[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11170-S11177]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   STROM THURMOND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                        1999--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The committee on conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     3616) have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their 
     respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the 
     conferees.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will proceed to the consideration 
of the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of September 22, 1998.)
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as the Senate takes up the conference 
report on the national defense authorization bill, it brings to an end 
a process that began in February with the introduction of the 
President's defense budget by Secretary Cohen. During the intervening 
months, the committee conducted more than 50 hearings which identified 
the declining readiness status of our military. In response, the 
committee formulated a bill that addressed these issues and garnered 
the support of both the civilian and military leadership of the 
Department of Defense.
  The committee completed the markup of the defense bill in mid-May. 
However, due to the intervening debate on the tobacco bill, the Senate 
took more than four weeks to complete action on the bill. Although the 
floor debate was protracted, I want to thank my colleagues for their 
overwhelming 88 to 4 vote in favor of the bill, and for their 
contributions during the floor debate.
  The Senate's strong support of the bill was a key factor during the 
difficult conference with the House. When we began the conference to 
resolve the differences between the House and Senate bills, we faced a 
veto threat on four provisions. I am pleased to report that we were 
able to mitigate each of these objections. At this point, I am not 
aware of any remaining veto issues, and expect that the President will 
sign this bill.

[[Page S11171]]

  Mr. President, tomorrow prior to the vote on final passage, Senator 
Levin and I will provide specific details on the conference report. 
Suffice it to say that this is a very good bill and contains vital 
provisions necessary for the security of our nation. However, like all 
compromise bills it does not please everyone and, unfortunately, one 
Senator has objected to provisions in the bill and delayed action on 
the report despite the fact that all members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the House National Security Committee signed the 
conference report and despite the fact that the House passed the bill 
by a vote of 373 to 50. I am disappointed that it took until today to 
get the report to the floor, but am certain that the Senate will show 
its strong support for the bill when we vote tomorrow.
  Mr. President, I want to emphasize again that this is a sound bill. 
It provides the best possible outcome for our national security while 
complying with the guidelines established in the balanced budget 
agreement. I recommend the conference report on the national defense 
authorization bill for fiscal year 1999 to the Senate and urge its 
adoption.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe my friend and colleague--and I 
wish to thank him very much for his cooperation in assisting Senator 
Thurmond, myself, and others to bring up this bill--has a matter of 
great importance to the Senator which he wishes to address, and at this 
time I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. I thank Senator Warner. I thank Senator Thurmond, the 
chairman of the committee, as well.
  As the Senator knows, I have raised an issue with the tritium 
provisions included in the fiscal year 1999 National Defense 
Authorization Act conference report. And I would be happy to engage in 
this colloquy with respect to that issue.
  As the Senator knows, the conference report provision regarding 
tritium states, among other things, that ``the Secretary of Energy may 
not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise available to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1999 to 
implement a final decision on the technology to be utilized for tritium 
production, made pursuant to section 3135 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998.''
  I am concerned that the administration will use this provision to 
continue to delay progress on this important program and build in a 
one-year delay in meeting DOD requirements.
  Can the Senator please explain the intent of this provision?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, again, I worked very closely with Chairman 
Thurmond throughout the conference, and I can reply to my colleague's 
question. I would be pleased to explain the impact of this provision.
  The intent of the proposed compromise is to keep the Department of 
Energy tritium program moving forward. The proposed conference 
agreement would require the Secretary of Energy to select his preferred 
tritium technology not later than December of this year, consistent 
with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1998. Although the Secretary would be prohibited from 
spending any money in fiscal year 1999 to implement the selected 
technology, he would not be prohibited from completing research, 
development, demonstration, or design activities, and, indeed, we 
strongly encourage him to do so.
  I would like to call on the Senator from New Hampshire, Strategic 
Forces Subcommittee chairman Bob Smith, for a few comments on this.
  Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator. I share the concern of the Senator 
from Arizona about tritium. We must have a new source of tritium to 
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As chairman of the subcommittee 
that is responsible for this issue, I can assure all of my colleagues 
that I am fully committed to ensuring that the Department of Energy 
meets DOD's requirement for new tritium production.
  I have made timely restoration of tritium production one of my 
highest priorities as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. 
For the past 3 years, the committee has taken action to accelerate 
DOE's tritium selection process. We have accelerated the Secretary's 
decision date twice and increased the DOE tritium budget three times. 
This year, we added $60 million to the tritium program in the 
committee's markup. The conference outcome reflects a $20 million 
increase to the tritium program because that was the highest amount 
included in the energy and water appropriations bill.
  The committee has taken these actions to ensure that the tritium 
program continues to move forward and we will continue to do so in the 
future.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the committee has a long history of 
keeping the Department of Energy focused on restoring tritium 
production to meet defense needs.
  Unfortunately, we found that the Department of Energy had not 
requested adequate budget authority nor developed sufficient plans to 
effectively implement a tritium production source decision, which the 
Secretary is required to make in December of 1998. The conference 
report requires the Secretary of Energy to submit with the President's 
fiscal year 2000 budget request a comprehensive plan on how he would 
implement his preferred technology. The plan would include a proposed 
implementation schedule, annual funding requirements for the life of 
the project, any legislation needed to implement the technology 
selected, and an assessment of the viability of purchasing tritium, if 
necessary for national security purposes, on an interim basis.
  By requiring the plan to be submitted with the President's budget, 
Congress can act if we find the selected technology cannot reliably 
meet defense requirements, the implementation schedule is too lax, or 
funding is inadequate.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
  Is it the Senator's understanding that, should the Department of 
Energy submit a deficient plan or fiscal year 2000 budget request, the 
committee will take action to rectify the problem?
  Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, in brief, the answer is yes. 
Consistent with the committee's previous actions, we would address any 
schedule our funding shortfalls identified in the Secretary's plan and 
budget request. We fully expect that Secretary Richardson will submit 
the required plan on time and that the plan will include a credible 
budget request for this important program.
  Mr. KYL. Is it further the Senator's understanding that the 
Department of Energy may reprogram funds to implement its December 1998 
tritium production decision?
  Mr. WARNER. In response, Mr. President, the Department is not 
restricted by this legislation from requesting permission to reprogram 
funds to implement its December 1998 tritium production decision. We 
expect the Secretary to take all actions necessary to restore a 
permanent and reliable tritium production source in time to meet 
established DOD requirements, and that includes reprogramming funds if 
necessary.
  The comprehensive tritium implementation plan required by this bill 
requires the Secretary to submit a life-cycle plan to fully fund and 
implement whichever technology is selected. We intend to review that 
plan very closely to ensure that it can be implemented and that it will 
result in the delivery of tritium by the date required by the 
Department of Defense.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
  I hope the Department does submit a reprogramming request to 
implement the December decision.
  Is it the committee's intent to indicate in any way to the Department 
or other parts of the Federal Government that the committee expects DOE 
to defer selection of a preferred tritium source in December of this 
year?
  Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, as I stated previously, the 
legislative provision included in this conference report requires the 
Secretary to select his preferred option not later than December 31 of 
this year.
  Mr. KYL. The Senator from Virginia and Chairman Thurmond have been 
strong and consistent proponents of the tritium production program. 
What is the Senator's view about how we should proceed at this point?
  Mr. WARNER. First, I would say we should ensure that the Department 
of Energy's fiscal year 2000 budget request be adequate to ensure 
delivery of tritium on a schedule that meets the Department of Defense 
requirements defined in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

[[Page S11172]]

  Second, it is the responsibility of the Armed Services Committee, 
working with other committees of the Senate, to ensure that the program 
plan and budget laid out by the Secretary of Energy in January of 1999 
are credible and will allow the Department to meet the requirements of 
the Department of Defense. This means, among other things, that the 
Department of Energy is going to have to submit more credible budget 
requests than it has in the past.
  Third, we are prepared to consider reprogramming requests or other 
actions DOE believes necessary to meet tritium production requirements 
on the schedule identified by DOD.
  Mr. SMITH. I agree. As Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 
I wish to emphasize to the Department of Energy and the administration 
that the President's fiscal year 2000 budget request includes 
sufficient funds for a tritium production source.
  Mr. WARNER. I agree. As a senior member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I fully expect Secretary Richardson to submit a budget in 
fiscal year 2000 and the outyears that includes adequate funding for 
our tritium source.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I too am concerned about the tritium 
production decision and its future funding. My position over the last 
several months focused on the debate to retain the decisionmaking 
authority of DOE so that the Department might be free to make the most 
technically feasible, cost-effective decision to meet our national 
defense needs. I share the concerns of my colleagues about the delay of 
implementation and the need for adequate funding, and I am hopeful that 
DOE will include full funding for a tritium production source, not only 
in fiscal year 2000, but in the outyears as well.
  Mr. WARNER. If I can say further, the Senator's colleague, the senior 
Senator from Alabama, likewise worked with the Armed Services Committee 
in the course of this very important resolution of this issue. That is 
Senator Shelby.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the commitment that Senator 
Warner and other members of the Armed Services Committee and Senator 
Sessions have expressed regarding this program. I look forward to 
working with my colleagues to ensure that a new tritium source is 
implemented on schedule meeting DOD requirements.
  Again, I thank Senator Warner for his cooperation in helping to bring 
this matter to the floor at this time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague.
  This is a subject that would not ordinarily attract the attention of 
a great many because it is a very complex and technical one. But this 
fine Senator, Senator Kyl, has devoted much of his career to working 
with strategic programs. For that, I express my gratitude and, indeed, 
on behalf of most, if not all, of our colleagues for his very 
industrious and thorough work for many, many years as relates to the 
Nation's strategic programs.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise at this time to express my opposition 
to specific language in the defense authorization conference report 
prohibiting the use of fiscal year 1999 funds to implement the decision 
of the Department of Energy regarding a production source for tritium. 
Specifically, the language states as follows:

       The Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend any 
     funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise available to 
     the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1999 to implement a 
     final decision on the technology to be utilized for tritium 
     production, made pursuant to section 3135 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 . . . until 
     October 1, 1999.

  Mr. President, anything that might delay implementation of a tritium 
production program ought to be of great concern to all of us. Tritium 
is the key to maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. 
Without a reliable source of tritium, our nuclear forces could become 
impotent, thereby undermining the very essence of a deterrent that has 
kept the peace for more than 40 years.
  Mr. President, for the benefit of those who are not as familiar with 
the program, tritium is a gas that is injected into a nuclear warhead 
to boost its yield. Once it is produced, however, tritium begins to 
decay at a rate of approximately 5 percent per year, therefore it must 
be replenished constantly.
  The United States has not produced tritium since 1988 when the Bush 
administration made the decision to shut down the K-reactor at the 
Savannah River site. Since that time, replenishment of tritium in the 
stockpile has continued only by recycling it from dismantled nuclear 
warheads.
  When the Bush administration made the decision to shut down the K-
reactor, it immediately embarked on a new production reactor program 
with the purpose of identifying and selecting a new production source 
for tritium.
  Mr. President, I should say at this point that I have no parochial 
interest in what type of technology the Department of Energy selects to 
produce tritium. I favor only the option that will provide an assured 
source of tritium in the timeframe necessary to meet the requirements 
set by the Department of Defense. My interest in tritium dates back to 
the 1988 decision by the Bush administration when I was the ranking 
minority member of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel of the House 
Armed Services Committee.
  It is because I have no parochial interest and that I have had such a 
longstanding interest in ensuring a reliable source for tritium in the 
United States that I rise in opposition to the actions taken by the 
conferees in the fiscal year 1999 defense conference report.
  For 10 years, the Congress has been on record as encouraging DOE to 
make a decision on a tritium production source. A report issued by 
former Senator Sam Nunn in 1990 said:

       The committee strongly supports the acquisition of a new 
     production reactor, believing an assured supply of tritium is 
     the highest nuclear material priority in support of the 
     nation's nuclear deterrent forces.

  A 1992 defense authorization report from the Senate stated:

       As long as the United States maintains a nuclear deterrent 
     it will need a reliable supply of tritium to retain the 
     viability of the stockpile.

  A 1995 House report stated:

       The Committee is deeply concerned about the lack of 
     progress by the department in establishing a long term source 
     of tritium, which is necessary to maintain the nation's 
     nuclear deterrent.

  And section 3135 of the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill 
required the Secretary of Energy to select a production source for 
tritium not later than December of this year.
  For 10 years, Congress has been on record as pushing the Department 
of Energy to select among all of the technologies once thought to be 
optimum to produce tritium. First, there was the heavy water option, 
then the modular, high temperature gas cooled reactor, then a triple 
play reactor. Even the heavy metal reactor came under consideration. 
The Fast Flux reactor was next, and then the commercial lightwater 
reactor and finally the accelerator. Now DOE is selecting between the 
TVA reactor option--a civilian lightwater reactor that may include 
irradiation services only, and building a particle accelerator at the 
Savannah River site.
  For ten years, Congress has pushed and pulled DOE along to make a 
decision on a production source for tritium. Until now. This year, 
inexplicably, just three months before the Secretary of Energy will 
make a decision Congress has been waiting for ten years to hear, the 
conferees decided to stop the DOE from expending or obligating any 
funds to implement its December decision. Why?
  I certainly do not intend to criticize any individual Senator on the 
Armed Services Committee. Certainly they have all acted with deep 
concern for the national security of the United States. Senator Bob 
Smith, the chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over DOE 
nuclear matters and a strong advocate for a new production source, 
attempted to add $60 million to the budget line for tritium. He was 
thwarted for a variety of reasons.
  Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the full committee, has always 
fought hard to protect the interests of his state; but he has fought 
equally hard for the interests of all Americans in national defense 
matters. And Senator Warner, with whom I just had a colloquy, attempted 
to do his best in this regard, as well.
  So why did the Congress prohibit the Department of Energy from 
spending or obligating funds to implement the tritium production 
decision? The answer is: politics. This conference compromise, I am sad 
to say, is all about

[[Page S11173]]

politics. In the House, anti-nuclear foes teamed up with Members 
promoting one of the options under consideration by DOE, forming a 
coalition that threatened to jeopardize the entire defense 
authorization bill. Senate conferees had to find a ``compromise'' just 
to get the bill out of the conference committee. And the only 
compromise the House would agree to was calculated to allow advocates 
for the losing production option to challenge the Secretary's decision 
for a year, in effect, without prejudice.
  I would be remiss in my duty if I did not express my strong 
opposition to this language, because I believe it is tragic that a 
matter of this magnitude--literally going to the viability of our 
strategic stockpile--might be influenced by parochial interests.
  I can assure my colleagues that one of my top priorities from this 
point forward will be to ensure that the Department of Energy selects a 
tritium production source, that the Department requests adequate funds 
to implement its decision in fiscal year 2000 and beyond, and that the 
Department be allowed, indeed required, to proceed with the production 
of tritium without hometown politics or anti-nuke groups stopping it or 
slowing it down.
  Force level requirements will dictate when the United States needs 
tritium. If START I levels are maintained, the United States may need 
tritium as early as 2005. Since it will take several years to complete 
TVA's Belefonte reactor or to build an accelerator, two of the options, 
we are already bumping up against the deadline to begin producing 
tritium for the active stockpile. We already know that tritium will not 
be available for the inactive stockpile. That means if there's a 
crisis, the United States will not be able to bring the inactive 
stockpile into the inventory.
  Many hope that the United States and Russia will reduce their 
strategic forces to START II levels; however, there is no evidence that 
the Duma in Russia is inclined to ratify START II. And, U.S. law 
prohibits U.S. forces from being reduced beyond START I levels until 
START II enters into force. The Resolution of Ratification for the 
Start II Treaty states, ``The START II Treaty shall be binding on the 
United States until such time as the Duma of the Russian Federation has 
acted pursuant to its constitutional responsibilities.'' At the START 
II level, the United States must make a decision on a tritium 
production source without delay.
  So, I support the requirement that Secretary Richardson make that 
decision this December, and I pledge to work as hard as I can to ensure 
that the decision is carried through to the actual timely production of 
tritium. I urge my colleagues, including those in the House, to put the 
nation's interests first, and support a timely implementation of a 
tritium production facility decision.
  I appreciate that the majority leader will make a strong statement 
tomorrow making clear his commitment to provide the leadership to 
ensure the achievement of that goal. And, the colloquy with Senator 
Warner and Senator Smith of the Armed Services Committee and Senator 
Sessions should make it clear that the Senate leaders on this issue are 
all strongly committed to seeing that the DOE follow up the Secretary's 
Decision with everything necessary to meet our tritium production 
requirements.
  With these assurances strongly asserted here today, I am hopeful the 
congressional majority will hereafter present a united front, leaving 
no doubt that the administration must move with dispatch to implement 
the tritium production decision. As a result, I will support the 
conference report.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, earlier today, my good friend, the 
junior Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, entered into a colloquy with 
Senator Warner and others regarding the tritium provisions included in 
the Defense authorization conference report. Senator Kyl later made a 
statement about the agreement we negotiated in conference on the 
tritium issue. While I appreciated the kind words he said about me, I 
was somewhat surprised by some of his comments made about the tritium 
agreement we negotiated in conference. I'm reminded of something my old 
friend, Will Rogers used to say, ``It's not what he don't know that 
bothers me, it's what he knows so well, that ain't so.''
  I want to take this opportunity to clarify what the conference 
agreement actually does. The tritium provision included in this bill 
will not cause any meaningful delay in the resumption of tritium 
production. Let me repeat that so all of my colleagues are clear about 
this point--our conference provision on tritium does not cause any 
meaningful delay in the Department of Energy's tritium production 
program.
  Energy Secretary Richardson stated this fact in a letter dated 
September 24, 1998, in which he said that the conference provision will 
have a ``minimal impact'' on DOE's tritium program.
  Just so all Senators will understand the compromise agreement we made 
on the tritium issue, I want to take a few moments to explain it.
  First and foremost, we require the Secretary of Energy to select his 
preferred technology on time, in December of this year. Second, the 
Department of Energy is prohibited from spending only about 5 percent 
of the overall tritium program budget in fiscal year 1999. The 
conference agreement does not, however, limit the DOE from spending 
funds for design, research, or demonstration activities. These design, 
research, and demonstration activities account for approximately 95 
percent of the program that DOE presented to Congress this year, which 
the Congress authorized. Thus, virtually all of those activities which 
the Department intended to conduct in fiscal year 1999 are authorized 
to be conducted by the conference agreement and the conferees expect 
the Secretary to complete those activities in fiscal year 1999. This 
includes much of the work to be conducted on the tritium extraction 
facility, which would be constructed regardless of which technology 
were selected by the Secretary. Third, and most importantly, we require 
the Secretary of Energy to submit a comprehensive plan in January, 
1999--just 20 days after he makes his preferred technology selection--
on how tritium production will be restored. Such a plan does not exist 
currently, nor has one been proposed by the administration. This 
comprehensive implementation plan goes to the very issue raised by the 
Senator from Arizona.
  So I hope all Senators can readily see that we managed to achieve a 
compromise on this very difficult issue, with virtually no adverse 
impact on the tritium program, while avoiding a veto threat, and 
satisfying most of the desires of most members.
  This is a very strong bipartisan bill. Every member of the conference 
committee--both Democrats and Republicans--have indicated their strong 
support the conference agreement by signing the conference report, 
which as many of my colleagues know has not happened in many years. 
This is a good conference report and it should be passed with unanimous 
support.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to address the importance of 
bringing up the defense authorization bill. I first commend my 
distinguished friend, long-time friend, Senator Thurmond, and our 
ranking member, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and all members 
of our committee, together with staff, for a very hard job throughout 
the year to put together the bill and now the conference report which 
Chairman Thurmond worked out with his counterparts on the House Armed 
Services Committee.
  These are very difficult times in the history of our Nation. I look 
back over my lifetime when in World War II and the very closing days of 
that war I served briefly in the U.S. Navy. There was absolute clarity 
in the minds of all who served in uniform, in the minds of every 
citizen of the United States. We knew who the enemy was, what they 
stood for, what their capabilities were, and there was no doubt as to 
what this Nation should do to bring that conflict to an end, and, 
indeed, it was done.
  Subsequently, in the Korean war, President Truman made a very bold 
and correct decision to draw the line in the face of communism. Again, 
it was understood, understood by all of us in uniform. I happened to 
have served a second tour in the Marines in that conflict. All of us 
understood that as well as the people back home. Through his courage, 
he did draw that line against communism.

[[Page S11174]]

  In subsequent conflicts, indeed in Vietnam, there was a measure of 
clarity. I wish to stress, that clarity does not exist today. Today, 
the problems confronting the security of this Nation, as well as that 
of our allies and friends, lack clarity. It is very difficult, in many 
instances, to determine who is the enemy, what are their capabilities, 
and, most important, Mr. President, what are their intentions to 
inflict harm on this great Nation or the nations of our allies or, 
indeed, the free peoples of the world.
  That is why yesterday we had a historic meeting of the Armed Services 
Committee. Before that committee appeared the chiefs of the several 
services, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, 
together with General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was 
a very important meeting.
  Reports today in the press describe, and, indeed, we had strong 
differences of views, but the issues are so serious, they merited 
nothing less than strong expressions of opinion by Members of the 
Senate, and, indeed, the members of the Joint Chiefs, I think in a very 
steadfast and credible manner, stated what their positions are today 
and for the future. There is no doubt in my mind that those fine 
individuals, all of whom I know very well, have foremost in their 
hearts the interests of this Nation and the people, the men and women 
who proudly wear the uniform of this country and the thousands of 
civilians who dedicate their careers to work in the Department of 
Defense or other agencies directly related to our national security.
  Yesterday was a landmark hearing. We, as a matter of practice, in the 
Armed Services Committee, whenever these men--hopefully someday women--
come before that committee seeking confirmation of the U.S. Senate to 
become a chief of staff, it is a long tradition of our committee that 
we obtain from them their commitment, at any time the committee so 
desires, to have them present to testify and to give their personal 
opinions regarding the state of the Armed Forces of the United States 
and the need for the President and for the future.
  They did that yesterday in a very forthright and courageous manner. 
They had consulted with the President, they had consulted with the 
Secretary of Defense, and they came before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and laid down with specificity the respective needs of their 
departments. Those needs, in my judgment, should be addressed as 
quickly as possible by the Senate, then by the Congress, and those 
dollar needs authorized and appropriated so that we can restore the 
full confidence of those who proudly wear the uniform today in their 
ability to endure the hardships and the risks associated with military 
service and to having nothing less than the best equipment to carry out 
their respective missions proudly as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines.
  I commend the chiefs for their testimony yesterday. I think our 
colleagues, in the course of the hearing, elicited, by way of questions 
and other colloquy, important facts which make an irrefutable case to 
bring before this body in the very near future requests for immediate 
funding to take care of certain needs and then, in the next fiscal 
year, considerable sums of money, Mr. President, for each of the 
military departments and, hopefully, lay down the foundation for the 
outyear budgets to be increased in amounts comparable to those in the 
year 2000 budget so that, once again, America can avoid, in the words 
of the respective members of the chiefs, a hollow military force.
  I remember so well that period when General Shy Meyer, then Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Army, used the phrase ``a hollow army.'' It resonated 
not only in the Department of Defense and in the Halls of the Congress 
and not only in the United States, it resonated all over the world, 
that America, the superpower--at that time there was a second 
superpower, the Soviet Union--but the superpower acknowledges that its 
army was hollow, that they lacked the quality and the quantity of 
personnel, that they lacked the equipment to defend the security 
interests of this country and to associate with our allies wherever it 
might be in the world in the cause of freedom.

  It was a real bugle call. And this Nation responded, largely through 
the leadership of President Reagan, to build back America's military 
strength. Well, we did not reach, in the judgment of the Chiefs--and I 
concur in that judgment--we did not reach that bottom that would in any 
way reflect back on the hollow Army of the early 1970s, fortunately, 
because the Chiefs have come to the Congress and stated their case.
  Now I am absolutely confident--and indeed I hope for the 
participation of the President and the Secretary of Defense--that the 
Congress will begin to do the necessary authorizations and the 
appropriations to pull, in the very words of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, that aircraft which is nosed over in the dive, pull it 
out and to bring it back up to that level of readiness, that level of 
quality of life that the men and women of the Armed Forces deserve--
that level of a military that will leave in the minds of Americans and 
people all over this world no doubt that the United States has behind 
it, the military power to support its foreign policy and to preserve 
the cause of freedom here at home and wherever we are challenged 
throughout the world.
  I thank the Chair.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I first commend the Senator from Virginia for 
his eloquent remarks, highlighting the result of the very important 
hearing yesterday before the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
calling all of us to the challenge of providing the adequate resources 
necessary for our armed services to carry out their mission in the 
defense of the security interests of the United States of America. It 
was an eloquent statement, and I think it is something that all of us 
need to take to heart.
  Again, I want to thank Senator Warner for his efforts, largely I 
suspect unappreciated, because they are behind the scenes to deal with 
all of the myriad of problems in putting together a defense conference 
report and assisting the chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, 
and working with our House colleagues as well. The colloquy that we had 
a moment ago was, in significant respect, to the result of his efforts. 
And I appreciate that.


              juniper butte range withdrawal act colloquy

       Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I would like to inquire of 
     the managers as to the intent of the conferees with respect 
     to the issuance of grazing permits for lands withdrawn and 
     reserved under Title XXIX of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 in the event that the 
     Air Force relinquishes such withdrawn lands. As the managers 
     know, the Juniper Butte Range withdrawal under title XXIX, 
     would withdraw certain public lands for use by the Air Force 
     as a training area. The lands are withdrawn from the existing 
     Juniper draw allotment managed by the Bureau of Land 
     Management (BLM) in an area south of the Mountain Home Air 
     Force Base, Idaho. The withdrawal is from the center of the 
     allotment, leaving approximately 6,000 perimeter acres of the 
     allotment still under a grazing permit and the jurisdiction 
     of the BLM. It is my understanding that, at such time as the 
     Air Force relinquishes its use of the withdrawn lands and 
     returns jurisdiction to the Department of the Interior, the 
     holder of the grazing permit for the Juniper draw allotment 
     at that time should have an opportunity to obtain a grazing 
     permit for the relinquished lands in the center of the 
     allotment.
       Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, would my colleague yield the 
     floor?
       Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I would be pleased to yield to my friend.
       Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I appreciate the leadership that 
     my friend and colleague, Senator Kempthorne, has shown on 
     this legislation. He has raised a very important point here 
     today. Anyone familiar with ranching in the West knows that 
     an economically viable ranch requires access to large blocks 
     of land to raise livestock in an environmentally sound way. 
     With the intermingling of federal, state, and private lands 
     in our state of Idaho, access to BLM land is essential for 
     ranchers. Any time 12,000 acres are withdrawn from an 
     existing BLM allotment, it will dramatically impact the 
     rancher who holds the permit for that allotment. Blocked up 
     land is more easily and economically managed. Scattered 
     parcels have the opposite effect. There may come a time, as 
     contemplated by the legislation, when the Air Force would 
     relinquish its control over these lands. While Air Force 
     relinquishment of the withdrawn lands may not occur for what 
     would be considered a long time by most people, members of 
     the ranching community measure such events by the passing

[[Page S11175]]

     of generations, and that end result can reasonably be 
     anticipated. And so, I seek clarification for the inquiry 
     initiated by my colleague from Idaho. The answer to his 
     question will be vitally important to whoever holds the 
     permit surrounding the withdrawn land at such time as the Air 
     Force would, in fact, relinquish it to the Department of the 
     Interior. I thank my colleague for yielding.
       Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would tell my able friends 
     and colleagues from Idaho that I concur with their assessment 
     of the intent of the conferees following relinquishment of 
     the Juniper Butte Range to the Department of the Interior. 
     The conferees are mindful of the impact this withdrawal will 
     have upon the surrounding BLM lands and the use of those 
     lands by current and future grazing permittees.
       Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank the Chair and I thank the managers 
     of this important legislation for their response to our 
     inquiry. Mr. President, I wish to determine whether the 
     managers of the legislation agree with my understanding as to 
     one additional provision. Section 2917(b)(3) of the Juniper 
     Butte Range Withdrawal Act provides for delegated authority 
     and approvals granted by the Bureau of Land Management 
     pursuant to the decisions of the Secretary of the Interior, 
     or the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management. 
     Section 2907(b)(1) specifically refers to the authority of 
     the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals 
     Management to grant rights-of-way and approvals must be 
     granted by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land 
     and Minerals Management. This is as it should be. Mr. 
     President, I ask the managers of this legislation if my 
     characterization is accurate?
       Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho has 
     correctly interpreted the intent of the conferees as to the 
     authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land 
     and Minerals Management. It is the intention of the conferees 
     that the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and 
     Minerals Management shall grant rights-of-way and approvals 
     and take such actions as are necessary under Section 
     2907(b)(1).
       Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have been listening to the 
     discussion of the Juniper Butte Range Withdrawal as it 
     pertains to grazing permits and the delegation of authority. 
     As to the relinquishment of withdrawn lands to the Department 
     of the Interior for grazing use, I fully agree with the 
     statements of the Senators from Idaho. I also agree with the 
     need to clarify the congressional intent regarding the 
     delegation of authority, as stated by my friend, the junior 
     Senator from Idaho.
       Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, again, I wish to thank the 
     managers of the bill and the senior Senator from Virginia for 
     their cooperation in clarifying the congressional intent.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the fiscal year 
1999 Defense authorization conference report.
  This bill emerges in the turmoil of a post-cold-war world--one 
demanding a U.S. military that can face transnational developments such 
as weapons proliferation, regional tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, and 
emerging powers such as China.
  As a result, the authorization cycle of the last few months allowed 
Congress to bring the Pentagon's budget into alignment with the 
changing Armed Services on which the nation will rely to deter a broad 
and unpredictable spectrum of global threats to U.S. national security.
  The conference report emphasizes a type of warfare that will loom 
large in future defense planning: littoral operations near coastal 
plains. Accordingly to the Navy's official definition, littoral 
engagements require forces to maneuver ``close enough to influence 
events on shore if necessary.''
  This post-Soviet mission connects our force structure to our security 
interests since 80 percent of the world's population lives near the 
shorelines and waterways that open into the littorals.
  The priorities established by the conference report demonstrate how 
littoral concepts have started to displace more conventional ideas of 
weapons development.
  Major research and modernization programs, for example, share the 
common goal of delivering increased firepower, speed, and precision at 
a lower cost.
  Ship and aircraft architectures have sacrificed the hard angles prone 
to enemy detection in favor of modular composite materials that leave 
smaller signatures on a radar screen.
  Smaller crews will maintain more advanced command an control systems 
configured for instant data transmission.
  And self-guided missiles now assume the targeting role that 
concentrated divisions of heavy armor had to bear in the past.
  In addition to high technology hardware, Mr. President, efficient 
training programs remain critical to the evolution of the military. I 
am therefore pleased that the bill allows the Armed Services to manage 
their gender-integrated training policies as commanders and instructors 
have designed them.
  The new international security environment gives us new guidelines to 
measure the readiness of the Total Force. Active duty men and women 
must subsequently continue to train as they will deploy to accomplish 
the gender-neutral task of supporting our war fighters.
  Common sense means that recruits destined to repair fighter-bombers, 
frigates, submarines, and missile launch tubes should train the same 
way, under the same standards, and at the same time.
  Common sense means that radar operators, quality assurance engineers, 
and military police should follow universal rules of engagement for 
males and females who wear identical uniforms.
  Yet we would suspend our common sense by pretending that the solution 
to workplace harassment means the segregation of enlistees into 
isolated training components.
  We have to move beyond the charge that integrated training fosters 
sexual misconduct to ask how the men and women of the All-Volunteer 
Force can each play a decisive role in support of combat readiness.
  It is for this core mission purpose, rather than the testing of 
social policy theories, that the armed services unite men and women to 
acquire the skills expected of all soldiers.
  Gender-integrated training maximizes the return on the taxpayers' 
defense investment in making all service members accountable for a 
range of logistical, medical, and technical jobs that sharpen the 
ability of the Defense Department to protect both our homeland and the 
country's core interests abroad.
  Finally, Mr. President, both the House and Senate defense authorizing 
committees struggled this spring with the nation's incoherent 
contingency operations policy. By the end of the coming fiscal year, 
the taxpayers will have devoted $9.4 billion to the maintenance of our 
Bosnia mission since the conclusion of the Dayton peace agreement in 
November 1995.
  But the administration has requested this enormous sum of money in a 
vacuum of silence about our strategic purpose and an aura of deception 
about the length of our commitment.
  Officials perpetuate their failure of leadership with the assumption 
that Congress supports the Bosnia deployments simply by funding them. 
This assessment, however, only uncovers the cynicism of the 
administration's foreign policy.
  Neither the House nor the Senate, as the President knows, would 
intentionally place our overseas forces in a position of jeopardy by 
depriving them of money for daily operations and self-protection.
  At the same time, the Pentagon cannot continue to hold the safety of 
our troops hostage to unjustified budget requests for keeping between 
6,000 and 8,000 military personnel in a country struggling to restore 
its political institutions.
  The confusion underpinning U.S. policies toward Bosnia led Senator 
Cleland and I to draft an amendment requiring the submission of 
statutory reports to Congress on the purpose and potential endpoint of 
military contingency operations involving more than 500 people in 
uniform. The reports must accompany all budget requests made for such 
operations.
  Our amendment, including in the Senate's version of the bill and 
approved by the authorization conferees, reflects the lessons that the 
Bosnia experience teaches us about the interaction between the 
executive and legislative branches on the Defense Department's non-
wartime deployments.
  Congress must insist on a regular process under which we can match 
the administration's own peacekeeping policy arguments with its ongoing 
budget demands.
  We need to determine more definitively if the Pentagon has a 
contingency operations strategy that advances the security interests of 
the United States rather than the false hope of relying on our military 
presence to solve the domestic political, economic, and cultural 
problems of other nations.

[[Page S11176]]

  The Snowe-Cleland amendment, I believe, will equip Congress with the 
tools necessary to exercise aggressive oversight of the 
administration's peacekeeping initiatives.
  The fiscal year 1999 Defense authorization conference report, Mr. 
President, foreshadows both the challenges and the phenomenal 
capabilities that the Armed Forces will manage in the new century. I, 
therefore, urge the Senate to uphold its tradition of bipartisan 
support for the military by adopting this responsible legislation.


        ALABAMA SPACE SCIENCE EXHIBIT COMMISSION LAND CONVEYANCE

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks concerning 
a specific land conveyance provision in the DoD Authorization Bill 
(section 2837). I am pleased that the conferees were able to make these 
technical, but necessary changes to the conveyance terms of real 
property from the Army's Redstone Arsenal to the Alabama Space Science 
Exhibit Commission.
  Section 2837 of the Bill ensures that the future development of the 
U.S. Space & Rocket Center property previously conveyed by the Army to 
the appropriate agency of the State of Alabama will remain consistent 
with the long term master plan for the use of that property as agreed 
upon by the Center, Redstone Arsenal, and Marshall Space Flight Center, 
and that present financing arrangements and mortgages relating to new 
and existing facilities at the Space and Rocket Center are preserved, 
and appropriate coordination of further financing initiatives, 
mortgages and other debt society arrangements in accordance with the 
agreed-upon master plan is assured.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, permit me to quote from the Armed Services 
Committee's report accompanying the Senate-passed version of the fiscal 
year 1999 defense authorization bill:

       The Committee views with concern the slow progress of the 
     C-130J program, the increased expense of developing the 
     aircraft . . . and notes the Department's failure to provide 
     a report on the remanufacture of existing C-130 airframes . . 
     . Development costs were initially estimated at $350 million 
     and introduction of the new model forecast to begin in mid-
     1997 . . . However, it has been estimated that the program 
     has cost more than $900 million and is over two years behind 
     schedule.

  To the objective observer, this language would indicate a certain 
frustration or disenchantment with the developmental history of the C-
130J airlifter. Indeed, cognizant as we are of the Air Force's enormous 
surplus of C-130s and the fact that, of the 256 such planes funded by 
Congress since 1978, only five were actually requested by the Air 
Force, one could reasonably conclude that Congress would not be in a 
hurry to expend scarce financial resources for additional planes. Yet, 
that is precisely what we continue to do, every year, to the tune of 
literally billions of dollars.
  Let me see if I can summarize the situation. We are concerned about 
enormous cost overruns associated with the C-130J's development and 
with the degree to which that development has fallen behind schedule. 
The Air Force has far more C-130s than it needs. So our response is to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars per year to purchase more.
  Over the last two weeks, the Senate Armed Services Committee, on 
which I serve, has devoted considerable time and energy to the issue of 
military readiness. My office has only recently received the responses 
of the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff to a number of questions I had 
submitted in an effort to ascertain to the extent possible the true 
state of military preparedness. Indeed, I have for the past six years 
spent a great deal of time tracking preparedness trends in the military 
in order that we might prevent the resurgence of the kind of 
preparedness problems that plagued our armed forces during the 1970s. I 
warned in the early 1990s that if we continued on our then-current 
path, the ability of our military to respond to crises and to prevail 
in the major regional contingencies for which they exist would 
eventually reach crisis proportions. As the train advanced down the 
track, those of us who did advance such warnings were categorized as 
Cold War anachronisms. As the train neared over the past two years, our 
numbers increased somewhat, but the President and many in Congress 
continued to ignore the growing problem. And now the train has arrived.
  The United States Armed Forces are the finest in the world. No one 
would deny that basic fact. The quality of intellectual discourse on 
the subjects of force posture and military preparedness, however, has 
been disappointingly shallow. How often, Mr. President, have we heard 
critics of defense spending argue that the United States spends more on 
defense than the sum of its potential adversaries combined? Do such 
individuals honestly believe that the subject lends itself to such 
simplistic equations? Has history taught them nothing?
  The United States military, alone in the world, is tasked by this 
country's civilian leadership to be prepared to respond to crises 
anywhere in the world, on short notice, and with sufficient strength to 
defeat aggression with a minimal loss of life. No other country bears 
that burden.
  We have serious problems afflicting our armed forces that six years 
of presidential rhetoric to the contrary could not deny, although the 
Administration did its best to ignore it. So how do the committees with 
oversight of U.S. defense policy react to the current confluence of 
budgetary restrictions and historically high operational tempos? With 
the aforementioned C-130s, with a $1.5 billion ship not requested by 
the Department of Defense, with the continued acquisition of 
unrequested C-35 passenger jets, with the exasperatingly constant 
tendency to send hundreds of millions of dollars a year to National 
Guard units whether it is needed or not, and with the repeated 
acquisition of rockets and grenade launchers solely because contractors 
have convinced, with little effort, their congressional representatives 
to continue the flow of money for unneeded weapon systems. I fully 
support and encourage the allocation of additional funding to address 
legitimate readiness concerns, which we have in abundance. The 
programmatic and highly questionable operations and maintenance 
expenditures that are included in the lists I am submitting, however, 
do not qualify.
  It has been said that a million dollars here, and a million dollars 
there, and pretty soon we're talking real money. The list I am 
submitting pretty much fits that category. It is composed of hundreds 
of Member-adds. They range from half-a-million dollars to $94 million, 
not including the ship and airlifters, which are in a category all 
their own. The total dollar amount of the list from the defense 
authorization bill is $4.5 billion.
  The continued practice in the defense appropriations bill of 
restricting procurement of major weapon system components to United 
States manufacturers at the expense of more cost-effective options--
and, I should point out, at the expense of other U.S. companies that 
benefit from the cooperative arrangements we maintain with allied 
countries and are consequently threatened by these ``Buy America'' 
provisions--represent a throwback to an earlier time when defense 
budgets allowed for such congressionally-mandated inefficiencies. 
Similarly, prohibitions and restrictions on the Department of Defense's 
ability to manage itself in order to protect hometown contractors and 
civil servants, such as are included in the appropriations bill are 
reaching ever-more multifarious levels that would make Rube Goldberg 
proud. I invite my colleagues to read Section 8071 of the bill for one 
such example.
  I am also concerned about the precedent set by Section 8125 of the 
appropriations bill, which intervenes in the relationships between 
Federal agencies, prime and subcontractors. The ramifications of that 
effort to benefit specific subcontractors will redound to the Federal 
government's misfortune in complicated contractual matters involving 
primes that go out of business, leaving their subcontractors in the 
lurch. Obviously, we are all sympathetic to those subcontractors' 
plight, but intervening in bankruptcy proceedings like this provision 
does is not good government.
  At a time when our declining force structure is stretched virtually 
to the breaking point; when our most skilled personnel are leaving the 
service in droves for better paying, less stressful jobs in the private 
sector; when front-line aircraft are routinely cannibalized so that 
squadrons may deploy and equipment and personnel are cross-decked to 
the long-term detriment of

[[Page S11177]]

both, it is disheartening in the extreme to still witness the scale of 
unnecessary and wasteful spending represented in these bills.
  The airplane mechanic having to remove parts from one fighter in 
order to repair another can be excused for not understanding why $5 
million is diverted from the defense budget to the public school system 
in the state of a senior member of the Armed Services Committee. He or 
she can be excused for not comprehending the mind set that allocates 
$75,000 for establishment of a State Maritime Academy with no realistic 
military application. Five million dollars for Agricultural Based 
Bioremediation and $20 million for the National Defense Center for 
Environmental Excellence--the word ``defense'' being inserted in the 
title strictly for propagandistic purposes--and $3 million for research 
into stainless steel double hull technology, on which private industry 
is supposed to be spending its own money per the requirements of the 
Oil Pollution Prevention Act, are just the tip of a very large iceberg.
  Try as I might, I cannot rationalize, with the scale of readiness 
problems highlighted in yesterday's Armed Services Committee hearing, 
the expenditure of $64 million for the National Guard Youth Challenge 
program. In fact, the budget authority earmarked for the Guard and 
Reserve, once again solely for parochial reasons, continues to 
represent one of the greatest hemorrhages of defense dollars for low-
priority programs in the defense budget. Ten million dollars, Mr. 
President, to convert a National Guard Armory into a Chicago Military 
Academy in order to provide a Junior ROTC program is not consistent 
with national security imperatives that should be driving the process. 
I have no idea--no idea--why we are earmarking a million dollars for 
Lewis and Clark.
  Earmarks for specific facilities are out of control. Whether it's the 
Francis S. Grabeski Airport in New York, the earmark of $2,250,000 from 
the Operations and Maintenance budget--yes, the very portion of the 
budget most closely tied to readiness--for the White Sands Missile 
Range and Fort Bliss, Texas, or the earmarking of $4.6 million for the 
Montana National Guard Distance Learning Network, such practices 
illustrate all too well the unwillingness of Congress to translate its 
rhetoric on readiness problems into constructive action and to cast 
aside once and for all the business-as-usual approach that is so 
damaging to our national defense.
  The appropriations bill adds $50 million for the B-2 bomber for 
continued upgrades. The continued expenditure of millions for upgrades 
for that formidable fleet of 21 aircraft is particularly disturbing, as 
the B-2's practical utility scarcely warrants the funding Congress 
lavishes upon it every year. If it could fly combat air patrols, I 
would be inclined to be a little more sympathetic. Its' theoretical 
application to real world contingencies, however, leaves me aghast at 
the cost of that program.
  Mr. President, my views on parochial-oriented spending remain very 
much in the minority. That is why we continue to see billions of 
dollars wasted by Congress to satisfy parochial interests. I will not, 
however, shy away from continuing to shine a spotlight on these 
wasteful practices. During a week in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have testified on the myriad of readiness problems afflicting our armed 
forces, to ignore the scale of the problem represented in the lists I 
am submitting for the record would be to fail the men and women who 
wear the uniform of our Nation. They deserve better. It is a shame they 
will not receive better.
  I ask unanimous consent that highlights of special interest 
provisions in the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization and 
Appropriations Conference Reports be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


Highlights of provisions in the fiscal year 1999 defense authorization 
                 and appropriations conference reports

Increase purchase of C-130 J (Hercules), from 1 to 7, Marie$465,000,000
LHD (WASP Class) Amphibious Assault Ship, authorization for $1.5 
  billion, Pascagoula, Mississippi...........................50,000,000
Purchase C-XX, Executive travel aircraft built in Wichita, Kansas and 
  Savannah, Georgia..........................................27,000,000
Los Alamos, New Mexico public school system diversion from military 
  readiness...................................................5,000,000
Agricultural Based Bioremediation............................20,000,000
Stainless steel double hull technology research, Mississippi..3,000,000
Conversion of a National Guard Armory into a Chicago Military10,000,000
Testing and training operations and support at the White Sands Missile 
  Range, New Mexico and Fort Bliss, Texas.....................2,250,000
B-2 Bomber upgrades, California and Washington...............50,000,000
Increase purchase of MK-19 grenade launcher from 697 to 800, M3,000,000
Various Medical Research Programs...........................355,000,000
    Disaster relief and emergency services
    Breast cancer research
    Osteoporosis research
    Teleradiology
    Diabetes
    Pain
Mentor-Protege Program.......................................10,000,000
National Guard and Reserve:
    National Guard Youth Challenge Program...................64,000,000
    Montana National Guard Distance Learning Network..........4,600,000
    Civilian Technicians personnel reduction restrictions: 
      Miscellaneous equipment...............................100,000,000
Buy America restrictions:
    Ship anchor and mooring chain
    Ball and roller bearings
    Carbon, alloy and armor steel plate
    Shipboard auxiliary and propulsion systems
    Ship cranes
    Other miscellaneous items
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, A complete listing of these parochial 
provisions concerning the fiscal year 1999 defense appropriations 
conference report and the fiscal year 1999 authorization conference 
report are available on my web site.
  Mr. President, shortly, I intend to propound a unanimous consent 
request for the Internet Tax Freedom Act to be considered. In the 
meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________