[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 122 (Tuesday, September 15, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10332-S10335]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  GAO STUDIES FIND MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH CUSTOMS' ANTI-DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
                                PROGRAMS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to bring this body's attention 
to a number of very serious problems that have now been documented in 
the U.S. Customs Service's drug enforcement efforts at ports of entry 
on the Southwest Border.
  Back in March 1996, I asked the General Accounting Office to 
investigate the continuing influx of drugs entering our country across 
the border with Mexico, and the inability or unwillingness of the 
Customs Service to effectively address the problem. I was especially 
concerned about reports that trucks loaded with drugs were coming into 
the country without inspection by Customs.
  The investigation by the GAO over the past 18 months has now 
confirmed my long-standing concerns that there are major weaknesses in 
several Customs' programs that were supposed to help separate so-called 
``low-risk'' Mexican cargo shipments from those that are of higher drug 
smuggling risk.
  These programs were intended to help expedite the processing of cargo 
by companies with no previous involvement in narcotics smuggling, which 
had been thoroughly checked so authorities could focus on other 
shipments considered to be of significant risk of drug smuggling.
  The problems uncovered by the GAO's 18-month investigation are, by 
themselves, cause of serious concern. But what is also disturbing, is 
that the flow of large amounts of drugs through our ports of entry has 
apparently continued even while the GAO was conducting its research.
  Four reports in all have been issued by the GAO:
  Customs Service: Information on Southwest Border Drug Enforcement 
Operations (GAO/GGD-97-173R, Sept. 30, 1997).
  Customs Service: Process for Estimating and Allocating Inspectional 
Personnel (GAO/GGD-98-107, April 30, 1998).
  Customs Service: Drug Interdiction: Internal Control Weaknesses and 
Other Concerns With Low-Risk Cargo Entry Programs (GAO/GGD-98-175, July 
31, 1998).
  Customs Service: Internal Control Weaknesses Over Deletion of Certain 
Law Enforcement Records (GAO/GGD-98-187, August 21, 1998)
  The August 1998 report was particularly troubling and I sent a letter 
to

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Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin on August 17, 1998, asking for his 
response. To date, I have not heard back from him. I am also including 
a copy of this letter in the record.
  The problems identified in Customs' drug enforcement efforts at three 
cargo inspection facilities (Loredo, Texas; Nogales, Arizona; and Otay 
Mesa, California) have been occurring during a time when the North 
American Free Trade Agreement has stimulated significant increases in 
commercial trade.
  The increased trade generated by NAFTA has resulted in significant 
expansion of opportunities for drug trafficking organizations. This is 
largely because of the excellent ``cover'' commercial trade activity 
provides, according to a report issued by Operation Alliance, a 
federally sponsored drug enforcement coordinating agency in El Paso.
  The Operation Alliance Report clearly describes the ways in which 
drug smugglers are exploiting increased trade. Let me cite just a few 
examples of how drug traffickers are taking advantage of the increased 
trade generated by NAFTA:
  Traffickers are making extensive use of ``legitimate'' systems for 
moving drugs into the United States by becoming thoroughly familiar 
with Customs documents, procedures and processes.
  Traffickers are also becoming involved with well-known legitimate 
trucking firms that would be less likely targets of law enforcement 
scrutiny.
  Known drug traffickers are also involved as owners or controlling 
parties in other commercial trade-related businesses to assist in the 
storage and transportation of drugs, such as semi-trailer manufacturing 
companies, railroad systems, factories, distributing companies and 
warehouses.
  Some traffickers have sought trade consultants to determine what 
merchandise moves most quickly across the border under NAFTA rules.
  Against this backdrop of traffickers exploiting legitimate means of 
transporting cargo across the border for their own illicit smuggling 
operations, we now have the GAO finding disturbing evidence of problems 
in Customs' drug enforcement efforts.
  Problems found by the GAO include:
  Internal control weaknesses in a program known as ``Line Release,'' 
intended to identify and separate ``low-risk'' shipments from those 
with apparently higher smuggling risk. These flaws at all three of the 
above-mentioned border crossings are seriously jeopardizing the 
security of the program.
  Incomplete documentation of screening and review of applicants at 
Otay Mesa, as well as Nogales.
  Lost or misplaced Line Release application files and background 
checklists that served as support for approving applications. Otay Mesa 
officials were unable to locate 15 of 46 background checklists in the 
Line Release program.
  No recertification requirement for companies already approved for the 
Line Release Program to ensure that the participants remained a low 
risk for drug smuggling. (The Otay Mesa Port did recertify participants 
on the basis of their shipping volume criteria, but does not recheck 
those same companies for their compliance or perform follow-up 
background checks, the GAO said.)
  A lack of documentation of supervisory reviews and approval of 
decisions.
  Mr. President, given these problems in a program whose intent was to 
expedite crossing of low-risk shipments so more enforcement attention 
could be focused on high-risk shipments, the effectiveness of the Line 
Release program is called into question.
  Moreover, the GAO found that Customs officials themselves have little 
confidence in the ``Three Tier Targets'' concept, another enforcement 
initiative implemented in 1992, which was supposed to help identify 
low- and high-risk shipments so inspectors could focus their attention 
on suspect shipments.
  Under the program, Customs headquarters identified how cargo 
shipments would be divided into three-tier categories, but allowed the 
ports of entry to develop their own procedures for assigning risk.
  The GAO found that this program does not work because there is 
insufficient information in the Customs' database for researching 
foreign manufacturers. What this means is that the reliability of the 
risk designations, which range from ``little risk'' for narcotics 
smuggling to a ``significant risk,'' are questionable and therefore 
unreliable.
  The GAO report noted that some inspectors (at Laredo) were ``more 
suspicious of shipments classified as low risk because they had doubts 
about the reliability of the tier designations.'' Such doubts could 
lead to a self-defeating exercise in which inspectors checked more low-
risk shipments instead of focusing their attention on high-risk 
shipments, the GAO said.
  Although I have cited only a few of the numerous problems and 
concerns identified in the GAO reports dealing with low-risk cargo 
entry programs, they are sufficient to raise serious doubts about the 
effectiveness of Customs' drug enforcement efforts at our Southwestern 
Border Ports of Entry.
  But, unfortunately, there is more.
  The GAO also found significant internal control problems with a 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, which is used to compile 
lookout data for law enforcement purposes, including identification of 
persons and vehicles suspected of drug smuggling.
  The system is used by more than 20 federal agencies, including the 
INS, DEA, IRS and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. However, 
Customs did not have adequate controls over deletion of records from 
the system and Customs' guidance for its use does not follow standards 
set by the Comptroller General, and which renders it vulnerable to 
deletion of data without checks and balances by management.

  The bottom line: this could result in cargo shipments being expedited 
when they in fact should be stopped and searched.
  In addition to communications problems, and the previously cited 
weaknesses in the Line Release and Three-Tier Targeting program, the 
GAO also found problems with the processes for estimating and 
allocating inspection personnel at the ports.
  For example, under the current Customs' employees union contracts, 
inspectors can only be moved to new sites if they volunteer, which I 
find quite surprising.
  The GAO report also found that inconsistent practices in the agency's 
personnel decision-making processes could prevent Customs from 
accurately estimating the need for inspector personnel and allocating 
them to ports. This inability to quickly allocate resources to where 
they are needed most is just another hindrance in our drug interdiction 
efforts at the border.
  Mr. President, the problems go on and on. It's an alarming situation 
that demonstrates the Southwest Border is still, without question, 
ground zero in U.S. drug interdiction efforts.
  More than 70% of the cocaine and other narcotics entering this 
country come across our Southwest border. In fact, narcotics 
intelligence officials continue to warn that an estimated 5 to 7 tons 
of cocaine enters this country every single day of the year.
  In the last two years, Congress has authorized more than $100 million 
for 650 additional inspectors and state-of-the-art technologies along 
the Southwest border. The President's budget in FY1999 calls for an 
additional $104 million for Southwest Border drug interdiction efforts.
  Despite our best efforts and constant drum beat by Members of 
Congress, including myself, to try to tighten Customs' drug enforcement 
efforts, little progress has been made.
  Trucks are still getting through our ports of entry with their loads 
of illicit drugs concealed in cargo ranging from electronics components 
to vegetables, or in false compartments built into the trucks.
  For example, one of the largest cocaine seizures ever made in 
California's Imperial County occurred last November when Border Patrol 
agents found 835 pounds of the drug concealed in a tractor trailer rig 
of Mexican registry at a highway checkpoint about 50 miles north of the 
border. (Source: U.S. Border Patrol.)
  The next month Border Patrol agents seized 474 pounds of marijuana in 
another truck of Mexican registry in Calexico, CA., across the border 
from Mexicali, Mexico. (Source: U.S. Border Patrol)
  At the Otay Mesa Cargo Inspection facility, there have been 24 
seizures

[[Page S10334]]

within the last year of drugs found concealed in trucks and trailers, 
including those of two Line Release participants. (Source: information 
provided San Diego District Office by a Customs inspector.)
  And, in August of 1997, the New York Times News Service reported the 
following:

       For nearly a year, 18-wheel trailer trucks, driven by 
     experienced truckers recruited in Michigan, have been rolling 
     north from the Mexican border to New York, delivering tons of 
     concealed cocaine and marijuana and carrying back millions of 
     dollars in illegal drug profits.

  Authorities said the trucks were dispatched by Mexico's most powerful 
drug-trafficking syndicate, once headed by the late Amado Carillo 
Fuentes.
  A parallel investigation discovered the smuggling of at least 1.5 
tons of cocaine a month in crates of fruits and vegetables from Mexico, 
according to the New York Times Service article.
  One wonders if these cocaine-laden vegetable shipments were routinely 
passed through by border inspectors month after month because they were 
part of the Line Release or other Customs' programs that had classified 
the shipments as low-risk for drug smuggling.
  More than once, officials at Customs have told me that not only is it 
impossible to increase inspection of trucks and cars entering our 
borders, but that it is not really necessary. Customs is relying on its 
sophisticated technology, including electronic technology, random 
searches, and Customs' vast intelligence operations, to stop the drug 
smugglers.
  But the fact is, while Customs is having internal control problems, 
the drug traffickers have developed detailed knowledge and profiles of 
our port operations, and are using the ``cover'' that legitimate 
commercial trade activity provides to penetrate our borders and smuggle 
drugs.
  Additionally, the ``random'' searches that I have heard so much about 
are supposed to keep traffickers trembling in their ``big-rigs.'' But 
they have become so predictable that, as Customs has previously told my 
staff: ``traffickers know what cargo, conveyances, or passengers we 
inspect, how many of those conveyances are checked on an average day, 
what lanes we work harder, and what lanes are more accessible for 
smuggling.''
  Mr. President, I know how difficult this task is, and I want to 
commend the extremely hard working men and women of the United States 
Customs Service, but the impact of Customs' internal control problems 
have dire consequences in our fight against drugs in our cities and in 
our rural areas.
  But without effective internal controls over the Line Release 
program, the Three-tier risk program and other enforcement initiatives 
cited by the GAO, Customs' ability to detect drug smugglers and to 
interdict drugs at the border is seriously jeopardized.
  Mr. President, we must address the Customs' internal control problems 
now. We need to fix the problems before authorizing any additional 
programs that would further complicate our drug interdiction efforts at 
the border.
  As the ranking member of the Technology Terrorism Subcommittee on the 
Judiciary Committee, I hope to work with the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee to hold hearings on the issues raised by the GAO reports 
so that we can fully understand the problem and identify a long-term 
solution.
  I will work with the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee to identify a way for such hearings to be held without delay.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letters to GAO and to 
Secretary Rubin be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, August 17, 1998.
     Hon. Robert Rubin,
     Department of Treasury,
     Washington DC.
       Dear Secretary Rubin: I am writing to ask that you review 
     and respond to the weaknesses outlined in the enclosed recent 
     GAO study of Customs Services' drug interdiction and 
     enforcement programs along the Southwest border.
       The GAO study clearly indicates problems with the current 
     drug enforcement operations along the Southwest border, 
     particularly the Line Release program and the Three Tier 
     Targeting Program.
       The Line Release Program has weak internal controls. As you 
     may know, the Line Release program was created in 1986 on the 
     northern border and in 1989 on the southern border to 
     expedite shipments of those brokers, importers and 
     manufacturers who Customs considered a low risk for drug 
     smuggling based on specific guidelines set by the Customs's 
     Line Release Quality Standards.
       Of the three ports studied--Otay Mesa, CA, Laredo, TX and 
     Nogales, AZ--GAO identified one or more internal weaknesses 
     in the Line Release program as implemented at all of the 
     ports, seriously jeopardizing the security of the program 
     against drug smugglers.
       The internal control weaknesses found by the GAO include: 
     lack of specific criteria for determining applicant 
     eligibility at Nogales and Laredo; incomplete documentation 
     of screening and review of applicants at Otay Mesa and 
     Nogales; lack of documentation of supervisory reviews and 
     approval of decisions; lost or misplaced application files 
     and background checklists; (For instance, Nogales officials 
     were unable to locate 2 of 7 applications for companies 
     currently using the Line Release program, and could only 
     locate 1 of 7 Line Release checklists identified with the 
     applications on file. Otay Mesa officials were unable to 
     locate 15 of 46 background checklists in the Line Release 
     program.); and no recertification requirement under the Code 
     of Federal Regulations or Customs' implementing guidelines 
     for companies already approved for the Line Release Program 
     despite the fact that without recertification, there is no 
     assurance that the participants remain a low risk for drug 
     smuggling.
       All three ports have little confidence in the Three Tier 
     Targeting Program. The Three Tier Program allows Customs to 
     classify shipments into three tiers--little risk, unknown 
     degree of risk and significant risk--giving expedited 
     treatment for those shipments considered ``low risk''. GAO 
     reports that officials from all three ports agreed that this 
     program is not effective in distinguishing low to high risk 
     shipments since little information is in the database to 
     research foreign manufacturers and the reliability of the 
     risk designations are questionable. For instance, narcotics 
     seizures have been made from ``low risk'' shipments.
       GAO recommendations. The GAO report recommends that Customs 
     strengthen internal control procedures for the Line Release 
     application and review process and that Customs suspend the 
     Three Tier Program until more comprehensive data is available 
     for Customs to make risk assessments and give expedited entry 
     into the U.S. Furthermore, GAO suggests evaluating the 
     effectiveness and efficiency of pilot programs such as the 
     Prefile program and the Automated Targeting System being 
     tested at Laredo before expanding the program further.
       As you know, drug smuggling is an ongoing problem for 
     border states like California. I know you share my concern in 
     facilitating the flow of legitimate cargo into the United 
     States without jeopardizing our enforcement abilities against 
     illegal drug smuggling. I would appreciate your response on 
     the problems outlined by GAO as quickly as possible.
       With warmest personal regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                 Dianne Feinstein,
     U.S. Senator.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, March 6, 1996.
     Charles A. Bowsher,
     Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Comptroller General Bowsher: I am alarmed at the 
     continuing influx of drugs entering our country across the 
     border with Mexico, and at the inability or unwillingness of 
     the United States Customs Service to effective address this 
     problem.
       Mexico is a dominant source of drugs entering our country:
       75 percent of the cocaine in the United States comes here 
     through Mexico, according to the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration (DEA).
       70 to 80 percent of all foreign-grown marijuana enters the 
     U.S. from Mexico, according to the Boston Globe.
       90 percent of the precursor chemical ephedrine, used to 
     manufacture the rapidly-escalating problem drug 
     methamphetamine, comes through Mexico, according to the DEA.
       Colombian drug cartels are using Mexico as a safe haven to 
     store as much as 70 to 100 tons of cocaine to be smuggled 
     into the U.S., according to the DEA.
       Yet, faced with a problem of this magnitude, the Customs 
     Service, a critical enforcement agency at the Mexican border, 
     has been surprisingly and disappointingly ineffective.
       Last year, the Los Angeles Times reported that not one 
     pound of cocaine was seized from trucks at three of the 
     busiest ports of entry on the Southwest border in 1994.
       Despite the alarm which I expressed at this fact, and my 
     calls for corrective action, reporters from the Los Angeles 
     Times have told my staff that, according to sources at 
     Customs, this continued unabated in 1995, with no cocaine 
     seizures being made from trucks at Otay Mesa, Brownsville, El 
     Paso, and Laredo, four of the busiest ports. The Customs 
     Service has not yet responded to my staff's requests to 
     verify this fact.
       The Washington Post reported that cargo trucks, along with 
     ships, are considered a

[[Page S10335]]

     primary means of smuggling large amounts of narcotics into 
     the United States.
       In 1993, the then-District Director of the Customs Service 
     may have prevented investigators from the Inspector-General's 
     office from conducting a surprise inspection of the ``line 
     release'' program at the southwest border, an investigation 
     aimed at determining whether unauthorized trucks, potentially 
     carrying drugs, were allowed to cross the border without 
     inspection.
       The news program ``Dateline: NBC'' recently filmed more 
     than 35 trucks in just four hours of surveillance belonging 
     to companies on Customs' ``watch list'' for drug smuggling 
     rolling right through Customs, without being inspected.
       It has been reported that the organization of recently-
     arrested Mexican drug kingpin Juan Garcia Abrego has paid 
     millions of dollars to U.S. and Mexican law enforcement 
     officers. It seems inevitable that a substantial portion of 
     that money has gone to Customs officials, as they are 
     responsible for intercepting drugs at the ports of entry 
     along the Mexican border.
       As a Customs supervisor told the Washington Post, ``Tons 
     and tons of cocaine are crossing the border, and we're 
     getting very little of it.''
       The current pattern of drug flow and drug enforcement into 
     and within this country must be changed. To better understand 
     how federal law enforcement approaches these problems and the 
     efficacy of federal programs to curtail drugs, I am 
     officially asking the General Accounting Office to 
     investigate drug enforcement by the Customs Service.
       To target your resources, I ask that you focus initially on 
     evaluating the Customs Service's drug enforcement operations 
     at Otay Mesa. After you have evaluated Otay Mesa, I would 
     like to work with you to broaden this inquiry to the rest of 
     the Southwest border. Specifically, I would appreciate your 
     addressing the following questions regarding Otay mesa:
       Does the Commissioner of Customs provide clear direction to 
     Customs personnel regarding Customs' drug enforcement 
     mission?
       How have Customs' drug enforcement efforts been, or how 
     will they be, affected by their programs to facilitate trade 
     and passenger movement, including but not limited to: line 
     release; re-engineering primary passenger processing; and 
     expanded access by Mexican trucks to the U.S. pursuant to the 
     North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)?
       How have the percentage rates of inspections of trucks, 
     cars, and ships by Customs changed over the last three years?
       What increases in border crossings by trucks, cars and 
     ships does Customs expect over the next several years? Does 
     Customs have a reasonable basis for the projections it has 
     made? If Customs has not made such projections, why haven't 
     they, and was any consideration given to making them?
       Has Customs made adequate plans to meet any expected 
     increases in such border crossings?
       What is the basis for Customs' allocation of personnel 
     resources for carrying out their drug enforcement 
     responsibilities? Is this basis reasonable? Have Customs' 
     actual allocations of personnel matched their projections?
       What are Customs' processes for training their personnel in 
     their drug enforcement responsibilities?
       Why are trucks on Customs' ``watch list'' passing through 
     without inspection? Is it human error, corruption, systematic 
     flaws, or something else, and in any case what is necessary 
     to fix this? Do Customs personnel actually implement, on an 
     operational level, what Customs' law enforcement plans 
     describe that they do?
       Is the Los Angeles Times report that there were no cocaine 
     seizures from trucks at three or four of the busiest ports of 
     entry on the Southwest border in 1994 and 1995 accurate, and, 
     if so, what accounts for this?
       Is Customs following up and adequately using the 
     intelligence which they gather?
       How vulnerable are Customs' communication systems to 
     penetration by drug smugglers?
       What steps are Customs taking to address the problem of 
     ``spotters'' (individuals who linger around ports of entry, 
     radioing inspection patterns to smugglers on the other side 
     of the border)? How are these steps working?
       How are the Cargo search x-ray machines performing?
       It is imperative that we get to the bottom of the problems 
     at Customs, and I appreciate your assistance in this regard.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Dianne Feinstein,
                                                     U.S. Senator.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. As I understand it, 
we are in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak for up 
to 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Murkowski pertaining to the submission of (S. 
Res. 276) are printed in today's Record under ``Submission of 
Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.''
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GORTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________