[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 133 (Tuesday, September 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11122-S11127]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. LOTT (for himself, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. McCain, Mr. Lieberman,
Mr. Helms, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Brownback, and Mr. Kyl):
S. 2525. A bill to establish a program to support a transition to
democracy in Iraq; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
iraq liberation act of 1998
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation allowing the
President to provide direct and overt military assistance to the Iraqi
opposition. This is a bipartisan initiative. I am joined by Senator
Kerrey of Nebraska, Senator McCain of Arizona, Senator Lieberman of
Connecticut, Senator Helms of North Carolina, Senator Shelby of
Alabama, Senator Brownback of Kansas, and Senator Kyl of Arizona.
Today is the 55th day without weapons inspections in Iraq. For
months, I have urged the Administration to fundamentally change its
policy on Iraq. Monitoring the concealment of weapons of mass
destruction is not enough. Our goal should be to remove the regime of
Saddam Hussein from power.
We should have no illusions. This will not be easy and it will not
happen quickly. But it can happen. the U.S. has worked with Iraqi
opponents of Saddam Hussein in the past. We can and should do so in the
future.
I have been working with a bipartisan group of Senators throughout
much of the year to support a change in U.S. policy toward Iraq. In
State Department Authorization Conference Report, $38 million is
authorized for political and humanitarian support for the Iraqi
opposition.
In P.L. 105-174, Congress appropriated $5 million to support the
political opposition and $5 million to establish Radio Free Iraq.
In the Senate passed version of the Fiscal Year 1999 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, there is an additional $10 million for
political support to the Iraq opposition.
These steps have been important. But they are not enough. It is time
to move beyond political support to direct military assistance. It is
time to openly state our policy goal is the removal of Saddam Hussein's
regime from power.
As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, Iraq will pose a threat
to stability in the Persian Gulf. As long as he remains in power, Iraq
will pursue weapons of mass destruction programs. His record speaks for
itself.
The answer is not just ``containment'' or a US-led invasion. There
are Iraqis willing to fight and die for the
[[Page S11123]]
freedom of their country. There are significant portions of Iraq today
which are not under the control of Saddam Hussein.
Our goal should be to support Iraqi freedom fighters and expand the
area under their control.
I have discussed this approach with senior Administration officials.
I have consulted with distinguished outside experts. I have raised this
approach with heads of states and government officials from the region.
I believe this approach can work.
S. 2525, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, has four major components.
First, it calls for a policy to seek the removal of the Saddam Hussein
regime.
Second, it authorizes the President to provide $2 million for
broadcasting and $97 million in military aid to Iraqi opposition
forces. The President is given the discretion to designate the
recipients of this assistance. The military aid authority is similar to
that used to support anti-narcotics operations in South America and to
train and equip the Bosnian army.
Third, it renews Congressional calls for an international tribunal to
try Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials for war crimes. This will
be a crucial step in delegitimizing his reign of terror.
Finally, the bill looks toward post-Saddam Iraq and calls for a
comprehensive response to the challenges of rebuilding the country
devastated by decades of Saddam Hussein' rule.
Similar legislation has already been introduced in the House. We will
make every effort to work with the Administration to see if we can
enact this legislation before we leave.
We need bipartisanship now more than ever in foreign policy. This is
a bipartisan approach to U.S. policy toward Iraq. We are interested in
looking to the future. We are interested in protecting American
interests and ensuring that Saddam Hussein can never again threaten his
neighbors with military force or weapons of mass destruction.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2525
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Liberation Act of
1998''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting an
eight year war in which Iraq employed chemical weapons
against Iranian troops and ballistic missiles against Iranian
cities.
(2) In February 1988, Iraq forcibly relocated Kurdish
civilians from their home villages in the Anfal campaign,
killing an estimated 50,000 to 180,000 Kurds.
(3) On March 16, 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iraqi Kurdish civilian opponents in the town of Halabja,
killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds and causing numerous birth
defects that affect the town today.
(4) On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and began a seven month
occupation of Kuwait, killing and committing numerous abuses
against Kuwaiti civilians, and setting Kuwait's oil wells
ablaze upon retreat.
(5) Hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February
28, 1991, and Iraq subsequently accepted the ceasefire
conditions specified in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) requiring Iraq, among other
things, to disclose fully and permit the dismantlement of its
weapons of mass destruction programs and submit to long-term
monitoring and verification of such dismantlement.
(6) In April 1993, Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to
assassinate former President George Bush during his April 14-
16, 1993, visit to Kuwait.
(7) In October 1994, Iraq moved 80,000 troops to areas near
the border with Kuwait, posing an imminent threat of a
renewed invasion of or attack against Kuwait.
(8) On August 31, 1996, Iraq suppressed many of its
opponents by helping one Kurdish faction capture Irbil, the
seat of the Kurdish regional government.
(9) Since March 1996, Iraq has systematically sought to
deny weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) access to key facilities and
documents, has on several occasions endangered the safe
operation of UNSCOM helicopters transporting UNSCOM personnel
in Iraq, and has persisted in a pattern of deception and
concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass
destruction programs.
(10) On August 5, 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with
UNSCOM, and subsequently threatened to end long-term
monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and UNSCOM.
(11) On August 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Public
Law 105-235, which declared that ``the Government of Iraq is
in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations'' and urged the President ``to take appropriate
action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws
of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its
international obligations.''.
SEC. 3. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
It should be the policy of the United States to seek to
remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq
and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to
replace that regime.
SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
IRAQ.
(a) Authority To Provide Assistance.--The President may
provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations
designated in accordance with section 5 the following
assistance:
(1) Broadcasting.--(A) Grant assistance to such
organizations for radio and television broadcasting by such
organizations to Iraq.
(B) There is authorized to be appropriated to the United
States Information Agency $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 to
carry out this paragraph.
(2) Military assistance.--(A) The President is authorized
to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of
the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department
of Defense, and military education and training for such
organizations.
(B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 644(m) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided
under this paragraph may not exceed $97,000,000.
(b) Humanitarian Assistance.--The Congress urges the
President to use existing authorities under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to
individuals living in areas of Iraq controlled by
organizations designated in accordance with section 5, with
emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled
to such areas from areas under the control of the Saddam
Hussein regime.
(c) Restriction on Assistance.--No assistance under this
section shall be provided to any group within an organization
designated in accordance with section 5 which group is, at
the time the assistance is to be provided, engaged in
military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime.
(d) Notification Requirement.--The President shall notify
the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at least 15 days in advance of
each obligation of assistance under this section in
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications under such section 634A.
(e) Reimbursement Relating to Military Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Defense articles, defense services, and
military education and training provided under subsection
(a)(2) shall be made available without reimbursement to the
Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2).
(2) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 such sums as may be necessary to
reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for
the value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign
Assistance Act if 1961) of defense articles, defense
services, or military education and training provided under
subsection (a)(2).
(f) Availability of Funds.--(1) Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under this section are authorized to remain
available until expended.
(2) Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this
section are in addition to amounts otherwise available for
the purposes described in this section.
SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF IRAQI DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
ORGANIZATION.
(a) Initial Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the President shall designate
one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that
satisfy the criteria set forth in subsection (c) as eligible
to receive assistance under section 4.
(b) Designation of Additional Groups.--At any time
subsequent to the initial designation pursuant to subsection
(a), the President may designate one or more additional Iraqi
democratic opposition organizations that satisfy the criteria
set forth in subsection (c) as eligible to receive assistance
under section 4.
(c) Criteria for Designation.--In designating an
organization pursuant to this section, the President shall
consider only organizations that--
(1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals and
groups opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and
(2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for
human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to
maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering
cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein
regime.
(d) Notification Requirement.--At least 15 days in advance
of designating an Iraqi democratic opposition organization
pursuant to this section, the President shall notify the
congressional committees specified in section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of his proposed designation in
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications under such section 634A.
[[Page S11124]]
SEC. 6. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ.
Consistent with section 301 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
102-138), House Concurrent Resolution 137, 105th Congress
(approved by the House of Representatives on November 13,
1997), and Senate Concurrent Resolution 78, 105th Congress
(approved by the Senate on March 13, 1998), the Congress
urges the President to call upon the United Nations to
establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose
of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and
other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against
humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of
international law.
SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN REGIME.
It is the sense of Congress that, once Saddam Hussein is
removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support
Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and
substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by
providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties
and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's
foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to
Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the situation in Iraq
and to urge my colleagues to support the legislation introduced by the
Majority Leader today.
I spoke on Iraq on this floor last November and again in February,
but Saddam Hussein is still in power, still threatening his neighbors
and oppressing his people, so I must turn again to this topic. In fact,
I will keep turning to it, joining my colleagues from both sides of the
aisle, trying to change U.S. policy toward Iraq, because I cannot abide
the idea of Saddam Hussein as the dictator of Iraq and I will never
accept the status quo in Iraq. One of three things will happen, Mr.
President: Saddam Hussein will lose his job, I will lose my job, or I
will keep talking about him on this floor. 1998 has unfortunately
brought us a new and less advantageous situation in our relationship
with Iraq. First of all, other threats have pushed Iraq into the
background.
Asia's recession and the collapse of the Russian ruble have sent
shock waves through all the emerging markets. Economic instability is
usually the harbinger of political instability, which in turn threatens
the peace between nations and the ability of weakened nations to
maintain their own security. The Indian-Pakistani nuclear confrontation
and the unravelling of Russia's military are two highly significant
examples of this trend. Russia's crisis is particularly important
because our security and that of our allies depends on Russia keeping
its nuclear weapons and fissile materials out of the hands of the rogue
states and terrorist groups which would deliver them to us, either by
ballistic missile or by the rented or stolen truck favored by
terrorists.
Terrorism may or may not actually be on the rise, but terrorists have
recently shown the intention and ability to attack American targets
overseas. As we confront organizations like that of Usama bin Ladin, we
come face to face with people who will go to great efforts to kill
Americans, and we react strongly. In the aftermath of events like the
bombing of Khobar Towers or the two embassies in Africa, we naturally
move terrorism to the forefront of our threat concerns. As peace is
gradually made in the world's most intractable ethnic and religious
conflicts, terrorism ought to decline, but our rationality can not
penetrate terrorist motivation.
In addition, there is proliferation. Rogue missiles and their deadly
cargoes are rapidly developing, and spreading: the North Korean launch
follows launches by Pakistan and Iran and tests of nuclear weapons in
both India and Pakistan. The trend in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is running against us as an increasing number of
countries come to view these missiles as a low-cost way of placing the
U.S. and our allies at risk without expending the resources to confront
us militarily across the board. In a way, Iraq during the Gulf War was
the precursor of this kind of thinking: they entered the war with a big
army and air force, but in the end the only thing that made them a
serious and deadly opponent was their arsenal of SCUD missiles. SCUDs
and the like may be 1950's technology, but armed with biological,
chemical, or nuclear warheads, these missiles are equalizers in 1998.
And so, in this time of uncertainty and change, we rank the threats
to our national life and to our individual lives and livelihoods, and
we tend to forget Iraq. It is an old threat, after all, and we have
lived with it for all this decade. In addition, Iraq seems held in
check by its neighbors and by economic sanctions. Yet although the
Iraqi threat may appear to be dormant, in fact the risk we and our
allies run from the continuation of Saddam Hussein in power is in fact
greater than it has been for years.
We know, most recently and unambiguously from the former U.N. weapons
inspector Scott Ritter, that Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass
destruction continues. We know that more than fifty days have elapsed
since the last UNSCOM weapons inspection. Almost two months of immunity
have been granted to a regime which used chemical weapons on its own
people, which seeks biological weapons, and which had an active and
advanced nuclear weapons program. Further, Iraqi regime rhetoric,
stated most recently by Tariq Aziz at the U.N. General Assembly meeting
this week, notifies us that Iraq will no longer accept UNSCOM
monitoring, at least not in an effective form. So Iraq's neighbors, and
we, can expect to be threatened by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction of
ever-growing lethality in coming years, with no collective
international action to halt it.
Saddam Hussein pays for his weapons programs by smuggling oil, at
which he is getting more proficient, and by diverting resources which
should be going to the Iraqi people. His military may be less capable
than before the Gulf War, but his troops could still overwhelm the
remaining areas of Iraqi Kurdistan outside his control. They could move
north at any time or attack pockets of resistance in the southern marsh
areas.
It is strongly in America's interest that Iraq's neighbors and our
allies in the region live in peace and security. That interest alone
more than justifies a policy to change the Iraqi government. But there
is an additional reason which ought to have particular resonance in the
United States. Mr President, I refer to the need to free the Iraqi
people from one of the most oppressive dictatorships on earth.
We Americans, who have striven for more than two centuries to govern
ourselves, should particularly feel the cruel anomaly which is the
Iraqi government. In an age in which democracy is in the ascendant, in
which democracy is universally recognized as a government's seal of
legitimacy, the continued existence of a Stalinist regime like the one
in Baghdad should inspire us to action. Saddam Hussein rules by raw
fear. In terms of absolutism, personality cult, and terror applied at
every level of society, only North Korea rivals Iraq today. The
existence of such a government is a daily affront to every freedom-
loving person, to everyone who is revolted by the degradation of our
fellow human beings. I refuse to accept it, and I want the United
States to refuse to accept it. As I have said on this floor before,
when Saddam's prisons and secret police records and burial grounds are
opened, when the Iraqis can at last tell their horrifying story to the
international court which will try Saddam for his many crimes against
his own people, we Americans will be proud we took this stand.
Mr. President, over the past year we have made some progress toward a
policy of replacing the Iraqi regime. The Foreign Operations
Appropriations Bill passed by this body included funding for assistance
to Iraqi opposition movements and for broadcasting to Iraq. The
Administration has proposed a program to assist the Iraqi opposition
abroad, to link the different groups together and get them organized. I
support all these efforts, but they don't go far enough. The
legislation before us takes the additional steps which indicate full
commitment to helping the Iraqi people get rid of Saddam and his
regime: the legislation states the commitment, and it enables the
Administration to supply military assistance to the Iraqi opposition.
Mr. President, should this legislation come into effect, we and the
Administration should be prepared for the possibility that the Iraqi
opposition may use the military equipment they receive, together with
their own resources, to liberate some portion of
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Iraq. As I have said before that will be the time for the United States
to recognize the opposition as Iraq's government and lift economic
sanctions on the liberated part of the country.
At this time in history, when some in the world seem ready to set
aside their moral scruples and interact with Saddam, when the UNSCOM
inspection system is at grave risk, when Saddam may attempt to break
free of the sanctions which have restrained him since the Gulf War, it
is urgent for the United States to clearly state its implacable
opposition to Saddam and his regime. This legislation is the way to do
that, and to simultaneously help Iraqis make their revolution. Besides
strengthening the Iraqi opposition, this legislation tells Iraqis to
keep up hope. It enables the Administration to tell Iraqis we know how
bad Saddam is, we have the facts on him, and we will not rest until we
see him in court. Iraqis will also learn that we understand the need to
deal with the burden of debt Saddam has incurred, and we will work with
Iraq's international creditors to find a solution for a post-Saddam
Iraq. Iraqis will learn of our commitment to provide humanitarian
assistance and democracy transition assistance to a post-Saddam Iraq.
They will learn that an Iraq committed to democracy will be a welcome
member in the family of nations. As they learn what we have done and
what we are prepared to do, the Iraqi people will be our allies in an
enterprise which will make them free, and America and its allies more
secure.
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS:
S. 2526. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue
a certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for
employment in the coastwise trade for the vessel Little Toot; to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
certificate of documentation for the vessel ``little toot''
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I am introducing a bill today to
direct that the vessel Little Toot, Official Number 938858, be accorded
coastwise trading privileges and be issued a certificate of
documentation under section 12103 of title 46, U.S. Code.
The Little Toot was constructed in Panama City, Florida in 1988. It
is a tender vessel, which can be used also as a small tugboat, and was
constructed by Marine Fabricators for Structures, Inc. It is 25.2 feet
long, 12.2 feet wide, 4.1 feet deep, and self-propelled.
The vessel was purchased by Marinex Construction Company, Inc. of
Johns Island, South Carolina, which purchased it in 1997 for intended
use as a working tugboat in the harbor of Charleston, SC. The vessel
has never been registered with the Coast Guard and has been sold a
number of times. U.S. documentation laws require documentary proof of
continuous U.S. ownership. The current owner has not been able to
locate all the necessary documentation to prove continuous U.S.
ownership, and therefore I am introducing legislation to waive the
requirements of the coastwise trade law.
The owner of the Little Toot is seeking a waiver of the existing law
because he wishes to use the vessel as a tugboat. His desired
intentions for the vessel's use will not adversely affect the coastwise
trade in U.S. waters. If he is granted this waiver, it is his intention
to comply fully with U.S. documentation and safety requirements. The
purpose of the legislation I am introducing is to allow the Little Toot
to engage in the coastwise trade and the fisheries of the United
States.
______
By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Bumpers, and Ms.
Moseley-Braun):
S. 2527. A bill to better regulate the transfer of firearms at gun
shows; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
the gun show sunshine act of 1998
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today on behalf of myself and
Senators Bumpers, Dodd, and Moseley-Braun, I introduce the Gun Show
Sunshine Act of 1998. This bill addresses the serious problem of gun
shows where criminals can buy and sell dangerous weapons without any
record of the sale, and without any background checks.
Let me outline the scope of the problem.
Since the Brady Act went into effect in 1994, more than 242,000
handgun purchases have been denied to convicted felons, fugitives, drug
addicts and other dangerous persons. The Domestic Violence Gun Ban in
the Brady Act, which I sponsored, went into effect in 1996 and has
prevented more than 6,800 firearms sales to people convicted of abusing
a spouse or child.
However, because of a loophole in our laws, those same people merely
need to drive to a gun show and they can buy as many weapons as they
want. Just walk in with cash and walk out with a weapon--no waiting, no
background check, and no record of the transaction.
Simply put, gun shows are firearm flea markets for felons.
Because gun shows are largely unregulated, no one knows for sure how
many gun shows are held each year, or how many guns are sold at them.
Estimates range from 2,000 to 5,200 shows a year. These shows generate
billions of dollars in gun sales and put thousands of guns into the
hands of people who would be stopped from buying a gun if a background
check were done.
The system is perfectly geared to the anonymity criminals crave.
Tommy Dillon, a serial killer in Ohio, used gun shows to both buy and
sell his murder weapons without a trace--even though police suspected
he was the killer. Dillon was so sure he found a perfect system that he
taunted police with an anonymous letter promising he would never be
caught. He was caught after killing five people, but only because of a
freak coincidence. After Dillon was picked up on an unrelated weapons
charge, someone he had sold one of his murder weapons to recognized
Dillon from a newspaper photo, and called the police when he realized
he had one of the murder weapons police sought.
One California gun dealer used the unregulated flea-market atmosphere
of gun shows to sell 1,700 guns in a four-year period. Some of these
guns made their way to gang members and juveniles. Of the guns that
could be traced, at least 30 were used in crimes, including three
murders and a shoot out with police.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 341,000 guns a year
were stolen from private citizens between 1987 and 1992. Because there
is no requirement to keep records, gun shows provide a safe haven to
dispose of these weapons.
How did it come to be like this?
Back in 1986, under intense pressure from the gun lobby, Congress
passed and President Reagan signed into law the Firearm Owners'
Protection Act. The law substantially weakened the Gun Control Act of
1968, which was passed after the assassinations of Sen. Robert F.
Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King.
Among the changes was a loosening of the law regarding who needs a
license to sell firearms and what records must be kept. Under the new
law, anyone selling from their ``private collection'' or who is engaged
in ``occasional sales'' was made exempt from federal record-keeping.
But the law does not define ``occasional sales'' or precisely what
constitutes a ``personal collection.'' And, to make matters worse, the
law prohibits agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
from even entering a gun show unless they are there on a specific case.
This has to stop. This bill would bring these weapons sales into the
light and strip criminals of their government-granted anonymity. Under
this bill, gun show operators would be required to obtain a license
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and meet the same
standards as federally licensed gun dealers--they must be more than 21
years of age and have no convictions for gun-law violations.
Any person selling a firearm at a gun show would be required to
notify the gun-show operator. The gun-show operator would then conduct
a background check of the purchaser using the Instant Check system,
just as a licensed gun dealer is required to do. The gun-show operator
would also be required to keep the same records as a licensed gun
dealer, including the name and address of the purchaser, the type of
gun and its serial number. The operator would also be required to
submit to the ATF a list of the serial numbers of all guns sold at the
show so that if these guns are later recovered at a crime scene, the
ATF will be able to trace the gun.
This bill simply takes the laws that already apply to licensed gun
dealers,
[[Page S11126]]
and applies them to the thousands of transactions conducted by
unlicensed sellers at gun shows.
Mr. President, we must do more to stop the gun violence on our
streets. Firearms are involved in 35,000 deaths a year. That's more
American killed than in the entire Korean War.
I urge my colleagues to help cut this weapons supply line that fuels
an arms race on our streets. Let's work together to pass the Gun Show
Sunshine Act and keep guns out of the hands of criminals.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2527
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. REGULATION OF GUN SHOWS.
(a) In General.--Section 923 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(m)(1) No person shall hold a gun show, unless--
``(A) the person is licensed to hold a gun show under this
subsection; and
``(B) not less than 30 days have elapsed since the person,
using a form which shall be prescribed by the Secretary, has
notified the Secretary and the chief law enforcement officer
of the appropriate jurisdiction of the postal address and the
dates and times at which the gun show is to be held.
``(2) In order to be licensed to hold a gun show under this
subsection, a person shall submit to the Secretary an
application that--
``(A) contains a certification by the applicant that--
``(i) the applicant meets the requirements of subparagraphs
(A) through (D) of subsection (d)(1); and
``(ii) any gun show to be conducted under the license is
not prohibited under State or local law, and will be
conducted in accordance with all applicable State and local
laws;
``(B) contains a photograph and fingerprints of the
applicant; and
``(C) is in such form as the Secretary shall prescribe by
regulation.
``(3)(A) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the
Secretary receives an application under paragraph (2), the
Secretary shall approve or deny the application. The
Secretary shall approve an application submitted pursuant to
paragraph (2) if the application meets the requirements of
that paragraph.
``(B) If the Secretary fails to approve or deny an
application submitted under paragraph (2) before the
expiration of the 60-day period described in subparagraph
(A), the applicant may bring an action under section 1361 of
title 28 to compel the Secretary to either approve or deny
the application in accordance with this subsection.
``(C) Upon approval of an application submitted under
paragraph (2) by the Secretary and payment by the applicant
of such fee as the Secretary shall establish to ensure that
the fees collected under this subsection are sufficient to
cover the costs of issuing licenses under this subsection,
the Secretary shall issue to the applicant a license that,
subject to this chapter and other applicable provisions of
law, entitles the licensee to hold gun shows in interstate or
foreign commerce during the 3-year period beginning on the
date on which the license is issued.
``(4)(A) Before any person who is not licensed under this
subsection may transfer any firearm at a gun show--
``(i) the person shall provide to the holder of the gun
show written notice of--
``(I) the name, age, and address of the person and of the
prospective transferee (or, in the case of a party who is a
corporation or other business entity, the identity and
principal and local places of business of such party);
``(II) the serial number, make, and model of the firearm;
and
``(III) the date and location of the transfer; and
``(ii) the holder of a gun show shall comply with the
requirements imposed on licensed dealers by section 922(t)
and subsections (g)(1)(A) and (g)(3)(A) of this section with
respect to the transfer.
``(B) Not later than 30 days after the end of a gun show
for which a license is issued under this subsection, the
licensee shall deliver to the Secretary all records or
documents collected by the licensee pursuant to subparagraph
(A) with respect to that gun show.
``(5) In this subsection, the term `gun show' means an
event or function that is--
``(A) sponsored by--
``(i) a national, State, or local organization devoted to
the collection, competitive use, or other sporting use of
firearms; or
``(ii) an organization or association that sponsors
functions devoted to the collection, competitive use, or
other sporting use of firearms in the community; and
``(B) held at a location--
``(i) that is not specified in any license issued under
subsection (b) or (c);
``(ii) at which a firearm is offered for sale or transfer;
and
``(iii) at which not less than 50 firearms are present, not
less than 1 of which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.''.
(b) Penalties.--Section 924(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(7)(A) Whoever knowingly violates section 923(m)(1) shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.
``(B) Whoever knowingly violates subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)
of section 923(m)(4) shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
``(C) Whoever violates section 923(m)(4)(A)(ii) by
knowingly failing to comply with a provision of law specified
in that section shall be punished as otherwise provided under
this section for knowingly violating that provision of
law.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to any conduct engaged in after the expiration of
the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this
Act.
______
By Mr. McConnell:
S. 2528. A bill to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to
establish a demonstration project to conduct outreach efforts to
increase awareness of the availability of Medicare cost-sharing
assistance to eligible low-income Medicare beneficiaries; to the
Committee on Finance.
social security administration outreach demonstration
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, since 1988, Congress has
established three programs to provide low-income elderly and disabled
individuals with Medicare cost-sharing assistance under Medicaid.
Despite the availability of these dual-eligible programs, gaps in
beneficiary knowledge and deficiencies in program administration by
federal and state agencies have created persistent barriers to
enrollment by eligible Medicare recipients.
For several years, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
and the Social Security Administration have sought to educate seniors
on the availability of Medicare cost-sharing programs through mass
mailings, informational hotlines, and pamphlet distribution. While
these initiatives have helped, a study by Families USA found that over
three million low-income Medicare beneficiaries are not enrolled in any
cost-sharing program. In Kentucky, the study estimates that the lack of
information about and participation in Medicare cost-sharing programs
cost more than 49,000 low-income Kentuckians about $25 million a year.
In order to overcome these troubling blockades to enrollment, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services,the Health Care Financing
Administration and the Social Security Administration are studying
options to more effectively serve our nation's financially vulnerable
seniors and disabled.
A key aspect to improving participation in cost-sharing programs is
the capacity for federal and state agencies to identify those who
experience critical income shifts after their initial enrollment in
Medicare and Social Security. One group at particular risk of reduced
income in later life is widowed spouses.
For anyone who has lost a loved one, the experience is overwhelming
both mentally and emotionally. The loss of a spouse, often after a
long, intensive illness, leaves many elderly with the difficult task of
restructuring their lives in order to regain personal and financial
stability. At this critical time of change, widowed spouses rely on
their revised Social Security benefit as the foundation for their
future budget planning. Statistics furnished by the Social Security
Administration show that 40 percent of nonmarried women, a category
which includes widows, rely on Social Security for 90 percent of their
income in comparison to only 18 percent of married couples. In
addition, nearly one-fourth of nonmarried women rely on Social Security
as their sole source of income.
In an effort to focus federal and state agencies on the health and
welfare needs of low-income, widowed spouses, I am introducing
legislation for a research demonstration to identify potential dual
eligibles during the recalculation of Social Security benefits for
widowed spouses. The Social Security Administration would refer this
information to the state administrators of Medicare cost-sharing
programs for their followup.
Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to thank Senator Arlen
Specter for including my request to fund this research effort by the
Social Security Administration in the committee report to FY 1999
Labor, Health
[[Page S11127]]
and Human Services, and Education Appropriations bill approved by the
Senate Appropriations Committee in September. As the House and Senate
work to complete the omnibus appropriations bill for FY 1999, I
strongly urge my colleagues to include this research endeavor in the
final measure as part of our commitment to improving the responsiveness
of federal and state agencies to the health and welfare needs of our
nation's at-risk seniors.
______
By Mr. SPECTER:
S. 2530. A bill to designate certain lands in the Valley Forge
National Historical Park as the Valley Forge National Cemetery, and for
other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
VALLEY FORGE NATIONAL CEMETERY.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation
creating a Valley Forge National Cemetery and calling on the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs to determine the feasibility of a national cemetery
in southwestern Pennsylvania.
This legislation specifically authorizes the Department of the
Interior to transfer a portion of the Valley Forge National Historic
Park to the Department of Veterans Affairs for establishment of a
Valley Forge National Cemetery in Southeastern Pennsylvania. This new
cemetery will be constructed and operated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs' National Cemetery System (NCS). The NCS was established by
Congress and approved by President Lincoln in 1862 to provide for the
proper burial and registration of graves of Civil War soldiers. The NCS
currently operates 115 cemeteries throughout the nation and in Puerto
Rico. Since its establishment, the National Cemetery System has been
fulfilling one of our nation's most solemn obligations; it has provided
for the proper burial of our nation's veterans. This mission is perhaps
more important today than it has been in the entire history of the NCS.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in a September 1997 report
that the numbers of veteran deaths and interments performed by NCS
continue to grow each year and are projected to peak between 2005 and
2010. This expected increase in workload has been reiterated by Mr.
Roger Rapp, Acting Director of the National Cemetery System, at an
April 29, 1998 hearing before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Subcommittee on Benefits. According to Mr. Rapp, annual veteran deaths
are expected to peak in 2008.
With the fifth largest 65 and older veteran population in the
country, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania faces many challenges in
fulfilling the nation's solemn obligation to its deceased veterans and
their families. Striving to meet these challenges, the NCS operates two
Pennsylvania national cemeteries: Indiantown Gap National Cemetery and
the Philadelphia National Cemetery. The Indiantown Gap National
Cemetery is a 677-acre cemetery, which opened in 1982 and is expected
to remain open until 2030 under estimated rates of interment. The
Philadelphia National Cemetery opened in 1885 with 13 acres, reached
casket capacity in 1962 and is expected to reach cremation capacity in
1999.
A Valley Forge National Cemetery would provide the Philadelphia area
with new gravesites and alleviate the need for families to travel over
two hours to the Indiantown Gap National Cemetery. I am informed that
the land to be transferred to the Department of Veterans Affairs does
not contain any historical markers and is a suitable site for such an
important facility.
Also, there is no national cemetery in the southern or western parts
of Pennsylvania, where the veteran population is heavy. In an effort to
address the burial needs of these veterans, I have included a provision
in the Senate legislation requiring the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
to report to the House and Senate Committees on Veterans' Affairs
within 90 days of enactment on the feasibility of establishing and
operating a national cemetery in Southwestern Pennsylvania.
The House legislation, H.R. 4365, introduced by my good friend,
Congressman Jon Fox, is co-sponsored by the entire Pennsylvania
delegation. I join my House colleagues in introducing this legislation
for consideration in the Senate.
____________________