[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 130 (Friday, September 25, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H8765-H8805]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1997

  Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 553, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 2621) to extend trade authorities procedures with 
respect to reciprocal trade agreements, and for other purposes, and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 553, the bill 
is considered read for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 2621 is as follows:

                               H.R. 2621

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                 TITLE I--TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 102. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

       (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall 
     trade negotiating objectives of the United States for 
     agreements subject to the provisions of section 103 are--
       (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access;
       (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
     distortions that are directly related to trade and that 
     decrease market opportunities for United States exports or 
     otherwise distort United States trade;
       (3) to further strengthen the system of international 
     trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute 
     settlement; and
       (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and 
     promote full employment in the United States and to enhance 
     the global economy.
       (b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--

[[Page H8766]]

       (1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     barriers and other trade distortions are--
       (A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United 
     States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions 
     of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff 
     barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments 
     directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities 
     for United States exports or otherwise distort United States 
     trade; and
       (B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
     elimination agreements, with particular attention to those 
     tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce 
     or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, 
     including regulatory and other barriers that deny national 
     treatment and unreasonably restrict the establishment and 
     operations of service suppliers.
       (3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objective of the United States regarding foreign investment 
     is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting 
     barriers to trade related foreign investment by--
       (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of 
     national treatment;
       (B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
       (C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements and 
     other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and 
     operation of investments;
       (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and 
     compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States 
     legal principles and practice; and
       (E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
     investment disputes.
       (4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
     intellectual property are--
       (A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of 
     intellectual property rights, including through--
       (i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the 
     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
     Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)),
       (II) achieving improvements in the standards of that 
     Agreement, particularly with respect to United States 
     industries whose products are subject to the lengthiest 
     transition periods for full compliance by developing 
     countries with that Agreement; and
       (III) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or 
     bilateral trade agreement entered into by the United States 
     provide protection at least as strong as the protection 
     afforded by chapter 17 of the North American Free Trade 
     Agreement and the annexes thereto;
       (ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging 
     technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing 
     products embodying intellectual property;
       (iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect 
     to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
     maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights; and
       (iv) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and 
     effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement 
     mechanisms; and
       (B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon 
     intellectual property protection.
       (5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of 
     the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain 
     broader application of the principle of transparency 
     through--
       (A) increased and more timely public access to information 
     regarding trade issues and the activities of international 
     trade institutions; and
       (B) increased openness of dispute settlement proceedings, 
     including under the World Trade Organization.
       (6) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports in foreign markets substantially equivalent to 
     the competitive opportunities afforded foreign exports in 
     United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open 
     conditions of trade in bulk and value-added commodities by--
       (A) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports--
       (i) giving priority to those products that are subject to 
     significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major 
     producing countries; and
       (ii) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United 
     States import-sensitive products;
       (B) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market 
     opportunities for United States exports or unfairly distort 
     agriculture markets to the detriment of the United States;
       (C) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and 
     effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate 
     practices that unfairly decrease United States market access 
     opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the 
     detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to 
     import-sensitive products, including--
       (i) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading 
     enterprises and other administrative mechanisms;
       (ii) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial 
     requirements affecting new technologies, including 
     biotechnology;
       (iii) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, 
     including those not based on sound science in contravention 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
       (iv) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
       (v) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate 
     quotas;
       (D) improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the 
     unique characteristics of perishable agriculture;
       (E) taking into account whether a party to the negotiations 
     has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing 
     trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented 
     obligations under those agreements;
       (F) taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements; and
       (G) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the 
     World Trade Organization have made meaningful market 
     liberalization commitments in agriculture.
       (7) Labor, the environment, and other matters.--The 
     principal negotiating objective of the United States 
     regarding labor, the environment, and other matters is to 
     address the following aspects of foreign government policies 
     and practices regarding labor, the environment, and other 
     matters that are directly related to trade:
       (A) To ensure that foreign labor, environmental, health, or 
     safety policies and practices do not arbitrarily or 
     unjustifiably discriminate or serve as disguised barriers to 
     trade.
       (B) To ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from 
     or waive existing domestic environmental, health, safety, or 
     labor measures, including measures that deter exploitative 
     child labor, as an encouragement to gain competitive 
     advantage in international trade or investment. Nothing in 
     this subparagraph is intended to address changes to a 
     country's laws that are nondiscriminatory and consistent with 
     sound macroeconomic development.
       (8) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade in financial 
     services are those set forth in section 135(a) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)), regarding trade in 
     civil aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of that 
     Act, and regarding rules of origin are the conclusion of an 
     agreement described in section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 
     3552).
       (c) International Economic Policy Objectives.--
       (1) In general.--The President should take into account the 
     relationship between trade agreements and other important 
     priorities of the United States and seek to ensure that the 
     trade agreements entered into by the United States complement 
     and reinforce other policy goals. The United States 
     priorities in this area include--
       (A) seeking to ensure that trade and environmental policies 
     are mutually supportive;
       (B) seeking to protect and preserve the environment and 
     enhance the international means for doing so, while 
     optimizing the use of the world's resources;
       (C) promoting the respect for worker rights and the rights 
     of children and an understanding of the relationship between 
     trade and worker rights, particularly by working with the 
     International Labor Organization to encourage the observance 
     and enforcing of core labor standards, including exploitative 
     child labor; and
       (D) supplementing and strengthening standards for 
     protection of intellectual property under conventions 
     administered by international organizations other than the 
     World Trade Organization, expanding the conventions to cover 
     new and emerging technologies, and eliminating discrimination 
     and unreasonable exceptions or preconditions to such 
     protection.
       (2) Applicability of trade authorities procedures.--Nothing 
     in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the use of 
     the trade authorities procedures described in section 103 to 
     modify United States law.
       (d) Guidance for Negotiators.--
       (1) Domestic objectives.--In pursuing the negotiating 
     objectives described in subsection (b), the negotiators on 
     behalf of the United States shall take into account United 
     States domestic objectives, including the protection of 
     health and safety, essential security, environmental, 
     consumer, and employment opportunity interests, and the law 
     and regulations related thereto.
       (2) Consultations with congressional advisers and 
     enforcement of the trade laws.--In the course of negotiations 
     conducted under this title, the United States Trade 
     Representative shall--
       (A) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional 
     advisers on trade policy and negotiations appointed under 
     section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974; and
       (B) take into account the need for the United States to 
     retain the ability to enforce

[[Page H8767]]

     rigorously its trade laws in order to ensure that United 
     States workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete 
     on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade 
     concessions.
       (e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round 
     Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into 
     negotiations with a particular country, the President shall 
     take into account the extent to which that country has 
     implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
     obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

     SEC. 103. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

       (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
     or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
     foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
     restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that 
     the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be 
     promoted thereby, the President--
       (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
     before--
       (i) October 1, 2001, or
       (ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c), and
       (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
       (i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty, 
     or
       (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise 
     treatment,

     as the President determines to be required or appropriate to 
     carry out any such trade agreement. The President shall 
     notify the Congress of the President's intention to enter 
     into an agreement under this subsection.
       (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under 
     paragraph (1) that--
       (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty 
     that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 
     50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date 
     of enactment; or
       (B) reduces the rate of duty on an article to take effect 
     on a date that is more than 10 years after the first 
     reduction that is proclaimed to carry out a trade agreement 
     with respect to such article.
       (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
       (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty 
     on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a 
     trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not 
     exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in 
     effect on such day if--
       (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 
     one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had 
     taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement 
     with respect to such article; and
       (ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under 
     clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the 
     effective date of such first reduction.
       (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that 
     is not produced in the United States. The United States 
     International Trade Commission shall advise the President of 
     the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging 
     under this subparagraph.
       (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
     will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
     (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
     equal to the lesser of--
       (A) the difference between the reduction without regard to 
     this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
       (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
       (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may 
     not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect 
     only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included 
     within an implementing bill provided for under section 105 
     and that bill is enacted into law.
       (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation 
     and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification 
     of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in 
     Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the 
     United States agrees to such modification or staged rate 
     reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
     harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to 
     the formation of a regional free-trade area.
       (7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not 
     affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the 
     authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines 
     that--
       (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
     restriction of any foreign country or the United States or 
     any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international 
     trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the 
     United States or adversely affects the United States economy, 
     or
       (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
     likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

     and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title 
     will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a 
     trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the 
     period described in subparagraph (C).
       (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
       (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, 
     barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), 
     or
       (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition 
     of, such barrier or other distortion.
       (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     this paragraph before--
       (i) October 1, 2001, or
       (ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c).
       (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into 
     under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress 
     in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 102 
     and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in 
     section 104.
       (3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--The 
     provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this 
     title referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'') apply 
     to a bill of either House of Congress consisting only of--
       (A) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into 
     under this subsection and approving the statement of 
     administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such 
     trade agreement,
       (B) provisions directly related to the principal trade 
     negotiating objectives set forth in section 102(b) achieved 
     in such trade agreement, if those provisions are necessary 
     for the operation or implementation of United States rights 
     or obligations under such trade agreement,
       (C) provisions that define and clarify, or provisions that 
     are related to, the operation or effect of the provisions of 
     the trade agreement,
       (D) provisions to provide adjustment assistance to workers 
     and firms adversely affected by trade, and
       (E) provisions necessary for purposes of complying with 
     section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 in implementing the trade agreement,

     to the same extent as such section 151 applies to 
     implementing bills under that section. A bill to which this 
     subparagraph applies shall hereafter in this title be 
     referred to as an ``implementing bill''.
       (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade 
     Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 105(b)--
       (A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing 
     bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into 
     under subsection (b) before October 1, 2001; and
       (B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to 
     implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements 
     entered into under subsection (b) after September 30, 2001, 
     and before October 1, 2005, if (and only if)--
       (i) the President requests such extension under paragraph 
     (2); and
       (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension 
     disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before October 1, 
     2001.
       (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President 
     is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures 
     should be extended to implementing bills described in 
     paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, 
     not later than July 1, 2001, a written report that contains a 
     request for such extension, together with--
       (A) a description of all trade agreements that have been 
     negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule 
     for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
       (B) a description of the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this title, and a statement that such progress 
     justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
       (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed 
     to complete the negotiations.
       (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
     President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
     Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
     decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
     (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
     soon as practicable, but not later than August 1, 2001, a 
     written report that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this title; and
       (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (4) Reports may be classified.--The reports submitted to 
     the Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of 
     such reports, may be classified to the extent the President 
     determines appropriate.
       (5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the term

[[Page H8768]]

     ``extension disapproval resolution'' means a resolution of 
     either House of the Congress, the sole matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the __ 
     disapproves the request of the President for the extension, 
     under section 103(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1997, of the provisions of 
     section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 to any implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into 
     under section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997 after September 30, 2001.'', with the 
     blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House 
     of the Congress.
       (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
       (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by 
     any member of such House; and
       (ii) shall be jointly referred, in the House of 
     Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
       (D) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
     resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension 
     disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means and the Committee on Rules; or
       (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension 
     disapproval resolution after September 30, 2001.

     SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS.

       (a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--
       (1) In general.--The President, with respect to any 
     agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 
     103(b), shall--
       (A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
     negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the 
     President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set 
     forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such 
     negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the 
     negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an 
     agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and
       (B) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives and such other committees of the House and 
     Senate as the President deems appropriate.
       (2) Consultations regarding negotiations on certain 
     objectives.--
       (A) Consultation.--In addition to the requirements set 
     forth in paragraph (1), before initiating negotiations with 
     respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 
     103(b) in which the subject matter is directly related to the 
     principal trade negotiating objectives set forth in section 
     2(b)(1) or section 102(b)(7), the President shall consult 
     with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
     and with the appropriate industry sector advisory groups 
     established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 with 
     respect to such negotiations.
       (B) Scope.--The consultations described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall concern the manner in which the negotiation will 
     address the objective of reducing or eliminating a specific 
     tariff or nontariff barrier or foreign government policy or 
     practice directly related to trade that decreases market 
     opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distorts 
     United States trade.
       (3) Negotiations regarding agriculture.--Before initiating 
     negotiations under section 102(b)(6)(A) with any country, the 
     President shall assess whether United States tariffs on 
     agriculture products that were bound under the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country. 
     In addition, the President shall consider whether the tariff 
     levels bound and applied throughout the world with respect to 
     imports from the United States are higher than United States 
     tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an opportunity 
     to address any such disparity. The President shall consult 
     with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on 
     Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
     Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of the 
     assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United States 
     to agree to further tariff reductions based on the 
     conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable 
     negotiating objectives will be met.
       (b) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered 
     Into.--
       (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
     under section 103(b), the President shall consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
     and
       (B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and 
     each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction 
     over legislation involving subject matters which would be 
     affected by the trade agreement.
       (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) 
     shall include consultation with respect to--
       (A) the nature of the agreement;
       (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
     applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; 
     and
       (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 105.
       (c) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under 
     section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any 
     trade agreement entered into under section 103(a) or (b) of 
     this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, 
     and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 
     days after the date on which the President notifies the 
     Congress under section 103(a)(1) or 105(a)(1)(A) of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement.

     SEC. 105. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered 
     into under section 103(b) shall enter into force with respect 
     to the United States if (and only if)--
       (A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day 
     on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement, and 
     promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the 
     Federal Register;
       (B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the 
     President submits to the Congress a description of those 
     changes to existing laws that the President considers would 
     be required in order to bring the United States into 
     compliance with the agreement;
       (C) after entering into the agreement, the President 
     submits a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, 
     together with--
       (i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 
     103(b)(3);
       (ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to 
     implement the trade agreement; and
       (iii) the supporting information described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
       (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
     required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
       (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
     proposed administrative action will change or affect existing 
     law; and
       (B) a statement--
       (i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     of this title;
       (ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--

       (I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in clause (i);
       (II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an 
     agreement previously negotiated;
       (III) how the agreement serves the interests of United 
     States commerce; and
       (IV) how the implementing bill complies with section 
     103(b)(3).

       (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
     country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
     under section 103(b) does not receive benefits under the 
     agreement unless the country is also subject to the 
     obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that 
     the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only 
     to the parties to the agreement, if such application is 
     consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing 
     bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under 
     the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the 
     agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
     of the agreement.
       (b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) For lack of consultations.--
       (A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a 
     trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) if during 
     the 60-day period beginning on the date that one House of 
     Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for 
     lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade 
     agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural 
     disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.
       (B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--For purposes of 
     this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval 
     resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, 
     the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify 
     or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance 
     with section 104 or 105 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997 on negotiations with respect to, or 
     entering into, a trade agreement to which section 103(b) of 
     that Act applies and, therefore, the provisions of section 
     151 of the Trade Act of 1974 shall not apply to any 
     implementing bill submitted with respect to that trade 
     agreement.''.
       (2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural 
     disapproval resolutions--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;
       (II) shall be jointly referred to the Committee on Ways and 
     Means and the Committee on Rules; and

[[Page H8769]]

       (III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the 
     Committee on Finance.
       (B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.
       (C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to 
     consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported 
     by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on 
     Rules.
       (c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
     Subsection (b) of this section and section 103(c) are enacted 
     by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
     such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
       (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 106. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2), 
     if an agreement to which section 103(b) applies--
       (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding trade in information technology 
     products,
       (2) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding extended negotiations on financial 
     services as described in section 135(a) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)),
       (3) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding the rules of origin work program 
     described in Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
     referred to in section 101(d)(10) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(10)), or
       (4) is entered into with Chile,

     and results from negotiations that were commenced before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall 
     apply.
       (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement 
     to which subsection (a) applies--
       (1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures 
     to implementing bills for be determined without regard to the 
     requirements of section 104(a), and any procedural 
     disapproval resolution under section 105(b)(1)(B) shall not 
     be in order with respect to the provisions of section 104(a); 
     and
       (2) consultations under section 104(a) that would be 
     required prior to initiation of negotiations shall be made as 
     soon as feasible after the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 107. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) Implementing bill.--
       (A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``section 282 of the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 105(a)(1) of the 
     Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997''.
       (B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, or section 105(a)(1) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1997''.
       (2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section 
     131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act 
     or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of 
     this Act or section 103(a) or (b) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1997,''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or 
     (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1997'';
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section 
     1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 103(a)(3)(A) of the 
     Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997'' before 
     the end period; and
       (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997,''.
       (3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by 
     striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997,''.
       (4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 
     2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
     Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities 
     Act of 1997''.
       (5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135 
     (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of 
     the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1997''; and
       (ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 
     1988'' and inserting ``section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Reciprocal 
     Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997''; and
       (C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 102 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities 
     Act of 1997''.
       (6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section 
     1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``or under section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1997''.
       (b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of 
     applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 
     (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
       (1) any trade agreement entered into under section 103 
     shall be treated as an agreement entered into under section 
     101 or 102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 or 2112); and
       (2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to 
     a trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be 
     treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant 
     to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the 
     Trade Act of 1974.

     SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States; and
       (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that 
     is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is 
     controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or 
     United States citizens, or both.
       (2) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
       (3) World trade organization.--The term ``World Trade 
     Organization'' means the organization established pursuant to 
     the WTO Agreement.
       (4) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.

                 TITLE II--TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

     SEC. 201. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS.

       Section 245 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2317) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by striking ``1993'' and all that 
     follows through ``1998'' and inserting ``1998, 1999, and 
     2000''; and
       (2) in subsection (b) by striking ``1994'' and all that 
     follows through ``1998'' and inserting ``1998, 1999, and 
     2000''.

     SEC. 202. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FIRMS.

       Section 256(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2346(b)) 
     is amended by striking ``1993'' and all that follows through 
     ``1998'' and inserting ``1998, 1999, and 2000''.

     SEC. 203. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT.

       Section 280(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2391(a)) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking ``2, 3, and 4'' and inserting ``2 and 3''; 
     and
       (2) by striking ``January 31, 1980'' and inserting 
     ``October 1, 1999''.

     SEC. 204. TERMINATION.

       Section 285(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2271 
     note) is amended in paragraphs (1) and (2)(A)(i) by striking 
     ``1998'' and inserting ``2000''.

     SEC. 205. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title take effect on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

                     TITLE III--REVENUE PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. REPEAL OF SPECIAL RULE FOR RENTAL USE OF VACATION 
                   HOMES, ETC., FOR LESS THAN 15 DAYS.

       (a) In General.--Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986 (relating to disallowance of certain expenses in 
     connection with business use of home, rental of vacation 
     homes, etc.) is amended by striking subsection (g).
       (b) No Basis Reduction Unless Depreciation Claimed.--
     Section 1016 of such Code is amended by redesignating 
     subsection (e) as subsection (f) and by inserting after 
     subsection (d) the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Special Rule Where Rental Use of Vacation Home, Etc., 
     for Less Than 15 Days.--If a dwelling unit is used during the 
     taxable year by the taxpayer as a residence and such dwelling 
     unit is actually rented for less than 15 days during the 
     taxable year, the reduction under subsection (a)(2) by reason 
     of such rental use in any taxable year beginning after 
     December 31, 1997, shall not exceed the depreciation 
     deduction allowed for such rental use.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     1997.


[[Page H8770]]


  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill, modified 
by the amendment printed in House Report 105-745, is adopted.
  The text of H.R. 2621, as amended by the amendment printed in the 
bill and, as modified by the amendment printed in House Report 105-745, 
is as follows:

                               H.R. 2621

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
                 TITLE I--TRADE AUTHORITIES PROCEDURES

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.

       (a) Short Title.--The Act may be cited as the ``Reciprocal 
     Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998''.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the 
     national security of the United States. Trade is critical to 
     the economic growth and strength of the United States and to 
     its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships 
     promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve 
     the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold 
     War, binding nations together through a series of mutual 
     rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in 
     international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and 
     peace throughout the world.
       (2) The national security of the United States depends on 
     its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a 
     vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been 
     the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize 
     opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of 
     the economy of the United States, such as information 
     technology, telecommunications and other leading 
     technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical 
     equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology, 
     and intellectual property. Trade will create new 
     opportunities for the United States and preserve the 
     unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, 
     political, and military affairs. The United States, secured 
     by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the 
     challenges of the twenty-first century.

     SEC. 102. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

       (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall 
     trade negotiating objectives of the United States for 
     agreements subject to the provisions of section 103 are--
       (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access;
       (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
     distortions that are directly related to trade and that 
     decrease market opportunities for United States exports or 
     otherwise distort United States trade;
       (3) to further strengthen the system of international 
     trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute 
     settlement; and
       (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and 
     promote full employment in the United States and to enhance 
     the global economy.
       (b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
       (1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     barriers and other trade distortions are--
       (A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United 
     States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions 
     of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff 
     barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments 
     directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities 
     for United States exports or otherwise distort United States 
     trade; and
       (B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
     elimination agreements, with particular attention to those 
     tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce 
     or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, 
     including regulatory and other barriers that deny national 
     treatment or unreasonably restrict the establishment or 
     operations of service suppliers.
       (3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objective of the United States regarding foreign investment 
     is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting 
     barriers to trade related foreign investment by--
       (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of 
     national treatment;
       (B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
       (C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements and 
     other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and 
     operation of investments;
       (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and 
     compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States 
     legal principles and practice; and
       (E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
     investment disputes.
       (4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
     intellectual property are--
       (A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of 
     intellectual property rights, including through--
       (i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the 
     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
     Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with 
     respect to United States industries whose products are 
     subject to the lengthiest transition periods for full 
     compliance by developing countries with that Agreement, and
       (II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or 
     bilateral trade agreement entered into by the United States 
     provide protection at least as strong as the protection 
     afforded by chapter 17 of the North American Free Trade 
     Agreement and the annexes thereto;
       (ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging 
     technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing 
     products embodying intellectual property;
       (iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect 
     to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
     maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights; and
       (iv) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and 
     effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement 
     mechanisms; and
       (B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon 
     intellectual property protection.
       (5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of 
     the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain 
     broader application of the principle of transparency 
     through--
       (A) increased and more timely public access to information 
     regarding trade issues and the activities of international 
     trade institutions; and
       (B) increased openness of dispute settlement proceedings, 
     including under the World Trade Organization.
       (6) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
     substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities 
     afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to 
     achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk and 
     value-added commodities by--
       (i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports--
       (I) giving priority to those products that are subject to 
     significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major 
     producing countries; and
       (II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United 
     States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with 
     the Congress on such products before initiating tariff 
     reduction negotiations;
       (ii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market 
     opportunities for United States exports or unfairly distort 
     agriculture markets to the detriment of the United States;
       (iii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and 
     effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate 
     practices that unfairly decrease United States market access 
     opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the 
     detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to 
     import-sensitive products, including--
       (I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading 
     enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with 
     emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of 
     state trading enterprises and such other mechanisms;
       (II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial 
     requirements affecting new technologies, including 
     biotechnology;
       (III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, 
     including those not based on scientific principles in 
     contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
       (IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
       (V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate 
     quotas;
       (iv) improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the 
     unique characteristics of perishable agriculture;
       (v) taking into account whether a party to the negotiations 
     has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing 
     trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented 
     obligations under those agreements;
       (vi) taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements;
       (vii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the 
     World Trade Organization have made meaningful market 
     liberalization commitments in agriculture; and
       (viii) taking into account the impact that agreements 
     covering agriculture to which the United States is a party, 
     including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on 
     the United States agricultural industry.
       (B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to 
     agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in 
     consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a 
     position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable 
     agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations in 
     order to develop an international consensus on the treatment 
     of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in 
     investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and in any 
     other relevant area.
       (ii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph (A) 
     applies with respect to agricultural matters to be addressed 
     in any trade agreement entered into under section 103 (a) or 
     (b), including any trade agreement entered into under section 
     103 (a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade 
     agreement to which the United States is already a party, such 
     as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United 
     States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
       (7) Labor, the environment, and other matters.--The 
     principal negotiating objective of the United States 
     regarding labor, the environment, and other matters is to 
     address the following aspects of foreign government policies 
     and practices regarding labor, the environment, and other 
     matters that are directly related to trade:

[[Page H8771]]

       (A) To ensure that foreign labor, environmental, health, or 
     safety policies and practices do not arbitrarily or 
     unjustifiably discriminate or serve as disguised barriers to 
     trade.
       (B) To ensure that foreign governments do not derogate from 
     or waive existing domestic environmental, health, safety, or 
     labor measures, including measures that deter exploitative 
     child labor, as an encouragement to gain competitive 
     advantage in international trade or investment. Nothing in 
     this subparagraph is intended to address changes to a 
     country's laws that are consistent with sound macroeconomic 
     development. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed 
     to authorize inclusion in an implementing bill under this Act 
     or in an agreement subject to an implementing bill under this 
     Act provisions that would restrict the autonomy of the United 
     States in these areas.
       (8) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade in financial 
     services are those set forth in section 135(a) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(a)), regarding trade in 
     civil aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of that 
     Act, and regarding rules of origin are the conclusion of an 
     agreement described in section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 
     3552).
       (c) International Economic Policy Objectives.--
       (1) In general.--The President should take into account the 
     relationship between trade agreements and other important 
     priorities of the United States and seek to ensure that the 
     trade agreements entered into by the United States complement 
     and reinforce other policy goals. The United States 
     priorities in this area include--
       (A) seeking to ensure that trade and environmental policies 
     are mutually supportive;
       (B) seeking to protect and preserve the environment and 
     enhance the international means for doing so, while 
     optimizing the use of the world's resources;
       (C) promoting respect for worker rights and the rights of 
     children and an understanding of the relationship between 
     trade and worker rights, particularly by working with the 
     International Labor Organization to encourage the observance 
     and enforcement of core labor standards, including the 
     prohibition on exploitative child labor; and
       (D) supplementing and strengthening standards for 
     protection of intellectual property under conventions 
     administered by international organizations other than the 
     World Trade Organization, expanding these conventions to 
     cover new and emerging technologies, and eliminating 
     discrimination and unreasonable exceptions or preconditions 
     to such protection.
       (2) Applicability of trade authorities procedures.--Nothing 
     in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the use of 
     the trade authorities procedures described in section 103 to 
     modify United States law.
       (d) Guidance for Negotiators.--
       (1) Domestic objectives.--In pursuing the negotiating 
     objectives described in subsection (b), the negotiators on 
     behalf of the United States shall take into account United 
     States domestic objectives, including the protection of 
     health and safety, essential security, environmental, 
     consumer, and employment opportunity interests, and the law 
     and regulations related thereto.
       (2) Consultations with congressional advisers and 
     enforcement of the trade laws.--In the course of negotiations 
     conducted under this title, the United States Trade 
     Representative shall--
       (A) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the Congressional 
     Oversight Group appointed under section 107 with respect to 
     the negotiations; and
       (B) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
     rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and 
     countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen 
     the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines 
     on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order 
     to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, 
     and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the 
     benefits of reciprocal trade concessions.
       (3) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course 
     of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States 
     Trade Representative shall--
       (A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including 
     immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional 
     advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under 
     section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 
     and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating 
     to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely 
     basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) 
     with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate.
       (e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round 
     Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into 
     negotiations with a particular country, the President shall 
     take into account the extent to which that country has 
     implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
     obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
       (f) Report on Child Labor Laws.--With respect to any trade 
     agreement which the President seeks to implement under trade 
     authorities procedures, the President shall submit to the 
     Congress a report describing the extent to which the country 
     or countries that are parties to the agreement have in effect 
     laws governing exploitative child labor.

     SEC. 103. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

       (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
     or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
     foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
     restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that 
     the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title will be 
     promoted thereby, the President--
       (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
     before--
       (i) October 1, 2001, or
       (ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c), and
       (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
       (i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
       (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise 
     treatment, or
       (iii) such additional duties,

     as the President determines to be required or appropriate to 
     carry out any such trade agreement.

     The President shall notify the Congress of the President's 
     intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
       (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under 
     paragraph (1) that--
       (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty 
     that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 
     50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date 
     of enactment;
       (B) notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
     reduces the rate of duty below that applicable under the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements, on any agricultural product which 
     was the subject of tariff reductions by the United States as 
     a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, for which the rate 
     of duty, pursuant to such Agreements, was reduced on January 
     1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5 percent of 
     the rate of duty that applied to such article on December 31, 
     1994; or
       (C) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied 
     on January 1, 1996.
       (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
       (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty 
     on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a 
     trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not 
     exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in 
     effect on such day if--
       (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 
     one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had 
     taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement 
     with respect to such article; and
       (ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under 
     clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the 
     effective date of such first reduction.
       (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that 
     is not produced in the United States. The United States 
     International Trade Commission shall advise the President of 
     the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging 
     under this subparagraph.
       (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
     will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
     (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
     equal to the lesser of--
       (A) the difference between the reduction without regard to 
     this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
       (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
       (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may 
     not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect 
     only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included 
     within an implementing bill provided for under section 105 
     and that bill is enacted into law.
       (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation 
     and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification 
     of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in 
     Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the 
     United States agrees to such modification or staged rate 
     reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
     harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to 
     the formation of a regional free-trade area.
       (7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not 
     affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the 
     authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines 
     that--
       (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
     restriction of any foreign country or the United States or 
     any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international 
     trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the 
     United States or adversely affects the United States economy, 
     or
       (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
     likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

     and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this title 
     will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a 
     trade agreement described in

[[Page H8772]]

     subparagraph (B) during the period described in subparagraph 
     (C).
       (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
       (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, 
     barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), 
     or
       (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition 
     of, such barrier or other distortion.
       (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     this paragraph before--
       (i) October 1, 2001, or
       (ii) October 1, 2005, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c).
       (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into 
     under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress 
     in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 102 
     and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in 
     section 104.
       (3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--The 
     provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this 
     title referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'') apply 
     to a bill of either House of Congress consisting only of--
       (A) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into 
     under this subsection and approving the statement of 
     administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such 
     trade agreement,
       (B) provisions directly related to the principal trade 
     negotiating objectives set forth in section 102(b) achieved 
     in such trade agreement, if those provisions are necessary 
     for the operation or implementation of United States rights 
     or obligations under such trade agreement,
       (C) provisions that define and clarify, or provisions that 
     are related to, the operation or effect of the provisions of 
     the trade agreement,
       (D) provisions to provide adjustment assistance to workers 
     and firms adversely affected by trade, and
       (E) provisions necessary for purposes of complying with 
     section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 in implementing the trade agreement,

     to the same extent as such section 151 applies to 
     implementing bills under that section. A bill to which this 
     paragraph applies shall hereafter in this title be referred 
     to as an ``implementing bill''.
       (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade 
     Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 105(b)--
       (A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing 
     bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into 
     under subsection (b) before October 1, 2001; and
       (B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to 
     implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements 
     entered into under subsection (b) after September 30, 2001, 
     and before October 1, 2005, if (and only if)--
       (i) the President requests such extension under paragraph 
     (2); and
       (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension 
     disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before October 1, 
     2001.
       (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President 
     is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures 
     should be extended to implementing bills described in 
     paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, 
     not later than July 1, 2001, a written report that contains a 
     request for such extension, together with--
       (A) a description of all trade agreements that have been 
     negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule 
     for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
       (B) a description of the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this title, and a statement that such progress 
     justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
       (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed 
     to complete the negotiations.
       (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
     President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
     Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
     decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
     (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
     soon as practicable, but not later than August 1, 2001, a 
     written report that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this title; and
       (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (4) Reports may be classified.--The reports submitted to 
     the Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of 
     such reports, may be classified to the extent the President 
     determines appropriate.
       (5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution'' 
     means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole 
     matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
     ``That the __ disapproves the request of the President for 
     the extension, under section 103(c)(1)(B)(i) of the 
     Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998, of the 
     trade authorities procedures under that Act to any 
     implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade 
     agreement entered into under section 103(b) of that Act after 
     September 30, 2001.'', with the blank space being filled with 
     the name of the resolving House of the Congress.
       (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
       (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by 
     any member of such House; and
       (ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to 
     the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
       (D) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
     resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension 
     disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
       (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension 
     disapproval resolution after September 30, 2001.
       (d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute 
     to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the 
     President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and 
     nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or 
     service sector, and to expand existing sectoral agreements to 
     countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases 
     where the President determines that such negotiations are 
     feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such 
     sectors, include agriculture, commercial services, 
     intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods, 
     government procurement, information technology products, 
     environmental technology and services, medical equipment and 
     services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products.

     SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--
       (1) In general.--The President, with respect to any 
     agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 
     103(b), shall--
       (A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
     negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the 
     President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set 
     forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such 
     negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the 
     negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an 
     agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and
       (B) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives and such other committees of the House and 
     Senate as the President deems appropriate.
       (2) Consultations regarding negotiations on certain 
     objectives.--
       (A) Consultation.--In addition to the requirements set 
     forth in paragraph (1), before initiating negotiations with 
     respect to a trade agreement subject to section 103(b) where 
     the subject matter of such negotiations is directly related 
     to the principal trade negotiating objectives set forth in 
     section 102(b)(1) or section 102(b)(7), the President shall 
     consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
     and with the appropriate advisory groups established under 
     section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to such 
     negotiations.
       (B) Scope.--The consultations described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall concern the manner in which the negotiation will 
     address the objective of reducing or eliminating a specific 
     tariff or nontariff barrier or foreign government policy or 
     practice directly related to trade that decreases market 
     opportunities for United States exports or otherwise distorts 
     United States trade.
       (3) Negotiations regarding agriculture.--(A) Before 
     initiating negotiations the subject matter of which is 
     directly related to the subject matter under section 
     102(b)(6)(A)(i) with any country, the President shall assess 
     whether United States tariffs on agriculture products that 
     were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than 
     the tariffs bound by that country. In addition, the President 
     shall consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied 
     throughout the world with respect to imports from the United 
     States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the 
     negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such 
     disparity. The President shall consult with the Committee on 
     Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it 
     is appropriate for the United States to agree to further 
     tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the 
     assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives 
     will be met.
       (B) Before initiating negotiations to reduce United States 
     tariffs on agricultural products which the President 
     determines to be import sensitive, the President shall 
     consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture 
     Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning such tariff 
     reductions. The consultations shall include an assessment of 
     the impact of any tariff reduction on the United States 
     industry producing the product and whether adjustment periods 
     should be provided to the industry. The President, with the 
     advice of the International Trade Commission, shall determine 
     which agricultural products are import sensitive.
       (C) Before initiating negotiations with regard to 
     agriculture, the United States Trade Representative shall--
       (i) identify those agricultural products subject to tariff 
     reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty was reduced on 
     January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5

[[Page H8773]]

     percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on 
     December 31, 1994;
       (ii) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, 
     Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning whether any 
     further tariff reductions on the products identified under 
     clause (i) should be appropriate, taking into account the 
     impact of any such tariff reduction on the United States 
     industry producing the product;
       (iii) request that the International Trade Commission 
     prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of the 
     tariff reduction on the United States industry producing the 
     product and on the United States economy as a whole; and
       (iv) upon complying with clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), 
     notify the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on 
     Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
     Forestry of the Senate those products identified in clause 
     (i) for which the Trade Representative intends to seek 
     further tariff liberalization in the negotiations.
       (D) If, after negotiations described in subparagraph (C) 
     are commenced--
       (i) the United States Trade Representative identifies any 
     additional agriculture product described in subparagraph 
     (C)(i) for tariff reductions which were not the subject of a 
     notification under subparagraph (C)(iv), or
       (ii) any additional agricultural product described in 
     subparagraph (C)(i) is the subject of a request for tariff 
     reductions by a party to the negotiations,

     the Trade Representative shall notify the committees referred 
     to in subparagraph (C)(iv) as soon as practicable of those 
     products.
       (b) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered 
     Into.--
       (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
     under section 103(b), the President shall consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
     and
       (B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and 
     each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction 
     over legislation involving subject matters which would be 
     affected by the trade agreement.
       (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) 
     shall include consultation with respect to--
       (A) the nature of the agreement;
       (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
     applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this title; 
     and
       (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 105, 
     including the general effect of the agreement on existing 
     laws.
       (c) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under 
     section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any 
     trade agreement entered into under section 103(a) or (b) of 
     this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, 
     and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 
     days after the date on which the President notifies the 
     Congress under section 103(a)(1) or 105(a)(1)(A) of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement.
       (d) ITC Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days 
     before the day on which the President enters into a trade 
     agreement under section 103(b), shall provide the 
     International Trade Commission (referred to in this 
     subsection as the ``Commission'') with the details of the 
     agreement as it exists at that time and request the 
     Commission to prepare and submit an assessment of the 
     agreement as described in paragraph (2). Between the time the 
     President makes the request under this paragraph and the time 
     the Commission submits the assessment, the President shall 
     keep the Commission current with respect to the details of 
     the agreement.
       (2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after 
     the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and Congress a report assessing the 
     likely impact of the agreement on the United States economy 
     as a whole and on specific industry sectors, including the 
     impact the agreement will have on the gross domestic product, 
     exports, and imports, aggregate employment and employment 
     opportunities, the production, employment, and the 
     competitive position of industries likely to be significantly 
     affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States 
     consumers.
       (3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the 
     assessment, the Commission shall review available economic 
     assessments regarding the agreement, including literature 
     regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, 
     and shall provide in its assessment a description of the 
     analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a 
     discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the 
     various analyses and conclusions, including those of the 
     Commission regarding the agreement.

     SEC. 105. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered 
     into under section 103(b) shall enter into force with respect 
     to the United States if (and only if)--
       (A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day 
     on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement, and 
     promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the 
     Federal Register;
       (B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the 
     President submits to the Congress a description of those 
     changes to existing laws that the President considers would 
     be required in order to bring the United States into 
     compliance with the agreement;
       (C) after entering into the agreement, the President 
     submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the 
     agreement, together with--
       (i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 
     103(b)(3);
       (ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to 
     implement the trade agreement; and
       (iii) the supporting information described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
       (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
     required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
       (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
     proposed administrative action will change or affect existing 
     law; and
       (B) a statement--
       (i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     of this title; and
       (ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--

       (I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in clause (i);
       (II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an 
     agreement previously negotiated;
       (III) how the agreement serves the interests of United 
     States commerce; and
       (IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set 
     forth in section 103(b)(3).

       (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
     country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
     under section 103(b) does not receive benefits under the 
     agreement unless the country is also subject to the 
     obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that 
     the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only 
     to the parties to the agreement, if such application is 
     consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing 
     bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under 
     the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the 
     agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
     of the agreement.
       (b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
       (A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a 
     trade agreement entered into under section 103(b) if during 
     the 60-day period beginning on the date that one House of 
     Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for 
     lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade 
     agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural 
     disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.
       (B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--For purposes of 
     this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval 
     resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, 
     the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify 
     or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance 
     with section 104 or 105 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1998 on negotiations with respect to ____ 
     and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that 
     Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with 
     respect to that trade agreement.'', with the blank space 
     being filled with a description of the trade agreement with 
     respect to which the President is considered to have failed 
     or refused to notify or consult.
       (2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural 
     disapproval resolutions--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;
       (II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
       (III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the 
     Committee on Finance.
       (B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.
       (C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to 
     consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported 
     by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
     Subsection (b) of this section and section 103(c) are enacted 
     by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
     such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
       (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 106. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2), 
     if an agreement to which section 103(b) applies--
       (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding trade in information technology 
     products,

[[Page H8774]]

       (2) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding the rules of origin work program 
     described in Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
     referred to in section 101(d)(10) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(10)), or
       (3) is entered into with Chile,

     and results from negotiations that were commenced before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall 
     apply.
       (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement 
     to which subsection (a) applies--
       (1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures 
     to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to 
     the requirements of section 104(a), and any procedural 
     disapproval resolution under section 105(b)(1)(B) shall not 
     be in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply 
     with the provisions of section 104(a); and
       (2) the President shall consult regarding the negotiations 
     described in subsection (a) with the committees described in 
     section 104(a)(1)(B) as soon as feasible after the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (c) Multilateral Agreement on Investment.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this Act, the trade authorities 
     procedures shall not apply to the Multilateral Agreement on 
     Investment concluded under the auspices of the Organization 
     for Economic Cooperation and Development.

     SEC. 107. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUPS.

       (a) Appointment and Functions.--Not later than 30 days 
     after the date on which the President provides notice under 
     section 104(a)(1) of the President's intention to enter into 
     negotiations with respect to a trade agreement--
       (1) the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon the 
     recommendation of the chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
     Means, shall appoint 5 members (not more than 3 of whom are 
     members of the same political party) of such committee, and
       (2) the President pro tempore of the Senate, upon the 
     recommendation of the chairman of the Committee on Finance, 
     shall appoint 5 members (not more than 3 of whom are members 
     of the same political party) of such committee,

     to serve as members of a Congressional Oversight Group for 
     the negotiations. Each such member shall be accredited by the 
     United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President 
     as official advisers to the United States delegation in the 
     negotiations. Members of the Congressional Oversight Group 
     shall consult with and provide advice to the Trade 
     Representative regarding the formulation of specific 
     objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, and the 
     development of the trade agreement.
       (b) Additional Members.--
       (1) Authority to appoint.--In addition to the members 
     designated under subsection (a) for a Congressional Oversight 
     Group--
       (A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives may appoint 
     additional members of the House from any other committee of 
     the House or joint committee of Congress to serve as members 
     of the Congressional Oversight Group; and
       (B) the President pro tempore of the Senate may appoint 
     additional members of the Senate from any other committee of 
     the Senate or joint committee of Congress to serve as members 
     of the Congressional Oversight Group.

     Members of the House and Senate appointed under this 
     paragraph shall be accredited by the United States Trade 
     Representative.
       (2) Consultations.--Before designating any member under 
     paragraph (1), the Speaker or the President pro tempore shall 
     consult with--
       (A) the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance, as 
     appropriate; and
       (B) the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     committee from which the member will be appointed.
       (3) Affiliation.--Not more than 2 members may be appointed 
     under this subsection as members of any Congressional 
     Oversight Group from any 1 committee of Congress. If 2 
     members are appointed from 1 committee, they must be from 
     different political parties, and the total members from any 
     political party appointed under this subsection for any 
     Congressional Oversight Group may not exceed the total number 
     of members from any other political party.
       (c) Guidelines.--
       (1) Purpose and revision.--Within 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the United States Trade 
     Representative shall develop written guidelines, in 
     consultation with the chairmen and ranking minority members 
     of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, 
     to facilitate the useful and timely exchange of information 
     between the Trade Representative and the Congressional 
     Oversight Groups established under this section. The Trade 
     Representative may revise the guidelines from time to time as 
     needed following further such consultation.
       (2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) 
     shall provide for, among other things--
       (A) regular, detailed briefings of each Congressional 
     Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives and 
     positions and status of the negotiations with respect to 
     which the group was appointed, beginning as soon as 
     practicable after the appointment of the members of the 
     group, with more frequent briefings as trade negotiations 
     enter the final stage;
       (B) access by members of each Congressional Oversight 
     Group, and staff with proper security clearances, to 
     pertinent documents relating to the negotiations, including 
     classified materials; and
       (C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade 
     Representative and each Congressional Oversight Group at all 
     critical periods during the negotiations, including at 
     negotiation sites.

     SEC. 108. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--At the time the President submits the 
     final text of an agreement pursuant to section 105(a)(1)(C), 
     the President shall also submit a plan for implementing and 
     enforcing the agreement. The implementation and enforcement 
     plan shall include the following:
       (1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required at border entry points, 
     including a list of additional customs and agricultural 
     inspectors.
       (2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible 
     for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, 
     including personnel required by the Office of the United 
     States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the 
     Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the 
     Treasury.
       (3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of 
     the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United 
     States Customs Service.
       (4) Impact on State and local governments.--A description 
     of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and 
     local governments as a result of increases in trade.
       (5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated 
     with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
       (b) Budget submission.--The President shall include a 
     request for the resources necessary to support the plan 
     described in subsection (a) in the first budget the President 
     submits to Congress after the submission of the plan.

     SEC. 109. CHIEF AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATOR.

       (a) Establishment of Position.--There shall be in the 
     Office of the United States Trade Representative a Chief 
     Agricultural Negotiator, who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
     from among individuals with appropriate experience in 
     agricultural matters. The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall 
     hold office at the pleasure of the President and shall have 
     the rank of Ambassador.
       (b) Functions.--The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall 
     have as his or her primary function the conduct of trade 
     negotiations relating to agricultural commodities and shall 
     have such other functions as the United States Trade 
     Representative may direct.
       (c) Compensation.--The Chief Agricultural Negotiator shall 
     be paid at the highest rate of basic pay payable to a member 
     of the Senior Executive Service.

     SEC. 110. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) Implementing bill.--Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 
     2191(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``, section 1103(a)(1) of 
     the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,''; and
       (2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section 
     131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act 
     or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of 
     this Act or section 103(a) or (b) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1998,''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or 
     (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``section 103(b) of the Reciprocal Trade 
     Agreement Authorities Act of 1998'';
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section 
     1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 103(a)(3)(A) of the 
     Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998'' before 
     the end period; and
       (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1998,''.
       (3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by 
     striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1998,''.
       (4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 
     2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
     Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities 
     Act of 1998''.
       (5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135 
     (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of 
     the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1998'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 103 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement 
     Authorities Act of 1998''; and
       (ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 
     1988'' and inserting ``section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Reciprocal 
     Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998''; and
       (C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 102 of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities 
     Act of 1998''.
       (6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section 
     1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``or under section 103 of the

[[Page H8775]]

     Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1998''.
       (b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of 
     applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 
     (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
       (1) any trade agreement entered into under section 103 
     shall be treated as an agreement entered into under section 
     101 or 102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 or 2112); and
       (2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to 
     a trade agreement entered into under section 103 shall be 
     treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant 
     to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the 
     Trade Act of 1974.

     SEC. 111. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States; and
       (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that 
     is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is 
     controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or 
     United States citizens, or both.
       (2) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
       (3) World trade organization.--The term ``World Trade 
     Organization'' means the organization established pursuant to 
     the WTO Agreement.
       (4) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.
                 TITLE II--TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

     SEC. 201. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS.

       Section 245 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2317) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by striking ``1993'' and all that 
     follows through ``1998,'' and inserting ``1998 and 1999 and 
     for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 
     31, 1999,''; and
       (2) in subsection (b) by striking ``1994'' and all that 
     follows through ``1998,'' and inserting ``1998 and 1999 and 
     for the period beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 
     31, 1999.''.

     SEC. 202. NAFTA TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM.

       Section 250(d)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2331(d)(2)) is amended by striking ``for any fiscal year 
     $30,000,000'' and inserting ``$30,000,000 for fiscal year 
     1998 or 1999 and shall not exceed $7,000,000 for the period 
     beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999''.

     SEC. 203. ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FIRMS.

       Section 256(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2346(b)) 
     is amended by striking ``1993'' and all that follows through 
     ``1998'' and inserting ``1998 and 1999 and for the period 
     beginning October 1, 1999, and ending December 31, 1999''.

     SEC. 204. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT.

       Section 280(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2391(a)) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking ``2, 3, and 4'' and inserting ``2 and 3''; 
     and
       (2) by striking ``January 31, 1980'' and inserting 
     ``October 1, 1999''.

     SEC. 205. TERMINATION.

       Section 285(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2271 
     note preceding) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1) by striking ``September 30, 1998'' and 
     inserting ``December 31, 1999''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``the day that is'' 
     and all that follows through ``effective'' and inserting 
     ``December 31, 1999''.

     SEC. 206. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title take effect on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

                      TITLE III--SPENDING OFFSETS

     SEC. 301. COMPUTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   AGRICULTURE.

       (a) Prohibition on Funding.--No expenses for computer-
     related activities of the Department of Agriculture that are 
     funded through the Commodity Credit Corporation pursuant to 
     section 4(g) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act 
     shall be funded in fiscal year 1999.
       (b) Reduction in Limitation on Obligations.--Section 4(g) 
     of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 
     714b(g)) is amended in the first sentence by striking 
     ``$193,000,000'' and inserting ``$128,000,000''.

                TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS TRADE PROVISIONS

     SEC. 401. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT DENY MARKET ACCESS 
                   FOR UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

       (a) Identification Required.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 8 of title I of the Trade Act of 
     1974 is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 183. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT DENY MARKET 
                   ACCESS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than the date that is 30 days 
     after the date on which the annual report is required to be 
     submitted to Congressional committees under section 181(b), 
     the United States Trade Representative (hereafter in this 
     section referred to as the `Trade Representative') shall 
     identify--
       ``(1) those foreign countries that--
       ``(A) deny fair and equitable market access to United 
     States agricultural products, or
       ``(B) apply unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary standards 
     for imported agricultural products from the United States; 
     and
       ``(2) those foreign countries identified under paragraph 
     (1) that are determined by the Trade Representative to be 
     priority foreign countries.
       ``(b) Special Rules for Identifications.--
       ``(1) Criteria.--In identifying priority foreign countries 
     under subsection (a)(2), the Trade Representative shall only 
     identify those foreign countries--
       ``(A) that engage in or have the most onerous or egregious 
     acts, policies, or practices that deny fair and equitable 
     market access to the United States agricultural products,
       ``(B) whose acts, policies, or practices described in 
     subparagraph (A) have the greatest adverse impact (actual or 
     potential) on the relevant United States products, and
       ``(C) that are not--
       ``(i) entering into good faith negotiations, or
       ``(ii) making significant progress in bilateral or 
     multilateral negotiations,

     to provide fair and equitable market access to United States 
     agricultural products.
       ``(2) Consultation and consideration requirements.--In 
     identifying priority foreign countries under subsection 
     (a)(2), the Trade Representative shall--
       ``(A) consult with the Secretary of Agriculture and other 
     appropriate officers of the Federal Government, and
       ``(B) take into account information from such sources as 
     may be available to the Trade Representative and such 
     information as may be submitted to the Trade Representative 
     by interested persons, including information contained in 
     reports submitted under section 181(b) and petitions 
     submitted under section 181(b) and petitions submitted under 
     section 302.
       ``(3) Factual basis requirement.--The Trade Representative 
     may identify a foreign country under subsection (a)(1) only 
     if the Trade Representative finds that there is a factual 
     basis for the denial of fair and equitable market access as a 
     result of the violation of international law or agreement, or 
     the existence of barriers, referred to in subsection (d).
       ``(4) Consideration of historical factors.--In identifying 
     foreign countries under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection 
     (a), the Trade Representative shall take into account--
       ``(A) the history of agricultural trade relations with the 
     foreign country, including any previous identification under 
     subsection (a)(2), and
       ``(B) the history of efforts of the United States, and the 
     response of the foreign country, to achieve fair and 
     equitable market access for United States agricultural 
     products.
       ``(c) Revocation and Additional Identifications.--
       ``(1) Authority to act at any time.--If information 
     available to the Trade Representative indicates that such 
     action is appropriate, the Trade Representative may at any 
     time--
       ``(A) revoke the identification of any foreign country as a 
     priority foreign country under this section, or
       ``(B) identify any foreign country as a priority foreign 
     country under this section.
       ``(2) Revocation reports.--The trade Representative shall 
     include in the semiannual report submitted to the Congress 
     under section 309(3) a detailed explanation of the reasons 
     for the revocation under paragraph (1) of the identification 
     of any foreign country as a priority foreign country under 
     this section.
       ``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, a foreign 
     country denies fair and equitable market access if the 
     foreign country effectively denies access to a market for a 
     product through the use of laws procedures, practices, or 
     regulations which--
       ``(1) violate provisions of international law or 
     international agreements to which both the United States and 
     the foreign country are parties, or
       ``(2) constitute discriminatory nontariff trade barriers.
       ``(e) Publication.--The Trade Representative shall publish 
     in the Federal Register a list of foreign countries 
     identified under subsection (a) and shall make such revisions 
     to the list as may be required by reason of the action under 
     subsection (c).
       ``(f) Annual Report.--The Trade Representative shall, not 
     later than the date by which countries are identified under 
     subsection (a), transmit to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate, a report on the actions taken under this section 
     during the 12 months preceding such report, and the reasons 
     for such actions, including a description of progress made in 
     achieving fair and equitable market access for United States 
     agricultural products.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Trade Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 182 the following:

``Sec. 183. Identification of countries that deny market access for 
              agricultural products.''.

       (b) Investigations.--
       (1) In general.--Subparagraph (A) of section 302(b)(2) of 
     the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2412(b)(2)) is amended by 
     inserting ``or 183(a)(2)'' after ``section 182(a)(2)'' in the 
     matter preceding clause (i).
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Subparagraph (D) of section 
     302(b)(2) of such Act is amended by inserting ``concerning 
     intellectual property rights that is'' after ``any 
     investigation''.

     SEC. 402. ENFORCEMENT OF U.S.-JAPAN INSURANCE AGREEMENT.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the Japanese insurance market has historically been 
     closed to United States interests and investment;
       (2) the terms of the U.S.-Japanese Insurance Agreement have 
     begun the process of opening the Japanese insurance market to 
     United States interests and investment; and

[[Page H8776]]

       (3) failure to fully enforce the terms of the U.S.-Japanese 
     Insurance Agreement will endanger the United States 
     investments that have occurred and those which may occur in 
     the future.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the United States Trade Representative should work 
     diligently with the Minister of Finance of Japan to fully 
     enforce the terms of the U.S.-Japan Insurance Agreement so 
     that Japanese insurance markets will continue to be open to 
     United States investment and that existing and future United 
     States investments in the Japanese insurance markets are 
     protected.
       (c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``U.S.-
     Japan Insurance Agreement'' means the Measures by the 
     Government of the United States and the Government of Japan 
     Regarding Insurance, signed on October 11, 1994, as amended 
     by the Supplementary Measures by the Government of the United 
     States and the Government of Japan Regarding Insurance, 
     signed on December 24, 1996.

     SEC. 403. MARKING OF CONTAINERS FOR PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL 
                   COMMODITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
     U.S.C. 1304) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k) as 
     subsections (i), (j), (k), and (l), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h) Marking of Containers of Perishable Agricultural 
     Commodities.--
       ``(1) In general.--The immediate container, as it 
     ordinarily reaches the ultimate purchaser, of any perishable 
     agricultural commodity excepted from the marking requirements 
     of subsection (a) shall be marked in the manner required by 
     subsection (a), unless an exception from the requirements of 
     marking applies to such container under any subparagraph of 
     subsection (a)(3) other than subparagraph (J).
       ``(2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
     term `perishable agricultural commodity' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 1(b) of the Perishable 
     Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C. 499a(b)).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 304(j) of such Act, as 
     redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended by striking 
     ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     apply to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
     consumption, on or after the 120th day after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 404. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUSPENSION AGREEMENT.

       The administering authority (as defined in section 771(1) 
     of the Tariff Act of 1930) shall closely monitor and 
     vigorously enforce the suspension agreement concerning fresh 
     tomatoes from Mexico that was entered into on October 28, 
     1996, pursuant to section 734 of the Tariff Act of 1930. If 
     the administering authority determines that the suspension 
     agreement is being, or has been, violated, is no longer in 
     the public interest as set forth in section 734(d) of that 
     Act, or no longer meets the applicable requirements of 
     section 734(c) or (d) of that Act, the administering 
     authority shall immediately resume the antidumping 
     investigation suspended by the agreement and take other 
     action under section 734(i) of that Act. The administering 
     authority shall establish a Rapid Response Team to ensure 
     full compliance with the agreement and speedy resolution of 
     claims with respect to the agreement.

     SEC. 405. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS ALONG UNITED STATES-MEXICAN 
                   BORDER.

       (a) Task Force To Review Conditions.--The President shall 
     establish a task force to review conditions along the United 
     States-Mexican border relating to housing, labor, the 
     environment, and other relevant issues as they relate to 
     United States companies that are located along the border. 
     The task force should determine the ways in which 
     partnerships made up of public and private entities can 
     improve conditions along the border.
       (b) Report to Congress.--The President shall report to the 
     Congress not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act on the results of the review under 
     subsection (a).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Archer) and 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) each will control 1 hour of 
debate on the bill.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Archer).

                              {time}  1600


                             General Leave

  Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous matter on H.R. 2621.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this could be a fulcrum moment in America's future. This 
is an unusually fragile time for economies throughout the world, the 
likes of which we have not seen for generations.
  There are only a few things that we in America can do to increase our 
ability to be a bulwark against decaying economies around the world and 
prevent their ultimately enveloping us. One thing we can do is 
demonstrate a clear commitment to resist the suggestiveness of 
protectionism, protectionism which could drag the whole world into 
depression.
  This legislation grants the administration the authority to negotiate 
trade agreements and bring them back to Congress for an up or down 
vote. Historically it has been bipartisan, and it represents a key 
component to preserving our economy and helping the rest of the world 
for years to come.
  Trade has been and will always be the force that drives our economic 
engine. Trade benefits everyone, workers, businesses and consumers. If 
we are to stay on the right economic road, we should not halt the 
process of opening foreign markets. We must not.
  To the President's credit, his policy on trade has been very, very 
good. It has helped us to continue to keep a growing economy. He 
deserves credit for that. But it is sad that, today, the administration 
is withholding its support for this bill, support that was so active 
last year. It is sad that his strength in the past of resisting the 
pressures of organized labor have now come into play today, and we 
cannot afford to lose one month, six months or a year until we do one 
of the few things that we can do to help America and the world.
  The U.S. is the world's largest exporting country, with exports 
nearing the $1 trillion mark. This economic boom has translated into 
approximately 11.5 million U.S. jobs which pay on average 15 percent 
more than non-trade related jobs. Many Americans do not know that they 
have a trade-related job, but it affects 11.5 million jobs.
  We have been able to achieve these impressive results because we have 
been aggressive in expanding overseas markets. To sustain our growth 
and prosperity, we must continue to tap into the growing economies 
around the world, and we must remember that 19 out of 20 potential 
customers in the world do not live in this country. As a result, 
negotiating trade agreements that reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to our products and our services is a win-win proposition.
  Our average tariffs are already very, very low, less than 3 percent, 
but most of our trading partners have much, much higher tariffs: Chile, 
11 percent, Argentina, 10 percent, Australia, 9 percent, Thailand, 26 
percent. What do we have to fear? We have far less risk to go down from 
under 3 percent than we have to gain by reducing tariffs that are 
three, four and five times higher than ours.
  Because we export more products and services than any country in the 
world, reducing foreign tariffs means huge savings for our industries 
and our workers. But, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, we are at a 
standstill. Without fast track, our failure to participate in shaping 
the global trading system will allow our competitors to negotiate 
preferential trade agreements and form strategic relationships that 
exclude us. And that is why I say, again, we should not wait another 
month or six months before we act on this vital legislation.
  Each month we lose is a loss for America. Since 1992 our competitors 
have negotiated 20 free trade agreements that exclude us in Latin 
America and Asia alone. We are losing orders for our products over and 
over again in Chile and other countries, and those orders are going to 
Canada and they are going to Mexico and they are going to other 
countries for export. The European union is negotiating in a trade 
agreement with Latin America that will keep us out. We can no longer 
afford to stand idly by.
  So the legislation we consider today gives the President the 
authority he needs to move ahead in negotiating these vital trade 
agreements, and it does so without undermining Congress' constitutional 
role.
  Congress must under this bill be consulted before, during and after 
trade negotiations. For farmers and ranchers, who derive 30 percent of 
their income for exports, this bill puts the Committee on Agriculture, 
in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, in a position to review 
all proposed agreements before they are signed.
  The U.S. has everything to gain by passing fast track. We have 
everything to lose if we fail. The choices before us are stark: We can 
approve this legislation and sow the seeds of hope, growth

[[Page H8777]]

and prosperity, or we can yield to the forces of fear, protectionism 
and shortsightedness and cast this opportunity aside, potentially 
undermining the economies of the world, with America being irresistibly 
potentially included in that undermining.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope we will support future prosperity. Support fast 
track, and vote for this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I certainly agree 
with most of the things that the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means has said, that if this great Nation is 
going to continue to grow and maintain our economic advantage, we have 
to remove all of the barriers to trade.
  Trade is the one thing that our Nation excels in, and we have to make 
certain that we remain competitive. A piece of legislation like fast 
track or trade, as I said earlier, or taxes or Social Security, cannot 
be a pre-election gimmick, but it has to be, indeed, a bipartisan 
effort, where people who have honest differences of opinion but still 
want our Nation to maintain its leadership in trade sit down and work 
out those differences.
  We cannot afford to allow the world marketplace as it relates to 
labor to set the standards for the United States of America. We cannot 
pick a country that has the lowest labor wages, no benefits, no health 
benefits, and allow industries in our cities around the United States 
to close and go there to take advantage of that particular economic 
advantage.
  No, we must be able to say that when we trade, Americans are going to 
be the beneficiaries; not just those in the high-tech jobs, but those 
in the lower skilled jobs have to be protected as well.
  I believe that our president, as other presidents, should have the 
right to negotiate trade contracts, and it should not be the House or 
the Senate that is going to dot every ``i'' or cross every ``t''. But 
when it comes to Americans losing their jobs, losing their pensions, 
losing their homes, merely because business has gone, we should be able 
to tell the president, you do not negotiate any treaty or contract 
without protecting American workers, without protecting the 
environment, without protecting human rights. We cannot let the free 
marketplace dictate the principles we believe in as a country.
  So I believe that when the president is ready to sit down with us, 
Republicans and Democrats, we can work out fast track. Nobody is 
against it because it gives the President authority. People oppose it 
because it does not spell out the human rights and the rights of 
workers, which is just as much a part of our prosperity as it is to see 
that the stock market has improved as a result of the stability that 
the President has brought.
  I do not know why these matters are brought up on the eve of 
elections. I do not know who we want to embarrass. I do not know why we 
just entertain vetoes. This thing is just too important to allow it to 
be treated in a partisan way.
  For that reason, I do not know why it is on the calendar now. I have 
no idea what the politics is behind it. You certainly cannot have 
something like this be approved without bipartisan support. You 
certainly need the leader of the free world and the President of the 
United States working with you. But I suspect you have taken some poll 
somewhere and you think this gives you an advantage someplace come 
November.
  I hope that you are not right, but I still believe that you should 
not be taking legislation like Social Security, tax cuts, and God knows 
what else you are going to try to do before we get out of here, and try 
to negotiate these things just before an election. It is important for 
the country, but it is important for Americans, Democrats and 
Republicans, it is important for the President, and I hope that soon we 
will be able to work a little more closely together.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Matsui), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Trade, and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to yield blocks 
of time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield three minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Smith).

                              {time}  1615

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman 
for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I continue to hear this question, why, why now? Why not 
next year? I should not have to remind members of the Committee on Ways 
and Means that next year we have a chance to revisit the Uruguay Round, 
1999. There are many, many problems that we have in trade around the 
world. I should not have to advise the Committee on Ways and Means 
members of what they are, but let me just tick them off.
  We have lost, in agriculture, 30 percent of our markets in Asia. We 
have been excommunicated from markets in the European Union. We have 
difficulty with phytosanitary problems getting into Japan, and all of 
that in the face of disasters in this country for agriculture, of 
floods, of droughts, and of course, of lost revenues to the tune of 
some $9 billion.
  If there was ever a time that we ought to be reaching out for 
markets, it is now, it seems to me, especially in the face of the 
Uruguay Round. Without fast track, we do not have tools to sit down at 
the table and to discuss these problems that I have just identified 
around the world.
  I can tell the Members, having traveled halfway around the world with 
my Committee on Agriculture, that the rest of the countries are smiling 
and chortling at us. I just left a representative from New Zealand who 
said, ``You mean you do not have fast track? You are not going to 
trade? You are not going to to be involved? We thought we were allies. 
We are going to go into the Uruguay Round without you having fast track 
and the tools to trade?'' He was smiling at us.
  The facts are that this agreement is unlike any other that we have 
ever looked at. It is not like NAFTA, it is not like GATT. It is 
different because, especially in agriculture, for the first time in 
history, by the way, and I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Archer) 
and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane) of the Committee on Ways 
and Means for allowing agriculture to be included, not only in the 
consultation process, as the agreements move along, but before anything 
is finally penned, the Committee on Agriculture gets a chance to look 
at every word of the agreement. If it is no good for agriculture, it 
cannot pass. If agriculture opposes any agreement, it cannot pass this 
body. For the first time, we have generated an opportunity for 
agriculture to be at the table when we negotiate agreements. It is 
outstandingly important that we do that.
  I think this is almost humorous, except it is true. This side does 
not want to give their president fast track. Our side wants to give 
their president fast track authority. I think the point remains that 
really no president negotiates trade agreements.
  We are a Nation. We are a Nation and a leader in trade. We should be 
a leader in fast track. Giving this president authority is what I want 
to do, because I know that trade agreements can be looked at, can be 
consulted by Congress as we move along, so that gives me safety and 
that gives me comfort, because I know it will be done properly.
  Please, please understand, this is the most important vote for 
agriculture that we will have in many, many years. Understand, this is 
the time we stand up for trade.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 10 minutes 
of my time to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), a member 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, in support of the bill, and that he 
in turn be permitted to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
McDermott) will control 10 minutes.

[[Page H8778]]

  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui).
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in opposition to H.R. 2621, reluctantly, Mr. Speaker. Today's 
exercise in this legislation soils our national trade policy with the 
mud of partisan politics. It shows a disdain for the legislative 
process, and it threatens to disrupt international markets and quite 
possibly our national economy.
  I would first like to make absolutely clear that I support granting 
the President fast track negotiating authority that he needs to enter 
into trade agreements. Fast track authority is essential to maintain 
U.S. economic leadership by opening foreign markets to American 
agriculture, manufactured goods and services. I supported it in 1988, I 
supported it last year, I intend to support it in the future. But I 
will not, however, support it today.
  This debate, Mr. Speaker, is not about fast track. This debate is 
about partisan politics. The fast track bill that we are considering 
today is not scheduled and will not pass in the Chamber of this House, 
but it is, rather, an attempt to embarrass members of my party. I will 
tell the Members, I will not participate in any effort to do damage or 
defeat any of my colleagues by using trade policy as a tool.
  When the Republican leadership decided to bring fast track up in the 
waning days of this Congress, there was little attempt to disguise the 
motivations, the political motivations, behind it. In fact, the 
chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee was quoted 
in the Washington Post on July 20, 1998, specifically naming one of my 
Democratic colleagues, with the clear threat to use this vote against 
him in the upcoming election.
  In addition, Willard Workman, a senior official of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, suggested that he would rather see fast track brought up 
to lose, which it will, so that he could make an issue out of it in the 
November election. It is personally surprising to me that one of the 
Nation's premier business lobbying organizations would display such a 
reckless attitude about fast track for the sake of perceived partisan 
advantage.
  As I said, however, today is not about passing fast track. We all 
know that. This bill is virtually identical to the one that was shelved 
last year. Since then, there has been absolutely no effort to refashion 
this legislation.
  Many of us, including the President, worked very hard last year to 
pass it, but we could not muster the bipartisan support needed. The 
sensible and rational thing to do, if we want to pass it, would be to 
make changes to add additional support. But that simply has not 
happened. If the Republican leadership sincerely wanted to pass this 
bill, it would have made the necessary changes to broaden the base of 
support on the floor of the House.
  Our colleagues have modified this bill to take care of agriculture, 
or at least perceived to take care of agriculture. There has really 
been no effort to reach out to Members in other areas of this 
legislation. For example, there has been no discussion on labor and the 
environment, about language that would implement and expand the 
implementation if the bill is finally passed, or other bipartisan 
changes that could get a majority for a good fast track bill.
  In fact, this bill under consideration actually limits the 
President's negotiating authority, compared to the bill that President 
Reagan and President Bush had, which had flexibility, the law that 
expired.
  While political points may be scored to defeat fast track on the 
floor today, Mr. Speaker, it will have serious and negative 
consequences. When coupled with our failure to pass MFN funding, 
funding for the United Nations, and loose talk about impeachment, this 
body sends a dangerous message to investors in the markets in Asia, 
Russia, and Latin America. A signal such as the defeat of fast track 
today is further evidence that the U.S., or at least this Congress, is 
not serious about international leadership.
  Just as significantly, what happens here also sends a new signal that 
American trade policy is used for partisan advantage, and that strong 
bipartisanship in the area of free and international trade no longer 
exists.
  I will tell the Members, we all know that the votes are not there for 
passage of this legislation. This is brought up only for partisan 
advantage. That is not the way to use trade policy in America.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in response to our distinguished minority leader on the 
Subcommittee on Trade, I would remind him that there are important 
contents in the Archer amendment to H.R. 2621. They deal not just with 
agriculture.
  There is one, for example, that insists that the President, with 
respect to any trade agreement implemented under trade authorities 
procedures, submit to Congress a report describing the extent to which 
the parties to that trade agreement have in effect laws governing 
exploitative child labor.
  There is a new provision on agriculture, a special 301 procedure for 
identifying in a report trade barriers and countries that deny fair and 
equitable market access, and that impose unjustified sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards against U.S. agricultural products.
  One month after the report is issued, USTR would be required to 
identify priority foreign countries against which it would initiate 
section 301 unfair trade practice investigations, resulting in possible 
trade sanctions against the offending country.
  It also requires that the President establish a task force to review 
conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border relating to housing, labor, the 
environment, and other relevant issues.
  Mr. Speaker, I would remind my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle of a statement that was made in this Chamber back in January. 
``We all know in every way in life change is not always easy, but we 
have to decide whether we are going to try to hold it back and hide 
from it or reap its benefits. Remember the big picture here. While we 
have been entering into hundreds of new trade agreements, we have been 
creating millions of new jobs. So this year we will forge new 
partnerships with Latin America, Asia, and Europe, and we should pass 
the new African Trade Act. It has bipartisan support. I also renew my 
request for the fast track negotiating authority necessary to open more 
new markets and create more new jobs, which every president has had for 
two decades.''
  That was President Clinton in his State of the Union message here.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Delay).
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, fast track would pass tonight if the 
President would honor his commitments and get his party to vote for it. 
Who said, ``I will also renew my request for the fast track negotiating 
authority necessary to open new markets and create more new jobs, which 
every president has had for two decades?'' Who has traveled across the 
world promising to support fast track?
  Who said in Santiago, Chile, earlier this year, that ``The benefits 
for American workers and companies and consumers for expanding trade 
should make, in my judgment, a clear case for fast track authority. I 
will continue to work hard with Congress to build support for fast 
track''? Bill Clinton.
  President Clinton was once the strongest supporter of fast track. 
Now, for political reasons, he has withdrawn that support. It is 
troubling that Bill Clinton has already concluded that he does not have 
the strength to win this vote, and it is astounding that he has 
withdrawn his support for this measure. I think that is a shame. I 
believe that every president must have the tools to do the job.
  Our workers need trade agreements that create jobs for Americans. Our 
businesses need them so they can sell their products overseas. Our 
consumers need them so they can spend more money on their family and 
less money on border taxes.
  The only way we can get these trade agreements is to give the 
President fast track authority. It is a shame that so many Democrats 
have played politics with trade. It is sad that so many Democrats have 
relied on the politics of fear and isolation. It is a scandal that the 
President has misled the American people about his commitment to 
support fast track, when negotiating trade agreements is one of his 
most important responsibilities.

[[Page H8779]]

  A vote against fast track is not only a vote of no confidence in this 
President, it is also a vote of no confidence in the world economy. A 
vote for fast track is a vote for free trade and continued engagement 
with our trade partners. I ask Members to vote for fast track.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just hope that the gentleman from Illinois has picked 
up some votes with the major changes he made in the legislation. I 
suspect not, but I just hope he picked up a few votes, because he gave 
up so much.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Fazio).
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, regrettably, I, too, rise to 
say I cannot vote in favor of fast track today. Many of my colleagues 
know that the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui), the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), a number of us, helped lead the effort to 
gain support among Democratic Members in order to win a fair and 
bipartisan fast track proposal in the past.
  Unlike some, my support for strong and fair trade policies for this 
country has not changed when the person in the White House has changed. 
It has been consistent under both Republican and Democratic Presidents.

                              {time}  1430

  We rallied the troops last year because we knew the necessity to 
grant the President fast track authority. Fair and timely fast track 
ensures, in my view, a continuation of United States engagement and 
leadership on the international scale that it must be.
  But I must say that, unfortunately, today the timing of this vote has 
little to do with granting the President fast track authority or 
reasserting American primacy in international markets. It has to do 
instead, I am afraid to say, with politics. It is not fair, it is not 
timely, and I think it lays the predicate for further defeats, if we 
are not careful, when we have all our forces coming together to bring 
fast track to a successful conclusion in the next Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the International Monetary Fund issue is where 
this Congress should concentrate its fire. We have seen a lack of 
leadership in this House on this issue, and we do have in the world 
monetary system a sickness we have got to address. I hope that this 
majority, during the next several weeks, will find within itself the 
ability to put at the top of the list of priorities fully funding that 
agency, with the reforms that have been worked out in the House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services.
  But until we find that kind of consensus on IMF, a meaningless, 
politically driven vote today on fast track, which I fear has never had 
a chance of succeeding, does nothing but set back the cause that we 
have all been associated with in the past.
  I am sad to take the position I do. I look forward to the day when we 
can put a coalition together with some modifications in this that 
broaden the base of support for fast track in place and pass it, but it 
is not going to be today.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  One more quote, Mr. Speaker, to our distinguished colleagues across 
the aisle. ``In the last 5 years we have led the way in opening new 
markets with 240 trade agreements that remove foreign barriers to 
products bearing the proud stamp, `Made in the U.S.A.,' Mr. Traficant. 
Today record high exports account for fully one-third of our economic 
growth. I want to keep them going, because that is the way to keep 
America growing and to advance a safer, more stable world.'' President 
William Clinton in this Chamber in January of this year.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut 
(Mrs. Johnson), our distinguished colleague on the Committee on Ways 
and Means.
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
this bill, and I regret that my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle keep talking about this as political.
  The truth is the last time we had this vote, the Democrats were only 
able to mobilize about 40 votes in support of giving the President the 
authority he needs to be at the table to negotiate markets for 
American-made goods. The fact is that, as a party, they do not believe 
that America's standard of living depends on selling American-made 
goods into other people's markets.
  Yet, our growth in recent years is directly the result of our success 
in ever-growing foreign markets. Indeed, foreign trade creates jobs. 
Foreign trade raises our standard of living. And this vote is simply 
about this Nation's interest, the national interest, in being at the 
negotiating table so that we can negotiate access for American-made 
goods into foreign markets.
  Because it is merely about selling, merely about selling our goods to 
others, it is about jobs. It is about standard of living. Ninety-five 
percent of the customers in the world are outside of America. And while 
we have diddled, while Congress has not been able to give the President 
authority he has traditionally had, Canada has negotiated 10 percent 
tariff cuts on their goods into the Chilean market and we have lost 
customers.
  Last year, Europe sold more goods into South America than they ever 
have in history; and for the first time in history, they sold more 
goods into that market than the United States did because they have 
been at that table negotiating agreements to reduce tariffs on European 
goods. So they have taken customers from American manufacturers, now in 
droves.
  Yes, not being at the table costs jobs, closes us out of markets. 
Being there is our future and our children's future. Vote ``yes'' on 
fast track authority.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2621, which would 
continue the 20-year history of granting the president the authority to 
negotiate trade agreements that then must be approved or rejected by 
Congress. With 95 percent of the world's consumers living outside our 
borders, we need to take advantage of new markets in which to sell our 
goods. America has the greatest workforce in the world, but to give our 
workers opportunity and security, we need to give them the chance to 
sell their products overseas.
  My home state of Connecticut is an excellent example of how the 
global economy is transforming domestic markets. 124,000 jobs in 
Connecticut accounted for the approximately $8 billion of goods our 
state exported last year. Had fast track been in place, those numbers 
would have been even higher, because additional markets would be open 
to us. Instead, because we have not been at the table and a part of 
agreements that has been negotiated, we are losing customers to 
competitors in other countries. Why? Simply because they are at the 
negotiating table and have made trade agreements that exclude us.
  In 1993, the year before NAFTA went into effect, Connecticut exports 
to Canada totaled $1.4 billion. This number grew to $1.8 billion in 
1997--a 28 percent increase. Exports to Mexico have increased from $336 
million to $530 million over that same period--a 57 percent increase. 
Increased exports, means increased numbers of jobs. And export-related 
jobs pay on average 13 to 17 percent more.
  Connecticut companies like the toy manufacturer Lego have seen 
exports rise at tremendous rates--Lego's exports to Mexico have 
increased by 300% since 1995. Their main competitors from China do not 
have the benefits of tariff reductions that the U.S. negotiated under 
NAFTA, giving Lego the competitive advantage in that market.
  Exports account for a third of America's economic growth. Business' 
ability to create jobs at home depends increasingly on raw ability to 
sell goods in foreign markets. And yet, how much we sell in other 
markets depends on our ability to negotiate trade agreements reducing 
tariff barriers to those markets. If we continue to let other nations 
forge trade agreements without us, they will continue to take customers 
from us and to take market share that will be very hard to win back.
  We must restore the Presidents' power to be a negotiating force in 
shaping the international markets of the future. Without fast track 
authority, we are simply not at the negotiating table and countries are 
reluctant to negotiate, knowing that Congress could demand unilateral 
changes to any negotiated trade agreement at a later date. Let's not 
tie our negotiators' hand by denying them traditional authority because 
it makes hammering out international agreements--already an extremely 
difficult process--virtually impossible.
  I also want to make my colleagues aware that this legislation 
reauthorizes the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program which will 
expire on September 30th. This necessary and important program assists 
American workers and firms who have been adversely affected by import 
competition. TAA plays a vital role in protecting working families, 
retaining a skilled and productive workforce, and allowing domestic 
companies the opportunity to adjust to foreign competition. It is a 
unique public-private sector partnership that saves and creates jobs.

[[Page H8780]]

  The global economy will grow at three times the rate of the U.S. 
economy. A vote for fast track today is a vote of confidence in our 
workers and a vote for America's future. I urge my colleagues to 
support H.R. 2621.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
  (Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
McDermott) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the fast track authority, as 
imperfect as it may be. I will relate why. I think this may well be one 
of the most important issues we face as a Nation since the end of the 
Cold War.
  During this century, most of the standing that this country has 
enjoyed in the world was really defined by military alliances. During 
the Cold War, it was who was on whose side, either the East, U.S.S.R. 
or the West, the United States. I believe in the next century the 
Nation's standing in the world will be judged primarily by trading 
alliances. I think in this global economy which we are definitely in we 
have to remain engaged.
  It is not a hard question. If one believes, as I do, that we can grow 
more food in this country than we can consume, we can make more stuff 
than we can buy and sell to each other, we must have some means by 
which we sell this to somebody else, or it is an economic fact of 
capitalism that whoever is engaged in that surplus production is going 
to lose their job. That is not a political argument. That is an 
economic fact of capitalism.
  Now, I regret very, very much that this bill is up today. We, some of 
us on our side of the aisle, worked our heads off last November to try 
to get the votes to pass this. I think we were within three or four 
votes when the bill was pulled. I have not seen, quite frankly, the 
same effort applied to bring this bill to the floor today.
  As I said, I think this is one of the most important votes this 
Congress will take since the end of the Cold War, and I regret very 
deeply and very much the circumstances under which we are considering 
it.
  Nevertheless, I intend to support it, because I think it is that 
important to the country. I hope after it fails today, which I assume 
that it will, that we can get together and do something for the 
country, not our political agendas.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, I have another quote for everyone that, interestingly 
enough, is germane to our current situation in the Florida Keys. ``And 
I think we should say to all the people we are trying to represent here 
that preparing for a far-off storm that may reach our shores is far 
wiser than ignoring the thunder until the clouds are just overhead.''
  That was a reference to some of the economic problems with our 
trading partners in Asia, and again part of the State of the Union 
message by President Clinton in this body in January of this year.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Houghton).
  (Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of fast track. I was not 
ready for the vote the last time, because I thought that there were 
some things that we could do as far as protection of our jobs, as far 
as the environment, but I voted on it. It may not be the appropriate 
time now. I do not know when an appropriate time is.
  But I will tell my colleagues the thing that I worry about. This is 
not just an intellectual discussion here in this Chamber. We are living 
in a real world, and the world is passing us by, particularly now with 
the emphasis of the Asian flu.
  I have taken groups down to Chile, to Argentina, to Mexico, to other 
parts of the world, all privately sponsored, and the one thing they ask 
is, ``When are you going to give the President the authority to 
negotiate with us, not just on a bilateral but a multilateral basis?''
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is so important that we do that. Time is 
important. It is not just an intellectual argument or a legal argument. 
It is an argument that has to do with business expansion. And countries 
and institutions and industries are passing us by, and I think it is 
very important we look at that.
  Another thing I think is important we look at is separate the two 
economic issues. People say we have to protect our jobs. Therefore, we 
cannot have fast track. But protecting our jobs, there are things we 
can do through 301, super 301, section 201 of the Trade Act.
  But to protect our jobs by not allowing our salesmen to go out and 
sell our products is crazy. Ninety-six percent of the customers of this 
world are outside of this country. We have got to reach them. Time is 
against us. We must pass this legislation.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Matsui) for yielding me this time, a gentleman who has been one of the 
great leaders on this issue on our side of the aisle.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise as someone who supported NAFTA, who supported 
GATT, who has voted for fast track, and who was one of the 42 Democrats 
ready to vote for fast track, which was not brought to the floor just 
about a year ago.
  I rise as someone who is going to vote ``no.'' I rise lamenting the 
fact that this issue has been so politicized, an issue that the 
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means rightfully said is critical 
to this country.
  There has been no bipartisan discussion on fast track this year as 
there was last. I rise in opposition to this being brought to the floor 
because I think it hurts this effort; it does not help it. The 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the majority whip, came to the floor 
and intimated that Bill Clinton, the President of the United States, 
had withdrawn his support. President Clinton has shown more courage on 
trade than any president under whom I have served or with whom I have 
served.
  This issue should not go forward now. Why? Because it is critical 
that we pass fast track. And I am going to support it next year. I will 
tell my friends, I am voting ``no'' now, and next year I will be asking 
a lot of ``noes'' to vote ``yes.'' I think that may get us to a 
majority. I am not sure, because my colleagues on the Republican side 
of the aisle have put this in the context of putting at risk this issue 
5 weeks before an election for political purposes solely. That is the 
only reason this bill is on this floor right now.
  The chairman said we ought to resist the seductiveness of 
protectionism. I agree with that. Let me repeat. The chairman said it 
is a shame that we do not resist the seductiveness of protectionism. I 
agree with that. Let me also say it is a shame that we have not 
resisted the seductiveness of political advantage in bringing this bill 
to this floor this day.
  There is no one on this floor who believes this bill is going to pass 
today. Not one. Not on the Republican side and not on our side. And 
even if it did, there is no one on this floor that believes that it 
could get through the United States Senate. So the only thing that the 
Republicans are doing is perhaps making it more difficult for us in 
February or March of next year, in a bipartisan way, coming together on 
behalf of America, not on behalf of Republicans or Democrats but on 
behalf of a more competitive, economically vibrant America, to pass 
this legislation to empower our President to negotiate.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope others will join me in voting ``no'' today and 
``yes'' next year when we have an opportunity to pass this legislation.

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Portman).
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, this is a bizarre debate today. I guess the 
bottom line is, if you are for fast track, you think this legislation 
as presented to the House today makes sense, vote for it. Then we can 
pass this thing. If all the Members who have come up here and said that 
they are for free trade truly are for free trade and are sincere about 
it, we can pass this thing.
  This is a bizarre debate in another respect. For years Ronald Reagan 
and

[[Page H8781]]

George Bush got fast track authority from a Democrat Congress. They 
went out and they negotiated agreements that were in the interest of 
this country. Now we have a situation where President Clinton is coming 
before a Congress that is dominated by Republicans, and the Republicans 
are willing to give him fast track authority to negotiate on behalf of 
our country to open up foreign markets. Yet the Democrats are not 
giving it to their own President. It has only lapsed twice in history, 
in 1988 and again in 1993. This is the longest lapse in duration by 
far.
  It has been 6 years since this President has had full fast track 
authority. We need to provide it. Thirty percent of our growth in our 
economy is directly related to exports. We have the freest market in 
the world. We need to knock down the barriers in these other countries. 
We have a whole slew of multilateral agreements that are being 
negotiated over the next couple of years. We have to be at the table.
  The fact is, we are not going to be taken seriously either by 
individual countries in our negotiations on a bilateral basis or by the 
rest of the world on our multilateral negotiations unless the President 
has the authority under fast track to bring an agreement to this 
Congress for an up or down vote.
  Remember, we retain our right to turn down any agreement we do not 
like. So this is not even about specific trade policy issues. This is 
about allowing the American economy to move forward. We cannot stick 
our heads in the sand. We are living in a global economy. We need to 
have America out there as a leader in that global economy to make it a 
freer economy, to help with regard to jobs and exports in this country.
  I urge my colleagues, forget the politics. Forget the Republicans and 
the Democrats. Do what is in your heart. If you really believe in free 
trade, vote for fast track today.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Just this week Levi Strauss announced the layoff of 6,395 U.S. 
workers at 11 plants. Kodak has announced plans to lay off up to 14,000 
workers, and hundreds of workers at Huffy Bicycle in Celina, Ohio have 
just gotten the pink slip.
  By voting no on extending fast track authority today, this House has 
the opportunity to redefine U.S. trade negotiating policy from one 
which gives away the store to one which establishes an international 
trade regime of fair and reciprocal trade with our trade competitors.
  Just look at the evidence on agriculture. The consultation provisions 
included in this bill have no practical effect. They mean nothing. Just 
with our NAFTA trading partners on this continent, what had been a 
surplus has now turned into a $2 billion negative balance, adversely 
impacting our agricultural trade sector. Existing trade agreements 
adversely affect U.S. farmers by lack of inspection on food safety, 
surges in agriculture imports, an inadequate trade dispute resolution 
system, and no way to hedge currency fluctuations.
  Overall since the Trade Act of 1974, where fast track was first 
approved, our trade deficit has moved from $9 billion to $220 billion.
  Vote no on fast track. Stand up for the U.S. standard of living.
  By voting no on every Fast Track authority today, the House has the 
opportunity to redefine U.S. trade negotiating policy--from one which 
gives away the store--to one that establishes an international trade 
regime of fair and reciprocal trade agreements between our nation and 
our trading competitors.
  Look at the evidence on agriculture provisions: The consultation 
provisions in the modifications made to H.R. 2621 in regard to 
agriculture issues have no practical effect. Just with our NAFTA 
trading partners, what has been a surplus imports rose by $3 billion 
and exports by only $1 billion--a $2 billion negative impact on our 
agricultural trade balance. Take the Florida tomato industry, for 
instance. In 1991, Florida had 300 tomato producers. In 1995, there 
were only 75.
  The problems existing trade agreements have created that adversely 
affect U.S. farmers include: Lack of inspection of food imports; Surges 
in agricultural imports; An inadequate trade dispute resolution system; 
and Currency fluctuations.
  Overall, since the Trade Act of 1974, implementation of fast track, 
the U.S. has suffered a negative merchandise trade balance. From $9 
billion in 1976 to an estimated $220 billion in 1998.
  The problem is not trade but our trade policy. Our trade policy 
serves the needs of nominally American multinational corporations whose 
business visions and plans are global in scope and which maintain no 
national allegiance. Our trade policy has failed America's small 
businesses families, America's working families, and America's 
consumers.
  When a multinational conglomerate moves a factory overseas, the local 
grocery doesn't go with it. The auto parts store loses its customers. 
Small supplier companies lost their customer. American small business 
hurts. Real wages for American working people have fallen since 1973. 
Consumers pay as much for an Arrow shirt made in Thailand as for the 
same shirt made in the U.S.
  Fast Track is not required for good trade agreements. It is required 
to get bad trade deals through Congress.
  This Administration has negotiated 220 plus trade agreements without 
fast track. The fast track bill we consider today actually puts limits 
on the President's negotiating options rather than giving him a free 
hand to negotiate.
  Our trade balance with MERCOSUR countries has steadily improved since 
1990 (from -$3.2 billion to +$9.2 billion in 1996) without a free trade 
agreement. MERCOSUR countries have an average tariff of 14%.
  China is touted as the great new market for American exports. The 
average annual income in China is $2,200. China has many tariffs on 
consumer goods of 40% or higher. Imports to China have to survive an 
obstacle course of non-tariff barriers including import regulations 
that are not even published. China demands technology transfers to 
accompany the importation of high-value-added goods in order to develop 
domestic competition.
  NAFTA's promises have proved illusory. Our trade surplus with Mexico 
has become a $16 billion trade deficit. NAFTA has eliminated 400,000 
job opportunities in the U.S. The labor and environmental side 
agreements have provide toothless and unworkable. Just this week Levi 
Strauss announced the layoff of 6,395 workers at 11 plants and Kodak 
has announced plans to lay off up to 14,000 U.S. workers; 100's at 
Huffy Bicycle in Celina, Ohio.
  NAFTA has failed Mexico. The Mexican standard of living has been cut 
by 50% Maquiladoras have increased not decreased and their employees 
live in squalor. Most U.S. exports to Mexico turn around and come back 
as imports. The Mexican market for U.S. exports has been a 
disappointment.
  The solution is a U.S. trade policy that demands reciprocal treatment 
of labor and environmental issues on a par with market access and 
tariff issues.
  Vote no on fast track!!!
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would simply like to remind all of the colleagues in this Chamber 
that the gentlewoman's concern about that escalation of our imports is 
not an invalid one. As we all know, yesterday we vastly increased the 
import of skilled labor because we lack labor in this country to meet 
all of the job requests.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska 
(Mr. Bereuter).
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of fast 
track negotiating authority.
  Today's vote is quite likely to be the most important vote of the 
105th Congress, and it could not come at a more important time. Forty 
percent of the world's economy is in recession. The Asian financial 
crisis has spread from Thailand to Indonesia, to Korea, to Russia, and 
it now stands on Brazil's doorstep. If Brazil succumbs to this crisis, 
Argentina, Mexico and the United States are not far behind.
  With many countries retreating from their promises of trade 
liberalization and financial modernization, this is a crucial moment 
for the world's economy and for world growth. A setback for fast track 
in the 105th Congress, be it last year or this year, is a setback for 
United States leadership for trade liberalization. It is a setback for 
the appropriate and necessary trend toward the establishment of market-
oriented economies throughout the world.
  Mr. Speaker, as one who also supports fundamental reexamination and 
reform of the international financial architecture, I believe that fast 
track negotiating authority for the executive

[[Page H8782]]

branch is very much relatedly of paramount importance in this time of 
global financial crisis and perhaps a slide toward global recession. 
The ability of the United States executive branch to initiate and 
conclude bilateral regional and global trade agreements is absolutely 
crucial for worldwide economic growth.
  I believe that the President of the United States and a majority of 
Members here understand that. Protectionists in this country want to 
make this fast track vote a referendum on international trade, on GATT 
and NAFTA. This Member says, let it be a fair reform under fair rules, 
a fair referendum.
  I urge my colleagues to support fast track legislation for the 
President.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  (Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the fast track 
legislation. I supported it last year. I think it is the right thing to 
do. I think the future of our economy is directly tied to trade.
  But I think it is a mistake to take this bill up today. The chairman 
of the Committee on Ways and Means talked about the delicate markets 
that we face right now. Everybody knows this bill is going to fail. So 
here we have a situation where the House of Representatives is going to 
vote down fast track trading authority. We have been incapable of 
mustering support for the IMF recapitalization. We look like we are 
probably doing away with the fiscal responsibility that started just a 
few years ago through the highway bill and through the tax bill. So as 
the world financial situation worsens and starts to affect us, America 
appears to be turning inward, at least if we look at the House of 
Representatives. I think that is a terrible mistake.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), my colleague, and the chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Trade quoted the President in his State of the 
Union address he gave earlier this year. They did not quote the part 
where he talked about the IMF. And the fact is, you all cannot get it 
out of your own conference. The votes are here to pass the IMF bill 
between our side and your side, but you cannot get it out of the 
political debate in your own conference.
  The fact that we are having this vote today, it is not about trade. 
It is not about good policy, although I think fast track is good 
policy. It is about politics. That is what it has come down to. Maybe 
that is the way end of sessions are. It is all about politics. We are 
going into an election.
  The problem is, the people out in the country are looking at this and 
they are looking at the House and they are saying, they cannot do 
anything. They are a paralyzed body. But even worse, the markets around 
the world look at it and say, they cannot do anything. The United 
States is paralyzed. And that just undermines confidence and increases 
contagion further throughout the world.
  Who pays for that? The American worker that we are all talking about 
today.
  It is a real shame that the House is taking this up when they know it 
is going to fail. It is going to make the United States look bad. I 
will vote for it, but I think it is a big mistake.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation to grant the 
President fast-track authority to negotiate international trade 
agreements because I believe that expanded trade is good for our 
economy and good for American workers. However, I strongly disagree 
with the majority's decision to play politics with this issue by 
scheduling this vote today when it is clear the votes are not there to 
pass this bill. This decision undermines this nation's long history of 
bipartisanship on trade issues, poisons the long-term prospects for 
such legislation, and in the short-term risks further destabilizing 
world markets already experiencing the greatest instability and 
weakness in 50 years. The decision to hold this vote today puts 
partisan politics ahead of international leadership, to the detriment 
of our own economy and the world economy.
  Let me be clear. I strongly support extending fast-track authority to 
the President. In anticipation of last year's vote, and after 
discussion with constituents, including labor and industry, as well as 
government officials and economic and trade experts, I announced that I 
would vote in support of the fast-track legislation. I did so because I 
believe that expanded trade, through agreements that reduce foreign 
trade barriers and open new markets for American products, is vital to 
growing our economy, raising our standard of living, and creating high-
skilled, high-wage jobs. However, I announced my support only after 
having secured from the President a commitment to significantly expand 
our nation's trade adjustment assistance programs to help those who are 
hurt by trade. While I believe that trade helps our economy as a whole, 
we must recognize that some industries and some workers are hurt by 
trade, and we need to put in place a comprehensive trade policy that 
seeks to maximize the benefits and minimize the harm. I remain strongly 
committed to an economic policy that includes free and fair trade that 
reduces foreign trade barriers to American products, while ensuring 
that all Americans share in the benefits of trade through trade 
adjustment assistance and retraining programs.
  While I agree philosophically with the intent of this legislation, I 
believe it is short-sighted and dangerous for the majority to hold this 
vote today. Global markets are looking to the United States for 
stability and guidance as global financial markets move through this 
difficult era. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted in his 
testimony to the House Banking Committee on Wednesday, world leaders, 
including the U.S. Congress, must pay very close attention to the 
potential harm of the global financial crisis to their own countries. 
In a time when we see contagion in Asia, a collapse of the Russian 
economy and the economic turmoil in Latin America, we simply cannot 
take our vote on fast-track lightly.
  By voting on this bill today, which has no chance for passage, this 
body is taking a very irresponsible action that places short-term 
political goals ahead of assuring global markets of our nation's 
commitment to financial security and free markets. The end result of 
this politically motivated effort will only make passage of fast-track 
even less likely during the next Congress. While I will vote ``yes'' on 
final passage, it is only with the most reluctance and hesitation.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Shaw), our distinguished colleague on the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me the time 
to speak on this most important piece of legislation.
  So much has been said on both sides, by Members on both sides of this 
issue and on both sides of the aisle, about what is happening in the 
world economy today. And some of those things, when you really zero in 
on them, are rather frightening.
  All this legislation does is to give the President the authority to 
go to the bargaining table to work out some type of a trade agreement, 
free trade agreement. And then, with the expectation and the knowledge 
and the fact that that particular treaty has to come back to this body 
and to the Senate for ratification. We in no way empower the President 
to do anything. We simply give him the guarantee of an up-or-down vote 
on whatever he might negotiate.
  Now, for most of the Members that would seem so logical, but politics 
has gotten into this thing in an incredible way and an incredibly bad 
way. The unions are out there negotiating or trying to lean on their 
Members to vote against the fast track authority, when the fact is and 
the bottom line is that the higher-level jobs stay here in the United 
States, and those are the type of jobs that these unions want to 
attract to the United States. I never could understand that exact 
reasoning.
  I think most important, even if you are not a free trader, the rest 
of the world is becoming a free trader. We are not there. The rest of 
the world is moving ahead. We are standing still in a protectionist 
situation. This is what this is all about.
  If we were able to pass fast track within the next hour, hour and a 
half, that would probably be one of the most important votes that we 
could take in this session of the Congress that show that we are moving 
ahead. How can the strongest, largest economy that has ever been on the 
face of this earth be afraid of free trade?
  We are the world's greatest exporter, the largest exporter in the 
world. Our jobs depend upon it. With all of the problems that are going 
on in the other economies, let us pull together and pass fast track 
today. Let us give the President the authority that he needs to move us 
ahead in the world economy.

[[Page H8783]]

  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
just to mention to the gentleman, if you want to pass fast track, all 
you have to do is get the law that expired in 1994, which we passed in 
1988, put it on the floor, and you will probably have 250 votes. But 
you do not want to do that because you really do not want this bill to 
pass. You want to use it for partisan advantage.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. 
Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  This is a sad moment for me because I came to Congress believing in 
enhancing the United States role in a global economy. I represent a 
State which has prospered mightily from trade. I have enjoyed working 
with my colleagues the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui), the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and with members on the other side 
of the aisle like the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane), the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) and the gentleman from Arizona 
(Mr. Kolbe) in the development of a bipartisan trade policy.
  Last year I was part of an effort, and we came close, there were 
maybe 210 Members who were willing to vote. But because we were not 
quite close enough, the Republican Speaker and the administration 
pulled it back.
  Now, in an increasingly partisan atmosphere, the Republican 
leadership has recklessly endangered our progress and will produce not 
just fewer Democrats, there will be fewer Republicans that will vote 
for this bill than we claim to have had last year.
  It will undercut our progress on environment and labor. It is a 
blatant partisan effort that will freeze some of the positions on both 
sides of the aisle. It toys with Members who really do care about this 
issue. And by producing today fewer Republicans, fewer Democrats, we 
are going to send a negative economic signal both at home and abroad.
  Most sadly, it shatters the bipartisan trade leadership efforts that 
Members have worked so hard on on this floor.
  I will personally work to restore that bipartisan coalition, work to 
build bridges, listen to and deal with the legitimate concerns Members 
have. But this failure that is going to occur today does not underscore 
the weakness of this President. It talks about the recklessness of the 
Republican leadership that is not going to be able to produce the same 
amount of votes that they claimed last year. I am not going to dignify 
this political act with a yes vote. I will vote present, and I urge 
others to do similar or vote against it.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to 
remind our distinguished ranking minority member that there was 
obviously something substantive in this bill when he voted for it in 
committee. I am sorry that the gentleman changed his position with the 
passage of time, because we need that kind of important bipartisan 
support.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ramstad).
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for 
yielding the time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, if ever we needed to put statesmanship ahead of 
partisanship, it is here and now. We can move forward, remaining 
engaged in the global marketplace, or we can turn backward and isolate 
ourselves, driving a stake into our economy and saying goodbye to 
thousands of lost jobs.
  As has been said before, the world economy will move forward with or 
without us. Our trading partners will continue to negotiate and enter 
into new trade agreements which grow their businesses and create new 
jobs in their countries.
  Look at the last 20 major trade agreements enacted in this hemisphere 
since fast track expired. Where is the United States? Left out of all 
20 major agreements. Around the world, believe me, Mr. Speaker, major 
exporting nations are hoping that Congress votes down fast track 
authority tonight.

                              {time}  1700

  Our competitors win if the world's largest economy is excluded from 
trade negotiations, pure and simple. As a Minnesotan and a member of 
the Subcommittee on Trade, I have seen firsthand the value of exports 
and increased trade to U.S. workers. My State of Minnesota is the 12th 
largest exporting State. The Twin Cities, which includes the Third 
Congressional District, is the eighth largest metropolitan area in 
terms of exporting in the Nation. Eight percent of Minnesota's gross 
State product is exported to other nations. Minnesota's exports over 
the last five years have grown 150 percent. Jobs have increased 25 
percent.
  But, Mr. Speaker, we cannot sit still. We must pass fast track to 
continue to grow our economy. Farmers in Minnesota and the rest of the 
Nation need the expanding markets in Latin America and Asia. Our high-
tech manufacturers need them. Intellectual property needs them. Fast 
track is needed to break down the barriers to those critical markets.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Houghton) told us that 96 percent of 
the world's consumers live outside the United States. We cannot ignore 
them. Let us not leave America's workers, farmers, consumers and 
businesses behind. Let us put statesmanship ahead of partisanship. Let 
us pass fast track and keep America competitive.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I 
just might mention to the chair of the subcommittee that we did not 
even bring this bill to the committee nor subcommittee. We just brought 
it right to the floor because you were so anxious to make a political 
point.
  I might add also last week in Congress Daily AM, ``One senior 
Republican aide appeared to view the bill as a loser, indicating that 
the leadership's decision to press is based upon political 
calculations. `The decision to do it is to show business who is in the 
camp of business and who is in the camp of labor.' ''
  That is a great way to pass legislation. You know this bill is not 
going to pass. All this rhetoric about how we really need fast track is 
just that. It is rhetoric. This is not a debating society. This is to 
pass good legislation. But you are incapable of doing it because you 
folks do not know how to compromise. We passed NAFTA. We passed GATT. 
We passed the MFN China. You cannot pass legislation, because you just 
do not know how to compromise and make deals. That is the problem. You 
like to just talk about it.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Becerra).
  Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I would agree with everyone who has said that we need free trade. 
I would agree with everyone who says that we need to give the President 
fast track authority to negotiate free trade agreements. But we need 
free trade that offers fair treatment for America's workers and offers 
protection of our environment. And we need a bill to vote on for fast 
track authority that is not encumbered by politics.
  Everyone here, as has been said before, knows that this bill is not 
going to pass. If you believe it will, then you should stand up here 
and say that you are willing to put your month's paycheck behind that. 
Yet we are five days away from the end of this fiscal year. On day six, 
we would have to shut the doors of government down because we do not 
yet have a budget in place to allow us to operate the government for 
the next fiscal year beginning October 1. Were it not for a short-term, 
stopgap, emergency continuing resolution that passed this House that 
allows us to operate until October 9, we would be preparing to close 
all of the doors of government down, from our parks to our Defense 
Department to our Department of Justice, in five days.
  Today we are taking time to discuss fast track authority when we know 
it will fail, when we are five days away from closing down the end of 
the fiscal year and only one of the 13 appropriations bills that we 
need to have a full budget for the next fiscal year has been sent to 
the President for his signature. Why are we doing this? We know what is 
going to happen. October 9 will come and we still will not have those 
12 other appropriation bills passed. We are not doing our work. We know 
this will not pass. It is clear six weeks away from an election, a 
point is to be made.

[[Page H8784]]

That point could have been made without jeopardizing the future of free 
trade for this country, of good fast track authority for the President.
  It is unfortunate that politics again has taken over this House and 
has doomed what should otherwise be a good opportunity to have free 
trade authority and fast track authority for this President.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I 
would remind our colleagues that job relocation has always been a 
component of trade. Because of NAFTA, the Department of Labor estimated 
that we did lose 125,000 jobs, but only 10,000 of those people took 
advantage of the NAFTA retraining benefits. That was over the span of 
three years. We create more than 125,000 jobs every two weeks. We have 
been, primarily because of the advancement of free trade.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Camp).
  (Mr. CAMP asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I would say to my colleagues from rural districts, this fast 
track bill has some of the most important pro-agricultural language in 
any bill you will vote on this year. A vote for fast track is a vote 
for United States farm families.
  A provision in our fast track bill not included in any other version 
that has passed the House before in the 1980s or any other time, 
Special 301 for agriculture, requires the Trade Representative to place 
a much higher focus on our Nation's farmers every year, initiating 
cases against those countries with barriers to U.S. agricultural 
products. There is no doubt about it, our farmers are hurting this 
year. Why? Part of it is weather. In my own congressional district we 
have had half the rain of a normal year. But a lot of it also has to do 
with international conditions. South American countries had a bumper 
crop this year, pushing worldwide crop prices down. The Asian economic 
crisis pushed prices down further, because Asian demand has plummeted. 
The lack of demand is cutting U.S. agricultural exports by $2 billion 
or more, according to USDA estimates.
  But we need to be able to tell our farmers in 1998, ``We're going to 
help you, we're going to help you increase your share in international 
markets when a strong dollar or weak demand are working against us. We 
are going to help you get good prices and a fair farm income.''
  Trade is one of the most important tools we have to increase farm 
income. Last year our farmers exported $57 billion in agricultural 
products. With a $21 billion trade surplus last year, farmers made the 
largest dent in our trade deficit of any industry. Special 301 for 
agriculture helps address trade barriers. Under Special 301, when the 
U.S. Trade Representative makes their annual report on trade barriers, 
they must identify as priority countries those nations whose 
agricultural trade barriers have the most harmful impact on U.S. 
agricultural products. After identifying those countries, USTR is 
required to negotiate removal of the discriminatory barriers. If 
negotiations are unsuccessful, the U.S. can take retaliatory action 
under 301.
  I am pleased to have worked on this provision with the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht). I urge support of the bill.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Edwards).
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, as a Democratic supporter of fast track, I 
say here today that the Republican leadership of this House has killed 
the possibility of fast track's passage for years to come.
  Let us be clear about what has happened and let us be honest about 
what has happened. Republicans have enough votes right now today to 
pass fast track without one single Democratic vote. You know that and I 
know that. But you also know you cannot do that, because there are a 
lot of Republicans not supporting fast track. So what you have done 
basically is to say, ``We can't pass it on our own,'' and then you 
gleefully let your leaders go out and say this is a great vote to have 
right before the election because it will give Democrats grief, and 
then you make no real effort to put together a bipartisan bill, and 
then have the audacity to have some Members come to the well of this 
House and blame the defeat of this on Democrats. I would say that is 
disingenuous.
  I want fast track to pass. I think it is the right thing to do. But I 
hope that every American farmer and rancher and every American business 
that understands the importance of fast track knows that the Republican 
leadership today is putting the nail of death into the coffin of fast 
track's passage.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
One more quote:
  ``As we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires us to 
seek opportunity, not just at home but in all of the markets of the 
world. We must shape this global economy, not shrink from it.''
  That again is President William Clinton in this Chamber in January of 
this year.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Davis).
  Mr. DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, this is not a bipartisan bill? 
This is a bill that just a few months ago the President would have 
signed and many of you voted for it in committee and would vote for it.
  I am really disappointed in some of my colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle. What I hear them saying is they are more concerned about 
protecting some of their Members from a controversial vote that splits 
their coalition than in passing fast track. Frankly as one of the 
Republicans who voted for IMF funding over objections from some of my 
leadership, I do not think it is statesmanship, I do not think it is 
the right direction for the country, and I do not think you are giving 
cover to anybody by voting ``no'' on this or fooling anybody.
  But meantime, the world goes on. Dozens of treaties are being 
negotiated around the world between countries while America simply sits 
on the sidelines. Chile, the fastest growing economy in the western 
hemisphere, has new trade agreements with every country in the western 
hemisphere except for Cuba and the United States. Their markets now buy 
more from European countries than from the United States because we 
have not been able to sit down and negotiate agreements with them 
because we sit idly by in the House waiting for, I guess what people on 
the other side would wait for an opportune time, which I gather now is 
sometime after the election when they believe their coalition is not 
split.
  Our experience with amendable trade agreements goes way back to 
Smoot-Hawley and shows that it does not work. We need fast track 
legislation. This is the longest expiration that we have had in 
history. With 95, 96 percent of world consumers living outside the 
United States, it is important that the surpluses that we have in this 
country, whether it is computers, whether it is food and agricultural 
products, that we be able to sell these at a fair price and penetrate 
other markets. Without this, we cannot move on.
  A ``no'' vote today just kisses this off to six months or a year from 
now. In the meantime, American consumers suffer by paying higher prices 
and American exporters lose jobs.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).
  Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. 
Speaker, we in Minnesota and Michigan's iron ore and mining industry 
and the lower lake steel mills must never forget the harsh lessons of 
the 1970s and 1980s. We paid a terrible price for unfair trading 
practices in steel and iron ore. We lost 330,000 jobs in the basic 
steel industry in America, a 57 percent reduction in jobs, 450 plants 
closed, nearly 10,000 jobs permanently lost in Minnesota's iron ore, 
mining and taconite industry due to subsidized imports of steel from 
Japan, Korea, Europe and Brazil.
  Our domestic industry since then has modernized, spent $50 billion in 
new plant and equipment, producing the highest quality steel in the 
world. Our productivity stands at four man-hours per ton. Our plants 
give the best quality steel at the lowest cost. Yet steel imports have 
surged in May, June and July this year, 113 percent up from Japan, 90 
percent up from Korea, 32 percent up from Russia, Ukraine and

[[Page H8785]]

others. From Latin America and the Caribbean, imports stand at 4.7 
million tons for the first seven months of this year alone. We are on a 
pace toward 36 million tons of steel imports in America, 26 percent of 
domestic consumption. Layoffs are already happening in basic steel and 
in the iron ore mining industry in Minnesota and Michigan.
  I say no fast track in the face of unfairly traded steel, dumped in 
the U.S. market at subsidized prices with the label ``Japanese steel at 
Russian prices imported from Latin America.''
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Manzullo).
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, they get up at the crack of dawn and they 
work 18 hours a day. They take care of their animals. They cultivate 
their crops. They repair the roofs of their barns that have been torn 
off by savage winds. They are preparing to go into the field, to 
cultivate the corn, to harvest it, to sell it. Harvest time is the time 
to pass fast track. Because without fast track, American farmers have 
lost 78 million bushels of corn in sales to Chile and three other Latin 
American countries to the Argentinians. Because Argentina has an 
agreement with those four Latin American countries and we do not.

                              {time}  1715

  Let us talk about the people. Let us talk about the farmers who are 
directly suffering as a result of the President's failure to lead the 
Nation in adopting fast track. They are the ones that are suffering. 
Them. The ones who work all those hours. And to the men and women at 
the Neon plant in Chrysler, they could not sell 4000 Neons to Chile. 
Mexico sold those Neons to Chile because Mexico has a free trade 
agreement with Chile and the United States does not. Four thousand 
automobiles could have been manufactured in this country, and they were 
not because we do not have fast track.
  Mr. Speaker, it is the people that count.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Iowa (Mr. Boswell).
  (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the opportunity 
to come and speak this afternoon, and I welcome the opportunity to 
finally see a vote on fast track. I deplore the games that have been 
played with American farmers and others who depend on trade.
  Since last summer I have fought to include child labor provisions in 
the fast track legislation. Like many of my colleagues, I have lived 
outside the country for 9 years of my life, and I have seen firsthand 
some of the miserable conditions, some of the rotten conditions under 
which some children have to work. As the one true leader of the world 
stage, I believe the United States must be concerned about those who 
are least able to protect themselves, the children.
  Mr. Speaker, I have worked with the administration and leaders from 
both sides of the aisle to have fast track legislation that will 
consider child labor in countries with which we negotiate under fast 
track. This bill make an important first step in this direction. As of 
last night, and I thank my colleagues, as of last night the bill 
requires the President to focus on the laws governing the exploitative 
labor and submit to this body a report on the Nation's child labor 
laws.
  I might share with my colleagues that the amendment that I had tried 
to bring before this body did much the same thing. It said a country 
which we would deal with would have a standard for child labor, and, 
second, that they would not force their own standard, not saying what 
it would be. I think this accomplishes much the same thing.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I claim that partial victory and I feel very good. 
Last year I worked very closely with the administration to support my 
child labor language, and the President did support my efforts and 
agreed to my language, and I have a letter here that affirms that, that 
precedes the fact that we made this effort.
  This fast track bill gives farmers a fair shake in fast track 
negotiations. The legislation requires the trade representative to 
identify countries that deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. 
agricultural products. Also, before entering into negotiations that 
reduce United States tariffs on agricultural products the President 
must consult with the agricultural committees of the House and Senate. 
Involving the ag committee is a very good addition to the process.
  Make no mistake, fast track is an important part of the long solution 
for the world economy. What our agricultural community needs in the 
short term is to fully fund the IMF. I have always supported fast 
track, and I have always supported provisions that contemplate child 
labor. Today I declare a partial win and am pleased to vote for fast 
track. Both of these are important measures.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert).
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of fast track trade 
legislation.
  For the last several years the majority in Congress has eliminated 
the deficit, produced tax relief for the first time in 16 years and 
reformed welfare. The result has been a strong American economy. And 
Congress today has its role to play again. We cannot allow the current 
global economic crisis to slow U.S. economic growth any further.
  By denying the President the ability to negotiate fast track trade 
agreements we are hurting the long term prosperity of our country. We 
in Congress must send a strong and clear signal to our citizens and the 
world that we are willing to make the tough decisions today to secure 
prosperity for our children.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support fast track 
legislation. It is the right thing to do. As was mentioned, 95 percent 
of the customers are outside of the United States. Keep our country 
strong, support fast track.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 2 
additional minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) who 
is a member of the Committee on Ways and Means and that he in turn be 
permitted to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Davis).
  (Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, the American people oppose fast 
track by a 2-to-1 margin because they see existing trade agreements 
that do not do enough to protect living standards or to keep our food, 
air and water safe. Some Members of this body feel that because we are 
in an economic boom like we have never seen before that the American 
people should support fast track to give our industries an even 
stronger economic boost. But while the rich of America are enjoying the 
good times of economic prosperity, I am constantly reminded in my 
district that there are no good times to be poor, but some times are 
worse than others.
  Now we understand the question is not whether we should trade. Of 
course we should. There is no turning back from our global economy. But 
we also must understand that how we trade makes a big difference.
  Mr. Speaker, I heard an old African proverb that says when elephants 
fight it is only the grass that gets trampled. Do not let this fast 
track further trample the lives of every day people. I ask that we vote 
against fast track and vote to save decent jobs for the American 
people.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield a minute and a half to our 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I just want to say that some of the debate I have heard 
so far today on the floor of the House is almost embarrassing. We have 
literally heard Members say:
  I would have voted for this bill 6 months ago, and I will vote for it 
in January, but I cannot vote for it now.
  Mr. Speaker, it almost gives hypocrisy a bad name even here in 
Washington.

[[Page H8786]]

  This is a very important vote, and as some of my colleagues have 
already pointed out, many of our farmers are in the middle of the 
harvest right now, and, frankly, we need to make sure that that harvest 
has a market.
  As my colleagues know, a lot of people have criticized the farm bill 
and they say farmers are going broke today. Well, of course they are. 
We have lost $5 billion worth of exports. Trade was at record high back 
in 1996, and so was farm income, and it is no coincidence. Exports have 
dropped, and so has farm income. We cannot eat all that we produce here 
in the United States. Trade is critically important to us, and I want 
to call attention to something that the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
Boswell) said just a minute ago and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Camp) said earlier as well:
  This bill has in it super 301 language so that our government is now 
going to be responsible for enforcing the trade agreements that we 
have. Heretofore we have required that the trade groups have actually 
had to enforce them.
  In the end, Members, this is a debate between those who believe that 
America can compete in a world marketplace and those who believe that 
America cannot. I, for one, am not willing to give up on America's 
farmers or America's workers because I believe that America can and 
will and must compete in a world marketplace.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of fast track 
legislation. Fast track authority will ensure that the agricultural 
trade success story does not reach an untimely end and that we maintain 
our position as a leader in the global economy.
  But it is not the esoteric language of economics and trade ratios 
that motivate me on this issue. It is people and especially the people 
of west Texas who I am privileged to represent. My farmers and ranchers 
are hurting, and so are all the people who have business related to 
agriculture. In the absence of recent trade progress, my constituents 
have lost ground and see their incomes decrease by 30 percent. They 
need a ray of hope that markets will soon open up and allow them to 
keep and expand jobs and care for their families.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2621 would renew the authority necessary to 
renegotiate new trade agreements aimed at achieving these objectives.
  To those who oppose this legislation, that is all we are talking 
about is sending our negotiators back to the table.
  To the Republican leadership I say that I sincerely hope in the 
process of making the judgment to bring this bill to the floor; today 
they have done everything in their power to make sure this measure 
succeeds. If this was a reckless gamble on their part, I fear the 
message that failure will send to our trading partners around the 
world.
  To my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle who support free 
trade but have been frustrated about the process, let me say I 
understand their frustration, but it is time to put people above 
politics. Our constituents who need jobs, who need opportunities, look 
at our partisan squabbling as just so much childishness. Adults are 
expected to know that there comes a time when it does not matter who is 
at fault. They just have to take the circumstances they have been given 
and try to do what is right.
  Mr. Speaker, I appeal to my friends on both sides of the aisle to 
vote yes for fast track.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of fast-track legislation on 
behalf of the farmers and ranchers and other producers of America. This 
legislation is far more important than any short-term political gain or 
benefit to either side.
  U.S. agricultural trade is a great success story. Our agricultural 
exports have increased nearly $20 billion since 1990 to $57.1 billion 
in 1997. Sixty percent of this expansion was due to the rising volume 
of high-value exports, such as beef, poultry meat, and horticultural 
products. Bulk commodities, especially grains and soybeans, accounted 
for the rest of the expansion as both volume and prices rose in 1995-
1996. How did this tremendous growth occur? Because of the trade 
agreements negotiated under previous fast-track authority.
  Fast-track authority will ensure that the agricultural trade success 
story does not reach an untimely end, and that we maintain our position 
as a leader in the global economy. Future export prospects for U.S. 
agricultural products depend, in large part, on our ability to maintain 
and expand market access, ensure fair competition, and further level 
the international playing field for U.S. producers and exporters.
  But it's not the esoteric language of economics and trade ratios that 
motivate me on this issue; it's people, and especially the people of 
west Texas whom I am privileged to represent. We have heard a lot today 
from folks on the other side of this issue about workers and jobs and 
what trade agreements mean for them. That is my concern precisely. My 
farmers and ranchers are hurting, and so are all of the people who have 
businesses related to agriculture. In the absence of recent trade 
progress, my constituents have lost ground and seen their incomes 
decrease by 30 percent. They need a ray of hope that markets will soon 
open up, allowing them to keep and expand their jobs and care for their 
families.
  H.R. 2621 would renew the authority necessary to negotiate new trade 
agreements aimed at achieving these objectives. Any trade agreement 
reached under fast track would still require congressional approval. 
Fast track legislation simply says that we give our negotiators the 
authority they need to be at the table in upcoming trade negotiations 
in the World Trade Organization, Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. 
Without fast-track authority, the U.S. will miss an important 
opportunity to help write the rules that will govern trade in the 21st 
century. Our farmers and ranchers, as well as other business exporters, 
will be left out in the cold.
  To the Republican leadership I say that I sincerely hope in the 
process of making the judgment to bring this bill to a vote today, you 
have done everything in your power to make sure this measure succeeds. 
If this was a reckless gamble on your part, I fear the message that 
failure will send to our trading partners around the world.
  To my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle who support free 
trade but have been frustrated about the process by which this bill has 
come to the floor, I say that I understand your frustration. But it's 
time to put people above politics. Our constituents who need jobs, who 
need opportunities, look at our partisan squabbling as just so much 
childishness. Adults are expected to know that there comes a time when 
it doesn't matter who is at fault--you just have to take the 
circumstances you've been given and try to do what's right.
  Regardless of what you think about how we got to where we are today, 
we are past the point of arguing about whether this is the right time 
to vote on fast track. The time is here; the bill is before us. We must 
make a choice.
  I appeal to my friends on my own side of the aisle to rise above the 
circumstances into which we were thrust and reaffirm our commitment to 
the hard-working men and women of our districts who count on us to keep 
their best interests at heart.
  I ask all Members to put politics aside and pass this legislation. 
Vote for the American farmer and rancher, the small business man and 
woman. Vote yes for fast track.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Barrett).
  Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I obviously rise in support of 
H.R. 2621.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that everyone is aware of the economic distress 
out there on our farms and our ranches. Fast track, of course, is one 
of the much needed responses to that situation.
  This fall, if we fail to pass it and if we adjourn without having 
extended fast track, if the legislation does fail, I think the finger 
of blame can be directed, of course, straight at the White House for 
failing to rally the number of Democrat votes needed to pass.
  Agriculture is dependent on its export markets, and it is the 
responsibility of Congress and the administration to make sure that 
those markets are maintained and expanded. We need lower foreign 
tariffs, we need to stop the use of foreign trading enterprises to 
block or underbid our U.S. ag exports, and of course we need fast track 
to get this done.
  For those who argue an imperiled Bill Clinton should not be granted 
fast track authority, they might be looking at the trade issue with 
blinders on. It will be the trade experts at the table, not the 
President, and if history is any gauge, the next round of GATT will not 
be completed for years. Bill Clinton will be out of the picture by 
then.
  This could be a good day for agriculture and other industries 
dependent on exports, and I hope it is. I hope enough Members muster 
the courage to

[[Page H8787]]

ignore the pleadings of labor unions and protectionists who want us to 
live in the past ignoring the global marketplace and limiting future 
economic growth. U.S. businesses and industry cannot survive without 
fully participating in the global marketplace, and of course we need 
fast track to negotiate that full and fair participation.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2621.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Brown).
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, the message we send to the world 
today by voting no on fast track is crystal clear. The primary focus of 
the next generation of trade policies will be in support of worker 
rights, strong environmental laws and solid food safety regulations.

                              {time}  1730

  Future trade agreements coming from this Congress will mean better 
wages in developing countries, and improved environment, better food 
safety and increased workers' rights. Existing trade agreements have 
all too often eroded our living standards, undermined clean air and 
water laws, and continued to depress wages from workers all over the 
world, from Nike workers in Indonesia, to GM workers in Mexico, to 
metal workers in Lorraine, Ohio.
  Vote no on fast track.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Ryun).
  Mr. RYUN. Mr. Speaker, while the majority of Americans are enjoying 
an unprecedented level of economic prosperity, natural disasters and 
low farm commodity prices are hurting farmers nationwide.
  I have seen firsthand the devastating effects facing farmers in my 
state. The farmers near LeRoy, Kansas, must sell their wheat, milo, 
corn and soybeans at record low prices, primarily because export 
markets for these products have been shut out. Farmers simply cannot 
survive under these conditions.
  The correlation between fast track authority and the recent decline 
in farm prices is unmistakable. When U.S. presidents have had fast 
track authority, commodity prices have remained stable. However, prices 
have sharply declined for these products since 1996 when fast track 
authority expired.
  Approval of fast track is a vital step in relieving the burden that 
has fallen so heavily on the backs of American farm families. It is 
wrong. It is absolutely wrong for us to prevent our hard-working 
farmers from earning a living and feeding their families while they 
allow us to feed our own.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and 
the President to stand up for American farmers and approve fast track 
authority.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Klink).
  Mr. KLINK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe what I am hearing: If we do not have 
fast track authority, we cannot negotiate a trade agreement. Yet dozens 
upon dozens of trade agreements have been negotiated by this 
administration without fast track authority, including a giant 
international telecom agreement. That is the fact of the matter.
  The question here is whether we as Members of Congress have a say in 
what is done. And I have to go back to NAFTA, because there were many 
of us in this chamber that had concerns about the environmental 
measures, about the labor law measures, about the fact that increased 
drugs would come here. We wanted to insert language into the agreement. 
We could not do that. We were concerned about the violence and the 
assassinations in Mexico and wanted to put some language in to deal 
with that. We wanted to deal with the problem of their indigenous 
population. Right after NAFTA passed, they had a revolution. We did not 
have an opportunity to deal with that.
  The question is whether we here in Congress want to have a say or 
whether we just want to have an up or down vote on every trade 
agreement.
  Do not give up what is your duty. We as Members of Congress are to 
have a say in the commerce of this Nation. Fast track flushes that 
away.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Stenholm). I think of all the debate today, that he was 
very rational. He asked both sides to take a look at this and come 
together, instead of the partisanship from either side. I laud the 
gentleman.
  I was undecided. I have been treed, I have been lobbied, but never 
threatened, because I said I did not know if I was going to vote for 
this bill, and I came here today to listen, and I am appalled.
  I would tell my friend from California, I am appalled, because when 
we sit down, the thing we talk about that we hate the most about this 
job is the partisanship at times. And I want to tell you, this debate 
has sickened most of us on this floor, that when you want to talk about 
an issue and you are well rehearsed in unison partisan attacks on the 
Republicans, it sickens this debate.
  I grew up in Missouri. I have friends that have farms that are having 
to work second and third jobs just to hang onto their farms. I have got 
ranchers in California from whom you can buy a cow for about $500, 
about one-third of the value that it should be. They are dying.
  The most important thing that I hear today is that this is the most 
important vote that we can cast in this body for our farmers and our 
ranchers and our small business people. But yet we would rather stay up 
here and say the Republicans are only doing this to embarrass the 
President.
  This gentleman is not doing that. I came to this floor to listen to 
an honest debate, and I am sorry and saddened by the debate that has 
taken place today.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from 
Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).
  Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the 
gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to say to my colleagues in this House that I had 
the opportunity this past year to go down to Reynosa, Mexico. I went 
into the maquiladora section. I went to several maquiladora sections. I 
went in unannounced to factories and introduced myself to the workers. 
Most of the workers were women, most of them were 14 and 15 years old. 
Most of them, I would say 90 percent of them, worked six days a week, 
and at the end of the week they had $47 to take home. I went to 
neighborhood after neighborhood, and all I saw were mud floors. No 
indoor plumbing.
  So I say to myself, it is fine to talk about this global economy and 
the need for trade, but the fact of the matter is, as Martin Luther 
King said, we are all going to be affected by the same web of 
mutuality. If we do not insist on standards for our brothers and 
sisters in Mexico, believe me, we are the next ones on the chopping 
blocks.
  In my state of Rhode Island, we have already seen our workers lose 
jobs and benefits because of the depressing aspect that NAFTA has had 
on our workers' conditions here in this country. Vote no on fast track 
authority. Let the Congress decide how to enforce the status.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would say to my colleague that in my lifetime as a 
child before World War II, I was child labor at the farm. We got paid 
10 cents an hour, worked 10 hours a day to make a dollar, six days a 
week, and we were ecstatic. We had no indoor plumbing and had no 
electricity either. But we made a tremendous transition upward 
nationwide from that time. That was in the State of Indiana, I might 
remind the gentleman too.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Upton).
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, what is fast track? Fast track allows the 
President to negotiate trade agreements with other countries. Does 
Congress lose its right to approve those treaties, those agreements? 
No, they do not. Absolutely not. This body, this Congress, will then 
vote yes or no based on the merits of the trade agreement that may be 
negotiated.
  I would like to think that every Republican and every Democrat in 
this body does in fact care about jobs. Let

[[Page H8788]]

me tell you about some of the jobs in Michigan, an exporter, by the 
way, to the tune of $38 billion in exports last year.
  I visited a multinational company recently that showed me a letter 
from their general manager down in Chile. That letter talked about the 
importance of Chile's market, their leadership, the gateway to a very 
important market in the world. That general manager in that letter 
asked that the Michigan company stop sending goods manufactured in 
Michigan and change to their facility in Canada.
  Why? Well, Canada, thanks to their free trade agreement, their 
strategy, their trade agreements they have been able to reach because 
they had fast track, do not have to pay tariffs on their goods going 
down to Chile. That is right. That same good produced in Canada has an 
automatic 11 percent discount compared to the same product manufactured 
in Michigan. We cannot do that. Why? We do not have fast track. This 
bill allows that to happen.
  We see this happening time and time again across the country. Without 
fast track, there are incentives in fact for companies to send their 
manufactured goods from other countries.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Sawyer).
  (Mr. SAWYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means got it exactly right. This is a very fragile time. And while I am 
inclined to support this bill, that fragility makes this measure at 
this time a foolhardy exercise that could greatly damage our economic 
strength in the world.
  Make no mistake about it: American prosperity depends on the success 
of our trading arrangements. Today the world's balance of power is 
defined less in military terms than it is as a matter of economic 
strength. Trade negotiations are as important to our economic future as 
the Soviet arms talks were to our national security in an earlier era. 
But subjecting fast-track legislation to certain defeat today is not 
only bad politics, it is bad and dangerous policy. It sends a reckless 
message to securities markets everywhere.
  Our inability to work out an orderly agreement for trade negotiating 
authority can do real damage in real time to already fragile markets, 
including our own, and to economies around the world. Moreover, it 
damages the worthwhile goals of people on both sides of the measure 
before us. It works toward no constructive resolution of legitimate 
concerns over labor and environmental standards that are within our 
grasp.
  Negotiating authority is important because our prosperity is tied to 
market opening global trade, and I believe we must move forward. But 
playing reckless politics with this issue is a dangerous exercise, and 
those who brought it to the floor will bear the burden for its defeat 
and whatever consequences it has throughout the world.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to pass on another quote two to our 
colleagues this evening. ``I think we should seek to advance worker and 
environmental standards around the world. I have made it abundantly 
clear that it should be part of our trade agenda. But we cannot 
influence other countries' decisions if we send them a message that we 
are backing away from trade with them.''
  Again, President Clinton in January of this year in this chamber.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield one minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
Nethercutt).
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, if American agriculture does not grow, it will die. That 
is what Secretary Glickman has said, and he is absolutely right.
  The reason I am supporting this fast track bill is because it has the 
tremendous potential for our agriculture exports to grow and prevent 
American agriculture from suffering more than it already has this year.
  This bill has an agriculture component that allows an ag trade 
representative to sit at the table at all trade negotiations and to 
report back to Congress the effort that such negotiations have on 
agriculture. We in Congress get to vote on these final trade bills. We 
get to vote no if they are no good, and I would not hesitate to vote 
no. I trust my friends on the left would not either.
  What is interesting is we have heard today people say, let us fund 
IMF with $18 billion. What is surprising is those proponents would 
trust a non-American entity with an $18 billion sort of unstructured 
commitment, but not trust the President of the United States or this 
administration to negotiate a trade bill.
  If you support agriculture, vote for fast track.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Traficant.)
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, this is not a free trade bill. This is 
not even a trade bill. This is a process bill, an accelerated process 
on how we are going to handle the trade agreement. And, once again, 
Congress is going to turn the powers over to the White House.
  So I have a couple questions. The first one is, if our policy on 
trade is so good, why do we not follow the Constitution and have the 
Senate ratify it with a two-thirds vote? And another question, maybe a 
street question: If our trade policy is so good, why does China not do 
it? Why does Japan not do it? I want you to think about that.
  You know, it really gets to me when we talk about all of this. China 
is building missiles with American dollars, Japan is building schools 
with American dollars, Mexico is building factories with American 
dollars. America is building prisons and passing out training vouchers.
  Now, I have heard all of this about all these great jobs you are 
producing. We are shipping jobs overseas and we are not even keeping 
score.
  So I just want to say this to the Congress: An America that buys much 
more than they sell year in and year out is an America that is facing 
economic and military disaster.

                              {time}  1745

  If this policy is so good, let two-thirds of the United States Senate 
ratify it and let it earn its merits through the constitutional 
process.
  I would just like to say one other thing. Even a flea market charges 
table space. American policies are subsidizing foreign workers and 
American policies are downsizing American workers. Members can give me 
all the statistics on jobs they want, but we are flipping a lot of 
hamburgers in America. People are worried sick about their jobs.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind my colleague, again, the 
gentleman from I think it is Poland, Ohio (Mr. Traficant), I would like 
to remind him that we have been at full employment for now 3 years in a 
row, and that the fastest growing component of our national economy has 
been trade. It has been the most productive. That is what we are 
putting at risk when we contemplate terminating international trade 
agreements.
  I would remind my colleague also that the Constitution says that on 
trade issues we are the ultimate judge. Under fast track, we are still 
the ultimate judge. We make the input all along the way, we look at the 
final product, and then we vote it up or down, so it is exclusively 
within our jurisdiction. I would urge the gentleman to reconsider his 
misguided policy.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Kolbe)
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to a few of the arguments that I 
have been listening to in this debate today. One, of course, that we 
have heard over and over again is about how trade and trade agreements 
are going to drive down incomes, they are going to drive down wages.
  It is ironic that argument should be raised today. Here on the front 
page of the Washington Post, ``Poverty rate fell, incomes rose in 1997. 
Income for the typical American household rose at a rate nearly twice 
that of inflation in 1997, and income and poverty figures

[[Page H8789]]

returned to the levels that the Nation hasn't seen before the last 
recession,'' more than a decade ago.
  So it is just false. We have had a 3,000 percent increase in trade 
over the last 35 years, a tremendous increase in the last 7 to 10 
years. It is absolutely false to say that income levels are falling, 
that jobs are being lost. How can they argue that jobs are being lost 
when 6 million jobs have been created in the last few years, and 
unemployment is at the lowest possible rate? We have to be putting our 
heads in the sand, imagining things, to say that employment has been 
lost.
  The second argument I want to raise is one we have heard a lot of on 
the floor the last several years, why we need to provide the funding 
for the IMF. I happen to believe that is important. I do think part of 
our world responsibilities is to have this funding to maintain 
stability in currencies.
  However, I would like to ask my colleagues who urge us to vote for 
IMF, and then turn around and vote against fast track, how do they 
think these countries are ever going to generate the economy, the 
wherewithal, to repay the loans they get from the IMF? Or do they just 
believe there should be international welfare, that we should shell 
this money out, but those countries are never going to be able to have 
the income in order to make the repayments to the International 
Monetary Fund? It is another phony argument.
  Finally, there is the political argument that somehow this is just 
being done for political reasons. There is politics that are being 
played. This President said last year he was for IMF, or for fast 
track. He said in his State of the Union speech this January he was for 
it. Now he is against it, but next January he will be for it again. If 
he was not off raising funds today, if he was here in the United States 
campaigning, if he was here in Washington campaigning for this, we 
might be able to pass this today.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this. Vote for America. Vote for our 
future. Vote for fast track.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I might just point out to the gentleman, my very dear 
friend from Arizona, that the President does not oppose fast track. The 
President advised the gentleman's membership in the early summer of 
this year that the votes were not there. He knew the votes were not 
there. The votes are not going to happen. They will not have 218 votes. 
The President was right about this.
  We are bringing this up for no reason at all except for political 
advantage. The gentleman saw the quotes in the newspapers from various 
Members, including the chairman of the Republican Campaign Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the State of 
Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I have heard some interesting things. I guess we could 
call it election year hyperbole. Somehow this legislation, fast track, 
is going to be the salvation of our failing family farms. Can they hang 
on for 5 or 10 years until the next hypothetical trade agreements 
brought forward under fast track? I don't think so.
  Guess what, the last two agreements that came forward under fast 
track screwed the farmers in America. They were promised the world, but 
when it came down to whether the banking sector or the aerospace sector 
or the computer sector got favorable treatment in those agreements, and 
something had to be traded off, what got traded off? Agriculture.
  This is about a process that includes plausible deniability. That 
means there are a lot of people here who do not want to take 
responsibility for what is happening in America. They can say, you 
know, I had concerns about NAFTA. I knew there were problems with some 
parts of NAFTA. I knew there were problems with labor agreements, they 
were kind of weak, and we lost a lot of jobs there, and wages have gone 
down on both sides of the border. Yes, I had some real concerns about 
those environmental provisions. I really did not think they would clean 
up the border, which is one of the largest and fastest growing 
hazardous waste sites in the world. But I had to vote up or down, and I 
could not sacrifice 2 years of secret negotiations, and we will fix 
those things later.
  That is what we hear every time an agreement comes forward under fast 
track. Are Members going to blow up three years of careful secret 
negotiations, just because they have a minor concern about their 
farmers or about the environment or about American workers? No. The 
herd here most times said, gee, I would have liked to do something, but 
I could not. Why could they not? Because they gave away that authority 
at the beginning.
  Do not give away that authority ever again. Have Members not learned 
from our past mistakes? Can we not learn from a $200 billion a year 
trade deficit? Can we not learn from a race to the bottom in terms of 
wages and the environment?
  If we cannot learn, then hopefully the election year shenanigans 
here, this will help family farms, it is not going to do a damned thing 
for family farms, and the Members know that.


                Announcement by the Speaker pro tempore.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The Chair will 
remind Members they should avoid profanity.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Maryland (Mrs. Morella).
  (Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bill. I do not 
know why all this rhetoric, because this legislation is, at its 
essence, a simple and straightforward proposition.
  The bill would give the President the authority to have a straight up 
or down vote on legislation implementing the trade agreements which he 
negotiates. It is the same authority which previous Congresses have 
granted to every U.S. president, Republicans and Democrats, since 1974.
  Presidents need this authority in order to assure their negotiating 
partners that a deal is a deal. Why would anyone negotiate with someone 
who could not stand by the deal to which they agreed? Why would a 
national leader invest enormous time, energy, and prestige in a 
negotiating process in which the other party kept coming back to 
renegotiate the deal?
  I just want to point out that in the last 10 years, about 70 percent 
of U.S. economic growth has been generated by the exporter of goods and 
services. In my own State of Maryland, our exports to Mexico, just as 
an example, have increased by 82 percent since the passage of the 
NAFTA. Overall, Maryland's exports have increased by almost 130 percent 
since 1987.
  Expanded trade has opened markets, created opportunities for 
exporters, created jobs, strengthened the State economy, and raised the 
living standards for all Marylanders and throughout the country. We are 
not even debating a trade agreement, we are only proposing to allow the 
President an up or down vote on whatever deal he may reach.
  Fast track authorization will give the President the opportunity to 
negotiate the strongest and most beneficial agreement possible. If 
Members do not like the agreement, we can vote against it. But to deny 
the President fast track authority is to prejudge and agreement before 
it is made.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Minge).
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I am troubled by the circumstances in which fast track 
is coming up this afternoon. I am afraid that we are bringing this 
agreement up at this time, not so much to promote fast track as to 
promote wedge issues, and to claim that it is going to accomplish 
things going far beyond what it actually can accomplish in the short 
term.
  I represent an agricultural area. I recognize the importance of 
trade. But I would also like to remind my colleagues that we just 
finished dealing with the International Monetary Fund. What happened? A 
very modest increase in funding, far below what the President 
requested, and no up or down vote on the actual $18 billion that are 
needed for IMF.
  Perhaps even more important than something that is long-term or an 
intermediate term advantage opportunity for agriculture is what are we

[[Page H8790]]

doing in the short term. We ought to be bringing that up for a vote 
this afternoon. We need to respond to the agricultural crisis that 
confronts America, and do it promptly.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson) for a brief colloquy.
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask for 
clarification by the chairman of a provision which concerns negotiating 
objectives for trade in civil aircraft.
  Is it the chairman's understanding that H.R. 2621 explicitly retains 
the legislated negotiating objectives contained in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act and the accompanying Statement of Administrative Action 
for trade in civil aircraft?
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, that is my understanding.
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Then, I would ask the chairman, shall 
the USTR understand that such intent is confirmed in legislation, and 
ensure that the legislated objectives will continue to constitute the 
principal U.S. negotiating objectives in future negotiations?
  Mr. CRANE. That is correct.
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for 
his support of this provision, which is necessary for the continuing 
international competitiveness of aerospace companies and the jobs they 
support.
  Mr. CRANE. I thank the gentlewoman.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
  (Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I am strongly supportive of 
expanded free and open trade, but this bill is not the way to get 
there. It is unconstitutional. I have here a press release from the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the media in my district, chastising me for 
not supporting this bill. They make my point. Listen.
  ``* * * noted that with fast track, negotiators would be able to 
close deals.'' The President and his negotiators closed the deal. Where 
is the Congress? We would become merely a rubber stamp, clearly in 
violation of the Constitution.
  I am all for free and expanded trade. This is not the way to get 
there, at the expense of our Constitution. If we do not understand it, 
the U.S. Chamber understands it. The President and his negotiators 
would close the deal.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, thank my good friend, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Matsui) for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today on the floor, recognizing the importance of 
trade and growth in our economy, and rise as a free trader. I have 
supported GATT, I have supported normal trade with China, I have 
supported the Caribbean Basin Initiative. I have also supported African 
trade.
  But I also rise, Mr. Speaker, as a fair trader. These initiatives 
were both free, to get into new markets, and fair. This proposal, fast 
track, is more of NAFTA. It is free trade, but it is not fair to our 
working people, to the people with families and jobs, particularly in 
the Midwest.

                              {time}  1800

  NAFTA lost Hoosiers 17,000 jobs. NAFTA created a $40 billion deficit 
between the U.S. and Mexico when we had a surplus before, and fast 
track is more of NAFTA.
  Let us defeat this bill, but let us work together in a bipartisan way 
for growth and trade. Let us work on improving education and training 
for displaced workers. Let us work on trade fairness, and let us work 
on trade enforcement and implementation.
  Trade is important. Trade should be bipartisan. But trade has to be 
fair. This program will not be fair to working Hoosiers, it will not be 
fair to families, and it will not be good for America.
  I encourage my colleagues to defeat fast track.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I have a graph here that shows the G7, that 
is the big nations of the world, the big western democracies and their 
net exports to Mexico before and after NAFTA. That includes the United 
States.
  We call this chart ``Find the dummies,'' because it is apparent that, 
after NAFTA, every one of the big nations, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, UK and Japan, all continue to do well with Mexico with respect 
to trade, except the United States. The United States immediately fell 
into an enduring $15 billion trade deficit.
  The first rule of business is one does not give their money to poor 
business managers. The Clinton trade team consists of poor business 
managers.
  Not this President, not this time.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, as we all know, fast track authority will establish the 
framework for our trade relationship for the next 10 years. As such, it 
is critical to the importance that this accord places on the 
environment.
  Therefore, I reluctantly oppose this bill, because it limits the 
administration's ability to address concerns regarding protection of 
the environment and bilateral regional and other trade agreements.
  To the extent that the environment is mentioned at all in the pending 
legislation, it is in a restrictive way. San Francisco, the city which 
I represent, is a city which is built on trade and continues to thrive 
on it. We appreciate the value of free trade. We also understand that 
the environment and the economy are inextricably linked. We believe 
that the environment must be central to any fast track legislation.
  My colleagues have mentioned that other presidents have had this 
authority. Indeed, I have voted for it in the past. Under previous fast 
track authority, the President had the discretion both to negotiate and 
to include in trade bills that were brought to Congress under fact 
track environmental, labor and human rights terms that the President 
deemed appropriate. That the President deemed appropriate. This bill 
removes the ``appropriate'' standard.
  The legislation passed by the House Committee on Ways and Means also 
limits the discretion of the negotiators to achieve results only on 
matters that are directly related to trade.
  One important aspect of addressing global environmental degradation 
is through attention to production process methods. If we are to slow 
environmental damage, we must deal with the way items are produced as 
well as with consumption. Will production process methods be included 
under the administration's interpretation of ``directly related to 
trade"?
  In addition, there are many other reasons why, and I will submit that 
with my full statement, but, in addition, unless we give the 
environment more value by including it in fast track, we are 
squandering the comparative value U.S. business has in leading the 
world in the development of production environmental technologies. To 
ignore the connection between the environment and the economy is to be 
on the wrong side of the future.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2621, the Fast Track 
legislation before the House today. I am disappointed that the 
Republican leadership has chosen to bring before the House a failed 
fast track proposal which does not address pressing issues in the 
global economy. Fast track authority will establish the framework of 
our trade relations for the next ten years. As such, it is a defining 
moment for the importance we accord the environment. This fast track 
bill would relegate this important issue to secondary status in trade 
agreements and would only ensure that it remains of secondary status as 
we move into the next century.
  Not one of the concerns raised about this fast track proposal last 
year has been remedied in the bill before us today. This fast track 
bill limits the Administration's ability to address concerns regarding 
protection of the environment in bilateral, regional, and other

[[Page H8791]]

trade agreements. To the extent that the environment is mentioned in 
the pending legislation, it is in a restrictive way.
  San Francisco, which I represent, is a city which was built on trade 
and continues to thrive on it. We appreciate the value of free trade. 
We also understand that the environment and the economy are 
inextricably linked. We believe that the environment must be central to 
any fast track legislation.
  Under previous fast track authority, the President had the discretion 
both to negotiate and to include in trade bills that were brought to 
Congress under fast track environmental, labor or human rights terms 
that the President deemed ``appropriate.'' H.R. 2621 removes the 
``appropriate'' standard and the Administration's discretion is limited 
to making the language necessary only for the operation or 
implementation of the trade agreement. The Administration would now be 
precluded from achieving more than allowed under the legislation and 
prevented from having those provisions considered under fast track.
  The legislation passed by the House Ways and Means Committee also 
limits the discretion of the negotiators to achieve results only on 
matters that are ``directly related to trade.'' Serious questions are 
already being raised about how ``directly related to trade'' will be 
defined. It is my understanding that there is no legislative history to 
define this phrase.
  One important aspect of addressing global environmental degradation 
is through attention to production process methods. If we are to slow 
environmental damage, we must deal with the way items are produced, as 
well as with consumption. Will production process methods be included 
under the Administration's interpretation of ``directly related to 
trade?''
  Serious questions have also been raised about the implications of 
language in H.R. 2621 purportedly designed to ensure that foreign 
governments do not waive their existing domestic environmental, health, 
safety or labor measures in order to give themselves a competitive 
edge. The language in the bill unfortunately precludes action to 
encourage strengthening such standards. Perhaps of even more immediate 
harm, however, is that it does not address a government's failure to 
enforce existing standards. In addition, H.R. 2621 only addresses 
foreign governmental policies and practices. Private sector actions to 
limit environmental protection are not addressed. Finally, countries 
with no existing environmental standards fall completely outside this 
provision.
  My constituents and I are also concerned with the consequences of a 
provision in the fast track bill which would essentially allow 
derogation or waiver of existing domestic laws if such actions are 
``consistent with sound macroeconomic development.'' Under this 
provision, it appears that countries could indeed lower their 
environmental standards to gain a competitive edge, as long as this 
action is consistent with their macroeconomic development.

  As many of our Republican colleagues have recently expressed concern 
about the lack of transparency in the functioning of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), I believe they should be supportive of promoting 
transparency in the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
While ``transparency'' is appropriately one of the negotiating 
objectives outlined in the legislation, it is essential that procedural 
transparency be expanded to the WTO both in the trade negotiation 
process and in the dispute settlement process. Benchmarks must be 
established by which transparency can be gauged. There must be expanded 
access to documents by those who are interested in the dispute 
settlement process. And, we must insist on ensuring the ability of non-
governmental groups to participate.
  I would also note my concern that while we are promoting transparency 
in other countries, the fast track legislation takes a step back from 
transparency in this country by granting the President new authority to 
allow for the classification of trade reports when deemed appropriate, 
rather than employing previous language allowing classification only 
when necessary to protect national security or trade secrets.
  Environmental issues in the global economy have very real 
consequences not only for people in the developing world, but also for 
people here in the United States. Concerns about the quality of the air 
we breathe and the water we drink have now been compounded in the 
public eye by concerns about the safety of the food which we eat. As 
international trade is increasingly the norm, we must ensure the right 
to safeguard American consumers in international trade agreements. 
Standards worldwide should be elevated; we cannot encourage a ``race to 
the bottom''. In addition, unless we give the environment more value by 
including it in fast track, we are squandering the comparative value 
U.S. business has in leading the world in the development and 
production of environmental technology.
  H.R. 2621 is not the appropriate tool which to enter trade 
negotiations for the Twenty-First Century. I urge my colleagues to vote 
no on this flawed bill.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Stearns).
  (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks and to include extraneous material.)
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly rise to oppose fast track, 
and I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui) for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association has 
basically come out against the fast track vote we are having here 
tonight. Earlier, I was on the House Floor with the Florida Farm Bureau 
Federation, where they also opposed this fast track vote.
  Farmers in my district are still opposed to the authority that we are 
proposing tonight to give to the President with fast track, regardless 
of the last-minute deals, because of the failure of this administration 
to live up to their promises from the last fast track authority.
  For example, my tomato growers have written that, ``The President 
could have taken real steps to fix the problems for Florida's tomato 
growers and other winter or seasonal vegetable growers associated with 
the failures of the NAFTA agreement, yet nothing has happened.''
  Mr. Speaker, President Clinton even wrote to Congress before NAFTA 
was approved to state that he ``was permanently committed to ensuring 
NAFTA was enforceable and effective to protect the U.S. vegetable 
industry against price-based import surges from Mexico.''
  Mr. Speaker, despite these promises, the administration has failed to 
protect the winter vegetable industry; and, in fact, the onslaught of 
vegetables coming into Florida has hurt our industry terribly.
  For these reasons, and for the reasons outlined in the two letters I 
put in the Record, I oppose fast track at this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letter for the Record:
                                                   Florida Fruit &


                                        Vegetable Association,

                                  Orlando, FL, September 25, 1998.
     Hon. Cliff Stearns,
     U.S. House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Stearns: This is to advise you on behalf 
     of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association and its 
     membership that we continue to be opposed to the enactment of 
     fast-track legislation. Our opposition is based on continuing 
     concerns over current and potential trade agreements on 
     import-sensitive agricultural products, the inadequacy of 
     import relief remedies, country of origin labeling, and other 
     issues. We accordingly ask you to vote ``no'' when the fast-
     track bill comes to the House floor later today.
       We greatly appreciate your on-going support of Florida 
     agriculture.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael J. Stuart,
                                                        President.

  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Matsui) for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss a matter which is of great importance 
to my district and the Nation as a whole. This measure before us should 
be defeated. It seeks to extend fast track authority for 4 years. As 
such, it sets our national trade policy as we approach and then enter 
the 21st century.
  No one doubts the fact that we live in a global economy. No one 
doubts that if we are to retain our preeminent position in the world we 
must lead from a position of economic strength.
  For me, global leadership in the arena of international trade means 
that fair trade should not be subordinated to the notion of free trade. 
There is very little reciprocity in our trade agreements. We must trade 
with other nations on an equal footing.
  Mr. Speaker, with such an horrific Asian economy, those goods are 
going to be flooding our markets in the next 2 months, 3 months, 2 
years. The ships are coming into San Francisco ports now full with 
foreign goods. They are leaving half filled with our goods. They will 
leave with a quarter filled by the time this Asian crisis really hits 
our shores. This is the worst time to have fast track.

[[Page H8792]]

  The proponents of fast track argue that we need it based on what they 
perceive as the successful NAFTA policy. They point to the creation of 
311,000 jobs. I take exception to this figure and cite an alternative 
one which states we have lost 600,000 jobs because of NAFTA.
  Now is not the time for fast track. Fast track is about jobs. It is 
about time that we stopped exporting our jobs. It is time that we 
protect our jobs. And it is time that we had fair trade agreements 
instead of the ones that have been placed before us.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to defeat fast track resoundingly. 
It is not enough if we just slam it down with a few votes. We need 
total victory here, because we need a fair trade policy.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to fast track. Today's 
legislation could be an opportunity to make a new beginning, to define 
a progressive role in trade for the next century for America. But this 
bill does not do this. It is a step backward.
  We are not divided here today on the benefits of free trade. We 
embrace it. We are divided on how to best achieve it to compete in the 
global economy. I believe this fast track proposal turns its back on 
hard-working Americans. It will not defend small business owners and 
workers from the threat to their security posed by our trading 
partners' cheap labor and low standards. It does precious little to 
move away from the pattern of lost jobs, reduced labor, and lower 
living standards seen under NAFTA.
  American families are struggling every single day to make ends meet. 
America has the opportunity and the responsibility to ensure that 
American values define the international market and that our citizens 
build solid futures.
  Let us show that the Congress of the United States cares about and 
understands America's hopes and fears for the future. Vote ``no'' on 
fast track.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Visclosky).
  (Mr. VISCLOSKY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, I also want to express my appreciation to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui) for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to fast track, given the experience 
historically we have had with NAFTA. We have had 124,000 jobs certified 
as having been lost because of NAFTA.
  I would remind my colleagues the math works out to 72 workers a day 
since the inception of NAFTA have lost their jobs. Before the end of 
business today, 72 more American citizens are going to be certified as 
having lost their job because of NAFTA.
  I rise in strong opposition to fast track.
  But in fairness to the other side, there are potentially some reasons 
why Members might want to vote for it. The average real hourly wage in 
1973 was $12 an hour. In 1997, it was $12.28, about 1 penny a year 
increase. If Members think that is enough for the American workers they 
represent, maybe they do want to vote for fast track.
  If Members think that every household in America ought to have two 
workers for what one worker could provide in 1950, then fast track is 
for them. Thirty percent of American households in 1950 had one worker. 
Today, 53 percent need two workers.
  If Members think it is a good idea to have a trade deficit with 
Mexico and other countries instead of trade surpluses, this is the 
thing for them. In 1993, we had a trade surplus with Mexico of $1.7 
billion. Today, our deficit is $14.5 billion.
  If Members think we ought to not have a strong steel industry in 
America, fast track is for them. We had a 100,000 ton steel surplus 
with Mexico in 1993. We have a 2.2 million ton deficit today.
  Health care, if Members do not think workers need health care 
benefits or pensions or need a job, fast track is for them. I grew up 
in a neighborhood, I grew up in an America believing that the next 
generation should be better off. That is what we should be about. Those 
are the negotiations we ought to undertake to make sure that every 
American worker, every worker worldwide, has an improved standard of 
living.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my vehement opposition to Fast 
Track legislation. The last president to have Fast Track used it to 
give us the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since January 
1, 1994, when NAFTA went into effect, our country has lost 124,000 jobs 
as a result of NAFTA. That breaks down to a loss of 72 jobs each day. 
72 American citizens each day watch their jobs move out of this country 
and out of their communities. Before we leave tonight, an additional 72 
Americans will be unemployed.
  But its not just a problem of losing jobs. America's workers are 
seeing a sharp decline in their quality of life thanks to NAFTA and 
unfair trade. If you don't care about workers' quality of life, then 
vote for Fast Track.
  The average real hourly wage for working Americans in 1973 was $12.00 
per hour. In 1997, the average real hourly wage for working Americans 
was $12.28 per hour. That is an increase of one penny per year. One 
extra penny to pay bills, buy shoes for your children and put food on 
the table. If your family can survive on an annual raise of one extra 
cent per hour, then Fast Track is for you.
  30% of American households in 1950 had two people working outside the 
home. Today, 53% of all families have two incomes. Two Americans today 
must work to make the equivalent of one income in 1950. If you believe 
that two adults in every household should have to work in order to 
support a family, then Fast Track is for you.
  Our neighbor to the South, Mexico, is one of our largest trading 
partners. In the fiscal year prior to NAFTA, FY 1993, the U.S. had a 
trade surplus of $1.7 billion with Mexico. In FY 1997, the U.S. had a 
$14.5 billion trade deficit with Mexico. If you think that we ought to 
increase our trade deficits with other nations, then Fast Track is for 
you.
  In 1993, The American steel industry saw a trade surplus with Mexico 
of 100,000 tons of steel. In 1997, the steel industry saw a trade 
deficit with Mexico of 2.2 million tons. If you think that we need to 
put the American steel industry out of business, laying off hundreds of 
thousands of U.S. steelworkers, then Fast Track is for you.
  Because of jobs lost to NAFTA, many of our citizens have had to take 
lower-paying jobs with no benefits and no pensions. If you think that 
our citizens are not entitled to have a job that provides health 
benefits for themselves and their children, then vote for Fast Track. 
If you think that the hard working men and women of this country do not 
deserve a pension for their retirement years, then, yes, Fast Track is 
for you.
  If it is fine with you that at the end of this day, at the end of 
this debate, 72 more people will be without work and unable to provide 
for their families, then vote for Fast Track. If you can live with the 
fact that you have sent American industry to foreign lands to make a 
profit without regard to workers' safety, human rights or the 
environment, then please, vote for Fast Track.
  The American Dream has always promised that the next generation would 
have a better life, not a lower standard of living. American workers 
should not have to lower their standard of living just to compete with 
foreign workers who make $3.00 a day. If you want to sacrifice the 
American Dream for the working people of our nation, then vote for Fast 
Track.
  I can't do that. I can't support raising hourly wages by a penny a 
year. I can't support forcing more and more households to rely on two 
incomes. I can't support turning trade surpluses into deficits. I can't 
support denying health insurance and pensions to workers. I can't 
support undercutting worker safety, human rights or the environment. I 
can't support sacrificing the American Dream for the workers of 
America. I cannot and will not support Fast Track.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Latham).
  Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support for fast 
track. As a representative from the State of Iowa, the importance of 
this to everyone in agriculture cannot be overestimated.
  It is imperative that we have fast track. There are trade agreements 
going on today, negotiations that are going on around the world, and we 
are not at the table because we have not seen fit to trust this 
administration to give the authority to make agreements. We have got to 
be at the table with these agreements. It is essential for long-term 
growth.
  I am very saddened today to see people who, as a matter of principle 
in the past, have supported fast track but today have decided they are 
going to play a shell game and let somebody else off the hook, let them 
vote ``yes'', because they are going to cover them and vote ``no.''

[[Page H8793]]

  This is for the interest of the entire country. We have to pass fast 
track for agriculture, for the rest of trade in this world, and for 
this country for jobs here, for economic prosperity. We have to do it, 
and we have to do it today.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
  (Mr. Cardin asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1815

  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I had hoped that we were going to have a 
real debate on fast track where we would have a chance to reach a fair 
compromise on the issue. Instead we are going through a political 
exercise. That is regrettable.
  In today's world, fast track should give the President the ability to 
negotiate international standards on labor and environment. But, no, 
this legislation restricts the President's ability to negotiate 
international standards on labor and environment. Negotiating strong 
international standards on environmental and labor issues will help 
American manufacturers, producers and farmers. It makes no sense to 
restrict the President's negotiating ability in this area unless you 
want to help foreign companies with cheap labor and poor environmental 
records.
  For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the fast track 
legislation that we have today. I would hope that in the future, there 
will be a real effort by the Republican leadership to work on a fast 
track bill that could pass this House, that will give the appropriate 
authority to the President.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dreier).
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, there is never a good time for a good trade 
bill. There is always a filing date or an election or the prospect of 
some other political development taking place. There is always an 
excuse not to proceed with a good trade bill.
  I had the great privilege last fall to travel with the President 
throughout South America. The President stood up in country after 
country and talked about the fact that one of his top priorities was to 
get fast track negotiating authority through so that we could, in fact, 
embark on these very important trade agreements.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a bipartisan bill. It was reported out of the 
Committee on Ways and Means with a very strong bipartisan vote. It was 
worked on long and hard by the President of the United States last fall 
as we moved towards that November 13 vote. And as has been said time 
and time again, the President, in his State of the Union message, 
talked about it being a priority this year and, on July 23, said that 
he believed that the Congress should vote on fast track when we can get 
the votes for the bill.
  Now, with that strong bipartisan spirit here, I am convinced that 
there is a very strong will to implement fast track negotiating 
authority and to pass this measure. But what are our priorities? We 
continually hear Members talk about the fact that it is a top priority, 
Democrats and Republicans alike, many Democrats with whom I have been 
privileged to work over the past several years on this issue. But what 
are the priorities?
  There are political priorities. There are political interests with 
which we are having to contend. There are partisan interests, and there 
are special interests. Quite frankly, we have special interests on our 
side, too. This is not an easy vote. We have got the Buchananites, Ross 
Perot. There are people who are opposed to this. But we have a 
responsibility to place the national interest ahead of those political 
interests, ahead of those partisan interests and ahead of those special 
interests.
  Mr. Speaker, it is very, very important that we move ahead, because 
we are having this vote as we look at the serious problem that exists 
in the Pacific Rim. We are not going to find a perfect time to do it, 
but it seems to me that this is the right time because the right time 
is today.
  Cast a vote in favor of fast track so that we can do this for 
American workers and American consumers and the global economy.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 
minutes for a special bipartisan purpose.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
and I yield to the distinguished and talented service of Mary Jane 
Wignot. She has served on the professional staff of our Committee on 
Ways and Means during development of landmark trade legislation, such 
as the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the 
implementing bills for NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements.
  There are few individuals in this country who know more and have 
contributed more to the development of U.S. trade policy than Mary Jane 
Wignot. Her wise counsel and drafting skills have been absolutely 
essential to the success of these historic bipartisan initiatives. I 
want to salute her and wish her all the best as she returns to her home 
town of Boston to continue her career.
  I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel).
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  I, too, pay tribute to a remarkable individual that took the reins 
after one of our Members left, but she has given 24 years of her life 
to this committee and to her work and in every policymaking issue 
concerning trade, she was there from the negotiations of the Kennedy 
and Tokyo rounds and the formulation of the Trade Act of 1974.
  She has worked on the trade agreements of 1979, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competition Act of 1988, and the NAFTA and Uruguay Round implementing 
bills in her capacity with the committee. These are the many projects, 
some of the many projects on which Mary Jane has brought her 
intellectual ability and sound judgment to bear.
  Her devotion to excellence has epitomized the finest in bipartisan 
tradition that has characterized trade making policy over the last 20 
years. At the end of this session she will retire, but we still know 
that she will be missed. To say that she will be missed is a gross 
understatement. We owe so much to her dedication and the fact that she 
has worked well with Republicans and Democrats. She has enjoyed her job 
and we all, staff and Members, have truly enjoyed working with her.
  Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me add my comments about the service that Mary Jane Wignot has 
had in helping our committee work through so many trade issues for so 
many years. I think from almost the first time that I can remember 
trade deliberation on the Committee on Ways and Means, I looked out at 
the witness table and there Mary Jane was. And she always gave 
professional information that was always, at least in my memory, 
accurate, and helped us get through many, many trade issues over the 
years.
  It is people who are so dedicated, who work such long hours and who 
do so on a nonpartisan, professional basis that make this Congress a 
truly enjoyable and fulfilling place to serve.
  So, Mary Jane, I wish you well. We are losing a great resource when 
you leave. But I know that you will go on to help some other 
organization or many other people the rest of your life. Good luck.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I just have to say that Mary Jane Wignot has been on the Committee on 
Ways and Means staff now since 1974, 24 years, but before that, many 
Members do not know this, but there was an office called the Special 
Trade Representative's office, and she actually virtually opened that 
office in 1964 with, believe it or not, the former Secretary of State; 
at that time he was the special trade representative, Christian Herter. 
That goes back an awful long ways in most of our memories.
  There are so many nuggets, jewels on this Capitol Hill. She is a 
Vassar graduate, cum laude. She was graduated from the London School of 
Economics at the University of London, Columbia University in New York, 
the International School of International Affairs. She is really just 
an outstanding individual, and she has toiled in Washington for 34 
years, 24 years on the Committee on Ways and Means. She served with 
Chairman Mills, Chairman Ullman, Chairman Rostenkowski, and Chairman 
Archer.

[[Page H8794]]

  I would say that her loss to all of us and our committee and perhaps 
even in this body will probably be one of the major losses we have, 
probably more than all of the Members in this institution, because she 
is the institutional memory. She is the one who helped develop 
international trade policy in America for the last 30 years.
  So, Mary Jane, we love you, and we are going to miss you a lot.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair advises Members that the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Archer) has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining; the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Matsui) has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining; and the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) has 2\1/4\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I have served 15 years in the State legislature and 10 
years in the United States Congress, and this is a sad day because it 
is the most amateurish, inept legislative effort I have ever seen to 
try and pass a tough piece of legislation. There is no question that 
the Republicans have poisoned the fast track debate with partisan 
politics that will do honor to Ken Starr.
  If the Republicans were serious about promoting America's global 
leadership and stabilizing the global economy, they would have 
replenished the International Monetary Fund months ago. Instead, the 
future of America's commitment to the IMF remains unclear to this day 
and so does the future of the international economy.
  It would be easy for me to vote no today, to reject this vote for 
what it is, a political game to be debated on a day of pure 
partisanship. However, I feel strongly that collectively we have to 
rise above the partisan games of the majority and do the right thing 
for our Nation's economy.
  This Congress simply should not play games with an issue that is 
difficult enough to pass without petty politics. So I will rise above 
the Speaker's games and support the promotion of the American export 
economy, but I am deeply disheartened that this bill will fail today 
because the Republicans have allowed political avarice to damage 
support for what must be a bipartisan issue. You have made the future 
passage of this bill infinitely more difficult by bringing it out this 
way and ramming it. You know you have not got the votes.
  I learned in the State legislature 25 years ago, if you do not have 
the votes, do not come to the floor with it, because you will never get 
it passed if you keep doing that kind of thing.
  This is a bad day for the United States economy. You should not do 
this kind of thing without consulting and building the broad base that 
trade should have in this country.
  This is not a partisan issue. It is not Republican. It is not 
Democrat. You have to work together when you are dealing in the 
international arena. I sat at the table at the State dinner in Brazilia 
and had Brazilians say to me, boy, we are glad you have not passed fast 
track because we want your President weak. Now, that is not what we 
want, whether that President is a Democrat or a Republican.
  I voted for every piece of free trade legislation. We have to, if we 
are going to be a strong country.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Farr.).
  (Mr. FARR of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote no 
on this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss a very important issue: fast 
track authority.
  Fast track has been the subject of much debate and discussion, not 
just inside the Beltway but across the country. In my own district, 
many of my constituents have told me that they will benefit from new 
trade agreements reached with fast track; others have said that fast 
track ignores important global issues such as labor standards or 
environmental pollution.
  ``Fast Track'' sounds simple. Just give the President the authority 
to negotiate a trade treaty agreement and bring the end product back to 
Congress for an up or down vote. Sounds logical, doesn't it?
  But it's not that simple. Here's the reason why: Political battles 
are won by listening to, and acting on, the concerns of those who have 
a vote in the outcome. I have one vote. My constituents want me to use 
it wisely, looking out for the best interests of the Central Coast of 
California. They want me to think globally and act locally.
  Acting locally means protecting existing American jobs--local jobs 
dependent on reciprocal export markets for American products and goods. 
When you think about it, our economic future in agriculture and tourism 
depends on a healthy local economy.
  Look at agriculture. The Central Coast has been a world leader in 
specialty crops and one of our strongest specialty crops have been 
fresh cut flowers. The flower and foliage industry in California ranks 
number one in the United States with $702 million in sales in 1996, 
holding a 22% share of the U.S. market. But we're losing nurseries and 
jobs to foreign imports. Colombian flowers that are allowed into the 
United States without any tariff are our biggest competition. No other 
flower growing country has that privilege.
  The President has done nothing to right the wrongs created by the 
1991 Andean Trade Pact, which put Central Coast flower growers at a 
severe disadvantage to Colombian fresh flower imports. The President 
has the legal authority to stop the closure of American nurseries that 
raise fresh cut flowers. But he is not using that authority because he 
is listening to the State Department, rather than American workers.
  So why should the President be given more authority to make more 
deals for more South American imports when he doesn't protect American 
interests under existing law?
  I support free trade. But free trade can't exist unless it is based 
on fairness. Fair trade means making deals for the United States that 
do not put our working men and women, our manufacturers and producers, 
and our quality of life at risk.
  Chile is a beautiful country. I have traveled there and met with 
political, labor and business interests. They import three times more 
U.S. goods than they export, with the exception of agriculture. Making 
Chile a full trading partner with Canada, U.S. and Mexico will only 
jeopardize more American jobs in the fresh cut flower industry, in 
addition to our fishing and wine industries on the Central Coast.
  So I will continue to oppose Fast Track unless we can see the 
following: (1) Lift the ``free entry'' of Colombian flowers to the U.S. 
marketplace. Treat Colombian flowers as all other flower imports are 
treated, with equal tariffs; and (2) protect the environmental and 
labor safeguards as strong as banking and security safeguards.
  Some people would say that my ``no'' vote on fast track is 
inconsistent with, or contradictory to, my ``yes'' vote on NAFTA four 
years ago. I disagree.
  Four years ago, the NAFTA vote was on legislation implementing a 
trade agreement negotiated by the President under fast track authority. 
This year's vote will not be on implementing a trade agreement but on 
renewing the power of the President to negotiate such agreements.
  When NAFTA was voted on, the fast track authority granted to the 
President did not contain instructions to him to include in the trade 
agreement provisions relating to the rights of laborers or meeting 
certain environmental standards. Knowing these issues were a concern to 
many members of Congress, the President negotiated sidebar agreements 
to supplement the underlying document. With these sidebars in place, I 
was convinced NAFTA would, in the long run, be a good thing for the 
United States. The underlying agreement would open up new markets to 
our producers and the added-on sidebars would help drive our trade 
partners to stronger labor and environmental protections.
  Although I must oppose the fast track legislation before Congress 
today, I have and will continue to support free trade. I will continue 
to examine each trade agreement reached with fast track authority on 
its individual merits, keeping in mind the need to think globally but 
act locally to protect American jobs on the Central Coast.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to granting fast 
track negotiating authority. I oppose this legislation because of the 
adverse effects that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which was negotiated under ``fast track'' authority, has had upon 
working American families.
  There is no question that NAFTA's track record has had an adverse 
effect on U.S. wages. This country has lost over a quarter of a million 
jobs. In my home state of Illinois, 23 companies have moved to Mexico 
as a result of NAFTA. Instead of the old, failed ``fast track'', we 
need a trade negotiating authority that gives the President the tools 
to negotiate trade agreements that reflect the wishes of most 
Americans--fair, responsible trade that protects the environment, 
working families and public health.
  We have must to lose with this vote. U.S. taxpayers have invested 
billions to establish and maintain one of the safest food supplies in 
the world. Yet we undermine consumer protection by allowing foods to be 
imported from countries where health and safety standards

[[Page H8795]]

either do not exist or are not enforced. Under NAFTA, food imports from 
Mexico and Canada have dramatically overburdened the Food and Drug 
Administration's ability to adequately inspect food imports. More and 
more we hear of illnesses caused from foreign foods. We need to make 
international bodies and foreign governments with weaker standards 
accountable if we are to protect the health of all Americans. Granting 
fast track authority will only threaten the safety of our food supply.
  As a respesentative from the Corn Belt, I understand our farmers are 
struggling through tough times with commodity prices that are the 
lowest they've been in years. However, trade negotiations take years. 
Our farmers need immediate relief. We should be looking at ways to put 
money in their pockets where they most need it and ways to help our 
trading partners get back on their economic feet. Fast track is not the 
cure-all to the farm crisis, it is, at the moment, a distraction.
  Without labor, food safety, and environmental provisions in the fast 
track legislation, we have no guarantee that these issues will ever be 
addressed. I am not willing to risk the health and safety of my 
constituents on an authority that cannot safeguard their well-being. 
Let fix the problems we have with unfair trade negotiations; let not 
add to them. I urge all my colleagues to vote no on fast track.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant opposition to fast 
track. Last year I strongly supported a similar fast track proposal, 
and I continue to believe that the fast track mechanism is necessary to 
ensure that new trade agreements don't become loaded up with special 
interest provisions in the normal legislative process.
  But I simply cannot support legislation that is being brought to the 
House floor for blatantly political purposes, to divide Democrats less 
than two months before an election. And I do not think it is 
appropriate to tie the President's hands at the negotiating table--to a 
much greater extent than Democratic Congresses tied the hands of 
President's Reagan and Bush--when the Administration is not involved in 
the process.
  It's clear that the Republican majority is not serious about passing 
this bill. Last year, members from both parties worked together to 
generate for fast track. This year, the majority made no effort to 
collaborate with the minority. This unwillingness to approach 
Democratic supporters of fast track exposes the Republican majority's 
true motivations--to score political points, not to pass the 
legislation.
  It is irresponsible to bring up fast track knowing that it's going to 
fail. This will make it even more difficult to pass next year, and send 
an unfortunate signal to the international community that the United 
States does not want to remain engaged in the global economy. Such a 
signal couldn't come at a worse time, given the financial turmoil in 
Russia and parts of Asia.
  International trade is clearly good for the American economy. Since 
1992, almost 40 percent of our nation's total economic growth has been 
the direct result in international trade. Companies involved in 
exporting have expanded employment nearly 20 percent faster than firms 
serving only domestic markets, and jobs related to exports pay about 15 
percent above the national average. New trade agreements--completed 
with fast track authority--would extend the benefits of trade to even 
more workers, consumers and companies.
  But our trade policy--like foreign policy in general--must be based 
on bipartisan cooperation and consensus, not partisan politics. For 
that reason--and that reason alone--I intend to oppose this fast track 
legislation.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2621, a 
bill to allow fast track procedures for trade agreements. NAFTA is a 
recent example of why Congress should not approve this fast track 
authority.
  NAFTA proves that trade agreements do not necessarily beneift all 
workers. Our experience with NAFTA demonstrates that ``side 
agreements'' are not enforceable and labor, the environment and public 
safety are all at risk. Large corporations benefit from trade 
agreements like NAFTA. NAFTA enables these companies to exploit our 
most valuable resources for their own bottom line. For these reasons, I 
vehemently oppose granting fast track negotiating authority to the 
president.
  In any trade agreement, the people deserve to know--and have us 
debate--the terms of trade expension. I am not satisfied that the terms 
before us in this fast track authority are satisfactory and I am 
certain that the benefit doesn't go to the workers in my district.
  Estimates show that the number of jobs foregone in the U.S. because 
of NAFTA-induced imports is over 400,000. In my home state of 
California, 38,406 jobs were lost directly because of NAFTA, according 
to a narrow Commerce Department formula. This is nearly 10 percent of 
the total U.S. jobs lost because of NAFTA. Workers in California 
qualify for a significant portion of the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA)--California is one of the top six states where the most workers 
are certified for TAA.
  Multinational corporations export not only products but also business 
operations cross the border; they exploit Mexican workers for a 
fraction of the United States labor costs. American workers lose decent 
paying jobs. Mexican workers get work with subsistence wages. The 
corporations benefit at the expense of human labor.
  There are 981,302 Mexicans working in abhorrent conditions in 
Maquiladoras, making an average wage of $30-$35 for a 48 hour week as a 
direct result of NAFTA. These workers live in shacks made of cardboard 
and wood. I cannot grant a fast track trade negotiating authority if 
fair labor practices will not be protected.
  The environmental loses through NAFTA as well. The Administration 
promised greater environmental protections along the border regions 
where industry was expected to grow as a result of NAFTA. Well, we have 
experienced greater industry growth along the Southern borbers, but as 
far as environmental protection goes, it was just another promise 
broken.
  Hazardous waste coming into the United States increased 30 percent in 
1995. In that same year, well water in U.S. border communities had 
sulfate concentrations of nearly twice what is considered safe for 
drinking water. Not only does the U.S. laborer lose through NAFTA, but 
so does the vulnerable child and grandparent who drinks polluted well 
water.
  NAFTA does not ensure inspection standards for produce, agriculture 
and livistock. NAFTA has crippled border inspections and the U.S. does 
not have the manpower to inspect everything that comes across its 
borders. Frozen fruit imports have increased by 45 percent and frozen 
vegetable by 31 percent since NAFTA, but there has been no increase in 
inspection.
  A 1997 GAO report shows that commercial passenger vehicles from 
Mexico are not being inspected regularly. The ones that have been 
inspected have been placed out of service for serious safety violations 
such as steering or brake problems, according to the Federal Highway 
Administration. Fifty-four percent of the commercial passenger vehicles 
that pass through our southern borders do so through California. These 
unsafe vehicles are endangering the passengers as well as the safety of 
those on the streets and highways of California.
  Negotiating authority with the right terms-allowing US workers to 
share in the benefit and promoting economic growth in environmentally 
sound ways worldwide--is my bottom line. Without that before us, I will 
vote ``no'' on the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, today, the House is asked to vote to approve 
H.R. 2621, a fast-track procedure under which international agreements 
might be approved as far into the future as October 1, 2005. The ``fast 
track'' procedure requires the President to submit draft international 
agreements, implementing legislation, and a statement of administrative 
action for congressional approval. Amendments to the legislation in 
Congress are not permitted once the bill is introduced and committee 
and floor action votes may consist only of ``yes'' or ``no'' votes on 
any potential agreement as it is introduced.
  The fast-track procedure bill, in addition to creating an extra-
constitutional procedure by which international agreements become 
ratified, sets general international economic policy objectives, re-
authorizes ``Trade Adjustment Assistance'' welfare for workers who lose 
their jobs and for businesses which fail, and creates a new permanent 
position of Chief Agriculture Negotiator within the office of the 
United States Trade representative. The bill would reestablish the 
President's extra-constitutional ``executive authority'' to negotiate 
``side agreements'' such as those dealing with environmental and labor 
issues. Lastly, the bill ``pays'' the government's ``cost'' of free 
trade by increasing taxes on a number of businesses which recently 
benefitted by a favorable judgment in federal tax court.
  The Constitution clearly allows for international agreements and 
clearly specifies the means by which they are to be accomplished. 
Treaties, quite clearly are to be negotiated by the President with 
advice and consent of the Senate and can only become effective upon 
being ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The 
Constitution, however, does not expressly confer authority to make 
international agreements other than by treaties and, of course, the 
tenth amendment specifies that ``powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.'' To ignore or 
allow the one branch of the federal government to delegate it's powers 
to others destroys the liberty-protecting ability inherent to the 
Constitutional separation of powers.
  Congress does have, amongst its enumerated powers, regulation of 
commerce with foreign nations. Imposing import tariffs, quotas, and 
embargoes, however economically detrimental to the macro economy of the 
United

[[Page H8796]]

States, are, at least, amongst powers delegated to Congress by Article 
I of the Constitution. Regulating commerce, of course, refers to 
enacting domestic laws which effect voluntary exchanges between trading 
partners who happen to be citizens of different governments. 
International agreements between the governments of those trading 
partners cannot be construed to escape the stringent treaty 
ratification process established by the document's framers just by 
suggesting Congress has the power to enact domestic regulation 
regarding foreign commerce. If this were an allowable justification for 
bypassing the constitutionally-mandated treaty process, Article I 
Congressional powers would almost completely undermine the necessity 
for the Constitutionally-mandated treaty process. Treaties regarding 
everything from international monetary policy to military policy would 
suddenly become ``ripe'' for the ``treaty-making'' power of the 
President and Congress. Instead, a bright line process exists whereby 
entering into agreements with foreign nations under which the U.S. 
government will do ``X'' if the government of Ruritania does ``Y'' must 
be understood to constitute an international agreement and, as such, 
require the more restrictive treaty process.
  Moreover, because international courts regard ``treaties'' and 
``agreements'' as equally binding on signatory governments, a stronger 
case is made that they must be made subject to the same constitutional 
process. Insofar as H.R. 2621 ignores the lake of a congressional role 
in the international treaty process and instead attempts to make 
Congress an integral part of a procedure for which it lacks any 
constitutional authority, this bill can be opposed on constitutional 
grounds alone.
  Even if the procedure advocated by the bill were able to survive what 
should always be the Congressman's initial threshold of 
constitutionality, the bill contains provisions which will likely 
continue our country down the ugly path of internationally-engineered, 
``managed trade'' rather than that of free trade. As explained by 
economist Murray N. Rothbard:

       [G]enuine free trade doesn't require a treaty (or its 
     deformed cousin, a `trade agreement'; NAFTA is called an 
     agreement so it can avoid the constitutional requirement of 
     approval by two-thirds of the Senate). If the establishment 
     truly wants free trade, all it has to do is to repeal our 
     numerous tariffs, import quotas, anti-dumping laws, and other 
     American-imposed restrictions of free trade. No foreign 
     policy or foreign maneuvering is necessary.

  In truth, the bipartisan establishment's fanfare of ``free trade'' 
fosters the opposite of genuine freedom of exchange. Whereas genuine 
free traders examine free markets from the perspective of the consumer 
(each individual), the mercantilist examines trade from the perspective 
of the power elite; in other words, from the perspective of the big 
business in concert with big government. Genuine free traders consider 
exports a means of paying for imports, in the same way that goods in 
general are produced in order to be sold to consumers. But the 
mercantilists want to privilege the government business elite at the 
expense of all consumers, be they domestic or foreign.
  Fast track is merely a procedure under which the United States can 
more quickly integrate and cartelize government in order to entrench 
the interventionist mixed economy. In Europe, this process culminated 
in the Maastricht Treaty, the attempt to impose a single currency and 
central bank and force relatively free economies to ratchet up their 
regulatory and welfare states. In the United States, it has instead 
taken the form of transferring legislative and judicial authority from 
states and localities and to the executive branch of the federal 
government. Thus, agreements negotiated under fast track authority 
(like NAFTA) are, in essence, the same alluring means by which the 
socialist Eurocrats have tried to get Europeans to surrender to the 
super-statism of the European community. And just as Brussels has 
forced low-tax European countries to raise their taxes to the European 
average or to expand their respective welfare states in the name of 
``fairness,'' a ``level playing field,'' and ``upward harmonization,'' 
so too will the international trade governors and commissions be 
empowered to ``upwardly harmonize,'' internationalize, and otherwise 
usurp laws of American state governments.
  The harmonization language in last year's FDA reform bill constitutes 
a perfect example. Harmonization language in this bill has the Health 
and Human Services Secretary negotiating multilateral and bilateral 
international agreements to unify regulations in this country with 
those of others. The bill removes from the state governments the right 
to exercise their police powers under the tenth amendment to the 
constitution and, at the same time, creates or corporatist power elite 
board of directors to review medical devices and drugs for approval. 
This board, of course, is to be made up of ``objective'' industry 
experts appointed by national governments. Instead of the ``national'' 
variety, known as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (enacted for the 
``good reason'' of protecting railroad consumers from exploitative 
railroad freight rates, only to be staffed by railroad attorneys who 
then used their positions to line the pockets of their respective 
railroads), we now have the same sham imposed upon worldwide consumers 
on an international scale soon to be staffed by heads of multilateral 
pharmaceutical corporations.

  Lastly, critics of the bill convincingly argue that language within 
H.R. 2621 regarding ``Foreign Investment'' would establish new rights 
for foreign investors and corporations and new obligations for the 
United States. H.R. 2621 attempts to eliminate artificial or trade-
distorting barriers to trade-related foreign investment by reducing or 
eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment; free the 
transfer of funds relating to investments; reduce or eliminate 
performance requirements and other unreasonable barriers to the 
establishment and operation of investments; seeks to establish 
standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, 
consistent with United States legal principles and practice; and 
provide meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes. It is 
argued that H.R. 2621 will congressionally activate the nearly 
completed Multilateral Agreement on Investment which covers 29 
countries and forbids countries from regulating investment or capital 
flows and would establish new rights for foreign investors and 
corporations and new obligations for the United States. The MAI 
requires governments to pay investors for any action that directly or 
indirectly has an equivalent effect of expropriation. The MAI would be 
enforceable through international tribunals similar to those of the 
World Trade Organization without the due process protections of the 
United States.
  Because H.R. 2621 enacts an unconstitutional foreign policy 
procedure, furthers our nation down the internationally-managed (rather 
than free trade) path, sets general international economic policy 
objectives, re-authorizes ``Trade Adjustment Assistance'' welfare for 
workers who lose their jobs and for businesses which fail, potentially 
undermines U.S. sovereignty through MAI, and preserves the President's 
executive authority to negotiate ``side agreements.'' As such, I must 
oppose the bill.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Speaker, after close review of this legislation, I 
have decided to oppose the ``Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities 
Act'' otherwise known as fast track trading authority. This proposal 
includes environmental, labor, and food safety standards as merely 
negotiating objectives, without any accompanying legislation or side 
agreements that directly address these issues. My greatest concern is 
that the health and safety of American families will be jeopardized in 
future trade accords if these issues are not made a much higher 
priority.
  I believe that free trade is good for our economy. There are, 
however, certain precautions that need to be taken to ensure that free 
trade agreements do not undermine other principles that our country 
holds dear, such as a clean environment. One of the potential problems 
with trade agreements is that they create pressure on neighboring 
governments to relax environmental regulations in an effort to lure 
manufacturers across borders, thereby allowing these companies to 
profit by polluting and abusing natural resources. Congress must also 
make sure that there are sufficient labor protections when we make our 
trade agreements so that we can protect against multinational 
corporations moving production to other countries with lower labor 
costs. Lastly, we need to make sure that our trade agreements do not 
compromise our food safety standards. This is a real threat, 
particularly to our children who are often more severely affected by 
contaminated food than adults.
  I am a proponent of free trade; I am as even stronger proponent of 
fair trade. Our priority should be to forge a sound trade policy that 
helps, not hurts, the working people of this country. While we address 
our concerns, we can still achieve strong free trade accords. The 
Executive branch has negotiated hundreds of agreements without the 
benefit of fast track, and will continue to do so if fast track 
authority is not renewed.
  In my view, the administration's latest set of initiatives to protect 
labor and environmental issues in trade agreements are insufficient. If 
these issues are truly a priority, I believe the administration would 
have worked more aggressively to include them earlier on, instead of 
presenting a few feeble objectives in the eleventh hour of this debate. 
The new initiatives to make World Trade Organization activities, such 
as the settlement of international trade disputes, more open to the 
public, and to issue reports on worker conditions in other countries 
might prove valuable but they certainly do not offer enforceable 
protections. We must insist on negotiating authority that ensures trade 
pacts contain enforceable food safety, environmental, and labor 
provisions.

[[Page H8797]]

  What we need is a concrete strategy to improve workers' rights and 
protect the environment in developing countries, while at the same time 
negotiating effective trade agreements. I do not believe that this 
version of fast track meets these vital goals.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, free trade advocates say that NAFTA has 
nothing to do with fast track. That's not true. NAFTA has everything to 
do with fast track.
  NAFTA was negotiated under fast track, and look at what NAFTA has 
brought us. The evidence is clear. America has lost hundreds of 
thousands of jobs. And not only has it brought us a $16 billion trade 
deficit with Mexico, it's brought us lower wages, weaker consumer 
protections, and a dirtier environment. It's rolled back all of the 
advances we made this century and brought us back to the 19th century. 
Instead of leading us into the 21st century, it's dragging us down. 
That isn't sound public policy, no matter how you look at it.
  Free trade advocates say that the economy is booming. That may be 
statistically accurate, but let's take a closer look at what NAFTA has 
meant for American working families. Although the U.S. economy grew at 
a robust 4 percent in 1994 and productivity increased by about 2 
percent, American workers did not share in these gains. The wages of 
American workers have continued to fall since NAFTA was implemented. In 
NAFTA's first year, American workers saw the sharpest one year drop of 
their real hourly wages. The real median wage fell by over 2 percent, 
continuing a 20 year downward trend.
  The evidence shows that not only did we lost American jobs, the 
American working men and women have seen a reduction in their wages as 
well. So what does NAFTA mean for American workers? The evidence shows 
NAFTA means stagnant incomes and falling wages for working Americans. 
Face the facts.
  If we cut through the economic rhetoric that the free trade advocates 
use to cloud the debate on fast track and NAFTA, the question we have 
before us is actually quite simple--do we want to sacrifice American 
jobs at the altar of free trade? For myself, the answer is very 
simple--no.
  That's why I opposed NAFTA. That's why I opposed fast track back in 
1991, and that's why I am so strongly opposed to this fast track bill.
  Free trade advocates want the American people to believe that those 
of us who oppose fast track are ignorant of the new international 
economy and are pursuing an ``America-last'' strategy. They think we 
are protectionists, as if it were some kind of dirty word. Well, if 
trying to protect American jobs, the American standard of living and 
American working families makes me a protectionist, then I will gladly 
wear that label.
  The majority of Americans want fair trade. The majority of Americans 
don't want fast track stripped of labor and environmental protections. 
When I'm back home in the Third Congressional District of Illinois, 
every working man and woman tells me that thy don't want fast track. 
They don't want any more NAFTAs. They're tired of exporting American 
jobs instead of American products. Perhaps if some folks were to spend 
more time talking to Main Street instead of Wall Street, they would 
hear the same thing. Some folks seem to have lost sight of the fact 
that we work for the American people.
  In reality though, this isn't a debate between so-called 
``protectionism'' and free trade. It's a debate to shape America's 
future in the global economy, and to make the global economy work for 
us--not the other way around.
  Mr. Speaker, this fast track legislation just won't work. It's just 
going to give us more NAFTAs. Instead of leading us into the 21st 
century, this fast track legislation will pull as back. Instead of 
rebuilding the American dream for working families, it will tear it 
down. That's why I am so strongly opposed to this bill. I will vote 
``no'' on fast track, and I strongly urge all of my colleagues to do 
the same. Let us listen to Main Street, not Wall Street, because it's 
the working men and women of America that makes America so strong.
  Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a proponent of expanded trade 
opportunities for Americans. I support renewal of traditional trading 
authority for the President, and I will vote today in favor of H.R. 
2621.
  My vote today should not be an indication that I agree with the 
process that led us to vote at this time. In fact, I strongly disagree 
with the timing of this vote. I disagree with those Members who claim 
that we are voting on fast track today solely because fast track is a 
good idea. If the majority party wanted to pass fast track we could 
have voted on it last November; or January, February, March, or any 
other date before now. Likewise, we could vote on this next spring when 
we all return. The timing of this vote will jeopardize this much needed 
legislation from eventually passage.
  I have worked for a long time and very hard for passage of fast 
track. I have colleagues on both sides of the aisle who are committed 
to expanding international trade, and they too have worked tirelessly 
for fast track. But today, some of these champions of trade are 
compelled to vote ``no'' on this crucial bill--not because it is a bad 
bill, but because of its terrible timing. People are playing politics 
with the global economy, and I find that shameful. At this precarious 
time we should be more prudent. The timing of this vote sends a signal 
to the world's economies that the United States is not ready to engage 
them in the marketplace. The timing of this vote sends them a message 
that we are preparing to move to a protectionist stance and that we are 
willing to stifle global economic growth.
  I am prepared to vote ``yes'' on this critical legislation because I 
am so strongly committed to expanding trade opportunities for 
Americans. I only wish that the leaders of the majority party were 
prepared to show an equal commitment to this principle--and less of a 
willingness to play politics with our future.
  Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very concerned about this 
Fast Track legislation. The way I see it, NAFTA has eroded 100 years of 
U.S. workers fighting for safety rights, worker protection, and fair 
wages and hours. There can be no serious global trade legislation 
without protection for workers and for the environment. For instance, 
we need to know that rain forests will not be destroyed or that women 
and children will not suffer from increased poverty and a violation of 
human rights.
  And I need to know that Florida farmers will not suffer. What has 
NAFTA done for Florida? No oranges from Florida have gone to Mexico; 
however Mexican tomatoes have flooded the U.S. market.
  We now have a history with NAFTA. We have lost good jobs. 
Corporations move and unemployed workers left behind get jobs paying 
less. The skilled jobs that once moved black workers into the middle 
class are gone and cities have lost an important tax base. At the same 
time, workers in rural America are suffering.
  This is wrong. All citizens must be lifted with the economic tide--we 
are all in the same boat. I will work to see that we all can do better 
in this new global economy. I am especially concerned about our working 
men and women. Our workers want answers to important questions:
  (1) How will American workers integrate into the global community? 
(2) Where will corporate investment be made? (3) How will global trade 
affect the balance of power between worker and management? (4) How will 
global trade affect our rural farmers and the global environment?
  Our workers deserve reasonable answers to these questions.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the pending 
measure granting the President fast track consideration of trade 
agreements he negotiates with our foreign trading partners.
  As many of my colleagues know, despite pressure from the 
Administration, former President Carter, and many of my business 
constituents, I voted against NAFTA. But fast track is not NAFTA. But 
fast track is not NAFTA. Indeed, as I explained to a business audience 
in my district last fall, fast track is not a debate over NAFTA or 
whether what is negotiated will even resemble NAFTA.
  I can appreciate the concern that the fast track process may result 
in a trade agreement certain interests can't support and perhaps can't 
defeat. But I am more concerned that the lack of fast track authority 
will mean that even good trade agreements cannot be negotiated because 
our trading partners will not want Congress to amend them.
  I represent California's 36th Congressional District--which I call 
the aerospace center of the universe. Over the course of the last 
decade, the district has seen thousands of defense-dependent jobs 
disappear. But the local economy has rebounded--rebounded by 
diversifying and applying the high technology skills of South Bay 
workers to solving transportation problems, to cleaning up the 
environment, to developing advanced communications satellites and the 
infrastructure and software to support them, and to making advances in 
medical technologies adapted from Cold War programs.
  Future growth, indeed the continued existence of these industries, 
depends on finding foreign markets. Diversification and access to 
foreign markets are the strategy for saving the defense industrial base 
that won the Cold War. Without trade, this industrial base would be far 
weaker today, and fewer high skilled workers would be employed. Most 
important, our ability to ramp up in times when our nation's security 
is threatened would be gravely jeopardized.
  Trade benefits the non-defense sectors in my district as well: from 
toys to wet suits to automobiles. Most of our growth in manufacturing 
and service jobs in the last decade is trade-related.
  Mr. Speaker, creating trade opportunities is an integral part of 
keeping a strong defense

[[Page H8798]]

production base at home and for keeping a strong local economy vibrant. 
Fast track is an essential tool in this effort.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important measure.
  Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2621 and the 
extension of Fast Track trade negotiating authority. Study after study 
has shown that free trade benefits America by increasing exports, 
creating higher wage jobs, giving U.S. consumers more choice and lower 
prices, and keeping U.S. industries competitive. Since its original 
enactment in 1974, each president has benefitted from fast track 
authority, and has used this negotiating tool to advance U.S. economic 
and foreign policy interests. Without fast track, U.S. trade 
negotiators are put in the position of negotiating a treaty and then 
having it altered by the ``535 Secretaries of State'' residing in the 
Capitol. These alterations often make the agreement unacceptable to the 
other parties. For this reason, the U.S. has not been a party to over 
20 free trade agreements which have been negotiated since fast track 
authority lapsed in 1994.
  The partnership created under fast track between the president and 
Congress, enhances our ability to shape the rules of international 
trade and lead on multilateral initiatives that benefit U.S. businesses 
and workers through our entry into trade agreements. Without free 
trade, our ability to influence nations in other areas of critical 
interest to the United States, including human rights, the environment, 
and drug trafficking would be diminished. To influence these nations, 
we need to increase contact and trade, we cannot turn inward. Clearly, 
we need to reinstate fast track authority to restore our presence 
worldwide. Only with this authority can America retain and strengthen 
its trade status and its leverage with foreign nations to influence 
their labor, environmental, and other policies.
  In addition, fast track helps American businesses and workers. Tariff 
rates in the United States are already among the lowest in the world. 
Fast track authority will give the president the ability to negotiate 
trade agreements with other nations, to lower their tariff rates. This 
will greatly increase the number of American goods that can be exported 
to these foreign nations. Treaties negotiated under fast track 
procedures will break down trade barriers and expand our exports, 
creating American jobs and providing a more secure economic future for 
America. You can be assured, Mr. Speaker, that while we debate the 
merits of fast track authority, Canada, Japan, and the countries of the 
European Union are negotiating free trade agreements with America's 
trading partners.
  Our nation should be able to take full advantage of the advances 
which free trade status and fast track authority offer. I urge my 
colleagues to support H.R. 2621, and reinstate fast track authority for 
workers, for business, for America.
  Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation.
  I oppose H.R. 2621 because I think that it would produce trade 
agreements that contain inadequate labor and environmental protections. 
I believe that trade agreements negotiated under the terms of this fast 
track authorization bill would destroy U.S. jobs and drive down 
American workers' wages.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States is a world leader in terms of military 
power, diplomatic influence, economic vitality, technological 
innovation, and popular culture. As the richest and most powerful 
nation on earth, the United States enjoys a unique position of 
leadership--and provides us with the ability and opportunity to 
influence countries around the globe.
  This country must be a leader in terms of worker rights and 
environmental standards as well. Our labor and environmental standards 
have a positive influence on labor and environmental laws and 
regulations around the world. We can and should promote labor rights, 
workplace safety, and environmental stewardship in developing nations. 
By doing so we help both American workers and foreign ones. Moreover, 
failure to do so places our workers and their employers at a 
competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. Consequently, I 
strongly believe that any trade agreements that we reach with 
developing countries should promote worker rights and environmental 
protection in those countries.
  I believe that responsible trade agreements can benefit this nation 
and its workers, and that giving the President carefully crafted ``fast 
track'' negotiating authority can promote such agreements. 
Consequently, in considering this legislation reauthorizing the 
administration's fast track negotiating authority, my decision on 
whether to support or oppose this fast track bill has been based upon 
the legislation's treatment of labor and environmental issues. I have 
concluded that this bill does not provide that adequate labor 
protections and environmental standards will be included in trade 
agreements negotiated under its fast track authority. Consequently I 
oppose this legislation.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this fast track legislation, and 
to work with me to develop fast track legislation that does a better 
job of promoting America's trade interests.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, today, the Republican leadership is up to 
their old tricks again. Their plan to consider fast track trade 
authority not trivializes this important debate. The Republican 
leadership is playing a game with electoral politics--creating 
political havoc prior to the mid-term elections. We should be focusing 
on passing the appropriations bills and addressing health care 
legislation and education issues and true Social Security reform. We 
should put this bill away until we are ready to include binding 
provisions and enforcement mechanisms to protect worker rights, food 
safety and the environment.
  I oppose this fast track legislation. When we considered granting the 
President fast track trade authority last year, I was opposed to that 
plan. Today, I have the same reservations. Presumably, one of the main 
reasons for fast track authority is to expand the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has cost hundreds of thousands of 
American jobs and failed to improve environmental conditions along the 
U.S.--Mexican border. I did not support NAFTA then, and I will not 
support expanding it now.
  NAFTA resulted in a loss of almost 17,000 jobs in Illinois and 
420,000 jobs nationwide. U.S. workers who found new employment after 
their jobs moved to Mexico took an average pay cut of $4,400. 
Unfortunately, this proposal will result in more disastrous impacts on 
U.S. workers. Workers will have reduced bargaining power under this 
agreement as employers use threats of moving jobs to lower wage-paying 
nations in order to lower worker contract demands. This fact track 
legislation provides absolutely no protection for American workers.
  Further, this proposal fails to address necessary environmental 
standards. Since the passage of NAFTA, the degradation of the 
environment along our border with Mexico has escalated. By not 
requiring other nations to increase their environmental standards, we 
are putting American products, which are subject to stronger 
environmental rules, at a disadvantage in the competitive marketplace.
  I am also concerned about food safety. Food-borne illness is on the 
rise around the world in part because of the ``globalization'' of the 
food supply. Imported food is over three times more likely to be 
contaminated with illegal pesticide residues than food grown in the 
U.S. Stronger pro-consumer language in any fast track legislation would 
correct this oversight, however, the provisions of this fast track bill 
would greatly restrict the United States' ability to protect the public 
from unsafe food. I am not convinced that this bill provides adequate 
consumer protections that we, as consumers, expect and should demand.
  I also believe that trade agreements should be subject to moral and 
ethical standards. There are 1.3 billion people around the world living 
on less than $1 a day. This fast track legislation does not include 
provisions to reduce child labor or decrease poverty and inequity 
throughout the developing world. U.S. trade policies and negotiations 
should seek to change this unfortunate reality.
  This is not the right fast track legislation; it is irresponsible to 
bring this bill up now. We put our credibility with our trading 
partners at risk because this fast track bill does not have the support 
of the majority of this Congress. Trade policy and its domestic and 
international consequences is too important to be used as a political 
football.
  The bottom line is that this bill fails to address human rights, food 
safety, environmental regulations, or protect American workers. I 
cannot support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to vote no on fast 
track.
  Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to a measure that 
would trade away my right to represent the interest of my constituents. 
This fast track legislation would place a straight jacket upon my 
ability to advocate for the people of Minnesota without the minimal 
safeguards that address key issues of concern. Let me be clear, I am 
for trade, but I am not in favor of surrending and limiting the 
opportunity to influence trade agreements the United States 
administration appointees shape. The Constitution in fact preserves our 
role in the Congress to shape trade agreements, and this fast track 
measure takes the wrong track in surrender of such congressional role 
to the Administration and bureaucrats.
  I am especially concerned that this legislation today is being used 
as a political pawn by the Republican majority. Trade policies, and our 
role in shaping those policies, are much too important to be thrown 
away merely on the basis of eve-of-the-election politics. We should 
stop the rush for fast track, and open this floor for real debate on 
the role of our country in the global economy.
  Despite what you may hear from proponents of this legislation, trade 
expansion will not die without fast track negotiating authority. Of the 
200 plus trade pacts this Administration has

[[Page H8799]]

made over the past six years, all but two were considered without fast 
track procedures. 198 agreements didn't need such power. This is 
essentially the same fast track legislation that was opposed last year 
by labor, consumer, and environmental groups. No matter how you 
repackage it, fast track in this form is a bad deal for Americans. Our 
job in Congress is to represent our constituents, not to shift our 
power and limit our voice on key trade agreements, especially as our 
global economics become more integrated.
  I understand the benefits of trade on our national and local 
economies. However, we need to use our economic leverage and market 
power to ensure that the rights and interests of our farmers, workers, 
environment and public health are advanced in our trade agreements. 
These are the very elements which have contributed in shaping one of 
the greatest economies in the world. Why should we lower the standards 
and protections that provide the foundation of our economy and U.S. 
prosperity? Trade pacts today have too often been the Trojan horse 
which undermines progress in these emerging areas of environmental 
policy, worker rights, health and safety standards.
  I fear that new trade agreements without a prerequisite to address 
these specific concerns will just represent a high tide which carries 
American jobs to foreign shores and creates a lower common denominator. 
Some will capitalize on the growth of the emerging global economy and 
the expansion of trade, no matter the human indignity upon which it 
rests, and others will be displaced by downsizing, new technology, and 
offshore production. I, therefore, will not negotiate away my ability 
to advocate for my constituents' interests, jobs, wages, and 
livelihoods. My rejection of this process isn't the end of the issue, 
but rather a vote for Congress to insist upon a new negotiation 
framework and reclaim its proper role--a direct role in the trade 
agreements that will determine the policy and economic interface 
between the United States and our trade partners.
  We have the ability and the responsibility to guide and set our 
economic and trade policy, keeping in mind the core values that have 
sustained our nation as the world's most successful economy; the basic 
human rights, social justice, safety and health, worker rights and the 
safeguarding of the environment. For that reason, I oppose this fast 
track legislation, and encourage my colleagues to do the same. It isn't 
a solution but the wrong track--a detour on the economic policy path to 
a sound global economy.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, a year ago, when I announced my decision to 
support fast track trade negotiating authority, I told my constituents 
that I was supporting it because I believe strongly that good jobs 
depend on expanded trade--especially for a state like Colorado that is 
a leader in high tech and agricultural exports.
  Over my twelve years in Congress, I have talked with workers, 
farmers, managers, and CEOs whose jobs depend on being able to sell 
their goods overseas. To expand U.S. exports we must make trade 
agreements to open foreign markets to the goods and services produced 
by Colorado's and America's workers.
  One-third of our economic growth in recent years has come from 
exports. Our economy is in the eighth year of a steady expansion, with 
low inflation, and unemployment at such low levels that economists 
consider it to be ``full'' employment. I am convinced that the long-
term health of our economy depends on continuing to lower barriers to 
our exports and expand opportunities to sell our goods.
  For the United States to retreat from the policy of trade 
liberalization, which has been a major source of worldwide economic 
growth since the end of World War II, would have enormous consequences 
for this country and for the rest of the world.
  What is essential in the long-run is a sustainable, centrist, 
bipartisan, and reliable coalition for a progressive trade policy. 
Playing political games with this issue won't succeed in the short-
run--few believe there are enough votes to pass this measure today. But 
far worse, pushing today's vote on Fast Track will cause positions to 
harden and so will diminish the chances of achieving a centrist 
consensus on trade over the long-run. And trade policy simply has to be 
bipartisan if it is to be effective or reliable.
  Sadly, the Republican leadership seems more interested in scoring 
pre-election political points in making real improvements in the world 
trading environment. If they really wanted to sustain a bipartisan 
coalition in support of a progressive trade policy, they would not be 
bringing Fast Track up today.
  A Republican aide is quoted as saying that the decision to bring this 
to a vote, regardless of its chance of passage, was ``to show business 
who is in the camp of business, and who is in the camp of labor.'' 
That's the sort of maneuver that severely damages the prospects for a 
national consensus on trade.
  I can't vote for Fast Track today, because I choose not to be part of 
an effort to manipulate this important issue for partisan advantage a 
few weeks before the election. I will vote ``present'' to protest this 
cynical treatment of an issue that is so important to America's 
continued prosperity.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I am very disappointed with the reasons that 
the leadership has brought this legislation to the floor this 
afternoon. Both sides of this debate--and both parties--know very well 
that there are not enough votes to pass this bill today, a bill that I 
believe is extremely important for the future of our country. Rather, 
this legislation is being used as a political tool with the sole 
purpose of trying to embarrass the President. I believe that this is 
wrong, and I think that the leadership on the other side should have 
worked with the Administration in good faith to gain the votes to pass 
this bill instead of using such an important and inflammatory political 
issue simply for partisan gain.
  Despite the actions of the other side, I support reextending fast 
track negotiating authority to the President for certain trade 
agreements. I believe that this authority is necessary to ensure that 
the United States remains a global leader on free trade, and to enable 
the President to continue to work to open foreign markets to American 
goods.
  Trade is critical to Washington state, which is our nation's leader 
in per capita goods exports. In fact, one in every four jobs in my 
state is directly or indirectly dependent on exports--almost 740,000 
people--and this figure is expected to increase to one in three by 
2005.
  These are not low wage service jobs that have been generated from the 
growth of trade in my state. These are high-wage jobs--jobs that pay 46 
percent more than the overall state average. We are talking about 
thousands of union Machinists making airplanes at the Boeing Company, 
we are talking about software developers at Microsoft, we are talking 
about mill workers that fabricate aluminum at Kaiser, chip makers at 
Intel, and workers at Weyerhaeuser that produce lumber and wood 
products for export.
  Trade is not just important to big companies; in my state, there are 
many more small businesses than big ones that depend on international 
trade. There are many small companies that supply machine and airplane 
parts that go into the aircraft that we sell overseas, thousands of 
farmers that grow apples and wheat, and countless small, family-owned 
mills that process timber and sell the products in Asian and other 
overseas markets.
  Fast track negotiating authority is critical to the continued 
prosperity of the Pacific Northwest. A second Information Technology 
Agreement, one of the Fast Track priorities of this Administration, is 
important for the many high tech companies in the Puget Sound area. 
Further negotiations on intellectual property, a principal negotiating 
objective of the bill, will also help these companies to fight software 
piracy, which costs the industry billions of dollars each year. Future 
agricultural agreements will also help open markets for Washington's 
farmers.
  Many Fast track opponents are arguing that the only reason for 
considering this bill at all is to enable the President to expand NAFTA 
to Chile and beyond. In actuality, negotiating a comprehensive trade 
agreement with Chile--a more economically developed country than 
Mexico--is only a small part of the Administration's trade agenda. This 
agenda also includes expanding current trade agreements to achieve 
reduced foreign tariffs on U.S. high technology products and services 
(some of which currently exceed 30 percent), greater protection of 
American intellectual property, improved access to foreign government 
procurement activities, and elimination of barriers against U.S. 
agricultural products. With 30 percent of our recent economic growth 
tied to exports, and these export-related jobs paying between 13 to 16 
percent more than the average national wage, it is imperative that we 
actively pursue trade agreements that open foreign markets to America's 
products and services. It is important not to forget that more than 95 
percent of the world's population lives outside the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, despite my dissatisfaction with the reasons for which 
this legislation is under consideration today, I will vote in favor of 
the bill. In my judgment, fast track negotiating authority is too 
important to my district, my state, and my country for me not to 
support it.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the United 
States Congress and in opposition to fast track.
  I am going to be brief because what I have to say is straight 
forward: fast track may have been right in the past, but it is clearly 
wrong for the present and wrong for the future.
  There was a time then international trade agreements were little more 
than the terrain of bean-counters: the fees applied to the importing 
and exporting of goods.
  Today, however, these agreements have expanded well beyond bean-
counting, and even beyond trade into the realm of finance and 
investment.

[[Page H8800]]

  Such agreements directly impact the meat and potatoes of what our 
work in Congress is all about: worker rights, the environment, economic 
equality, human rights, food safety, even health care and education 
spending.
  Therefore, we, the Members of Congress, must have a voice in the 
direction of these international agreements.
  I did not become a United States Representative to act as a rubber 
stamp.
  Rather, I came here to represent my constituents by using my voice to 
debate and to amend as I see fit legislation that has a direct bearing 
on their lives.
  And, to those among us who argue that the United States needs fast 
track to participate in the international global economy--I ask for 
one, just one example from the last four years during which time we did 
not have fast track that the United States has not had a seat at the 
table in an international trade, investment or finance negotiation? 
Anyone? I thought not. Because there are no examples. We have never 
been kept from the table and we will not be left out in the future.
  For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I continue my opposition to fast 
track by voting against this bill.
  Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my strong 
opposition to giving fast track trade negotiating authority to the 
president. Not only is this bill a bad deal for working men and women, 
but it prevents Congress from doing its job.
  Let me start out by saying that I am very concerned that we are even 
having this debate today. The Republican leadership has brought this 
bill to the floor with little interest in promoting a sensible trade 
policy for our nation. Instead, the bill before us today has the sole 
intent of embarrassing President Clinton and forcing Democrats to cast 
a tough political vote before an election.
  Last year, fast track was pulled from the House calendar because 
there were not enough votes for passage. Since that time, no effort has 
been made to address the concerns of those who opposed fast track. The 
Republican leadership tinkered around the edges to add a few more 
provisions to make the vote even more difficult for some members, but 
nothing of substance. No protections for our environment. No 
protections for workplace safety. No protections for hardworking 
Americans and their families.
  I must remind my colleagues that the Constitution of the United 
States gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations. Since 1974, however, the House and Senate have abdicated this 
responsibility by giving the president trade negotiating authority that 
limits congressional input. This culminated in the failed North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
  The legacy of NAFTA is the growing number of American companies 
heading south of the border to take advantage of low wages and non-
existent workplace safety and environmental standards. Two years ago, 
Johnson Controls, located in my congressional district, said they were 
closing a valve plant and taking 200 jobs with them to Mexico. 
Companies such as Fruit of the Loom and Sara Lee have joined Johnson 
Controls in abandoning thousands of their workers in search of lower 
costs in Mexico.
  Even worse, companies are using the threat of relocating in Mexico in 
order to force their loyal employees to accept cuts in pay and 
benefits. To top it off, many workers are being required to work longer 
hours in order to meet the production demands of corporate CEOs. A 
commission created under a side agreement of NAFTA conducted a study 
that showed these threats were carried out three times more often under 
NAFTA than in the past. This lack of bargaining power has prevented 
American workers from enjoying the benefits of the recent period of 
economic prosperity.
  Many say the recent economic expansion has been, in part, a result of 
the recent trade policies of our nation. While that may be true, it is 
a fact that American workers have not enjoyed the benefits that should 
come with economic prosperity. From 1993 to 1996, real median wages 
fell 4.1 percent. My state of Wisconsin has been hit particularly 
hard--recent Census data shows Wisconsin was only one of four states 
where household income did not grow over the past year. In fact, the 
median income in Wisconsin dropped almost $1,800--or 4.2 percent--last 
year. The reason: the quality of jobs, measured by wages, has 
deteriorated.
  America should also be concerned about what recent trade agreements 
have done to the environment. The proponents of fast track point out 
that we are in a global economy and need this authority to avoid being 
left out. But what they fail to realize that when we choose to ignore 
environmental standards in trade negotiations, we are putting our own 
health and safety at risk.
  Instead of debating this partisan sham of a trade bill, the House of 
Representatives should be doing its job. We must defeat this 
legislation and reassert our constitutional duty to debate, amend, and 
then approve trade proposals that are in the best interest of working 
families.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of 
H.R., 2621, known as ``fast track'' authorization for the President to 
negotiate international trade agreements. Congress must pass this 
legislation today for several reasons--it will open markets and create 
jobs, it is the right policy for American export businesses, and it is 
about leadership.
  H.R. 2621 will give the U.S. an edge by opening up overseas markets 
to our products and services. Over 96 percent of the world's consumers 
live outside of the U.S. and fast track will ensure some of America's 
most important industries market access and future economic expansion.
  I hear from countless businesses and their employees that fast track 
is the right policy for American Export Businesses. There is virtually 
no question that exports have contributed immensely to America's 
increasing economic vitality and stature throughout the world.
  America leads the world in net exports. Last year, American exports 
of goods and services totaled more than $933 billion--14 percent of 
total world trade. More than 11 million U.S. jobs are export-related, 
including 1 in 5 manufacturing jobs, which pay an average of 13-16 
percent above the national average.
  Thirdly, fast track is about leadership. We are the world's global 
leader in trade and our action today is both symbolic and substantive. 
You can't lead the world towards democratic ideals and free markets if 
you remove yourself from the trade process. We need to be involved on 
all continents, and right now we are shutting ourselves out of too many 
overseas markets.
  Similarly, our country cannot be an advocate for global environmental 
protection and the improvement of labor conditions and wages if we are 
not at the table to lead in these efforts.
  Finally, I would like to express my disappointment over the 
President's personal involvement during this debate today. Over the 
past year, he and members of his Administration, including the Vice-
President, the Secretary of State, and the Treasury Secretary, have 
been quoted repeatedly about the urgency of passage of fast track. In 
this regard, I would like to quote Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright's July 24, 1997 speech to the Pacific Council and Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council. She said,

       American prestige is not divisible. If we want our views 
     and interests respected, we cannot sit on the sidelines with 
     towels over our heads while others seize the opportunities 
     presented by the global marketplace. That is why, from a 
     foreign policy perspective, I consider fast track to be among 
     our highest legislative priorities.

  I commend the leadership of the House for bringing this bill to the 
floor today, despite the lack its support by the President and his 
Administration, because they understand the importance of this bill for 
our country.
  Mr. Speaker and colleagues, I urge the passage of this legislation. 
It is inconceivable that we would not act today to assure a brighter 
future and a better standard of living for our children and 
grandchildren and their futures.
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, when the United States enters 
into trade agreements, the objective should be to advance the standard 
of living for working families in our country and abroad.
  Just like the average family in Illinois' 7th Congressional District. 
They are impacted by this trade agreement whether they like it or not. 
My hope is for them. They want what you and I want--to provide, to the 
best of their ability, for their loved ones.
  My hope is for the people in the district, so that they can obtain a 
Living Wage, a wage that allows workers to lead a dignified life while 
working in a safe and healthy environment--an environment that respects 
their needs as a worker and a human being. Their struggles and desires 
are not so different from yours and mine. They want to put clothes on 
their children's back, they want to put food on the table, have access 
to reliable transportation, live in adequate housing and be able to 
obtain affordable child care for their children. Their issues need to 
be taken into account and be an active part of this debate. We need to 
engage the people in this debate--for we are playing with their 
livelihoods.
  I hope for a trade agreement that will help to broaden our economy, 
help eradicate poverty, while bringing jobs and a decent quality of 
life to all of those involved. However, based upon recent reports, 
NAFTA as a trade agreement and trade model, has not met its promises. 
Thus, I believe that any standard of trade, based on the NAFTA model, 
will further threaten the standard of living for working families, not 
only in the USA but in other countries as well. Therefore, I am opposed 
to HR 2621, Fast Track.
  ``Free traders'' often state that those opposed to NAFTA-based 
agreements--like fast track, need to ``get with the times''-- Often 
asserting that we are opposed to this treaty out

[[Page H8801]]

of fear for the future. I pronounce that this is just simply not the 
truth. I welcome healthy change and look forward to supporting a treaty 
that will serve in the best interest of small businesses, workers and 
the environment in this country, as well as all those involved.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that when we start placing people before profits; 
placing democratic safeguards before raw political gain; placing the 
well-being of our land ahead of the fiscal bottom line of a limited 
number of business concerns and protecting our inhabitants from 
irresponsible development--then the future will be hopeful for those 
ordinary folks both here and in places like Mexico.
  Instead of fast-track, we need an agreement that increases our 
purchasing power, that improves living standards for all, and that 
proposes constructive solutions to pressing development and social 
problems, and that enhances healthy commerce throughout the region.
  ``Fast track'' proponents continue to argue that jobs are being 
created, but they cannot back up their claims.
  Studies show that 65% of laid off U.S. workers end up in lower paying 
jobs. The vast majority of new jobs in the United States are now in low 
paying sectors of the economy. The U.S. Department of Labor's forecast 
of job growth over the next ten years shows the greatest increase in 
cashiers, janitors, retail sales clerks and waiters and waitresses.
  The Administration argues that they need ``fast track'' authority to 
negotiate trade agreements, but this just isn't so. By their own 
admission, only 2, out of over 200 trade agreements negotiated while in 
office, have been negotiated under ``fast-track'' authority. Working 
families are better served by public debate over trade agreements, not 
backroom deals cut by policy players that can only be voted up or down.
  Fast-tracking is an issue of democracy. There is no adequate time to 
debate. Thus, members are forced to circumvent on their duty to vote.
  Finally, given the negative effects that NAFTA has had on workers 
both here and across the continent, using a region known as the 
Maquiladora, as point-in-case. The area is an environmental and health 
disaster area called a ``cesspool of infectious diseases'' by the 
American Medical Association. Residents on both sides of the border 
suffer from alarming rates of hepatitis, chronic diarrhea and 
tuberculosis. Contamination by toxic industrial wastes and chemicals 
has been linked to the clusters of cancer, rare birth defects and 
immunological diseases on both sides of the border in 1995.
  This is a tragic example of the types of human costs that can be 
experienced when linked to rapid industrialization without any human 
rights standards. Yes, we need jobs and a solid economy, but, I ask my 
colleagues, at what cost and at the expense of whom? We need to seek 
equitable trade across borders, we cannot think of what is only good 
for U.S. citizens. We need enforceable workers' rights provisions and 
standards for all parties in trade agreements. This is fair trade.
  To honestly analyze this ``agreement,'' we must understand not only 
what NAFTA is, but more importantly what it is not. NAFTA did not 
create substantially more free trade with Mexico, it did not create 
higher paying jobs for rank and file workers--on either side of the Rio 
Grande, it did not ensure the development of Mexico, and it side-steps 
critical social, environmental and economic issues. NAFTA is the 
absence of wage and labor rights, and responsible environmental 
regulations.

  I say that NAFTA is more about Wall St. than about Roosevelt Road in 
my district where businesses thrive and employe many working-class 
families.
  What can we learn from this debate? One strategy that seems 
abundantly clear is that we must work together to introduce and pass 
legislation that seeks to defend the rights and improve the quality of 
life for all working people across borders. People in my district--and 
beyond--need good, decent-paying jobs with a liveable wage as well as a 
workplace that has an atmosphere of safety and respect for all.
  With a new effort afoot to spearhead international trading blocks, we 
must respond by allowing aggressive organizing to take place in the 
workplace, and create an atmosphere that welcomes the advocating of 
social change that safeguards workers, communities and the environment. 
To ask for less is to consign all of us to a spiral of economic decay 
and growing human misery that undercuts the humanity and well-being of 
all people of the America.
  Mr. Speaker, I close today, by submitting to you that our struggle is 
linked to the struggle of poor and oppressed people throughout the 
world and their economic liberation protects our economic development. 
I look forward to supporting a treaty that will help small business 
prosper, a treaty that gives everybody the same break that the current 
treaty reserves for only the most powerful players at the table. We 
need a fair trade agreement that includes all who have a right and need 
to trade.
  Good trade is good for people in the 7th Congressional District of 
Illinois, the city of Chicago as well as the people in the USA and 
Mexico. A higher wage means more purchasing power which means a 
stronger economy.
  Mr. CONYERS. I am opposed to this bill to grant ``fast track'' 
negotiating authority to the president. The failed record of the North 
American Trade Agreement should have taught this body that it is time 
for us to remake our trade policy. NAFTA has hurt workers in America, 
increased poverty in Mexico and accelerated environmental destruction 
along the border.
  The NAFTA disaster demonstrates not that we shouldn't be making trade 
agreements, but that we need a fully participatory policy making 
process that protects the interests of consumers, workers and the 
environment. That process should put Congress, a body devoted to 
responsiveness to people back home, at the center of the trade debate.
  In my own state, NAFTA has been devastating to the auto industry. In 
1997, the trade deficit with Mexico was $13.9 billion for autos and 
automobile parts alone! This figure is expected to go up a bit this 
year because from January through July of 1998, the trade deficit was 
$8.7 billion, compared to $8.3 billion for the same period last year. 
And keep in mind that before NAFTA, in 1993, the United States only had 
a $3.6 billion overall deficit with Mexico.
  I visited the low-wage maquiladora factories in Mexico in 1993. All 
the foreign-owned corporations told us that this business sector would 
shrink. Instead it has increased by half since NAFTA. This means that 
polluted corridor along the US border is growing uncontrollably and 
NAFTA's weak environmental protections give us almost no redress.
  So Americans are not better off and Mexicans are not better off. 
According to Mexico's National Autonomous University, the number of 
people living in extreme poverty has gone up from 31 percent in 1993 to 
50 percent in 1996. This is not a fair deal for anyone except the 
greedy few who have profited from slashing American jobs and 
suppressing American wages.
  I know we can negotiate a better trade agreement. But the first step 
is to keep Congress and the American people involved by rejecting the 
failed fast-track approach to trade. I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill.
  Mr. WEYGAND. Mr. Speaker, today we are scheduled to vote on whether 
to grant fast-track authority to the President. I believe that, as 
written, we cannot ensure that U.S. citizens and citizens of other 
countries will get the safeguards they deserve therefore, I will be 
voting against granting the president fast-track authority and urge my 
colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. Speaker, in the United States we have a great deal of 
environmental, worker and consumer safeguards that make our standard of 
living among the highest in the world. We have worked very hard at 
building a nation where people can live with assurances that their food 
has been inspected, their roads are relatively free of unsafe vehicles, 
their air and water are clean and they can earn a livable wage. Why 
should U.S. citizens or any other citizen of any nation not be 
guaranteed the continuation of those same benefits? Why should U.S. 
standards be compromised?
  One of the purposes of trade agreements should be to better both or 
all trading partners. Our goal should be to raise the standard of 
living for everyone. Weak standards should be strengthened, strong 
standards should not be weakened. As we have seen with NAFTA, not 
including certain safeguards in the text of a trade agreement itself 
will result in a lower standard of living.
  Because we cannot look into a crystal ball to find out how a trade 
agreement will turn out we must ensure that environmental, consumer and 
worker safeguards are included, up-front. Including these provisions in 
the fast-track bill will ensure that high standards are part of the 
negotiations and will not be sacrificed.
  I fully understand the importance of entering into trade agreements 
to make sure that the U.S. is not left behind in this global economy. 
Expanding export opportunities is critical to the continued economic 
development of Rhode Island's economy and I will work to continue to 
create and expand those opportunities without giving up our standard of 
living. I am in favor of fair and equitable trade, but not at the 
expense of jobs and our families. We should trade goods, not export 
jobs.
  I believe that this fast track is the wrong track. It quiets the 
American people's voice in their government. This Fast-Track does not 
defend workers and consumers and therefore is a hindrance to fair 
trade, rather than a boon.
  I believe we can have free and fair trade, trade that benefits 
American workers and consumers and defends the environment. I believe 
we can have agreement that will result in higher wages, cleaner air and 
greater consumer safeguards. This bill will not yield those

[[Page H8802]]

desired results. Again, I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the bill.
  This debate is not about ``free trade'' versus ``protectionism''--
though that is how proponents of the fast track proposal often 
characterize it. It is not about ``engagement'' versus 
``isolationism.'' Or ``leadership'' versus ``retreat.''
  What this debate is about is whether the most powerful nation on the 
planet will help create a global economic system in which everyone has 
a fair share of the wealth.
  Or whether we will continue to pursue trade policies that magnify 
existing inequities. That favor huge multinationals and 
``agribusiness'' combines over locally-owned enterprises and family 
farms. That encourage American companies to go where they won't be 
hampered by fair labor standards, consumer protection laws and 
environmental regulations.
  This legislation failed last year and it deserves to fail again. 
Because the working people of America understand what it will mean for 
them. For their families. And their communities. They have seen what 
NAFTA has brought them, and they are not about to allow the Congress to 
repeat that costly mistake.
  NAFTA may have generated record profits for some large corporations. 
But those profits have come at the expense of workers whose jobs moved 
south. And farmers who couldn't compete with cheap Mexican wages. And 
consumers forced to buy potentially unsafe produce.
  Nor are the consequences of NAFTA confined to our side of the border. 
On a recent trip to Mexico, I saw what NAFTA has meant for the people 
of that country. Factory workers denied decent working conditions and 
the right to organize. Agricultural laborers exposed to chemicals 
banned in the United States. Thousands of subsistence farmers forced 
off their land to make room for giant export producers.
  To help address these concerns, I have joined with a number of my 
colleagues in this House, the Mexican Congress and the Parliament of 
Canada, in an agreement to establish a Tri-National Commission. The 
Commission will meet every few months, beginning early next year, to 
examine the effects of NAFTA in all three countries, and to look at 
better alternatives.
  We have been warned that if we fail to approve the bill, we will be 
shut out while other countries reach agreements. That, I submit, is an 
appeal to fear and weakness that ill befits a strong and confident 
nation. A nation with the strongest economy in the world.
  We should not negotiate because we are afraid we will be left out. 
Rather, we should negotiate in the secure knowledge that our trading 
partners need the American market at least as much as we need theirs. 
That a great nation need not accept what others decree, but can work 
with them to reshape the structure of international trade.
  If we fail to do this--if we do nothing to address the growing gulf 
between the haves and have nots--if we continue to enter into 
agreements which codify the inequities of the current trading system--
we will have much to answer for.
  I urge my colleagues to stand with working men and women everywhere 
in just saying ``no.''
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this once-
failed ``Fast Track'' trade authority legislation that the Republican 
leadership has chosen to bring to the floor.
  Our urban centers and rural communities nationwide have suffered 
greatly from the corporate flight and job loss promoted and encouraged 
by NAFTA. Wages for manufacturing workers have been depressed by brutal 
global competition with terribly exploited workers overseas. And the 
violent turmoil in the world's financial markets threaten to ruin the 
economies of many developing nations.
  But, in these uncertain financial times, the Republicans are using 
this bill for their partisan purposes and ignoring the danger signs, 
throwing protections for American workers and families out the window.
  But they should not, and will not, pass this bill. They still have no 
real protections for American workers who face the loss of their jobs 
overseas. Environmental concerns continue to be ignored.
  And, despite all the Republican rhetoric about being tough on drugs, 
this legislation does nothing to stop the increase of the flow of drugs 
into the U.S.
  Loosening the rules of trade, without building in any safeguards 
against drug trafficking, has meant a virtual explosion of the flow of 
cocaine, heroin and other narcotics into the U.S. In November 1997 I 
called for the addition of specific, core language in trade agreements 
that addressed drug trafficking. I published a report ``Drug 
Trafficking on the Fast Track'' that documented the dramatic increase 
in drug trafficking that came as a result of NAFTA.
  And this week's New York Times highlighted these dangers reporting 
that the brother of Mexico's former President Carlos Salinas, ``assumed 
control over practically all drug shipments through Mexico.'' He used 
government trucks and railroad cars to ship tons of narcotics into the 
United States using influence and bribery to buy protection from the 
nation's army and police force.
  So we negotiated a free trade treaty having absolutely no drug 
trafficking protections built in, with a government that was literally 
directing the flow of cocaine and narcotics into the United States.
  We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past.
  We cannot sign trade treaties with governments who are involved in, 
or complicit with, drug cartels and international drug trafficking. 
Until we address this issue, and protect the rights of American 
workers, we should reject this legislation.
  We need a fair trade agreement that protects American families. I 
urge my colleagues to vote no on this fast track legislation.

               [From the New York Times, Sept. 19, 1998]

             Salinas Brother Is Tied by Swiss to Drug Trade

                            (By Tim Golden)

       Mexico City.--After a nearly three-year inquiry into drug 
     corruption in Mexico, Swiss police investigators have 
     concluded that a brother of former President Carlos Salinas 
     de Gortari played a central role in Mexico's cocaine trade, 
     raking in huge bribes to protect the flow of drugs into the 
     United States.
       In a secret 369-page report, the investigators assert that 
     Salinas's elder brother, Raul, used his wide influence in the 
     administration to organize an elaborate network of protection 
     for drug smugglers. He also channeled drug money to his 
     brother's presidential campaign, the report alleges.
       ``When Carlo Salinas de Gortari became President of Mexico 
     in 1988, Raul Salinas de Gortari assumed control over 
     practically all drug shipments through Mexico,'' the report 
     states. ``Through his influence and bribes paid with drug 
     money, officials of the army and the police supported and 
     protected the flourishing drug business.''
       From a low-profile position in the administration's food-
     distribution agency, the report states, Raul Salinas 
     commandeered Government trucks and railroad cars to haul 
     cocaine north, skimming payoffs that the Swiss estimate at 
     upwards of $500 million. On what some of his reputed former 
     associates referred to as ``green light days,'' he arranged 
     for drug loads to transit Mexico without concern that they 
     might be checked by the army, the coast guard or the federal 
     police.
       A partial copy of the report was obtained by The New York 
     Times. It appears to be based largely on interviews with 
     nearly 90 former drug traffickers, reputed Salinas associates 
     and other witnesses, most of them unidentified.
       Swiss officials said they expected the report to be the 
     basis for their Government's seizure in the coming weeks of 
     more than $130 million that Raul Salinas deposited in Swiss 
     banks.
       Lawyers for Salinas dismissed the report Friday as the 
     slanderous product of a Swiss crusade to confiscate what they 
     insisted was a fortune that their client earned by legitimate 
     means.
       ``The report is absolutely false,'' Salinas's lead 
     attorney, Eduardo Luengo Creel, said in an interview. ``It 
     contains statements, assertions and situations that do not 
     correspond to the facts. It is a police report. It does not 
     have the validity of an evaluation by an investigating 
     judge.''
       ``We do not even know who these people are,'' Luengo said 
     of the many confidential informants listed in the document, 
     which Salinas's lawyers received two months ago. ``To accuse 
     someone with anonymous witnesses is unconstitutional in any 
     country.''
       The document states that Swiss investigators were unable to 
     determine conclusively what involvement the former President, 
     his father and other family members might have had in the 
     purportedly illicit activities of Raul Salinas.
       Some family members, it implies, were among a group of 
     people around Raul Salinas who were implicated in criminal 
     activities. It based that finding on witnesses it described 
     as ``principally credible'' but did not identify.
       The report says the investigators did not look further into 
     the matter because the people mentioned were irrelevant to 
     their inquiry into whether Salinas's Swiss funds came from 
     illegal activities.
       Nonetheless, the report adds, somewhat obliquely. ``We have 
     to seriously question the probability that a person with as 
     much power as the President of Mexico for years did not learn 
     about criminal activities of this extent, even if his brother 
     was heavily involved.'' Carlos Salinas has been living 
     recently in Europe.
       The Swiss report is by far the most exhaustive assessment 
     to date of Raul Salinas's reported dealings with the Mexican 
     underworld.
       It is clearly a prosecutorial document, one that cites 
     Salinas's own version of events mostly to show how it appears 
     to contradict other facts. Because the Swiss seizure of 
     Salinas's assets would be a civil court action, the report 
     also aims at a considerably lower threshold of proof than 
     would be required in a criminal case.

[[Page H8803]]

       Raul Salinas was widely rumored to have grown rich on 
     dubious business dealings during his brother's presidency, 
     but the accusations were almost never public or specific. 
     Shortly after Carlos Salinas's term ended, in December 1994, 
     his chosen successor, Ernesto Zedillo, shattered a long 
     Mexico tradition of impunity for presidential families by 
     authorizing Raul Salinas's arrest on charges that he ordered 
     the murder of a leader of the governing party who was his 
     former brother-in-law.
       In the tiny maximum-security prison cell where Salinas has 
     spent the last three and a half years, he has been struck by 
     wave after wave of new allegations. Federal prosecutors in 
     New York are pressing ahead with a criminal investigation 
     into the possibility that he may have laundered illicit funds 
     through his accounts at Citibank headquarters in New York. 
     And after a series of reversals in their murder case, Mexican 
     officials say they are close to announcing new corruption 
     charges against him.
       Much of the Swiss evidence seems to come from witnesses who 
     are identified only by pseudonyms like ``Ludmilla'' and 
     ``Juan,'' and whose credibility is difficult to judge.
       Some claimed they had arranged the protection of drug 
     shipments with Salinas directly. Others, including 
     bodyguards, chauffeurs and secretaries, said they had 
     attended meetings at which they saw Salinas receive suitcases 
     full of cash from smugglers. Still others, including an 
     American drug enforcement agent, testified to matters they 
     had learned about second-hand.
       As the true names of several of the witnesses have leaked 
     out over the course of the Swiss investigation, Salinas's 
     lawyers have attacked their accounts. But even when the 
     informants are convicted criminals, the report often asserts 
     reasons why their claims are credible.
       Legal experts in Switzerland and the United States 
     predicted that the confidentiality of the sources arrayed 
     against Salinas might well prove a weak point in the 
     Government's case. If a seizure is ordered and lawyers for 
     Salinas challenge it in court, as they insist they will, the 
     judge who evaluates the case will have access to the 
     witnesses' identities but the lawyers will not.
       In contrast to law enforcement officials in the United 
     States who have studied Mexican drug corruption for years, 
     the small team of Swiss federal police investigators had 
     virtually no background in the subject. But since their 
     arrest of Salinas's third wife, Paulina Castanon, as she 
     tried to retrieve phony passports with her husband's picture 
     from a Swiss safe-deposit box in November 1995, the Swiss 
     detectives managed to scour American court files and jail 
     cells for anyone who might claim a link to their target.
       In at least a few such cases, United States law-enforcement 
     officials have acknowledged, those informants had been 
     ignored or misused by prosecutors in the United States until 
     the Swiss sought them out. The Swiss report also cites some 
     confidential witnesses who are described as people who once 
     worked or socialized around Salinas, and it contains what two 
     American investigators described as a meticulous analysis of 
     his financial dealings.
       ``For us, what they have would be a triable case,'' said a 
     United States law-enforcement official who is familiar with 
     the Swiss evidence.'' It wouldn't be a slam-dunk, but you 
     could definitely take it to court.''
       For the family of a former President who was once 
     celebrated as the bold architect of a new relationship 
     between Mexico and the United States--the man who championed 
     the North American Free Trade Agreement and brought to power 
     a new generation of Ivy League-educated technocrats--the 
     report paints a devastating portrait.
       Quoting unidentified former associates of the family, the 
     report contends that both Raul and Carlos were ``introduced'' 
     to the drug trade in the late 1970's by their father, Raul 
     Salinas Lozano, a former Government minister. It did not make 
     clear what that introduction involved.
       ``Raul Salinas Lozano, with his political influence, would 
     have preferred Raul at the head of the Government in 
     Mexico,'' it continues, quoting an informant close to the 
     family to present a dark new twist on an old story of 
     brotherly ambition. ``But because Raul Salinas de Gortari's 
     infamous earlier life would not have permitted him to hold a 
     high-level government position, the father decided to support 
     his son Carlos instead.''
       Long before Carlos Salinas began to make his name in the 
     mid-1980's as Mexico's young, Harvard-trained Budget 
     Minister, the report suggests, his father had built a 
     friendship with one of the legendary figures of Mexico's 
     north-border drug trade, Juan N. Guerra. Such a relationship 
     has been reported in the past, and angrily denied by Raul 
     Salinas Lozano.
       The eldest son of the one-time border Senator--Salinas 
     Lozano was a dominant figure in the politics of his home 
     state of Nuevo Leon--and a nephew of the trafficker Juan 
     Garcia Abrego, inherited the connection, the report contends.
       Quoting a series of former drug traffickers, the Swiss 
     investigators state that Raul Salinas began arranging 
     protection for both Garcia Abrego and traffickers of the 
     Medellin cartel in Colombia even before his brother became 
     President.
       One of those traffickers, identified as ``Giuseppe,'' 
     appears to be Jose Manuel Ramos, a former high-level Medellin 
     cocaine distributor who operated out of northern Mexico and 
     Texas until his arrest in 1990. Three American law-
     enforcement officials familiar with his case described Ramos, 
     who remains in prison, as highly credible.
       Both Ramos and his wife, Luz Salazar, (the ``Ludmilla'' of 
     the report) referred the Swiss detectives to payment ledgers 
     and other documents that had been seized at the time of their 
     arrest. According to the report, the documents helped to 
     corroborate that from 1987 to 1989, they paid Salinas $28.7 
     million on behalf of their boss, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez 
     Gacha.
       Another convicted trafficker who gushes with information 
     about Raul Salinas, Marco Enrique Torres, has weaker bona 
     fides.
       While the report notes some corroboration of Torres's 
     account by an F.B.I. agent who pursued his case, Orlando 
     Munoz, it fails to note Salinas's denials that he ever knew 
     Torres. Nor does it raise questions about the more improbable 
     parts of his tale of a long criminal friendship between a 
     mid-level drug smuggler and a member of the Mexican political 
     aristocracy.
       Once Carlos Salinas became President at the end of 1988, 
     the report states, his brother's power to assure the safe 
     northward passage of drugs grew sharply.

  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the Democratic leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill and ask 
Members on both sides of the aisle to oppose this bill.
  I have voted for and worked on fast track bills in the past. I worked 
on a bill with then President Bush that we passed back in the late 
1980s. I believe in trade, and I believe in trade agreements. I believe 
in opening markets. I believe in free trade agreements.
  This is not a partisan issue. It is an issue on which I think people 
of like minds have to come together to prepare an architecture so that 
the free trade treaties that come from the fast track authority will 
succeed in opening up more trade and, most importantly, in increasing 
the compatibility between the countries that are engaging in trade.

                              {time}  1830

  To take NAFTA, for an example, it is a free trade treaty between 
countries that have very different standards of living, very different 
attempts at enforcing their basic laws. We now know that the problems 
that have come from NAFTA have been caused because we did not get in 
NAFTA the kind of enforcement provisions, with teeth, that would allow 
all the parties to get the other parties to the agreement to properly 
enforce their labor and environmental laws. We tried to get that in the 
treaty and at the end everyone said, ``Well, we can't get it.'' I vowed 
from that moment that if we had another fast track, and I thought and 
knew we should and would, that I would try to get in it provisions that 
would say definitely that any treaty that would come from that fast 
track would have to have proper provisions in it, with teeth, that 
would get the labor and environmental and other laws in the signatories 
to the treaty to properly enforce their laws.
  Now, why is this important? If you go to Mexico today on the border, 
you will find the most modern plants in the world. In fact, there are 
double the number of plants than there were before NAFTA and double the 
number of jobs. In many ways that is good. That is what we hoped would 
happen. But if you examine further and you go in the villages where the 
workers live next to the plants that are modern, as modern as anything 
in the United States, you will find workers living in abject poverty. 
They live literally in the cardboard boxes that carry the goods out of 
the plants. The labor laws in Mexico are better than ours. They are 
just not enforced. If you speak with the workers and you ask why do you 
not join an independent union or why do you not bargain for better 
wages, they laugh at you. And they say, ``We have no ability to do 
that.'' They live next to open sewage ditches. Their children have 
hepatitis. Half the children cannot go to school because the workers do 
not earn enough money to send their children to school.
  If this is the future of free trade in the world economy, then we 
have no future. If it is a race to the bottom because we do not insist 
on standards in trade, then we have let down everybody in the United 
States and we have let down everybody in the world. Surely we can do 
better than this.
  I believe if we work from this day forward, because I do not think 
this

[[Page H8804]]

fast track will pass, we can work to a bipartisan fast track that will 
give the President the fast track authority that he wants, that has the 
proper conditions in it so we can construct the right architecture in 
the world so that free trade is also fair trade, it is trade with 
standards, it is trade that raises the standards in the world and not 
lowering everybody's standards to the lowest common denominator. Now, 
surely we can do this.
  The fast track we have tonight not only does not allow us to have 
those kinds of provisions in free trade treaties, it specifically says 
we cannot take up those matters in free trade negotiations. It is the 
opposite of what we need. We are the leader in the world. We are the 
one that has to help bring this infrastructure, this architecture to 
the world.
  What you are voting on tonight is a very imperfect instrument that 
will not get us where we need to be. We can do better than this. Vote 
this fast track down. Let us come back next year in a bipartisan way, 
honestly and decently, and put together a piece of legislation that 
will allow America to lead the world to a higher standard of living and 
to the benefits of trade for all the people of the world.
  Mr. ARCHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrich) the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman 
from Georgia is recognized for 4\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, let me say that I agree with the gentleman 
from Missouri that this is an imperfect instrument and that this is a 
difficult time. On the other hand, we were told a year ago it was the 
wrong time to vote. That was not an election year. Now we are told this 
year, it is the wrong time to vote. This is an election year.
  Now, since under our Constitution the House is elected every two 
years, if it is not right to vote in the year before the election and 
it is not right to vote in the year of the election, the correct answer 
from some of our friends on the left is that there is never a time to 
vote, because they do not want to expand markets. And I understand 
that. But we need to understand just how historic this moment is. And 
Members are going to have to live with their conscience for a long time 
if they vote ``no.''
  We have entered the first deflation since the Great Depression, from 
Malaysia and Thailand, to Indonesia, to South Korea, to Japan, to 
Russia, now to Brazil, we see all over this planet people whose 
economies are shaky, whose currencies are shaky and they are looking 
for leadership. The choice for them is very simple: Do they move into 
the world market which since World War II has so dramatically increased 
the wealth of the entire world, including the United States? Or do they 
move towards autarchy and protectionism and beggaring their neighbors 
and all of the policies which under Smoot-Hawley led to the Great 
Depression? It is that simple. And you get to vote in a few minutes to 
send a signal to the entire world because the entire world is watching.
  My friend from Washington State said the Brazilians hope we defeat 
it. He is right. The Brazilians want us to defeat fast track because 
they are creating a common market in South America and they do not want 
American exports and they know that if we do not have fast track, 
corporations are going to build new plants in Brazil and new plants in 
Argentina and take the jobs out of the U.S. because they are going to 
go behind that barrier. The European Common Market wants you to vote 
``no.'' The European Common Market knows that for the first time since 
World War II, they are selling more to Argentina and more to Brazil 
than the United States. So the European Common Market hopes you will 
vote ``no.'' That is the goal they have, make sure the American 
President stays impotent.
  You say we are playing politics? It is the American President, 
William Clinton, who sent up the request for fast track, and who this 
year talked about how bitterly, that is his word, bitterly he regretted 
the defeat of fast track last year in his own caucus. We did not bring 
it up last year because we were told it was impossible because your 
unions would not let you vote.
  Well, most of you do not have an opponent now. Most of you do not 
have an excuse now. This is a vote of conscience. You can vote ``no,'' 
and when you vote ``no,'' particularly those of you who have said for 
years you were free traders, you tell us who is playing politics: The 
people who vote their conscience, the people who vote for history, the 
people who send the signal to the world that we actually believe and 
vote for free trade? Or those of you who were for free trade until it 
became inconvenient for the Democratic Party?
  You were for free trade until the unions told you, not this time, not 
on this bill, not last year, not this year. And you think the unions 
are going to tell you next year, oh, that is fine, Gephardt and Gore 
can be for free trade in 1999, because after all, there will not be a 
presidential nomination, the unions will not care.

  Let us be honest. The fact is the Democratic Party is wedded to 
protectionism and it is willing to give away Latin America to the 
Europeans, it is willing to allow the Brazilians to create a common 
market that excludes America, it is willing to have the world market 
grow without us and if necessary it is willing to send the signal to 
Asia, go ahead and withdraw from the world market. And for what gain?
  Now, you will say, ``Well, it hurts America.'' Today's Washington 
Post, Poverty Rate Fell, Incomes Rose in 1997. This is the great damage 
of NAFTA. Poverty is going down, incomes are going up, we have the 
lowest unemployment rate in 30 years, the lowest inflation rate in 30 
years, the lowest housing mortgage rate since 1967, because we have had 
the guts to compete in the world market, because our companies have 
grown leaner and tougher and smarter, because our farmers export, our 
small businesses export. 108,000 of the 113,000 exporters are small 
businesses. But that is not good enough. More jobs for Americans, more 
wealth.
  You think you are going to convince the Mexicans to establish a 
higher standard of child labor when you do not trade with them? You 
think you are going to convince El Salvador to create a higher standard 
of wealth when you do not trade with them? The fact is this 
administration could introduce a proposed child labor agreement with 
Mexico anytime it wants to. They could come up next week and introduce 
it as a freestanding bill and make it be heard on its merits. But that 
is an excuse.
  You know what the real issue is here. The real issue is, your union 
will not let you vote for free trade and you are willing to send a 
signal to the entire world at a time when a major firm was bailed out 
yesterday for $3.5 billion, an American firm, not a Japanese, not a 
Korean, not an Indonesian, an American firm, and in the middle of this 
level of instability, you yell partisan politics and then you vote 
partisan against your own rhetoric?
  I am not going to embarrass my colleagues by reading into the Record 
what they said, what their President has said, what the Vice President 
has said. Because when they go out of the country, they are for fast 
track. The fact is this year, the President said he is for fast track. 
This year the Vice President said he is for fast track. It is sad to 
see the partisan politics of the unions and the Democratic Party and 
yes, this may go down, but if this goes down and we end up in a steep 
worldwide recession, some of us will have had the comfort of knowing, 
we cast the right vote, we sent the right signal, and we tried to 
sustain what has worked for 50 years and not let the world slide back 
to what failed in the Great Depression.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 553, the 
previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.
  The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

[[Page H8805]]

  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 180, 
noes 243, answered ``present'' 3, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 466]

                               AYES--180

     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Christensen
     Clement
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hyde
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lofgren
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Northup
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Riggs
     Rogan
     Roukema
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     White
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--243

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Buyer
     Canady
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cook
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crapo
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Forbes
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Graham
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Inglis
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDade
     McGovern
     McHale
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Scarborough
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Young (AK)

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--3

     Blumenauer
     Martinez
     Skaggs

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Burton
     Fowler
     Furse
     Goss
     Hutchinson
     Jefferson
     Pryce (OH)
     Saxton
     Yates

                              {time}  1859

  So the bill was not passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________