[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 119 (Thursday, September 10, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10198-S10201]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        STATUS OF OPERATIONAL READINESS OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, only 8 years ago we went to war in the 
Persian Gulf as the most combat-ready force in the world. The value of 
that preparedness was clear. We won a massive victory in a few weeks 
over one of the largest armies in the world and we did so with 
remarkably few American and allied casualties. We were able to end 
aggression with minimum losses of civilian life and were even able to 
greatly reduce the casualties of our enemy. Today, our enormous 
preparedness, impressive military force, is beginning to evaporate.
  In spite of the efforts of our services, armed services, we are 
having significant problems again that remind me of the very difficult 
period during the 1970s when the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army came 
before the Congress and said we had a ``hollow army.'' We are losing 
the combat readiness and edge that is an essential aspect of 
deterrence, defense, and the ability to repel aggression.
  It is true that we have heard many reassuring words to the contrary 
from the administration. The fact is, however, that we are ``going 
hollow.'' We are losing our ability to get there ``fastest with the 
mostest,'' and the indicators are all too clear the moment we look 
beyond superficial indicators and the normal rhetoric of budget 
testimony.
  Mr. President, I have heard firsthand accounts from commanders in the 
field and in the fleet on the deteriorating status of the operational 
readiness of the U.S. military forces, including the availability of 
resources and training opportunities necessary to meet our national 
security requirements. Although the upcoming year's budget makes some 
strides to reverse 5 straight years of underfunding for both short-term 
and long-term modernization, I have serious concerns about the future 
state of preparedness of our units and our men and women in the 
military.
  The tangible evidence of this trend is contained in the words of 
nearly all the military witnesses who have testified this past year 
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services as well as before our 
House counterparts. Their statements do not reveal a single reason why 
we are going hollow or a single set of answers as to how these problems 
can be solved.
  Each service has a unique mix of readiness problems and has made 
different tradeoffs. At its core, however, is an alarming lack of 
concern on the part of the administration that repeatedly acts without 
regard for the most basic requirements for maintaining Armed Forces 
essential for our national security and promoting our national 
interests. The repeated and deliberate failure to match requirements, 
as set forth by the National Command Authority, with resources adequate 
to the task, compounded by the White House's unwillingness to budget 
for ongoing contingency peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, has 
over time clearly degraded military preparedness.
  Not to be ignored is the role of Congress in exacerbating this 
situation through its exceedingly damaging practice of wasting scarce 
financial resources on programs for strictly parochial reasons. That 
practice was harmful when we were adding to the administration's budget 
request in the context of the 1997 balanced budget agreement. And that 
harm is magnified manyfold.
  Mr. President, I have spoken many times of the wasteful spending 
practices embodied in the defense appropriations bill, and I will not 
go through the details again now. But the fact is that a lack of a Base 
Closing Commission commitment, the lack of a commitment to a balanced 
force, the continued unnecessary and unneeded funding for especially 
our Guard resources, and our inability to somehow make the transition 
to the post-cold-war requirements of a military that is ready to move 
anyplace in the world on short notice, is absolutely deplorable. And as 
I indict the administration, Mr. President, the Congress also bears 
enormous responsibility for our failure as well.
  In spite of the highest readiness funding in our history, we are 
having preparedness and readiness difficulties. Some recent examples 
noted by experts

[[Page S10199]]

are--and I quote a memorandum dated August 20, 1998, from General 
Bramlett, Commander-in-Chief of Forces Command, to Army Chief of Staff 
General Reimer. General Bramlett wrote:

       . . . we can no longer train and sustain the force, stop 
     infrastructure degradation, and provide our soldiers the 
     quality of life programs critical to long term readiness of 
     the force . . . we cannot operate within current funding 
     levels and have the viable fighting force we want to project 
     into the next century. Operation and maintenance funding 
     levels are no longer sufficient to ``make it happen'' and 
     avoid serious long-term negative impacts to the force. 
     Commanders of Fort Lewis, Stewart, and Bragg [all 
     installations home to major contingency ``first-to-deploy'' 
     units] report units will drop below authorized training 
     levels in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999. This 
     threatens our ability to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. 
     Current funding levels place FORSCOM's ability to accomplish 
     its mission at an unacceptable risk.

  Mr. President, let me repeat: ``Current funding levels place 
FORSCOM's ability to accomplish its mission at an unacceptable risk.'' 
Mr. President, I want to remind you, these are not my words but the 
words of General Bramlett who is the Commander-in-Chief of Forces 
Command and contained in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the 
Army.

       Current funding levels place FORSCOM's ability to 
     accomplish its mission at an unacceptable risk.
       We must have additional funding for FY 99 and beyond.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire memorandum 
from General Bramlett to General Reimer be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Department of the Army, Headquarters United States Army 
           Forces Command,

                  Fort McPherson, GA, August 20, 1998.

 Memorandum for Chief of Staff, United States Army, 200 Army Pentagon, 
                             Washington, DC


                   subject: fy 99 funding assessment

       1. The FORSCOM commanders have recently completed their 
     review of resource requirements against their FY 99 funding 
     distribution. My guidance was to maintain training (go-to-
     war) readiness at the expense of infrastructure and Quality 
     of Life (QOL) if they could not balance the requirements of 
     all three. They have done their best to implement this 
     guidance, but we can no longer train and sustain the force, 
     stop infrastructure degradation, and provide our soldiers the 
     QOL programs critical to long term readiness of the force. 
     Commanders remain fully committed to supporting force 
     readiness, but we cannot operate within current funding 
     levels and have the viable fighting force we want to project 
     into the next century.
       2. We can provide trained and ready units in FY 99, but we 
     anticipate some drop in reported readiness levels as the year 
     progresses. Our BASOPS accounts have only marginal funding 
     levels, and Real Property Maintenance (RPM) accounts are 
     nearly depleted at many of our installations. The OMA funding 
     levels are no longer sufficient to ``make it happen'' and 
     avoid serious long-term negative impacts to the force. These 
     insufficient funding levels are further degraded by refined 
     TRM cost factors, by the inability to achieve the programmed 
     efficiencies, and by the increased funding for contracting 
     support. Our flexibility is further hampered by stovepipe 
     funding for specific programs that have become a larger 
     percentage or our total budget.
       3. Despite considerable efforts to conserve scarce training 
     resources at the expense of QOL and infrastructure, unit 
     readiness will be degraded. Commanders at Forts Lewis, 
     Stewart, and Bragg report units will drop below ALO in the 
     fourth quarter of FY 99. This threatens our ability to 
     mobilize, deploy, fight, and win.
       4. In FY 98, we mortgaged infrastructure and QOL to 
     maintain training readiness. BASOPS and RPM were underfunded 
     again, but with little migration ($18M) as we needed every 
     dollar for training. Infrastructure maintenance and repair 
     are now funded below survival levels. FY 99 marks the second 
     consecutive year in which FORSCOM could not fund installation 
     infrastructure repair beyond ``break and fix.'' The most 
     critical unfunded repairs totaling $215M are: sewer and 
     utility systems--$49M; barracks roofing/heading/and air 
     conditioning repair--$59M; roofs on maintenance and ammo 
     facilities--$10M; bridges and roads--$29M; training and 
     operations facilities repairs--$7M; and other general 
     facility repair projects--$60M. Of immediate concern is our 
     inability to resource food service contracts which drives us 
     to the associated alternative of possibly returning our 
     soldiers to perform kitchen and dining facility attendant 
     duties. Base Information management operations, the DOIMs, 
     were hit especially hard. This account is down more than 30 
     percent from FY 98, severely affecting base automation, 
     printing, and automation equipment accounts. Commanders state 
     that shortfalls will ``render infrastructure, QOL, and 
     BASOPS(-) non-mission capable.''
       5. We fully understand that many of our unfunded 
     requirements can only be realized with an increase in the 
     overall funding level for the Department, and we continue to 
     advocate that goal. As part of our assessment, we have 
     identified those UFRs requiring funding by way of Funding 
     Letter inserts as well as other critical UFRs to be worked 
     through the year of execution. Those items requiring 
     additional funds within our funding letter include: Food 
     Services and Dining Facility Operations--$10.1M; AC/RC 
     Support--$15.6M; AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions--$4.1M; Digital 
     Training--$18.5M; Force Modernization--$18.6M; and Commercial 
     Activities Studies--$3.2M.
       6. Our Executive Agent role in the DCSC4 areas demands 
     intense management as we act on the Army's behalf. To 
     resource the requirements of these missions in FY 99 will 
     require: an additional $26.3M in funding letter inserts for 
     Long Haul Commo; $14.1M for sustainment of the new Command 
     and Control Protect mission; and $1.7M for support of the 
     Defense Red Switch Network. In addition, we request that 
     Europe's portion be provided to them as was done in the POM.
       7. AC/RC Support (Training Support XXI) continues to be 
     significantly underfunded as we transition into the new 
     Support to Operational Training Functional Area Assessment 
     (SOT-AA) Integrated alternative structure. This structure 
     will be fully staffed in FY 99 after a ramp-up year in FY 98. 
     The funding requirement is inherently heavy in TDY, as 
     observer/controllers/evaluators and other training 
     assistance personnel must travel to the associated RC 
     units and training sites. We are concerned about our 
     ability to fully perform this growing mission. In 
     addition, the new AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions that will 
     begin to stand up provisionally on 1 October 1998 are 
     unfunded in FY99. These shortages are particularly acute 
     in the context of our stated commitment to the Total Army.
       8. As we move toward fielding a digitized force, we need 
     resources for robust digital training events and associated 
     training infrastructure upgrades. Funding tails become major 
     cost drivers as the Army moves from Advanced Warfighting 
     Experiments (AWE) and applique to equipping and training the 
     digitized force. Insufficient funding continues to delay 
     modernization of many training support facilities. The TRM 
     process needs to better resource training support 
     infrastructure such as ranges, simulation facilities, 
     transportation networks to/from/in and around ranges, 
     targetry, and maneuver boxes.
       9. My assessment is not good news. Funding has fallen below 
     the survival level in FY 99. The commanders are concerned 
     that they can not meet the daily challenges of the three 
     imperatives of readiness: training, QOL, and infrastructure. 
     Our commitment to doing our part in reengineering, creative 
     training strategies, and best business practices has never 
     been stronger. Current funding levels place FORSCOM's ability 
     to accomplish its mission at an unacceptable risk. We must 
     have additional funding for FY 99 and beyond.

                                            David A. Bramlett,

                                                     General, USA,
                                                       Commanding.

  Mr. McCAIN. He ends up by saying:

       My assessment is not good news. Funding has fallen below 
     the survival level in FY 99. The commanders are concerned 
     that they cannot meet the daily challenges of the three 
     imperatives of readiness: Training, QOL [meaning quality of 
     life], and infrastructure. Our commitment to doing our part 
     in reengineering, creative training strategies, and best 
     business practices has never been stronger. Current funding 
     levels place FORSCOM's ability to accomplish its mission at 
     an unacceptable risk.

  It is a very, very strong statement, Mr. President. I have been 
associated with the military all my life, and I have not seen quite 
that strong a statement or a stronger statement than that from one of 
our commanders in the field.
  The Air Force's 1st Fighter Wing, with primary responsibility for the 
Middle East, has experienced a prolonged period of declining 
preparedness, as squadrons are forced to deploy at physically and 
mentally exhausting rates while spare parts shortages result in the 
cannibalization of fighters from one squadron to ensure another can 
deploy on schedule.
  Naval aviators have stated to Armed Services Committee members and 
staff that the frequency of deployments has placed excessive stress on 
their personal lives, with the result that many are leaving the service 
for higher paying, less stressful jobs with the commercial airlines. 
That operational tempo is a direct result of the convergence of 
shrinking force structure and increased deployments to overseas 
contingencies.
  The commander of the 3rd Fleet, Vice Adm. Herbert Browne, testified 
before the Readiness Subcommittee that the shortage of skilled 
personnel has resulted in crossdecking, which places enormous 
additional stress on those

[[Page S10200]]

personnel remaining in the service. ``Crossdecking,'' Mr. President, 
means when a ship comes back from a deployment, the personnel of that 
ship, rather than being allowed to come home, then move to another ship 
that is headed out on another deployment--an absolutely unacceptable 
practice.
  During the same hearing, the commander of an Air Force fighter wing 
operations group testified that his unit's full mission capable rates 
have consistently dropped from 90 percent in 1993, to 80 percent in the 
1995 time frame, down to 70 percent for the present.
  Radar and jet engine mechanics told ABC News reporters of their 
growing frustration with shortages of spare parts to repair aircraft 
and of the exodus from the service of skilled mid-level maintenance 
people, with the result that aircraft sit idle and less skilled 
personnel are assigned vital maintenance and repair work. On the same 
broadcast, the commander of Air Combat Command stated that his command 
has ``suffered about a 10 percent to 12 percent decline in the average 
readiness of our fleet from day-to-day.''
  In a June 1998 letter from Admiral M.G. Mullen, Director of Surface 
Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operations staff wrote to every 
surface warfare commanding officer soliciting ideas to turn around 
retention amongst surface warfare junior officers. In his letter he 
wrote, ``I can also tell you we are only retaining about 1 in 4 and we 
must keep 1 in 3 to develop the leaders our Navy needs.''
  In a San Diego Union-Tribune article on September 2, 1998 during an 
interview with Admiral Clemins, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, it was reported that the Navy is short 18,000 sailors, forcing 
the Navy to send many warships including carriers to the Persian Gulf 
at a reduced level of readiness, specifically a C-2 rating, only the 
second highest level of readiness.
  According to a 1998 article in the Army Times, the mission of the 
Army has increased by 300 percent since 1989, yet its active duty force 
has declined by 36 percent and its budget by 40 percent. These facts 
have resulted in a severe decrease in the level of operational 
readiness for the service and led former Assistant Vice-Army Chief of 
Staff of the Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to describe divisions 
as ``hollow.''
  Colonel Stephen E. Bozarth, Commander of the 388th Operations Group, 
testified before the Readiness Subcommittee that although the current 
experience level of the pilots of the Wing is 77 percent, it is 
expected to degrade over the next 18 months to approximately 50 
percent. Such a loss in experience results in not only untrained 
personnel fulfilling necessary pilot positions but also an inadequate 
number of people to train these individuals. Moreover these losses 
necessitate that pilots who choose to remain in the service work longer 
and harder hours, thus creating a serious strain on morale.
  Vice Admiral Browne also testified this year that inadequate fuel 
supplies are depriving pilots of strike fighter jets the flight hour 
training necessary for familiarization of the aircraft. Lack of such 
training will result in the substandard performance of these men and 
women in the multi-threat environment in which they currently operate.
  The commander of the Air Warfare Center (AWFC), Major General Marvin 
Esmond, testified before the Readiness Subcommittee that those under 
his command have experienced a six month slip in skill improvement due 
to delays in specialized training. Such delays are a direct consequence 
of a lack of manpower. This loss in personnel has also required that 
the servicemen and women work 60-65 hours per week as well as 12 hour 
duty shifts.
  Major General Ronald Richard, Commanding General of the Marine Corps 
Air Ground Combat Center, voiced concerns over equipment readiness to 
the Readiness Subcommittee. According to the general, a majority of his 
equipment is ``getting exceedingly old,'' a fact which has led to 
increased maintenance as well as excessive expenditure.
  In order to understand the issues involved, it is necessary to 
understand just how difficult it is to achieve the level of military 
preparedness we enjoyed during Desert Storm. Military preparedness is 
the product of readiness and sustainability, the former referring to 
the ability of forces to go to war on short notice, the latter the 
ability to support them in the field. Preparedness is not just a matter 
of funding operations and maintenance at the proper level. It is not 
only a matter of funding adequate numbers of high quality personnel. It 
is not simply a matter of funding superior weapons and munitions, 
strategic mobility and prepositioning, high operating tempos, realistic 
levels of training at every level of combat, or logistics and support 
capabilities.
  Military preparedness is all these things and more. A force begins to 
go hollow the moment it loses its overall mix of combat capabilities in 
any one critical area. Our technological edge in Desert Storm would 
have been meaningless if we did not have properly trained men and 
women. Having the best weapons system platforms in the world would not 
have given us our victory if we had not had the right command and 
control facilities, maintenance capabilities, and munitions.
  The preparedness problem within the military is compounded by both 
the ``can do'' attitude of the military and the history of military 
readiness reporting. On the one hand, our men and women in uniform have 
a history of making do, of adjusting to civilian decisions, and working 
out potential solutions even at the cost of assuming higher risks. An 
example of this is the continued practice of the Marine Corps to 
retread the tires of the humvees (HMMVV's) and five-ton trucks of the 
First and Second Marine Expeditionary Forces.
  On the other, we have been very slow to modernize and integrate our 
various measures of effectiveness, to independently audit command 
reporting, and to adopt modern management information systems. Time and 
again, we have learned that our readiness measures are unrealistic or 
fail to anticipate real-world demands on readiness funds and budget 
cuts. Time and again, we have seen peacetime claims of ``can do'' turn 
into wartime realities of ``can't fight.''
  Mr. President, in mid-July I sent letters to each of the Service 
Chiefs expressing my concern about the military's overall state of 
readiness. In order that I might gain a better understanding of current 
readiness and readiness trends in the military, I asked each Service 
Chief to provide detailed answers to questions by September 30, 1998, 
from all levels within the military and not just the typical Pentagon 
talk that we have become used to during the multitude of hearings that 
surround the defense budget cycle. In addition, I requested that the 
responses to the questions also include an assessment of National Guard 
and Reserve readiness. Mr. President, I intend to share these answers 
with my colleagues and make them widely available to the public. It is 
critical that not only Members of Congress, but all Americans should be 
fully informed on the state of our military so that they can 
participate in any discussions in the near future to add money to the 
defense budget and reprioritize critical resources within the military.
  Very often, those who question the Administration's commitment to 
maintaining proper levels of military preparedness are accused of 
exaggerating the scale of the problem through the random marshaling of 
anecdotal information. These criticms, to say the least, are without 
merit. If a pattern of evidence cannot be seen as leading to a logical 
conclusion, then the basis for rational, objective intellectual 
discourse is thoroughly discredited. This ``anecdotal evidence'' 
increases every year, is discovered through visits to the field to meet 
with military personnel of all ranks, through congressional hearings, 
media reports and scholarly studies, and is beyond dispute.
  My President, this will be as true in the future as it was during 
Desert Storm, and it has been true throughout the history of warfare. 
As Sun Tzu pointed out over 2,000 years ago, ``It is a doctrine of war 
not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's 
readiness to meet him. It is a doctrine of war not to presume that he 
will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible.''
  I make those statements concerning military readiness in the context 
of what is happening in the world today.

[[Page S10201]]

 When you glance around the globe you find that there is a potential 
trouble spot in literally every continent of the world with the 
exception of the two poles and perhaps Australia. We find this 
situation in Kosovo with ethnic cleansing where our Secretary of State, 
several months ago said, and I believe the quote is accurate, ``We will 
not allow the Serbs to do in Kosovo what we prevented them from doing 
in Bosnia.'' The last time I checked, Mr. President, they were doing 
quite a bit of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and the situation continues 
to worsen.
  In Iraq, we have gone from a position where our Secretary of State 
said we would respond with military force if Saddam Hussein refused to 
allow our U.N. inspectors access to any installation that they 
desired--would be met with military force. Now, according to Scott 
Ritter and other reports, the administration has been encouraging 
UNSCOM not to inspect.
  The situation in Asia is serious. Riots are taking place in Indonesia 
as we speak. The nation that the World Bank a year and a half ago did a 
study on as a model nation for economic development, now had the 
privilege of seeing its President go on nationwide television in 
Indonesia and recommended that the Indonesian people not eat 2 days a 
week because of food shortages.
  We have seen the administration surprised by the nuclear tests 
conducted by both India and Pakistan.
  We have now apparently circumstantial evidence that technology was 
transferred to China, which either marginally or substantially, 
depending on which expert you talk to, increased the precision 
targeting capability of Russian ICBMs until recently, 12 of which were 
targeted on the United States of America--now are not--but in a matter 
of seconds could be retargeted.
  Mr. President, I could go on. But the fact is that the world is a 
very tough neighborhood and requires a tough cop. The cop is now not on 
the beat and bad things are happening all over the world, which makes 
it even more likely that we may have to call upon the United States of 
America to again expend its blood and treasure somewhere in the world. 
The very least we can do is make sure that those men and women who we 
have to send somewhere are the best equipped and trained as we possibly 
can make them. What I greatly fear is that we may have to send them 
less than well prepared, less than ready, and less than well equipped, 
which then leads to the inevitable consequence of casualties that are 
unnecessary and tragic.
  Mr. President, I intend to talk more on this issue. I think it is an 
important one. I also remind my colleagues that we--the traditional 
protectors of the military--have an obligation to address this issue as 
well as the administration. Mr. President, I thank the Chair for his 
patience and for presiding at this late hour.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SESSIONS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning 
business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________