[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 125 (Friday, September 18, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10578-S10579]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE--ELIMINATING TONS OF WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I traveled to the recent Summit meeting 
in Moscow. At that Summit, a protocol was signed that will, if 
successfully implemented, safeguard 50 tons of Russian weapons-grade 
plutonium and transform it into new forms that should ensure that it is 
never again used in nuclear weapons.
  I've placed special emphasis on this agreement for many months, and I 
invested a great deal of personal effort to achieve success. I welcome 
these recent steps. At the same time, I recognize that this protocol 
only creates an opportunity for real progress, we have to go far beyond 
just signing the protocol to secure the benefits that it can provide.
  I've spoken out in the past on the need to ensure that Russian stocks 
of weapons-grade materials do not find their way to terrorists or rogue 
states. The current financial crisis in Russia only adds further 
emphasis to these concerns. The former Soviet Union relied on guards 
and guns to safeguard their fissile materials. Now those guards may not 
have been paid for months--that has to increase our concerns. At the 
Summit we certainly heard about the tremendous burdens being borne by 
the Russian people from the current economic uncertainties and rampant 
inflation.
  Some programs already exist to improve the protection of nuclear 
materials. The Materials Protection Control and Accounting program is 
demonstrating some real successes in improving this situation. But the 
current opportunity to remove 50 tons of weapons-grade material from 
potential weapons use is most unique. I've worked to be sure that we 
quickly seize it. In fact, my visit to Russia in July with Senators 
Thompson and Grams was motivated largely by my interest in finding ways 
to progress more rapidly with this 50 tons.
  After that visit in July, I spoke with you about my misgivings with 
the Administration's plan to couple the rate of weapons dismantlement 
to the rate at which the weapons-grade plutonium could be used in 
reactors, as mixed-oxide or MOX fuel. At that time, the Administration 
was planning for Russia to use about 1.3 tons of this material per year 
in a set of Russian reactors. I argued that this was far too slow a 
rate. It would take 35 years to dispose of the 50 tons at that rate--
none of us can be the least bit sure that the current window of 
opportunity for progress with Russia will stay open anywhere near that 
long.
  In July, I proposed that we structure an agreement that decouples the 
initial steps in dismantlement from the final step of reactor use. 
Specifically, I believed that the Russians would accept a program that 
targets a goal for moving 10 tons per year of weapons-grade plutonium 
through the weapons dismantlement step, through conversion of 
classified shapes into unclassified ones, and into safeguarded storage. 
These steps have the effect of significantly reducing the risk that 
this material will be re-used in weapons.
  We still need to proceed with the final disposition of the Russian 
plutonium in reactors, and I want to accomplish that step as rapidly as 
possible as part of our overall integrated program on plutonium 
disposition. But construction of MOX fuel fabrication facilities, plus 
limitations on the number of reactors in Russia that can accept MOX 
fuel, will lead to slower progress for this final step.
  I discussed this approach with President Clinton in late July and 
encouraged that plutonium disposition be a focus of his next Summit. I 
appreciate his willingness to include this subject at the Moscow 
meetings.
  I've just recently corresponded again with the President to outline 
my suggestions on key principles that should guide our negotiations of 
the detailed agreements required to implement the new plutonium 
disposition protocol. In that letter, I repeated my strong advice that 
he appoint a special envoy charged with the entire plutonium 
disposition effort. This program requires coordination across multiple 
federal agencies, as well as negotiations with Russia and the G-7 
countries. In my view, an envoy who commands domestic and international 
respect, and who clearly has Presidential authority, is essential to 
expedite success.
  I listed six key negotiating points in my letter to the President. 
First, I emphasized that agreements must focus on rapid progress for 
the initial steps of the process, the dismantlement, conversion of 
classified shapes, and the safeguarded storage. These steps can and 
should be targeted at a rate of 10 tons per year.
  Second, all milestones that we establish to gauge progress must 
include sufficient transparency that we can be positive that agreed-
upon steps are accomplished.
  Third, Russian plutonium must eventually be used in MOX fuel, but the 
rate for this step will be much slower than 10 tons per year. 
Nevertheless, we need to make progress toward this ultimate goal and 
this step must be part of the overall integrated program. I also noted 
that in my conversations with Russian leadership, they are very 
sensitive to achieving the best utilization of their plutonium. They 
believe that new generations of reactors can best utilize some of their 
plutonium. I believe that we should respect their interests, as long as 
the weapons material is always stored under effective safeguards while 
awaiting eventual use.
  Fourth, we should minimize the construction of new Russian 
facilities. We should seek and perhaps help to convert some existing 
Russian facilities. For example, some of their weapon production 
facilities should be converted to weapon dismantlement.
  Fifth, it is important to involve the other G-7 countries. Plutonium 
represents a global risk prior to disposition and careful disposition 
of plutonium is a global benefit. For that reason, we should encourage 
meaningful participation from our G-7 friends as we work together on 
these goals.
  And finally, we should assure that any U.S. resources that subsidize 
the Russian Federation's program are provided only upon assurance that 
tasks and milestones were satisfactorily completed.
  It will be a challenge to negotiate agreements that follow these six 
points, but it is essential that we promptly start serious 
negotiations. I'm pleased to be informed by the Administration that the 
first discussions with the Russians on this subject will occur very 
soon.
  In closing, I want to note that this current emphasis on disposition 
of excess weapons materials is only one action in what I hope will be a 
long series of important steps toward dramatic reductions in global 
risks and tensions. This agreement is important, but it has to be 
followed by more agreements. Each of these subsequent agreements must 
be carefully and fully implemented, and should target further 
reductions in the large world-wide stocks of weapons materials.
  In order to achieve these reductions, new agreements have to be in 
place to inventory global sources of fissile materials; and obviously 
all nations will eventually have to participate to achieve real 
success. Other future agreements need to provide reliable counts of 
actual warheads, and eventually to dramatic reductions in the numbers 
of such warheads.

[[Page S10579]]

  Our long term goal should be a world without nuclear weapons, but 
that goal will only be achieved by many many years of patient progress 
toward intermediate goals. Each step along this journey must be focused 
on further reductions in global tensions and in risks of international 
conflicts.
  In the near term, I am committed to the importance of the disposition 
of the current 50 tons of Russian excess weapons-grade plutonium. We 
have a golden window of opportunity to rid the world of materials for 
thousands of nuclear weapons, we must not squander the chance.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mr. SESSIONS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico. He 
is truly a treasure for this Senate and the country in his knowledge of 
matters involving nuclear power and weapons. His leadership in this 
crucial area could in fact help us to avoid a tragedy in the future, 
and I think it is wonderful that he is continuing to show leadership on 
this important issue. I express my appreciation to the Senator.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.

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