[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 126 (Monday, September 21, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10653-S10654]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY

  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, over the course of the past several 
months, I have come to the Senate floor on three occasions to discuss 
what I believe is the most important national security challenge we 
face today--reducing the risks associated with the spread and potential 
use of weapons of mass destruction. The depth and urgency of this 
challenge were dramatically illustrated in a recent article from 
Scientific American by Drs. Bruce Blair, Harold Feiveson, and Frank von 
Hippl. I am quoting from that article:

       [M]ilitary technicians at a handful of radar stations 
     across northern Russia saw a troubling blip suddenly appear 
     on their screens. A rocket, launched from somewhere off the 
     coast of Norway, was rising rapidly through the night sky. 
     Well aware that a single missile from a U.S. submarine plying 
     those waters could scatter eight nuclear bombs over Moscow 
     within 15 minutes, the radar operators immediately alerted 
     their superiors. The message passed swiftly from Russian 
     military authorities to the Russian President, who holding 
     the electronic case that could order the firing of nuclear 
     missiles in response, hurriedly conferred by telephone with 
     his top advisors. For the first time ever, that nuclear 
     briefcase was activated for emergency use.
       For a few tense minutes, the trajectory of the mysterious 
     rocket remained unknown to the worried Russian officials. 
     Anxiety mounted when the separation of multiple rocket stages 
     created an impression of a possible attack by several 
     missiles. But the radar crews continued to track their 
     targets, and just a few minutes short of the procedural 
     deadline to respond to an impending nuclear attack, senior 
     military officers determined that the rocket was headed far 
     out to sea and posed no threat to Russia.

  As I noted, this chilling excerpt was not taken from Tom Clancy's 
latest techno-thriller. It happened. The event described did not occur 
during the heart of the Cold War. It happened January 25, 1995. It was 
not an isolated incident. According to public sources, Russian nuclear 
missiles have automatically switched to launch mode several times.
  A look at the record since the January 25, 1995 incident demonstrates 
that, if anything, our concerns about Russia's early warning system, 
command and control system, and the morale of the people assigned to 
operate these systems, have only grown. That record is clear. No longer 
should anyone believe Russia's nuclear forces are exempt from the 
neglect and disarray that has been experienced by her conventional 
forces. A leading member of the Russian parliament, Lev Rokhlin, best 
summed up this deterioration: ``[Russia's] strategic nuclear forces are 
headed for extinction. There are no means to maintain the forces.'' The 
dramatic economic downturn in Russia's economic circumstances will only 
exacerbate this situation. Some may be tempted to take joy in this 
situation. They should not. As the event of January 25, 1995 reminds 
us, U.S. security is dependent on the reliability of Russia's strategic 
warning and launch control systems.
  Reasonable people can only ask the obvious question: with the Soviet 
Union dissolved and the cold war over

[[Page S10654]]

for nearly seven years, how can the United States and Russia continue 
to be one bad call away from a nuclear disaster?
  It is precisely for this reason that last September I sent a letter 
to the Congressional Budget Office asking them to assess the budget and 
security consequences of a series of measures designed to reduce the 
spread of nuclear weapons and the likelihood that they will ever be 
used. On Friday I received preliminary results from CBO on one means to 
accomplish this objective--improving Russia's confidence that it is not 
under attack by providing it with a global awareness of missile 
launches.
  CBO reaches several conclusions in its report. First, there are a 
number of deficiencies in Russia's ground- and satellite-based early-
warning systems. According to CBO, ``Russia's early warning radars will 
not detect all missile attacks, especially missiles launched on shallow 
trajectories from submarines.'' The situation is similar with respect 
to Russia's space-based platforms. Quoting CBO, ``Russia's satellite-
based early-warning system also has shortcomings . . . CBO has 
estimated that its [satellite] fleet currently provides coverage of the 
U.S. missile fields for less than 17 hours a day. Thus, Russia cannot 
depend on its fleet to detect a U.S. missile launch.'' Second, CBO 
states that, ``shortcomings in Russia's early-warning system can have a 
direct effect on the security of the United States.'' Nothing 
demonstrates this reality better than the Norwegian missile launch. 
Third, there are a variety of options available to the United States 
and Russia to address deficiencies in Russia's early warning system. 
Although CBO rightly asserts that further study is required to ensure 
that U.S. security is enhanced, not compromised, CBO lays out 5 options 
for U.S. policymakers. I ask that all of my colleagues take a look at 
this excellent study.
  It must be noted at this point that during the recently concluded 
U.S.-Russia summit, just days before CBO released its analysis to me, 
the Administration and the Russians reached agreement to implement the 
first of CBO's 5 options--sharing early warning information on the 
launch of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. I commend the 
Administration for this initiative. I believe it is a small but useful 
step. However, it does not fully address the underlying weaknesses in 
Russia's early warning systems. The proposal will give the Russians 
access to some of our early warning data but does nothing to improve 
Russia's own ability to collect and assess this same information.
  Therefore, much more needs to be done, not only in the area of early 
warning but elsewhere, if we are to reduce the risk of the spread and 
use of weapons of mass destruction to an acceptable level. As I stand 
here today--nearly 8 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the Cold War--the United States and Russia still possess nearly 
14,000 strategic nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of tactical 
nuclear weapons. Even more alarming, both sides keep the vast majority 
of their strategic weapons on a high level of alert, greatly increasing 
the likelihood of an unauthorized or accidental launch.
  Russia's current economic and fiscal woes only add to my sense of 
concern. Numerous press accounts point out that Russia's early warning 
sensors are aging and incomplete, its command and control system is 
deteriorating, and the morale of the personnel operating these systems 
is suffering as a result of lack of pay and difficult working 
conditions. The Washington Post ran an article just yesterday that 
illustrates how increasingly dire economic circumstances in Russia 
affect U.S. security. According to the Post, street protests are 
popping up all over Russia, including a town called Snezhinsk, home of 
a nuclear weapons laboratory where workers said they have not been paid 
for 5 months.
  I believe reducing the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction in 
Russia and elsewhere must be our number one national security objective 
in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, there are 3 initiatives the 
United States could take immediately that begin to address these risks: 
de-alerting a portion of the U.S. and Russian strategic and nuclear 
weapons, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and pushing for 
much deeper reductions in nuclear weapons than currently contemplated 
in START II.
  However, these measures alone are not enough. We must vigorously 
pursue other possible avenues, many of which may lie outside the 
traditional arms control process. Therefore, I have asked the 
Congressional Budget Office to explore the budgetary and security 
implications of numerous other ``non-traditional'' proposals. I 
understand this work is nearing completion and hope to report back to 
the Senate on CBO's findings before we adjourn. I look forward to 
working with my colleagues and the Administration in the next session 
of Congress to fully explore these proposals.

                          ____________________