[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11139-S11142]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, 7 months ago, three out of the four 
service chiefs testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that the President's fiscal year 1999 defense budget was well balanced 
and that the operating and maintenance accounts and manpower accounts 
were about correct.
  Yesterday, in a hearing held by the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
there was a dramatic reversal of those statements that were made by 
three of the four Service Chiefs. Yesterday, the Service Chiefs 
acknowledged that there is a long-term degradation in our ability to 
fight and win a war and that immediate action, indeed, emergency 
supplemental funds are called for.
  I am sure that there were a number of factors that contributed to 
this incredibly candid display yesterday before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. I have the utmost respect and regard for every one 
of the military leaders of our services. But the reality is that this 
problem has been building for years, not just 7 months. I believe that 
some of the problems that we are going to have to address in emergency 
fashion now could have been addressed in a much more measured way if 
the Joint Chiefs had been more candid in their testimony before the 
Armed Services Committee and the Congress in the past years, not to 
mention 7 months ago.
  The preparedness problem within the military is compounded by both 
the ``can do'' attitude of the military, which I admire, and the 
pressure that senior leadership puts on its ranks to not report bad 
news. Our men and women in uniform have a history of making do, of 
adjusting to civilian decisions, and working out potential solutions 
even at the cost of assuming higher risks. But we commit a grave 
disservice to those very men and women when we fail to provide the 
resources they need to do their job, and when political considerations 
prohibit our military leaders from telling Congress and the American 
people the truth about their ability to execute our National Military 
Strategy. At yesterday's Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff told us the truth about our declining military 
readiness--something that has long been apparent to those of us who 
hear regularly from lower-level officers and enlisted personnel in the 
field, who risk their careers by making Congress aware of the readiness 
gaps not acknowledged by their superiors.
  In mid-July, I sent letters to each of the Service Chiefs expressing 
my concern about the military's overall state of readiness. In order 
that I might gain a better understanding of current readiness and 
readiness trends in the military, I asked each Chief to address key 
readiness issues in his Service, and to provide me with written answers 
to a series of questions that addressed these problems. I requested 
that the responses to the questions also include an assessment of 
National Guard and Reserve readiness. I have now received answers from 
each of the Chiefs. Their responses are thoughtful and thorough, and I 
was grateful that they and their staffs took the time to describe in 
detail our current state of military readiness.
  I have now received answers from each of the Chiefs. Their responses 
are thoughtful and thorough, and I was grateful they and their staffs 
took the time to describe in detail our current state of military 
readiness.
  These responses do not reveal a single reason for the continued 
degradation of the Services, or a single set of answers as to how these 
problems can be solved. Each service has a unique mix of readiness 
problems and has made different trade-offs in efforts to compensate. 
The data provided by the Service Chiefs clearly demonstrate that both 
the Executive Branch and the Congress are to blame. They show that the 
Administration is to blame for underfunding some aspects of readiness 
at the expense of others, and that Congress is to blame for using 
readiness for parochial and other special interest projects. Moreover, 
for two years now, we have turned down pleas by the Secretary of 
Defense and the President for additional base closure rounds, causing 
money earmarked for readiness and modernization accounts to be used 
instead to maintain bases built to sustain a Cold War force structure. 
The central issue is not, however, who is to blame, but how to reverse 
these alarming trends.
  The world is a very tough neighborhood and requires a tough cop. As 
the world's sole superpower, we have no choice but to patrol this beat 
in order to defend our interests. Safeguarding our security and 
advancing the cause of freedom may well require us to send young 
Americans into battle against the enemies of peace. The very least we 
can do is to make sure that the men and women we send into harm's way 
are equipped and trained to fight and

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win. What I greatly fear, though, is that they will be sent less than 
optimally combat-ready, which leads to the inevitable consequence of 
casualties that are unnecessary and tragic.


                      Today's Readiness Challenges

  In their replies to my letters, the Service Chiefs identified a 
series of general risks that affect each service, and which both the 
Administration and the Congress must consider in funding an adequate 
defense program.
  The Illusion of OPTEMPO. One example is the current effort to 
maintain high levels of operational activity or OPTEMPO. Our military 
forces cannot be ready if they do not constantly maintain high levels 
of training, and there is merit in ensuring that we do not reduce their 
operational tempo as we cut total force strength and defense spending. 
However, if such levels are funded at the expense of major overhauls 
and depot maintenance, of keeping personnel deployed for excessive 
periods such as our military deployments to Bosnia, Somalia, SOUTHERN 
WATCH and PROVIDE COMFORT in Southwest Asia, and at the general cost of 
straining our military forces and our major combat equipment, they 
trade this year's readiness for going hollow in the future.
  On a given day, one-third of our Navy ships, submarines and squadrons 
are deployed overseas. In his testimony yesterday morning, Admiral 
Johnson stated that well over 50 percent of the Navy's surface fleet is 
deployed around the globe. In 1992, that figure was 37 percent. Of 
particular concern is the Chief of Naval Operations' comments on the 
continuing erosion of non-deployed readiness in the sea service. 
Admiral Johnson writes,

       A decade ago, non-deployed naval units were at the highest 
     states of readiness (C1/C2) nearly 70 percent of the time. 
     Today, that figure is barely 50 percent. Non-deployed 
     readiness has fallen to the point that an intense effort is 
     required by our Sailors to regain a deployable level of 
     readiness, and that peak is being reached closer and closer 
     to deployment. This compression of training and maintenance 
     puts tremendous strain on our people as they struggle to meet 
     commitments, pressure that negatively impacts the personal 
     and professional quality of life of our Sailors.

  The high levels of OPTEMPO reported by each service are no longer a 
guarantee against going hollow. In fact, to a large degree, the nature 
of contingencies driving OPTEMPO is the surest guarantee that readiness 
will degrade.
  Furthermore, time and again, we have learned that our system for 
measuring readiness is unrealistic and fails to anticipate real-world 
demands on operating funds. In the past, data that indicated a decline 
in readiness was considered ``merely'' anecdotal.
  Increasing Depot Level Backlogs. A tangible indicator of decreasing 
readiness is the fact that the price of correcting our depot level 
maintenance backlogs has been rising for the last six years, despite 
sizable reductions in force structure. That backlog now totals $1.6 
billion compared to $420 million in 1991. Similarly, the cost of our 
backlogs in real property maintenance (RPM) have risen from $3 billion 
in the mid-1980s to over $10 billion today.
  Underfunding Quality-of-Life. More than anything else, our victory in 
Desert Storm was a tribute to the men and women in our military--a 
clear victory for the all-volunteer force. Displaying the ``can do'' 
attitude not found anywhere else in the world, our military personnel 
exhibited an overall level of individual combat performance that had 
previously been limited to a small portion of our total force.
  At the same time, our economy has prospered, producing historically 
high levels of employment, resulting in the emergence of a very 
difficult recruiting and retention environment. Maintaining this top-
quality force requires a military personnel system that has the 
flexibility to react quickly to the dynamics of the civilian market and 
the leadership and confidence to follow through with critical personnel 
decisions rather than neglecting them out of fiscal opportunism. 
However, first, second, and third term enlisted retention, pilot and 
mid-grade officer retention, and recruiting are all short of goal for 
each of the Services.
  Recruiting and retaining quality individuals requires pay scales that 
adjust to meet prevailing rates rather than fall 14 percent behind 
comparable civilian pay. It requires adequate funding for recruiting. 
It requires proper promotion rates--not promotion boards that take five 
months to process reports of promotion boards, as is the case with the 
Navy. It requires proper living conditions and morale, welfare and 
recreation services. It requires reasonable tours of duty and a higher 
quality of civilian leadership and ``role models'' to deal with matters 
fairly. It requires a reinstatement of the 50 percent retirement plan 
and a close examination as to whether the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) or 
a 401K-type plan has utility in the military pay system. General Reimer 
writes that

       . . . the retirement package we have offered our soldiers 
     entering the Army since 1986 is inadequate. Having lost 25 
     percent of its lifetime value as a result of the 1980's 
     reforms, military retirement is no longer our number one 
     retention tool. Our soldiers and families deserve better. We 
     need to send them a strong signal that we haven't forgotten 
     them.

  The military medical health care system, particularly the TRICARE 
program, has been described by Service Chiefs as falling far short of 
what is warranted and needed. We cannot ignore the erosion of 
retirement and health care benefits, and the resultant impact on 
retention and readiness. General Reimer writes, ``The loss in medical 
benefits when a retiree turns 65 is particularly bothersome to our 
soldiers who are making career decisions.'' From the Service Chiefs' 
answers, it is highly questionable whether we are meeting any of these 
requirements. On the contrary, it is clear that there is much work to 
be done.
  Finally, it is demoralizing to the men and women we send into harm's 
way, and is incomprehensible to the American people, who expect a well 
trained and well equipped force, to witness military personnel, up to 
25,000, on food stamps. One tax provision that I have tried to reverse 
this year excludes uniformed men and women in the military from 
beneficial tax treatment on the profits resulting from the sale of 
their homes. We order servicemembers to move from place to place, but 
we do not afford them the same tax treatment as other U.S. citizens. 
Should this issue have been permitted to exist for so many years?
  Underfunding Manpower Strength. President Clinton's defense budget 
and National Military Strategy calls for force levels of 1.37 million 
servicemembers. This is nearly 250,000 less than the Base Force 
advocated by President Bush. What must be determined by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, however, is whether we really have the resources to 
maintain a force of much over 1 million servicemembers by the year 
2000. The end result may be manning levels that are too low to meet our 
readiness needs and too low to provide effective combat capability. 
This fact is compounded by the ever increasing number of contingency 
operations that increase OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and put additional 
stress on our men and women in uniform and the equipment they use. We 
have to be certain that our force levels are adequate to meet 
deployments, and that rotations conform properly to overseas 
commitments. Admiral Johnson stated in his responses to me that ``. . . 
deployed readiness is trending downward, owing mostly to personnel 
shortages.'' The Chief of Staff of the Army had similar concerns. 
General Reimer has written that:

       The readiness of our Armed Forces is more difficult to 
     understand and more complex to manage today than at any other 
     time in our Nation's history. We have reduced the Total Army 
     by 34 percent--nearly 650,000 Active, Army National Guard, 
     and U.S. Army Reserve soldiers and Department of Army 
     civilians--and have closed over 700 bases worldwide. 
     Meanwhile, the requirements for land forces are greater than 
     ever. In the 40 years prior to 1989, the Army participated in 
     10 major deployments. Since then, the Army has participated 
     in 29 major deployments--a dramatic increase in operational 
     tempo.

  Manpower Turbulence and Insecurity. According to the Joint Chiefs' 
responses, each service is experiencing near-record levels of 
turbulence and insecurity. This is reflected in extended tours of duty, 
sudden changes of assignment, high rates of relocation, and a series of 
changes in personnel policies that essentially eliminate the ability of 
personnel, thereby complicating decisions on whether to stay in the 
service.
  These problems are compounded in the case of military families. 
Across each service, extended family separations are the number one 
reason why

[[Page S11141]]

enlisted personnel and junior officers are leaving the military. 
Spouses often lose their jobs with relocations, moves mean significant 
unexpected expenses, and dependents often have adjustment problems. At 
the same time, unit and crew continuity is lost, as moves break up well 
trained, cohesive units, depriving them of much of their readiness.
  Underfunding Base Maintenance and Repair. Ships, aircraft, and 
weapons systems are kept ready through planned maintenance and 
modernization programs. Buildings, runways, truck bays, piers, barracks 
and utilities are equally important assets that must be kept ready 
through a similar level of commitment and fiscal support. Historically, 
each of the Services have used infrastructure to pay the bill for other 
accounts. General Krulak has said, ``Our Backlog of Maintenance and 
Repair will reach $1 billion by FY03 and our plant replacement cycle 
will grow to nearly two hundred years.'' Admiral Johnson writes, ``We 
have mined as much as we can from the infrastructure accounts; we are 
not at an unacceptable level and QOL in the workplace environment is 
negatively affecting morale and readiness.'' General Reimer's response: 
``We have been forced to underfund our Base Operations (BASOPS) and 
Real Property Maintenance (RPM) accounts--84 percent and 58 percent of 
requirements respectively in Fiscal Year 1999. This level of resourcing 
has proven insufficient to run our bases in a way that provides our 
soldiers and families with an adequate quality of life. As a result, 
our commanders have been forced to divert funds from training accounts 
in order to maintain their installations.''
  Underfunding Equipment Modernization. Prior to the 1990s, our 
National Military Strategy and corresponding force structure were 
oriented overwhelmingly toward the Soviet threat. That emphasis, 
obviously, is less relevant today. The December 1997 National Defense 
Panel Report put it this way:

       We must look beyond the challenges for defense and assess 
     the relevance of the National Security Act of 1947 for the 
     next millennium. This framework served us well during the 
     Cold War, but we must objectively reexamine our national 
     security structure if we intend to remain a world leader. It 
     will take wisdom to walk the delicate line that avoids 
     premature decisions and unintended ``lock-in'' with equipment 
     purchases, operational concepts, and related systems whose 
     effectiveness may quickly erode in a rapidly changing 
     environment.

  Furthermore, comprehensive developmental test and evaluation is 
expensive and it is tempting to cut corners by reducing resources. Any 
reduction, however, means a loss of readiness.
  Current critical needs for modernization include funding improved 
medium troop lift, amphibious lift, amphibious vehicles and fire 
support for the Marine Corps. They include increasing shipbuilding 
rates, funding mine warfare, naval fire support, improved 
interoperability and battle management, and improved fighter/strike 
aircraft for the Navy.
  They include funding for digitizing the force (Force XXI), 
information dominance and interoperability, maintaining combat 
overmatch through increased lethality of ground weapon systems, 
improved attack and other combat helicopters for the Army.
  Finally, they include funding improved strategic lift, precision 
guided munitions, bomber force upgrades, air dominance fighter aircraft 
and space initiatives for the Air Force.
  Underfunding Training and Excessive Reliance on Simulation. We must 
continue to fund training in order to maintain mission and unit 
readiness. Critical training includes unit-level operations, the flying 
hour program, the number of steaming days, combined arms exercises, 
temporary duty in conjunction with operations, student skills training, 
and professional development. Better business practices, through the 
military's Revolution in Business Affairs, and increased usage of 
simulators are being incorporated as quickly as possible to ensure 
efficient use of existing training resources. Any reductions to the 
Services' training accounts cannot be tolerated because they will 
directly reduce readiness.
  Simulation can be an extremely useful supplement to training, but it 
cannot replace it. It is tempting, however, to save money on exercises 
and other high cost training scenarios and increase reliance on 
simulations even when this produces a significant cut in real world 
readiness. For example, the Air Force over the past three years has cut 
pilot flying hours and increased pilot simulation hours by equal 
amounts. I do not believe the two are interchangeable. Excessive 
reliance on simulation may produce lower training costs, but it is no 
substitute for the real thing.
  Underfunding Major Equipment Life Cycles. History has proven that 
periods of diminishing defense resources inevitably mean that equipment 
and munitions must be kept in service much longer than the military 
services originally planned. In General Krulak's letter, he wrote:

       We have reached a critical point in the life cycle of our 
     ground and aviation equipment. We are facing virtual block 
     obsolescence of crucial items. Time needed by our units for 
     training in the field is being spent in the motor pools, 
     hangars, and armories. Our commanders are finding it more and 
     more difficult to train their units because their equipment 
     is ``deadlined'' or evacuated for repair. Our amphibious 
     assault vehicles (AAVs) are, on average, seven years older 
     than their already extended programmed service life.

  The general goes on to say that two aviation workhorses, the CH-46E 
and the CH-53D helicopters, are 27 and 30 years old on average, 
exceeding their projected service lives by many years. Another example 
of this is the continued practice of the Marine Corps' retreading tires 
on the humvees (HMMVV's) and five-ton trucks of the First and Second 
Marine Expeditionary Forces.
  The age of our military equipment, along with high operational tempo, 
has dramatically increased the cost of equipment maintenance in man-
hours and money while dramatically reducing the availability of that 
equipment for training. Our equipment readiness rates remain high only 
because of the dedication of our men and women in uniform, who 
routinely work twelve to sixteen hours per day, six to seven days a 
week, on overlapping and rotating shifts to maintain this equipment. 
Unless a concerted effort is made to adjust maintenance and overhaul 
cycles to provide for service lives, existing readiness standards will 
continue to drift further towards a hollow force.
  Underfunding Munition Stocks. Each of the Services now tends to meet 
its munitions goals by redefining the stocks on hand as adequate to 
meet a shrinking force posture. As Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Ryan wrote me, ``While we lived off the surplus from the 40 percent 
drawdown of our forces in the early 90s, funding has not matched our 
need for the last several years.'' The net result is smaller stocks of 
munitions per weapon system, and a failure to purchase the most 
advanced forms of smart weapons, fuzes, and conventional weapons in the 
amount required by our National Military Strategy. Admiral Johnson 
writes,

       I am concerned about the inventory levels of modern 
     weaponry, particularly the Tomahawk Block III missile, and 
     the resultant increased risk in fighting two nearly 
     simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). We have maintained the 
     current level by limiting the fleet's training allowances, 
     with some units only receiving one training missile per year 
     of our costly leading edge weapons, and by significantly 
     reducing funding for development of future weapons.

  In the process, we are risking our industrial base for smart and 
conventional munitions by reducing orders below a critical threshold or 
to achieve the production economies which would result from a higher 
procurement rate.
  Balancing Act of Emerging Technologies. There is a growing tendency 
to reduce force posture and readiness in anticipation of the 
introduction of technological innovations like network-centric warfare 
and interoperability and weapon systems that are not yet in the force 
structure. This ``betting on things to come'' trades readiness we have 
on hand for technology that is still in the bush. Historically, we have 
never deployed such systems on time, at the estimated cost, or, often, 
with the anticipated effectiveness.
  However, the risks of such efforts to trade readiness in the near-
term for future technologies must be balanced with the statement of 
General Krulak:

       For the military, this is a time when emerging 
     technologies, if exploited, will fundamentally alter and 
     substantially increase our warfighting capability. To the 
     maximum extent possible, consistent with the imperative for 
     maintaining current readiness, we

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     should leverage these ``leap ahead technologies'' which 
     promise a warfighting edge well into the next century. We 
     should minimize expenditures on procuring evolutionary 
     technologies and maintaining old systems that do not promise 
     a significant edge on tomorrow's battlefield.

  Funding Operations at the Expense of Readiness. We are already deep 
in the process of using readiness funds to pay for peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations. In theory, much of this expenditure will be 
repaid through supplemental appropriations or out of Department of 
Defense contingency funds. In practice, it is very unlikely that the 
services will ever be fully repaid for the cost of their operations, 
and they will be forced to pay for peacekeeping and humanitarian 
actions in a way that will affect their readiness. In Bosnia, the 
Army's actual reimbursement is about 90 cents on the dollar.
  Spending Savings Before We Achieve Them. It is very easy to achieve 
management efficiencies on paper, and to cut infrastructure or reduce 
support funding to achieve budget savings. In practice, however, there 
is an increasing tendency to cut first and determine the practicality 
of such savings later. On February 10, 1998, General Reimer testified 
to the Senate Armed Services Committee that

       We have programmed $10.5 billion worth of efficiencies 
     across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). These 
     efficiencies are based upon better business practices and 
     reform initiatives . . . these are risks associated with this 
     budget.


          Repeating the 1970s, the Road to Going Hollow Again

  Whatever we do, let us not repeat the mistakes of the 1970s. In the 
Post-Vietnam era, much of the decline in active duty force levels 
through the 1970s was the result of decisions made by the individual 
services to funnel resources into badly needed modernization programs. 
To at least some extent, however, the numbers also reflected the 
difficulty the services were having attracting and retaining quality 
recruits. A number of factors combined to complicate the challenge of 
manning the all-volunteer force. First, military pay generally lagged 
well behind pay in the private sector. Second, the end of the Vietnam 
War saw cuts in many personnel benefits, including the education 
benefits of the Montgomery GI Bill.
  In the post-Vietnam era, I remember all too well, from first-hand 
experience, U.S. Navy ships that could not get underway for lack of 
manning and from serious maintenance shortfalls. I remember too many 
aircraft--we called them hangar queens--parked in the hangar bay, never 
to fly during a deployment for lack of spare parts, sacrificed so that 
other jets could launch from the decks of the carrier.
  As a matter of national security, we must solemnly commit that the 
dangerous decline in military readiness that followed the conclusion of 
the Vietnam War will not be repeated as we continue to draw down our 
Cold War-era forces. Credible warnings that we are approaching the 
``hollow force'' levels of the 1970s can no longer be ignored. Let us 
act now to avoid this calamity.
  Acting responsibly requires an awareness of the ways in which forces 
can go hollow. Simply attempting to avoid the mistakes of the 1970s 
will not necessarily protect us as the United States prepares to enter 
the new millennium as the preeminent political, economic, and military 
power in the world.
  My Naval Academy classmate and former roommate in flight school, 
Admiral Chuck Larson, had this to say about readiness when he was the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific (USCINCPAC) in 1993:

       When the system of readiness begins to crumble, the decay 
     will normally start from the inside out to the cutting edge. 
     We should be on guard when it becomes necessary to increase 
     operational tempo requirements to meet routine commitments; 
     funds must be transferred among accounts to support increased 
     OPTEMPO, unforseen operations, or contingencies; and, we are 
     compelled to decrease, cancel or defer planned maintenance, 
     training or logistics support activities and functions.

  Mr. President, in 1777, Thomas Paine said, ``Those who expect to reap 
the blessings of freedom must undergo the fatigue of supporting it.'' 
Yesterday, the Joint Chiefs made clear that this Administration has not 
adequately supported our armed forces. We must labor to provide this 
support or face the dire consequences of inaction. The blessings of 
freedom may ultimately hang in the balance.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, I thought it was important--and maybe 
even a similar event yesterday--the testimony of the Service Chiefs 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee; their candor and frank 
assessment of the challenges that we face were more than welcome. I and 
others expressed our disappointment that this candor was so long in 
coming. But we should applaud the fact that it was there.
  Mr. President, I picked up the Washington Post this morning and saw 
that there is evidence that Iraq is now developing a nuclear weapon.
  In Kosovo, there are horrible pictures on the front page of the New 
York Times of the ethnic cleansing and barbaric, terrible, murderous 
behavior of the Serbs that is going on there. Two weeks ago, we learned 
that the North Koreans had launched a three-stage nuclear capable 
missile, and this administration seems to believe that bribing them to 
somehow modify their behavior is the way to go when clearly there are 
indications that their acts have become more bellicose. Their efforts 
to acquire nuclear capable weapons and the testing of missiles indicate 
that that policy has failed.
  I could go to other places in the world of potential flashpoints 
which may entail the expenditure of American blood and treasure. I am 
very concerned, Mr. President, about our ability to meet those 
potential challenges. I am more concerned after the testimony of the 
Joint Chiefs yesterday. I strongly argue for a change, I mean a very 
significant change--that the administration sit down with the Congress 
of the United States, the people's representatives, and try together to 
chart out a way we can rectify these wrongs that have taken place over 
the last 6 years. We must act together in a bipartisan fashion. If the 
administration continues to ignore the Congress, we will have to act 
ourselves, which is not always in the benefit of the Nation. However, 
we as Members of Congress have to readjust our priorities concerning 
base closings and most efficient use of depots, including unneeded and 
unwanted military construction projects and many other parochial 
projects, so that we can divert all of these scarce resources to 
protecting our national security.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 30 
minutes under the control of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, 
Mr. Hagel. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. HAGEL. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I wish to commend my friend and distinguished 
colleague from Arizona for his comments. He is on target. I wish to 
associate myself with those comments and pick up where Senator McCain 
left off, addressing some of the same issues but from a different 
perspective, although it is part of the total perspective, and that is 
foreign policy.

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