[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 133 (Tuesday, September 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11122-S11125]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LOTT (for himself, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. McCain, Mr. Lieberman, 
        Mr. Helms, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Brownback, and Mr. Kyl):
  S. 2525. A bill to establish a program to support a transition to 
democracy in Iraq; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                      iraq liberation act of 1998

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation allowing the 
President to provide direct and overt military assistance to the Iraqi 
opposition. This is a bipartisan initiative. I am joined by Senator 
Kerrey of Nebraska, Senator McCain of Arizona, Senator Lieberman of 
Connecticut, Senator Helms of North Carolina, Senator Shelby of 
Alabama, Senator Brownback of Kansas, and Senator Kyl of Arizona.
  Today is the 55th day without weapons inspections in Iraq. For 
months, I have urged the Administration to fundamentally change its 
policy on Iraq. Monitoring the concealment of weapons of mass 
destruction is not enough. Our goal should be to remove the regime of 
Saddam Hussein from power.
  We should have no illusions. This will not be easy and it will not 
happen quickly. But it can happen. the U.S. has worked with Iraqi 
opponents of Saddam Hussein in the past. We can and should do so in the 
future.
  I have been working with a bipartisan group of Senators throughout 
much of the year to support a change in U.S. policy toward Iraq. In 
State Department Authorization Conference Report, $38 million is 
authorized for political and humanitarian support for the Iraqi 
opposition.
  In P.L. 105-174, Congress appropriated $5 million to support the 
political opposition and $5 million to establish Radio Free Iraq.
  In the Senate passed version of the Fiscal Year 1999 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, there is an additional $10 million for 
political support to the Iraq opposition.
  These steps have been important. But they are not enough. It is time 
to move beyond political support to direct military assistance. It is 
time to openly state our policy goal is the removal of Saddam Hussein's 
regime from power.
  As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, Iraq will pose a threat 
to stability in the Persian Gulf. As long as he remains in power, Iraq 
will pursue weapons of mass destruction programs. His record speaks for 
itself.
  The answer is not just ``containment'' or a US-led invasion. There 
are Iraqis willing to fight and die for the

[[Page S11123]]

freedom of their country. There are significant portions of Iraq today 
which are not under the control of Saddam Hussein.
  Our goal should be to support Iraqi freedom fighters and expand the 
area under their control.
  I have discussed this approach with senior Administration officials. 
I have consulted with distinguished outside experts. I have raised this 
approach with heads of states and government officials from the region. 
I believe this approach can work.
  S. 2525, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, has four major components. 
First, it calls for a policy to seek the removal of the Saddam Hussein 
regime.
  Second, it authorizes the President to provide $2 million for 
broadcasting and $97 million in military aid to Iraqi opposition 
forces. The President is given the discretion to designate the 
recipients of this assistance. The military aid authority is similar to 
that used to support anti-narcotics operations in South America and to 
train and equip the Bosnian army.
  Third, it renews Congressional calls for an international tribunal to 
try Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials for war crimes. This will 
be a crucial step in delegitimizing his reign of terror.
  Finally, the bill looks toward post-Saddam Iraq and calls for a 
comprehensive response to the challenges of rebuilding the country 
devastated by decades of Saddam Hussein' rule.
  Similar legislation has already been introduced in the House. We will 
make every effort to work with the Administration to see if we can 
enact this legislation before we leave.
  We need bipartisanship now more than ever in foreign policy. This is 
a bipartisan approach to U.S. policy toward Iraq. We are interested in 
looking to the future. We are interested in protecting American 
interests and ensuring that Saddam Hussein can never again threaten his 
neighbors with military force or weapons of mass destruction.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2525

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Liberation Act of 
     1998''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting an 
     eight year war in which Iraq employed chemical weapons 
     against Iranian troops and ballistic missiles against Iranian 
     cities.
       (2) In February 1988, Iraq forcibly relocated Kurdish 
     civilians from their home villages in the Anfal campaign, 
     killing an estimated 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds.
       (3) On March 16, 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons against 
     Iraqi Kurdish civilian opponents in the town of Halabja, 
     killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds and causing numerous birth 
     defects that affect the town today.
       (4) On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and began a seven month 
     occupation of Kuwait, killing and committing numerous abuses 
     against Kuwaiti civilians, and setting Kuwait's oil wells 
     ablaze upon retreat.
       (5) Hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February 
     28, 1991, and Iraq subsequently accepted the ceasefire 
     conditions specified in United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) requiring Iraq, among other 
     things, to disclose fully and permit the dismantlement of its 
     weapons of mass destruction programs and submit to long-term 
     monitoring and verification of such dismantlement.
       (6) In April 1993, Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to 
     assassinate former President George Bush during his April 14-
     16, 1993, visit to Kuwait.
       (7) In October 1994, Iraq moved 80,000 troops to areas near 
     the border with Kuwait, posing an imminent threat of a 
     renewed invasion of or attack against Kuwait.
       (8) On August 31, 1996, Iraq suppressed many of its 
     opponents by helping one Kurdish faction capture Irbil, the 
     seat of the Kurdish regional government.
       (9) Since March 1996, Iraq has systematically sought to 
     deny weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special 
     Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) access to key facilities and 
     documents, has on several occasions endangered the safe 
     operation of UNSCOM helicopters transporting UNSCOM personnel 
     in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and 
     concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass 
     destruction programs.
       (10) On August 5, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with 
     UNSCOM, and subsequently threatened to end long-term 
     monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency and UNSCOM.
       (11) On August 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Public 
     Law 105-235, which declared that ``the Government of Iraq is 
     in material and unacceptable breach of its international 
     obligations'' and urged the President ``to take appropriate 
     action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws 
     of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its 
     international obligations.''.

     SEC. 3. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

       It should be the policy of the United States to seek to 
     remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq 
     and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to 
     replace that regime.

     SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Authority To Provide Assistance.--The President may 
     provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations 
     designated in accordance with section 5 the following 
     assistance:
       (1) Broadcasting.--(A) Grant assistance to such 
     organizations for radio and television broadcasting by such 
     organizations to Iraq.
       (B) There is authorized to be appropriated to the United 
     States Information Agency $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to 
     carry out this paragraph.
       (2) Military assistance.--(A) The President is authorized 
     to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of 
     the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department 
     of Defense, and military education and training for such 
     organizations.
       (B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 644(m) of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided 
     under this paragraph may not exceed $97,000,000.
       (b) Humanitarian Assistance.--The Congress urges the 
     President to use existing authorities under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to 
     individuals living in areas of Iraq controlled by 
     organizations designated in accordance with section 5, with 
     emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled 
     to such areas from areas under the control of the Saddam 
     Hussein regime.
       (c) Restriction on Assistance.--No assistance under this 
     section shall be provided to any group within an organization 
     designated in accordance with section 5 which group is, at 
     the time the assistance is to be provided, engaged in 
     military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime.
       (d) Notification Requirement.--The President shall notify 
     the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at least 15 days in advance of 
     each obligation of assistance under this section in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under such section 634A.
       (e) Reimbursement Relating to Military Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--Defense articles, defense services, and 
     military education and training provided under subsection 
     (a)(2) shall be made available without reimbursement to the 
     Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are 
     appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).
       (2) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal 
     years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to 
     reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for 
     the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act if 1961) of defense articles, defense 
     services, or military education and training provided under 
     subsection (a)(2).
       (f) Availability of Funds.--(1) Amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under this section are authorized to remain 
     available until expended.
       (2) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this 
     section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for 
     the purposes described in this section.

     SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF IRAQI DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION 
                   ORGANIZATION.

       (a) Initial Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the President shall designate 
     one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that 
     satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible 
     to receive assistance under section 4.
       (b) Designation of Additional Groups.--At any time 
     subsequent to the initial designation pursuant to subsection 
     (a), the President may designate one or more additional Iraqi 
     democratic opposition organizations that satisfy the criteria 
     set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance 
     under section 4.
       (c) Criteria for Designation.--In designating an 
     organization pursuant to this section, the President shall 
     consider only organizations that--
       (1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals and 
     groups opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and
       (2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for 
     human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to 
     maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering 
     cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein 
     regime.
       (d) Notification Requirement.--At least 15 days in advance 
     of designating an Iraqi democratic opposition organization 
     pursuant to this section, the President shall notify the 
     congressional committees specified in section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of his proposed designation in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under such section 634A.

[[Page S11124]]

     SEC. 6. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ.

       Consistent with section 301 of the Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
     102-138), House Concurrent Resolution 137, 105th Congress 
     (approved by the House of Representatives on November 13, 
     1997), and Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, 105th Congress 
     (approved by the Senate on March 13, 1998), the Congress 
     urges the President to call upon the United Nations to 
     establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose 
     of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and 
     other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against 
     humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of 
     international law.

     SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM 
                   HUSSEIN REGIME.

       It is the sense of Congress that, once Saddam Hussein is 
     removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support 
     Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and 
     substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by 
     providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties 
     and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's 
     foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to 
     Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the situation in Iraq 
and to urge my colleagues to support the legislation introduced by the 
Majority Leader today.
  I spoke on Iraq on this floor last November and again in February, 
but Saddam Hussein is still in power, still threatening his neighbors 
and oppressing his people, so I must turn again to this topic. In fact, 
I will keep turning to it, joining my colleagues from both sides of the 
aisle, trying to change U.S. policy toward Iraq, because I cannot abide 
the idea of Saddam Hussein as the dictator of Iraq and I will never 
accept the status quo in Iraq. One of three things will happen, Mr. 
President: Saddam Hussein will lose his job, I will lose my job, or I 
will keep talking about him on this floor. 1998 has unfortunately 
brought us a new and less advantageous situation in our relationship 
with Iraq. First of all, other threats have pushed Iraq into the 
background.
  Asia's recession and the collapse of the Russian ruble have sent 
shock waves through all the emerging markets. Economic instability is 
usually the harbinger of political instability, which in turn threatens 
the peace between nations and the ability of weakened nations to 
maintain their own security. The Indian-Pakistani nuclear confrontation 
and the unravelling of Russia's military are two highly significant 
examples of this trend. Russia's crisis is particularly important 
because our security and that of our allies depends on Russia keeping 
its nuclear weapons and fissile materials out of the hands of the rogue 
states and terrorist groups which would deliver them to us, either by 
ballistic missile or by the rented or stolen truck favored by 
terrorists.
  Terrorism may or may not actually be on the rise, but terrorists have 
recently shown the intention and ability to attack American targets 
overseas. As we confront organizations like that of Usama bin Ladin, we 
come face to face with people who will go to great efforts to kill 
Americans, and we react strongly. In the aftermath of events like the 
bombing of Khobar Towers or the two embassies in Africa, we naturally 
move terrorism to the forefront of our threat concerns. As peace is 
gradually made in the world's most intractable ethnic and religious 
conflicts, terrorism ought to decline, but our rationality can not 
penetrate terrorist motivation.
  In addition, there is proliferation. Rogue missiles and their deadly 
cargoes are rapidly developing, and spreading: the North Korean launch 
follows launches by Pakistan and Iran and tests of nuclear weapons in 
both India and Pakistan. The trend in the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction is running against us as an increasing number of 
countries come to view these missiles as a low-cost way of placing the 
U.S. and our allies at risk without expending the resources to confront 
us militarily across the board. In a way, Iraq during the Gulf War was 
the precursor of this kind of thinking: they entered the war with a big 
army and air force, but in the end the only thing that made them a 
serious and deadly opponent was their arsenal of SCUD missiles. SCUDs 
and the like may be 1950's technology, but armed with biological, 
chemical, or nuclear warheads, these missiles are equalizers in 1998.
  And so, in this time of uncertainty and change, we rank the threats 
to our national life and to our individual lives and livelihoods, and 
we tend to forget Iraq. It is an old threat, after all, and we have 
lived with it for all this decade. In addition, Iraq seems held in 
check by its neighbors and by economic sanctions. Yet although the 
Iraqi threat may appear to be dormant, in fact the risk we and our 
allies run from the continuation of Saddam Hussein in power is in fact 
greater than it has been for years.
  We know, most recently and unambiguously from the former U.N. weapons 
inspector Scott Ritter, that Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass 
destruction continues. We know that more than fifty days have elapsed 
since the last UNSCOM weapons inspection. Almost two months of immunity 
have been granted to a regime which used chemical weapons on its own 
people, which seeks biological weapons, and which had an active and 
advanced nuclear weapons program. Further, Iraqi regime rhetoric, 
stated most recently by Tariq Aziz at the U.N. General Assembly meeting 
this week, notifies us that Iraq will no longer accept UNSCOM 
monitoring, at least not in an effective form. So Iraq's neighbors, and 
we, can expect to be threatened by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction of 
ever-growing lethality in coming years, with no collective 
international action to halt it.
  Saddam Hussein pays for his weapons programs by smuggling oil, at 
which he is getting more proficient, and by diverting resources which 
should be going to the Iraqi people. His military may be less capable 
than before the Gulf War, but his troops could still overwhelm the 
remaining areas of Iraqi Kurdistan outside his control. They could move 
north at any time or attack pockets of resistance in the southern marsh 
areas.
  It is strongly in America's interest that Iraq's neighbors and our 
allies in the region live in peace and security. That interest alone 
more than justifies a policy to change the Iraqi government. But there 
is an additional reason which ought to have particular resonance in the 
United States. Mr President, I refer to the need to free the Iraqi 
people from one of the most oppressive dictatorships on earth.
  We Americans, who have striven for more than two centuries to govern 
ourselves, should particularly feel the cruel anomaly which is the 
Iraqi government. In an age in which democracy is in the ascendant, in 
which democracy is universally recognized as a government's seal of 
legitimacy, the continued existence of a Stalinist regime like the one 
in Baghdad should inspire us to action. Saddam Hussein rules by raw 
fear. In terms of absolutism, personality cult, and terror applied at 
every level of society, only North Korea rivals Iraq today. The 
existence of such a government is a daily affront to every freedom-
loving person, to everyone who is revolted by the degradation of our 
fellow human beings. I refuse to accept it, and I want the United 
States to refuse to accept it. As I have said on this floor before, 
when Saddam's prisons and secret police records and burial grounds are 
opened, when the Iraqis can at last tell their horrifying story to the 
international court which will try Saddam for his many crimes against 
his own people, we Americans will be proud we took this stand.
  Mr. President, over the past year we have made some progress toward a 
policy of replacing the Iraqi regime. The Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Bill passed by this body included funding for assistance 
to Iraqi opposition movements and for broadcasting to Iraq. The 
Administration has proposed a program to assist the Iraqi opposition 
abroad, to link the different groups together and get them organized. I 
support all these efforts, but they don't go far enough. The 
legislation before us takes the additional steps which indicate full 
commitment to helping the Iraqi people get rid of Saddam and his 
regime: the legislation states the commitment, and it enables the 
Administration to supply military assistance to the Iraqi opposition.
  Mr. President, should this legislation come into effect, we and the 
Administration should be prepared for the possibility that the Iraqi 
opposition may use the military equipment they receive, together with 
their own resources, to liberate some portion of

[[Page S11125]]

Iraq. As I have said before that will be the time for the United States 
to recognize the opposition as Iraq's government and lift economic 
sanctions on the liberated part of the country.
  At this time in history, when some in the world seem ready to set 
aside their moral scruples and interact with Saddam, when the UNSCOM 
inspection system is at grave risk, when Saddam may attempt to break 
free of the sanctions which have restrained him since the Gulf War, it 
is urgent for the United States to clearly state its implacable 
opposition to Saddam and his regime. This legislation is the way to do 
that, and to simultaneously help Iraqis make their revolution. Besides 
strengthening the Iraqi opposition, this legislation tells Iraqis to 
keep up hope. It enables the Administration to tell Iraqis we know how 
bad Saddam is, we have the facts on him, and we will not rest until we 
see him in court. Iraqis will also learn that we understand the need to 
deal with the burden of debt Saddam has incurred, and we will work with 
Iraq's international creditors to find a solution for a post-Saddam 
Iraq. Iraqis will learn of our commitment to provide humanitarian 
assistance and democracy transition assistance to a post-Saddam Iraq. 
They will learn that an Iraq committed to democracy will be a welcome 
member in the family of nations. As they learn what we have done and 
what we are prepared to do, the Iraqi people will be our allies in an 
enterprise which will make them free, and America and its allies more 
secure.
                                 ______