[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 131 (Saturday, September 26, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1829-E1830]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         THREATS AGINST ISRAEL

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                      Saturday, September 26, 1998

  Mr. SCHAFFER of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I have addressed the House on 
a number of occasions regarding one of America's closest and most-
trusted allies, Israel. The following article, written by Mr. Paul 
Mann, was published on September 21, 1998 in Aviation Week & Space 
Technology. Mr. Mann's article paints a sobering picture of the current 
threats facing Israel today by the accelerating spread of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout 
the Middle East. America must take every step to help Israel counter 
these threats through full development and deployment of an effective 
antimissile defense. I hereby submit Mr. Mann's article, entitled 
``Israel Lobbies Hard For Antimissile Defense,'' for the Record.

              Israel Lobbies Hard For Antimissile Defense

                             (By Paul Mann)

       Israeli legislators of all political stripes are pressing 
     for faster deployment of antimissile defenses, warning that 
     democracies everywhere face a ``new world order'' of 
     dictatorships increasingly equipped with mass destruction 
     warheads and the missiles to deliver them.
       In an impassioned plea last week to their counterparts on 
     Capitol Hill, four members of the Israeli Knesset called for 
     a re-thinking of strategic preparedness in light of the 
     accelerating spread of nuclear, chemical and biological 
     weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
       Recent Iranian and North Korean tests suggest their 
     missiles might have longer ranges than previously thought. 
     Israel suspects North Korea of assisting Syria in developing 
     an indigenous missile manufacturing capacity. Tel Aviv also 
     suspects the Damascus government is working on nerve gas 
     warheads on its ballistic missiles date back at least to mid-
     1997, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International 
     Peace.
       Israeli lawmakers want to expand on many years of bilateral 
     cooperation with the U.S., particularly in the 
     interoperability of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems 
     designed for theater warfare. Israel successfully tested its 
     Arrow anti-ballistic missile again last week and might 
     eventually join in the U.S. Theater High Altitude Area 
     Defense (Thaad) program, if varied problems that have dogged 
     it for years are finally overcome. Modifications to the 
     program might be announced by the Pentagon this week, one 
     U.S. lawmaker said.
       At the first meeting of the American/Israeli 
     Interparliamentary Commission on National Security, a joint 
     caucus of legislators who are ardent missile defense 
     advocates, the Israelis sought to stoke up support for their 
     long-held advocacy of multilayered BMD deployment. They 
     placed heavy emphasis on boost-phase intercepts--striking 
     enemy missiles right after launch so the warheads fall back 
     on the attacker. This is considered essential with the advent 
     of chemical and biological warheads in the possessions of 
     regional military powers. Tel Aviv suspects Iraq, Iran and 
     Syria have chemical warheads and probably biological warheads 
     as well.
       But boost-phase intercept capability presents major 
     technical challenges and almost certainly will not be 
     deployable in the next few years, a period the Israelis 
     consider crucial lead time if theater BMD deployments are to 
     be ready when they are needed to counter the emerging Middle 
     Eastern threat. Israel's plan for a multiple-layer missile 
     defense had its inception in 1988 in a joint program with 
     Washington, begun under the now-defunct Strategy Defense 
     Initiative (SDI) of the Reagan Administration.
       The Israelis also met with high-ranking U.S. military 
     officials last week, including Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles, 
     director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization. It succeeded the SDI office.
       Beyond expanded bilateral cooperation, Israeli legislators 
     urged regional BMD cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, and 
     proposed that the U.S. lead world democracies in an 
     initiative to head off a global mass weapons capability while 
     there is still time.
       ``Jordanian officials are interested in this kind of 
     cooperation, which we intend to pursue'' when the 
     congressional half of the Interparliamentary Commission makes 
     a reciprocal visit to Israel, possibly in December, said Sen. 
     Jon Kyl (R-Ariz), a commission member.
       As for the presumed global potential of the threat, 
     countries that have never had WMD ``can have it tomorrow 
     because [the technology]'' is so readily available; ``it's 
     more than a theater-specific issue,'' said former Israeli 
     Finance Minister Dan Meridor of the ruling Likud coalition.
       Israeli lawmakers stressed there was no time to lose, 
     claiming that terrorist states such as Iran are developing 
     offensive ballistic missiles faster than the U.S. and Israel 
     are developing defense against them.
       ``They are ahead of us--we must face this very clearly,'' 
     warned Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh of Israel's opposition Labor 
     party. ``Their ability to hit Israel and U.S. troops in the 
     Middle East is far ahead of what we can do to contain it. 
     Active defenses, like the Arrow and Thaad, are indispensable, 
     but they are not enough. We must have as well the capacity 
     for preemptive defense--whatever that may mean.'' Sneh 
     appeared to be referring to preemptive Israeli strikes 
     against emerging WMD capabilities, but did not elaborate.
       ``We're now very close to a thousand missiles surrounding 
     the state of Israel,'' added Ran Cohen of the Meretz party.
       ``And we don't have Canadians as neighbors,'' rejoined Uzi 
     Landau, Likud chairman of the Knesset's foreign affairs and 
     defense committee.
       Arab nations have protested for years, however, that Israel 
     is a de facto nuclear power, has nuclear-capable Jericho 
     ballistic missiles, is pursuing unmanned aerial vehicles and 
     cruise missile development and is collaborating with the U.S. 
     on the Tactical High-Energy Laser (Thel) system (AW&ST Aug. 
     12, 1996, p. 31).
       Landau outlined the latest Israeli estimates of the missile 
     threat:
       Neighboring Syria is believed to have hundreds of very 
     short-range Frog 7 and SS-21s, plus hundreds of Scud B and 
     tens of Scud Cs with a range ``basically covering the 
     entirety of Israel,'' The Scud Cs are imported from North 
     Korea, which is assisting the development of Syria's 
     independent manufacture of those missiles, Landau alleged. 
     ``Tens of warheads with these missiles can be equipped with 
     chemical gases, and with respect to this, a project is now 
     underway in Syria for development of a new, more advanced 
     lethal nerve gas of the VX type.''
       Iran has 300-plus Scud B missiles and 60 Scud Cs. Landau 
     called Iran's development of its 800-mi. range Shahab-3 
     missile ``vigorous, done with the active involvement of North 
     Korea, and above it, Russia. Our assessment is that without 
     Russian assistance, [the Iranians] would not have been as 
     successful as they were [in the Shahab-3 test in July] and 
     they need [Russian aid] critically for the successful 
     completion of this project.'' The Shahab would enable Iran to 
     target Israel.
       Iraq retains the know-how to reconstitute much of its 
     previous WMD capability, once U.N. sanctions and weapons 
     inspections are lifted, according to Landau ``It will not 
     take much time for Iraq not only to come back to what it used 
     to be, but to be much more of a threatening force in the 
     region.'' Following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf 
     war, the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered 
     that Baghdad had been secretly pursuing a multibillion 
     dollar nuclear weapons program, code-named ``Petrochemical 
     3,'' employing thousands of people at numerous sites. The 
     regime of Saddam Hussein has sought steadfastly to limit 
     or thwart U.N.

[[Page E1830]]

     inspections of its WMD capability, which includes chemical 
     and biological weapons and materials.
       The Middle East threat is unusually acute, Landau argued, 
     owing to three factors. First, the outlaw regimes procuring 
     WMD capabilities have far-reaching, radical political 
     objectives, among them supplanting Western culture. In other 
     words, they are zealots. Second, the attempts to acquire WMD 
     capability are being fostered with active foreign 
     involvement, namely Russia. Third, there are no treaty or 
     arms control constraints on outlaw regimes to prevent them 
     from using WMD to promote their strategic goals.
       ``When dictators of very poor countries, particularly in 
     the Middle East region, invest scarce resources in such 
     projects, they do not do so for exhibition purposes,'' Landau 
     asserted. ``They are prepared to use [them]--they mean 
     business. Such a Middle East threatens other moderate 
     countries in the region like Turkey, like Jordan, like other 
     countries friendly to the U.S., such as Egypt, the Persian 
     Gulf emirates, Saudi Arabia. Such a Middle East poses a 
     threat to the heart of Europe in a few years to come--and 
     beyond the European continent, not later than the first 
     decade of the next millennium.''
       Reliable deterrence cannot be assured by a single solution, 
     technologically or otherwise, Meridor cautioned. 
     Intelligence, diplomacy, economic sanctions, boost-phase 
     intercept capability--all avenues of deterrence will have to 
     be pursued. Seeking to dramatize the urgency of the issue, he 
     added: ``If we don't deter [the threat] in time, with the 
     whole range of political and defense capabilities, we will 
     find ourselves in a very dangerous situation. It takes time 
     to develop [missile defenses], it takes time to test, it 
     takes time to produce, to deploy and to train, and we are in 
     the last hour or minute.''