[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 130 (Friday, September 25, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1818]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       HUMAN RIGHTS IN UZBEKISTAN

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 25, 1998

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, the situation in Russia seems 
to be deteriorating further every day. An enfeebled Boris Yeltsin, 
under pressure from a Communist-dominated parliament, has named Foreign 
Minister Evgenyi Primakov, the anti-American former chief spy, Russia's 
Prime Minister. As we watch this man entrusted with Russia's domestic 
policy while maintaining control over foreign affairs, our once fond 
hopes for political and economic reform in the former Soviet Union are 
fraying at the edge. The rout of Russia's so-called reformers has 
raised troubling questions about the policy of supporting one man in 
the name of security and stability.
  While the situation in Central Asia is very different, of course, 
there are some disturbing parallels. specifically, I rise today to 
discuss the depressing state of human rights and democratization in 
Uzbekistan, which the United States apparently has come to see as an 
anchor of stability in a complex region. The Departments of State and 
Defense have avidly pursued a relationship with Uzbekistan. I do not 
criticize them for doing so. Uzbekistan is the most populous country in 
Central Asia, and if it lacks the large-scale potential of Kazakstan or 
Turkmenistan to export oil and gas, it still has impressive reserves of 
natural resources. Moreover, its strategic location and its pro-
American stance bolster the case for good relations between Washington 
and Tashkent, especially in the face of longstanding neo-imperialist 
instincts in Russia.
  Nevertheless, Uzbekistan remains the second most repressive country 
among the new independent states, slightly ahead of benighted 
Turkmenistan. The rationale Tashkent offers for the acknowledged lack 
of freedom is the need to ensure stability. But President Islam 
Karimov's policies may well create the very dangers these policies are 
ostensibly designed to avert.
  Over the last ten years, it occasionally seemed Uzbekistan might 
develop towards genuine pluralism. Opposition movements were allowed to 
function, though under constant duress, from the late 1980s to mid-
1992. In December 1991, Karimov actually permitted an opposition leader 
to run against him. But since June 1992, when another opposition leader 
was nearly beaten to death in broad daylight, the regime has clamped 
down on all expressions of dissent. No opposition parties may function, 
opposition literature is confiscated, and Soviet-style censorship 
stifles freedom of the press. The authorities have even refused to 
register an independent human rights monitoring organization, although 
western human rights NGOs have been operating in Uzbekistan since 1996. 
Uzbek and western groups have compiled a list of some 35 political 
prisoners, not counting about 20 more caught up in a wave of mass 
arrests in the Fergana Valley last year.
  To mask these realities, President Karimov, like all the leaders of 
the new independent states, have adopted the fashionable rhetoric of 
democratization and created institutions which purportedly realize that 
goal. Under the guise of creating three branches of power, for example, 
Karimov has created a pocket parliament. Uzbekistan's judiciary, for 
its part, is wholly subordinate to the executive in political matters 
or corrupt in other cases. The government has also established human 
rights organizations, which distribute educational materials and 
supposedly work for the country's eventual democratization, while 
allowing the regime to show a reformist face to the international 
community.
  All of these issues are well known, as human rights groups can 
testify, and as the Helsinki Commission's reports and the State 
Department's annual reports document. But in the last year and a half, 
another issue has come to the fore: persecution of religious believers. 
It is true that Uzbekistan's constitution enshrines freedom of religion 
and Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism and Islam have emerged from Soviet-era 
repression into the open. But the local religious establishment has 
supported the government's campaign against non-traditional religions, 
including Protestant denominations. Uzbekistan's new legislation on 
religion is the most repressive in the former Soviet Union: as of 
August 15, any church with fewer than 100 members must close down and 
stop all activities. Church leaders who fail to comply will be subject 
to criminal charges. Churches that manage to register are strictly 
forbidden to engage in any proselytism or missionary activity, and 
private religious instruction is banned.
  This law contradicts OSCE commitments, under which freedom of speech 
applies to religion. But from the perspective of stability, the most 
worrisome development has been the campaign against Muslims who want to 
practice their faith outside Uzbekistan's religious establishment, 
which, like the parliament and judiciary, is under tight government 
control. Under cover of an attack on ``Wahhabism,'' a conservative form 
of Islam associated with Saudi Arabia, the authorities have cracked 
down on all expressions of piety. Men with beards and women covering 
their heads are subject to repression. Independent mosques have been 
closed, Imams have been arrested or ``disappeared'' and their followers 
intimidated. In late 1997, a full-fledged campaign against alleged 
Islamic radicals and criminals began in the Fergana Valley. Uzbek 
authorities charged that Islamic radicals beheaded a policeman and 
committed other crimes. But according to reports by Human Rights Watch/
Helsinki, the ensuing wave of arrests indiscriminately targeted pious 
Muslims. There is good reason to believe the claims of those arrested 
that they were tortured in jail, denied food, refused contact with 
their attorneys and forced to confess to crimes. the conduct of the 
trial, which Human Rights Watch representatives personally monitored, 
was appalling, with the judge ignoring the recantations of guilt 
extorted by torture and other blatant violations of due process.
  Mr. Speaker, let me be plain. I support freedom of religion, not 
Islamic fanaticism or criminal behavior. Moreover, I am concerned about 
reports by Uzbek officials, which knowledgeable Western journalists 
take seriously, that Islamic groups are training in Tajikistan and 
Pakistan to destabilize Uzbekistan by force of arms. The environment in 
the region is indeed worrying, considering that the radical Taliban has 
taken over most of Afghanistan, Iran remains hostile to western values 
and Islamic terrorists are threatening the physical security of 
Americans. But the blanket condemnation of Muslims in Uzbekistan is 
worse than unfair--it is counterproductive. Such a policy applied in 
Uzbekistan, where declining living standards are creating desperation 
in some quarters, could lead to a radicalization that might not have 
occurred otherwise.
  If this growing problem is to be addressed, Uzbek authorities must 
come to an understanding with the Islamic community based on a 
recognition that the government cannot control all aspects of society 
and certainly not matters of faith. Room must be found in Uzbekistan's 
political process for religious and political dissidents.
  It is not too late for such an initiative and a particularly timely 
opportunity is approaching: parliamentary elections are scheduled for 
1999. As of now, only government-created parties will be allowed to 
participate, whereas Erk and Birlik, the democratic-nationalist parties 
that arose in the late 1980s, remain banned. It is high time to readmit 
them to the political life of Uzbekistan.
  Mr. Speaker, for Uzbekistan, good relations with the United States 
are a critical basis of geostrategy. I intend to send this statement to 
President Karimov, and I hope that he takes to heart these well-meaning 
suggestions.

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