committee. He or
she can be excused for not comprehending the mind set that allocates
$75,000 for establishment of a State Maritime Academy with no realistic
military application. Five million dollars for Agricultural Based
Bioremediation and $20 million for the National Defense Center for
Environmental Excellence--the word ``defense'' being inserted in the
title strictly for propagandistic purposes--and $3 million for research
into stainless steel double hull technology, on which private industry
is supposed to be spending its own money per the requirements of the
Oil Pollution Prevention Act, are just the tip of a very large iceberg.
Try as I might, I cannot rationalize, with the scale of readiness
problems highlighted in yesterday's Armed Services Committee hearing,
the expenditure of $64 million for the National Guard Youth Challenge
program. In fact, the budget authority earmarked for the Guard and
Reserve, once again solely for parochial reasons, continues to
represent one of the greatest hemorrhages of defense dollars for low-
priority programs in the defense budget. Ten million dollars, Mr.
President, to convert a National Guard Armory into a Chicago Military
Academy in order to provide a Junior ROTC program is not consistent
with national security imperatives that should be driving the process.
I have no idea--no idea--why we are earmarking a million dollars for
Lewis and Clark.
Earmarks for specific facilities are out of control. Whether it's the
Francis S. Grabeski Airport in New York, the earmark of $2,250,000 from
the Operations and Maintenance budget--yes, the very portion of the
budget most closely tied to readiness--for the White Sands Missile
Range and Fort Bliss, Texas, or the earmarking of $4.6 million for the
Montana National Guard Distance Learning Network, such practices
illustrate all too well the unwillingness of Congress to translate its
rhetoric on readiness problems into constructive action and to cast
aside once and for all the business-as-usual approach that is so
damaging to our national defense.
The appropriations bill adds $50 million for the B-2 bomber for
continued upgrades. The continued expenditure of millions for upgrades
for that formidable fleet of 21 aircraft is particularly disturbing, as
the B-2's practical utility scarcely warrants the funding Congress
lavishes upon it every year. If it could fly combat air patrols, I
would be inclined to be a little more sympathetic. Its' theoretical
application to real world contingencies, however, leaves me aghast at
the cost of that program.
Mr. President, my views on parochial-oriented spending remain very
much in the minority. That is why we continue to see billions of
dollars wasted by Congress to satisfy parochial interests. I will not,
however, shy away from continuing to shine a spotlight on these
wasteful practices. During a week in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have testified on the myriad of readiness problems afflicting our armed
forces, to ignore the scale of the problem represented in the lists I
am submitting for the record would be to fail the men and women who
wear the uniform of our Nation. They deserve better. It is a shame they
will not receive better.
I ask unanimous consent that highlights of special interest
provisions in the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization and
Appropriations Conference Reports be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Highlights of provisions in the fiscal year 1999 defense authorization
and appropriations conference reports
Increase purchase of C-130 J (Hercules), from 1 to 7, Marie$465,000,000
LHD (WASP Class) Amphibious Assault Ship, authorization for $1.5
billion, Pascagoula, Mississippi...........................50,000,000
Purchase C-XX, Executive travel aircraft built in Wichita, Kansas and
Savannah, Georgia..........................................27,000,000
Los Alamos, New Mexico public school system diversion from military
readiness...................................................5,000,000
Agricultural Based Bioremediation............................20,000,000
Stainless steel double hull technology research, Mississippi..3,000,000
Conversion of a National Guard Armory into a Chicago Military10,000,000
Testing and training operations and support at the White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico and Fort Bliss, Texas.....................2,250,000
B-2 Bomber upgrades, California and Washington...............50,000,000
Increase purchase of MK-19 grenade launcher from 697 to 800, M3,000,000
Various Medical Research Programs...........................355,000,000
Disaster relief and emergency services
Breast cancer research
Osteoporosis research
Teleradiology
Diabetes
Pain
Mentor-Protege Program.......................................10,000,000
National Guard and Reserve:
National Guard Youth Challenge Program...................64,000,000
Montana National Guard Distance Learning Network..........4,600,000
Civilian Technicians personnel reduction restrictions:
Miscellaneous equipment...............................100,000,000
Buy America restrictions:
Ship anchor and mooring chain
Ball and roller bearings
Carbon, alloy and armor steel plate
Shipboard auxiliary and propulsion systems
Ship cranes
Other miscellaneous items
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, A complete listing of these parochial
provisions concerning the fiscal year 1999 defense appropriations
conference report and the fiscal year 1999 authorization conference
report are available on my web site.
Mr. President, shortly, I intend to propound a unanimous consent
request for the Internet Tax Freedom Act to be considered. In the
meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________