

growing markets? Or when the countries of Asia talk about ways to rebound from their economic crisis?

Obviously, Mr. Speaker, we are much better off if we, the world's only complete superpower, are at the table for trade negotiations. The world will not stop to wait for us if we simply miss the bus. We will be the losers, Mr. Speaker.

We have got to pass this rule and pass fast track so, as President Clinton said on July 23, we can have these votes and put it together. We can have bipartisan support for a very important policy.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

Pursuant to clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of agreeing to the resolution.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 230, nays 193, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 465]

YEAS—230

Aderholt	Combest	Granger
Archer	Cook	Greenwood
Armey	Cooksey	Gutknecht
Bachus	Cox	Hall (TX)
Baker	Crane	Hamilton
Ballenger	Crapo	Hansen
Barr	Cubin	Hastert
Barrett (NE)	Cunningham	Hastings (WA)
Bartlett	Davis (FL)	Hayworth
Barton	Davis (VA)	Hefley
Bass	Deal	Herger
Bateman	DeLay	Hill
Bereuter	Diaz-Balart	Hilley
Berman	Dickey	Hobson
Bilbray	Doolittle	Hoekstra
Bilirakis	Dreier	Horn
Billey	Duncan	Hostettler
Blunt	Dunn	Houghton
Boehlert	Ehlers	Hulshof
Boehner	Ehrlich	Hunter
Bonilla	Emerson	Hutchinson
Bono	Ensign	Hyde
Boswell	Everett	Inglis
Brady (TX)	Ewing	Istook
Bryant	Fawell	Jenkins
Bunning	Foley	Johnson (CT)
Burr	Forbes	Johnson, Sam
Buyer	Fossella	Jones
Callahan	Fowler	Kasich
Calvert	Fox	Kelly
Camp	Franks (NJ)	Kim
Campbell	Frelinghuysen	King (NY)
Canady	Gallegher	Kingston
Cannon	Ganske	Klug
Castle	Gekas	Knollenberg
Chabot	Gibbons	Kolbe
Chambliss	Gilchrest	LaHood
Chenoweth	Gillmor	Largent
Christensen	Gilman	Latham
Coble	Goodlatte	LaTourette
Coburn	Goodling	Lazio
Collins	Graham	Leach

Lewis (CA)	Pickering
Lewis (KY)	Pitts
Linder	Pombo
Livingston	Porter
LoBiondo	Portman
Lucas	Quinn
Manzullo	Radanovich
McCollum	Ramstad
McCryer	Redmond
McDade	Regula
McHugh	Riggs
McInnis	Riley
McIntosh	Rogan
McKeon	Rogers
Metcalf	Rohrabacher
Mica	Ros-Lehtinen
Miller (FL)	Roukema
Moran (KS)	Royce
Morella	Ryun
Myrick	Salmon
Nethercutt	Saxton
Neumann	Scarborough
Ney	Schaefer, Dan
Northup	Schaeffer, Bob
Norwood	Sensenbrenner
Nussle	Sessions
Oxley	Shadegg
Packard	Pappas
Parker	Shays
Paul	Shimkus
Paxton	Shuster
Pease	Skeen
Peterson (PA)	Smith (MI)
Petri	Smith (NJ)

Smith (OR)	Visclosky
Smith (TX)	Waters
Smith, Linda	Watt (NC)
Snowbarger	
Solomon	
Souder	Burton
Spence	English
Stearns	Furse
Stenholm	Goss
Stump	
Sununu	
Talent	
Tanner	
Tauzin	
Taylor (NC)	
Thomas	
Thornberry	
Thune	
Tiaht	
Upton	
Walsh	
Wamp	
Watkins	
Watts (OK)	
Weldon (FL)	
Weldon (PA)	
Weller	
White	
Whitfield	
Wicker	
Wilson	
Wolf	
Young (AK)	
Young (FL)	

Waxman	Wise
Wexler	Woolsey
Weygand	Wynn
	NOT VOTING—11
Burton	Jefferson
English	Kennelly
Furse	Moakley
Goss	Payne

□ 1552

Mr. GONZALEZ changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. SOLOMON and Mrs. LINDA SMITH of Washington changed their vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the previous question was ordered. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. THORNBERRY). The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 4095

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have my name removed as a co-sponsor of H.R. 4095.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

#### RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1997

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 553, I call up the bill (H.R. 2621) to extend trade authorities procedures with respect to reciprocal trade agreements, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 553, the bill is considered read for amendment.

The text of H.R. 2621 is as follows:

H.R. 2621

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### TITLE I—TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES

##### SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

##### SEC. 102. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

(a) OVERALL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States for agreements subject to the provisions of section 103 are—

(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;

(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and distortions that are directly related to trade and that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade;

(3) to further strengthen the system of international trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute settlement; and

(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote full employment in the United States and to enhance the global economy.

(b) PRINCIPAL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—

(1) TRADE BARRIERS AND DISTORTIONS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade barriers and other trade distortions are—

(A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade; and

(B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier elimination agreements, with particular attention to those tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(2) TRADE IN SERVICES.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, including regulatory and other barriers that deny national treatment and unreasonably restrict the establishment and operations of service suppliers.

(3) FOREIGN INVESTMENT.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding foreign investment is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to trade related foreign investment by—

(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment;

(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;

(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements and other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments;

(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice; and

(E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes.

(4) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are—

(A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through—

(i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)),

(II) achieving improvements in the standards of that Agreement, particularly with respect to United States industries whose products are subject to the lengthiest transition periods for full compliance by developing countries with that Agreement; and

(III) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement entered into by the United States provide protection at least as strong as the protection afforded by chapter 17 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the annexes thereto;

(ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing products embodying intellectual property;

(iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property rights; and

(iv) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement mechanisms; and

(B) to secure fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory market access opportunities

for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.

(5) TRANSPARENCY.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain broader application of the principle of transparency through—

(A) increased and more timely public access to information regarding trade issues and the activities of international trade institutions; and

(B) increased openness of dispute settlement proceedings, including under the World Trade Organization.

(6) RECIPROCAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports in foreign markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk and value-added commodities by—

(A) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or other charges that decrease market opportunities for United States exports—

(i) giving priority to those products that are subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major producing countries; and

(ii) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United States import-sensitive products;

(B) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United States;

(C) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate practices that unfairly decrease United States market access opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to import-sensitive products, including—

(i) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading enterprises and other administrative mechanisms;

(ii) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial requirements affecting new technologies, including biotechnology;

(iii) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not based on sound science in contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;

(iv) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and

(v) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate quotas;

(D) improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of perishable agriculture;

(E) taking into account whether a party to the negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented obligations under those agreements;

(F) taking into account whether a product is subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of a major producing country to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or by the circumvention by that country of its obligations under those agreements; and

(G) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the World Trade Organization have made meaningful market liberalization commitments in agriculture.

(7) LABOR, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND OTHER MATTERS.—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding labor, the environment, and other matters is to address the following aspects of foreign government policies and practices regarding labor, the

environment, and other matters that are directly related to trade:

(A) To ensure that foreign labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or serve as disguised barriers to trade.

(B) To ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from or waive existing domestic environmental, health, safety, or labor measures, including measures that deter exploitative child labor, as an encouragement to gain competitive advantage in international trade or investment. Nothing in this subparagraph is intended to address changes to a country's laws that are non-discriminatory and consistent with sound macroeconomic development.

(8) WTO EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in financial services are those set forth in section 135(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)), regarding trade in civil aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of that Act, and regarding rules of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).

(C) INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY OBJECTIVES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President should take into account the relationship between trade agreements and other important priorities of the United States and seek to ensure that the trade agreements entered into by the United States complement and reinforce other policy goals. The United States priorities in this area include—

(A) seeking to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive;

(B) seeking to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means for doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources;

(C) promoting the respect for worker rights and the rights of children and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights, particularly by working with the International Labor Organization to encourage the observance and enforcing of core labor standards, including exploitative child labor; and

(D) supplementing and strengthening standards for protection of intellectual property under conventions administered by international organizations other than the World Trade Organization, expanding the conventions to cover new and emerging technologies, and eliminating discrimination and unreasonable exceptions or preconditions to such protection.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the use of the trade authorities procedures described in section 103 to modify United States law.

(d) GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATORS.—

(1) DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES.—In pursuing the negotiating objectives described in subsection (b), the negotiators on behalf of the United States shall take into account United States domestic objectives, including the protection of health and safety, essential security, environmental, consumer, and employment opportunity interests, and the law and regulations related thereto.

(2) CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRADE LAWS.—In the course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(A) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional advisers on trade policy and negotiations appointed under section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974; and

(B) take into account the need for the United States to retain the ability to enforce

rigorously its trade laws in order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions.

(e) ADHERENCE TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.—In determining whether to enter into negotiations with a particular country, the President shall take into account the extent to which that country has implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

**SEC. 103. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.**

(a) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF BARRIERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Whenever the President determines that one or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President—

(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries before—

(i) October 1, 2001, or

(ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c), and

(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim—

(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty, or

(ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment,

as the President determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement. The President shall notify the Congress of the President's intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.

(2) LIMITATIONS.—No proclamation may be made under paragraph (1) that—

(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date of enactment; or

(B) reduces the rate of duty on an article to take effect on a date that is more than 10 years after the first reduction that is proclaimed to carry out a trade agreement with respect to such article.

(3) AGGREGATE REDUCTION; EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—

(A) AGGREGATE REDUCTION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in effect on such day if—

(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement with respect to such article; and

(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the effective date of such first reduction.

(B) EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—No staging is required under subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that is not produced in the United States. The United States International Trade Commission shall advise the President of the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging under this subparagraph.

(4) ROUNDING.—If the President determines that such action will simplify the computa-

tion of reductions under paragraph (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount equal to the lesser of—

(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or

(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.

(5) OTHER LIMITATIONS.—A rate of duty reduction that may not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included within an implementing bill provided for under section 105 and that bill is enacted into law.

(6) OTHER TARIFF MODIFICATIONS.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the United States agrees to such modification or staged rate reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to the formation of a regional free-trade area.

(7) AUTHORITY UNDER URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT NOT AFFECTED.—Nothing in this subsection shall limit the authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(b) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF AND NONTARIFF BARRIERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—(A) Whenever the President determines that—

(i) one or more existing duties or any other import restriction of any foreign country or the United States or any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the United States economy, or

(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the period described in subparagraph (C).

(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for—

(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), or

(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition of, such barrier or other distortion.

(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under this paragraph before—

(i) October 1, 2001, or

(ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c).

(2) CONDITIONS.—A trade agreement may be entered into under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 102 and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in section 104.

(3) BILLS QUALIFYING FOR TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this title referred to as "trade authorities procedures") apply to a bill of either House of Congress consisting only of—

(A) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into under this subsection and approving the statement of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such trade agreement.

(B) provisions directly related to the principal trade negotiating objectives set forth

in section 102(b) achieved in such trade agreement, if those provisions are necessary for the operation or implementation of United States rights or obligations under such trade agreement.

(C) provisions that define and clarify, or provisions that are related to, the operation or effect of the provisions of the trade agreement.

(D) provisions to provide adjustment assistance to workers and firms adversely affected by trade, and

(E) provisions necessary for purposes of complying with section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 in implementing the trade agreement, to the same extent as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section. A bill to which this subparagraph applies shall hereafter in this title be referred to as an "implementing bill".

(c) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL PROCESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in section 105(b)—

(A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) before October 1, 2001; and

(B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) after September 30, 2001, and before October 1, 2005, if (and only if)—

(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph (2); and

(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before October 1, 2001.

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT.—If the President is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures should be extended to implementing bills described in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, not later than July 1, 2001, a written report that contains a request for such extension, together with—

(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;

(B) a description of the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title, and a statement that such progress justifies the continuation of negotiations; and

(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed to complete the negotiations.

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—The President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as soon as practicable, but not later than August 1, 2001, a written report that contains—

(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; and

(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) should be approved or disapproved.

(4) REPORTS MAY BE CLASSIFIED.—The reports submitted to the Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, may be classified to the extent the President determines appropriate.

(5) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS.—(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term

"extension disapproval resolution" means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the \_\_\_ disapproves the request of the President for the extension, under section 103(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997, of the provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997 after September 30, 2001.", with the blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House of the Congress.

(B) Extension disapproval resolutions—

(i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by any member of such House; and

(ii) shall be jointly referred, in the House of Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules.

(C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.

(D) It is not in order for—

(i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;

(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules; or

(iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension disapproval resolution after September 30, 2001.

**SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS.**

(a) **NOTICE AND CONSULTATION BEFORE NEGOTIATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 103(b), shall—

(A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and

(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and such other committees of the House and Senate as the President deems appropriate.

(2) **CONSULTATIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS ON CERTAIN OBJECTIVES.**—

(A) **CONSULTATION.**—In addition to the requirements set forth in paragraph (1), before initiating negotiations with respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) in which the subject matter is directly related to the principal trade negotiating objectives set forth in section 2(b)(1) or section 102(b)(7), the President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and with the appropriate industry sector advisory groups established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to such negotiations.

(B) **SCOPE.**—The consultations described in subparagraph (A) shall concern the manner in which the negotiation will address the objective of reducing or eliminating a specific tariff or nontariff barrier or foreign government policy or practice directly related to trade that decreases market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distorts United States trade.

(3) **NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING AGRICULTURE.**—Before initiating negotiations under section 102(b)(6)(A) with any country, the President shall assess whether United States tariffs on agriculture products that were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country. In addition, the President shall consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with respect to imports from the United States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. The President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met.

(b) **CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS BEFORE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO.**—

(1) **CONSULTATION.**—Before entering into any trade agreement under section 103(b), the President shall consult with—

(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters which would be affected by the trade agreement.

(2) **SCOPE.**—The consultation described in paragraph (1) shall include consultation with respect to—

(A) the nature of the agreement;

(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; and

(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 105.

(c) **ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORTS.**—The report required under section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any trade agreement entered into under section 103(a) or (b) of this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 days after the date on which the President notifies the Congress under section 103(a)(1) or 105(a)(1)(A) of the President's intention to enter into the agreement.

**SEC. 105. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—

(1) **NOTIFICATION AND SUBMISSION.**—Any agreement entered into under section 103(b) shall enter into force with respect to the United States if (and only if)—

(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into the trade agreement, notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the President's intention to enter into the agreement, and promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the Federal Register;

(B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the President submits to the Congress a description of those changes to existing laws that the President considers would be required in order to bring the United States into compliance with the agreement;

(C) after entering into the agreement, the President submits a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, together with—

(i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 103(b)(3); and

(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the trade agreement; and

(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph (2); and

(D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.

(2) **SUPPORTING INFORMATION.**—The supporting information required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of—

(A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law; and

(B) a statement—

(i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title;

(ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding—

(I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives referred to in clause (i);

(II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an agreement previously negotiated;

(III) how the agreement serves the interests of United States commerce; and

(IV) how the implementing bill complies with section 103(b)(3).

(3) **RECIPROCAL BENEFITS.**—In order to ensure that a foreign country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) does not receive benefits under the agreement unless the country is also subject to the obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only to the parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement.

(b) **LIMITATIONS ON TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.**—

(1) **FOR LACK OF CONSULTATIONS.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the date that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.

(B) **PROCEDURAL DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of this paragraph, the term "procedural disapproval resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance with section 104 or 105 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997 on negotiations with respect to, or entering into, a trade agreement to which section 103(b) of that Act applies and, therefore, the provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to that trade agreement."

(2) **PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS.**—(A) Procedural disapproval resolutions—

(i) in the House of Representatives—

(I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;

(II) shall be jointly referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules; and

(III) may not be amended by either Committee; and

(ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the Committee on Finance.

(B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.

(C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules.

(C) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—Subsection (b) of this section and section 103(c) are enacted by the Congress—

(I) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such other rules; and

(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House.

**SEC. 106. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.**

(a) CERTAIN AGREEMENTS.—Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2), if an agreement to which section 103(b) applies—

(1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization regarding trade in information technology products,

(2) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization regarding extended negotiations on financial services as described in section 135(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)),

(3) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization regarding the rules of origin work program described in Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin referred to in section 101(d)(10) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(10)), or

(4) is entered into with Chile, and results from negotiations that were commenced before the date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall apply.

(b) TREATMENT OF AGREEMENTS.—In the case of any agreement to which subsection (a) applies—

(I) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures to implementing bills for be determined without regard to the requirements of section 104(a), and any procedural disapproval resolution under section 105(b)(1)(B) shall not be in order with respect to the provisions of section 104(a); and

(2) consultations under section 104(a) that would be required prior to initiation of negotiations shall be made as soon as feasible after the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 107. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(1) IMPLEMENTING BILL.—

(A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by striking "section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act" and inserting "section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 105(a)(1) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by striking "or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act" and inserting "section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 105(a)(1) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(2) ADVICE FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.—Section 131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking "section 123 of this Act or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988," and inserting "section 123 of this Act or section 103(a) or (b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997";

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking "section 1102 (b) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting "section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997";

(B) in subsection (b), by striking "section 1102(a)(3)(A)" and inserting "section 103(a)(3)(A) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997" before the end period; and

(C) in subsection (c), by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988," and inserting "section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(3) HEARINGS AND ADVICE.—Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988," each place it appears and inserting "section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(4) PREREQUISITES FOR OFFERS.—Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 2154(b)) is amended by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting "section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(5) ADVICE FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS.—Section 135 (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting "section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997";

(B) in subsection (e)(1)—

(i) by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" each place it appears and inserting "section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997"; and

(ii) by striking "section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 1988" and inserting "section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997"; and

(C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking "section 1101 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting "section 102 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(6) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 162(a) (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking "or under section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting "or under section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997".

(b) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS.—For purposes of applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)—

(1) any trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 or 2112); and

(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974.

**SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.**

In this title:

(1) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity organized under the laws of the United States; and

(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or United States citizens, or both.

(2) URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.—The term "Uruguay Round Agreements" has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).

(3) WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.—The term "World Trade Organization" means the organization established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.

(4) WTO AGREEMENT.—The term "WTO Agreement" means the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered into on April 15, 1994.

**TITLE II—TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE**

**SEC. 201. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS.**

Section 245 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2317) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a) by striking "1993" and all that follows through "1998" and inserting "1998, 1999, and 2000"; and

(2) in subsection (b) by striking "1994" and all that follows through "1998" and inserting "1998, 1999, and 2000".

**SEC. 202. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FIRMS.**

Section 256(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2346(b)) is amended by striking "1993" and all that follows through "1998" and inserting "1998, 1999, and 2000".

**SEC. 203. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT.**

Section 280(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2391(a)) is amended—

(1) by striking "2, 3, and 4" and inserting "2 and 3"; and

(2) by striking "January 31, 1980" and inserting "October 1, 1999".

**SEC. 204. TERMINATION.**

Section 285(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2271 note) is amended in paragraphs (1) and (2)(A)(i) by striking "1998" and inserting "2000".

**SEC. 205. EFFECTIVE DATE.**

The amendments made by this title take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

**TITLE III—REVENUE PROVISIONS**

**SEC. 301. REPEAL OF SPECIAL RULE FOR RENTAL USE OF VACATION HOMES, ETC., FOR LESS THAN 15 DAYS.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to disallowance of certain expenses in connection with business use of home, rental of vacation homes, etc.) is amended by striking subsection (g).

(b) NO BASIS REDUCTION UNLESS DEPRECIATION CLAIMED.—Section 1016 of such Code is amended by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f) and by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:

(e) SPECIAL RULE WHERE RENTAL USE OF VACATION HOME, ETC., FOR LESS THAN 15 DAYS.—If a dwelling unit is used during the taxable year by the taxpayer as a residence and such dwelling unit is actually rented for less than 15 days during the taxable year, the reduction under subsection (a)(2) by reason of such rental use in any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1997, shall not exceed the depreciation deduction allowed for such rental use.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1997.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in House Report 105-745, is adopted.

The text of H.R. 2621, as amended by the amendment printed in the bill and, as modified by the amendment printed in House Report 105-745, is as follows:

H.R. 2621

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**TITLE I—TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES**

**SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.**

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—The Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998’’.

(b) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold War, binding nations together through a series of mutual rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.

(2) The national security of the United States depends on its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of the economy of the United States, such as information technology, telecommunications and other leading technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology, and intellectual property. Trade will create new opportunities for the United States and preserve the unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, political, and military affairs. The United States, secured by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

**SEC. 102. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.**

(a) **OVERALL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.**—The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States for agreements subject to the provisions of section 103 are—

(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;

(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and distortions that are directly related to trade and that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade;

(3) to further strengthen the system of international trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute settlement; and

(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote full employment in the United States and to enhance the global economy.

(b) **PRINCIPAL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.**—

(1) **TRADE BARRIERS AND DISTORTIONS.**—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade barriers and other trade distortions are—

(A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distort United States trade; and

(B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier elimination agreements, with particular

attention to those tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(2) **TRADE IN SERVICES.**—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, including regulatory and other barriers that deny national treatment or unreasonably restrict the establishment or operations of service suppliers.

(3) **FOREIGN INVESTMENT.**—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding foreign investment is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to trade related foreign investment by—

(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment;

(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;

(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements and other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments;

(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice; and

(E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes.

(4) **INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.**—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are—

(A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through—

(i) (I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with respect to United States industries whose products are subject to the lengthiest transition periods for full compliance by developing countries with that Agreement, and

(II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement entered into by the United States provide protection at least as strong as the protection afforded by chapter 17 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the annexes thereto;

(ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing products embodying intellectual property;

(iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property rights; and

(iv) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement mechanisms; and

(B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.

(5) **TRANSPARENCY.**—The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain broader application of the principle of transparency through—

(A) increased and more timely public access to information regarding trade issues and the activities of international trade institutions; and

(B) increased openness of dispute settlement proceedings, including under the World Trade Organization.

(6) **RECIPROCAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE.**—(A) The principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports agricultural commodities in foreign markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk and value-added commodities by—

(i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or other charges that decrease market opportunities for United States exports—

(I) giving priority to those products that are subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major producing countries; and

(II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with the Congress on such products before initiating tariff reduction negotiations;

(ii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United States;

(iii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate practices that unfairly decrease United States market access opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to import-sensitive products, including—

(I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of state trading enterprises and such other mechanisms;

(II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial requirements affecting new technologies, including biotechnology;

(III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not based on scientific principles in contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;

(IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and

(V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate quotas;

(iv) improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of perishable agriculture;

(v) taking into account whether a party to the negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented obligations under those agreements;

(vi) taking into account whether a product is subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of a major producing country to adhere to the provisions of already existing trade agreements with the United States or by the circumvention by that country of its obligations under those agreements;

(vii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the World Trade Organization have made meaningful market liberalization commitments in agriculture; and

(viii) taking into account the impact that agreements covering agriculture to which the United States is a party, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on the United States agricultural industry.

(B) (i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations in order to develop an international consensus on the treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and in any other relevant area.

(ii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph (A) applies with respect to agricultural matters to be addressed in any trade agreement entered into under section 103 (a) or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under section 103 (a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade agreement to which the United States is already a party, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.

(7) **LABOR, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND OTHER MATTERS.**—The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding labor, the environment, and other matters is to address the following aspects of foreign government policies and practices regarding labor, the environment, and other matters that are directly related to trade:

(A) To ensure that foreign labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or serve as disguised barriers to trade.

(B) To ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from or waive existing domestic environmental, health, safety, or labor measures, including measures that deter exploitative child labor, as an encouragement to gain competitive advantage in international trade or investment. Nothing in this subparagraph is intended to address changes to a country's laws that are consistent with sound macroeconomic development. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to authorize inclusion in an implementing bill under this Act or in an agreement subject to an implementing bill under this Act provisions that would restrict the autonomy of the United States in these areas.

(8) WTO EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS.—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in financial services are those set forth in section 135(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)), regarding trade in civil aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of that Act, and regarding rules of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).

(C) INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY OBJECTIVES.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—The President should take into account the relationship between trade agreements and other important priorities of the United States and seek to ensure that the trade agreements entered into by the United States complement and reinforce other policy goals. The United States priorities in this area include—

(A) seeking to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive;

(B) seeking to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means for doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources;

(C) promoting respect for worker rights and the rights of children and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights, particularly by working with the International Labor Organization to encourage the observance and enforcement of core labor standards, including the prohibition on exploitative child labor; and

(D) supplementing and strengthening standards for protection of intellectual property under conventions administered by international organizations other than the World Trade Organization, expanding these conventions to cover new and emerging technologies, and eliminating discrimination and unreasonable exceptions or preconditions to such protection.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the use of the trade authorities procedures described in section 103 to modify United States law.

(D) GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATORS.—

(I) DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES.—In pursuing the negotiating objectives described in subsection (b), the negotiators on behalf of the United States shall take into account United States domestic objectives, including the protection of health and safety, essential security, environmental, consumer, and employment opportunity interests, and the law and regulations related thereto.

(2) CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRADE LAWS.—In the course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(A) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the Congressional Oversight Group appointed under section 107 with respect to the negotiations; and

(B) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the

antidumping and countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions.

(3) CONSULTATION BEFORE AGREEMENT INITIALED.—In the course of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate.

(e) ADHERENCE TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.—In determining whether to enter into negotiations with a particular country, the President shall take into account the extent to which that country has implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

(f) REPORT ON CHILD LABOR LAWS.—With respect to any trade agreement which the President seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, the President shall submit to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the country or countries that are parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor.

**SEC. 103. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.**

(a) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF BARRIERS.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—Whenever the President determines that one or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President—

(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries before—

(i) October 1, 2001, or

(ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c), and

(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim—

(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,

(ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment, or

(iii) such additional duties,

as the President determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.

The President shall notify the Congress of the President's intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.

(2) LIMITATIONS.—No proclamation may be made under paragraph (1) that—

(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date of enactment;

(B) notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, reduces the rate of duty below that applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreements, on any agricultural product which was the sub-

ject of tariff reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty, pursuant to such Agreements, was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5 percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on December 31, 1994; or

(C) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied on January 1, 1996.

(3) AGGREGATE REDUCTION; EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—

(A) AGGREGATE REDUCTION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in effect on such day if—

(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement with respect to such article; and

(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the effective date of such first reduction.

(B) EXEMPTION FROM STAGING.—No staging is required under subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that is not produced in the United States. The United States International Trade Commission shall advise the President of the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging under this subparagraph.

(4) ROUNDING.—If the President determines that such action will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount equal to the lesser of—

(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or

(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.

(5) OTHER LIMITATIONS.—A rate of duty reduction that may not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included within an implementing bill provided for under section 105 and that bill is enacted into law.

(6) OTHER TARIFF MODIFICATIONS.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the United States agrees to such modification or staged rate reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to the formation of a regional free-trade area.

(7) AUTHORITY UNDER URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT NOT AFFECTED.—Nothing in this subsection shall limit the authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).

(b) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—(A) Whenever the President determines that—

(i) one or more existing duties or any other import restriction of any foreign country or the United States or any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the United States economy, or

(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a trade agreement described in

subparagraph (B) during the period described in subparagraph (C).

(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for—

(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), or

(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition of, such barrier or other distortion.

(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under this paragraph before—

(i) October 1, 2001, or

(ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are extended under subsection (c).

(2) CONDITIONS.—A trade agreement may be entered into under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 102 and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in section 104.

(3) BILLS QUALIFYING FOR TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this title referred to as "trade authorities procedures") apply to a bill of either House of Congress consisting only of—

(A) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into under this subsection and approving the statement of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such trade agreement.

(B) provisions directly related to the principal trade negotiating objectives set forth in section 102(b) achieved in such trade agreement, if those provisions are necessary for the operation or implementation of United States rights or obligations under such trade agreement.

(C) provisions that define and clarify, or provisions that are related to, the operation or effect of the provisions of the trade agreement.

(D) provisions to provide adjustment assistance to workers and firms adversely affected by trade, and

(E) provisions necessary for purposes of complying with section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 in implementing the trade agreement,

to the same extent as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall hereafter in this title be referred to as an "implementing bill".

(C) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL PROCESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in section 105(b)—

(A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) before October 1, 2001; and

(B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) after September 30, 2001, and before October 1, 2005, if (and only if)—

(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph (2); and

(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before October 1, 2001.

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT.—If the President is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures should be extended to implementing bills described in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, not later than July 1, 2001, a written report that contains a request for such extension, together with—

(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;

(B) a description of the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title, and a statement that such progress justifies the continuation of negotiations; and

(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed to complete the negotiations.

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.—The President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as soon as practicable, but not later than August 1, 2001, a written report that contains—

(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; and

(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) should be approved or disapproved.

(4) REPORTS MAY BE CLASSIFIED.—The reports submitted to the Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, may be classified to the extent the President determines appropriate.

(5) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS.—

(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "extension disapproval resolution" means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the \_\_\_ disapproves the request of the President for the extension, under section 103(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998, of the trade authorities procedures under that Act to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) of that Act after September 30, 2001.", with the blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House of the Congress.

(B) Extension disapproval resolutions—

(i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by any member of such House; and

(ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules.

(C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.

(D) It is not in order for—

(i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;

(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or

(iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension disapproval resolution after September 30, 2001.

(d) COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS.—In order to contribute to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or service sector, and to expand existing sectoral agreements to countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases where the President determines that such negotiations are feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such sectors, include agriculture, commercial services, intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods, government procurement, information technology products, environmental technology and services, medical equipment and services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products.

#### SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.

(a) NOTICE AND CONSULTATION BEFORE NEGOTIATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 103(b), shall—

(A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating negotiations, written notice to the

Congress of the President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and

(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and such other committees of the House and Senate as the President deems appropriate.

(2) CONSULTATIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS ON CERTAIN OBJECTIVES.—

(A) CONSULTATION.—In addition to the requirements set forth in paragraph (1), before initiating negotiations with respect to a trade agreement subject to section 103(b) where the subject matter of such negotiations is directly related to the principal trade negotiating objectives set forth in section 102(b)(1) or section 102(b)(7), the President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and with the appropriate advisory groups established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to such negotiations.

(B) SCOPE.—The consultations described in subparagraph (A) shall concern the manner in which the negotiation will address the objective of reducing or eliminating a specific tariff or nontariff barrier or foreign government policy or practice directly related to trade that decreases market opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distorts United States trade.

(3) NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING AGRICULTURE.—

(A) Before initiating negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related to the subject matter under section 102(b)(6)(A)(i) with any country, the President shall assess whether United States tariffs on agriculture products that were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country. In addition, the President shall consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with respect to imports from the United States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. The President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met.

(B) Before initiating negotiations to reduce United States tariffs on agricultural products which the President determines to be import sensitive, the President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning such tariff reductions. The consultations shall include an assessment of the impact of any tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the product and whether adjustment periods should be provided to the industry. The President, with the advice of the International Trade Commission, shall determine which agricultural products are import sensitive.

(C) Before initiating negotiations with regard to agriculture, the United States Trade Representative shall—

(i) identify those agricultural products subject to tariff reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5

percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on December 31, 1994;

(ii) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning whether any further tariff reductions on the products identified under clause (i) should be appropriate, taking into account the impact of any such tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the product;

(iii) request that the International Trade Commission prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of the tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the product and on the United States economy as a whole; and

(iv) upon complying with clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), notify the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate those products identified in clause (i) for which the Trade Representative intends to seek further tariff liberalization in the negotiations.

(D) If, after negotiations described in subparagraph (C) are commenced—

(i) the United States Trade Representative identifies any additional agriculture product described in subparagraph (C)(i) for tariff reductions which were not the subject of a notification under subparagraph (C)(iv), or

(ii) any additional agricultural product described in subparagraph (C)(i) is the subject of a request for tariff reductions by a party to the negotiations,

the Trade Representative shall notify the committees referred to in subparagraph (C)(iv) as soon as practicable of those products.

(b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS BEFORE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO.—

(1) CONSULTATION.—Before entering into any trade agreement under section 103(b), the President shall consult with—

(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters which would be affected by the trade agreement.

(2) SCOPE.—The consultation described in paragraph (1) shall include consultation with respect to—

(A) the nature of the agreement;

(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; and

(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 105, including the general effect of the agreement on existing laws.

(d) ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORTS.—The report required under section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any trade agreement entered into under section 103(a) or (b) of this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 days after the date on which the President notifies the Congress under section 103(a)(1) or 105(a)(1)(A) of the President's intention to enter into the agreement.

(d) ITC ASSESSMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President, at least 90 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into a trade agreement under section 103(b), shall provide the International Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as the "Commission") with the details of the agreement as it exists at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2). Between the time the President makes the request under this paragraph and the time

the Commission submits the assessment, the President shall keep the Commission current with respect to the details of the agreement.

(2) ITC ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 90 calendar days after the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report assessing the likely impact of the agreement on the United States economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors, including the impact the agreement will have on the gross domestic product, exports, and imports, aggregate employment and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and the competitive position of industries likely to be significantly affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States consumers.

(3) REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE.—In preparing the assessment, the Commission shall review available economic assessments regarding the agreement, including literature regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, and shall provide in its assessment a description of the analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the various analyses and conclusions, including those of the Commission regarding the agreement.

#### SEC. 105. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

##### (a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) NOTIFICATION AND SUBMISSION.—Any agreement entered into under section 103(b) shall enter into force with respect to the United States if (and only if)—

(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day on which the President enters into the trade agreement, notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the President's intention to enter into the agreement, and promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the Federal Register;

(B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the President submits to the Congress a description of those changes to existing laws that the President considers would be required in order to bring the United States into compliance with the agreement;

(C) after entering into the agreement, the President submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, together with—

(i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 103(b)(3);

(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the trade agreement; and

(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph (2); and

(D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.

(2) SUPPORTING INFORMATION.—The supporting information required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of—

(A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and proposed administrative action will change or affect existing law; and

(B) a statement—

(i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; and

(ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding—

(I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives referred to in clause (i);

(II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an agreement previously negotiated;

(III) how the agreement serves the interests of United States commerce; and

(IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set forth in section 103(b)(3).

(3) RECIPROCAL BENEFITS.—In order to ensure that a foreign country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) does not receive benefits under the agreement unless the country is also subject to the obligations under the agreement, the implement-

ing bill submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only to the parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms of the agreement.

##### (b) LIMITATIONS ON TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES.—

(1) FOR LACK OF NOTICE OR CONSULTATIONS.—  
(A) IN GENERAL.—The trade authorities procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the date that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.

(B) PROCEDURAL DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—  
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "procedural disapproval resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance with section 104 or 105 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998 on negotiations with respect to \_\_\_\_\_ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to that trade agreement.", with the blank space being filled with a description of the trade agreement with respect to which the President is considered to have failed or refused to notify or consult.

(2) PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS.—  
(A) Procedural disapproval resolutions—

(i) in the House of Representatives—

(I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;

(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and

(III) may not be amended by either Committee; and

(ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the Committee on Finance.

(B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.

(C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules.

(C) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—Subsection (b) of this section and section 103(c) are enacted by the Congress—

(I) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such other rules; and

(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House.

#### SEC. 106. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.

(a) CERTAIN AGREEMENTS.—Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2), if an agreement to which section 103(b) applies—

(I) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization regarding trade in information technology products,

(2) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade Organization regarding the rules of origin work program described in Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin referred to in section 101(d)(10) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(10)), or

(3) is entered into with Chile,

and results from negotiations that were commenced before the date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall apply.

(b) TREATMENT OF AGREEMENTS.—In the case of any agreement to which subsection (a) applies—

(1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to the requirements of section 104(a), and any procedural disapproval resolution under section 105(b)(1)(B) shall not be in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with the provisions of section 104(a); and

(2) the President shall consult regarding the negotiations described in subsection (a) with the committees described in section 104(a)(1)(B) as soon as feasible after the enactment of this Act.

(c) MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the trade authorities procedures shall not apply to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment concluded under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

#### SEC. 107. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUPS.

(a) APPOINTMENT AND FUNCTIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President provides notice under section 104(a)(1) of the President's intention to enter into negotiations with respect to a trade agreement—

(1) the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon the recommendation of the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, shall appoint 5 members (not more than 3 of whom are members of the same political party) of such committee, and

(2) the President pro tempore of the Senate, upon the recommendation of the chairman of the Committee on Finance, shall appoint 5 members (not more than 3 of whom are members of the same political party) of such committee,

to serve as members of a Congressional Oversight Group for the negotiations. Each such member shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United States delegation in the negotiations. Members of the Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, and the development of the trade agreement.

#### (b) ADDITIONAL MEMBERS.—

(1) AUTHORITY TO APPOINT.—In addition to the members designated under subsection (a) for a Congressional Oversight Group—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives may appoint additional members of the House from any other committee of the House or joint committee of Congress to serve as members of the Congressional Oversight Group; and

(B) the President pro tempore of the Senate may appoint additional members of the Senate from any other committee of the Senate or joint committee of Congress to serve as members of the Congressional Oversight Group.

Members of the House and Senate appointed under this paragraph shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative.

(2) CONSULTATIONS.—Before designating any member under paragraph (1), the Speaker or the President pro tempore shall consult with—

(A) the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance, as appropriate; and

(B) the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee from which the member will be appointed.

(3) AFFILIATION.—Not more than 2 members may be appointed under this subsection as mem-

bers of any Congressional Oversight Group from any 1 committee of Congress. If 2 members are appointed from 1 committee, they must be from different political parties, and the total members from any political party appointed under this subsection for any Congressional Oversight Group may not exceed the total number of members from any other political party.

#### (c) GUIDELINES.—

(1) PURPOSE AND REVISION.—Within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Trade Representative shall develop written guidelines, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, to facilitate the useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade Representative and the Congressional Oversight Groups established under this section. The Trade Representative may revise the guidelines from time to time as needed following further such consultation.

(2) CONTENT.—The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall provide for, among other things—

(A) regular, detailed briefings of each Congressional Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives and positions and status of the negotiations with respect to which the group was appointed, beginning as soon as practicable after the appointment of the members of the group, with more frequent briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;

(B) access by members of each Congressional Oversight Group, and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent documents relating to the negotiations, including classified materials; and

(C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade Representative and each Congressional Oversight Group at all critical periods during the negotiations, including at negotiation sites.

#### SEC. 108. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—At the time the President submits the final text of an agreement pursuant to section 105(a)(1)(C), the President shall also submit a plan for implementing and enforcing the agreement. The implementation and enforcement plan shall include the following:

(1) BORDER PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.—A description of additional personnel required at border entry points, including a list of additional customs and agricultural inspectors.

(2) AGENCY STAFFING REQUIREMENTS.—A description of additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, including personnel required by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the Treasury.

(3) CUSTOMS INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS.—A description of the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United States Customs Service.

(4) IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—A description of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and local governments as a result of increases in trade.

(5) COST ANALYSIS.—An analysis of the costs associated with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).

(b) BUDGET SUBMISSION.—The President shall include a request for the resources necessary to support the plan described in subsection (a) in the first budget the President submits to Congress after the submission of the plan.

#### SEC. 109. CHIEF AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATOR.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION.—There shall be in the Office of the United States Trade Representative a Chief Agricultural Negotiator, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among individuals with appropriate experience

in agricultural matters. The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall hold office at the pleasure of the President and shall have the rank of Ambassador.

(b) FUNCTIONS.—The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall have as his or her primary function the conduct of trade negotiations relating to agricultural commodities and shall have such other functions as the United States Trade Representative may direct.

(c) COMPENSATION.—The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall be paid at the highest rate of basic pay payable to a member of the Senior Executive Service.

#### SEC. 110. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(1) IMPLEMENTING BILL.—Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by striking “, section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,”; and

(2) ADVICE FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.—Section 131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended—

#### (A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking “section 123 of this Act or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,” and inserting “section 123 of this Act or section 103(a) or (b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998,”; and

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking “section 1102 (b) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” and inserting “section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”;

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “section 1102(a)(3)(A)” and inserting “section 103(a)(3)(A) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998” before the end period; and

(C) in subsection (c), by striking “section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,” and inserting “section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998.”

(3) HEARINGS AND ADVICE.—Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by striking “section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,” each place it appears and inserting “section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998.”

(4) PREREQUISITES FOR OFFERS.—Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 2154(b)) is amended by striking “section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” and inserting “section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”.

(5) ADVICE FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SEC-TORS.—Section 135 (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking “section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” and inserting “section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”;

#### (B) in subsection (e)(1)—

(i) by striking “section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” each place it appears and inserting “section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”; and

(ii) by striking “section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 1988” and inserting “section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”; and

(C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking “section 1101 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” and inserting “section 102 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998”.

(6) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 162(a) (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking “or under section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988” and inserting “or under section 103 of the

Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998".

(b) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS.—For purposes of applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)—

(1) any trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 or 2112); and

(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974.

#### SEC. 111. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity organized under the laws of the United States; and

(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or United States citizens, or both.

(2) URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS.—The term "Uruguay Round Agreements" has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).

(3) WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.—The term "World Trade Organization" means the organization established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.

(4) WTO AGREEMENT.—The term "WTO Agreement" means the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered into on April 15, 1994.

#### TITLE II—TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

##### SEC. 201. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS.

Section 245 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2317) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a) by striking "1993" and all that follows through "1998," and inserting "1998 and 1999 and for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999"; and

(2) in subsection (b) by striking "1994" and all that follows through "1998," and inserting "1998 and 1999 and for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999".

##### SEC. 202. NAFTA TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM.

Section 250(d)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2331(d)(2)) is amended by striking "for any fiscal year \$30,000,000" and inserting "\$30,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 or 1999 and shall not exceed \$7,000,000 for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999".

##### SEC. 203. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FIRMS.

Section 256(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2346(b)) is amended by striking "1993" and all that follows through "1998" and inserting "1998 and 1999 and for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999".

##### SEC. 204. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT.

Section 280(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2391(a)) is amended—

(1) by striking "2, 3, and 4" and inserting "2 and 3"; and

(2) by striking "January 31, 1980" and inserting "October 1, 1999".

##### SEC. 205. TERMINATION.

Section 285(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2271 note preceding) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1) by striking "September 30, 1998" and inserting "December 31, 1999"; and

(2) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking "the day that is" and all that follows through "effective" and inserting "December 31, 1999".

#### SEC. 206. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this title take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

#### TITLE III—SPENDING OFFSETS

##### SEC. 301. COMPUTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.

(a) PROHIBITION ON FUNDING.—No expenses for computer-related activities of the Department of Agriculture that are funded through the Commodity Credit Corporation pursuant to section 4(g) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act shall be funded in fiscal year 1999.

(b) REDUCTION IN LIMITATION ON OBLIGATIONS.—Section 4(g) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714b(g)) is amended in the first sentence by striking "\$193,000,000" and inserting "\$128,000,000".

#### TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS TRADE PROVISIONS

##### SEC. 401. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT DENY MARKET ACCESS FOR UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

###### (a) IDENTIFICATION REQUIRED.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 8 of title I of the Trade Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following:

###### "SEC. 183. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT DENY MARKET ACCESS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

"(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than the date that is 30 days after the date on which the annual report is required to be submitted to Congressional committees under section 181(b), the United States Trade Representative (hereafter in this section referred to as the 'Trade Representative') shall identify—

"(1) those foreign countries that—

"(A) deny fair and equitable market access to United States agricultural products, or

"(B) apply unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary standards for imported agricultural products from the United States; and

"(2) those foreign countries identified under paragraph (1) that are determined by the Trade Representative to be priority foreign countries.

###### "(b) SPECIAL RULES FOR IDENTIFICATIONS.

"(1) CRITERIA.—In identifying priority foreign countries under subsection (a)(2), the Trade Representative shall only identify those foreign countries—

"(A) that engage in or have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices that deny fair and equitable market access to the United States agricultural products,

"(B) whose acts, policies, or practices described in subparagraph (A) have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant United States products, and

"(C) that are not—

"(i) entering into good faith negotiations, or

"(ii) making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations,

to provide fair and equitable market access to United States agricultural products.

"(2) CONSULTATION AND CONSIDERATION REQUIREMENTS.—In identifying priority foreign countries under subsection (a)(2), the Trade Representative shall—

"(A) consult with the Secretary of Agriculture and other appropriate officers of the Federal Government, and

"(B) take into account information from such sources as may be available to the Trade Representative and such information as may be submitted to the Trade Representative by interested persons, including information contained in reports submitted under section 181(b) and petitions submitted under section 181(b) and petitions submitted under section 302.

"(3) FACTUAL BASIS REQUIREMENT.—The Trade Representative may identify a foreign country under subsection (a)(1) only if the Trade Representative finds that there is a factual basis for the denial of fair and equitable market access as a result of the violation of international law or agreement, or the existence of barriers, referred to in subsection (d).

"(4) CONSIDERATION OF HISTORICAL FACTORS.—In identifying foreign countries under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), the Trade Representative shall take into account—

"(A) the history of agricultural trade relations with the foreign country, including any previous identification under subsection (a)(2), and

"(B) the history of efforts of the United States, and the response of the foreign country, to achieve fair and equitable market access for United States agricultural products.

"(c) REVOCATION AND ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS.

"(1) AUTHORITY TO ACT AT ANY TIME.—If information available to the Trade Representative indicates that such action is appropriate, the Trade Representative may at any time—

"(A) revoke the identification of any foreign country as a priority foreign country under this section, or

"(B) identify any foreign country as a priority foreign country under this section.

"(2) REVOCATION REPORTS.—The trade Representative shall include in the semiannual report submitted to the Congress under section 309(3) a detailed explanation of the reasons for the revocation under paragraph (1) of the identification of any foreign country as a priority foreign country under this section.

"(d) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, a foreign country denies fair and equitable market access if the foreign country effectively denies access to a market for a product through the use of laws, procedures, practices, or regulations which—

"(1) violate provisions of international law or international agreements to which both the United States and the foreign country are parties, or

"(2) constitute discriminatory nontariff trade barriers.

"(e) PUBLICATION.—The Trade Representative shall publish in the Federal Register a list of foreign countries identified under subsection (a) and shall make such revisions to the list as may be required by reason of the action under subsection (c).

"(f) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Trade Representative shall, not later than the date by which countries are identified under subsection (a), transmit to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, a report on the actions taken under this section during the 12 months preceding such report, and the reasons for such actions, including a description of progress made in achieving fair and equitable market access for United States agricultural products."

"(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Trade Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 182 the following:

"Sec. 183. Identification of countries that deny market access for agricultural products."

###### "(b) INVESTIGATIONS.

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (A) of section 302(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2412(b)(2)) is amended by inserting "or 183(a)(2)" after "section 182(a)(2)" in the matter preceding clause (i).

"(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subparagraph (D) of section 302(b)(2) of such Act is amended by inserting "concerning intellectual property rights that is" after "any investigation".

##### SEC. 402. ENFORCEMENT OF U.S.-JAPAN INSURANCE AGREEMENT.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the Japanese insurance market has historically been closed to United States interests and investment;

(2) the terms of the U.S.-Japanese Insurance Agreement have begun the process of opening the Japanese insurance market to United States interests and investment; and

(3) failure to fully enforce the terms of the U.S.-Japanese Insurance Agreement will endanger the United States investments that have occurred and those which may occur in the future.

(b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Trade Representative should work diligently with the Minister of Finance of Japan to fully enforce the terms of the U.S.-Japan Insurance Agreement so that Japanese insurance markets will continue to be open to United States investment and that existing and future United States investments in the Japanese insurance markets are protected.

(c) **DEFINITION.**—As used in this section, the term "U.S.-Japan Insurance Agreement" means the Measures by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan Regarding Insurance, signed on October 11, 1994, as amended by the Supplementary Measures by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan Regarding Insurance, signed on December 24, 1996.

**SEC. 403. MARKING OF CONTAINERS FOR PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1304) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k) as subsections (i), (j), (k), and (l), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:

"(h) **MARKING OF CONTAINERS OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.**—

"(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The immediate container, as it ordinarily reaches the ultimate purchaser, of any perishable agricultural commodity excepted from the marking requirements of subsection (a) shall be marked in the manner required by subsection (a), unless an exception from the requirements of marking applies to such container under any subparagraph of subsection (a)(3) other than subparagraph (J).

"(2) **DEFINITION.**—For purposes of this subsection, the term 'perishable agricultural commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 1(b) of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C. 499a(b))".

(b) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Section 304(j) of such Act, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended by striking "subsection (h)" and inserting "subsection (i)".

(c) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section apply to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 120th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 404. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUSPENSION AGREEMENT.**

The administering authority (as defined in section 771(l) of the Tariff Act of 1930) shall closely monitor and vigorously enforce the suspension agreement concerning fresh tomatoes from Mexico that was entered into on October 28, 1996, pursuant to section 734 of the Tariff Act of 1930. If the administering authority determines that the suspension agreement is being, or has been, violated, is no longer in the public interest as set forth in section 734(d) of that Act, or no longer meets the applicable requirements of section 734(c) or (d) of that Act, the administering authority shall immediately resume the antidumping investigation suspended by the agreement and take other action under section 734(i) of that Act. The administering authority shall establish a Rapid Response Team to ensure full compliance with the agreement and speedy resolution of claims with respect to the agreement.

**SEC. 405. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS ALONG UNITED STATES-MEXICAN BORDER.**

(a) **TASK FORCE TO REVIEW CONDITIONS.**—The President shall establish a task force to review conditions along the United States-Mexican border relating to housing, labor, the environment, and other relevant issues as they relate to United States companies that are located along the border. The task force should determine the

ways in which partnerships made up of public and private entities can improve conditions along the border.

(b) **REPORT TO CONGRESS.**—The President shall report to the Congress not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act on the results of the review under subsection (a).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARCHER) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL) each will control 1 hour of debate on the bill.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARCHER).

□ 1600

**GENERAL LEAVE**

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on H.R. 2621.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this could be a fulcrum moment in America's future. This is an unusually fragile time for economies throughout the world, the likes of which we have not seen for generations.

There are only a few things that we in America can do to increase our ability to be a bulwark against decaying economies around the world and prevent their ultimately enveloping us. One thing we can do is demonstrate a clear commitment to resist the suggestiveness of protectionism, protectionism which could drag the whole world into depression.

This legislation grants the administration the authority to negotiate trade agreements and bring them back to Congress for an up or down vote. Historically it has been bipartisan, and it represents a key component to preserving our economy and helping the rest of the world for years to come.

Trade has been and will always be the force that drives our economic engine. Trade benefits everyone, workers, businesses and consumers. If we are to stay on the right economic road, we should not halt the process of opening foreign markets. We must not.

To the President's credit, his policy on trade has been very, very good. It has helped us to continue to keep a growing economy. He deserves credit for that. But it is sad that, today, the administration is withholding its support for this bill, support that was so active last year. It is sad that his strength in the past of resisting the pressures of organized labor have now come into play today, and we cannot afford to lose one month, six months or a year until we do one of the few things that we can do to help America and the world.

The U.S. is the world's largest exporting country, with exports nearing the \$1 trillion mark. This economic

boom has translated into approximately 11.5 million U.S. jobs which pay on average 15 percent more than non-trade related jobs. Many Americans do not know that they have a trade-related job, but it affects 11.5 million jobs.

We have been able to achieve these impressive results because we have been aggressive in expanding overseas markets. To sustain our growth and prosperity, we must continue to tap into the growing economies around the world, and we must remember that 19 out of 20 potential customers in the world do not live in this country. As a result, negotiating trade agreements that reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to our products and our services is a win-win proposition.

Our average tariffs are already very, very low, less than 3 percent, but most of our trading partners have much, much higher tariffs: Chile, 11 percent, Argentina, 10 percent, Australia, 9 percent, Thailand, 26 percent. What do we have to fear? We have far less risk to go down from under 3 percent than we have to gain by reducing tariffs that are three, four and five times higher than ours.

Because we export more products and services than any country in the world, reducing foreign tariffs means huge savings for our industries and our workers. But, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, we are at a standstill. Without fast track, our failure to participate in shaping the global trading system will allow our competitors to negotiate preferential trade agreements and form strategic relationships that exclude us. And that is why I say, again, we should not wait another month or six months before we act on this vital legislation.

Each month we lose is a loss for America. Since 1992 our competitors have negotiated 20 free trade agreements that exclude us in Latin America and Asia alone. We are losing orders for our products over and over again in Chile and other countries, and those orders are going to Canada and they are going to Mexico and they are going to other countries for export. The European union is negotiating in a trade agreement with Latin America that will keep us out. We can no longer afford to stand idly by.

So the legislation we consider today gives the President the authority he needs to move ahead in negotiating these vital trade agreements, and it does so without undermining Congress' constitutional role.

Congress must under this bill be consulted before, during and after trade negotiations. For farmers and ranchers, who derive 30 percent of their income for exports, this bill puts the Committee on Agriculture, in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, in a position to review all proposed agreements before they are signed.

The U.S. has everything to gain by passing fast track. We have everything to lose if we fail. The choices before us are stark: We can approve this legislation and sow the seeds of hope, growth

and prosperity, or we can yield to the forces of fear, protectionism and short-sightedness and cast this opportunity aside, potentially undermining the economies of the world, with America being irresistibly potentially included in that undermining.

Mr. Speaker, I hope we will support future prosperity. Support fast track, and vote for this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I certainly agree with most of the things that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means has said, that if this great Nation is going to continue to grow and maintain our economic advantage, we have to remove all of the barriers to trade.

Trade is the one thing that our Nation excels in, and we have to make certain that we remain competitive. A piece of legislation like fast track or trade, as I said earlier, or taxes or Social Security, cannot be a pre-election gimmick, but it has to be, indeed, a bipartisan effort, where people who have honest differences of opinion but still want our Nation to maintain its leadership in trade sit down and work out those differences.

We cannot afford to allow the world marketplace as it relates to labor to set the standards for the United States of America. We cannot pick a country that has the lowest labor wages, no benefits, no health benefits, and allow industries in our cities around the United States to close and go there to take advantage of that particular economic advantage.

No, we must be able to say that when we trade, Americans are going to be the beneficiaries; not just those in the high-tech jobs, but those in the lower skilled jobs have to be protected as well.

I believe that our president, as other presidents, should have the right to negotiate trade contracts, and it should not be the House or the Senate that is going to dot every "i" or cross every "t". But when it comes to Americans losing their jobs, losing their pensions, losing their homes, merely because business has gone, we should be able to tell the president, you do not negotiate any treaty or contract without protecting American workers, without protecting the environment, without protecting human rights. We cannot let the free marketplace dictate the principles we believe in as a country.

So I believe that when the president is ready to sit down with us, Republicans and Democrats, we can work out fast track. Nobody is against it because it gives the President authority. People oppose it because it does not spell out the human rights and the rights of workers, which is just as much a part of our prosperity as it is to see that the stock market has improved as a result of the stability that the President has brought.

I do not know why these matters are brought up on the eve of elections. I do not know who we want to embarrass. I do not know why we just entertain vetoes. This thing is just too important to allow it to be treated in a partisan way.

For that reason, I do not know why it is on the calendar now. I have no idea what the politics is behind it. You certainly cannot have something like this be approved without bipartisan support. You certainly need the leader of the free world and the President of the United States working with you. But I suspect you have taken some poll somewhere and you think this gives you an advantage someplace come November.

I hope that you are not right, but I still believe that you should not be taking legislation like Social Security, tax cuts, and God knows what else you are going to try to do before we get out of here, and try to negotiate these things just before an election. It is important for the country, but it is important for Americans, Democrats and Republicans, it is important for the President, and I hope that soon we will be able to work a little more closely together.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Trade, and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to yield blocks of time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield three minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. SMITH).

□ 1615

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to hear this question, why, why now? Why not next year? I should not have to remind members of the Committee on Ways and Means that next year we have a chance to revisit the Uruguay Round, 1999. There are many, many problems that we have in trade around the world. I should not have to advise the Committee on Ways and Means members of what they are, but let me just tick them off.

We have lost, in agriculture, 30 percent of our markets in Asia. We have been excommunicated from markets in the European Union. We have difficulty with phytosanitary problems getting into Japan, and all of that in the face of disasters in this country for agriculture, of floods, of droughts, and of course, of lost revenues to the tune of some \$9 billion.

If there was ever a time that we ought to be reaching out for markets, it is now, it seems to me, especially in the face of the Uruguay Round. Without fast track, we do not have tools to

sit down at the table and to discuss these problems that I have just identified around the world.

I can tell the Members, having traveled halfway around the world with my Committee on Agriculture, that the rest of the countries are smiling and chortling at us. I just left a representative from New Zealand who said, "You mean you do not have fast track? You are not going to trade? You are not going to be involved? We thought we were allies. We are going to go into the Uruguay Round without you having fast track and the tools to trade?" He was smiling at us.

The facts are that this agreement is unlike any other that we have ever looked at. It is not like NAFTA, it is not like GATT. It is different because, especially in agriculture, for the first time in history, by the way, and I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARCHER) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CRANE) of the Committee on Ways and Means for allowing agriculture to be included, not only in the consultation process, as the agreements move along, but before anything is finally penned, the Committee on Agriculture gets a chance to look at every word of the agreement. If it is no good for agriculture, it cannot pass. If agriculture opposes any agreement, it cannot pass this body. For the first time, we have generated an opportunity for agriculture to be at the table when we negotiate agreements. It is outstandingly important that we do that.

I think this is almost humorous, except it is true. This side does not want to give their president fast track. Our side wants to give their president fast track authority. I think the point remains that really no president negotiates trade agreements.

We are a Nation. We are a Nation and a leader in trade. We should be a leader in fast track. Giving this president authority is what I want to do, because I know that trade agreements can be looked at, can be consulted by Congress as we move along, so that gives me safety and that gives me comfort, because I know it will be done properly.

Please, please understand, this is the most important vote for agriculture that we will have in many, many years. Understand, this is the time we stand up for trade.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDERMOTT), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, in support of the bill, and that he in turn be permitted to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDERMOTT) will control 10 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI).

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in opposition to H.R. 2621, reluctantly, Mr. Speaker. Today's exercise in this legislation soils our national trade policy with the mud of partisan politics. It shows a disdain for the legislative process, and it threatens to disrupt international markets and quite possibly our national economy.

I would first like to make absolutely clear that I support granting the President fast track negotiating authority that he needs to enter into trade agreements. Fast track authority is essential to maintain U.S. economic leadership by opening foreign markets to American agriculture, manufactured goods and services. I supported it in 1988, I supported it last year, I intend to support it in the future. But I will not, however, support it today.

This debate, Mr. Speaker, is not about fast track. This debate is about partisan politics. The fast track bill that we are considering today is not scheduled and will not pass in the Chamber of this House, but it is, rather, an attempt to embarrass members of my party. I will tell the Members, I will not participate in any effort to do damage or defeat any of my colleagues by using trade policy as a tool.

When the Republican leadership decided to bring fast track up in the waning days of this Congress, there was little attempt to disguise the motivations, the political motivations, behind it. In fact, the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee was quoted in the Washington Post on July 20, 1998, specifically naming one of my Democratic colleagues, with the clear threat to use this vote against him in the upcoming election.

In addition, Willard Workman, a senior official of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, suggested that he would rather see fast track brought up to lose, which it will, so that he could make an issue out of it in the November election. It is personally surprising to me that one of the Nation's premier business lobbying organizations would display such a reckless attitude about fast track for the sake of perceived partisan advantage.

As I said, however, today is not about passing fast track. We all know that. This bill is virtually identical to the one that was shelved last year. Since then, there has been absolutely no effort to refashion this legislation.

Many of us, including the President, worked very hard last year to pass it, but we could not muster the bipartisan support needed. The sensible and rational thing to do, if we want to pass it, would be to make changes to add additional support. But that simply has not happened. If the Republican leadership sincerely wanted to pass this bill, it would have made the necessary changes to broaden the base of support on the floor of the House.

Our colleagues have modified this bill to take care of agriculture, or at

least perceived to take care of agriculture. There has really been no effort to reach out to Members in other areas of this legislation. For example, there has been no discussion on labor and the environment, about language that would implement and expand the implementation if the bill is finally passed, or other bipartisan changes that could get a majority for a good fast track bill.

In fact, this bill under consideration actually limits the President's negotiating authority, compared to the bill that President Reagan and President Bush had, which had flexibility, the law that expired.

While political points may be scored to defeat fast track on the floor today, Mr. Speaker, it will have serious and negative consequences. When coupled with our failure to pass MFN funding, funding for the United Nations, and loose talk about impeachment, this body sends a dangerous message to investors in the markets in Asia, Russia, and Latin America. A signal such as the defeat of fast track today is further evidence that the U.S., or at least this Congress, is not serious about international leadership.

Just as significantly, what happens here also sends a new signal that American trade policy is used for partisan advantage, and that strong bipartisanship in the area of free and international trade no longer exists.

I will tell the Members, we all know that the votes are not there for passage of this legislation. This is brought up only for partisan advantage. That is not the way to use trade policy in America.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in response to our distinguished minority leader on the Subcommittee on Trade, I would remind him that there are important contents in the Archer amendment to H.R. 2621. They deal not just with agriculture.

There is one, for example, that insists that the President, with respect to any trade agreement implemented under trade authorities procedures, submit to Congress a report describing the extent to which the parties to that trade agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor.

There is a new provision on agriculture, a special 301 procedure for identifying in a report trade barriers and countries that deny fair and equitable market access, and that impose unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary standards against U.S. agricultural products.

One month after the report is issued, USTR would be required to identify priority foreign countries against which it would initiate section 301 unfair trade practice investigations, resulting in possible trade sanctions against the offending country.

It also requires that the President establish a task force to review condi-

tions along the U.S.-Mexico border relating to housing, labor, the environment, and other relevant issues.

Mr. Speaker, I would remind my colleagues on the other side of the aisle of a statement that was made in this Chamber back in January. "We all know in every way in life change is not always easy, but we have to decide whether we are going to try to hold it back and hide from it or reap its benefits. Remember the big picture here. While we have been entering into hundreds of new trade agreements, we have been creating millions of new jobs. So this year we will forge new partnerships with Latin America, Asia, and Europe, and we should pass the new African Trade Act. It has bipartisan support. I also renew my request for the fast track negotiating authority necessary to open more new markets and create more new jobs, which every president has had for two decades."

That was President Clinton in his State of the Union message here.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY).

Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, fast track would pass tonight if the President would honor his commitments and get his party to vote for it. Who said, "I will also renew my request for the fast track negotiating authority necessary to open new markets and create more new jobs, which every president has had for two decades?" Who has traveled across the world promising to support fast track?

Who said in Santiago, Chile, earlier this year, that "The benefits for American workers and companies and consumers for expanding trade should make, in my judgment, a clear case for fast track authority. I will continue to work hard with Congress to build support for fast track"? Bill Clinton.

President Clinton was once the strongest supporter of fast track. Now, for political reasons, he has withdrawn that support. It is troubling that Bill Clinton has already concluded that he does not have the strength to win this vote, and it is astounding that he has withdrawn his support for this measure. I think that is a shame. I believe that every president must have the tools to do the job.

Our workers need trade agreements that create jobs for Americans. Our businesses need them so they can sell their products overseas. Our consumers need them so they can spend more money on their family and less money on border taxes.

The only way we can get these trade agreements is to give the President fast track authority. It is a shame that so many Democrats have played politics with trade. It is sad that so many Democrats have relied on the politics of fear and isolation. It is a scandal that the President has misled the American people about his commitment to support fast track, when negotiating trade agreements is one of his most important responsibilities.

A vote against fast track is not only a vote of no confidence in this President, it is also a vote of no confidence in the world economy. A vote for fast track is a vote for free trade and continued engagement with our trade partners. I ask Members to vote for fast track.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I just hope that the gentleman from Illinois has picked up some votes with the major changes he made in the legislation. I suspect not, but I just hope he picked up a few votes, because he gave up so much.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO).

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, regrettably, I, too, rise to say I cannot vote in favor of fast track today. Many of my colleagues know that the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), a number of us, helped lead the effort to gain support among Democratic Members in order to win a fair and bipartisan fast track proposal in the past.

Unlike some, my support for strong and fair trade policies for this country has not changed when the person in the White House has changed. It has been consistent under both Republican and Democratic Presidents.

□ 1430

We rallied the troops last year because we knew the necessity to grant the President fast track authority. Fair and timely fast track ensures, in my view, a continuation of United States engagement and leadership on the international scale that it must be.

But I must say that, unfortunately, today the timing of this vote has little to do with granting the President fast track authority or reasserting American primacy in international markets. It has to do instead, I am afraid to say, with politics. It is not fair, it is not timely, and I think it lays the predicate for further defeats, if we are not careful, when we have all our forces coming together to bring fast track to a successful conclusion in the next Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I think the International Monetary Fund issue is where this Congress should concentrate its fire. We have seen a lack of leadership in this House on this issue, and we do have in the world monetary system a sickness we have got to address. I hope that this majority, during the next several weeks, will find within itself the ability to put at the top of the list of priorities fully funding that agency, with the reforms that have been worked out in the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

But until we find that kind of consensus on IMF, a meaningless, politically driven vote today on fast track, which I fear has never had a chance of succeeding, does nothing but set back the cause that we have all been associated with in the past.

I am sad to take the position I do. I look forward to the day when we can put a coalition together with some modifications in this that broaden the base of support for fast track in place and pass it, but it is not going to be today.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

One more quote, Mr. Speaker, to our distinguished colleagues across the aisle. "In the last 5 years we have led the way in opening new markets with 240 trade agreements that remove foreign barriers to products bearing the proud stamp, 'Made in the U.S.A.'," Mr. TRAFICANT. Today record high exports account for fully one-third of our economic growth. I want to keep them going, because that is the way to keep America growing and to advance a safer, more stable world." President William Clinton in this Chamber in January of this year.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. JOHNSON), our distinguished colleague on the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill, and I regret that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle keep talking about this as political.

The truth is the last time we had this vote, the Democrats were only able to mobilize about 40 votes in support of giving the President the authority he needs to be at the table to negotiate markets for American-made goods. The fact is that, as a party, they do not believe that America's standard of living depends on selling American-made goods into other people's markets.

Yet, our growth in recent years is directly the result of our success in ever-growing foreign markets. Indeed, foreign trade creates jobs. Foreign trade raises our standard of living. And this vote is simply about this Nation's interest, the national interest, in being at the negotiating table so that we can negotiate access for American-made goods into foreign markets.

Because it is merely about selling, merely about selling our goods to others, it is about jobs. It is about standard of living. Ninety-five percent of the customers in the world are outside of America. And while we have dabbled, while Congress has not been able to give the President authority he has traditionally had, Canada has negotiated 10 percent tariff cuts on their goods into the Chilean market and we have lost customers.

Last year, Europe sold more goods into South America than they ever have in history; and for the first time in history, they sold more goods into that market than the United States did because they have been at that table negotiating agreements to reduce tariffs on European goods. So they have taken customers from American manufacturers, now in droves.

Yes, not being at the table costs jobs, closes us out of markets. Being there is our future and our children's future. Vote "yes" on fast track authority.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2621, which would continue the 20-year history of granting the president the authority to negotiate trade agreements that then must be approved or rejected by Congress. With 95 percent of the world's consumers living outside our borders, we need to take advantage of new markets in which to sell our goods. America has the greatest workforce in the world, but to give our workers opportunity and security, we need to give them the chance to sell their products overseas.

My home state of Connecticut is an excellent example of how the global economy is transforming domestic markets. 124,000 jobs in Connecticut accounted for the approximately \$8 billion of goods our state exported last year. Had fast track been in place, those numbers would have been even higher, because additional markets would be open to us. Instead, because we have not been at the table and a part of agreements that has been negotiated, we are losing customers to competitors in other countries. Why? Simply because they are at the negotiating table and have made trade agreements that exclude us.

In 1993, the year before NAFTA went into effect, Connecticut exports to Canada totaled \$1.4 billion. This number grew to \$1.8 billion in 1997—a 28 percent increase. Exports to Mexico have increased from \$336 million to \$530 million over that same period—a 57 percent increase. Increased exports, means increased numbers of jobs. And export-related jobs pay on average 13 to 17 percent more.

Connecticut companies like the toy manufacturer Lego have seen exports rise at tremendous rates—Lego's exports to Mexico have increased by 300% since 1995. Their main competitors from China do not have the benefits of tariff reductions that the U.S. negotiated under NAFTA, giving Lego the competitive advantage in that market.

Exports account for a third of America's economic growth. Business' ability to create jobs at home depends increasingly on raw ability to sell goods in foreign markets. And yet, how much we sell in other markets depends on our ability to negotiate trade agreements reducing tariff barriers to those markets. If we continue to let other nations forge trade agreements without us, they will continue to take customers from us and to take market share that will be very hard to win back.

We must restore the Presidents' power to be a negotiating force in shaping the international markets of the future. Without fast track authority, we are simply not at the negotiating table and countries are reluctant to negotiate, knowing that Congress could demand unilateral changes to any negotiated trade agreement at a later date. Let's not tie our negotiators' hand by denying them traditional authority because it makes hammering out international agreements—already an extremely difficult process—virtually impossible.

I also want to make my colleagues aware that this legislation reauthorizes the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program which will expire on September 30th. This necessary and important program assists American workers and firms who have been adversely affected by import competition. TAA plays a vital role in protecting working families, retaining a skilled and productive workforce, and allowing domestic companies the opportunity to adjust to foreign competition. It is a unique public-private sector partnership that saves and creates jobs.

The global economy will grow at three times the rate of the U.S. economy. A vote for fast track today is a vote of confidence in our workers and a vote for America's future. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2621.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. TANNER).

(Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDERMOTT) for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the fast track authority, as imperfect as it may be. I will relate why. I think this may well be one of the most important issues we face as a Nation since the end of the Cold War.

During this century, most of the standing that this country has enjoyed in the world was really defined by military alliances. During the Cold War, it was who was on whose side, either the East, U.S.S.R. or the West, the United States. I believe in the next century the Nation's standing in the world will be judged primarily by trading alliances. I think in this global economy which we are definitely in we have to remain engaged.

It is not a hard question. If one believes, as I do, that we can grow more food in this country than we can consume, we can make more stuff than we can buy and sell to each other, we must have some means by which we sell this to somebody else, or it is an economic fact of capitalism that whoever is engaged in that surplus production is going to lose their job. That is not a political argument. That is an economic fact of capitalism.

Now, I regret very, very much that this bill is up today. We, some of us on our side of the aisle, worked our heads off last November to try to get the votes to pass this. I think we were within three or four votes when the bill was pulled. I have not seen, quite frankly, the same effort applied to bring this bill to the floor today.

As I said, I think this is one of the most important votes this Congress will take since the end of the Cold War, and I regret very deeply and very much the circumstances under which we are considering it.

Nevertheless, I intend to support it, because I think it is that important to the country. I hope after it fails today, which I assume that it will, that we can get together and do something for the country, not our political agendas.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I have another quote for everyone that, interestingly enough, is germane to our current situation in the Florida Keys. "And I think we should say to all the people we are trying to represent here that preparing for a far-off storm that may reach our shores is far wiser than ignoring the thunder until the clouds are just overhead."

That was a reference to some of the economic problems with our trading

partners in Asia, and again part of the State of the Union message by President Clinton in this body in January of this year.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. HOUGHTON).

(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of fast track. I was not ready for the vote the last time, because I thought that there were some things that we could do as far as protection of our jobs, as far as the environment, but I voted on it. It may not be the appropriate time now. I do not know when an appropriate time is.

But I will tell my colleagues the thing that I worry about. This is not just an intellectual discussion here in this Chamber. We are living in a real world, and the world is passing us by, particularly now with the emphasis of the Asian flu.

I have taken groups down to Chile, to Argentina, to Mexico, to other parts of the world, all privately sponsored, and the one thing they ask is, "When are you going to give the President the authority to negotiate with us, not just on a bilateral but a multilateral basis?"

Mr. Speaker, I think it is so important that we do that. Time is important. It is not just an intellectual argument or a legal argument. It is an argument that has to do with business expansion. And countries and institutions and industries are passing us by, and I think it is very important we look at that.

Another thing I think is important we look at is separate the two economic issues. People say we have to protect our jobs. Therefore, we cannot have fast track. But protecting our jobs, there are things we can do through 301, super 301, section 201 of the Trade Act.

But to protect our jobs by not allowing our salesmen to go out and sell our products is crazy. Ninety-six percent of the customers of this world are outside of this country. We have got to reach them. Time is against us. We must pass this legislation.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) for yielding me this time, a gentleman who has been one of the great leaders on this issue on our side of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, I rise as someone who supported NAFTA, who supported GATT, who has voted for fast track, and who was one of the 42 Democrats ready to vote for fast track, which was not brought to the floor just about a year ago.

I rise as someone who is going to vote "no." I rise lamenting the fact that this issue has been so politicized, an issue that the chairman of the Com-

mittee on Ways and Means rightfully said is critical to this country.

There has been no bipartisan discussion on fast track this year as there was last. I rise in opposition to this being brought to the floor because I think it hurts this effort; it does not help it. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY), the majority whip, came to the floor and intimated that Bill Clinton, the President of the United States, had withdrawn his support. President Clinton has shown more courage on trade than any president under whom I have served or with whom I have served.

This issue should not go forward now. Why? Because it is critical that we pass fast track. And I am going to support it next year. I will tell my friends, I am voting "no" now, and next year I will be asking a lot of "noes" to vote "yes." I think that may get us to a majority. I am not sure, because my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle have put this in the context of putting at risk this issue 5 weeks before an election for political purposes solely. That is the only reason this bill is on this floor right now.

The chairman said we ought to resist the seductiveness of protectionism. I agree with that. Let me repeat. The chairman said it is a shame that we do not resist the seductiveness of protectionism. I agree with that. Let me also say it is a shame that we have not resisted the seductiveness of political advantage in bringing this bill to this floor this day.

There is no one on this floor who believes this bill is going to pass today. Not one. Not on the Republican side and not on our side. And even if it did, there is no one on this floor that believes that it could get through the United States Senate. So the only thing that the Republicans are doing is perhaps making it more difficult for us in February or March of next year, in a bipartisan way, coming together on behalf of America, not on behalf of Republicans or Democrats but on behalf of a more competitive, economically vibrant America, to pass this legislation to empower our President to negotiate.

Mr. Speaker, I hope others will join me in voting "no" today and "yes" next year when we have an opportunity to pass this legislation.

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Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. PORTMAN).

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, this is a bizarre debate today. I guess the bottom line is, if you are for fast track, you think this legislation as presented to the House today makes sense, vote for it. Then we can pass this thing. If all the Members who have come up here and said that they are for free trade truly are for free trade and are sincere about it, we can pass this thing.

This is a bizarre debate in another respect. For years Ronald Reagan and

George Bush got fast track authority from a Democrat Congress. They went out and they negotiated agreements that were in the interest of this country. Now we have a situation where President Clinton is coming before a Congress that is dominated by Republicans, and the Republicans are willing to give him fast track authority to negotiate on behalf of our country to open up foreign markets. Yet the Democrats are not giving it to their own President. It has only lapsed twice in history, in 1988 and again in 1993. This is the longest lapse in duration by far.

It has been 6 years since this President has had full fast track authority. We need to provide it. Thirty percent of our growth in our economy is directly related to exports. We have the freest market in the world. We need to knock down the barriers in these other countries. We have a whole slew of multilateral agreements that are being negotiated over the next couple of years. We have to be at the table.

The fact is, we are not going to be taken seriously either by individual countries in our negotiations on a bilateral basis or by the rest of the world on our multilateral negotiations unless the President has the authority under fast track to bring an agreement to this Congress for an up or down vote.

Remember, we retain our right to turn down any agreement we do not like. So this is not even about specific trade policy issues. This is about allowing the American economy to move forward. We cannot stick our heads in the sand. We are living in a global economy. We need to have America out there as a leader in that global economy to make it a freer economy, to help with regard to jobs and exports in this country.

I urge my colleagues, forget the politics. Forget the Republicans and the Democrats. Do what is in your heart. If you really believe in free trade, vote for fast track today.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR).

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Just this week Levi Strauss announced the layoff of 6,395 U.S. workers at 11 plants. Kodak has announced plans to lay off up to 14,000 workers, and hundreds of workers at Huffy Bicycle in Celina, Ohio have just gotten the pink slip.

By voting no on extending fast track authority today, this House has the opportunity to redefine U.S. trade negotiating policy from one which gives away the store to one which establishes an international trade regime of fair and reciprocal trade with our trade competitors.

Just look at the evidence on agriculture. The consultation provisions included in this bill have no practical effect. They mean nothing. Just with our NAFTA trading partners on this

continent, what had been a surplus has now turned into a \$2 billion negative balance, adversely impacting our agricultural trade sector. Existing trade agreements adversely affect U.S. farmers by lack of inspection on food safety, surges in agriculture imports, an inadequate trade dispute resolution system, and no way to hedge currency fluctuations.

Overall since the Trade Act of 1974, where fast track was first approved, our trade deficit has moved from \$9 billion to \$220 billion.

Vote no on fast track. Stand up for the U.S. standard of living.

By voting no on every Fast Track authority today, the House has the opportunity to redefine U.S. trade negotiating policy—from one which gives away the store—to one that establishes an international trade regime of fair and reciprocal trade agreements between our nation and our trading competitors.

Look at the evidence on agriculture provisions: The consultation provisions in the modifications made to H.R. 2621 in regard to agriculture issues have no practical effect. Just with our NAFTA trading partners, what has been a surplus imports rose by \$3 billion and exports by only \$1 billion—a \$2 billion negative impact on our agricultural trade balance. Take the Florida tomato industry, for instance. In 1991, Florida had 300 tomato producers. In 1995, there were only 75.

The problems existing trade agreements have created that adversely affect U.S. farmers include: Lack of inspection of food imports; Surges in agricultural imports; An inadequate trade dispute resolution system; and Currency fluctuations.

Overall, since the Trade Act of 1974, implementation of fast track, the U.S. has suffered a negative merchandise trade balance. From \$9 billion in 1976 to an estimated \$220 billion in 1998.

The problem is not trade but our trade policy. Our trade policy serves the needs of nominally American multinational corporations whose business visions and plans are global in scope and which maintain no national allegiance. Our trade policy has failed America's small businesses families, America's working families, and America's consumers.

When a multinational conglomerate moves a factory overseas, the local grocery doesn't go with it. The auto parts store loses its customers. Small supplier companies lost their customer. American small business hurts. Real wages for American working people have fallen since 1973. Consumers pay as much for an Arrow shirt made in Thailand as for the same shirt made in the U.S.

Fast Track is not required for good trade agreements. It is required to get bad trade deals through Congress.

This Administration has negotiated 220 plus trade agreements without fast track. The fast track bill we consider today actually puts limits on the President's negotiating options rather than giving him a free hand to negotiate.

Our trade balance with MERCOSUR countries has steadily improved since 1990 (from -\$3.2 billion to +\$9.2 billion in 1996) without a free trade agreement. MERCOSUR countries have an average tariff of 14%.

China is touted as the great new market for American exports. The average annual income in China is \$2,200. China has many tariffs on

consumer goods of 40% or higher. Imports to China have to survive an obstacle course of non-tariff barriers including import regulations that are not even published. China demands technology transfers to accompany the importation of high-value-added goods in order to develop domestic competition.

NAFTA's promises have proved illusory. Our trade surplus with Mexico has become a \$16 billion trade deficit. NAFTA has eliminated 400,000 job opportunities in the U.S. The labor and environmental side agreements have provided toothless and unworkable. Just this week Levi Strauss announced the layoff of 6,395 workers at 11 plants and Kodak has announced plans to lay off up to 14,000 U.S. workers; 100's at Huffy Bicycle in Celina, Ohio.

NAFTA has failed Mexico. The Mexican standard of living has been cut by 50% Maquiladoras have increased not decreased and their employees live in squalor. Most U.S. exports to Mexico turn around and come back as imports. The Mexican market for U.S. exports has been a disappointment.

The solution is a U.S. trade policy that demands reciprocal treatment of labor and environmental issues on a par with market access and tariff issues.

Vote no on fast track!!!

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would simply like to remind all of the colleagues in this Chamber that the gentlewoman's concern about that escalation of our imports is not an invalid one. As we all know, yesterday we vastly increased the import of skilled labor because we lack labor in this country to meet all of the job requests.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BEREUTER).

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of fast track negotiating authority.

Today's vote is quite likely to be the most important vote of the 105th Congress, and it could not come at a more important time. Forty percent of the world's economy is in recession. The Asian financial crisis has spread from Thailand to Indonesia, to Korea, to Russia, and it now stands on Brazil's doorstep. If Brazil succumbs to this crisis, Argentina, Mexico and the United States are not far behind.

With many countries retreating from their promises of trade liberalization and financial modernization, this is a crucial moment for the world's economy and for world growth. A setback for fast track in the 105th Congress, be it last year or this year, is a setback for United States leadership for trade liberalization. It is a setback for the appropriate and necessary trend toward the establishment of market-oriented economies throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, as one who also supports fundamental reexamination and reform of the international financial architecture, I believe that fast track negotiating authority for the executive

branch is very much relatedly of paramount importance in this time of global financial crisis and perhaps a slide toward global recession. The ability of the United States executive branch to initiate and conclude bilateral regional and global trade agreements is absolutely crucial for worldwide economic growth.

I believe that the President of the United States and a majority of Members here understand that. Protectionists in this country want to make this fast track vote a referendum on international trade, on GATT and NAFTA. This Member says, let it be a fair reform under fair rules, a fair referendum.

I urge my colleagues to support fast track legislation for the President.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN).

(Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the fast track legislation. I supported it last year. I think it is the right thing to do. I think the future of our economy is directly tied to trade.

But I think it is a mistake to take this bill up today. The chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means talked about the delicate markets that we face right now. Everybody knows this bill is going to fail. So here we have a situation where the House of Representatives is going to vote down fast track trading authority. We have been incapable of mustering support for the IMF recapitalization. We look like we are probably doing away with the fiscal responsibility that started just a few years ago through the highway bill and through the tax bill. So as the world financial situation worsens and starts to affect us, America appears to be turning inward, at least if we look at the House of Representatives. I think that is a terrible mistake.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY), my colleague, and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Trade quoted the President in his State of the Union address he gave earlier this year. They did not quote the part where he talked about the IMF. And the fact is, you all cannot get it out of your own conference. The votes are here to pass the IMF bill between our side and your side, but you cannot get it out of the political debate in your own conference.

The fact that we are having this vote today, it is not about trade. It is not about good policy, although I think fast track is good policy. It is about politics. That is what it has come down to. Maybe that is the way end of sessions are. It is all about politics. We are going into an election.

The problem is, the people out in the country are looking at this and they are looking at the House and they are saying, they cannot do anything. They are a paralyzed body. But even worse, the markets around the world look at

it and say, they cannot do anything. The United States is paralyzed. And that just undermines confidence and increases contagion further throughout the world.

Who pays for that? The American worker that we are all talking about today.

It is a real shame that the House is taking this up when they know it is going to fail. It is going to make the United States look bad. I will vote for it, but I think it is a big mistake.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation to grant the President fast-track authority to negotiate international trade agreements because I believe that expanded trade is good for our economy and good for American workers. However, I strongly disagree with the majority's decision to play politics with this issue by scheduling this vote today when it is clear the votes are not there to pass this bill. This decision undermines this nation's long history of bipartisanship on trade issues, poisons the long-term prospects for such legislation, and in the short-term risks further destabilizing world markets already experiencing the greatest instability and weakness in 50 years. The decision to hold this vote today puts partisan politics ahead of international leadership, to the detriment of our own economy and the world economy.

Let me be clear. I strongly support extending fast-track authority to the President. In anticipation of last year's vote, and after discussion with constituents, including labor and industry, as well as government officials and economic and trade experts, I announced that I would vote in support of the fast-track legislation. I did so because I believe that expanded trade, through agreements that reduce foreign trade barriers and open new markets for American products, is vital to growing our economy, raising our standard of living, and creating high-skilled, high-wage jobs. However, I announced my support only after having secured from the President a commitment to significantly expand our nation's trade adjustment assistance programs to help those who are hurt by trade. While I believe that trade helps our economy as a whole, we must recognize that some industries and some workers are hurt by trade, and we need to put in place a comprehensive trade policy that seeks to maximize the benefits and minimize the harm. I remain strongly committed to an economic policy that includes free and fair trade that reduces foreign trade barriers to American products, while ensuring that all Americans share in the benefits of trade through trade adjustment assistance and retraining programs.

While I agree philosophically with the intent of this legislation, I believe it is short-sighted and dangerous for the majority to hold this vote today. Global markets are looking to the United States for stability and guidance as global financial markets move through this difficult era. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted in his testimony to the House Banking Committee on Wednesday, world leaders, including the U.S. Congress, must pay very close attention to the potential harm of the global financial crisis to their own countries. In a time when we see contagion in Asia, a collapse of the Russian economy and the economic turmoil in Latin America, we simply cannot take our vote on fast-track lightly.

By voting on this bill today, which has no chance for passage, this body is taking a very irresponsible action that places short-term political goals ahead of assuring global markets of our nation's commitment to financial security and free markets. The end result of this politically motivated effort will only make passage of fast-track even less likely during the next Congress. While I will vote "yes" on final passage, it is only with the most reluctance and hesitation.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SHAW), our distinguished colleague on the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me the time to speak on this most important piece of legislation.

So much has been said on both sides, by Members on both sides of this issue and on both sides of the aisle, about what is happening in the world economy today. And some of those things, when you really zero in on them, are rather frightening.

All this legislation does is to give the President the authority to go to the bargaining table to work out some type of a trade agreement, free trade agreement. And then, with the expectation and the knowledge and the fact that that particular treaty has to come back to this body and to the Senate for ratification. We in no way empower the President to do anything. We simply give him the guarantee of an up-or-down vote on whatever he might negotiate.

Now, for most of the Members that would seem so logical, but politics has gotten into this thing in an incredible way and an incredibly bad way. The unions are out there negotiating or trying to lean on their Members to vote against the fast track authority, when the fact is and the bottom line is that the higher-level jobs stay here in the United States, and those are the type of jobs that these unions want to attract to the United States. I never could understand that exact reasoning.

I think most important, even if you are not a free trader, the rest of the world is becoming a free trader. We are not there. The rest of the world is moving ahead. We are standing still in a protectionist situation. This is what this is all about.

If we were able to pass fast track within the next hour, hour and a half, that would probably be one of the most important votes that we could take in this session of the Congress that show that we are moving ahead. How can the strongest, largest economy that has ever been on the face of this earth be afraid of free trade?

We are the world's greatest exporter, the largest exporter in the world. Our jobs depend upon it. With all of the problems that are going on in the other economies, let us pull together and pass fast track today. Let us give the President the authority that he needs to move us ahead in the world economy.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, just to mention to the gentleman, if you want to pass fast track, all you have to do is get the law that expired in 1994, which we passed in 1988, put it on the floor, and you will probably have 250 votes. But you do not want to do that because you really do not want this bill to pass. You want to use it for partisan advantage.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

This is a sad moment for me because I came to Congress believing in enhancing the United States role in a global economy. I represent a State which has prospered mightily from trade. I have enjoyed working with my colleagues the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI), the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL) and with members on the other side of the aisle like the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CRANE), the gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER) and the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. KOLBE) in the development of a bipartisan trade policy.

Last year I was part of an effort, and we came close, there were maybe 210 Members who were willing to vote. But because we were not quite close enough, the Republican Speaker and the administration pulled it back.

Now, in an increasingly partisan atmosphere, the Republican leadership has recklessly endangered our progress and will produce not just fewer Democrats, there will be fewer Republicans that will vote for this bill than we claim to have had last year.

It will undercut our progress on environment and labor. It is a blatant partisan effort that will freeze some of the positions on both sides of the aisle. It toys with Members who really do care about this issue. And by producing today fewer Republicans, fewer Democrats, we are going to send a negative economic signal both at home and abroad.

Most sadly, it shatters the bipartisan trade leadership efforts that Members have worked so hard on on this floor.

I will personally work to restore that bipartisan coalition, work to build bridges, listen to and deal with the legitimate concerns Members have. But this failure that is going to occur today does not underscore the weakness of this President. It talks about the recklessness of the Republican leadership that is not going to be able to produce the same amount of votes that they claimed last year. I am not going to dignify this political act with a yes vote. I will vote present, and I urge others to do similar or vote against it.

I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to remind our distinguished ranking minor-

ity member that there was obviously something substantive in this bill when he voted for it in committee. I am sorry that the gentleman changed his position with the passage of time, because we need that kind of important bipartisan support.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. RAMSTAD).

Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding the time to me.

Mr. Speaker, if ever we needed to put statesmanship ahead of partisanship, it is here and now. We can move forward, remaining engaged in the global marketplace, or we can turn backward and isolate ourselves, driving a stake into our economy and saying goodbye to thousands of lost jobs.

As has been said before, the world economy will move forward with or without us. Our trading partners will continue to negotiate and enter into new trade agreements which grow their businesses and create new jobs in their countries.

Look at the last 20 major trade agreements enacted in this hemisphere since fast track expired. Where is the United States? Left out of all 20 major agreements. Around the world, believe me, Mr. Speaker, major exporting nations are hoping that Congress votes down fast track authority tonight.

□ 1700

Our competitors win if the world's largest economy is excluded from trade negotiations, pure and simple. As a Minnesotan and a member of the Subcommittee on Trade, I have seen firsthand the value of exports and increased trade to U.S. workers. My State of Minnesota is the 12th largest exporting State. The Twin Cities, which includes the Third Congressional District, is the eighth largest metropolitan area in terms of exporting in the Nation. Eight percent of Minnesota's gross State product is exported to other nations. Minnesota's exports over the last five years have grown 150 percent. Jobs have increased 25 percent.

But, Mr. Speaker, we cannot sit still. We must pass fast track to continue to grow our economy. Farmers in Minnesota and the rest of the Nation need the expanding markets in Latin America and Asia. Our high-tech manufacturers need them. Intellectual property needs them. Fast track is needed to break down the barriers to those critical markets.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. HOUGHTON) told us that 96 percent of the world's consumers live outside the United States. We cannot ignore them. Let us not leave America's workers, farmers, consumers and businesses behind. Let us put statesmanship ahead of partisanship. Let us pass fast track and keep America competitive.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I just might mention to the chair of the subcommittee that we did not even

bring this bill to the committee nor subcommittee. We just brought it right to the floor because you were so anxious to make a political point.

I might add also last week in Congress Daily AM, "One senior Republican aide appeared to view the bill as a loser, indicating that the leadership's decision to press is based upon political calculations. 'The decision to do it is to show business who is in the camp of business and who is in the camp of labor.'"

That is a great way to pass legislation. You know this bill is not going to pass. All this rhetoric about how we really need fast track is just that. It is rhetoric. This is not a debating society. This is to pass good legislation. But you are incapable of doing it because you folks do not know how to compromise. We passed NAFTA. We passed GATT. We passed the MFN China. You cannot pass legislation, because you just do not know how to compromise and make deals. That is the problem. You like to just talk about it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BECERRA).

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I would agree with everyone who has said that we need free trade. I would agree with everyone who says that we need to give the President fast track authority to negotiate free trade agreements. But we need free trade that offers fair treatment for America's workers and offers protection of our environment. And we need a bill to vote on for fast track authority that is not encumbered by politics.

Everyone here, as has been said before, knows that this bill is not going to pass. If you believe it will, then you should stand up here and say that you are willing to put your month's paycheck behind that. Yet we are five days away from the end of this fiscal year. On day six, we would have to shut the doors of government down because we do not yet have a budget in place to allow us to operate the government for the next fiscal year beginning October 1. Were it not for a short-term, stopgap, emergency continuing resolution that passed this House that allows us to operate until October 9, we would be preparing to close all of the doors of government down, from our parks to our Defense Department to our Department of Justice, in five days.

Today we are taking time to discuss fast track authority when we know it will fail, when we are five days away from closing down the end of the fiscal year and only one of the 13 appropriations bills that we need to have a full budget for the next fiscal year has been sent to the President for his signature. Why are we doing this? We know what is going to happen. October 9 will come and we still will not have those 12 other appropriation bills passed. We are not doing our work. We know this will not pass. It is clear six weeks away from an election, a point is to be made.

That point could have been made without jeopardizing the future of free trade for this country, of good fast track authority for the President.

It is unfortunate that politics again has taken over this House and has doomed what should otherwise be a good opportunity to have free trade authority and fast track authority for this President.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would remind our colleagues that job relocation has always been a component of trade. Because of NAFTA, the Department of Labor estimated that we did lose 125,000 jobs, but only 10,000 of those people took advantage of the NAFTA retraining benefits. That was over the span of three years. We create more than 125,000 jobs every two weeks. We have been, primarily because of the advancement of free trade.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CAMP).

(Mr. CAMP asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I would say to my colleagues from rural districts, this fast track bill has some of the most important pro-agricultural language in any bill you will vote on this year. A vote for fast track is a vote for United States farm families.

A provision in our fast track bill not included in any other version that has passed the House before in the 1980s or any other time, Special 301 for agriculture, requires the Trade Representative to place a much higher focus on our Nation's farmers every year, initiating cases against those countries with barriers to U.S. agricultural products. There is no doubt about it, our farmers are hurting this year. Why? Part of it is weather. In my own congressional district we have had half the rain of a normal year. But a lot of it also has to do with international conditions. South American countries had a bumper crop this year, pushing worldwide crop prices down. The Asian economic crisis pushed prices down further, because Asian demand has plummeted. The lack of demand is cutting U.S. agricultural exports by \$2 billion or more, according to USDA estimates.

But we need to be able to tell our farmers in 1998, "We're going to help you, we're going to help you increase your share in international markets when a strong dollar or weak demand are working against us. We are going to help you get good prices and a fair farm income."

Trade is one of the most important tools we have to increase farm income. Last year our farmers exported \$57 billion in agricultural products. With a \$21 billion trade surplus last year, farmers made the largest dent in our trade deficit of any industry. Special 301 for agriculture helps address trade barriers. Under Special 301, when the U.S. Trade Representative makes their

annual report on trade barriers, they must identify as priority countries those nations whose agricultural trade barriers have the most harmful impact on U.S. agricultural products. After identifying those countries, USTR is required to negotiate removal of the discriminatory barriers. If negotiations are unsuccessful, the U.S. can take retaliatory action under 301.

I am pleased to have worked on this provision with the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. GUTKNECHT). I urge support of the bill.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. EDWARDS).

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, as a Democratic supporter of fast track, I say here today that the Republican leadership of this House has killed the possibility of fast track's passage for years to come.

Let us be clear about what has happened and let us be honest about what has happened. Republicans have enough votes right now today to pass fast track without one single Democratic vote. You know that and I know that. But you also know you cannot do that, because there are a lot of Republicans not supporting fast track. So what you have done basically is to say, "We can't pass it on our own," and then you gleefully let your leaders go out and say this is a great vote to have right before the election because it will give Democrats grief, and then you make no real effort to put together a bipartisan bill, and then have the audacity to have some Members come to the well of this House and blame the defeat of this on Democrats. I would say that is disingenuous.

I want fast track to pass. I think it is the right thing to do. But I hope that every American farmer and rancher and every American business that understands the importance of fast track knows that the Republican leadership today is putting the nail of death into the coffin of fast track's passage.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. One more quote:

"As we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires us to seek opportunity, not just at home but in all of the markets of the world. We must shape this global economy, not shrink from it."

That again is President William Clinton in this Chamber in January of this year.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DAVIS).

Mr. DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, this is not a bipartisan bill? This is a bill that just a few months ago the President would have signed and many of you voted for it in committee and would vote for it.

I am really disappointed in some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. What I hear them saying is they are more concerned about protecting some of their Members from a con-

troversial vote that splits their coalition than in passing fast track. Frankly as one of the Republicans who voted for IMF funding over objections from some of my leadership, I do not think it is statesmanship, I do not think it is the right direction for the country, and I do not think you are giving cover to anybody by voting "no" on this or fooling anybody.

But meantime, the world goes on. Dozens of treaties are being negotiated around the world between countries while America simply sits on the sidelines. Chile, the fastest growing economy in the western hemisphere, has new trade agreements with every country in the western hemisphere except for Cuba and the United States. Their markets now buy more from European countries than from the United States because we have not been able to sit down and negotiate agreements with them because we sit idly by in the House waiting for, I guess what people on the other side would wait for an opportune time, which I gather now is sometime after the election when they believe their coalition is not split.

Our experience with amendable trade agreements goes way back to Smoot-Hawley and shows that it does not work. We need fast track legislation. This is the longest expiration that we have had in history. With 95, 96 percent of world consumers living outside the United States, it is important that the surpluses that we have in this country, whether it is computers, whether it is food and agricultural products, that we be able to sell these at a fair price and penetrate other markets. Without this, we cannot move on.

A "no" vote today just kisses this off to six months or a year from now. In the meantime, American consumers suffer by paying higher prices and American exporters lose jobs.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR).

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, we in Minnesota and Michigan's iron ore and mining industry and the lower lake steel mills must never forget the harsh lessons of the 1970s and 1980s. We paid a terrible price for unfair trading practices in steel and iron ore. We lost 330,000 jobs in the basic steel industry in America, a 57 percent reduction in jobs, 450 plants closed, nearly 10,000 jobs permanently lost in Minnesota's iron ore, mining and taconite industry due to subsidized imports of steel from Japan, Korea, Europe and Brazil.

Our domestic industry since then has modernized, spent \$50 billion in new plant and equipment, producing the highest quality steel in the world. Our productivity stands at four man-hours per ton. Our plants give the best quality steel at the lowest cost. Yet steel imports have surged in May, June and July this year, 113 percent up from Japan, 90 percent up from Korea, 32 percent up from Russia, Ukraine and

others. From Latin America and the Caribbean, imports stand at 4.7 million tons for the first seven months of this year alone. We are on a pace toward 36 million tons of steel imports in America, 26 percent of domestic consumption. Layoffs are already happening in basic steel and in the iron ore mining industry in Minnesota and Michigan.

I say no fast track in the face of unfairly traded steel, dumped in the U.S. market at subsidized prices with the label "Japanese steel at Russian prices imported from Latin America."

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MANZULLO).

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, they get up at the crack of dawn and they work 18 hours a day. They take care of their animals. They cultivate their crops. They repair the roofs of their barns that have been torn off by savage winds. They are preparing to go into the field, to cultivate the corn, to harvest it, to sell it. Harvest time is the time to pass fast track. Because without fast track, American farmers have lost 78 million bushels of corn in sales to Chile and three other Latin American countries to the Argentinians. Because Argentina has an agreement with those four Latin American countries and we do not.

□ 1715

Let us talk about the people. Let us talk about the farmers who are directly suffering as a result of the President's failure to lead the Nation in adopting fast track. They are the ones that are suffering. Them. The ones who work all those hours. And to the men and women at the Neon plant in Chrysler, they could not sell 4000 Neons to Chile. Mexico sold those Neons to Chile because Mexico has a free trade agreement with Chile and the United States does not. Four thousand automobiles could have been manufactured in this country, and they were not because we do not have fast track.

Mr. Speaker, it is the people that count.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. BOSWELL).

(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the opportunity to come and speak this afternoon, and I welcome the opportunity to finally see a vote on fast track. I deplore the games that have been played with American farmers and others who depend on trade.

Since last summer I have fought to include child labor provisions in the fast track legislation. Like many of my colleagues, I have lived outside the country for 9 years of my life, and I have seen firsthand some of the miserable conditions, some of the rotten conditions under which some children have to work. As the one true leader of the world stage, I believe the United

States must be concerned about those who are least able to protect themselves, the children.

Mr. Speaker, I have worked with the administration and leaders from both sides of the aisle to have fast track legislation that will consider child labor in countries with which we negotiate under fast track. This bill make an important first step in this direction. As of last night, and I thank my colleagues, as of last night the bill requires the President to focus on the laws governing the exploitative labor and submit to this body a report on the Nation's child labor laws.

I might share with my colleagues that the amendment that I had tried to bring before this body did much the same thing. It said a country which we would deal with would have a standard for child labor, and, second, that they would not force their own standard, not saying what it would be. I think this accomplishes much the same thing.

So, Mr. Speaker, I claim that partial victory and I feel very good. Last year I worked very closely with the administration to support my child labor language, and the President did support my efforts and agreed to my language, and I have a letter here that affirms that, that precedes the fact that we made this effort.

This fast track bill gives farmers a fair shake in fast track negotiations. The legislation requires the trade representative to identify countries that deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. agricultural products. Also, before entering into negotiations that reduce United States tariffs on agricultural products the President must consult with the agricultural committees of the House and Senate. Involving the ag committee is a very good addition to the process.

Make no mistake, fast track is an important part of the long solution for the world economy. What our agricultural community needs in the short term is to fully fund the IMF. I have always supported fast track, and I have always supported provisions that contemplate child labor. Today I declare a partial win and am pleased to vote for fast track. Both of these are important measures.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. CALVERT).

Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of fast track trade legislation.

For the last several years the majority in Congress has eliminated the deficit, produced tax relief for the first time in 16 years and reformed welfare. The result has been a strong American economy. And Congress today has its role to play again. We cannot allow the current global economic crisis to slow U.S. economic growth any further.

By denying the President the ability to negotiate fast track trade agreements we are hurting the long term prosperity of our country. We in Con-

gress must send a strong and clear signal to our citizens and the world that we are willing to make the tough decisions today to secure prosperity for our children.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support fast track legislation. It is the right thing to do. As was mentioned, 95 percent of the customers are outside of the United States. Keep our country strong, support fast track.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) who is a member of the Committee on Ways and Means and that he in turn be permitted to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DAVIS).

(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, the American people oppose fast track by a 2-to-1 margin because they see existing trade agreements that do not do enough to protect living standards or to keep our food, air and water safe. Some Members of this body feel that because we are in an economic boom like we have never seen before that the American people should support fast track to give our industries an even stronger economic boost. But while the rich of America are enjoying the good times of economic prosperity, I am constantly reminded in my district that there are no good times to be poor, but some times are worse than others.

Now we understand the question is not whether we should trade. Of course we should. There is no turning back from our global economy. But we also must understand that how we trade makes a big difference.

Mr. Speaker, I heard an old African proverb that says when elephants fight it is only the grass that gets trampled. Do not let this fast track further trample the lives of every day people. I ask that we vote against fast track and vote to save decent jobs for the American people.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield a minute and a half to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. GUTKNECHT).

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to say that some of the debate I have heard so far today on the floor of the House is almost embarrassing. We have literally heard Members say:

I would have voted for this bill 6 months ago, and I will vote for it in January, but I cannot vote for it now.

Mr. Speaker, it almost gives hypocrisy a bad name even here in Washington.

This is a very important vote, and as some of my colleagues have already pointed out, many of our farmers are in the middle of the harvest right now, and, frankly, we need to make sure that that harvest has a market.

As my colleagues know, a lot of people have criticized the farm bill and they say farmers are going broke today. Well, of course they are. We have lost \$5 billion worth of exports. Trade was at record high back in 1996, and so was farm income, and it is no coincidence. Exports have dropped, and so has farm income. We cannot eat all that we produce here in the United States. Trade is critically important to us, and I want to call attention to something that the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. BOSWELL) said just a minute ago and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CAMP) said earlier as well:

This bill has in it super 301 language so that our government is now going to be responsible for enforcing the trade agreements that we have. Heretofore we have required that the trade groups have actually had to enforce them.

In the end, Members, this is a debate between those who believe that America can compete in a world marketplace and those who believe that America cannot. I, for one, am not willing to give up on America's farmers or America's workers because I believe that America can and will and must compete in a world marketplace.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. STENHOLM).

(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of fast track legislation. Fast track authority will ensure that the agricultural trade success story does not reach an untimely end and that we maintain our position as a leader in the global economy.

But it is not the esoteric language of economics and trade ratios that motivate me on this issue. It is people and especially the people of west Texas who I am privileged to represent. My farmers and ranchers are hurting, and so are all the people who have business related to agriculture. In the absence of recent trade progress, my constituents have lost ground and see their incomes decrease by 30 percent. They need a ray of hope that markets will soon open up and allow them to keep and expand jobs and care for their families.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2621 would renew the authority necessary to renegotiate new trade agreements aimed at achieving these objectives.

To those who oppose this legislation, that is all we are talking about is sending our negotiators back to the table.

To the Republican leadership I say that I sincerely hope in the process of making the judgment to bring this bill to the floor; today they have done everything in their power to make sure this measure succeeds. If this was a reckless gamble on their part, I fear

the message that failure will send to our trading partners around the world.

To my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle who support free trade but have been frustrated about the process, let me say I understand their frustration, but it is time to put people above politics. Our constituents who need jobs, who need opportunities, look at our partisan squabbling as just so much childishness. Adults are expected to know that there comes a time when it does not matter who is at fault. They just have to take the circumstances they have been given and try to do what is right.

Mr. Speaker, I appeal to my friends on both sides of the aisle to vote yes for fast track.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of fast-track legislation on behalf of the farmers and ranchers and other producers of America. This legislation is far more important than any short-term political gain or benefit to either side.

U.S. agricultural trade is a great success story. Our agricultural exports have increased nearly \$20 billion since 1990 to \$57.1 billion in 1997. Sixty percent of this expansion was due to the rising volume of high-value exports, such as beef, poultry meat, and horticultural products. Bulk commodities, especially grains and soybeans, accounted for the rest of the expansion as both volume and prices rose in 1995–1996. How did this tremendous growth occur? Because of the trade agreements negotiated under previous fast-track authority.

Fast-track authority will ensure that the agricultural trade success story does not reach an untimely end, and that we maintain our position as a leader in the global economy. Future export prospects for U.S. agricultural products depend, in large part, on our ability to maintain and expand market access, ensure fair competition, and further level the international playing field for U.S. producers and exporters.

But it's not the esoteric language of economics and trade ratios that motivate me on this issue; it's people, and especially the people of west Texas whom I am privileged to represent. We have heard a lot today from folks on the other side of this issue about workers and jobs and what trade agreements mean for them. That is my concern precisely. My farmers and ranchers are hurting, and so are all of the people who have businesses related to agriculture. In the absence of recent trade progress, my constituents have lost ground and seen their incomes decrease by 30 percent. They need a ray of hope that markets will soon open up, allowing them to keep and expand their jobs and care for their families.

H.R. 2621 would renew the authority necessary to negotiate new trade agreements aimed at achieving these objectives. Any trade agreement reached under fast track would still require congressional approval. Fast track legislation simply says that we give our negotiators the authority they need to be at the table in upcoming trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization, Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. Without fast-track authority, the U.S. will miss an important opportunity to help write the rules that will govern trade in the 21st century. Our farmers and ranchers, as well as other business exporters, will be left out in the cold.

To the Republican leadership I say that I sincerely hope in the process of making the judgment to bring this bill to a vote today, you have done everything in your power to make sure this measure succeeds. If this was a reckless gamble on your part, I fear the message that failure will send to our trading partners around the world.

To my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle who support free trade but have been frustrated about the process by which this bill has come to the floor, I say that I understand your frustration. But it's time to put people above politics. Our constituents who need jobs, who need opportunities, look at our partisan squabbling as just so much childishness. Adults are expected to know that there comes a time when it doesn't matter who is at fault—you just have to take the circumstances you've been given and try to do what's right.

Regardless of what you think about how we got to where we are today, we are past the point of arguing about whether this is the right time to vote on fast track. The time is here; the bill is before us. We must make a choice.

I appeal to my friends on my own side of the aisle to rise above the circumstances into which we were thrust and reaffirm our commitment to the hard-working men and women of our districts who count on us to keep their best interests at heart.

I ask all Members to put politics aside and pass this legislation. Vote for the American farmer and rancher, the small business man and woman. Vote yes for fast track.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BARRETT).

Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I obviously rise in support of H.R. 2621.

Mr. Speaker, I know that everyone is aware of the economic distress out there on our farms and our ranches. Fast track, of course, is one of the much needed responses to that situation.

This fall, if we fail to pass it and if we adjourn without having extended fast track, if the legislation does fail, I think the finger of blame can be directed, of course, straight at the White House for failing to rally the number of Democrat votes needed to pass.

Agriculture is dependent on its export markets, and it is the responsibility of Congress and the administration to make sure that those markets are maintained and expanded. We need lower foreign tariffs, we need to stop the use of foreign trading enterprises to block or underbid our U.S. ag exports, and of course we need fast track to get this done.

For those who argue an imperiled Bill Clinton should not be granted fast track authority, they might be looking at the trade issue with blinders on. It will be the trade experts at the table, not the President, and if history is any gauge, the next round of GATT will not be completed for years. Bill Clinton will be out of the picture by then.

This could be a good day for agriculture and other industries dependent on exports, and I hope it is. I hope enough Members muster the courage to

ignore the pleadings of labor unions and protectionists who want us to live in the past ignoring the global marketplace and limiting future economic growth. U.S. businesses and industry cannot survive without fully participating in the global marketplace, and of course we need fast track to negotiate that full and fair participation.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2621.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN).

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, the message we send to the world today by voting no on fast track is crystal clear. The primary focus of the next generation of trade policies will be in support of worker rights, strong environmental laws and solid food safety regulations.

□ 1730

Future trade agreements coming from this Congress will mean better wages in developing countries, and improved environment, better food safety and increased workers' rights. Existing trade agreements have all too often eroded our living standards, undermined clean air and water laws, and continued to depress wages from workers all over the world, from Nike workers in Indonesia, to GM workers in Mexico, to metal workers in Lorraine, Ohio.

Vote no on fast track.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. RYUN).

Mr. RYUN. Mr. Speaker, while the majority of Americans are enjoying an unprecedented level of economic prosperity, natural disasters and low farm commodity prices are hurting farmers nationwide.

I have seen firsthand the devastating effects facing farmers in my state. The farmers near LeRoy, Kansas, must sell their wheat, milo, corn and soybeans at record low prices, primarily because export markets for these products have been shut out. Farmers simply cannot survive under these conditions.

The correlation between fast track authority and the recent decline in farm prices is unmistakable. When U.S. presidents have had fast track authority, commodity prices have remained stable. However, prices have sharply declined for these products since 1996 when fast track authority expired.

Approval of fast track is a vital step in relieving the burden that has fallen so heavily on the backs of American farm families. It is wrong. It is absolutely wrong for us to prevent our hard-working farmers from earning a living and feeding their families while they allow us to feed our own.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and the President to stand up for American farmers and approve fast track authority.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. KLINK).

Mr. KLINK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe what I am hearing: If we do not have fast track authority, we cannot negotiate a trade agreement. Yet dozens upon dozens of trade agreements have been negotiated by this administration without fast track authority, including a giant international telecom agreement. That is the fact of the matter.

The question here is whether we as Members of Congress have a say in what is done. And I have to go back to NAFTA, because there were many of us in this chamber that had concerns about the environmental measures, about the labor law measures, about the fact that increased drugs would come here. We wanted to insert language into the agreement. We could not do that. We were concerned about the violence and the assassinations in Mexico and wanted to put some language in to deal with that. We wanted to deal with the problem of their indigenous population. Right after NAFTA passed, they had a revolution. We did not have an opportunity to deal with that.

The question is whether we here in Congress want to have a say or whether we just want to have an up or down vote on every trade agreement.

Do not give up what is your duty. We as Members of Congress are to have a say in the commerce of this Nation. Fast track flushes that away.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM).

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. STENHOLM). I think of all the debate today, that he was very rational. He asked both sides to take a look at this and come together, instead of the partisanship from either side. I laud the gentleman.

I was undecided. I have been treed, I have been lobbied, but never threatened, because I said I did not know if I was going to vote for this bill, and I came here today to listen, and I am appalled.

I would tell my friend from California, I am appalled, because when we sit down, the thing we talk about that we hate the most about this job is the partisanship at times. And I want to tell you, this debate has sickened most of us on this floor, that when you want to talk about an issue and you are well rehearsed in unison partisan attacks on the Republicans, it sickens this debate.

I grew up in Missouri. I have friends that have farms that are having to work second and third jobs just to hang onto their farms. I have got ranchers in California from whom you can buy a cow for about \$500, about one-third of the value that it should be. They are dying.

The most important thing that I hear today is that this is the most important vote that we can cast in this body for our farmers and our ranchers and

our small business people. But yet we would rather stay up here and say the Republicans are only doing this to embarrass the President.

This gentleman is not doing that. I came to this floor to listen to an honest debate, and I am sorry and saddened by the debate that has taken place today.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. KENNEDY).

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I want to say to my colleagues in this House that I had the opportunity this past year to go down to Reynosa, Mexico. I went into the maquiladora section. I went to several maquiladora sections. I went in unannounced to factories and introduced myself to the workers. Most of the workers were women, most of them were 14 and 15 years old. Most of them, I would say 90 percent of them, worked six days a week, and at the end of the week they had \$47 to take home. I went to neighborhood after neighborhood, and all I saw were mud floors. No indoor plumbing.

So I say to myself, it is fine to talk about this global economy and the need for trade, but the fact of the matter is, as Martin Luther King said, we are all going to be affected by the same web of mutuality. If we do not insist on standards for our brothers and sisters in Mexico, believe me, we are the next ones on the chopping blocks.

In my state of Rhode Island, we have already seen our workers lose jobs and benefits because of the depressing aspect that NAFTA has had on our workers' conditions here in this country. Vote no on fast track authority. Let the Congress decide how to enforce the status.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would say to my colleague that in my lifetime as a child before World War II, I was child labor at the farm. We got paid 10 cents an hour, worked 10 hours a day to make a dollar, six days a week, and we were ecstatic. We had no indoor plumbing and had no electricity either. But we made a tremendous transition upward nationwide from that time. That was in the State of Indiana, I might remind the gentleman too.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. UPTON).

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, what is fast track? Fast track allows the President to negotiate trade agreements with other countries. Does Congress lose its right to approve those treaties, those agreements? No, they do not. Absolutely not. This body, this Congress, will then vote yes or no based on the merits of the trade agreement that may be negotiated.

I would like to think that every Republican and every Democrat in this body does in fact care about jobs. Let

me tell you about some of the jobs in Michigan, an exporter, by the way, to the tune of \$38 billion in exports last year.

I visited a multinational company recently that showed me a letter from their general manager down in Chile. That letter talked about the importance of Chile's market, their leadership, the gateway to a very important market in the world. That general manager in that letter asked that the Michigan company stop sending goods manufactured in Michigan and change to their facility in Canada.

Why? Well, Canada, thanks to their free trade agreement, their strategy, their trade agreements they have been able to reach because they had fast track, do not have to pay tariffs on their goods going down to Chile. That is right. That same good produced in Canada has an automatic 11 percent discount compared to the same product manufactured in Michigan. We cannot do that. Why? We do not have fast track. This bill allows that to happen.

We see this happening time and time again across the country. Without fast track, there are incentives in fact for companies to send their manufactured goods from other countries.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. SAWYER).

(Mr. SAWYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means got it exactly right. This is a very fragile time. And while I am inclined to support this bill, that fragility makes this measure at this time a foolhardy exercise that could greatly damage our economic strength in the world.

Make no mistake about it: American prosperity depends on the success of our trading arrangements. Today the world's balance of power is defined less in military terms than it is as a matter of economic strength. Trade negotiations are as important to our economic future as the Soviet arms talks were to our national security in an earlier era. But subjecting fast-track legislation to certain defeat today is not only bad politics, it is bad and dangerous policy. It sends a reckless message to securities markets everywhere.

Our inability to work out an orderly agreement for trade negotiating authority can do real damage in real time to already fragile markets, including our own, and to economies around the world. Moreover, it damages the worthwhile goals of people on both sides of the measure before us. It works toward no constructive resolution of legitimate concerns over labor and environmental standards that are within our grasp.

Negotiating authority is important because our prosperity is tied to market opening global trade, and I believe we must move forward. But playing reckless politics with this issue is a

dangerous exercise, and those who brought it to the floor will bear the burden for its defeat and whatever consequences it has throughout the world.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to pass on another quote two to our colleagues this evening. "I think we should seek to advance worker and environmental standards around the world. I have made it abundantly clear that it should be part of our trade agenda. But we cannot influence other countries' decisions if we send them a message that we are backing away from trade with them."

Again, President Clinton in January of this year in this chamber.

Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. NETHERCUTT).

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, if American agriculture does not grow, it will die. That is what Secretary Glickman has said, and he is absolutely right.

The reason I am supporting this fast track bill is because it has the tremendous potential for our agriculture exports to grow and prevent American agriculture from suffering more than it already has this year.

This bill has an agriculture component that allows an ag trade representative to sit at the table at all trade negotiations and to report back to Congress the effort that such negotiations have on agriculture. We in Congress get to vote on these final trade bills. We get to vote no if they are no good, and I would not hesitate to vote no. I trust my friends on the left would not either.

What is interesting is we have heard today people say, let us fund IMF with \$18 billion. What is surprising is those proponents would trust a non-American entity with an \$18 billion sort of unstructured commitment, but not trust the President of the United States or this administration to negotiate a trade bill.

If you support agriculture, vote for fast track.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT).

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, this is not a free trade bill. This is not even a trade bill. This is a process bill, an accelerated process on how we are going to handle the trade agreement. And, once again, Congress is going to turn the powers over to the White House.

So I have a couple questions. The first one is, if our policy on trade is so good, why do we not follow the Constitution and have the Senate ratify it with a two-thirds vote? And another question, maybe a street question: If our trade policy is so good, why does

China not do it? Why does Japan not do it? I want you to think about that.

You know, it really gets to me when we talk about all of this. China is building missiles with American dollars, Japan is building schools with American dollars, Mexico is building factories with American dollars. America is building prisons and passing out training vouchers.

Now, I have heard all of this about all these great jobs you are producing. We are shipping jobs overseas and we are not even keeping score.

So I just want to say this to the Congress: An America that buys much more than they sell year in and year out is an America that is facing economic and military disaster.

□ 1745

If this policy is so good, let two-thirds of the United States Senate ratify it and let it earn its merits through the constitutional process.

I would just like to say one other thing. Even a flea market charges table space. American policies are subsidizing foreign workers and American policies are downsizing American workers. Members can give me all the statistics on jobs they want, but we are flipping a lot of hamburgers in America. People are worried sick about their jobs.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind my colleague, again, the gentleman from I think it is Poland, Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT), I would like to remind him that we have been at full employment for now 3 years in a row, and that the fastest growing component of our national economy has been trade. It has been the most productive. That is what we are putting at risk when we contemplate terminating international trade agreements.

I would remind my colleague also that the Constitution says that on trade issues we are the ultimate judge. Under fast track, we are still the ultimate judge. We make the input all along the way, we look at the final product, and then we vote it up or down, so it is exclusively within our jurisdiction. I would urge the gentleman to reconsider his misguided policy.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. KOLBE).

Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to a few of the arguments that I have been listening to in this debate today. One, of course, that we have heard over and over again is about how trade and trade agreements are going to drive down incomes, they are going to drive down wages.

It is ironic that argument should be raised today. Here on the front page of the Washington Post, 'Poverty rate fell, incomes rose in 1997. Income for the typical American household rose at a rate nearly twice that of inflation in 1997, and income and poverty figures

returned to the levels that the Nation hasn't seen before the last recession," more than a decade ago.

So it is just false. We have had a 3,000 percent increase in trade over the last 35 years, a tremendous increase in the last 7 to 10 years. It is absolutely false to say that income levels are falling, that jobs are being lost. How can they argue that jobs are being lost when 6 million jobs have been created in the last few years, and unemployment is at the lowest possible rate? We have to be putting our heads in the sand, imagining things, to say that employment has been lost.

The second argument I want to raise is one we have heard a lot of on the floor the last several years, why we need to provide the funding for the IMF. I happen to believe that is important. I do think part of our world responsibilities is to have this funding to maintain stability in currencies.

However, I would like to ask my colleagues who urge us to vote for IMF, and then turn around and vote against fast track, how do they think these countries are ever going to generate the economy, the wherewithal, to repay the loans they get from the IMF? Or do they just believe there should be international welfare, that we should shell this money out, but those countries are never going to be able to have the income in order to make the repayments to the International Monetary Fund? It is another phony argument.

Finally, there is the political argument that somehow this is just being done for political reasons. There is politics that are being played. This President said last year he was for IMF, or for fast track. He said in his State of the Union speech this January he was for it. Now he is against it, but next January he will be for it again. If he was not off raising funds today, if he was here in the United States campaigning, if he was here in Washington campaigning for this, we might be able to pass this today.

I urge my colleagues to vote for this. Vote for America. Vote for our future. Vote for fast track.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I might just point out to the gentleman, my very dear friend from Arizona, that the President does not oppose fast track. The President advised the gentleman's membership in the early summer of this year that the votes were not there. He knew the votes were not there. The votes are not going to happen. They will not have 218 votes. The President was right about this.

We are bringing this up for no reason at all except for political advantage. The gentleman saw the quotes in the newspapers from various Members, including the chairman of the Republican Campaign Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the State of Oregon (Mr. DEFAZIO).

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I have heard some interesting things. I guess we could call it election year hyperbole. Somehow this legislation, fast track, is going to be the salvation of our failing family farms. Can they hang on for 5 or 10 years until the next hypothetical trade agreements brought forward under fast track? I don't think so.

Guess what, the last two agreements that came forward under fast track screwed the farmers in America. They were promised the world, but when it came down to whether the banking sector or the aerospace sector or the computer sector got favorable treatment in those agreements, and something had to be traded off, what got traded off? Agriculture.

This is about a process that includes plausible deniability. That means there are a lot of people here who do not want to take responsibility for what is happening in America. They can say, you know, I had concerns about NAFTA. I knew there were problems with some parts of NAFTA. I knew there were problems with labor agreements, they were kind of weak, and we lost a lot of jobs there, and wages have gone down on both sides of the border. Yes, I had some real concerns about those environmental provisions. I really did not think they would clean up the border, which is one of the largest and fastest growing hazardous waste sites in the world. But I had to vote up or down, and I could not sacrifice 2 years of secret negotiations, and we will fix those things later.

That is what we hear every time an agreement comes forward under fast track. Are Members going to blow up three years of careful secret negotiations, just because they have a minor concern about their farmers or about the environment or about American workers? No. The herd here most times said, gee, I would have liked to do something, but I could not. Why could they not? Because they gave away that authority at the beginning.

Do not give away that authority ever again. Have Members not learned from our past mistakes? Can we not learn from a \$200 billion a year trade deficit? Can we not learn from a race to the bottom in terms of wages and the environment?

If we cannot learn, then hopefully the election year shenanigans here, this will help family farms, it is not going to do a damned thing for family farms, and the Members know that.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). The Chair will remind Members they should avoid profanity.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. MORELLA).

(Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bill. I do not know

why all this rhetoric, because this legislation is, at its essence, a simple and straightforward proposition.

The bill would give the President the authority to have a straight up or down vote on legislation implementing the trade agreements which he negotiates. It is the same authority which previous Congresses have granted to every U.S. president, Republicans and Democrats, since 1974.

Presidents need this authority in order to assure their negotiating partners that a deal is a deal. Why would anyone negotiate with someone who could not stand by the deal to which they agreed? Why would a national leader invest enormous time, energy, and prestige in a negotiating process in which the other party kept coming back to renegotiate the deal?

I just want to point out that in the last 10 years, about 70 percent of U.S. economic growth has been generated by the exporter of goods and services. In my own State of Maryland, our exports to Mexico, just as an example, have increased by 82 percent since the passage of the NAFTA. Overall, Maryland's exports have increased by almost 130 percent since 1987.

Expanded trade has opened markets, created opportunities for exporters, created jobs, strengthened the State economy, and raised the living standards for all Marylanders and throughout the country. We are not even debating a trade agreement, we are only proposing to allow the President an up or down vote on whatever deal he may reach.

Fast track authorization will give the President the opportunity to negotiate the strongest and most beneficial agreement possible. If Members do not like the agreement, we can vote against it. But to deny the President fast track authority is to prejudge and agree before it is made.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. MINGE).

Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I am troubled by the circumstances in which fast track is coming up this afternoon. I am afraid that we are bringing this agreement up at this time, not so much to promote fast track as to promote wedge issues, and to claim that it is going to accomplish things going far beyond what it actually can accomplish in the short term.

I represent an agricultural area. I recognize the importance of trade. But I would also like to remind my colleagues that we just finished dealing with the International Monetary Fund. What happened? A very modest increase in funding, far below what the President requested, and no up or down vote on the actual \$18 billion that are needed for IMF.

Perhaps even more important than something that is long-term or an intermediate term advantage opportunity for agriculture is what are we

doing in the short term. We ought to be bringing that up for a vote this afternoon. We need to respond to the agricultural crisis that confronts America, and do it promptly.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. JOHNSON) for a brief colloquy.

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask for clarification by the chairman of a provision which concerns negotiating objectives for trade in civil aircraft.

Is it the chairman's understanding that H.R. 2621 explicitly retains the legislated negotiating objectives contained in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the accompanying Statement of Administrative Action for trade in civil aircraft?

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, that is my understanding.

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Then, I would ask the chairman, shall the USTR understand that such intent is confirmed in legislation, and ensure that the legislated objectives will continue to constitute the principal U.S. negotiating objectives in future negotiations?

Mr. CRANE. That is correct.

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his support of this provision, which is necessary for the continuing international competitiveness of aerospace companies and the jobs they support.

Mr. CRANE. I thank the gentlewoman.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. BARTLETT).

(Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I am strongly supportive of expanded free and open trade, but this bill is not the way to get there. It is unconstitutional. I have here a press release from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the media in my district, chastising me for not supporting this bill. They make my point. Listen.

"\* \* \* noted that with fast track, negotiators would be able to close deals." The President and his negotiators closed the deal. Where is the Congress? We would become merely a rubber stamp, clearly in violation of the Constitution.

I am all for free and expanded trade. This is not the way to get there, at the expense of our Constitution. If we do not understand it, the U.S. Chamber understands it. The President and his negotiators would close the deal.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mr. ROEMER).

(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, thank my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today on the floor, recognizing the importance of trade and growth in our economy, and rise as a free trader. I have supported GATT, I have supported normal trade with China, I have supported the Caribbean Basin Initiative. I have also supported African trade.

But I also rise, Mr. Speaker, as a fair trader. These initiatives were both free, to get into new markets, and fair. This proposal, fast track, is more of NAFTA. It is free trade, but it is not fair to our working people, to the people with families and jobs, particularly in the Midwest.

□ 1800

NAFTA lost Hoosiers 17,000 jobs. NAFTA created a \$40 billion deficit between the U.S. and Mexico when we had a surplus before, and fast track is more of NAFTA.

Let us defeat this bill, but let us work together in a bipartisan way for growth and trade. Let us work on improving education and training for displaced workers. Let us work on trade fairness, and let us work on trade enforcement and implementation.

Trade is important. Trade should be bipartisan. But trade has to be fair. This program will not be fair to working Hoosiers, it will not be fair to families, and it will not be good for America.

I encourage my colleagues to defeat fast track.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER).

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I have a graph here that shows the G7, that is the big nations of the world, the big western democracies and their net exports to Mexico before and after NAFTA. That includes the United States.

We call this chart "Find the dummies," because it is apparent that, after NAFTA, every one of the big nations, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK and Japan, all continue to do well with Mexico with respect to trade, except the United States. The United States immediately fell into an enduring \$15 billion trade deficit.

The first rule of business is one does not give their money to poor business managers. The Clinton trade team consists of poor business managers.

Not this President, not this time.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI).

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, as we all know, fast track authority will establish the framework for our trade relationship for the next 10 years. As such, it is critical to the importance that this accord places on the environment.

Therefore, I reluctantly oppose this bill, because it limits the administra-

tion's ability to address concerns regarding protection of the environment and bilateral regional and other trade agreements.

To the extent that the environment is mentioned at all in the pending legislation, it is in a restrictive way. San Francisco, the city which I represent, is a city which is built on trade and continues to thrive on it. We appreciate the value of free trade. We also understand that the environment and the economy are inextricably linked. We believe that the environment must be central to any fast track legislation.

My colleagues have mentioned that other presidents have had this authority. Indeed, I have voted for it in the past. Under previous fast track authority, the President had the discretion both to negotiate and to include in trade bills that were brought to Congress under fast track environmental, labor and human rights terms that the President deemed appropriate. That the President deemed appropriate. This bill removes the "appropriate" standard.

The legislation passed by the House Committee on Ways and Means also limits the discretion of the negotiators to achieve results only on matters that are directly related to trade.

One important aspect of addressing global environmental degradation is through attention to production process methods. If we are to slow environmental damage, we must deal with the way items are produced as well as with consumption. Will production process methods be included under the administration's interpretation of "directly related to trade"?

In addition, there are many other reasons why, and I will submit that with my full statement, but, in addition, unless we give the environment more value by including it in fast track, we are squandering the comparative value U.S. business has in leading the world in the development of production environmental technologies. To ignore the connection between the environment and the economy is to be on the wrong side of the future.

I urge my colleagues to vote "no."

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2621, the Fast Track legislation before the House today. I am disappointed that the Republican leadership has chosen to bring before the House a failed fast track proposal which does not address pressing issues in the global economy. Fast track authority will establish the framework of our trade relations for the next ten years. As such, it is a defining moment for the importance we accord the environment. This fast track bill would relegate this important issue to secondary status in trade agreements and would only ensure that it remains of secondary status as we move into the next century.

Not one of the concerns raised about this fast track proposal last year has been remedied in the bill before us today. This fast track bill limits the Administration's ability to address concerns regarding protection of the environment in bilateral, regional, and other

trade agreements. To the extent that the environment is mentioned in the pending legislation, it is in a restrictive way.

San Francisco, which I represent, is a city which was built on trade and continues to thrive on it. We appreciate the value of free trade. We also understand that the environment and the economy are inextricably linked. We believe that the environment must be central to any fast track legislation.

Under previous fast track authority, the President had the discretion both to negotiate and to include in trade bills that were brought to Congress under fast track environmental, labor or human rights terms that the President deemed "appropriate." H.R. 2621 removes the "appropriate" standard and the Administration's discretion is limited to making the language necessary only for the operation or implementation of the trade agreement. The Administration would now be precluded from achieving more than allowed under the legislation and prevented from having those provisions considered under fast track.

The legislation passed by the House Ways and Means Committee also limits the discretion of the negotiators to achieve results only on matters that are "directly related to trade." Serious questions are already being raised about how "directly related to trade" will be defined. It is my understanding that there is no legislative history to define this phrase.

One important aspect of addressing global environmental degradation is through attention to production process methods. If we are to slow environmental damage, we must deal with the way items are produced, as well as with consumption. Will production process methods be included under the Administration's interpretation of "directly related to trade"?

Serious questions have also been raised about the implications of language in H.R. 2621 purportedly designed to ensure that foreign governments do not waive their existing domestic environmental, health, safety or labor measures in order to give themselves a competitive edge. The language in the bill unfortunately precludes action to encourage strengthening such standards. Perhaps of even more immediate harm, however, is that it does not address a government's failure to enforce existing standards. In addition, H.R. 2621 only addresses foreign governmental policies and practices. Private sector actions to limit environmental protection are not addressed. Finally, countries with no existing environmental standards fall completely outside this provision.

My constituents and I are also concerned with the consequences of a provision in the fast track bill which would essentially allow derogation or waiver of existing domestic laws if such actions are "consistent with sound macroeconomic development." Under this provision, it appears that countries could indeed lower their environmental standards to gain a competitive edge, as long as this action is consistent with their macroeconomic development.

As many of our Republican colleagues have recently expressed concern about the lack of transparency in the functioning of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), I believe they should be supportive of promoting transparency in the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While "transparency" is appropriately one of the negotiating objectives

outlined in the legislation, it is essential that procedural transparency be expanded to the WTO both in the trade negotiation process and in the dispute settlement process. Benchmarks must be established by which transparency can be gauged. There must be expanded access to documents by those who are interested in the dispute settlement process. And, we must insist on ensuring the ability of non-governmental groups to participate.

I would also note my concern that while we are promoting transparency in other countries, the fast track legislation takes a step back from transparency in this country by granting the President new authority to allow for the classification of trade reports when deemed appropriate, rather than employing previous language allowing classification only when necessary to protect national security or trade secrets.

Environmental issues in the global economy have very real consequences not only for people in the developing world, but also for people here in the United States. Concerns about the quality of the air we breathe and the water we drink have now been compounded in the public eye by concerns about the safety of the food which we eat. As international trade is increasingly the norm, we must ensure the right to safeguard American consumers in international trade agreements. Standards worldwide should be elevated; we cannot encourage a "race to the bottom". In addition, unless we give the environment more value by including it in fast track, we are squandering the comparative value U.S. business has in leading the world in the development and production of environmental technology.

H.R. 2621 is not the appropriate tool which to enter trade negotiations for the Twenty-First Century. I urge my colleagues to vote no on this flawed bill.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. STEARNS).

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly rise to oppose fast track, and I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association has basically come out against the fast track vote we are having here tonight. Earlier, I was on the House Floor with the Florida Farm Bureau Federation, where they also opposed this fast track vote.

Farmers in my district are still opposed to the authority that we are proposing tonight to give to the President with fast track, regardless of the last-minute deals, because of the failure of this administration to live up to their promises from the last fast track authority.

For example, my tomato growers have written that, "The President could have taken real steps to fix the problems for Florida's tomato growers and other winter or seasonal vegetable growers associated with the failures of the NAFTA agreement, yet nothing has happened."

Mr. Speaker, President Clinton even wrote to Congress before NAFTA was approved to state that he "was permanently committed to ensuring NAFTA was enforceable and effective to protect the U.S. vegetable industry against price-based import surges from Mexico."

Mr. Speaker, despite these promises, the administration has failed to protect the winter vegetable industry; and, in fact, the onslaught of vegetables coming into Florida has hurt our industry terribly.

For these reasons, and for the reasons outlined in the two letters I put in the RECORD, I oppose fast track at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letter for the RECORD:

FLORIDA FRUIT &  
VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION,  
Orlando, FL, September 25, 1998.  
Hon. CLIFF STEARNS,  
U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN STEARNS: This is to advise you on behalf of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association and its membership that we continue to be opposed to the enactment of fast-track legislation. Our opposition is based on continuing concerns over current and potential trade agreements on import-sensitive agricultural products, the inadequacy of import relief remedies, country of origin labeling, and other issues. We accordingly ask you to vote "no" when the fast-track bill comes to the House floor later today.

We greatly appreciate your on-going support of Florida agriculture.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL J. STUART,  
President.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PASCRELL).

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss a matter which is of great importance to my district and the Nation as a whole. This measure before us should be defeated. It seeks to extend fast track authority for 4 years. As such, it sets our national trade policy as we approach and then enter the 21st century.

No one doubts the fact that we live in a global economy. No one doubts that if we are to retain our preeminent position in the world we must lead from a position of economic strength.

For me, global leadership in the arena of international trade means that fair trade should not be subordinated to the notion of free trade. There is very little reciprocity in our trade agreements. We must trade with other nations on an equal footing.

Mr. Speaker, with such an horrific Asian economy, those goods are going to be flooding our markets in the next 2 months, 3 months, 2 years. The ships are coming into San Francisco ports now full with foreign goods. They are leaving half filled with our goods. They will leave with a quarter filled by the time this Asian crisis really hits our shores. This is the worst time to have fast track.

The proponents of fast track argue that we need it based on what they perceive as the successful NAFTA policy. They point to the creation of 311,000 jobs. I take exception to this figure and cite an alternative one which states we have lost 600,000 jobs because of NAFTA.

Now is not the time for fast track. Fast track is about jobs. It is about time that we stopped exporting our jobs. It is time that we protect our jobs. And it is time that we had fair trade agreements instead of the ones that have been placed before us.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to defeat fast track resoundingly. It is not enough if we just slam it down with a few votes. We need total victory here, because we need a fair trade policy.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DELAURO).

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to fast track. Today's legislation could be an opportunity to make a new beginning, to define a progressive role in trade for the next century for America. But this bill does not do this. It is a step backward.

We are not divided here today on the benefits of free trade. We embrace it. We are divided on how to best achieve it to compete in the global economy. I believe this fast track proposal turns its back on hard-working Americans. It will not defend small business owners and workers from the threat to their security posed by our trading partners' cheap labor and low standards. It does precious little to move away from the pattern of lost jobs, reduced labor, and lower living standards seen under NAFTA.

American families are struggling every single day to make ends meet. America has the opportunity and the responsibility to ensure that American values define the international market and that our citizens build solid futures.

Let us show that the Congress of the United States cares about and understands America's hopes and fears for the future. Vote "no" on fast track.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. VISCLOSEKY).

(Mr. VISCLOSEKY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VISCLOSEKY. Mr. Speaker, I also want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to fast track, given the experience historically we have had with NAFTA. We have had 124,000 jobs certified as having been lost because of NAFTA.

I would remind my colleagues the math works out to 72 workers a day since the inception of NAFTA have lost their jobs. Before the end of business today, 72 more American citizens are going to be certified as having lost their job because of NAFTA.

I rise in strong opposition to fast track.

But in fairness to the other side, there are potentially some reasons why Members might want to vote for it. The average real hourly wage in 1973 was \$12 an hour. In 1997, it was \$12.28, about 1 penny a year increase. If Members think that is enough for the American workers they represent, maybe they do want to vote for fast track.

If Members think that every household in America ought to have two workers for what one worker could provide in 1950, then fast track is for them. Thirty percent of American households in 1950 had one worker. Today, 53 percent need two workers.

If Members think it is a good idea to have a trade deficit with Mexico and other countries instead of trade surpluses, this is the thing for them. In 1993, we had a trade surplus with Mexico of \$1.7 billion. Today, our deficit is \$14.5 billion.

If Members think we ought to not have a strong steel industry in America, fast track is for them. We had a 100,000 ton steel surplus with Mexico in 1993. We have a 2.2 million ton deficit today.

Health care, if Members do not think workers need health care benefits or pensions or need a job, fast track is for them. I grew up in a neighborhood, I grew up in an America believing that the next generation should be better off. That is what we should be about. Those are the negotiations we ought to undertake to make sure that every American worker, every worker worldwide, has an improved standard of living.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my vehement opposition to Fast Track legislation. The last president to have Fast Track used it to give us the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since January 1, 1994, when NAFTA went into effect, our country has lost 124,000 jobs as a result of NAFTA. That breaks down to a loss of 72 jobs each day. 72 American citizens each day watch their jobs move out of this country and out of their communities. Before we leave tonight, an additional 72 Americans will be unemployed.

But its not just a problem of losing jobs. America's workers are seeing a sharp decline in their quality of life thanks to NAFTA and unfair trade. If you don't care about workers' quality of life, then vote for Fast Track.

The average real hourly wage for working Americans in 1973 was \$12.00 per hour. In 1997, the average real hourly wage for working Americans was \$12.28 per hour. That is an increase of one penny per year. One extra penny to pay bills, buy shoes for your children and put food on the table. If your family can survive on an annual raise of one extra cent per hour, then Fast Track is for you.

30% of American households in 1950 had two people working outside the home. Today, 53% of all families have two incomes. Two Americans today must work to make the equivalent of one income in 1950. If you believe that two adults in every household should have to work in order to support a family, then Fast Track is for you.

Our neighbor to the South, Mexico, is one of our largest trading partners. In the fiscal year prior to NAFTA, FY 1993, the U.S. had a trade

surplus of \$1.7 billion with Mexico. In FY 1997, the U.S. had a \$14.5 billion trade deficit with Mexico. If you think that we ought to increase our trade deficits with other nations, then Fast Track is for you.

In 1993, The American steel industry saw a trade surplus with Mexico of 100,000 tons of steel. In 1997, the steel industry saw a trade deficit with Mexico of 2.2 million tons. If you think that we need to put the American steel industry out of business, laying off hundreds of thousands of U.S. steelworkers, then Fast Track is for you.

Because of jobs lost to NAFTA, many of our citizens have had to take lower-paying jobs with no benefits and no pensions. If you think that our citizens are not entitled to have a job that provides health benefits for themselves and their children, then vote for Fast Track. If you think that the hard working men and women of this country do not deserve a pension for their retirement years, then, yes, Fast Track is for you.

If it is fine with you that at the end of this day, at the end of this debate, 72 more people will be without work and unable to provide for their families, then vote for Fast Track. If you can live with the fact that you have sent American industry to foreign lands to make a profit without regard to workers' safety, human rights or the environment, then please, vote for Fast Track.

The American Dream has always promised that the next generation would have a better life, not a lower standard of living. American workers should not have to lower their standard of living just to compete with foreign workers who make \$3.00 a day. If you want to sacrifice the American Dream for the working people of our nation, then vote for Fast Track.

I can't do that. I can't support raising hourly wages by a penny a year. I can't support forcing more and more households to rely on two incomes. I can't support turning trade surpluses into deficits. I can't support denying health insurance and pensions to workers. I can't support undercutting worker safety, human rights or the environment. I can't support sacrificing the American Dream for the workers of America. I cannot and will not support Fast Track.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LATHAM).

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support for fast track. As a representative from the State of Iowa, the importance of this to everyone in agriculture cannot be overestimated.

It is imperative that we have fast track. There are trade agreements going on today, negotiations that are going on around the world, and we are not at the table because we have not seen fit to trust this administration to give the authority to make agreements. We have got to be at the table with these agreements. It is essential for long-term growth.

I am very saddened today to see people who, as a matter of principle in the past, have supported fast track but today have decided they are going to play a shell game and let somebody else off the hook, let them vote "yes", because they are going to cover them and vote "no."

This is for the interest of the entire country. We have to pass fast track for agriculture, for the rest of trade in this world, and for this country for jobs here, for economic prosperity. We have to do it, and we have to do it today.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CARDIN).

(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

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Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I had hoped that we were going to have a real debate on fast track where we would have a chance to reach a fair compromise on the issue. Instead we are going through a political exercise. That is regrettable.

In today's world, fast track should give the President the ability to negotiate international standards on labor and environment. But, no, this legislation restricts the President's ability to negotiate international standards on labor and environment. Negotiating strong international standards on environmental and labor issues will help American manufacturers, producers and farmers. It makes no sense to restrict the President's negotiating ability in this area unless you want to help foreign companies with cheap labor and poor environmental records.

For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the fast track legislation that we have today. I would hope that in the future, there will be a real effort by the Republican leadership to work on a fast track bill that could pass this House, that will give the appropriate authority to the President.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER).

Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, there is never a good time for a good trade bill. There is always a filing date or an election or the prospect of some other political development taking place. There is always an excuse not to proceed with a good trade bill.

I had the great privilege last fall to travel with the President throughout South America. The President stood up in country after country and talked about the fact that one of his top priorities was to get fast track negotiating authority through so that we could, in fact, embark on these very important trade agreements.

Mr. Speaker, this is a bipartisan bill. It was reported out of the Committee on Ways and Means with a very strong bipartisan vote. It was worked on long and hard by the President of the United States last fall as we moved towards that November 13 vote. And as has been said time and time again, the President, in his State of the Union message, talked about it being a priority this year and, on July 23, said that he believed that the Congress should vote on fast track when we can get the votes for the bill.

Now, with that strong bipartisan spirit here, I am convinced that there

is a very strong will to implement fast track negotiating authority and to pass this measure. But what are our priorities? We continually hear Members talk about the fact that it is a top priority, Democrats and Republicans alike, many Democrats with whom I have been privileged to work over the past several years on this issue. But what are the priorities?

There are political priorities. There are political interests with which we are having to contend. There are partisan interests, and there are special interests. Quite frankly, we have special interests on our side, too. This is not an easy vote. We have got the Buchananites, Ross Perot. There are people who are opposed to this. But we have a responsibility to place the national interest ahead of those political interests, ahead of those partisan interests and ahead of those special interests.

Mr. Speaker, it is very, very important that we move ahead, because we are having this vote as we look at the serious problem that exists in the Pacific Rim. We are not going to find a perfect time to do it, but it seems to me that this is the right time because the right time is today.

Cast a vote in favor of fast track so that we can do this for American workers and American consumers and the global economy.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes for a special bipartisan purpose.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I yield to the distinguished and talented service of Mary Jane Wignot. She has served on the professional staff of our Committee on Ways and Means during development of landmark trade legislation, such as the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the implementing bills for NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements.

There are few individuals in this country who know more and have contributed more to the development of U.S. trade policy than Mary Jane Wignot. Her wise counsel and drafting skills have been absolutely essential to the success of these historic bipartisan initiatives. I want to salute her and wish her all the best as she returns to her home town of Boston to continue her career.

I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. RANGEL).

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I, too, pay tribute to a remarkable individual that took the reins after one of our Members left, but she has given 24 years of her life to this committee and to her work and in every policy-making issue concerning trade, she was there from the negotiations of the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds and the formulation of the Trade Act of 1974.

She has worked on the trade agreements of 1979, the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988, and the NAFTA and Uruguay Round implementing bills in her capacity with the committee. These are the many projects, some of the many projects on which Mary Jane has brought her intellectual ability and sound judgment to bear.

Her devotion to excellence has epitomized the finest in bipartisan tradition that has characterized trade making policy over the last 20 years. At the end of this session she will retire, but we still know that she will be missed. To say that she will be missed is a gross understatement. We owe so much to her dedication and the fact that she has worked well with Republicans and Democrats. She has enjoyed her job and we all, staff and Members, have truly enjoyed working with her.

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let me add my comments about the service that Mary Jane Wignot has had in helping our committee work through so many trade issues for so many years. I think from almost the first time that I can remember trade deliberation on the Committee on Ways and Means, I looked out at the witness table and there Mary Jane was. And she always gave professional information that was always, at least in my memory, accurate, and helped us get through many, many trade issues over the years.

It is people who are so dedicated, who work such long hours and who do so on a nonpartisan, professional basis that make this Congress a truly enjoyable and fulfilling place to serve.

So, Mary Jane, I wish you well. We are losing a great resource when you leave. But I know that you will go on to help some other organization or many other people the rest of your life. Good luck.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I just have to say that Mary Jane Wignot has been on the Committee on Ways and Means staff now since 1974, 24 years, but before that, many Members do not know this, but there was an office called the Special Trade Representative's office, and she actually virtually opened that office in 1964 with, believe it or not, the former Secretary of State; at that time he was the special trade representative, Christian Herter. That goes back an awful long ways in most of our memories.

There are so many nuggets, jewels on this Capitol Hill. She is a Vassar graduate, cum laude. She was graduated from the London School of Economics at the University of London, Columbia University in New York, the International School of International Affairs. She is really just an outstanding individual, and she has toiled in Washington for 34 years, 24 years on the Committee on Ways and Means. She served with Chairman Mills, Chairman Ullman, Chairman Rostenkowski, and Chairman Archer.

I would say that her loss to all of us and our committee and perhaps even in this body will probably be one of the major losses we have, probably more than all of the Members in this institution, because she is the institutional memory. She is the one who helped develop international trade policy in America for the last 30 years.

So, Mary Jane, we love you, and we are going to miss you a lot.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair advises Members that the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARCHER) has 4½ minutes remaining; the gentleman from California (Mr. MATSUI) has 4½ minutes remaining; and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDERMOTT) has 2½ minutes remaining.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have served 15 years in the State legislature and 10 years in the United States Congress, and this is a sad day because it is the most amateurish, inept legislative effort I have ever seen to try and pass a tough piece of legislation. There is no question that the Republicans have poisoned the fast track debate with partisan politics that will do honor to Ken Starr.

If the Republicans were serious about promoting America's global leadership and stabilizing the global economy, they would have replenished the International Monetary Fund months ago. Instead, the future of America's commitment to the IMF remains unclear to this day and so does the future of the international economy.

It would be easy for me to vote no today, to reject this vote for what it is, a political game to be debated on a day of pure partisanship. However, I feel strongly that collectively we have to rise above the partisan games of the majority and do the right thing for our Nation's economy.

This Congress simply should not play games with an issue that is difficult enough to pass without petty politics. So I will rise above the Speaker's games and support the promotion of the American export economy, but I am deeply disheartened that this bill will fail today because the Republicans have allowed political avarice to damage support for what must be a bipartisan issue. You have made the future passage of this bill infinitely more difficult by bringing it out this way and ramming it. You know you have not got the votes.

I learned in the State legislature 25 years ago, if you do not have the votes, do not come to the floor with it, because you will never get it passed if you keep doing that kind of thing.

This is a bad day for the United States economy. You should not do this kind of thing without consulting and building the broad base that trade should have in this country.

This is not a partisan issue. It is not Republican. It is not Democrat. You have to work together when you are dealing in the international arena. I sat at the table at the State dinner in

Brazilia and had Brazilians say to me, boy, we are glad you have not passed fast track because we want your President weak. Now, that is not what we want, whether that President is a Democrat or a Republican.

I voted for every piece of free trade legislation. We have to, if we are going to be a strong country.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. FARR.).

(Mr. FARR of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote no on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss a very important issue: fast track authority.

Fast track has been the subject of much debate and discussion, not just inside the Beltway but across the country. In my own district, many of my constituents have told me that they will benefit from new trade agreements reached with fast track; others have said that fast track ignores important global issues such as labor standards or environmental pollution.

"Fast Track" sounds simple. Just give the President the authority to negotiate a trade treaty agreement and bring the end product back to Congress for an up or down vote. Sounds logical, doesn't it?

But it's not that simple. Here's the reason why: Political battles are won by listening to, and acting on, the concerns of those who have a vote in the outcome. I have one vote. My constituents want me to use it wisely, looking out for the best interests of the Central Coast of California. They want me to think globally and act locally.

Acting locally means protecting existing American jobs—local jobs dependent on reciprocal export markets for American products and goods. When you think about it, our economic future in agriculture and tourism depends on a healthy local economy.

Look at agriculture. The Central Coast has been a world leader in specialty crops and one of our strongest specialty crops have been fresh cut flowers. The flower and foliage industry in California ranks number one in the United States with \$702 million in sales in 1996, holding a 22% share of the U.S. market. But we're losing nurseries and jobs to foreign imports. Colombian flowers that are allowed into the United States without any tariff are our biggest competition. No other flower growing country has that privilege.

The President has done nothing to right the wrongs created by the 1991 Andean Trade Pact, which put Central Coast flower growers at a severe disadvantage to Colombian fresh flower imports. The President has the legal authority to stop the closure of American nurseries that raise fresh cut flowers. But he is not using that authority because he is listening to the State Department, rather than American workers.

So why should the President be given more authority to make more deals for more South American imports when he doesn't protect American interests under existing law?

I support free trade. But free trade can't exist unless it is based on fairness. Fair trade means making deals for the United States that do not put our working men and women, our manufacturers and producers, and our quality of life at risk.

Chile is a beautiful country. I have traveled there and met with political, labor and business interests. They import three times more U.S. goods than they export, with the exception of agriculture. Making Chile a full trading partner with Canada, U.S. and Mexico will only jeopardize more American jobs in the fresh cut flower industry, in addition to our fishing and wine industries on the Central Coast.

So I will continue to oppose Fast Track unless we can see the following: (1) Lift the "free entry" of Colombian flowers to the U.S. marketplace. Treat Colombian flowers as all other flower imports are treated, with equal tariffs; and (2) protect the environmental and labor safeguards as strong as banking and security safeguards.

Some people would say that my "no" vote on fast track is inconsistent with, or contradictory to, my "yes" vote on NAFTA four years ago. I disagree.

Four years ago, the NAFTA vote was on legislation implementing a trade agreement negotiated by the President under fast track authority. This year's vote will not be on implementing a trade agreement but on renewing the power of the President to negotiate such agreements.

When NAFTA was voted on, the fast track authority granted to the President did not contain instructions to him to include in the trade agreement provisions relating to the rights of laborers or meeting certain environmental standards. Knowing these issues were a concern to many members of Congress, the President negotiated sidebar agreements to supplement the underlying document. With these sidebars in place, I was convinced NAFTA would, in the long run, be a good thing for the United States. The underlying agreement would open up new markets to our producers and the added-on sidebars would help drive our trade partners to stronger labor and environmental protections.

Although I must oppose the fast track legislation before Congress today, I have and will continue to support free trade. I will continue to examine each trade agreement reached with fast track authority on its individual merits, keeping in mind the need to think globally but act locally to protect American jobs on the Central Coast.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to granting fast track negotiating authority. I oppose this legislation because of the adverse effects that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was negotiated under "fast track" authority, has had upon working American families.

There is no question that NAFTA's track record has had an adverse effect on U.S. wages. This country has lost over a quarter of a million jobs. In my home state of Illinois, 23 companies have moved to Mexico as a result of NAFTA. Instead of the old, failed "fast track", we need a trade negotiating authority that gives the President the tools to negotiate trade agreements that reflect the wishes of most Americans—fair, responsible trade that protects the environment, working families and public health.

We have must to lose with this vote. U.S. taxpayers have invested billions to establish and maintain one of the safest food supplies in the world. Yet we undermine consumer protection by allowing foods to be imported from countries where health and safety standards

either do not exist or are not enforced. Under NAFTA, food imports from Mexico and Canada have dramatically overburdened the Food and Drug Administration's ability to adequately inspect food imports. More and more we hear of illnesses caused from foreign foods. We need to make international bodies and foreign governments with weaker standards accountable if we are to protect the health of all Americans. Granting fast track authority will only threaten the safety of our food supply.

As a representative from the Corn Belt, I understand our farmers are struggling through tough times with commodity prices that are the lowest they've been in years. However, trade negotiations take years. Our farmers need immediate relief. We should be looking at ways to put money in their pockets where they most need it and ways to help our trading partners get back on their economic feet. Fast track is not the cure-all to the farm crisis, it is, at the moment, a distraction.

Without labor, food safety, and environmental provisions in the fast track legislation, we have no guarantee that these issues will ever be addressed. I am not willing to risk the health and safety of my constituents on an authority that cannot safeguard their well-being. Let fix the problems we have with unfair trade negotiations; let not add to them. I urge all my colleagues to vote no on fast track.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant opposition to fast track. Last year I strongly supported a similar fast track proposal, and I continue to believe that the fast track mechanism is necessary to ensure that new trade agreements don't become loaded up with special interest provisions in the normal legislative process.

But I simply cannot support legislation that is being brought to the House floor for blatantly political purposes, to divide Democrats less than two months before an election. And I do not think it is appropriate to tie the President's hands at the negotiating table—to a much greater extent than Democratic Congresses tied the hands of President's Reagan and Bush—when the Administration is not involved in the process.

It's clear that the Republican majority is not serious about passing this bill. Last year, members from both parties worked together to generate for fast track. This year, the majority made no effort to collaborate with the minority. This unwillingness to approach Democratic supporters of fast track exposes the Republican majority's true motivations—to score political points, not to pass the legislation.

It is irresponsible to bring up fast track knowing that it's going to fail. This will make it even more difficult to pass next year, and send an unfortunate signal to the international community that the United States does not want to remain engaged in the global economy. Such a signal couldn't come at a worse time, given the financial turmoil in Russia and parts of Asia.

International trade is clearly good for the American economy. Since 1992, almost 40 percent of our nation's total economic growth has been the direct result in international trade. Companies involved in exporting have expanded employment nearly 20 percent faster than firms serving only domestic markets, and jobs related to exports pay about 15 percent above the national average. New trade agreements—completed with fast track authority—would extend the benefits of trade to even more workers, consumers and companies.

But our trade policy—like foreign policy in general—must be based on bipartisan cooperation and consensus, not partisan politics. For that reason—and that reason alone—I intend to oppose this fast track legislation.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2621, a bill to allow fast track procedures for trade agreements. NAFTA is a recent example of why Congress should not approve this fast track authority.

NAFTA proves that trade agreements do not necessarily benefit all workers. Our experience with NAFTA demonstrates that "side agreements" are not enforceable and labor, the environment and public safety are all at risk. Large corporations benefit from trade agreements like NAFTA. NAFTA enables these companies to exploit our most valuable resources for their own bottom line. For these reasons, I vehemently oppose granting fast track negotiating authority to the president.

In any trade agreement, the people deserve to know—and have us debate—the terms of trade expansion. I am not satisfied that the terms before us in this fast track authority are satisfactory and I am certain that the benefit doesn't go to the workers in my district.

Estimates show that the number of jobs foregone in the U.S. because of NAFTA-induced imports is over 400,000. In my home state of California, 38,406 jobs were lost directly because of NAFTA, according to a narrow Commerce Department formula. This is nearly 10 percent of the total U.S. jobs lost because of NAFTA. Workers in California qualify for a significant portion of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)—California is one of the top six states where the most workers are certified for TAA.

Multinational corporations export not only products but also business operations cross the border; they exploit Mexican workers for a fraction of the United States labor costs. American workers lose decent paying jobs. Mexican workers get work with subsistence wages. The corporations benefit at the expense of human labor.

There are 981,302 Mexicans working in abhorrent conditions in Maquiladoras, making an average wage of \$30-\$35 for a 48 hour week as a direct result of NAFTA. These workers live in shacks made of cardboard and wood. I cannot grant a fast track trade negotiating authority if fair labor practices will not be protected.

The environmental loses through NAFTA as well. The Administration promised greater environmental protections along the border regions where industry was expected to grow as a result of NAFTA. Well, we have experienced greater industry growth along the Southern borders, but as far as environmental protection goes, it was just another promise broken.

Hazardous waste coming into the United States increased 30 percent in 1995. In that same year, well water in U.S. border communities had sulfate concentrations of nearly twice what is considered safe for drinking water. Not only does the U.S. laborer lose through NAFTA, but so does the vulnerable child and grandparent who drinks polluted well water.

NAFTA does not ensure inspection standards for produce, agriculture and livestock. NAFTA has crippled border inspections and the U.S. does not have the manpower to inspect everything that comes across its borders. Frozen fruit imports have increased by

45 percent and frozen vegetable by 31 percent since NAFTA, but there has been no increase in inspection.

A 1997 GAO report shows that commercial passenger vehicles from Mexico are not being inspected regularly. The ones that have been inspected have been placed out of service for serious safety violations such as steering or brake problems, according to the Federal Highway Administration. Fifty-four percent of the commercial passenger vehicles that pass through our southern borders do so through California. These unsafe vehicles are endangering the passengers as well as the safety of those on the streets and highways of California.

Negotiating authority with the right terms—allowing US workers to share in the benefit and promoting economic growth in environmentally sound ways worldwide—is my bottom line. Without that before us, I will vote "no" on the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, today, the House is asked to vote to approve H.R. 2621, a fast-track procedure under which international agreements might be approved as far into the future as October 1, 2005. The "fast track" procedure requires the President to submit draft international agreements, implementing legislation, and a statement of administrative action for congressional approval. Amendments to the legislation in Congress are not permitted once the bill is introduced and committee and floor action votes may consist only of "yes" or "no" votes on any potential agreement as it is introduced.

The fast-track procedure bill, in addition to creating an extra-constitutional procedure by which international agreements become ratified, sets general international economic policy objectives, re-authorizes "Trade Adjustment Assistance" welfare for workers who lose their jobs and for businesses which fail, and creates a new permanent position of Chief Agriculture Negotiator within the office of the United States Trade representative. The bill would reestablish the President's extra-constitutional "executive authority" to negotiate "side agreements" such as those dealing with environmental and labor issues. Lastly, the bill "pays" the government's "cost" of free trade by increasing taxes on a number of businesses which recently benefitted by a favorable judgment in federal tax court.

The Constitution clearly allows for international agreements and clearly specifies the means by which they are to be accomplished. Treaties, quite clearly are to be negotiated by the President with advice and consent of the Senate and can only become effective upon being ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The Constitution, however, does not expressly confer authority to make international agreements other than by treaties and, of course, the tenth amendment specifies that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." To ignore or allow the one branch of the federal government to delegate its powers to others destroys the liberty-protecting ability inherent to the Constitutional separation of powers.

Congress does have, amongst its enumerated powers, regulation of commerce with foreign nations. Imposing import tariffs, quotas, and embargoes, however economically detrimental to the macro economy of the United

States, are, at least, amongst powers delegated to Congress by Article I of the Constitution. Regulating commerce, of course, refers to enacting domestic laws which effect voluntary exchanges between trading partners who happen to be citizens of different governments. International agreements between the governments of those trading partners cannot be construed to escape the stringent treaty ratification process established by the document's framers just by suggesting Congress has the power to enact domestic regulation regarding foreign commerce. If this were an allowable justification for bypassing the constitutionally-mandated treaty process, Article I Congressional powers would almost completely undermine the necessity for the Constitutionally-mandated treaty process. Treaties regarding everything from international monetary policy to military policy would suddenly become "ripe" for the "treaty-making" power of the President and Congress. Instead, a bright line process exists whereby entering into agreements with foreign nations under which the U.S. government will do "X" if the government of Ruritania does "Y" must be understood to constitute an international agreement and, as such, require the more restrictive treaty process.

Moreover, because international courts regard "treaties" and "agreements" as equally binding on signatory governments, a stronger case is made that they must be made subject to the same constitutional process. Insofar as H.R. 2621 ignores the lack of a congressional role in the international treaty process and instead attempts to make Congress an integral part of a procedure for which it lacks any constitutional authority, this bill can be opposed on constitutional grounds alone.

Even if the procedure advocated by the bill were able to survive what should always be the Congressman's initial threshold of constitutionality, the bill contains provisions which will likely continue our country down the ugly path of internationally-engineered, "managed trade" rather than that of free trade. As explained by economist Murray N. Rothbard:

[G]enuine free trade doesn't require a treaty (or its deformed cousin, a 'trade agreement'; NAFTA is called an agreement so it can avoid the constitutional requirement of approval by two-thirds of the Senate). If the establishment truly wants free trade, all it has to do is to repeal our numerous tariffs, import quotas, anti-dumping laws, and other American-imposed restrictions of free trade. No foreign policy or foreign maneuvering is necessary.

In truth, the bipartisan establishment's fanfare of "free trade" fosters the opposite of genuine freedom of exchange. Whereas genuine free traders examine free markets from the perspective of the consumer (each individual), the mercantilist examines trade from the perspective of the power elite; in other words, from the perspective of the big business in concert with big government. Genuine free traders consider exports a means of paying for imports, in the same way that goods in general are produced in order to be sold to consumers. But the mercantilists want to privilege the government business elite at the expense of all consumers, be they domestic or foreign.

Fast track is merely a procedure under which the United States can more quickly integrate and cartelize government in order to entrench the interventionist mixed economy. In Europe, this process culminated in the

Maastricht Treaty, the attempt to impose a single currency and central bank and force relatively free economies to ratchet up their regulatory and welfare states. In the United States, it has instead taken the form of transferring legislative and judicial authority from states and localities and to the executive branch of the federal government. Thus, agreements negotiated under fast track authority (like NAFTA) are, in essence, the same alluring means by which the socialist Eurocrats have tried to get Europeans to surrender to the super-state of the European community. And just as Brussels has forced low-tax European countries to raise their taxes to the European average or to expand their respective welfare states in the name of "fairness," a "level playing field," and "upward harmonization," so too will the international trade governors and commissions be empowered to "upwardly harmonize," internationalize, and otherwise usurp laws of American state governments.

The harmonization language in last year's FDA reform bill constitutes a perfect example. Harmonization language in this bill has the Health and Human Services Secretary negotiating multilateral and bilateral international agreements to unify regulations in this country with those of others. The bill removes from the state governments the right to exercise their police powers under the tenth amendment to the constitution and, at the same time, creates or corporatist power elite board of directors to review medical devices and drugs for approval. This board, of course, is to be made up of "objective" industry experts appointed by national governments. Instead of the "national" variety, known as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (enacted for the "good reason" of protecting railroad consumers from exploitative railroad freight rates, only to be staffed by railroad attorneys who then used their positions to line the pockets of their respective railroads), we now have the same sham imposed upon worldwide consumers on an international scale soon to be staffed by heads of multilateral pharmaceutical corporations.

Lastly, critics of the bill convincingly argue that language within H.R. 2621 regarding "Foreign Investment" would establish new rights for foreign investors and corporations and new obligations for the United States. H.R. 2621 attempts to eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to trade-related foreign investment by reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment; free the transfer of funds relating to investments; reduce or eliminate performance requirements and other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments; seeks to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice; and provide meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes. It is argued that H.R. 2621 will congressionally activate the nearly completed Multilateral Agreement on Investment which covers 29 countries and forbids countries from regulating investment or capital flows and would establish new rights for foreign investors and corporations and new obligations for the United States. The MAI requires governments to pay investors for any action that directly or indirectly has an equivalent effect of expropriation. The MAI would be enforceable through international tribunals

similar to those of the World Trade Organization without the due process protections of the United States.

Because H.R. 2621 enacts an unconstitutional foreign policy procedure, furthers our nation down the internationally-managed (rather than free trade) path, sets general international economic policy objectives, re-authorizes "Trade Adjustment Assistance" welfare for workers who lose their jobs and for businesses which fail, potentially undermines U.S. sovereignty through MAI, and preserves the President's executive authority to negotiate "side agreements." As such, I must oppose the bill.

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Speaker, after close review of this legislation, I have decided to oppose the "Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act" otherwise known as fast track trading authority. This proposal includes environmental, labor, and food safety standards as merely negotiating objectives, without any accompanying legislation or side agreements that directly address these issues. My greatest concern is that the health and safety of American families will be jeopardized in future trade accords if these issues are not made a much higher priority.

I believe that free trade is good for our economy. There are, however, certain precautions that need to be taken to ensure that free trade agreements do not undermine other principles that our country holds dear, such as a clean environment. One of the potential problems with trade agreements is that they create pressure on neighboring governments to relax environmental regulations in an effort to lure manufacturers across borders, thereby allowing these companies to profit by polluting and abusing natural resources. Congress must also make sure that there are sufficient labor protections when we make our trade agreements so that we can protect against multinational corporations moving production to other countries with lower labor costs. Lastly, we need to make sure that our trade agreements do not compromise our food safety standards. This is a real threat, particularly to our children who are often more severely affected by contaminated food than adults.

I am a proponent of free trade; I am as even stronger proponent of fair trade. Our priority should be to forge a sound trade policy that helps, not hurts, the working people of this country. While we address our concerns, we can still achieve strong free trade accords. The Executive branch has negotiated hundreds of agreements without the benefit of fast track, and will continue to do so if fast track authority is not renewed.

In my view, the administration's latest set of initiatives to protect labor and environmental issues in trade agreements are insufficient. If these issues are truly a priority, I believe the administration would have worked more aggressively to include them earlier on, instead of presenting a few feeble objectives in the eleventh hour of this debate. The new initiatives to make World Trade Organization activities, such as the settlement of international trade disputes, more open to the public, and to issue reports on worker conditions in other countries might prove valuable but they certainly do not offer enforceable protections. We must insist on negotiating authority that ensures trade pacts contain enforceable food safety, environmental, and labor provisions.

What we need is a concrete strategy to improve workers' rights and protect the environment in developing countries, while at the same time negotiating effective trade agreements. I do not believe that this version of fast track meets these vital goals.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, free trade advocates say that NAFTA has nothing to do with fast track. That's not true. NAFTA has everything to do with fast track.

NAFTA was negotiated under fast track, and look at what NAFTA has brought us. The evidence is clear. America has lost hundreds of thousands of jobs. And not only has it brought us a \$16 billion trade deficit with Mexico, it's brought us lower wages, weaker consumer protections, and a dirtier environment. It's rolled back all of the advances we made this century and brought us back to the 19th century. Instead of leading us into the 21st century, it's dragging us down. That isn't sound public policy, no matter how you look at it.

Free trade advocates say that the economy is booming. That may be statistically accurate, but let's take a closer look at what NAFTA has meant for American working families. Although the U.S. economy grew at a robust 4 percent in 1994 and productivity increased by about 2 percent, American workers did not share in these gains. The wages of American workers have continued to fall since NAFTA was implemented. In NAFTA's first year, American workers saw the sharpest one year drop of their real hourly wages. The real median wage fell by over 2 percent, continuing a 20 year downward trend.

The evidence shows that not only did we lose American jobs, the American working men and women have seen a reduction in their wages as well. So what does NAFTA mean for American workers? The evidence shows NAFTA means stagnant incomes and falling wages for working Americans. Face the facts.

If we cut through the economic rhetoric that the free trade advocates use to cloud the debate on fast track and NAFTA, the question we have before us is actually quite simple—do we want to sacrifice American jobs at the altar of free trade? For myself, the answer is very simple—no.

That's why I opposed NAFTA. That's why I opposed fast track back in 1991, and that's why I am so strongly opposed to this fast track bill.

Free trade advocates want the American people to believe that those of us who oppose fast track are ignorant of the new international economy and are pursuing an "America-last" strategy. They think we are protectionists, as if it were some kind of dirty word. Well, if trying to protect American jobs, the American standard of living and American working families makes me a protectionist, then I will gladly wear that label.

The majority of Americans want fair trade. The majority of Americans don't want fast track stripped of labor and environmental protections. When I'm back home in the Third Congressional District of Illinois, every working man and woman tells me that they don't want fast track. They don't want any more NAFTAs. They're tired of exporting American jobs instead of American products. Perhaps if some folks were to spend more time talking to Main Street instead of Wall Street, they would hear the same thing. Some folks seem to have lost sight of the fact that we work for the American people.

In reality though, this isn't a debate between so-called "protectionism" and free trade. It's a debate to shape America's future in the global economy, and to make the global economy work for us—not the other way around.

Mr. Speaker, this fast track legislation just won't work. It's just going to give us more NAFTAs. Instead of leading us into the 21st century, this fast track legislation will pull us back. Instead of rebuilding the American dream for working families, it will tear it down. That's why I am so strongly opposed to this bill. I will vote "no" on fast track, and I strongly urge all of my colleagues to do the same. Let us listen to Main Street, not Wall Street, because it's the working men and women of America that makes America so strong.

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a proponent of expanded trade opportunities for Americans. I support renewal of traditional trading authority for the President, and I will vote today in favor of H.R. 2621.

My vote today should not be an indication that I agree with the process that led us to vote at this time. In fact, I strongly disagree with the timing of this vote. I disagree with those Members who claim that we are voting on fast track today solely because fast track is a good idea. If the majority party wanted to pass fast track we could have voted on it last November; or January, February, March, or any other date before now. Likewise, we could vote on this next spring when we all return. The timing of this vote will jeopardize this much needed legislation from eventually passage.

I have worked for a long time and very hard for passage of fast track. I have colleagues on both sides of the aisle who are committed to expanding international trade, and they too have worked tirelessly for fast track. But today, some of these champions of trade are compelled to vote "no" on this crucial bill—not because it is a bad bill, but because of its terrible timing. People are playing politics with the global economy, and I find that shameful. At this precarious time we should be more prudent. The timing of this vote sends a signal to the world's economies that the United States is not ready to engage them in the marketplace. The timing of this vote sends them a message that we are preparing to move to a protectionist stance and that we are willing to stifle global economic growth.

I am prepared to vote "yes" on this critical legislation because I am so strongly committed to expanding trade opportunities for Americans. I only wish that the leaders of the majority party were prepared to show an equal commitment to this principle—and less of a willingness to play politics with our future.

Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very concerned about this Fast Track legislation. The way I see it, NAFTA has eroded 100 years of U.S. workers fighting for safety rights, worker protection, and fair wages and hours. There can be no serious global trade legislation without protection for workers and for the environment. For instance, we need to know that rain forests will not be destroyed or that women and children will not suffer from increased poverty and a violation of human rights.

And I need to know that Florida farmers will not suffer. What has NAFTA done for Florida? No oranges from Florida have gone to Mexico; however Mexican tomatoes have flooded the U.S. market.

We now have a history with NAFTA. We have lost good jobs. Corporations move and unemployed workers left behind get jobs paying less. The skilled jobs that once moved black workers into the middle class are gone and cities have lost an important tax base. At the same time, workers in rural America are suffering.

This is wrong. All citizens must be lifted with the economic tide—we are all in the same boat. I will work to see that we all can do better in this new global economy. I am especially concerned about our working men and women. Our workers want answers to important questions:

(1) How will American workers integrate into the global community? (2) Where will corporate investment be made? (3) How will global trade affect the balance of power between worker and management? (4) How will global trade affect our rural farmers and the global environment?

Our workers deserve reasonable answers to these questions.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the pending measure granting the President fast track consideration of trade agreements he negotiates with our foreign trading partners.

As many of my colleagues know, despite pressure from the Administration, former President Carter, and many of my business constituents, I voted against NAFTA. But fast track is not NAFTA. But fast track is not NAFTA. Indeed, as I explained to a business audience in my district last fall, fast track is not a debate over NAFTA or whether what is negotiated will even resemble NAFTA.

I can appreciate the concern that the fast track process may result in a trade agreement certain interests can't support and perhaps can't defeat. But I am more concerned that the lack of fast track authority will mean that even good trade agreements cannot be negotiated because our trading partners will not want Congress to amend them.

I represent California's 36th Congressional District—which I call the aerospace center of the universe. Over the course of the last decade, the district has seen thousands of defense-dependent jobs disappear. But the local economy has rebounded—rebounded by diversifying and applying the high technology skills of South Bay workers to solving transportation problems, to cleaning up the environment, to developing advanced communications satellites and the infrastructure and software to support them, and to making advances in medical technologies adapted from Cold War programs.

Future growth, indeed the continued existence of these industries, depends on finding foreign markets. Diversification and access to foreign markets are the strategy for saving the defense industrial base that won the Cold War. Without trade, this industrial base would be far weaker today, and fewer high skilled workers would be employed. Most important, our ability to ramp up in times when our nation's security is threatened would be gravely jeopardized.

Trade benefits the non-defense sectors in my district as well: from toys to wet suits to automobiles. Most of our growth in manufacturing and service jobs in the last decade is trade-related.

Mr. Speaker, creating trade opportunities is an integral part of keeping a strong defense

production base at home and for keeping a strong local economy vibrant. Fast track is an essential tool in this effort.

I urge my colleagues to support this important measure.

Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2621 and the extension of Fast Track trade negotiating authority. Study after study has shown that free trade benefits America by increasing exports, creating higher wage jobs, giving U.S. consumers more choice and lower prices, and keeping U.S. industries competitive. Since its original enactment in 1974, each president has benefitted from fast track authority, and has used this negotiating tool to advance U.S. economic and foreign policy interests. Without fast track, U.S. trade negotiators are put in the position of negotiating a treaty and then having it altered by the "535 Secretaries of State" residing in the Capitol. These alterations often make the agreement unacceptable to the other parties. For this reason, the U.S. has not been a party to over 20 free trade agreements which have been negotiated since fast track authority lapsed in 1994.

The partnership created under fast track between the president and Congress, enhances our ability to shape the rules of international trade and lead on multilateral initiatives that benefit U.S. businesses and workers through our entry into trade agreements. Without free trade, our ability to influence nations in other areas of critical interest to the United States, including human rights, the environment, and drug trafficking would be diminished. To influence these nations, we need to increase contact and trade, we cannot turn inward. Clearly, we need to reinstate fast track authority to restore our presence worldwide. Only with this authority can America retain and strengthen its trade status and its leverage with foreign nations to influence their labor, environmental, and other policies.

In addition, fast track helps American businesses and workers. Tariff rates in the United States are already among the lowest in the world. Fast track authority will give the president the ability to negotiate trade agreements with other nations, to lower their tariff rates. This will greatly increase the number of American goods that can be exported to these foreign nations. Treaties negotiated under fast track procedures will break down trade barriers and expand our exports, creating American jobs and providing a more secure economic future for America. You can be assured, Mr. Speaker, that while we debate the merits of fast track authority, Canada, Japan, and the countries of the European Union are negotiating free trade agreements with America's trading partners.

Our nation should be able to take full advantage of the advances which free trade status and fast track authority offer. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2621, and reinstate fast track authority for workers, for business, for America.

Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation.

I oppose H.R. 2621 because I think that it would produce trade agreements that contain inadequate labor and environmental protections. I believe that trade agreements negotiated under the terms of this fast track authorization bill would destroy U.S. jobs and drive down American workers' wages.

Mr. Speaker, the United States is a world leader in terms of military power, diplomatic in-

fluence, economic vitality, technological innovation, and popular culture. As the richest and most powerful nation on earth, the United States enjoys a unique position of leadership—and provides us with the ability and opportunity to influence countries around the globe.

This country must be a leader in terms of worker rights and environmental standards as well. Our labor and environmental standards have a positive influence on labor and environmental laws and regulations around the world. We can and should promote labor rights, workplace safety, and environmental stewardship in developing nations. By doing so we help both American workers and foreign ones. Moreover, failure to do so places our workers and their employers at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. Consequently, I strongly believe that any trade agreements that we reach with developing countries should promote worker rights and environmental protection in those countries.

I believe that responsible trade agreements can benefit this nation and its workers, and that giving the President carefully crafted "fast track" negotiating authority can promote such agreements. Consequently, in considering this legislation reauthorizing the administration's fast track negotiating authority, my decision on whether to support or oppose this fast track bill has been based upon the legislation's treatment of labor and environmental issues. I have concluded that this bill does not provide that adequate labor protections and environmental standards will be included in trade agreements negotiated under its fast track authority. Consequently I oppose this legislation.

I urge my colleagues to vote against this fast track legislation, and to work with me to develop fast track legislation that does a better job of promoting America's trade interests.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, today, the Republican leadership is up to their old tricks again. Their plan to consider fast track trade authority not trivializes this important debate. The Republican leadership is playing a game with electoral politics—creating political havoc prior to the mid-term elections. We should be focusing on passing the appropriations bills and addressing health care legislation and education issues and true Social Security reform. We should put this bill away until we are ready to include binding provisions and enforcement mechanisms to protect worker rights, food safety and the environment.

I oppose this fast track legislation. When we considered granting the President fast track trade authority last year, I was opposed to that plan. Today, I have the same reservations. Presumably, one of the main reasons for fast track authority is to expand the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has cost hundreds of thousands of American jobs and failed to improve environmental conditions along the U.S.—Mexican border. I did not support NAFTA then, and I will not support expanding it now.

NAFTA resulted in a loss of almost 17,000 jobs in Illinois and 420,000 jobs nationwide. U.S. workers who found new employment after their jobs moved to Mexico took an average pay cut of \$4,400. Unfortunately, this proposal will result in more disastrous impacts on U.S. workers. Workers will have reduced bargaining power under this agreement as employers use threats of moving jobs to lower wage-paying nations in order to lower worker

contract demands. This fact track legislation provides absolutely no protection for American workers.

Further, this proposal fails to address necessary environmental standards. Since the passage of NAFTA, the degradation of the environment along our border with Mexico has escalated. By not requiring other nations to increase their environmental standards, we are putting American products, which are subject to stronger environmental rules, at a disadvantage in the competitive marketplace.

I am also concerned about food safety. Food-borne illness is on the rise around the world in part because of the "globalization" of the food supply. Imported food is over three times more likely to be contaminated with illegal pesticide residues than food grown in the U.S. Stronger pro-consumer language in any fast track legislation would correct this oversight, however, the provisions of this fast track bill would greatly restrict the United States' ability to protect the public from unsafe food. I am not convinced that this bill provides adequate consumer protections that we, as consumers, expect and should demand.

I also believe that trade agreements should be subject to moral and ethical standards. There are 1.3 billion people around the world living on less than \$1 a day. This fast track legislation does not include provisions to reduce child labor or decrease poverty and inequity throughout the developing world. U.S. trade policies and negotiations should seek to change this unfortunate reality.

This is not the right fast track legislation; it is irresponsible to bring this bill up now. We put our credibility with our trading partners at risk because this fast track bill does not have the support of the majority of this Congress. Trade policy and its domestic and international consequences is too important to be used as a political football.

The bottom line is that this bill fails to address human rights, food safety, environmental regulations, or protect American workers. I cannot support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to vote no on fast track.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to a measure that would trade away my right to represent the interest of my constituents. This fast track legislation would place a straight jacket upon my ability to advocate for the people of Minnesota without the minimal safeguards that address key issues of concern. Let me be clear, I am for trade, but I am not in favor of surrendering and limiting the opportunity to influence trade agreements the United States administration appointees shape. The Constitution in fact preserves our role in the Congress to shape trade agreements, and this fast track measure takes the wrong track in surrender of such congressional role to the Administration and bureaucrats.

I am especially concerned that this legislation today is being used as a political pawn by the Republican majority. Trade policies, and our role in shaping those policies, are much too important to be thrown away merely on the basis of eve-of-the-election politics. We should stop the rush for fast track, and open this floor for real debate on the role of our country in the global economy.

Despite what you may hear from proponents of this legislation, trade expansion will not die without fast track negotiating authority. Of the 200 plus trade pacts this Administration has

made over the past six years, all but two were considered without fast track procedures. 198 agreements didn't need such power. This is essentially the same fast track legislation that was opposed last year by labor, consumer, and environmental groups. No matter how you repackage it, fast track in this form is a bad deal for Americans. Our job in Congress is to represent our constituents, not to shift our power and limit our voice on key trade agreements, especially as our global economics become more integrated.

I understand the benefits of trade on our national and local economies. However, we need to use our economic leverage and market power to ensure that the rights and interests of our farmers, workers, environment and public health are advanced in our trade agreements. These are the very elements which have contributed in shaping one of the greatest economies in the world. Why should we lower the standards and protections that provide the foundation of our economy and U.S. prosperity? Trade pacts today have too often been the Trojan horse which undermines progress in these emerging areas of environmental policy, worker rights, health and safety standards.

I fear that new trade agreements without a prerequisite to address these specific concerns will just represent a high tide which carries American jobs to foreign shores and creates a lower common denominator. Some will capitalize on the growth of the emerging global economy and the expansion of trade, no matter the human indignity upon which it rests, and others will be displaced by downsizing, new technology, and offshore production. I, therefore, will not negotiate away my ability to advocate for my constituents' interests, jobs, wages, and livelihoods. My rejection of this process isn't the end of the issue, but rather a vote for Congress to insist upon a new negotiation framework and reclaim its proper role—a direct role in the trade agreements that will determine the policy and economic interface between the United States and our trade partners.

We have the ability and the responsibility to guide and set our economic and trade policy, keeping in mind the core values that have sustained our nation as the world's most successful economy; the basic human rights, social justice, safety and health, worker rights and the safeguarding of the environment. For that reason, I oppose this fast track legislation, and encourage my colleagues to do the same. It isn't a solution but the wrong track—a detour on the economic policy path to a sound global economy.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, a year ago, when I announced my decision to support fast track trade negotiating authority, I told my constituents that I was supporting it because I believe strongly that good jobs depend on expanded trade—especially for a state like Colorado that is a leader in high tech and agricultural exports.

Over my twelve years in Congress, I have talked with workers, farmers, managers, and CEOs whose jobs depend on being able to sell their goods overseas. To expand U.S. exports we must make trade agreements to open foreign markets to the goods and services produced by Colorado's and America's workers.

One-third of our economic growth in recent years has come from exports. Our economy is

in the eighth year of a steady expansion, with low inflation, and unemployment at such low levels that economists consider it to be "full" employment. I am convinced that the long-term health of our economy depends on continuing to lower barriers to our exports and expand opportunities to sell our goods.

For the United States to retreat from the policy of trade liberalization, which has been a major source of worldwide economic growth since the end of World War II, would have enormous consequences for this country and for the rest of the world.

What is essential in the long-run is a sustainable, centrist, bipartisan, and reliable coalition for a progressive trade policy. Playing political games with this issue won't succeed in the short-run—few believe there are enough votes to pass this measure today. But far worse, pushing today's vote on Fast Track will cause positions to harden and so will diminish the chances of achieving a centrist consensus on trade over the long-run. And trade policy simply has to be bipartisan if it is to be effective or reliable.

Sadly, the Republican leadership seems more interested in scoring pre-election political points in making real improvements in the world trading environment. If they really wanted to sustain a bipartisan coalition in support of a progressive trade policy, they would not be bringing Fast Track up today.

A Republican aide is quoted as saying that the decision to bring this to a vote, regardless of its chance of passage, was "to show business who is in the camp of business, and who is in the camp of labor." That's the sort of maneuver that severely damages the prospects for a national consensus on trade.

I can't vote for Fast Track today, because I choose not to be part of an effort to manipulate this important issue for partisan advantage a few weeks before the election. I will vote "present" to protest this cynical treatment of an issue that is so important to America's continued prosperity.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I am very disappointed with the reasons that the leadership has brought this legislation to the floor this afternoon. Both sides of this debate—and both parties—know very well that there are not enough votes to pass this bill today, a bill that I believe is extremely important for the future of our country. Rather, this legislation is being used as a political tool with the sole purpose of trying to embarrass the President. I believe that this is wrong, and I think that the leadership on the other side should have worked with the Administration in good faith to gain the votes to pass this bill instead of using such an important and inflammatory political issue simply for partisan gain.

Despite the actions of the other side, I support reextending fast track negotiating authority to the President for certain trade agreements. I believe that this authority is necessary to ensure that the United States remains a global leader on free trade, and to enable the President to continue to work to open foreign markets to American goods.

Trade is critical to Washington state, which is our nation's leader in per capita goods exports. In fact, one in every four jobs in my state is directly or indirectly dependent on exports—almost 740,000 people—and this figure is expected to increase to one in three by 2005.

These are not low wage service jobs that have been generated from the growth of trade

in my state. These are high-wage jobs—jobs that pay 46 percent more than the overall state average. We are talking about thousands of union Machinists making airplanes at the Boeing Company, we are talking about software developers at Microsoft, we are talking about mill workers that fabricate aluminum at Kaiser, chip makers at Intel, and workers at Weyerhaeuser that produce lumber and wood products for export.

Trade is not just important to big companies; in my state, there are many more small businesses than big ones that depend on international trade. There are many small companies that supply machine and airplane parts that go into the aircraft that we sell overseas, thousands of farmers that grow apples and wheat, and countless small, family-owned mills that process timber and sell the products in Asian and other overseas markets.

Fast track negotiating authority is critical to the continued prosperity of the Pacific Northwest. A second Information Technology Agreement, one of the Fast Track priorities of this Administration, is important for the many high tech companies in the Puget Sound area. Further negotiations on intellectual property, a principal negotiating objective of the bill, will also help these companies to fight software piracy, which costs the industry billions of dollars each year. Future agricultural agreements will also help open markets for Washington's farmers.

Many Fast track opponents are arguing that the only reason for considering this bill at all is to enable the President to expand NAFTA to Chile and beyond. In actuality, negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement with Chile—a more economically developed country than Mexico—is only a small part of the Administration's trade agenda. This agenda also includes expanding current trade agreements to achieve reduced foreign tariffs on U.S. high technology products and services (some of which currently exceed 30 percent), greater protection of American intellectual property, improved access to foreign government procurement activities, and elimination of barriers against U.S. agricultural products. With 30 percent of our recent economic growth tied to exports, and these export-related jobs paying between 13 to 16 percent more than the average national wage, it is imperative that we actively pursue trade agreements that open foreign markets to America's products and services. It is important not to forget that more than 95 percent of the world's population lives outside the United States.

Mr. Speaker, despite my dissatisfaction with the reasons for which this legislation is under consideration today, I will vote in favor of the bill. In my judgment, fast track negotiating authority is too important to my district, my state, and my country for me not to support it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the United States Congress and in opposition to fast track.

I am going to be brief because what I have to say is straight forward: fast track may have been right in the past, but it is clearly wrong for the present and wrong for the future.

There was a time when international trade agreements were little more than the terrain of bean-counters: the fees applied to the importing and exporting of goods.

Today, however, these agreements have expanded well beyond bean-counting, and even beyond trade into the realm of finance and investment.

Such agreements directly impact the meat and potatoes of what our work in Congress is all about: worker rights, the environment, economic equality, human rights, food safety, even health care and education spending.

Therefore, we, the Members of Congress, must have a voice in the direction of these international agreements.

I did not become a United States Representative to act as a rubber stamp.

Rather, I came here to represent my constituents by using my voice to debate and to amend as I see fit legislation that has a direct bearing on their lives.

And, to those among us who argue that the United States needs fast track to participate in the international global economy—I ask for one, just one example from the last four years during which time we did not have fast track that the United States has not had a seat at the table in an international trade, investment or finance negotiation? Anyone? I thought not. Because there are no examples. We have never been kept from the table and we will not be left out in the future.

For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I continue my opposition to fast track by voting against this bill.

**Mr. KLECKZA.** Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my strong opposition to giving fast track trade negotiating authority to the president. Not only is this bill a bad deal for working men and women, but it prevents Congress from doing its job.

Let me start out by saying that I am very concerned that we are even having this debate today. The Republican leadership has brought this bill to the floor with little interest in promoting a sensible trade policy for our nation. Instead, the bill before us today has the sole intent of embarrassing President Clinton and forcing Democrats to cast a tough political vote before an election.

Last year, fast track was pulled from the House calendar because there were not enough votes for passage. Since that time, no effort has been made to address the concerns of those who opposed fast track. The Republican leadership tinkered around the edges to add a few more provisions to make the vote even more difficult for some members, but nothing of substance. No protections for our environment. No protections for workplace safety. No protections for hardworking Americans and their families.

I must remind my colleagues that the Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Since 1974, however, the House and Senate have abdicated this responsibility by giving the president trade negotiating authority that limits congressional input. This culminated in the failed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The legacy of NAFTA is the growing number of American companies heading south of the border to take advantage of low wages and non-existent workplace safety and environmental standards. Two years ago, Johnson Controls, located in my congressional district, said they were closing a valve plant and taking 200 jobs with them to Mexico. Companies such as Fruit of the Loom and Sara Lee have joined Johnson Controls in abandoning thousands of their workers in search of lower costs in Mexico.

Even worse, companies are using the threat of relocating in Mexico in order to force their

loyal employees to accept cuts in pay and benefits. To top it off, many workers are being required to work longer hours in order to meet the production demands of corporate CEOs. A commission created under a side agreement of NAFTA conducted a study that showed these threats were carried out three times more often under NAFTA than in the past. This lack of bargaining power has prevented American workers from enjoying the benefits of the recent period of economic prosperity.

Many say the recent economic expansion has been, in part, a result of the recent trade policies of our nation. While that may be true, it is a fact that American workers have not enjoyed the benefits that should come with economic prosperity. From 1993 to 1996, real median wages fell 4.1 percent. My state of Wisconsin has been hit particularly hard—recent Census data shows Wisconsin was only one of four states where household income did not grow over the past year. In fact, the median income in Wisconsin dropped almost \$1,800—or 4.2 percent—last year. The reason: the quality of jobs, measured by wages, has deteriorated.

America should also be concerned about what recent trade agreements have done to the environment. The proponents of fast track point out that we are in a global economy and need this authority to avoid being left out. But what they fail to realize that when we choose to ignore environmental standards in trade negotiations, we are putting our own health and safety at risk.

Instead of debating this partisan sham of a trade bill, the House of Representatives should be doing its job. We must defeat this legislation and reassert our constitutional duty to debate, amend, and then approve trade proposals that are in the best interest of working families.

**Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN.** Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2621, known as “fast track” authorization for the President to negotiate international trade agreements. Congress must pass this legislation today for several reasons—it will open markets and create jobs, it is the right policy for American export businesses, and it is about leadership.

H.R. 2621 will give the U.S. an edge by opening up overseas markets to our products and services. Over 96 percent of the world's consumers live outside of the U.S. and fast track will ensure some of America's most important industries market access and future economic expansion.

I hear from countless businesses and their employees that fast track is the right policy for American Export Businesses. There is virtually no question that exports have contributed immensely to America's increasing economic vitality and stature throughout the world.

America leads the world in net exports. Last year, American exports of goods and services totaled more than \$933 billion—14 percent of total world trade. More than 11 million U.S. jobs are export-related, including 1 in 5 manufacturing jobs, which pay an average of 13–16 percent above the national average.

Thirdly, fast track is about leadership. We are the world's global leader in trade and our action today is both symbolic and substantive. You can't lead the world towards democratic ideals and free markets if you remove yourself from the trade process. We need to be involved on all continents, and right now we are shutting ourselves out of too many overseas markets.

Similarly, our country cannot be an advocate for global environmental protection and the improvement of labor conditions and wages if we are not at the table to lead in these efforts.

Finally, I would like to express my disappointment over the President's personal involvement during this debate today. Over the past year, he and members of his Administration, including the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Treasury Secretary, have been quoted repeatedly about the urgency of passage of fast track. In this regard, I would like to quote Secretary of State Madeline Albright's July 24, 1997 speech to the Pacific Council and Los Angeles World Affairs Council. She said,

American prestige is not divisible. If we want our views and interests respected, we cannot sit on the sidelines with towels over our heads while others seize the opportunities presented by the global marketplace. That is why, from a foreign policy perspective, I consider fast track to be among our highest legislative priorities.

I commend the leadership of the House for bringing this bill to the floor today, despite the lack of support by the President and his Administration, because they understand the importance of this bill for our country.

Mr. Speaker and colleagues, I urge the passage of this legislation. It is inconceivable that we would not act today to assure a brighter future and a better standard of living for our children and grandchildren and their futures.

**Mr. DAVIS of Illinois.** Mr. Speaker, when the United States enters into trade agreements, the objective should be to advance the standard of living for working families in our country and abroad.

Just like the average family in Illinois' 7th Congressional District. They are impacted by this trade agreement whether they like it or not. My hope is for them. They want what you and I want—to provide, to the best of their ability, for their loved ones.

My hope is for the people in the district, so that they can obtain a Living Wage, a wage that allows workers to lead a dignified life while working in a safe and healthy environment—an environment that respects their needs as a worker and a human being. Their struggles and desires are not so different from yours and mine. They want to put clothes on their children's back, they want to put food on the table, have access to reliable transportation, live in adequate housing and be able to obtain affordable child care for their children. Their issues need to be taken into account and be an active part of this debate. We need to engage the people in this debate—for we are playing with their livelihoods.

I hope for a trade agreement that will help to broaden our economy, help eradicate poverty, while bringing jobs and a decent quality of life to all of those involved. However, based upon recent reports, NAFTA as a trade agreement and trade model, has not met its promises. Thus, I believe that any standard of trade, based on the NAFTA model, will further threaten the standard of living for working families, not only in the USA but in other countries as well. Therefore, I am opposed to HR 2621, Fast Track.

“Free traders” often state that those opposed to NAFTA-based agreements—like fast track, need to “get with the times”—Often asserting that we are opposed to this treaty out

of fear for the future. I pronounce that this is just simply not the truth. I welcome healthy change and look forward to supporting a treaty that will serve in the best interest of small businesses, workers and the environment in this country, as well as all those involved.

Mr. Speaker, I know that when we start placing people before profits; placing democratic safeguards before raw political gain; placing the well-being of our land ahead of the fiscal bottom line of a limited number of business concerns and protecting our inhabitants from irresponsible development—then the future will be hopeful for those ordinary folks both here and in places like Mexico.

Instead of fast-track, we need an agreement that increases our purchasing power, that improves living standards for all, and that proposes constructive solutions to pressing development and social problems, and that enhances healthy commerce throughout the region.

"Fast track" proponents continue to argue that jobs are being created, but they cannot back up their claims.

Studies show that 65% of laid off U.S. workers end up in lower paying jobs. The vast majority of new jobs in the United States are now in low paying sectors of the economy. The U.S. Department of Labor's forecast of job growth over the next ten years shows the greatest increase in cashiers, janitors, retail sales clerks and waiters and waitresses.

The Administration argues that they need "fast track" authority to negotiate trade agreements, but this just isn't so. By their own admission, only 2, out of over 200 trade agreements negotiated while in office, have been negotiated under "fast-track" authority. Working families are better served by public debate over trade agreements, not backroom deals cut by policy players that can only be voted up or down.

Fast-tracking is an issue of democracy. There is no adequate time to debate. Thus, members are forced to circumvent on their duty to vote.

Finally, given the negative effects that NAFTA has had on workers both here and across the continent, using a region known as the Maquiladora, as point-in-case. The area is an environmental and health disaster area called a "cesspool of infectious diseases" by the American Medical Association. Residents on both sides of the border suffer from alarming rates of hepatitis, chronic diarrhea and tuberculosis. Contamination by toxic industrial wastes and chemicals has been linked to the clusters of cancer, rare birth defects and immunological diseases on both sides of the border in 1995.

This is a tragic example of the types of human costs that can be experienced when linked to rapid industrialization without any human rights standards. Yes, we need jobs and a solid economy, but, I ask my colleagues, at what cost and at the expense of whom? We need to seek equitable trade across borders, we cannot think of what is only good for U.S. citizens. We need enforceable workers' rights provisions and standards for all parties in trade agreements. This is fair trade.

To honestly analyze this "agreement," we must understand not only what NAFTA is, but more importantly what it is not. NAFTA did not create substantially more free trade with Mexico, it did not create higher paying jobs for

rank and file workers—on either side of the Rio Grande, it did not ensure the development of Mexico, and it side-steps critical social, environmental and economic issues. NAFTA is the absence of wage and labor rights, and responsible environmental regulations.

I say that NAFTA is more about Wall St. than about Roosevelt Road in my district where businesses thrive and employ many working-class families.

What can we learn from this debate? One strategy that seems abundantly clear is that we must work together to introduce and pass legislation that seeks to defend the rights and improve the quality of life for all working people across borders. People in my district—and beyond—need good, decent-paying jobs with a liveable wage as well as a workplace that has an atmosphere of safety and respect for all.

With a new effort afoot to spearhead international trading blocks, we must respond by allowing aggressive organizing to take place in the workplace, and create an atmosphere that welcomes the advocating of social change that safeguards workers, communities and the environment. To ask for less is to consign all of us to a spiral of economic decay and growing human misery that undercuts the humanity and well-being of all people of the America.

Mr. Speaker, I close today, by submitting to you that our struggle is linked to the struggle of poor and oppressed people throughout the world and their economic liberation protects our economic development. I look forward to supporting a treaty that will help small business prosper, a treaty that gives everybody the same break that the current treaty reserves for only the most powerful players at the table. We need a fair trade agreement that includes all who have a right and need to trade.

Good trade is good for people in the 7th Congressional District of Illinois, the city of Chicago as well as the people in the USA and Mexico. A higher wage means more purchasing power which means a stronger economy.

Mr. CONYERS. I am opposed to this bill to grant "fast track" negotiating authority to the president. The failed record of the North American Trade Agreement should have taught this body that it is time for us to remake our trade policy. NAFTA has hurt workers in America, increased poverty in Mexico and accelerated environmental destruction along the border.

The NAFTA disaster demonstrates not that we shouldn't be making trade agreements, but that we need a fully participatory policy making process that protects the interests of consumers, workers and the environment. That process should put Congress, a body devoted to responsiveness to people back home, at the center of the trade debate.

In my own state, NAFTA has been devastating to the auto industry. In 1997, the trade deficit with Mexico was \$13.9 billion for autos and automobile parts alone! This figure is expected to go up a bit this year because from January through July of 1998, the trade deficit was \$8.7 billion, compared to \$8.3 billion for the same period last year. And keep in mind that before NAFTA, in 1993, the United States only had a \$3.6 billion overall deficit with Mexico.

I visited the low-wage maquiladora factories in Mexico in 1993. All the foreign-owned corporations told us that this business sector would shrink. Instead it has increased by half

since NAFTA. This means that polluted corridor along the US border is growing uncontrollably and NAFTA's weak environmental protections give us almost no redress.

So Americans are not better off and Mexicans are not better off. According to Mexico's National Autonomous University, the number of people living in extreme poverty has gone up from 31 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 1996. This is not a fair deal for anyone except the greedy few who have profited from slashing American jobs and suppressing American wages.

I know we can negotiate a better trade agreement. But the first step is to keep Congress and the American people involved by rejecting the failed fast-track approach to trade. I urge a "no" vote on this bill.

Mr. WEYGAND. Mr. Speaker, today we are scheduled to vote on whether to grant fast-track authority to the President. I believe that, as written, we cannot ensure that U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries will get the safeguards they deserve therefore, I will be voting against granting the president fast-track authority and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. Speaker, in the United States we have a great deal of environmental, worker and consumer safeguards that make our standard of living among the highest in the world. We have worked very hard at building a nation where people can live with assurances that their food has been inspected, their roads are relatively free of unsafe vehicles, their air and water are clean and they can earn a livable wage. Why should U.S. citizens or any other citizen of any nation not be guaranteed the continuation of those same benefits? Why should U.S. standards be compromised?

One of the purposes of trade agreements should be to better both or all trading partners. Our goal should be to raise the standard of living for everyone. Weak standards should be strengthened, strong standards should not be weakened. As we have seen with NAFTA, not including certain safeguards in the text of a trade agreement itself will result in a lower standard of living.

Because we cannot look into a crystal ball to find out how a trade agreement will turn out we must ensure that environmental, consumer and worker safeguards are included, up-front. Including these provisions in the fast-track bill will ensure that high standards are part of the negotiations and will not be sacrificed.

I fully understand the importance of entering into trade agreements to make sure that the U.S. is not left behind in this global economy. Expanding export opportunities is critical to the continued economic development of Rhode Island's economy and I will work to continue to create and expand those opportunities without giving up our standard of living. I am in favor of fair and equitable trade, but not at the expense of jobs and our families. We should trade goods, not export jobs.

I believe that this fast track is the wrong track. It quiets the American people's voice in their government. This Fast-Track does not defend workers and consumers and therefore is a hindrance to fair trade, rather than a boon.

I believe we can have free and fair trade, trade that benefits American workers and consumers and defends the environment. I believe we can have agreement that will result in higher wages, cleaner air and greater consumer safeguards. This bill will not yield those

desired results. Again, I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the bill.

This debate is not about "free trade" versus "protectionism"—though that is how proponents of the fast track proposal often characterize it. It is not about "engagement" versus "isolationism." Or "leadership" versus "retreat."

What this debate is about is whether the most powerful nation on the planet will help create a global economic system in which everyone has a fair share of the wealth.

Or whether we will continue to pursue trade policies that magnify existing inequities. That favor huge multinationals and "agribusiness" combines over locally-owned enterprises and family farms. That encourage American companies to go where they won't be hampered by fair labor standards, consumer protection laws and environmental regulations.

This legislation failed last year and it deserves to fail again. Because the working people of America understand what it will mean for them. For their families. And their communities. They have seen what NAFTA has brought them, and they are not about to allow the Congress to repeat that costly mistake.

NAFTA may have generated record profits for some large corporations. But those profits have come at the expense of workers whose jobs moved south. And farmers who couldn't compete with cheap Mexican wages. And consumers forced to buy potentially unsafe produce.

Nor are the consequences of NAFTA confined to our side of the border. On a recent trip to Mexico, I saw what NAFTA has meant for the people of that country. Factory workers denied decent working conditions and the right to organize. Agricultural laborers exposed to chemicals banned in the United States. Thousands of subsistence farmers forced off their land to make room for giant export producers.

To help address these concerns, I have joined with a number of my colleagues in this House, the Mexican Congress and the Parliament of Canada, in an agreement to establish a Tri-National Commission. The Commission will meet every few months, beginning early next year, to examine the effects of NAFTA in all three countries, and to look at better alternatives.

We have been warned that if we fail to approve the bill, we will be shut out while other countries reach agreements. That, I submit, is an appeal to fear and weakness that ill befits a strong and confident nation. A nation with the strongest economy in the world.

We should not negotiate because we are afraid we will be left out. Rather, we should negotiate in the secure knowledge that our trading partners need the American market at least as much as we need theirs. That a great nation need not accept what others decree, but can work with them to reshape the structure of international trade.

If we fail to do this—if we do nothing to address the growing gulf between the haves and have nots—if we continue to enter into agreements which codify the inequities of the current trading system—we will have much to answer for.

I urge my colleagues to stand with working men and women everywhere in just saying "no."

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this once-failed "Fast Track"

trade authority legislation that the Republican leadership has chosen to bring to the floor.

Our urban centers and rural communities nationwide have suffered greatly from the corporate flight and job loss promoted and encouraged by NAFTA. Wages for manufacturing workers have been depressed by brutal global competition with terribly exploited workers overseas. And the violent turmoil in the world's financial markets threaten to ruin the economies of many developing nations.

But, in these uncertain financial times, the Republicans are using this bill for their partisan purposes and ignoring the danger signs, throwing protections for American workers and families out the window.

But they should not, and will not, pass this bill. They still have no real protections for American workers who face the loss of their jobs overseas. Environmental concerns continue to be ignored.

And, despite all the Republican rhetoric about being tough on drugs, this legislation does nothing to stop the increase of the flow of drugs into the U.S.

Loosening the rules of trade, without building in any safeguards against drug trafficking, has meant a virtual explosion of the flow of cocaine, heroin and other narcotics into the U.S. In November 1997 I called for the addition of specific, core language in trade agreements that addressed drug trafficking. I published a report "Drug Trafficking on the Fast Track" that documented the dramatic increase in drug trafficking that came as a result of NAFTA.

And this week's New York Times highlighted these dangers reporting that the brother of Mexico's former President Carlos Salinas, "assumed control over practically all drug shipments through Mexico." He used government trucks and railroad cars to ship tons of narcotics into the United States using influence and bribery to buy protection from the nation's army and police force.

So we negotiated a free trade treaty having absolutely no drug trafficking protections built in, with a government that was literally directing the flow of cocaine and narcotics into the United States.

We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past.

We cannot sign trade treaties with governments who are involved in, or complicit with, drug cartels and international drug trafficking. Until we address this issue, and protect the rights of American workers, we should reject this legislation.

We need a fair trade agreement that protects American families. I urge my colleagues to vote no on this fast track legislation.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 19, 1998]

SALINAS BROTHER IS TIED BY SWISS TO DRUG TRADE

(By Tim Golden)

MEXICO CITY.—After a nearly three-year inquiry into drug corruption in Mexico, Swiss police investigators have concluded that a brother of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari played a central role in Mexico's cocaine trade, raking in huge bribes to protect the flow of drugs into the United States.

In a secret 369-page report, the investigators assert that Salinas's elder brother, Raúl, used his wide influence in the administration to organize an elaborate network of protection for drug smugglers. He also channeled drug money to his brother's presidential campaign, the report alleges.

"When Carlo Salinas de Gortari became President of Mexico in 1988, Raúl Salinas de Gortari assumed control over practically all drug shipments through Mexico," the report states. "Through his influence and bribes paid with drug money, officials of the army and the police supported and protected the flourishing drug business."

From a low-profile position in the administration's food-distribution agency, the report states, Raúl Salinas commandeered Government trucks and railroad cars to haul cocaine north, skimming payoffs that the Swiss estimate at upwards of \$500 million. On what some of his reputed former associates referred to as "green light days," he arranged for drug loads to transit Mexico without concern that they might be checked by the army, the coast guard or the federal police.

A partial copy of the report was obtained by The New York Times. It appears to be based largely on interviews with nearly 90 former drug traffickers, reputed Salinas associates and other witnesses, most of them unidentified.

Swiss officials said they expected the report to be the basis for their Government's seizure in the coming weeks of more than \$130 million that Raúl Salinas deposited in Swiss banks.

Lawyers for Salinas dismissed the report Friday as the slanderous product of a Swiss crusade to confiscate what they insisted was a fortune that their client earned by legitimate means.

"The report is absolutely false," Salinas's lead attorney, Eduardo Luengo Creel, said in an interview. "It contains statements, assertions and situations that do not correspond to the facts. It is a police report. It does not have the validity of an evaluation by an investigating judge."

"We do not even know who these people are," Luengo said of the many confidential informants listed in the document, which Salinas's lawyers received two months ago. "To accuse someone with anonymous witnesses is unconstitutional in any country."

The document states that Swiss investigators were unable to determine conclusively what involvement the former President, his father and other family members might have had in the purportedly illicit activities of Raúl Salinas.

Some family members, it implies, were among a group of people around Raúl Salinas who were implicated in criminal activities. It based that finding on witnesses it described as "principally credible" but did not identify.

The report says the investigators did not look further into the matter because the people mentioned were irrelevant to their inquiry into whether Salinas's Swiss funds came from illegal activities.

Nonetheless, the report adds, somewhat obliquely. "We have to seriously question the probability that a person with as much power as the President of Mexico for years did not learn about criminal activities of this extent, even if his brother was heavily involved." Carlos Salinas has been living recently in Europe.

The Swiss report is by far the most exhaustive assessment to date of Raúl Salinas's reported dealings with the Mexican underworld.

It is clearly a prosecutorial document, one that cites Salinas's own version of events mostly to show how it appears to contradict other facts. Because the Swiss seizure of Salinas's assets would be a civil court action, the report also aims at a considerably lower threshold of proof than would be required in a criminal case.

Raúl Salinas was widely rumored to have grown rich on dubious business dealings during his brother's presidency, but the accusations were almost never public or specific. Shortly after Carlos Salinas's term ended, in December 1994, his chosen successor, Ernesto Zedillo, shattered a long Mexico tradition of impunity for presidential families by authorizing Raúl Salinas's arrest on charges that he ordered the murder of a leader of the governing party who was his former brother-in-law.

In the tiny maximum-security prison cell where Salinas has spent the last three and a half years, he has been struck by wave after wave of new allegations. Federal prosecutors in New York are pressing ahead with a criminal investigation into the possibility that he may have laundered illicit funds through his accounts at Citibank headquarters in New York. And after a series of reversals in their murder case, Mexican officials say they are close to announcing new corruption charges against him.

Much of the Swiss evidence seems to come from witnesses who are identified only by pseudonyms like "Ludmilla" and "Juan," and whose credibility is difficult to judge.

Some claimed they had arranged the protection of drug shipments with Salinas directly. Others, including bodyguards, chauffeurs and secretaries, said they had attended meetings at which they saw Salinas receive suitcases full of cash from smugglers. Still others, including an American drug enforcement agent, testified to matters they had learned about second-hand.

As the true names of several of the witnesses have leaked out over the course of the Swiss investigation, Salinas's lawyers have attacked their accounts. But even when the informants are convicted criminals, the report often asserts reasons why their claims are credible.

Legal experts in Switzerland and the United States predicted that the confidentiality of the sources arrayed against Salinas might well prove a weak point in the Government's case. If a seizure is ordered and lawyers for Salinas challenge it in court, as they insist they will, the judge who evaluates the case will have access to the witnesses' identities but the lawyers will not.

In contrast to law enforcement officials in the United States who have studied Mexican drug corruption for years, the small team of Swiss federal police investigators had virtually no background in the subject. But since their arrest of Salinas's third wife, Paulina Castaño, as she tried to retrieve phony passports with her husband's picture from a Swiss safe-deposit box in November 1995, the Swiss detectives managed to scour American court files and jail cells for anyone who might claim a link to their target.

In at least a few such cases, United States law-enforcement officials have acknowledged, those informants had been ignored or misused by prosecutors in the United States until the Swiss sought them out. The Swiss report also cites some confidential witnesses who are described as people who once worked or socialized around Salinas, and it contains what two American investigators described as a meticulous analysis of his financial dealings.

"For us, what they have would be a triable case," said a United States law-enforcement official who is familiar with the Swiss evidence. "It wouldn't be a slam-dunk, but you could definitely take it to court."

For the family of a former President who was once celebrated as the bold architect of a new relationship between Mexico and the United States—the man who championed the North American Free Trade Agreement and brought to power a new generation of Ivy League-educated technocrats—the report paints a devastating portrait.

Quoting unidentified former associates of the family, the report contends that both Raúl and Carlos were "introduced" to the drug trade in the late 1970's by their father, Raúl Salinas Lozano, a former Government minister. It did not make clear what that introduction involved.

"Raúl Salinas Lozano, with his political influence, would have preferred Raúl at the head of the Government in Mexico," it continues, quoting an informant close to the family to present a dark new twist on an old story of brotherly ambition. "But because Raúl Salinas de Gortari's infamous earlier life would not have permitted him to hold a high-level government position, the father decided to support his son Carlos instead."

Long before Carlos Salinas began to make his name in the mid-1980's as Mexico's young, Harvard-trained Budget Minister, the report suggests, his father had built a friendship with one of the legendary figures of Mexico's north-border drug trade, Juan N. Guerra. Such a relationship has been reported in the past, and angrily denied by Raúl Salinas Lozano.

The eldest son of the one-time border Senator—Salinas Lozano was a dominant figure in the politics of his home state of Nuevo León—and a nephew of the trafficker Juan García Ábrego, inherited the connection, the report contends.

Quoting a series of former drug traffickers, the Swiss investigators state that Raúl Salinas began arranging protection for both García Ábrego and traffickers of the Medellín cartel in Colombia even before his brother became President.

One of those traffickers, identified as "Giuseppe," appears to be José Manuel Ramos, a former high-level Medellín cocaine distributor who operated out of northern Mexico and Texas until his arrest in 1990. Three American law-enforcement officials familiar with his case described Ramos, who remains in prison, as highly credible.

Both Ramos and his wife, Luz Salazar, (the "Ludmilla" of the report) referred the Swiss detectives to payment ledgers and other documents that had been seized at the time of their arrest. According to the report, the documents helped to corroborate that from 1987 to 1989, they paid Salinas \$28.7 million on behalf of their boss, José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha.

Another convicted trafficker who gushes with information about Raúl Salinas, Marco Enrique Torres, has weaker bona fides.

While the report notes some corroboration of Torres's account by an F.B.I. agent who pursued his case, Orlando Muñoz, it fails to note Salinas's denials that he ever knew Torres. Nor does it raise questions about the more improbable parts of his tale of a long criminal friendship between a mid-level drug smuggler and a member of the Mexican political aristocracy.

Once Carlos Salinas became President at the end of 1988, the report states, his brother's power to assure the safe northward passage of drugs grew sharply.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), the Democratic leader.

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill and ask Members on both sides of the aisle to oppose this bill.

I have voted for and worked on fast track bills in the past. I worked on a bill with then President Bush that we passed back in the late 1980s. I believe

in trade, and I believe in trade agreements. I believe in opening markets. I believe in free trade agreements.

This is not a partisan issue. It is an issue on which I think people of like minds have to come together to prepare an architecture so that the free trade treaties that come from the fast track authority will succeed in opening up more trade and, most importantly, in increasing the compatibility between the countries that are engaging in trade.

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To take NAFTA, for an example, it is a free trade treaty between countries that have very different standards of living, very different attempts at enforcing their basic laws. We now know that the problems that have come from NAFTA have been caused because we did not get in NAFTA the kind of enforcement provisions, with teeth, that would allow all the parties to get the other parties to the agreement to properly enforce their labor and environmental laws. We tried to get that in the treaty and at the end everyone said, "Well, we can't get it." I vowed from that moment that if we had another fast track, and I thought and knew we should and would, that I would try to get in it provisions that would say definitely that any treaty that would come from that fast track would have to have proper provisions in it, with teeth, that would get the labor and environmental and other laws in the signatories to the treaty to properly enforce their laws.

Now, why is this important? If you go to Mexico today on the border, you will find the most modern plants in the world. In fact, there are double the number of plants than there were before NAFTA and double the number of jobs. In many ways that is good. That is what we hoped would happen. But if you examine further and you go in the villages where the workers live next to the plants that are modern, as modern as anything in the United States, you will find workers living in abject poverty. They live literally in the cardboard boxes that carry the goods out of the plants. The labor laws in Mexico are better than ours. They are just not enforced. If you speak with the workers and you ask why do you not join an independent union or why do you not bargain for better wages, they laugh at you. And they say, "We have no ability to do that." They live next to open sewage ditches. Their children have hepatitis. Half the children cannot go to school because the workers do not earn enough money to send their children to school.

If this is the future of free trade in the world economy, then we have no future. If it is a race to the bottom because we do not insist on standards in trade, then we have let down everybody in the United States and we have let down everybody in the world. Surely we can do better than this.

I believe if we work from this day forward, because I do not think this

fast track will pass, we can work to a bipartisan fast track that will give the President the fast track authority that he wants, that has the proper conditions in it so we can construct the right architecture in the world so that free trade is also fair trade, it is trade with standards, it is trade that raises the standards in the world and not lowering everybody's standards to the lowest common denominator. Now, surely we can do this.

The fast track we have tonight not only does not allow us to have those kinds of provisions in free trade treaties, it specifically says we cannot take up those matters in free trade negotiations. It is the opposite of what we need. We are the leader in the world. We are the one that has to help bring this infrastructure, this architecture to the world.

What you are voting on tonight is a very imperfect instrument that will not get us where we need to be. We can do better than this. Vote this fast track down. Let us come back next year in a bipartisan way, honestly and decently, and put together a piece of legislation that will allow America to lead the world to a higher standard of living and to the benefits of trade for all the people of the world.

Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. GINGRICH) the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington). The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for 4½ minutes.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, let me say that I agree with the gentleman from Missouri that this is an imperfect instrument and that this is a difficult time. On the other hand, we were told a year ago it was the wrong time to vote. That was not an election year. Now we are told this year, it is the wrong time to vote. This is an election year.

Now, since under our Constitution the House is elected every two years, if it is not right to vote in the year before the election and it is not right to vote in the year of the election, the correct answer from some of our friends on the left is that there is never a time to vote, because they do not want to expand markets. And I understand that. But we need to understand just how historic this moment is. And Members are going to have to live with their conscience for a long time if they vote "no."

We have entered the first deflation since the Great Depression, from Malaysia and Thailand, to Indonesia, to South Korea, to Japan, to Russia, now to Brazil, we see all over this planet people whose economies are shaky, whose currencies are shaky and they are looking for leadership. The choice for them is very simple: Do they move into the world market which since World War II has so dramatically increased the wealth of the entire world,

including the United States? Or do they move towards autarchy and protectionism and beggaring their neighbors and all of the policies which under Smoot-Hawley led to the Great Depression? It is that simple. And you get to vote in a few minutes to send a signal to the entire world because the entire world is watching.

My friend from Washington State said the Brazilians hope we defeat it. He is right. The Brazilians want us to defeat fast track because they are creating a common market in South America and they do not want American exports and they know that if we do not have fast track, corporations are going to build new plants in Brazil and new plants in Argentina and take the jobs out of the U.S. because they are going to go behind that barrier. The European Common Market wants you to vote "no." The European Common Market knows that for the first time since World War II, they are selling more to Argentina and more to Brazil than the United States. So the European Common Market hopes you will vote "no." That is the goal they have, make sure the American President stays impotent.

You say we are playing politics? It is the American President, William Clinton, who sent up the request for fast track, and who this year talked about how bitterly, that is his word, bitterly he regretted the defeat of fast track last year in his own caucus. We did not bring it up last year because we were told it was impossible because your unions would not let you vote.

Well, most of you do not have an opponent now. Most of you do not have an excuse now. This is a vote of conscience. You can vote "no," and when you vote "no," particularly those of you who have said for years you were free traders, you tell us who is playing politics: The people who vote their conscience, the people who vote for history, the people who send the signal to the world that we actually believe and vote for free trade? Or those of you who were for free trade until it became inconvenient for the Democratic Party?

You were for free trade until the unions told you, not this time, not on this bill, not last year, not this year. And you think the unions are going to tell you next year, oh, that is fine, GEPHARDT and GORE can be for free trade in 1999, because after all, there will not be a presidential nomination, the unions will not care.

Let us be honest. The fact is the Democratic Party is wedded to protectionism and it is willing to give away Latin America to the Europeans, it is willing to allow the Brazilians to create a common market that excludes America, it is willing to have the world market grow without us and if necessary it is willing to send the signal to Asia, go ahead and withdraw from the world market. And for what gain?

Now, you will say, "Well, it hurts America." Today's Washington Post, Poverty Rate Fell, Incomes Rose in

1997. This is the great damage of NAFTA. Poverty is going down, incomes are going up, we have the lowest unemployment rate in 30 years, the lowest inflation rate in 30 years, the lowest housing mortgage rate since 1967, because we have had the guts to compete in the world market, because our companies have grown leaner and tougher and smarter, because our farmers export, our small businesses export. 108,000 of the 113,000 exporters are small businesses. But that is not good enough. More jobs for Americans, more wealth.

You think you are going to convince the Mexicans to establish a higher standard of child labor when you do not trade with them? You think you are going to convince El Salvador to create a higher standard of wealth when you do not trade with them? The fact is this administration could introduce a proposed child labor agreement with Mexico anytime it wants to. They could come up next week and introduce it as a freestanding bill and make it be heard on its merits. But that is an excuse.

You know what the real issue is here. The real issue is, your union will not let you vote for free trade and you are willing to send a signal to the entire world at a time when a major firm was bailed out yesterday for \$3.5 billion, an American firm, not a Japanese, not a Korean, not an Indonesian, an American firm, and in the middle of this level of instability, you yell partisan politics and then you vote partisan against your own rhetoric?

I am not going to embarrass my colleagues by reading into the RECORD what they said, what their President has said, what the Vice President has said. Because when they go out of the country, they are for fast track. The fact is this year, the President said he is for fast track. This year the Vice President said he is for fast track. It is sad to see the partisan politics of the unions and the Democratic Party and yes, this may go down, but if this goes down and we end up in a steep worldwide recession, some of us will have had the comfort of knowing, we cast the right vote, we sent the right signal, and we tried to sustain what has worked for 50 years and not let the world slide back to what failed in the Great Depression.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 553, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 180, noes 243, answered “present” 3, not voting 9, as follows:

[Roll No. 466]

AYES—180

Archer	Frelinghuysen	Nethercutt
Armey	Ganske	Northup
Bachus	Gekas	Nussle
Baker	Gilchrest	Ortiz
Ballenger	Gillmor	Oxley
Barrett (NE)	Gingrich	Packard
Barton	Goodlatte	Parker
Bass	Granger	Paxton
Bateman	Greenwood	Pease
Bentsen	Gutknecht	Peterson (PA)
Bereuter	Hall (TX)	Petri
Berry	Hamilton	Pickering
Bliley	Hansen	Pickett
Blunt	Harman	Pitts
Boehner	Hastert	Porter
Bonilla	Hastings (WA)	Portman
Bono	Hayworth	Price (NC)
Boswell	Hefley	Radanovich
Brady (TX)	Hobson	Redmond
Bryant	Hooley	Riggs
Bunning	Horn	Rogan
Burr	Houghton	Roukema
Callahan	Hulshof	Ryun
Calvert	Hyde	Salmon
Camp	Istook	Sanford
Campbell	Johnson (CT)	Sawyer
Cannon	Johnson, E.B.	Schaefer, Dan
Castle	Johnson, Sam	Schaffer, Bob
Chabot	Kasich	Sensenbrenner
Chambliss	Kim	Sessions
Christensen	King (NY)	Shadegg
Clement	Kingston	Shaw
Collins	Klug	Shays
Combest	Knollenberg	Shimkus
Cooksey	Kolbe	Skrein
Cox	LaHood	Skelton
Crane	Largent	Smith (OR)
Cubin	Latham	Smith (TX)
Cunningham	Lazio	Snowbarger
Davis (FL)	Leach	Snyder
Davis (VA)	Lewis (CA)	Stenholm
DeLay	Lewis (KY)	Stump
Dickey	Linder	Sununu
Dicks	Livingston	Talent
Dooley	Lofgren	Tanner
Dreier	Lucas	Tauscher
Dunn	Manzullo	Tauzin
Edwards	McCollum	Thomas
Ehlers	McCrary	Thornberry
Ehrlich	McDermott	Thune
Emerson	McInnis	Tiahrt
Eshoo	McIntosh	Upton
Etheridge	McKeon	Watkins
Ewing	Miller (FL)	Watts (OK)
Fawell	Minge	Weldon (FL)
Foley	Moran (KS)	White
Ford	Moran (VA)	Wicker
Fossella	Morella	Wilson
Franks (NJ)	Myrick	Young (FL)

NOES—243

Abercrombie	Capps	Dixon
Ackerman	Cardin	Doggett
Aderholt	Carson	Doolittle
Allen	Chenoweth	Doyle
Andrews	Clay	Duncan
Baesler	Clayton	Engel
Baldacci	Clyburn	English
Barcia	Coble	Ensign
Barr	Coburn	Evans
Barrett (WI)	Condit	Everett
Bartlett	Conyers	Farr
Becerra	Cook	Fattah
Berman	Costello	Fazio
Bilirakis	Coyne	Filner
Bishop	Cramer	Forbes
Blagojevich	Crapo	Fox
Boehlert	Cummings	Frank (MA)
Bonior	Danner	Frost
Borski	Davis (IL)	Galllegly
Boucher	Deal	Gelderson
Boyd	DeFazio	Gephardt
Brady (PA)	DeGette	Gibbons
Brown (CA)	Delahunt	Gilman
Brown (FL)	DeLauro	Gonzalez
Brown (OH)	Deutsch	Goode
Buyer	Diaz-Balart	Goodling
Canady	Dingell	Gordon

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

MAKING IN ORDER LIMITED DEBATE AND POSTPONEMENT OF FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4579, TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1998

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that during consideration of H.R. 4579, pursuant to House Resolution 552, notwithstanding the order of the previous question, it may be in order after 30 minutes of the 60 minutes provided for initial debate on the bill, as amended pursuant to the rule, for the Chair then to postpone further consideration of the bill until the following legislative day, on which consideration may resume at a time designated by the Speaker.

The intent is that we would do 30 minutes of debate on the tax bill tonight, then rise, and after a Journal vote tomorrow morning take up the remaining 30 minutes of general debate time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I will not object, but I would like to take this time to ask my friend, why is it that he only requested 30 minutes when there is a total of 2 hours debate on this bill?

In view of the fact that so many Members would want to return to their home districts, especially this time of the political year, it would seem to me that if we started debate now, we could be out of here by 9 o'clock this evening. I am wondering, why are we just debating for 30 minutes? Why can we not just take up the bill and move on from there?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANGEL. Further reserving the right to object, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman knows, this was agreed to by the Republican and the Democrat leadership. We have to make sure the appropriators are going to get our work done. It is very, very difficult. We will go along with this.

Mr. RANGEL. I am glad that the gentleman gave that lengthy explanation there, because I thought for a minute he did not have any reason why we were doing this, but now he has cleared that all up.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SNOWBARGER). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

## FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A Further message from the Senate by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 4382. An act to amend the Public Health Service Act to revise and extend the program for mammography quality standards.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4112) “An Act making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.”.

PERMISSION TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORTS ON H.R. 4060, ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999, AND H.R. 6, HIGHER EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1998

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers