[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 118 (Wednesday, September 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10045-S10059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Under the previous order, there 
will now be 45 minutes of debate on the motion to proceed to S. 1873, 
the American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the issue we are debating this morning is 
not new to the Senate. In May of this year, the Senate voted on a 
motion to invoke cloture so that we could proceed to consider the 
American Missile Protection Act. That motion was not successful. The 
vote was 59 in favor and 41 against. Therefore, we fell one vote short 
of invoking cloture so the Senate could proceed to debate the American 
Missile Protection Act.
  We have another chance today, Mr. President, to go on record in favor 
of considering this bill. So it should be put in context what we are 
voting for and what we are not voting for. We are not voting to pass 
the bill without any debate. That is not the issue. We are voting to 
proceed to consider the bill. Now let us put in context what the facts 
are today as compared with last May when we fell just one vote short of 
voting to consider this bill.
  At the time we voted in May, India had just tested--that very day--
for the second time, a nuclear weapons device. We were not aware that 
India was going to conduct that test. Our intelligence community was 
surprised. All the world was surprised.
  We used that example to urge the Senate to change our current policy 
on national missile defense, because the current policy is that we will 
make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system if we learn 
that some nation has developed the capacity to put us at risk, to 
threaten the security of American citizens with a ballistic missile 
system.
  So the assumption is that our intelligence community and our 
resources for learning things like this are so sophisticated and so 
reliable that we will be able to detect this, that we will have an 
early warning, that we will be able to know well in advance of any 
nation having the capability of inflicting damage or destruction on 
America's soil, through a ballistic missile system, in enough time that 
we could deploy a national missile defense system.
  Another consideration is that we have not yet developed a national 
missile defense system. We have various

[[Page S10046]]

programs that are being tested in various stages of development--
theater ballistic missile defense systems--that can defend us against 
regional attacks, shorter-range attacks. But this bill is talking about 
a national ballistic missile defense system and whether or not our 
policy should be to wait and see if other countries develop the 
capability to put us at risk and then decide--then decide--whether we 
should work to deploy a system to protect against that kind of threat.
  What has changed since the vote in May is that not only did Pakistan 
proceed to test a nuclear device--we were not sure they were going to 
do that--they also had just recently tested a missile system that we 
did not know they had. We had been told a few months earlier that they 
had a missile system that was in the 180 mile range. They tested one 
that had a range of about 900 miles without our knowing they had the 
capability to do that, without our knowing that they had that missile. 
But they had acquired either the missile, the component parts, or the 
design from other countries or another country--according to press 
reports, North Korea was involved in that--and they were able to 
actually launch that across that distance, and it was a surprise to our 
intelligence community, to our country and to the world.
  Those events occurred about the time we voted in May. Since then, 
look what has happened. Iran has tested a longer-range missile than we 
expected them to have. North Korea has tested and has fired a multiple-
stage ballistic missile. We had discussed the fact that that was 
possibly under development, the Taepo Dong missile. We are calling it 
the Taepo Dong I because we are told that there is a Taepo Dong II 
under development. That has been publicly reported in the press.

  The missile that was tested the other day by North Korea, the 
multiple-stage missile, was fired over Japan. There was evidence that 
the missile actually crossed the territory of Japan. Do you realize, 
Mr. President--I know Members of the Senate are aware--that we have 
some 37,000 Americans deployed in South Korea as a part of a defense 
stability effort in that region, and we have more than that in Japan, 
in the Okinawa area?
  The whole point is that if you consider all of that, we have 80,000 
Americans who are at risk now because of the proven capability of North 
Korea and its new advanced missile capability. We have gone to great 
lengths in the last few years to dissuade North Korea from proceeding 
to develop nuclear weapons. We were very concerned that they were 
proceeding to do just that. Some think that they have made substantial 
progress in doing just that.
  Incidentally, the Taepo Dong II that I just mentioned has the 
capacity of striking the territory of the United States. Many troops 
and military assets and resources are located in Alaska. According to 
press reports, the Taepo Dong II would have the capacity to destroy 
that area, as well as striking Hawaii.
  Now, the issue is, do we proceed with the wait-and-see policy of this 
administration, or do we today vote to proceed to consider legislation 
that will change that policy, that will say as soon as technology 
permits, the United States will deploy a national missile defense 
system that will protect it against ballistic missile attack, whether 
unauthorized or accidental or intentional. We have all worried about 
accidental and unauthorized launches from China and Russia. We know 
those countries have the capability of striking us. But think about 
this other fact: What else has changed recently?
  The United States has observed the Russian Government slowly 
deteriorate to the point that the command and control structure of the 
military is seriously in question. Who really controls the armed forces 
of Russia to the point that you can rely upon the good intentions of 
the Yeltsin government not to target U.S. sites with their missile 
systems, their intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most lethal and 
accurate of any other country in the world, with multitudes of 
warheads, nuclear-tipped warheads? We are sitting here hoping and 
assuming that we can continue to work with Russia and whatever 
government does come out of the struggle for power there to continue to 
destroy nuclear weapons under Russian control rather than to build them 
up and make them more accurate and lethal.
  By the way, it is not like they have dismantled the nuclear weapon 
systems in Russia. They exist. They are lethal. They are capable of 
striking anywhere in the United States they might decide to strike, and 
we are glad that they don't have any intention of doing that. But they 
have the capability of doing that and there could be an unauthorized or 
accidental launch and we have absolutely no defense against that kind 
of attack. We have been operating under the assumption that we can 
assure them we will retaliate--we have the capacity to--and we will 
destroy any country who attempts to strike us in that way. That has 
been the system for defense that we have had.
  We have had no defense. The defense is that we will destroy you if 
you attack us in that way. That doesn't work with North Korea or Iran 
or some other rogue states, leaders, and terrorists who have announced 
that it is their stated goal to kill Americans and to destroy America 
and to build missile systems to do that or to sell missile systems to 
those who want to do that. North Korea said just that. An official 
stated publicly that they are in the business of selling missile 
systems. They need the money. That was the explanation. We know that is 
true. They have sold missile systems; they have sold component parts. 
Russia has people who are cooperating in Iran right now, and have in 
the past, to develop systems that could inflict great damage not only 
in that region but beyond.
  Now, some are saying that we already have authorization and funds in 
the pipeline to develop these missile systems to protect us--
interceptor missiles--and we read about the testing that is going on of 
theater systems. But we have no program that has as its goal the 
development and deployment of a missile defense that will protect the 
United States against unauthorized, accidental, or intentional 
ballistic missile attack.
  That is what this legislation addresses. It has two parts. The first 
is recitation of all of the facts that we have been able to gather 
through hearings over the last 2 years in our Subcommittee on 
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. We have 
had hearings. We have published a report called Proliferation Primer. 
It has been widely distributed. It documents the fact that throughout 
the world there is a growing capability for the use of ballistic 
missiles.
  We talk about how it is happening and what people are saying who are 
in charge of those countries who are involved in this. It clearly, in 
our view, justified our asking this Congress to legislate a change in 
our policy to carry out now the express recommendations of the Rumsfeld 
Commission, which has, since our vote in May, given its report on the 
state of affairs regarding the ballistic missile threat to the United 
States. It was concluded in that report that our intelligence community 
does not have the capacity for making the early warning assessment that 
is contemplated under current administration policy.
  The Director of Central Intelligence has admitted in previous 
statements to the Senate that there are gaps and uncertainties in the 
information that his agency can obtain in making decisions about 
whether or not countries are developing or have the capacity to deploy 
ballistic missile systems that put our Nation at risk. Now that 
assessment and that description of the situation has been borne out by 
those recent developments.
  Admiral Jeremiah made a recent study of our intelligence agencies in 
the wake of some of these events, and he reported a similar problem.
  Given those facts, Mr. President, it seems clear to me, the 
cosponsors of this legislation, and 59 Senators, that the time has come 
to change the policy from wait and see to proceed as soon as 
technologically possible to deploy a national missile defense system to 
protect the security interests of the United States and its citizens. 
There is no higher responsibility that this Government has--no higher 
responsibility, no priority any greater--than the security of U.S. 
citizens. We are putting that security at risk, Mr. President, under 
the current policy. It is as clear as anything can be.

[[Page S10047]]

  The time has come today--this morning at 9:45 a.m.--to vote to 
proceed to consider this proposal, which simply calls for the 
deployment, as soon as technology permits, of a national missile 
defense system.
  Mr. President, I urge Senators to vote in support of the motion to 
invoke cloture.
  I ask unanimous consent that several articles pertaining to this 
subject be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, July 16, 1998]

        Panel Says U.S. Faces Risk of a Surprise Missile Attack

                           (By Eric Schmitt)

       Washington--Rogue nations or terrorists could develop and 
     deploy ballistic missiles for an attack against the United 
     States with ``little or no warning,'' an independent 
     commission announced Wednesday.
       But senior American intelligence officials disputed the 
     finding, which challenges a longstanding intelligence 
     estimate that no country except Russia and China, which 
     already possess ballistic missiles, could hit American 
     targets, and that North Korea could perhaps field long-range 
     missiles before 2010.
       The unanimous conclusions of the bipartisan commission, 
     headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, provide 
     fresh ammunition for supporters of a national missile 
     defense, and sharpen an election-year issue that Republicans 
     want to wield against the administration and Democrats in 
     Congress.
       ``It's a very sobering conclusion,'' said Speaker Newt 
     Gingrich, a strong supporter of national missile defenses, 
     who called on the administration to work with Congress in the 
     next several months to address the heightened threat as 
     described in the report.
       The United States has spent more than $40 billion since the 
     Reagan administration to build a space- or land-based defense 
     against ballistic missile strikes, but has yet to construct a 
     workable network.
       Indeed, a report Wednesday by the General Accounting 
     Office, the auditing arm of Congress, concluded that it is 
     unlikely that a program to develop a national missile defense 
     will meet an important deadline in 2000.
       The commission did not address the merit of any particular 
     defensive system, focusing instead on the ballistic missile 
     threat to the United States.
       ``The major implication of our conclusions is that warning 
     time is reduced,'' said Rumsfeld, who was defense secretary 
     under President Gerald Ford. ``We see an environment of 
     little or no warning of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. 
     from several emerging powers.''
       The commission singled out North Korea, Iran and Iraq for 
     scrutiny. For example, the panel's report said, ``We judge 
     that Iran now has the technical capability and resources 
     to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile'' similar 
     to a North Korean model.
       But in a letter sent to Congress on Wednesday, George 
     Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, said the 
     government stood by a threat assessment first made in 1995 
     and reaffirmed most recently in March.
       The government assessments, Tenet said in his letter, 
     ``were supported by the available evidence and were well 
     tested'' in an internal review.
       But the commission, in its 300-page classified report 
     delivered to the House and Senate on Wednesday, as well as in 
     an unclassified 27-page version, said the American 
     intelligence community was wrong in relying on the much-
     longer warning times.
       Rumsfeld said rogue nations, such as Iran and Iraq, had 
     obtained sensitive missile technology, in part because of 
     loosened export controls among industrialized nations. 
     ``Foreign assistance is not a wildcard,'' Rumsfeld said. ``It 
     is a fact of our relaxed post-Cold-War world.''
       Rumsfeld also said that these suspect countries had become 
     more adept at concealing their missile programs, making it 
     more difficult for Western intelligence analysts to gauge a 
     country's progress and intentions.
       In a hastily called briefing for reporters, senior 
     intelligence officials said Wednesday that the commission had 
     examined the same information available to government 
     analysts, but had come to different conclusions.
       These intelligence officials said that they tended to focus 
     on specific evidence to reach their conclusions, assigning 
     various degrees of certainty to each assessment.
       The intelligence officials said the panel, officially 
     titled the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat 
     to the United States, took the same information and, in 
     essence, assumed the worst about what was known for a 
     particular country's missile program, and drew its 
     conclusions.
       Rumsfeld concurred: ``We came at this subject as senior 
     decision-makers would, who have to make difficult judgments 
     based on limited information.''
       For that reason, the report, even though it was praised in 
     particular by Republicans, is likely to stoke the debate over 
     ballistic missile threats rather than be viewed as the 
     definitive conclusion.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, July 23, 1998]

                    Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile

                            (By Bill Gertz)

       Iran conducted its first test flight of a new medium-range 
     missile Tuesday night, giving the Islamic republic the 
     capability of hitting Israel and all U.S. forces in the 
     region with chemical or biological warheads, The Washington 
     Times has learned.
       ``It is a significant development because it puts all U.S. 
     forces in the region at risk,'' said one official familiar 
     with the test.
       U.S. intelligence agencies detected and monitored the 
     launch, which took place at a missile range over land in 
     northern Iran late Tuesday night, said officials familiar 
     with intelligence reports.
       The missile was identified as Iran's new Shahab-3 missile, 
     which is expected to have a range of 800 to 930 miles, far 
     longer than any of Iran's current arsenal of short-range 
     Scud-design and Chinese missiles.
       Data on the test are still being analyzed, but the missile 
     appeared to be a modified North Korean Nodong missile, which 
     Iran is using as the basis for its Shahab-3 design.
       The launch has raised new fears that Iran has acquired more 
     Nodongs, which have a range of about 620 miles, from North 
     Korea.
       Intelligence officials said the Shahab-3 is a liquid-fueled 
     system carried on a road-mobile launcher. Mobile launchers 
     are extremely difficult to detect and track.
       The Shahab is believed by U.S. intelligence agencies to be 
     inaccurate and thus is expected to be armed with chemical or 
     biological warheads. Iran is developing nuclear warheads but 
     is believed to be years away from having them.
       Officials said the test's success is significant because 
     U.S. military planners must regard the weapon as capable of 
     being used even though it was only fired once.
       North Korea's Nodong also was flight-tested only once and 
     recently was declared ``operational'' by the Pentagon, which 
     puts it in a position to threaten U.S. troops throughout that 
     region.
       In April, Pakistan for the first time also tested a Nodong-
     design missile called the Ghauri.
       A congressional report released last week by a commission 
     set up to assess the missile threat said, ``Iran is making 
     very rapid progress in developing the Shahab-3 medium-range 
     ballistic missiles.
       ``This missile may be flight tested at any time and 
     deployed soon thereafter,'' said the report by the 
     commission, headed by former Defense Secretary Donald 
     Rumsfeld.
       Iran also is building a longer-range Shahab-4, which is 
     expected to have a range of up to 1,240 miles--long enough to 
     hit Central Europe.
       The Shahab--which means ``meteor'' in Farsi--was first 
     disclosed by The Times last year.
       ``The development of long-range ballistic missiles is part 
     of Iran's effort to become a major regional military power,'' 
     a Pentagon official said recently.
       A second U.S. official said data on the missile test are 
     being evaluated by U.S. spy agencies to determine in more 
     detail its estimated range, payload capacity and other 
     characteristics.
       ``This is something that was anticipated by the 
     intelligence community,'' this official said.
       The Shahab missile program has benefited greatly from 
     Russian technology and materials, as well as Chinese and 
     North Korean assistance, according to a CIA report on 
     proliferation released Tuesday.
       The report said companies and agencies in Russia, China and 
     North Korea ``continued to supply missile-related goods and 
     technology to Iran'' throughout last year.
       ``Iran is using these goods and technologies to achieve its 
     goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of medium-
     range ballistic missiles,'' the report said. A medium-range 
     missile is one with a range between 600 and 1,800 miles.
       Russian assistance to Iran's missile program has meant 
     Tehran could deploy a medium-range missile ``much sooner than 
     otherwise expected,'' the CIA said.
       A U.S. intelligence official said recently that Shahab-3 
     deployment was about one year away and that before Russian 
     help it had been estimated to be up to three years from being 
     fielded.
       The Iranian Shahab program has been a target of intense 
     diplomatic efforts by the Clinton administration, which has 
     been seeking to curtail Russian technology and material 
     assistance.
       Asked to comment on the test, Rep. Curt Weldon, 
     Pennsylvania Republican, said it was ``devastating news.'' He 
     said the test confirms the findings of a bipartisan 
     congressional panel that emerging missile threats are hard to 
     predict.
       ``We now have evidence that Iran has already tested a 
     missile system that the intelligence community said would not 
     be tested for 12 to 18 months,'' he said. ``That means the 
     threat to Israel, to our Arab friends in the region and to 
     our 25,000 troops in the region is imminent, and we have no 
     deployed system in place to counter that threat.''
       Mr. Weldon, a member of the House National Security 
     Committee and an advocate of missile defenses, said Iran 
     would most likely deploy chemical or biological weapons on 
     the Shahab-3, depending on what types of advanced guidance 
     systems it may have obtained from Russia.
       ``There is evidence Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear 
     weapons and within a short period of time--months not years--
     will have a nuclear warhead,'' Mr. Weldon said.

[[Page S10048]]

       Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy 
     Education Center, said the test firing shows that long-range 
     missiles are likely to be the threat of the future.
       ``This stuff is moving a lot faster than we thought five 
     years ago in the Bush administration,'' said Mr. Sokolski, a 
     former defense official.
                                  ____


                             Early Warning

       When the history books on the 21st century are written, the 
     Shehab-3 may show up on a list of early warning signs that 
     schoolchildren memorize about great catastrophes. The medium-
     range ballistic missile that Iran tested last week is just 
     that--a warning that the missile threat is here and now, not 
     years away. The coming catastrophe is a ballistic missile 
     attack on an undefended U.S. or U.S. ally by a rogue nation.
       You can't say we haven't been warned. The week before the 
     launch of the Shehab-3, made from a North Korean design, a 
     bipartisan panel headed by former Defense Secretary Donald 
     Rumsfeld issued a report to Congress on the ballistic missile 
     threat. The unanimous finding? Ballistic missiles from rogue 
     nations could strike American cities with ``little or no 
     warning.''
       The security and defense experts on the Rumsfeld Commission 
     noted that North Korea is developing missiles with a 6,200-
     mile range, capable of reaching as far as Arizona or even 
     Wisconsin, and that Iran is seeking missile components that 
     could result in weapons with similar range, able to hit 
     Pennsylvania or Minnesota. That information is from the 
     unclassified version of the report. The general public 
     doesn't get to hear about the really scary stuff. The 
     bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission report, or course, received 
     little play in the general media, which seems to have 
     concluded somehow that this issue is no big deal.
       Earlier this year, Senator Thad Cochran's Subcommittee on 
     International Security reached many of the same conclusions. 
     Using open-source materials, the committee published ``The 
     Proliferation Primer,'' which lists in detail the progress 
     being made by a host of countries toward the development and 
     deployment of weapons of mass destruction. ``The 
     Proliferation Primer'' didn't make it into the headlines 
     either.
       As the Shehab-3 drama was being staged in Iran, Vice 
     President Gore found himself in Russia, playing another scene 
     in the absurd theater of arms control. This is a form of 
     diplomatic drama that employs repetitious and meaningless 
     dialogue and plots that lack logical or realistic 
     development. Over the past 30 years, every act in this 
     ongoing show has been structured around the same ludicrous 
     theme: arms control works.
       And so it goes in Moscow, where Mr. Gore, reading from the 
     usual script, expressed U.S. concern last week about the 
     transfer of Russian missile technology to Iran and other 
     rogue states, and signed two agreements on the peaceful uses 
     of nuclear technology. President Clinton voiced similar 
     concerns in Beijing last month.
       Meanwhile, two-dozen countries are hard at work on 
     improvements to their ballistic-missile capabilities and 
     North Korea is exporting do-it-yourself Nodong missile kits 
     like the one that Iran used to build Shehab-3. In addition to 
     all this there is the so-called loose-nukes problem, by which 
     it is feared that a Russian missile might find its way into 
     the hands of a terrorist group.
       No arms-control agreement can provide the necessary 
     protection against such threats. Not so long ago the threat 
     was a massive Soviet missile attack, but today it is more 
     likely to be one or two ballistic missiles in the hands of a 
     calculating national leader or government determined to 
     operate outside civilized norms. What do hoary notions of 
     ``arms control'' have to do with these realities? Is anyone 
     seriously going to propose that the way to keep more Iranian 
     Shehab-3s from being produced is to invite the ayatollahs for 
     a stay at Geneva's finest hotels and a long meeting of the 
     minds across a green baize table?
       What prospect is there at all that Iran will ``agree,'' 
     much less comply with any commitment to give up what it now 
     has? What it has is a medium-range missile that can reach 
     U.S. allies Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And if 
     similar minds somewhere in the world get hold of a missile 
     capable of reaching San Francisco or Honolulu or New York, 
     what ``agreement'' could induce them to give that up?
       The fact that the U.S. has absolutely no defenses against 
     ballistic-missile-attack is an unacceptably large negative 
     incentive to this country's enemies. The way to deter them is 
     not by signing more archaic arms-control agreements but by 
     researching and deploying a national missile-defense system 
     as quickly as possible after the next President takes office.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, Sept. 1, 1998]

                   N. Korea Fires Missile Over Japan

                 [By Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz]

       North Korea yesterday conducted the first test launch of an 
     extended-range ballistic missile in a provocative flight that 
     crossed Japan and signaled the hard-line regime is now able 
     to threaten more neighboring countries.
       The Taepo Dong-1 and its dummy warhead traveled about 1,000 
     miles, surpassing by 380 miles the reach of North Korea's 
     operational medium-range missile, the No Dong.
       Taepo Dong's debut was predicted by Washington. The flight 
     was tracked by U.S. Navy ships and by surveillance aircraft 
     as the missile left northern North Korea, dropped its first 
     stage in the Sea of Japan and then crossed Japan's Honshu 
     island before falling in the Pacific Ocean.
       The test of the medium-range missile immediately raised 
     security fears not only in Asia, but in the Middle East and 
     the United States as well.
       Republicans in Congress renewed demands for President 
     Clinton to accelerate development of a national missile 
     defense that could intercept incoming ballistic missiles. Mr. 
     Clinton has put off a decision until 2000 despite a blue-
     ribbon commission's finding that a rogue nation, such as 
     North Korea, could launch a ballistic missile onto U.S. soil 
     within the next five years without warning.
       ``The test of the Taepo Dong indicates that a North Korean 
     threat to the continental United States is just around the 
     corner,'' said Richard Fisher, an Asia expert at the Heritage 
     Foundation. ``It is now long past overdue for the 
     administration to finally wake up, smell the coffee and get 
     serious about missile defense.''
       By flying the missile directly over Japan, Mr. Fisher said, 
     North Korea is showing it has the ability to hit U.S. 
     military facilities there and can eventually field a missile 
     capable of hitting bases farther south in Okinawa. ``Okinawa 
     is the military reserve area for the United States in any 
     potential Korean peninsula conflict,'' he said.
       David Wright, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
     Technology in Cambridge and researcher at the Union of 
     Concerned Scientists, said of utmost concern is ``that this 
     is a two-state missile.''
       Creating a multiple-stage missile is ``one of the more 
     complicated hurdles . . . in developing a longer range,'' he 
     said. ``But in and of itself it doesn't give much new 
     capability to North Korea.
       ``The accuracy of these missiles is very low,'' he told 
     Agence France-Presse, adding that they would most likely be 
     used to carry biological or chemical weapons.
       Japan reacted to the test by abruptly withdrawing plans to 
     extend $1 billion in aid to build two civilian nuclear 
     reactors. North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear-weapons 
     program in exchange for the two plants and U.S. deliveries of 
     fuel oil.
       Japanese analysts saw the missile launch as a ploy in 
     winning concessions from the West during ongoing nuclear-
     disarmament talks in New York.
       Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, visiting 
     Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, said, ``This is something that 
     we will be raising with North Koreans in the talks that are 
     currently going on,'' the Associated Press reported.
       A South Korean Cabinet meeting of 15 ministers said North 
     Korea's ``reckless'' test-firing of a missile over Japanese 
     territory poses a direct threat to the region.
       North Korea is the world's largest exporter of ballistic 
     missiles. It has been helping Iran develop a missile arsenal 
     that can reach deployed American forces, moderate Arab states 
     and Israel. A North Korean envoy told congressional aides 
     last week the motive for exporting missile technology is 
     simple: badly needed hard currency for the famine-ridden 
     country.
       Intelligence officials said Iranian technicians observed 
     yesterday's test, underscoring the close ties between 
     Pyongyang and Tehran, which tested its own medium-range 
     missile, the Shahab-3, with a range of about 800 miles, last 
     month.
       North Korea, which boasts a 5-million-man army and stocks 
     of chemical and biological weapons, is also developing the 
     intermediate range Taepo Dong-2. Scheduled for operation in 
     2002, the weapon is designed to travel up to 3,700 miles, 
     putting it within range of Alaska. Eventually, Pyongyang 
     wants to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable 
     of reaching the continental United States.
       The U.S. has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, where 
     they are already vulnerable to North Korea's arsenal of 
     short-range missiles and thousands of artillery pieces. The 
     forces enjoy limited protection through Patriot interceptors 
     used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war to knock down Iraqi Scud 
     missiles.
       Maj. Bryan Salas, a Pentagon spokesman, said, ``We were not 
     surprised by the launching. We're still evaluating all the 
     specifics in the matter and we consider it a serious 
     development.''
       The missile test comes as Mr. Clinton and Republicans are 
     at odds on national missile defense.
       The GOP got a boost this summer when a congressionally 
     appointed panel of experts, led by former Defense Secretary 
     Donald Rumsfeld, stated the United States could be blindsided 
     by a missile attack within the next five years from North 
     Korea or another rogue nation.
       But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a letter disclosed last 
     week by The Washington Times, rejected the finding and 
     continued to support a 2003 deployment date at the earliest 
     for a national system.
       ``The administration needs to wake up,'' said Rep. Curt 
     Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican and a leading missile defense 
     advocate. ``From what we know about this missile, it can even 
     reach U.S. soil with a range that can strike U.S. citizens in 
     Guam.''
       Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas Republican, added: ``The 
     administration's decision to block development and deployment 
     of missile defenses means we are unable to protect either our 
     important allies . . . or the

[[Page S10049]]

     thousands of American troops stationed there.''
       North Korea has the expertise to mount chemical and 
     biological warheads on its ballistic missiles. It also has 
     been attempting to develop nuclear weapons, but promised to 
     end the program in return for economic aid.
       ``When you begin to feed the wolf, the wolf just gets 
     hungrier and hungrier,'' Mr. Fisher said. ``The aid to North 
     Korea since 1995 can be said to have indirectly assisted the 
     North Korean missile program because it allowed them to spend 
     less money on feeding their people and sustain their missile 
     develop budgets.''
       The Rumsfeld panel dismissed a CIA conclusion the United 
     States faces no ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation 
     for 15 years. The panel was particularly leery of North Korea 
     and its ally, Iran.
       Its report said: ``The extraordinary level of resources 
     North Korea and Iran are now devoting to developing their own 
     ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and 
     immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interest and its 
     allies. . . . In light of the considerable difficulties the 
     intelligence community encountered in assessing the pace and 
     scope of the No Dong missile program, the U.S. may have very 
     little warning prior to the deployment of the Taepo Dong-2.''

  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 6 minutes.
  Mr. President, this bill will not contribute to our national 
security. As a matter of fact, it will weaken and jeopardize our 
national security.
  That is not just me saying it and those of us who oppose this bill. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has written us a very, very 
strong letter supporting the current national missile defense policy, 
which is to develop defenses against these long-range missiles but not 
to commit to deploy such defenses, since such a commitment will violate 
an agreement that we have with Russia which has made it possible for us 
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world.
  Committing to break out of a treaty which has allowed us to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons will result in Russia--they have told us 
this--not ratifying START II, and then, indeed, deciding to reverse the 
START I reductions. START I reductions, START II reductions, and 
hopefully START III reductions are based on an agreement that we have 
with Russia that neither party will deploy defenses against long-range 
missiles.
  If we violate that agreement--this bill commits us to a position 
which would violate that agreement--if we violate that agreement, we 
are going to see Russia reverse the direction in which it is going--
reduction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there will be a much greater 
threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because thousands of 
additional weapons will then be on Russian soil.
  This bill is a pro-proliferation of a nuclear weapons bill. That is 
not the intent, obviously. But that is the effect of this bill, because 
instead of Russia just having a few thousand nuclear weapons on its 
soil--which are then subject to being stolen, or pilfered, or sold--it 
will have many more thousands of nuclear weapons.
  It is not in the security interests of this Nation to trash the START 
II agreement by threatening another treaty called the Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty upon which START II is based, upon which START I is 
based, and upon hopefully START III will be based.
  Can we negotiate a modification in that ABM Treaty? I hope so. Might 
it be desirable for both sides to move to defenses against long-range 
missiles? I think so. Should we develop defenses against long-range 
missiles but not commit to violate the ABM Treaty by committing to 
deploy those missiles? Yes. We should develop those defenses. And we 
are at a breakneck speed--by the way, a very high-risk speed.
  This bill, which would change our policy, will not speed up the 
development of national missile defenses by 1 day. We are already 
developing those defenses as fast as we possibly can.
  Mr. President, I want to just read briefly--if my 4 minutes are up, I 
ask for an additional 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
wrote Senator Inhofe a letter on August 24, which I ask unanimous 
consent to be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                  Washington, DC, August 24, 1998.
     Hon. James M. Inhofe,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Inhofe: Thank you for the opportunity to 
     provide my views, together with those of the Joint Chiefs, on 
     the Rumsfeld Commission Report and its relation to national 
     missile defense. We welcome the contributions of this 
     distinguished panel to our understanding of ballistic missile 
     threat assessments. While we have had the opportunity to 
     review only the Commission's pre-publication report, we can 
     provide answers to your questions subject to review of the 
     final report.
       While the Chiefs and I, along with the Intelligence 
     Community, agree with many of the Commission's findings, we 
     have some different perspectives on likely developmental 
     timelines and associated warning times. After carefully 
     considering the portions of the report available to us, we 
     remain confident that the Intelligence Community can provide 
     the necessary warning of the indigenous development and 
     deployment by a rogue state of an ICBM threat to the United 
     States. For example, we believe that North Korea continues 
     moving closer to the initiation of a Taepo Dong I Medium 
     Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) testing program. That program 
     has been predicted and considered in the current examination. 
     The Commission points out that through unconventional, high-
     risk development programs and foreign assistance, rogue 
     nations could acquire an ICBM capability in a short time, and 
     that the Intelligence Community may not detect it. We view 
     this as an unlikely development. I would also point out that 
     these rogue nations currently pose a threat to the United 
     States, including a threat by weapons of mass destruction, 
     through unconventional, terrorist-style delivery means. The 
     Chiefs and I believe all these threats must be addressed 
     consistent with a balanced judgment of risks and resources.
       Based on these considerations, we reaffirm our support for 
     the current NMD policy and deployment readiness program. Our 
     program represents an unprecedented level of effort to 
     address the likely emergence of a rogue ICBM threat. It 
     compresses what is normally a 6-12 year development program 
     into 3 years with some additional development concurrent with 
     a 3-year deployment. This emphasis is indicative of our 
     commitment to this vital national security objective. The 
     tremendous effort devoted to this program is a prudent 
     commitment to provide absolutely the best technology when a 
     threat warrants deployment.
       Given the present threat projections and the potential 
     requirement to deploy an effective limited defense, we 
     continue to support the ``three-plus-three'' program. It is 
     our view that the development program should proceed through 
     the integrated system testing scheduled to begin in late 
     1999, before the subsequent deployment decision consideration 
     in the year 2000. While previous plus-ups have reduced the 
     technical risk associated with this program, the risk remains 
     high. Additional funding would not buy back any time in our 
     already fast-paced schedule.
       As to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Chiefs 
     and I believe that under current conditions continued 
     adherence is still consistent with our national security 
     interests. The Treaty contributes to our strategic stability 
     with Russia and, for the immediate future, does not hinder 
     our development program. Consistent with US policy that NMD 
     development be consistent with the ABM Treaty, the Department 
     has an ongoing process to review NMD tests for compliance. 
     The integrated testing will precede a deployment decision has 
     not yet gone through compliance review. Although a final 
     determination has not been made, we currently intend and 
     project integrated system testing that will be both fully 
     effective and treaty compliant. A deployment decision may 
     well require treaty modification which would involve a 
     variety of factors including the emerging ballistic missile 
     threat to the United States (both capability and intent), and 
     the technology to support an effective national missile 
     defense.
       Again, the Chiefs and I appreciate the opportunity to offer 
     our views on the assessment of emerging ballistic missile 
     threats and their relation to national missile defense.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Henry H. Shelton.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, part of the Joint Chiefs' letter is the 
following:

       * * * we reaffirm our support for the current [National 
     Missile Defense] policy and deployment readiness program.

  Those are the key words.

       Based on these considerations, we reaffirm our support for 
     the current [National Missile Defense] policy and deployment 
     readiness program.

  Then General Shelton wrote the following:

       Our program represents an unprecedented level of effort to 
     address the likely emergence of a rogue ICBM threat. It 
     compresses what is normally a 6-12 year development program 
     into 3 years with some additional development concurrent with 
     a 3-year deployment. This emphasis is indicative of our

[[Page S10050]]

     commitment to this vital national security objective. The 
     tremendous effort devoted to this program is a prudent 
     commitment to provide absolutely the best technology when a 
     threat warrants deployment.
       Given the present threat projections and the potential 
     requirement to deploy an effective limited defense, we 
     continue to support the ``three-plus-three'' program. It is 
     our view that the development program should proceed through 
     the integrated system testing scheduled to begin in late 
     1999, before the subsequent deployment decision consideration 
     in the year 2000.

  Then he points out that:

       Additional funding would not buy back any time in our 
     already fast-paced schedule.

  Finally, General Shelton said the following:

       The [ABM] Treaty contributes to our strategic stability 
     with Russia and, for the immediate future, does not hinder 
     our development program.

  Mr. President, our program now calls for the development of defenses 
against long-range missiles. Let no one misunderstand that, or misstate 
that. That is our current program.
  We are moving as quickly as possible. Indeed, it is a high-risk move 
that we are making because we have collapsed this development schedule 
so much. We are not going to speed up this schedule 1 day by 
threatening to destroy the ABM Treaty. All we will do, if this bill 
passes, is to contribute to the threat of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons on the soil of Russia. That is not in our security interest. I 
hope we do not proceed to the consideration of this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the distinguished 
Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of this amendment. I 
believe that it is a very important amendment. Other countries are 
going forward and developing missile systems. Can we afford not to do 
it? For the sake of our people and the sake of this Nation, we should 
seize this opportunity to go forward on this matter promptly. It is in 
the interest of our Nation and the people of this country that we take 
that step.
  I thank the Senator, very much, for yielding to me.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I regret that we are on such a tight constraint, because I think this 
is the most significant issue this Senate will be addressing certainly 
this year. We are talking about the lives of American citizens.
  As one who is from Oklahoma and can see what type of terrorist 
devastation can take place, and realizing that the devastation in 
Oklahoma was one-thousandth of the power of the smallest nuclear 
warhead known, it is a very scary thing.
  I believe right now--I don't think there is a Senator here who 
doesn't believe this--that there could very well be a missile headed 
our direction as we speak. It is not a matter of a rogue nation 
learning how to make missiles to deliver the weapons of mass 
destruction that we know they have. It is a matter of just getting that 
technology and those systems from a country that already does. China is 
such a country.
  China fully has missiles that can reach Washington, DC, from any 
place in the world. We have no way in the world of knocking them down. 
We know that China is trading technology systems with countries like 
Iran--countries that would not hesitate to use missiles against us.
  I wish I were speaking last, because there are going to be some 
things said about the exorbitant costs of such a system. We can 
complete a system to protect us against a limited missile attack for 
about $4 billion. In the case of our AEGIS ship system, we have 22 
AEGIS ships that have the capability of knocking down a missile, but 
not an ICBM. We have a $50 billion investment in that system, and for 
only $4 billion more we could have that system to protect Americans.
  I hope that people will give consideration to this resolution. I 
think it is the most significant resolution we will be considering this 
year.
  I ask unanimous consent that three items pertaining to this matter be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                            [April 15, 1998]

           Pakistan's First Test of Its New Ballistic Missile

          (By Rahul Bedi, New Delhi and Duncan Lennox, London)

       The first test of Pakistan's new ballistic missile, the 
     Hatf 5 or `Ghauri', took place on 6 April. Statements from 
     the Pakistani government said that the missile has a maximum 
     range of 1,500km, a payload of 700kg and a launch weight of 
     16,000kg.
       Some earlier statements had implied that the `Ghauri' might 
     also be used as the basis for a satellite launch vehicle.
       Currently described by government officials as ``a research 
     effort for the time being'', its indigenous development and 
     research status means that ``no international sanctions or 
     regimes apply to its development or production''.
       Claims that the missile was tested over land are confusing 
     as the length of Pakistan's territory does not allow for the 
     range attributed to `Ghauri'. Other reports have indicated 
     that the missile was test launched from a location near 
     Jhelum in northeast Pakistan to the area southwest of Quetta, 
     a range of about 800km to 1,000km, which would agree with the 
     reported flight time of around eight minutes.
       An earlier secret test of the `Ghauri' missile in January 
     was reported by the Islamabad News, which said that further 
     tests would be made before a public demonstration of the 
     missile on 23 March. The ``secret'' test probably refers to a 
     static motor firing and systems check-out, and is unlikely to 
     have been a flight test.
       The `Ghauri' missile was not displayed during Pakistan's 
     National Day parade on 23 March. A missile similar to the 
     Hatf 1 short-range missile was the only ballistic missile 
     displayed.
       Pakistani official statements are limited to the maximum 
     range, payload and launch weight. From the pictures released, 
     the missile is similar in shape to the earlier Hatf 1 design, 
     which is also similar to the Chinese M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15). The 
     launch weight of 16,000kg makes `Ghauri' much heavier than 
     the M-9, which has a launch weight of 6,000kg. This would 
     appear to support the payload weight quoted for `Ghauri' of 
     700kg over the maximum range of 1,500km.
       It appears to be a scaled-up Hatf 1 single or two-stage 
     solid-propellant missile that may use some Chinese 
     technologies. The missile shown does not bear any resemblance 
     to the Chinese CSS-2 (DF-3), which uses liquid propellants 
     and has a launch weight of 64,000kg.
       An alternative option might be that `Ghauri' is based on 
     the Chinese CSS-5 (DF-21) and CSS-N-3 (JL-1) ballistic 
     missile design, which has a launch weight of 15,000kg, a 
     payload of 600 kg and a maximum range of between 1,700km and 
     1,800km. The CSS-N-3 SLBM version entered service in 1983 and 
     the CSS-5 in 1987.
       The Iranian `Shahab 3' ballistic missile project has a 
     similar range and payload to `Ghauri', and, although the 
     Iranians have never quoted a launch weight for `Shahab 3', it 
     might be in the 16,000kg bracket.
       `Shahab 3' is believed to be an Iranian-developed single-
     stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, based on North 
     Korea's `Nodong 1' design, and a series of motor tests were 
     reported last year.
       It is not clear whether Pakistan and Iran have shared 
     missile technologies, but their development approaches appear 
     to have followed relatively similar lines and in similar 
     timescales.
       Unconfirmed reports have suggested that Pakistan and Iran 
     may have received either missiles or technologies associated 
     with the Chinese solid-propellant M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) and M-9 
     programmes, and it is to be expected that there might have 
     been some assistance given both ways.
                                  ____


               [From the Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 8, 1998]

                         Vulnerable and at Risk

       Recently, U.S. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Tulsa, asked Gen. Henry 
     H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to comment 
     on a new report questioning U.S. readiness to deal with a 
     long-range missile attack. The general's response was 
     illuminating, particularly so in light of North Korea's 
     subsequent test of a missile capable of carrying nuclear 
     warheads.
       Inhofe raised the issue after release of the Rumsfeld 
     Commission Report, warning a missile threat may come sooner 
     than many in the U.S. government think. The panel said it's 
     possible an enemy could develop a ballistic missile program 
     in a way that would give the United States little or no 
     warning before an attack.
       In fairness, Shelton and the joint chiefs answer to Bill 
     Clinton, so it's not surprising they echo his 
     administration's soft-line on missile defense.
       Shelton reiterated to Inhofe that the chiefs don't think a 
     real threat is near. They believe the United States should 
     continue to

[[Page S10051]]

     comply with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and they 
     support Clinton's ``3-plus-3'' plan for a national missile 
     defense. The policy calls for three years of development with 
     another three years for deployment--if a missile threat is 
     identified. ``We remain confident that the Intelligence 
     Community can provide necessary warning of . . . an ICBM 
     threat,'' Shelton wrote.
       Inhofe points out that U.S. intelligence was surprised by 
     India's nuclear testing this summer and considered attacks on 
     embassies in Africa unlikely. As for the ABM treaty, Inhofe 
     says it ``reinforces the discredited policy of mutual-assured 
     destruction at a time when the U.S. is being targeted by 
     numerous potentially undeterrable rogue states and 
     terrorists.''
       Inhofe's ally on missile defense, U.S. Rep. Floyd Spence, 
     R-S.C., cut to the dangers of the Clinton administration's 
     ostrich-like approach to missile defense in an interview with 
     Frank Gaffney, director of the Center for Security Policy.
       ``The first warning of a heart attack is a heart attack,'' 
     Spence said. ``The Clinton administration's response to all 
     this is that we are working on a system and we are going to 
     experiment for about three years. And if the threat arises, 
     we will decide at that time whether or not to deploy. My God, 
     the threat is right now here, this minute, this moment, not 
     some time in the future.''
       The Oklahoman urges Inhofe, Spence and other patriots in 
     Congress to hold hearings highlighting America's 
     vulnerability to missile attack.
       Bold action is needed to counter Clinton's idle approach to 
     defending the U.S. against a grave and growing threat.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 1998]

                             Shooting Stars

       ``Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at 
     without success,'' Winston Churchill once famously said. 
     Perhaps. But the Japanese might have a different take, having 
     now had North Korea fire a missile over their heads. In a 
     world where Pathan tribesmen with rifles have been replaced 
     by rogue states with ballistic missiles, Churchill would have 
     been the first to argue that the leader of the free world 
     needs more going for him then the other guy's bad aim. To 
     wit, a missile defense.
       If the events of the past few weeks have taught us 
     anything, it is that the bad guys out there--Saddam Hussein, 
     Kim Jong II, Osama bin Laden and the like--are not kidding 
     when they threaten to blow up Americans. What we don't yet 
     know is just how many of them have the capability to follow 
     through on their threats, though recent tests by both North 
     Korea and Iran confirm that some are not that far away. We 
     shouldn't have to wait until a missile lands in Times Square 
     to find out.
       Unfortunately that is precisely what Democratic Senators 
     have been doing. Back in March, GOP Senator Thad Cochran 
     introduced a bill calling for the U.S. ``to deploy as soon as 
     is technologically possible an effective National Missile 
     Defense System capable of defending the territory of the 
     United States against limited ballistic missile attack.'' 
     When the motion to move it to the floor for debate and 
     amendments came up, it fell just one vote shy of the 60 
     needed. All 41 opposed were Democrats. While bin Laden bombs, 
     the Democrats filibuster.
       They have a chance to redeem themselves when the 
     reintroduced petition comes up for a vote tomorrow. Events 
     since the March 13 filibuster have tragically underscored 
     just how irresponsible a move it was: India and Pakistan have 
     exploded nuclear bombs; Iran and North Korea have tested 
     ballistic missiles; Saddam Hussein has forced U.N. inspectors 
     to a standstill; and bin Laden blew up two American embassies 
     in Africa.
       Indeed, it has lent a prophetic tone to the findings of the 
     Rumsfeld Commission, a team of defense experts which in July 
     warned that America's enemies could deliver a ballistic 
     missile threat to the U.S. within five years of any decision 
     to acquire such a capability. More ominously, the Rumsfeld 
     report warns that ``during several of those years, the U.S. 
     might not be aware that such a decision has been made.''
       In face of these tangible threats, the continued Democratic 
     preference for arms control agreements in the bush over real 
     defense capabilities in the hand is baffling. And our guess 
     is that an American public that has now watched North Korea 
     and seen for itself some of bin Laden's handiwork also would 
     be a hard sell. We wouldn't be surprised, then, if these 
     developments, coupled with a President suffering from a 
     severe loss of moral authority, might lead some of these 
     Democrats to consider whether they want to continue to block 
     debate about ways to protect Americans--especially the 13 
     Democratic Senators up for re-election which follow:


                           Up for Re-election

       Democratic senators who voted against closure on the 
     American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
       Barbara Boxer, California.
       John Breaux, Louisiana.
       Thomas A. Daschle, S. Dakota.
       Christopher J. Dodd, Connecticut.
       Byron L. Dorgan, N. Dakota.
       Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin.
       Bob Graham, Florida.
       Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont.
       Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland.
       Carol Moseley-Braun, Illinois.
       Patty Murray, Washington.
       Harry Reid, Nevada.
       Ron Wyden, Oregon.

       Source: Coalition to Defend America.

       Bill Clinton might have his own second thoughts. It is 
     worth asking whether Mr. Clinton could even have taken the 
     limited action he did against sites in Afghanistan and the 
     Sudan had bin Laden somehow managed to buy a missile of his 
     own--or pay the North Koreans or Iranians to shoot one off 
     for him.
       Likewise, could George Bush have prosecuted the Gulf War if 
     Saddam Hussein had had a missile capability? As Mr. Clinton 
     has had impressed on him, just four or five warheads in hands 
     like Kim Jong II's pose a far more immediate and practical 
     threat to American lives and interests than the 2,000 or so 
     in the Russian arsenal. Especially given North Korea's 
     willingness to sell its missiles to anyone with cash.
       Providing an American President with the wherewithal to 
     shoot down a ballistic missile on its way to an American city 
     shouldn't be a partisan issue. But if the Democrats decide 
     again to make it one in the coming vote, that would be a 
     persuasive Republican argument for a filibuster-proof 
     Republican Senate. If we ever get a missile defense system 
     this country needs, we may owe more to Monica Lewinsky and 
     Osama bin Laden than we do to our Democratic Senators.

  Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield Senator Conrad 4 minutes.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise as a strong supporter of national 
missile defense. But I also rise as a strong opponent of the Cochran 
bill that is before us. I believe so strongly in national missile 
defense that I have introduced legislation promoting national missile 
defense that has passed the U.S. Senate.
  I support national missile defense because we have an unpredictable 
and rapidly emerging ICBM threat to this country from the so-called 
rogue states. The Rumsfeld Commission recently alerted us to the 
growing need for national missile defense. As I have said many times on 
the Senate floor, we must be prepared before we are surprised.
  But the bill before us is fatally flawed because it does not include 
the correct criteria for a decision to deploy. It says that we should 
deploy ``as soon as technologically possible.'' Mr. President, that 
isn't the right test. Let's make sure that we deploy the best initial 
system, not simply the first one off the shelf. The first one off the 
shelf may be significantly inferior to one that follows soon thereafter 
that would be a far more effective system of national missile defense.
  Further, the Cochran bill is also seriously flawed because it has 
only one criterion--``as soon as technologically possible.'' It 
completely disregards three other vital criteria for national missile 
development:
  No. 1, treaty compliance. As the Joint Chiefs have said in several 
letters, the ABM Treaty and START accords must not be endangered. Mr. 
President, I direct my colleagues' attention to a statement by General 
Henry Shelton, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He said that 
the effect that ``NMD deployment would have on arms control agreements 
and nuclear arms reductions should be included in any bill on national 
missile defense.''
  Are we going to listen to the top military leadership of our country 
on this question? I hope so. I hope we are going to listen to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  The second key criterion is cost. A system we can't afford, such as 
one with space-based weapons, is a fantasy in the short run and 
protects no one. We need to have a system that we can afford.
  The third criterion is use of proven technology to ensure performance 
and contain costs. We ought to use technology we know will work. Again, 
rushing to failure will not protect one single American family.
  Mr. President, we are in a development stage on national missile 
defense, and that is where our efforts must be. I applaud our 
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee 
for fully funding aggressive development of national missile defense. 
However, the Cochran bill, at this point, is counterproductive because 
it applies the wrong criteria to the decision to deploy. The Senate 
should again vote no on cloture.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor and give back the remainder of 
my time.

[[Page S10052]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 4 minutes to Senator Dorgan.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this debate and this vote are not about 
whether we support research on a missile defense system. I am on the 
Appropriations Committee. I am on the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee. The Defense appropriations bill has over $3 billion for 
research and development of theater and national missile defense 
programs. I expect all Members of the Senate support that. I do.
  But this bill presents us with a different question. This bill would 
put the Senate on record saying there must be a deployment of a 
national missile defense system--there must be a deployment as soon as 
``technologically feasible.'' And we must then deploy.
  Well, 25 years ago, we had an antiballistic missile system in North 
Dakota. I guess that particular system was technologically feasible 
then. Of course, that system would have used nuclear bombs to intercept 
and destroy incoming missiles. But it was built, at the cost of over 
$20 billion in today's terms. Thirty days after it was declared 
operational, it was mothballed. That system was too expensive and too 
controversial.
  Let's keep that cautionary tale in mind as we consider this bill.
  If this bill were to pass, the question is, What is technologically 
feasible? What kind of technology? At what cost? Does cost have any 
relevance at all? How will the bill affect arms control? Will this bill 
crowd out spending on other ways of dealing with terrorism? What other 
defense programs that respond to terrorist threats or rogue nations 
will then lack funding because we forced deployment of a system when 
someone said we now have the technology, and we forced deployment 
notwithstanding costs?
  Frankly, a rogue nation or a terrorist state is much more likely to 
pose a threat to us with a suitcase nuclear bomb planted in the trunk 
of a rusty Yugo car at a dock in New York City. The threat is much more 
likely to be a nuclear weapon put on top of a cruise missile--not an 
ICBM, but a cruise missile. There is far greater proliferation of 
cruise missiles and greater access to them. Will this defend against 
cruise missiles? No. Will it do anything about the suitcase bomb? No. 
What about a fertilizer bomb in a truck parked in front of a building? 
No. What about a vial of the most deadly biological agents? Again, no.
  There are a lot of terrorist and rogue nation threats that we ought 
to be concerned about, and we ought to worry about developing missile 
defense--and we are. But rushing to say we must deploy now, as soon as 
it is technologically feasible, notwithstanding any other 
consideration, makes no sense.
  The Senator from Michigan was asking what this bill would do to arms 
control. I want to hold up a chart of unclassified pictures to try and 
show what arms control means. This is a photo from March 26, 1997. It 
shows the launching of an SSN-20 missile from a Russian submarine in 
the Barents Sea. The submarine launched a missile, and within minutes 
the missile was destroyed. And the last picture here shows the 
missile's pieces falling into the sea.
  Why was that missile destroyed? Because of arms control agreements 
that we have reached with Russia. There was a whole series of these 
``launch-to-destruction'' launches, because they were an inexpensive 
way for Russia to destroy its submarine-launched missiles and for us to 
verify their destruction. That is the way to deal with these threats--a 
reduction of nuclear weapons, reduction of delivery vehicles. This is 
the kind of thing, with Nunn-Lugar and other efforts, especially arms 
control agreements, that results in a real reduction of threat.
  The question is, What will the vote today do to arms control? Will it 
mean more delivery systems, more nuclear weapons? A greater arms race? 
I don't think anybody in this Chamber has that answer. My colleague, 
Senator Conrad, put it well. To those who support--and I think almost 
all of us do--theater missile defenses and the research on national 
missile defense, it doesn't make any sense to say that notwithstanding 
any other consideration we must deploy as soon as technologically 
feasible. That is not, in my judgment, the right thing or the 
thoughtful thing to do in order to defend this country.

  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield Senator Bingaman 3 minutes.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Michigan for 
yielding me time. I want to join my colleagues in resisting S. 1873, 
this proposal. In my view, what this proposal would do is to put our 
Defense Department in an untenable position. It essentially says that, 
in this case, in the case of national missile defense, as distinguished 
from all other cases, they should ignore the criteria that they use for 
deciding which programs to go ahead and deploy. Those criteria are that 
they maintain a sensible balance among cost, schedule, and performance 
considerations, given affordability constraints.
  Now, that is the criteria the Department of Defense has set up. This 
proposal by my colleague from Mississippi would have them ignore those 
provisions and rush ahead to develop this as soon as it is 
technologically feasible. We have some experience with efforts by 
Congress to turn up the political pressure on the Department of Defense 
and to urge them to rush ahead with development of programs before they 
can be safely deployed. The most recent example is one that many of us 
are familiar with; it is the THAAD Program, Theater High Altitude Area 
Defense Program. In that case, again, we were anxious to get this 
program fielded. The Congress put increased pressure on the Department 
of Defense to move ahead. Accordingly, we have had disaster. In that 
case, the program is 4 years behind schedule. There have been five 
consecutive flight test failures of the THAAD interceptor. The cost of 
the program has risen from $10 billion to $14 billion today.
  General Larry Welch, who reviewed this missile defense program and 
other programs indicated that one reason is that there was a very high 
level of risk, that we were, in fact, engaged in what he called a 
``rush to failure'' in the THAAD Program. We do not need a rush to 
failure in the national missile defense program to follow onto the rush 
to failure in the THAAD Program. We need a program that the Department 
of Defense can develop on an urgent basis, but on a reasonable basis. I 
believe they are on that course. I believe when General Shelton asks us 
to refrain from this kind of a legislative proposal, I think we should 
take his advice. I hope we will defeat the proposal by the Senator from 
Mississippi.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Biden.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, whatever our views on a nationwide 
ballistic missile defense, it seems to me that we should reject S. 
1873.
  Were that bill to pass, deploying a national missile defense system 
could, in my view, break the back of the economy at a moment when we 
finally have gotten a handle on things.
  A week ago, General Lyles warned that our current programs are over 
budget and ``may not be all affordable.''
  We spent years getting some budget discipline. We have finally 
achieved that. We must not throw that all away.
  This bill would require deployment even without a threat of new 
strategic missiles; and it would throw taxpayers' money at the first 
available technology, rather than the best technology.
  As Dr. Richard L. Garwin warns, the first technology will be 
vulnerable to missiles with penetration aids, which Russia surely has 
and others can easily develop. Missile defense is expensive; 
penetration aids are cheap.
  This bill will also guarantee what General Welch calls a ``rush to 
failure.'' Five test failures with the THAAD theater defense system are 
a reminder of how difficult it is to develop any missile defense. A 
policy of deploying the first ``technologically possible'' system is 
almost bound to fail.
  Finally, this bill does not even permit consideration of the negative 
consequences of deployment. S. 1873 would destroy the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, and thus end any hope of implementing START Two or of 
achieving START Three.

[[Page S10053]]

  ``Star Wars'' may seem easier than the hard, patient work of reducing 
great power armaments and stabilizing our forces. But the ``easier'' 
path can also be the dangerous path.
  Last week, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to share real-time 
data on third-country missile launches, to reduce the risk of 
accidental nuclear war. That is a good, sensible initiative.
  But what happens if we say we will deploy a national missile defense? 
We may call it just a defense, but others will see it as a second-
strike defense that enables us to mount first-strike nuclear attacks. 
Russia and China will adopt a hair-trigger, ``launch on warning'' 
posture to overwhelm that defense, and the risk of nuclear war will 
rise.
  Now, some day we may need a nation-wide ballistic missile defense. 
That is why the Defense Department has the ``3+3'' policy of developing 
technology that would permit deployment within three years of finding 
an actual threat on the horizon.
  Some of my colleagues believe we cannot wait for that. But Iran's 
missiles will hit the Middle East and parts of Europe. North Korea's 
missiles will hit Japan and Okinawa. Despite recent missile tests, 
these countries are several years away from threatening even the far 
western portions of Alaska and Hawaii, as General Shelton made clear in 
his letter of August 24.
  And should a real threat materialize, there are far cheaper 
alternatives to fielding a national missile defense. So, while sensible 
policy on ballistic missile defense is perfectly feasible, S. 1873 is 
not such a sensible policy.
  Mr. President, the Senate has real work to do. Americans deserve a 
Patient's Bill of Rights; we can enact campaign finance reform that 
even the House of Representatives had enough sense to pass; and we must 
stop the slaughter of our teenagers by Big Tobacco.
  Let us get back to legislation that meets real, current needs and 
that will not destroy the balanced budget. Let us reject cloture on the 
motion to debate S. 1873, and get this Senate back to work.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the legislation before 
the Senate, I rise in strong support of the objectives set forth in 
this bill. As we all know, this legislation would establish a policy 
for the U.S. to develop and deploy a national missile defense as soon 
as technologically possible. This system will defend all 50 states 
against any limited ballistic missile threats.
  Mr. President, allow me to offer a couple of observations about the 
changed international and national security environment which directly 
impact U.S. defense needs. The original impetus for a national missile 
defense system was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union during 
the cold war.
  Although some assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
continued thaw in previously frosty relations with Russia have rendered 
such defensive capabilities unnecessary, this view is naive. I believe 
that in many respects the threat has actually increased.
  The increased threat results from several interrelated factors. The 
collapse of the bipolar geopolitical order defined by U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation has ushered in multipolar instability. The threats we 
confront today as a nation are diffuse. Moreover, our potential enemies 
are abundant in a world where interstate relations are no longer 
delineated according to membership in one of two ideological camps.
  I would like to emphasize a further change brought about by changes 
in the international environment. An additional aspect of the post-
cold-war world is the rapid and, in some cases, uncontrollable 
diffusion of advanced technologies. While earlier non-proliferation 
efforts relied heavily on stringent export control regimes, heavy 
reliance on multilateral controls is insufficient to protect U.S. 
interests.
  The U.S. continues to maintain a complex and multi-layered system of 
export controls as a deterrent to would-be proliferators or rogue 
nations. However, an export control regime is only as strong as its 
weakest link. Furthermore, rogue nations--such as North Korea--who 
already possess threatening capabilities, are more than willing to sell 
their know-how to others.
  I am aware of others' predictions that ballistic missile capability 
will not present a threat for more than another decade. I believe, 
however, that these predictions rely too heavily on the assumption that 
export controls will keep rogue nations at bay. Without the technology, 
our potential enemies are presumably impotent. I think this is an 
overly optimistic view.
  More than 15 nations already possess short-range ballistic missiles. 
Many of these same nations are pursuing weapons of mass destruction to 
accompany these missile capabilities. Several of these same countries 
are hostile to U.S. interests.
  Any country with the know-how to launch low-orbit satellites is also 
capable of achieving long-range delivery of a nuclear or other type of 
warhead. In contrast to the CIA's earlier prediction, the recently 
released Rumsfeld Report stated that the threat is only five years 
away. Moreover, the Rumsfeld Commission determined that the U.S. may 
not be able to identify the source of a threat, thus having little or 
no warning.
  Let me simply offer one concrete example why the Administration's 
current policy is dangerous. The Administration assumes it will have 
three years warning of a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. Although 
U.S. intelligence previously believed that Iran could not field a 
medium-range missile until 2003, this system was flight-tested in July.
  According to intelligence sources, the light-weight alloys as well as 
equipment for testing these Iranian missiles came from Russia.
  If we assume the predictions about othe5r countries; lack of 
technological capacities are accurate and postpone implementation of 
our own defensive capabilities based on these assumptions, the U.S. 
will be rendered vulnerable while we test the accuracy of these 
predictions. If these assumptions are proven false, the results would 
be devastating.
  This is a risk to U.S. security and a risk to U.S. civilians that I 
personally am not willing to take.
  It has been an enduring objective of U.S. defense policy to achieve 
the capability to defend our country from ballistic missiles, whether 
the threat be from deliberate, accidental or unauthorized launch.
  A further reality we confront under changed circumstances is the 
steady deterioration of Russia's system of command and control over its 
nuclear warheads.
  Although the Russian situation presents a potential threat now and 
deployment is not slated for another several years, no one can assume 
that the command-and-control elements in any state possessing weapons 
of mass destruction and long-range delivery capability will remain 
impenetrable and secure. This is one more reason that devising and 
deploying missile defense makes sense.
  There has been sufficient debate as to whether this bill is necessary 
in addition to the Defense Department's three-plus-three program. I 
believe it is for the following reasons:
  First, although the three-plus-three program provides for development 
of national missile defense (NMD) technology, it does not commit to 
deployment.
  Under the Administration's program, the U.S. would achieve the means 
to deploy an NMD system, but would await an imminent threat to do so. 
Capability that is not deployed opens a window of vulnerability. 
Certainly the plans of an attack on the U.S. by a hostile nation are 
not going to include a great deal of advanced warning. By not providing 
a commitment to deployment, as is the objective of this legislation, we 
are deliberately creating an indefinite phase of vulnerability.
  Second, opponents to this legislation firmly believe that by 
committing to deployment we may end up with an inadequate or faulty 
system. This bill neither prematurely locks the U.S. into specific 
technological solutions nor does it freeze our missile defense options.
  We already are deploying systems, even though the technologies 
involved continue to evolve. The specific technologies utilized and the 
defense capabilities achieved are in no way determined by this 
legislation. Further development and improvements to the system are 
anticipated, and this legislation allows for that.

[[Page S10054]]

  An additional strategic consideration is that the lack of a U.S. NMD 
system may actually provide an additional incentive to would-be rogues. 
If the U.S. implements an NMD system early enough, this may serve as a 
deterrent to these states.
  As mentioned, I believe that predictions regarding the technical 
mediocrity of hostile nations are excessively optimistic. However, I 
also firmly believe that a national missile defense system undoubtedly 
raises the bar on the technological capability necessary to inflict 
damage.
  Any nation hostile to the U.S. would not only have to achieve long-
range capability, but they would also have to be sophisticated enough 
in their delivery system to defeat a defensive shield. The financial 
and technical means necessary to accomplish this goal does, indeed, 
comprise a substantial deterrent.
  More importantly, a missile defense system places strategic stability 
on a more reliable and less adversarial foundation. The cold war 
deterrence relied on vulnerability and threats of retaliation. Missile 
defenses create a shield of protection, while the maintenance of a 
reliable stockpile underpins our credibility in threats of retaliation 
if attacked.
  Arms reductions can only achieve objectives of stable U.S.-Russian 
relations if these reductions are accompanied by national missile 
defense deployment. With such a system in place, possible non-
compliance and third party threats are not as pertinent. This would 
provide the confidence necessary to achieve even greater reductions.
  Mr. President, based on these concerns about U.S. national security 
in conjunction with my commitment to disarmament objectives I 
cosponsored and fully support the legislation before us today.
  National missile defense will provide the necessary additional 
security requisite in an unstable and transitional global environment 
where hostile nations are rapidly amassing threatening and 
sophisticated weapons capability. The objectives set forth in this 
legislation achieve that goal.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 1873, the 
American Missile Protection Act. This bill is simple, but extremely 
important. It makes it clear that it is the policy of the United States 
to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a national missile 
defense system which is capable of defending the entire territory of 
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
  We voted on cloture earlier this year--the motion fell one vote shy. 
Well, as is common in this business, we are dealing with changed 
circumstances. North Korea continues to defy rational behavior. As we 
all know, it recently fired a multi-stage missile over Japan! 
Starvation in North Korea is rampant, and many North Korea watchers 
have long predicted that government's imminent collapse. Well, Mr. 
President, the North Korean Government continues to defy the odds--but, 
what concerns me is the old adage that ``desperate times often call for 
desperate measures.'' If North Korea is truly desperate, to what extent 
will it go to try to hold on to its grasp of power?
  We have almost 80,000 American troops in the Asia/Pacific Theater. 
Most of these troops are already in the range of current North Korean 
missile technology. As their missile development program advances, we 
can expect more American lives and territory to be at risk. We cannot 
stand idly by and wait! We need to be prepared so that we can protect 
our citizens and our territory from such a reckless or accidental 
strike by North Korea or some other nation.
  Alaskans have been justifiably concerned with this issue for some 
time. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this 
time a resolution passed by the Alaska State Legislature which calls on 
the Administration to include Alaska and Hawaii in all future 
assessments of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United 
States. More than 20 percent of our domestic oil comes from Alaska, all 
of it through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Alaskans are concerned, as 
should the rest of the country be concerned, that a strike at the 
pipeline could have dire consequences to our domestic energy 
production.
  There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:'

              State of Alaska--Legislative Resolve No. 36

       Whereas Alaska is the 49th State to enter the federal union 
     of the United States of America and is entitled to all of the 
     rights, privileges, and obligations that the union affords 
     and requires; and
       Whereas Alaska possesses natural resources, including 
     energy, mineral, and human resources, vital to the prosperity 
     and national security of the United States; and
       Whereas the people of Alaska are conscious of the State's 
     remote northern location and proximity to Northeast Asia and 
     the Eurasian land mass, and of how that unique location 
     places the state in a more vulnerable position than other 
     states with regard to missiles that could be launched in Asia 
     and Europe; and
       Whereas the people of Alaska recognize the changing nature 
     of the international political structure and the evolution 
     and proliferation of missile delivery systems and weapons of 
     mass destruction as foreign states seek the military means to 
     deter the power of the United States in international 
     affairs; and
       Whereas there is a growing threat to Alaska by potential 
     aggressors in these nations and in rogue nations that are 
     seeking nuclear weapons capability and that have sponsored 
     international terrorism; and
       Whereas a National Intelligence Estimate to assess missile 
     threats to the United States left Alaska and Hawaii out of 
     the assessment and estimate; and
       Whereas one of the primary reasons for joining the Union of 
     the United States of America was to gain security for the 
     people of Alaska and for the common regulation of foreign 
     affairs on the basis of an equitable membership in the United 
     States federation; and
       Whereas the United States plans to field a national missile 
     defense, perhaps as early as 2003; this national missile 
     defense plan will provide only a fragile defense for Alaska, 
     the state most likely to be threatened by new missile powers 
     that are emerging in Northeast Asia;
       Be it resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests the President of the United States to 
     take all actions necessary, within the considerable limits of 
     the resources of the United States, to protect on an equal 
     basis all peoples and resources of this great Union from 
     threat of missile attack regardless of the physical location 
     of the member state; and be it
       Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests that Alaska be included in every 
     National Intelligence Estimate conducted by the United States 
     joint intelligence agencies; and be it
       Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests the President of the United States to 
     include Alaska and Hawaii, not just the contiguous 48 states, 
     in every National Intelligence Estimate of missile threat to 
     the United States; and be it
       Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature urges 
     the United States government to take necessary measures to 
     ensure that Alaska is protected against foreseeable threats, 
     nuclear and otherwise, posed by foreign aggressors, including 
     deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to protect 
     Alaska; and be it
       Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature conveys 
     to the President of the United States expectations that 
     Alaska's safety and security take priority over any 
     international treaty or obligation and that the President 
     take whatever action is necessary to ensure that Alaska can 
     be defended against limited missile attacks with the same 
     degree of assurance as that provided to all other states; and 
     be it
       Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests that the appropriate Congressional 
     committees hold hearings in Alaska that include defense 
     experts and administration officials to help Alaskans 
     understand their risks, their level of security, and Alaska's 
     vulnerability.
       Copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable 
     Bill Clinton, President of the United States; the Honorable 
     Al Gore, Jr., Vice-President of the United States and 
     President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich, 
     Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable 
     Ted Stevens, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
     Appropriations; the Honorable Bob Livingston, Chair of the 
     U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations; 
     the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chair of the U.S. Senate 
     Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Floyd Spence, 
     Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
     National Security; and to the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. 
     Senator, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, 
     members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Last year North Korean defectors indicated that the 
North Korean missile development program already poses a verifiable 
threat to American forces in Okinawa and seems on track to threaten 
parts of Alaska by the turn of the Century. The Taepodong missile, 
which is under development, would have a range of about 3,100 miles. 
From certain parts of North Korea, this weapon could easily target many 
of the Aleutian islands in

[[Page S10055]]

western Alaska, including the former Adak Naval Air Base.
  The Washington Times reported earlier this year that the Chinese have 
13 of 18 long-range strategic missiles armed with nuclear warheads 
aimed at American cities. This is incredible, Mr. President. Opponents 
to the motion to invoke cloture somehow fail to understand that this 
threat is real and that we have a responsibility to protect the United 
States from attack, be it deliberate or accidental. Without question, 
the threat of an attack on the United States is increasingly real, and 
we must act now to make certain that it is the policy of the United 
States to construct a national missile defense system with the 
capability of intercepting and deterring an aggressive strike against 
American soil from all parts of the United States--as soon as possible.
  Finally, Mr. President, I would mention for a moment that S. 1873 is 
not, and I repeat not, in any way a strike at Russia. The ABM treaty 
was crafted and agreed to when the United States and the Soviet Union 
were the only nuclear powers. The mutually assured destruction system 
was agreed to under the understanding that we were dealing with the 
Soviet Union, and not third parties. Times have changed; there are 
countless more players that have complicated the issues. We have a 
responsibility to protect ourselves, and we must act now to do so.
  Mr. President, I support the motion to proceed to the bill and hope 
that my colleagues will vote overwhelmingly in favor of this 
legislation this morning and pass it in the near future.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of S.1873, 
the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 drafted by Senators Cochran 
and Inouye. While I have been an ardent supporter of a vigorous missile 
defense program with a specific architecture and under a specific 
deployment schedule, a sufficient minority of members has been able to 
derail this effort over the last few years. Therefore, the modest 
proposal under consideration today, is an attempt to compromise by 
affirmatively establishing as U.S. policy the deployment of an 
effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system as soon as 
technologically possible.
  I have long argued that such a system is both necessary and prudent 
because the threat of an attack or an inadvertent launch did not end 
with the termination of the cold war, but is real and continues to 
grow. In fact, the threat is greater today than any time in United 
States history. The technology revolution aids equally those who want 
to bring good into the world, as well as those who would do harm.
  Recent activities in Africa, namely the bombing of our embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, and the launch of ballistic missiles (or a 
satellite) by North Korea, as well as the shoot-down of two unarmed 
American aircraft in the Florida straits two years ago, reminds us of 
the threat the United States and our allies face from rogue and 
terrorist states, and non-state actors.
  Beyond these, the future of Russia and China remains unclear. While 
we wait to see if the forces of freedom and democracy prevail in the 
internal struggles happening in these countries, we must remember that 
they maintain the capability to launch weapons of mass destruction. 
Other states continue efforts to develop destructive capabilities. 
Recently, Iran has made dramatic progress in its missile development. 
We know that China's proliferation has aided the development of 
Pakistan's nuclear program, adding to the instability of South Asia.
  My primary concern with the Administration's ``plan'' on deploying an 
anti-ballistic missile defense system is that it is premised on 
deploying a system within three years of clearly identifying an 
emerging threat. I believe the Administration greatly overestimates its 
intelligence gathering capability.
  In early 1997, a CIA official testified that Iran was not expected to 
have the capability to field a medium range ballistic missile until 
2007. Less than a year later, that nine year time frame was 
significantly reduced by the CIA, and another Administration official 
predicted Iran could have the capability in as early as one-and-a-half 
years. Similarly, in 1997 the Department of Defense only credited 
Pakistan with a 300 km capability. However, less than six months later 
Pakistan launched a missile capable of traveling 1,500 km.
  Based on past performance, I am very hesitant to base the fielding of 
a missile defense system on the Administration's determination of the 
existence of an emerging threat. I believe such a plan is grossly 
inadequate and could have catastrophic consequences for the American 
people.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, last May, in the wake of India's nuclear 
weapons tests, the Senate rejected by one vote a motion to allow us to 
consider the need for a national missile defense. At that time I came 
to the floor and urged my colleagues to support defending our nation 
against missile attack. I recalled how the President, in his State of 
the Union address, underscored the importance of foresight and the need 
to prepare ``for a far off storm.'' The President wasn't talking about 
weapons proliferation and national missile defense, but I suggested he 
should have been--and that the thunder clouds of proliferation were 
gathering.
  Since that vote in May, the storm has picked up force and is not so 
``far off.'' That weapons proliferation is a serious threat to our 
nation is more obvious today that even a few month ago.
  Allow me to remind my colleagues of a few developments since the 
Senate last considered missile defense:
  Following India's nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted six of its own 
tests. The South Asian subcontinent--rife with smoldering disputes--is 
now perched on the edge of a nuclear arms race.
  The following month, in June, North Korea blatantly announced that it 
was selling, and would continue to sell, ballistic missiles to any and 
all comers. The only requirement is cash on the barrel-head.
  In July, the Congress received stark warning of our under-
preparedness from the Rumsfeld Commission. This distinguished, bi-
partisan, group of experts concluded that our assessment of the missile 
threat to America was inadequate, and that hostile countries were 
closer to developing and deploying ballistic missiles than we thought. 
As if to prove the Rumsfeld Commission right, Iran test-launched its 
Shahab-3 missile that same month. This weapon was based on a North 
Korean design and updated with Russian and Chinese assistance. It is 
capable of striking U.S. allies and troops in the Middle East. Iran 
also continues its work on the Shahab-4, which will be able to reach 
central Europe.
  Then, just a few weeks ago, North Korea test-launched its Taepo-Dong 
1 missile--and they shot it right over our key ally, Japan. The Taepo-
Dong 1 is a huge breakthrough for North Korea. It is a multi-stage 
rocket that puts North Korea over a critical technology threshold. 
Their next missile, already under development, is the Taepo-Dong 2 
which will be capable of striking American shores.
  When I spoke on this subject in May, I cautioned that developments 
such as these were on the horizon. Indeed, I noted a few of them 
specifically. But I truly did not expect to stand here this soon and 
recount that so many dangerous developments actually occurred. My 
friends, the past few months demonstrate that the threats from weapons 
of mass destruction and missiles with increasingly greater range are an 
imminent threat. We have consistently underestimated that threat and 
must proceed with development and deployment of a national missile 
defense as soon as possible.
  I do not know if there will be another proliferation development to 
report this month. Given the recent track record, it's very likely 
there will be. It's certain that missile development in hostile 
countries will continue apace. Moreover, world events are becoming more 
and more chaotic each day. The instability in Russia and Asia and the 
continuing proliferation activities of countries like China and North 
Korea only heightens the prospect that dangerous weapons technology 
will be sold to rogue actors.
  President Clinton was recently quoted in the press that requiring 
certification regarding other countries' actions only creates the need 
for the Administration to ``fudge'' its reporting. More recently, it 
appears the Administration took an active role to limit weapons 
inspections in Iraq, despite all its rhetoric to the contrary. Mr. 
President, events like these are

[[Page S10056]]

highly worrisome because they suggest the President is less than 
forthcoming to the American people, to our allies and to our foes on 
issues of national defense and foreign policy. Perhaps even more 
worrisome, however, is the possibility that Administration policy 
makers may be fooling themselves. In the case of missile defense, this 
appears to be so. Their defense policy is based on hollow rhetoric and 
delusion. It is based on the hope of a three-year advanced warning. My 
friends, we're receiving our warnings now--over and over again. It's 
time to act.
  It's time to wake up and it's time to act. The technology to develop 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is widely available. If 
we do not prepare today, when the day arrives that America is paralyzed 
by our vulnerability to ballistic missile attack, or when an attack 
actually occurs, we will be reduced to telling the American people--and 
history--that we had hoped this would not happen. We will have to say 
we had ample evidence of a growing threat, but did not act for whatever 
reason.
  Mr. President, if we're going to err on this issue, we should err on 
the side of caution. If our choices are to deploy a missile defense 
either too early or too late, let's make it early. The first step in 
raising our guard is to pass S. 1873, the American Missile Protection 
Act, and commit the United States to a policy of deploying national 
missile defenses.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as I listen to the debate on S. 1873, two 
observations come to my mind. First, it appears that a rigid adherence 
to ideology seems to be trumping the judgment of this nation's most 
senior military leaders. Second, advocates of S. 1873 apparently lack 
confidence in their own publicly stated position. They are insisting 
that the critical and costly decision about whether we deploy a 
national missile defense should be based on a single criterion--
technological feasibility--a simplistic test that the bill's supporters 
are unwilling to use for any other federal program.
  The Senate should act as it did in May. We should oppose cloture and 
move on to the Patients' Bill of Rights, campaign finance reform, 
education, agricultural relief, and the environment--all issues of 
greater urgency for working families in this country.
  The proponents of this latest attempt to deploy ballistic missile 
defenses at all costs have entitled this bill the American Missile 
Protection Act. But let's be clear, enactment of this bill will provide 
precious little if any additional protection. If the Senate were to 
immediately adopt this bill, we would not be a single day closer to 
actually having a national missile defense. In fact, as stated by the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
recent letters to Congress, deployment of national missile defenses at 
this time is unnecessary, premature, and could effectively increase the 
nuclear threats this country faces.
  Quoting from S. 1873, ``the United States should deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective national missile defense 
system.'' In the eyes of the sponsors of this bill, the only standard 
that must be met in deciding whether to deploy defenses is that they be 
technologically possible.
  Mr. President, I cannot find a clear definition of effective defenses 
in S. 1873. That troubles me greatly, though it apparently doesn't 
trouble the bill's supporters. They are strangely silent when it comes 
to establishing even the most minimal performance requirements for 
missile defenses. Many of these bill supporters are the same people who 
reject important domestic programs such as health care and school 
construction because they fail to meet their stringent--sometimes 
logically impossible--set of conditions.
  This irony is not lost on me, nor should it be lost on the rest of 
the Senate. As I noted in May when we last debated this bill, the 
attitude displayed by the proponents of S. 1873 is cavalier even by 
military spending standards. Some research by the Department of Defense 
shows that S. 1873 would make history. For the first time ever, we 
would be committing to deploy a weapons system before it had been 
developed, let alone thoroughly tested.
  An additional irony is that most experts believe that a rush to 
judgment on ballistic missile defenses will not necessarily lead to the 
deployment of the most effective system. According to General John 
Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ``if 
the decision is made to deploy a national missile defense system in the 
near term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited 
capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be avoided, the 
Defense Department can continue to enhance the technology base and the 
commensurate capability of the missile defense system that could be 
fielded on a later deployment schedule.''
  In addition to its silence on the effectiveness issue, there is not a 
word in S. 1873 about the costs of this system. The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that the deployment of even a very limited 
system could cost tens of billions of dollars. And given that so much 
of the necessary technology remains unproven, history tells us the real 
cost could be much, much more. Despite the hefty price tag and the 
questionable technology, proponents of this bill essentially say, ``the 
costs be damned, full speed ahead.'' Yet when it comes to proven 
proposals to improve our nation's schools, increase the quality of 
health care, or enhance the environment, the first question out of the 
mouths of the proponents of S. 1873 is, ``how much does it cost?''
  Mr. President, S. 1873 also says absolutely nothing about how a U.S. 
declaration that it plans to unilaterally deploy national missile 
defenses will affect existing and future arms control treaties. It 
should be clear to every one in this chamber that if the United States 
unilaterally abrogates the ABM Treaty, which is what S. 1873 states we 
will do, the Russians will effectively end a decades-long effort to 
reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They will back out of START I. They 
will not ratify START II. And they will not negotiate START III. In 
other words, a unilateral U.S. deployment of national missile defenses 
could end the prospect for reducing Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal 
from its current level of 9,000 weapons down to as few as 2,000.
  I find it hard to believe that many of my colleagues are willing to 
forego the opportunity to eliminate thousands of Russian nuclear 
weapons today in exchange for the possibility that we might some day be 
able to deploy a system that can intercept a few missiles. This is much 
too steep a price to pay for a course of action that at present is 
unproven, unaffordable, and unnecessary.
  Supporters of S. 1873 have argued that the Senate should reconsider 
its position on this issue as a result of three major developments 
since May--the nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan, the 
Rumsfeld Commission report on the threat posed by ballistic missiles, 
and North Korea's test of a medium-range ballistic missile. In reality, 
none of these events suggests we should go forward with premature 
deployment of national missile defenses. The tests of nuclear weapons 
by India and Pakistan as well as the larger issue of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons can best and most directly be addressed by swift 
consideration and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Adoption of S. 1873 does not directly address this situation and will, 
in fact, lead to more, not less, nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the 
majority side of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not seen 
fit to conduct a single hearing on this issue, let alone report out 
this treaty for consideration by the full Senate.
  As for the remaining two events, I commend to all members of the 
Senate an excellent letter from General Shelton, this nation's most 
senior military leader. General Shelton and the rest of the service 
chiefs take issue with the Rumsfeld Commission's findings and reaffirm 
their support for the Clinton Administration's current missile defense 
policy and deployment readiness program. As for the recent Korea 
missile test, although the letter was written prior to the test, the 
Chairman's conclusions were explicitly based on the assumption that 
North Korea would continue the development and testing of their missile 
program. Quoting General Shelton, the North Korean missile program, 
``has been predicted and considered in the current examination.''
  Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to reflect on the advice of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and vote against 
cloture on S. 1873.

[[Page S10057]]

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor and strong supporter 
of S. 1873, the American Missile Protection Act, and I urge all my 
colleagues to vote in favor of this much needed legislation.
  Let me begin by being blunt--the United States cannot defend its 
borders against a single ballistic missile attack. This leaves all 
fifty states, especially Alaska and Hawaii, defenseless against any 
country that wants to threaten the U.S. with ballistic missiles.
  We will hear that there is no need for a national missile defense 
because the Soviet Union is gone. This is true, but the USSR's demise 
has given rise to many nations ready to take their place. Russia has 
25,000 nuclear warheads and recent reports show that their technology 
and warheads are readily available. Just as problematic is that 25 
nations have or are developing nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons. Over 30 nations have ballistic missiles, with many more 
attempting to strengthen their weapon of mass destruction capability.
  Until just recently, China, with its over 400 warheads, had strategic 
nuclear missiles targeted at the United States. However, these missiles 
could be red-targeted within minutes if so desired. Just last week, 
North Korea placed all of South Asia on high alert due to their missile 
test. They now have demonstrated the capability to build two-stage 
missiles, which is significant because adding stages increases missile 
range. While the Administration plays down the threat, I cannot. This 
leaves the region and our over 80,000 troops in the area vulnerable to 
attack. Also, according to ``Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems,'' North 
Korea is developing long-range missile capability that could threaten 
southern Alaska and with additional assistance from Russia could later 
develop missiles with ranges which could threaten the west coast of the 
U.S.
  Opponents will also argue that a missile defense system cannot defend 
the United States against suitcase nukes or terrorist attacks on our 
own soil. They are right, and we need to do more to detect this form of 
terrorism, but it should not be done at the risk of a ballistic missile 
attack. To quote William Safire, ``. . . nations like China, Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not been investing heavily 
in suitcases.'' These countries are spending money on long range 
missiles. While many of these countries may never threaten the United 
States, we should not base all of our future threats on the present.
  Opponents also point out that non-proliferation agreements will end 
the need for a missile defense. The problem is that not all countries 
abide by these agreements, or even sign at all. Presently, China, North 
Korea, and Russia are all engaged in the transfer of missile components 
and technologies. Despite past denials, North Korea now admits to 
testing and selling missiles in an effort to help build the arsenals of 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Again, despite the threats and pleadings of the 
Administration, North Korea has refused to stop developing, testing, 
and deploying missiles.
  Lastly, opponents of a missile defense system point to the 
Administration's 1995 National Intelligence Estimate which stated that 
the United States would not face a threat of a missile attack for at 
least 15 years. However, to come to this conclusion, they had to 
exclude any threat to Alaska and Hawaii. This intentional omission is 
deceptive at best. We must not sacrifice the protection of U.S. 
citizens living in Alaska and Hawaii just to score political points. By 
leaving one state vulnerable, we leave the country vulnerable. This is 
unacceptable.
  While I am a strong supporter of the capability of our intelligence 
community, they are not perfect. In May, the U.S. intelligence 
community was caught by surprise when India conducted a series of 
nuclear tests on the 11th and 13th of that month. In another surprise, 
despite intelligence estimates that Iran could not field its medium 
range ballistic missile until 2003, Iran flight-tested this system on 
July 22nd of this year. Also, it has been reported that Iran is 
developing a longer-range version capable of reaching Central Europe.
  Again, the Administration believes that we will have at least 3 years 
warning before any missile attack would be feasible. However, on July 
15th, the Congressionally mandated bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission 
concluded that the United States could get little to no warning of 
ballistic missile deployments from several emerging powers. The 
Commission stated that ``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging 
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has 
been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community.'' 
It also warns that, ``The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, 
threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. . . . the 
U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational 
deployment.''
  While it may be difficult, we must admit that we live in an era of 
unstable international politics. The U.S. should never initiate a 
ballistic missile attack, but we cannot be sure that other nations are 
like-minded. The United States must be able to defend itself. I believe 
the world would be a better place without these weapons. In the 
meantime though, we must live with the reality that they do exist and 
in the wrong hands will be used.
  The bottom line is that if the United States is on the receiving end 
of a missile attack, we are defenseless. I believe it is wrong to 
understate the danger still lurking in the world. We must do all that 
is possible to protect all Americans. We must develop a true national 
missile defense as soon as technologically possible. To do anything 
less would be to shirk our duties to provide for the common defense of 
the United States and all its citizens.
  Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, how we vote is not always clear to 
Americans. For the average citizen it is not easy to keep straight 
whether a ``yea'' is for or against something--whether it is a vote to 
pass a bill or table it. It also can be difficult to sort out where 
their senators stand when a particular vote covers many provisions in 
one ``package.'' Which provision was the ``yea'' vote for or the ``no'' 
vote against?
  But, Mr. President, the vote on cloture of the American Missile 
Protection Act (S. 1873) this morning is not at all one of those 
``confusing'' votes. I can think of no vote where it can be seen more 
clearly exactly where each senator stands. This morning's vote was 
black and white. This morning's vote shows who takes the most important 
function of the Federal Government--national security--seriously. The 
Senate failed for a second time this year to invoke cloture on the 
bill. Forty-one Senators, all Democrats, voted against protecting 
American families from the greatest threat to our homeland.
  Nothing can be more frightening than the thought of an attack on our 
homes by another nation using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. 
Not thinking about it or pretending that it won't happen are absolutely 
not grownup ways to deal with this reality.
  Opponents of the American Missile Protection Act claim concern with 
the fact that the bill mandates deployment of a National Missile 
Defense system. They claim that this bill ties our hands because when 
we finally do develop the capability to deploy a system, there might 
not be a need for it.
  Might not be a need?? Let me be completely up-front. It's a myth that 
we have plenty of time to build a missile defense capability and hold 
off deployment until some potential future threat develops. The 
American people need to get that scenario out of their minds. The 
system is needed today, right now, and it is time for this 
Administration to get off its slow-track development program.
  Just two months ago, the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States concluded that ``ballistic missiles 
armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States.'' 
The commission did not say there might be a future threat, it said 
there is a present threat. Further, India and Pakistan have conducted 
nuclear tests, North Korea just launched a two-stage missile over 
Japan, and we don't know Iraq's chemical weapons capability because the 
inspectors have not been allowed to look. If these events do not 
convince my colleagues on the other side of the aisle of our need for a 
National Missile Defense system, what will it take to convince them? Do 
they actually have to see a missile strike?

[[Page S10058]]

  So, Mr. President, I do not take seriously this criticism that S. 
1873 is flawed because it mandates deployment of a missile defense 
system that may not be needed. This sounds more like a smoke screen. I 
believe that the Democrat's real hope is to try and resuscitate the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was voided by the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. Getting back the ABM Treaty seems to be all consuming for 
some senators, and a U.S. National Missile Defense system gets in the 
way of their goal.
  Mr. President, after today's vote it is very clear to American 
families that their senators either support real national security 
action or are trying to convince the citizens that a paper treaty will 
be sufficient to protect them--there is no middle ground.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 15 seconds remaining; the 
majority a minute and a half.
  Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose cloture on the 
Cochran bill.
  I will agree at the outset that the many cosponsors of this bill, 
though haling overwhelmingly from a single party, probably believe they 
have the best interests of the nation in mind by giving their support 
to this bill. So I am not here today to challenge their motives or to 
impugn their character. I am here instead to state as concisely and 
sincerely as I can how and why I believe they are simply wrong.
  This bill is fatally flawed because it bases a profound national 
security decision--that is, the decision to deploy a missile defense 
system spanning the entire territory of the United States--upon one 
single consideration . . . its technological possibility.
  Voters across the land sent us here to Washington because here is 
where the tough decisions are made that face all Americans. They are 
tough decisions precisely because they rarely if ever involve only one 
consideration. They are tough because they often entail tough trade-
offs in the pursuit of goals that our country simply cannot achieve all 
at once. As members of Congress, we have to consider politics, 
economics, short-term and long-term effects, impacts on other policies, 
legal issues, and other factors. We have to weigh all these 
considerations and reach a judgment on what will serve the interests of 
the nation.
  Yet here we are today, deliberating a decision that could well lead 
to the expenditure of tens or potentially hundreds of billions of 
dollars solely on the basis of a wish on a star. And that star is Star 
Wars.
  This is my main objection to the bill--I just do not think it is wise 
to base fundamental national security decisions on simply one 
criterion, especially one so notoriously ill-defined as the notion of a 
``technological possibility.''
  But I have other concerns as well. These relate to the potential cost 
of the policy enshrined in this bill. And they focus on the dubious 
technological objective that lies at the heart of what is known as 
``National Missile Defense.'' I think it is certainly appropriate to 
ask some tough questions--as the Rumsfeld Commission did--about the 
foreign missile threat to determine if this threat is so grave or so 
imminent that it requires throwing twin babies out with the bath water: 
first, by abandoning standard US government procurement laws and 
procedures when it comes to acquiring major technological systems, and 
second by setting America on a course that is contary to our nation's 
arms control treaty obligations. And with respect to the consideration 
of what is actually possible, I also want to call my colleagues' 
attention to an article in the New York Times dated July 28 by Richard 
Garwin, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission. The article makes a 
persuasive point: that we cannot--must not--depend on a system for our 
defense which, even under the best circumstances, cannot accomplish its 
mission. In fact, it is not at all clear that any system we design 
could ever deal with all of the varied threats from different quarters.
  Mr. President, the American people are not dummies. I am convinced 
that when they listen carefully to both sides on this issue, they will 
recognize that nobody has yet come up with an improvement on existing 
US policy for missile defense. They will come to this conclusion 
precisely because our current policy is premised upon all of the many 
considerations I have just summarized . . . not just one.
  Americans understand that it makes sense not to force the government 
to buy costly, high-risk technologies that simply have the possibility 
of being effective.
  They understand that America's national security decisions must not 
be made without considering the impacts of these decisions on the 
defense choices that will be left open to other countries.
  They understand that in an age of balanced budgets, large new public 
sector commitments will jeopardize funding prospects for a multitude of 
other precious national goals.
  They will know how to assess the incorrect claim so frequently made 
by missile defense advocates that America is allegedly ``defenseless'' 
against the foreign missile threat. The closer they look at the $270-
plus billion that we are spending each year on the nation's defense 
(not to mention the additional billions that we are investing in our 
diplomatic and intelligence capabilities), the sooner they will see the 
fallacy in the idea of a defensless America.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield the time remaining on our side to 
the distinguished Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, for closing 
our debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from 
Mississippi for his leadership.
  Which of these actions would be the act of a strong and powerful 
nation led by men and women of vision and foresight: a nation that 
constantly reassesses its security threats and tailors its defense to 
meet those threats, or a nation that sits back and says let's see what 
the threat is, then we will assess it and then we will address it?
  Mr. President, it was the latter thinking that caused us to go to a 
hollow military after World War II, and we paid the price with 
thousands of lives in the Korean war--lives of our men and women, 
because we hadn't planned for the future.
  Mr. President, we have gotten the wake-up call. It is the Rumsfeld 
report that Congress commissioned, which said that we have failed to 
estimate how long it would take rogue nations to develop ballistic 
missiles. That is the wake-up call. Are we going to meet the security 
threats of this country? The greatest security threat we have is 
incoming ballistic missiles. If we put our mind to the technology, we 
can prioritize our defense spending to say to the American people that 
we will protect you from incoming ballistic missiles to our shores, or 
to any theater where our Armed Forces are present. We can do no less if 
we are men and women of vision and foresight for the greatest Nation on 
Earth.
  I urge your support for the Cochran visionary amendment that would 
protect our country at the earliest opportunity.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Coats be added as a cosponsor of S. 1873.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                             CLOTURE MOTION

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, pursuant to rule XXII, 
the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the 
clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provision of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to 
     proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the Missile Defense 
     System legislation.
         Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad 
           Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry E. Craig, 
           Ted Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson, 
           Jim Inhofe, Connie Mack, Robert F. Bennett, and Jeff 
           Sessions.


                            CALL OF THE ROLL

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.


                                  VOTE

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate 
that debate on a motion to proceed

[[Page S10059]]

to Senate bill 1873, the missile defense bill, shall be brought to a 
close?
  The yeas and nays are required under the rule. The clerk will call 
the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 262 Leg.]

                                YEAS--59

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--41

     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are 
41. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted 
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
  Mr. GORTON. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The distinguished Senator from 
Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the distinguished President pro tempore 
has asked for 5 or 10 minutes to speak as in morning business. I ask 
unanimous consent that you recognize him for that purpose.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The distinguished Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

                          ____________________