[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 133 (Tuesday, September 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11110-S11111]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            THE FARM CRISIS

  Mr. DORGAN. Let me say that piece of legislation and a lot of other 
legislation that has been considered by the Congress, by this 105th 
Congress, in my judgement pales in importance to the responsibility we 
have to deal with the current farm crisis that exists in this country.

[[Page S11111]]

  Last evening, I drove home from the Capitol, and I thought about the 
day. When I left, I left the conference committee between the House and 
the Senate on agriculture appropriations. It was a conference committee 
in a small room. There were a lot of people. It was cramped and hot. 
The result of that conference committee was a party-line vote to reject 
a proposal by President Clinton to provide nearly $8 billion of 
emergency aid to deal with the farm crisis.
  Instead, the conference committee accepted the majority party's 
proposal of roughly $3.9 billion which almost everyone understands 
comes far short of what is necessary. I also thought about the news 
yesterday that was described in a story in the Washington Post this 
morning. I was thinking about it on the way home because I was thinking 
about the juxtaposition. It was a story about a hedge fund. This 
particular hedge fund apparently had liabilities upwards of $100 
billion and ran into serious problems. And then the rescuers were 
brought together under the Federal Reserve Board's so-called official 
sponsorship.
  The banks were brought together, and they put together a rescue 
package for this group that is involved in hedging. By the way, the Fed 
spokesman said they are helping sponsor this rescue package not with 
Federal funds but from all of the lenders. The Fed felt it had to get 
these lenders together for a rescue package because it had a ``concern 
about the good working of the marketplace and the large risk exposure 
and potential for a disruption of payments.''
  One wonders about such an organization that is involved in hedging. 
By definition this is a rather speculative occupation. In fact, one of 
the principals had been one of the top officials at the Federal Reserve 
Board. He went over to this hedging operation. It grows and expands, 
and then has liabilities up to $100 billion. I have no idea what the 
assets were. Then it gets in trouble. But then instead of having the 
marketplace assess its future, the Federal Reserve Board apparently 
brings together the lenders and says, ``Well, gosh, you're too big to 
fail.''
  If you apparently work in these environs, have these contacts, and 
are involved in this kind of risk, you are too big to fail. But what if 
you are one of those family farms out there that has seen what has 
happened to their wheat price. The price of wheat has been going down, 
down, down, down. These family farmers are told, ``You're too small to 
matter.'' What is the difference between those who are too big to fail 
and those who are too small to matter?
  I guess it is economic clout in the form of sheer raw economic power.
  I would hope that we would have the opportunity to decide in this 
Congress that family farmers ought not be failing in this country 
either. The fact is this country will lose something very important to 
its future if we decide that family farmers do not matter. Right now 
they are suffering through a crisis that is very significant and one 
that we must address.
  The question is whether we will address it in a kind of a puny, cheap 
way that does not solve it? Will Congress do just enough to pull us 
through the election for a month or two? Or is Congress going to 
address it and say, ``Farmers, we're on your side. You matter to this 
country. We're going to do something significant to help you get in the 
field next spring, help you harvest next fall, and give you some hope 
that maybe you can make a decent living"?
  Mr. President, I notice that a couple of my colleagues perhaps want 
to propound a unanimous consent request. And I will be happy to yield 
the floor briefly provided that I retain my right to the floor and 
provided it is not going to take 15 or 20 minutes. If they intend to 
propound a unanimous consent request that is very brief, I am happy to 
interrupt my presentation and allow them to do that so they don't have 
to wait.

  Mr. HARKIN. I thank my friend from North Dakota. I wanted to join him 
in talking about the agriculture situation, but I appreciate if he 
would yield the floor, and he can get the floor back when Senator 
Domenici and I finish.
  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent I regain the floor following the 
unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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