[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 118 (Wednesday, September 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10045-S10059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Under the previous order, there
will now be 45 minutes of debate on the motion to proceed to S. 1873,
the American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the issue we are debating this morning is
not new to the Senate. In May of this year, the Senate voted on a
motion to invoke cloture so that we could proceed to consider the
American Missile Protection Act. That motion was not successful. The
vote was 59 in favor and 41 against. Therefore, we fell one vote short
of invoking cloture so the Senate could proceed to debate the American
Missile Protection Act.
We have another chance today, Mr. President, to go on record in favor
of considering this bill. So it should be put in context what we are
voting for and what we are not voting for. We are not voting to pass
the bill without any debate. That is not the issue. We are voting to
proceed to consider the bill. Now let us put in context what the facts
are today as compared with last May when we fell just one vote short of
voting to consider this bill.
At the time we voted in May, India had just tested--that very day--
for the second time, a nuclear weapons device. We were not aware that
India was going to conduct that test. Our intelligence community was
surprised. All the world was surprised.
We used that example to urge the Senate to change our current policy
on national missile defense, because the current policy is that we will
make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system if we learn
that some nation has developed the capacity to put us at risk, to
threaten the security of American citizens with a ballistic missile
system.
So the assumption is that our intelligence community and our
resources for learning things like this are so sophisticated and so
reliable that we will be able to detect this, that we will have an
early warning, that we will be able to know well in advance of any
nation having the capability of inflicting damage or destruction on
America's soil, through a ballistic missile system, in enough time that
we could deploy a national missile defense system.
Another consideration is that we have not yet developed a national
missile defense system. We have various
[[Page S10046]]
programs that are being tested in various stages of development--
theater ballistic missile defense systems--that can defend us against
regional attacks, shorter-range attacks. But this bill is talking about
a national ballistic missile defense system and whether or not our
policy should be to wait and see if other countries develop the
capability to put us at risk and then decide--then decide--whether we
should work to deploy a system to protect against that kind of threat.
What has changed since the vote in May is that not only did Pakistan
proceed to test a nuclear device--we were not sure they were going to
do that--they also had just recently tested a missile system that we
did not know they had. We had been told a few months earlier that they
had a missile system that was in the 180 mile range. They tested one
that had a range of about 900 miles without our knowing they had the
capability to do that, without our knowing that they had that missile.
But they had acquired either the missile, the component parts, or the
design from other countries or another country--according to press
reports, North Korea was involved in that--and they were able to
actually launch that across that distance, and it was a surprise to our
intelligence community, to our country and to the world.
Those events occurred about the time we voted in May. Since then,
look what has happened. Iran has tested a longer-range missile than we
expected them to have. North Korea has tested and has fired a multiple-
stage ballistic missile. We had discussed the fact that that was
possibly under development, the Taepo Dong missile. We are calling it
the Taepo Dong I because we are told that there is a Taepo Dong II
under development. That has been publicly reported in the press.
The missile that was tested the other day by North Korea, the
multiple-stage missile, was fired over Japan. There was evidence that
the missile actually crossed the territory of Japan. Do you realize,
Mr. President--I know Members of the Senate are aware--that we have
some 37,000 Americans deployed in South Korea as a part of a defense
stability effort in that region, and we have more than that in Japan,
in the Okinawa area?
The whole point is that if you consider all of that, we have 80,000
Americans who are at risk now because of the proven capability of North
Korea and its new advanced missile capability. We have gone to great
lengths in the last few years to dissuade North Korea from proceeding
to develop nuclear weapons. We were very concerned that they were
proceeding to do just that. Some think that they have made substantial
progress in doing just that.
Incidentally, the Taepo Dong II that I just mentioned has the
capacity of striking the territory of the United States. Many troops
and military assets and resources are located in Alaska. According to
press reports, the Taepo Dong II would have the capacity to destroy
that area, as well as striking Hawaii.
Now, the issue is, do we proceed with the wait-and-see policy of this
administration, or do we today vote to proceed to consider legislation
that will change that policy, that will say as soon as technology
permits, the United States will deploy a national missile defense
system that will protect it against ballistic missile attack, whether
unauthorized or accidental or intentional. We have all worried about
accidental and unauthorized launches from China and Russia. We know
those countries have the capability of striking us. But think about
this other fact: What else has changed recently?
The United States has observed the Russian Government slowly
deteriorate to the point that the command and control structure of the
military is seriously in question. Who really controls the armed forces
of Russia to the point that you can rely upon the good intentions of
the Yeltsin government not to target U.S. sites with their missile
systems, their intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most lethal and
accurate of any other country in the world, with multitudes of
warheads, nuclear-tipped warheads? We are sitting here hoping and
assuming that we can continue to work with Russia and whatever
government does come out of the struggle for power there to continue to
destroy nuclear weapons under Russian control rather than to build them
up and make them more accurate and lethal.
By the way, it is not like they have dismantled the nuclear weapon
systems in Russia. They exist. They are lethal. They are capable of
striking anywhere in the United States they might decide to strike, and
we are glad that they don't have any intention of doing that. But they
have the capability of doing that and there could be an unauthorized or
accidental launch and we have absolutely no defense against that kind
of attack. We have been operating under the assumption that we can
assure them we will retaliate--we have the capacity to--and we will
destroy any country who attempts to strike us in that way. That has
been the system for defense that we have had.
We have had no defense. The defense is that we will destroy you if
you attack us in that way. That doesn't work with North Korea or Iran
or some other rogue states, leaders, and terrorists who have announced
that it is their stated goal to kill Americans and to destroy America
and to build missile systems to do that or to sell missile systems to
those who want to do that. North Korea said just that. An official
stated publicly that they are in the business of selling missile
systems. They need the money. That was the explanation. We know that is
true. They have sold missile systems; they have sold component parts.
Russia has people who are cooperating in Iran right now, and have in
the past, to develop systems that could inflict great damage not only
in that region but beyond.
Now, some are saying that we already have authorization and funds in
the pipeline to develop these missile systems to protect us--
interceptor missiles--and we read about the testing that is going on of
theater systems. But we have no program that has as its goal the
development and deployment of a missile defense that will protect the
United States against unauthorized, accidental, or intentional
ballistic missile attack.
That is what this legislation addresses. It has two parts. The first
is recitation of all of the facts that we have been able to gather
through hearings over the last 2 years in our Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. We have
had hearings. We have published a report called Proliferation Primer.
It has been widely distributed. It documents the fact that throughout
the world there is a growing capability for the use of ballistic
missiles.
We talk about how it is happening and what people are saying who are
in charge of those countries who are involved in this. It clearly, in
our view, justified our asking this Congress to legislate a change in
our policy to carry out now the express recommendations of the Rumsfeld
Commission, which has, since our vote in May, given its report on the
state of affairs regarding the ballistic missile threat to the United
States. It was concluded in that report that our intelligence community
does not have the capacity for making the early warning assessment that
is contemplated under current administration policy.
The Director of Central Intelligence has admitted in previous
statements to the Senate that there are gaps and uncertainties in the
information that his agency can obtain in making decisions about
whether or not countries are developing or have the capacity to deploy
ballistic missile systems that put our Nation at risk. Now that
assessment and that description of the situation has been borne out by
those recent developments.
Admiral Jeremiah made a recent study of our intelligence agencies in
the wake of some of these events, and he reported a similar problem.
Given those facts, Mr. President, it seems clear to me, the
cosponsors of this legislation, and 59 Senators, that the time has come
to change the policy from wait and see to proceed as soon as
technologically possible to deploy a national missile defense system to
protect the security interests of the United States and its citizens.
There is no higher responsibility that this Government has--no higher
responsibility, no priority any greater--than the security of U.S.
citizens. We are putting that security at risk, Mr. President, under
the current policy. It is as clear as anything can be.
[[Page S10047]]
The time has come today--this morning at 9:45 a.m.--to vote to
proceed to consider this proposal, which simply calls for the
deployment, as soon as technology permits, of a national missile
defense system.
Mr. President, I urge Senators to vote in support of the motion to
invoke cloture.
I ask unanimous consent that several articles pertaining to this
subject be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, July 16, 1998]
Panel Says U.S. Faces Risk of a Surprise Missile Attack
(By Eric Schmitt)
Washington--Rogue nations or terrorists could develop and
deploy ballistic missiles for an attack against the United
States with ``little or no warning,'' an independent
commission announced Wednesday.
But senior American intelligence officials disputed the
finding, which challenges a longstanding intelligence
estimate that no country except Russia and China, which
already possess ballistic missiles, could hit American
targets, and that North Korea could perhaps field long-range
missiles before 2010.
The unanimous conclusions of the bipartisan commission,
headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, provide
fresh ammunition for supporters of a national missile
defense, and sharpen an election-year issue that Republicans
want to wield against the administration and Democrats in
Congress.
``It's a very sobering conclusion,'' said Speaker Newt
Gingrich, a strong supporter of national missile defenses,
who called on the administration to work with Congress in the
next several months to address the heightened threat as
described in the report.
The United States has spent more than $40 billion since the
Reagan administration to build a space- or land-based defense
against ballistic missile strikes, but has yet to construct a
workable network.
Indeed, a report Wednesday by the General Accounting
Office, the auditing arm of Congress, concluded that it is
unlikely that a program to develop a national missile defense
will meet an important deadline in 2000.
The commission did not address the merit of any particular
defensive system, focusing instead on the ballistic missile
threat to the United States.
``The major implication of our conclusions is that warning
time is reduced,'' said Rumsfeld, who was defense secretary
under President Gerald Ford. ``We see an environment of
little or no warning of ballistic missile threats to the U.S.
from several emerging powers.''
The commission singled out North Korea, Iran and Iraq for
scrutiny. For example, the panel's report said, ``We judge
that Iran now has the technical capability and resources
to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile'' similar
to a North Korean model.
But in a letter sent to Congress on Wednesday, George
Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, said the
government stood by a threat assessment first made in 1995
and reaffirmed most recently in March.
The government assessments, Tenet said in his letter,
``were supported by the available evidence and were well
tested'' in an internal review.
But the commission, in its 300-page classified report
delivered to the House and Senate on Wednesday, as well as in
an unclassified 27-page version, said the American
intelligence community was wrong in relying on the much-
longer warning times.
Rumsfeld said rogue nations, such as Iran and Iraq, had
obtained sensitive missile technology, in part because of
loosened export controls among industrialized nations.
``Foreign assistance is not a wildcard,'' Rumsfeld said. ``It
is a fact of our relaxed post-Cold-War world.''
Rumsfeld also said that these suspect countries had become
more adept at concealing their missile programs, making it
more difficult for Western intelligence analysts to gauge a
country's progress and intentions.
In a hastily called briefing for reporters, senior
intelligence officials said Wednesday that the commission had
examined the same information available to government
analysts, but had come to different conclusions.
These intelligence officials said that they tended to focus
on specific evidence to reach their conclusions, assigning
various degrees of certainty to each assessment.
The intelligence officials said the panel, officially
titled the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States, took the same information and, in
essence, assumed the worst about what was known for a
particular country's missile program, and drew its
conclusions.
Rumsfeld concurred: ``We came at this subject as senior
decision-makers would, who have to make difficult judgments
based on limited information.''
For that reason, the report, even though it was praised in
particular by Republicans, is likely to stoke the debate over
ballistic missile threats rather than be viewed as the
definitive conclusion.
____
[From the Washington Times, July 23, 1998]
Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile
(By Bill Gertz)
Iran conducted its first test flight of a new medium-range
missile Tuesday night, giving the Islamic republic the
capability of hitting Israel and all U.S. forces in the
region with chemical or biological warheads, The Washington
Times has learned.
``It is a significant development because it puts all U.S.
forces in the region at risk,'' said one official familiar
with the test.
U.S. intelligence agencies detected and monitored the
launch, which took place at a missile range over land in
northern Iran late Tuesday night, said officials familiar
with intelligence reports.
The missile was identified as Iran's new Shahab-3 missile,
which is expected to have a range of 800 to 930 miles, far
longer than any of Iran's current arsenal of short-range
Scud-design and Chinese missiles.
Data on the test are still being analyzed, but the missile
appeared to be a modified North Korean Nodong missile, which
Iran is using as the basis for its Shahab-3 design.
The launch has raised new fears that Iran has acquired more
Nodongs, which have a range of about 620 miles, from North
Korea.
Intelligence officials said the Shahab-3 is a liquid-fueled
system carried on a road-mobile launcher. Mobile launchers
are extremely difficult to detect and track.
The Shahab is believed by U.S. intelligence agencies to be
inaccurate and thus is expected to be armed with chemical or
biological warheads. Iran is developing nuclear warheads but
is believed to be years away from having them.
Officials said the test's success is significant because
U.S. military planners must regard the weapon as capable of
being used even though it was only fired once.
North Korea's Nodong also was flight-tested only once and
recently was declared ``operational'' by the Pentagon, which
puts it in a position to threaten U.S. troops throughout that
region.
In April, Pakistan for the first time also tested a Nodong-
design missile called the Ghauri.
A congressional report released last week by a commission
set up to assess the missile threat said, ``Iran is making
very rapid progress in developing the Shahab-3 medium-range
ballistic missiles.
``This missile may be flight tested at any time and
deployed soon thereafter,'' said the report by the
commission, headed by former Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld.
Iran also is building a longer-range Shahab-4, which is
expected to have a range of up to 1,240 miles--long enough to
hit Central Europe.
The Shahab--which means ``meteor'' in Farsi--was first
disclosed by The Times last year.
``The development of long-range ballistic missiles is part
of Iran's effort to become a major regional military power,''
a Pentagon official said recently.
A second U.S. official said data on the missile test are
being evaluated by U.S. spy agencies to determine in more
detail its estimated range, payload capacity and other
characteristics.
``This is something that was anticipated by the
intelligence community,'' this official said.
The Shahab missile program has benefited greatly from
Russian technology and materials, as well as Chinese and
North Korean assistance, according to a CIA report on
proliferation released Tuesday.
The report said companies and agencies in Russia, China and
North Korea ``continued to supply missile-related goods and
technology to Iran'' throughout last year.
``Iran is using these goods and technologies to achieve its
goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of medium-
range ballistic missiles,'' the report said. A medium-range
missile is one with a range between 600 and 1,800 miles.
Russian assistance to Iran's missile program has meant
Tehran could deploy a medium-range missile ``much sooner than
otherwise expected,'' the CIA said.
A U.S. intelligence official said recently that Shahab-3
deployment was about one year away and that before Russian
help it had been estimated to be up to three years from being
fielded.
The Iranian Shahab program has been a target of intense
diplomatic efforts by the Clinton administration, which has
been seeking to curtail Russian technology and material
assistance.
Asked to comment on the test, Rep. Curt Weldon,
Pennsylvania Republican, said it was ``devastating news.'' He
said the test confirms the findings of a bipartisan
congressional panel that emerging missile threats are hard to
predict.
``We now have evidence that Iran has already tested a
missile system that the intelligence community said would not
be tested for 12 to 18 months,'' he said. ``That means the
threat to Israel, to our Arab friends in the region and to
our 25,000 troops in the region is imminent, and we have no
deployed system in place to counter that threat.''
Mr. Weldon, a member of the House National Security
Committee and an advocate of missile defenses, said Iran
would most likely deploy chemical or biological weapons on
the Shahab-3, depending on what types of advanced guidance
systems it may have obtained from Russia.
``There is evidence Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear
weapons and within a short period of time--months not years--
will have a nuclear warhead,'' Mr. Weldon said.
[[Page S10048]]
Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, said the test firing shows that long-range
missiles are likely to be the threat of the future.
``This stuff is moving a lot faster than we thought five
years ago in the Bush administration,'' said Mr. Sokolski, a
former defense official.
____
Early Warning
When the history books on the 21st century are written, the
Shehab-3 may show up on a list of early warning signs that
schoolchildren memorize about great catastrophes. The medium-
range ballistic missile that Iran tested last week is just
that--a warning that the missile threat is here and now, not
years away. The coming catastrophe is a ballistic missile
attack on an undefended U.S. or U.S. ally by a rogue nation.
You can't say we haven't been warned. The week before the
launch of the Shehab-3, made from a North Korean design, a
bipartisan panel headed by former Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld issued a report to Congress on the ballistic missile
threat. The unanimous finding? Ballistic missiles from rogue
nations could strike American cities with ``little or no
warning.''
The security and defense experts on the Rumsfeld Commission
noted that North Korea is developing missiles with a 6,200-
mile range, capable of reaching as far as Arizona or even
Wisconsin, and that Iran is seeking missile components that
could result in weapons with similar range, able to hit
Pennsylvania or Minnesota. That information is from the
unclassified version of the report. The general public
doesn't get to hear about the really scary stuff. The
bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission report, or course, received
little play in the general media, which seems to have
concluded somehow that this issue is no big deal.
Earlier this year, Senator Thad Cochran's Subcommittee on
International Security reached many of the same conclusions.
Using open-source materials, the committee published ``The
Proliferation Primer,'' which lists in detail the progress
being made by a host of countries toward the development and
deployment of weapons of mass destruction. ``The
Proliferation Primer'' didn't make it into the headlines
either.
As the Shehab-3 drama was being staged in Iran, Vice
President Gore found himself in Russia, playing another scene
in the absurd theater of arms control. This is a form of
diplomatic drama that employs repetitious and meaningless
dialogue and plots that lack logical or realistic
development. Over the past 30 years, every act in this
ongoing show has been structured around the same ludicrous
theme: arms control works.
And so it goes in Moscow, where Mr. Gore, reading from the
usual script, expressed U.S. concern last week about the
transfer of Russian missile technology to Iran and other
rogue states, and signed two agreements on the peaceful uses
of nuclear technology. President Clinton voiced similar
concerns in Beijing last month.
Meanwhile, two-dozen countries are hard at work on
improvements to their ballistic-missile capabilities and
North Korea is exporting do-it-yourself Nodong missile kits
like the one that Iran used to build Shehab-3. In addition to
all this there is the so-called loose-nukes problem, by which
it is feared that a Russian missile might find its way into
the hands of a terrorist group.
No arms-control agreement can provide the necessary
protection against such threats. Not so long ago the threat
was a massive Soviet missile attack, but today it is more
likely to be one or two ballistic missiles in the hands of a
calculating national leader or government determined to
operate outside civilized norms. What do hoary notions of
``arms control'' have to do with these realities? Is anyone
seriously going to propose that the way to keep more Iranian
Shehab-3s from being produced is to invite the ayatollahs for
a stay at Geneva's finest hotels and a long meeting of the
minds across a green baize table?
What prospect is there at all that Iran will ``agree,''
much less comply with any commitment to give up what it now
has? What it has is a medium-range missile that can reach
U.S. allies Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And if
similar minds somewhere in the world get hold of a missile
capable of reaching San Francisco or Honolulu or New York,
what ``agreement'' could induce them to give that up?
The fact that the U.S. has absolutely no defenses against
ballistic-missile-attack is an unacceptably large negative
incentive to this country's enemies. The way to deter them is
not by signing more archaic arms-control agreements but by
researching and deploying a national missile-defense system
as quickly as possible after the next President takes office.
____
[From the Washington Times, Sept. 1, 1998]
N. Korea Fires Missile Over Japan
[By Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz]
North Korea yesterday conducted the first test launch of an
extended-range ballistic missile in a provocative flight that
crossed Japan and signaled the hard-line regime is now able
to threaten more neighboring countries.
The Taepo Dong-1 and its dummy warhead traveled about 1,000
miles, surpassing by 380 miles the reach of North Korea's
operational medium-range missile, the No Dong.
Taepo Dong's debut was predicted by Washington. The flight
was tracked by U.S. Navy ships and by surveillance aircraft
as the missile left northern North Korea, dropped its first
stage in the Sea of Japan and then crossed Japan's Honshu
island before falling in the Pacific Ocean.
The test of the medium-range missile immediately raised
security fears not only in Asia, but in the Middle East and
the United States as well.
Republicans in Congress renewed demands for President
Clinton to accelerate development of a national missile
defense that could intercept incoming ballistic missiles. Mr.
Clinton has put off a decision until 2000 despite a blue-
ribbon commission's finding that a rogue nation, such as
North Korea, could launch a ballistic missile onto U.S. soil
within the next five years without warning.
``The test of the Taepo Dong indicates that a North Korean
threat to the continental United States is just around the
corner,'' said Richard Fisher, an Asia expert at the Heritage
Foundation. ``It is now long past overdue for the
administration to finally wake up, smell the coffee and get
serious about missile defense.''
By flying the missile directly over Japan, Mr. Fisher said,
North Korea is showing it has the ability to hit U.S.
military facilities there and can eventually field a missile
capable of hitting bases farther south in Okinawa. ``Okinawa
is the military reserve area for the United States in any
potential Korean peninsula conflict,'' he said.
David Wright, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in Cambridge and researcher at the Union of
Concerned Scientists, said of utmost concern is ``that this
is a two-state missile.''
Creating a multiple-stage missile is ``one of the more
complicated hurdles . . . in developing a longer range,'' he
said. ``But in and of itself it doesn't give much new
capability to North Korea.
``The accuracy of these missiles is very low,'' he told
Agence France-Presse, adding that they would most likely be
used to carry biological or chemical weapons.
Japan reacted to the test by abruptly withdrawing plans to
extend $1 billion in aid to build two civilian nuclear
reactors. North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear-weapons
program in exchange for the two plants and U.S. deliveries of
fuel oil.
Japanese analysts saw the missile launch as a ploy in
winning concessions from the West during ongoing nuclear-
disarmament talks in New York.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, visiting
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, said, ``This is something that
we will be raising with North Koreans in the talks that are
currently going on,'' the Associated Press reported.
A South Korean Cabinet meeting of 15 ministers said North
Korea's ``reckless'' test-firing of a missile over Japanese
territory poses a direct threat to the region.
North Korea is the world's largest exporter of ballistic
missiles. It has been helping Iran develop a missile arsenal
that can reach deployed American forces, moderate Arab states
and Israel. A North Korean envoy told congressional aides
last week the motive for exporting missile technology is
simple: badly needed hard currency for the famine-ridden
country.
Intelligence officials said Iranian technicians observed
yesterday's test, underscoring the close ties between
Pyongyang and Tehran, which tested its own medium-range
missile, the Shahab-3, with a range of about 800 miles, last
month.
North Korea, which boasts a 5-million-man army and stocks
of chemical and biological weapons, is also developing the
intermediate range Taepo Dong-2. Scheduled for operation in
2002, the weapon is designed to travel up to 3,700 miles,
putting it within range of Alaska. Eventually, Pyongyang
wants to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable
of reaching the continental United States.
The U.S. has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, where
they are already vulnerable to North Korea's arsenal of
short-range missiles and thousands of artillery pieces. The
forces enjoy limited protection through Patriot interceptors
used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war to knock down Iraqi Scud
missiles.
Maj. Bryan Salas, a Pentagon spokesman, said, ``We were not
surprised by the launching. We're still evaluating all the
specifics in the matter and we consider it a serious
development.''
The missile test comes as Mr. Clinton and Republicans are
at odds on national missile defense.
The GOP got a boost this summer when a congressionally
appointed panel of experts, led by former Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, stated the United States could be blindsided
by a missile attack within the next five years from North
Korea or another rogue nation.
But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a letter disclosed last
week by The Washington Times, rejected the finding and
continued to support a 2003 deployment date at the earliest
for a national system.
``The administration needs to wake up,'' said Rep. Curt
Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican and a leading missile defense
advocate. ``From what we know about this missile, it can even
reach U.S. soil with a range that can strike U.S. citizens in
Guam.''
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas Republican, added: ``The
administration's decision to block development and deployment
of missile defenses means we are unable to protect either our
important allies . . . or the
[[Page S10049]]
thousands of American troops stationed there.''
North Korea has the expertise to mount chemical and
biological warheads on its ballistic missiles. It also has
been attempting to develop nuclear weapons, but promised to
end the program in return for economic aid.
``When you begin to feed the wolf, the wolf just gets
hungrier and hungrier,'' Mr. Fisher said. ``The aid to North
Korea since 1995 can be said to have indirectly assisted the
North Korean missile program because it allowed them to spend
less money on feeding their people and sustain their missile
develop budgets.''
The Rumsfeld panel dismissed a CIA conclusion the United
States faces no ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation
for 15 years. The panel was particularly leery of North Korea
and its ally, Iran.
Its report said: ``The extraordinary level of resources
North Korea and Iran are now devoting to developing their own
ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and
immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interest and its
allies. . . . In light of the considerable difficulties the
intelligence community encountered in assessing the pace and
scope of the No Dong missile program, the U.S. may have very
little warning prior to the deployment of the Taepo Dong-2.''
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 6 minutes.
Mr. President, this bill will not contribute to our national
security. As a matter of fact, it will weaken and jeopardize our
national security.
That is not just me saying it and those of us who oppose this bill.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has written us a very, very
strong letter supporting the current national missile defense policy,
which is to develop defenses against these long-range missiles but not
to commit to deploy such defenses, since such a commitment will violate
an agreement that we have with Russia which has made it possible for us
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world.
Committing to break out of a treaty which has allowed us to reduce
the number of nuclear weapons will result in Russia--they have told us
this--not ratifying START II, and then, indeed, deciding to reverse the
START I reductions. START I reductions, START II reductions, and
hopefully START III reductions are based on an agreement that we have
with Russia that neither party will deploy defenses against long-range
missiles.
If we violate that agreement--this bill commits us to a position
which would violate that agreement--if we violate that agreement, we
are going to see Russia reverse the direction in which it is going--
reduction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there will be a much greater
threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because thousands of
additional weapons will then be on Russian soil.
This bill is a pro-proliferation of a nuclear weapons bill. That is
not the intent, obviously. But that is the effect of this bill, because
instead of Russia just having a few thousand nuclear weapons on its
soil--which are then subject to being stolen, or pilfered, or sold--it
will have many more thousands of nuclear weapons.
It is not in the security interests of this Nation to trash the START
II agreement by threatening another treaty called the Antiballistic
Missile Treaty upon which START II is based, upon which START I is
based, and upon hopefully START III will be based.
Can we negotiate a modification in that ABM Treaty? I hope so. Might
it be desirable for both sides to move to defenses against long-range
missiles? I think so. Should we develop defenses against long-range
missiles but not commit to violate the ABM Treaty by committing to
deploy those missiles? Yes. We should develop those defenses. And we
are at a breakneck speed--by the way, a very high-risk speed.
This bill, which would change our policy, will not speed up the
development of national missile defenses by 1 day. We are already
developing those defenses as fast as we possibly can.
Mr. President, I want to just read briefly--if my 4 minutes are up, I
ask for an additional 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
wrote Senator Inhofe a letter on August 24, which I ask unanimous
consent to be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, August 24, 1998.
Hon. James M. Inhofe,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Inhofe: Thank you for the opportunity to
provide my views, together with those of the Joint Chiefs, on
the Rumsfeld Commission Report and its relation to national
missile defense. We welcome the contributions of this
distinguished panel to our understanding of ballistic missile
threat assessments. While we have had the opportunity to
review only the Commission's pre-publication report, we can
provide answers to your questions subject to review of the
final report.
While the Chiefs and I, along with the Intelligence
Community, agree with many of the Commission's findings, we
have some different perspectives on likely developmental
timelines and associated warning times. After carefully
considering the portions of the report available to us, we
remain confident that the Intelligence Community can provide
the necessary warning of the indigenous development and
deployment by a rogue state of an ICBM threat to the United
States. For example, we believe that North Korea continues
moving closer to the initiation of a Taepo Dong I Medium
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) testing program. That program
has been predicted and considered in the current examination.
The Commission points out that through unconventional, high-
risk development programs and foreign assistance, rogue
nations could acquire an ICBM capability in a short time, and
that the Intelligence Community may not detect it. We view
this as an unlikely development. I would also point out that
these rogue nations currently pose a threat to the United
States, including a threat by weapons of mass destruction,
through unconventional, terrorist-style delivery means. The
Chiefs and I believe all these threats must be addressed
consistent with a balanced judgment of risks and resources.
Based on these considerations, we reaffirm our support for
the current NMD policy and deployment readiness program. Our
program represents an unprecedented level of effort to
address the likely emergence of a rogue ICBM threat. It
compresses what is normally a 6-12 year development program
into 3 years with some additional development concurrent with
a 3-year deployment. This emphasis is indicative of our
commitment to this vital national security objective. The
tremendous effort devoted to this program is a prudent
commitment to provide absolutely the best technology when a
threat warrants deployment.
Given the present threat projections and the potential
requirement to deploy an effective limited defense, we
continue to support the ``three-plus-three'' program. It is
our view that the development program should proceed through
the integrated system testing scheduled to begin in late
1999, before the subsequent deployment decision consideration
in the year 2000. While previous plus-ups have reduced the
technical risk associated with this program, the risk remains
high. Additional funding would not buy back any time in our
already fast-paced schedule.
As to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Chiefs
and I believe that under current conditions continued
adherence is still consistent with our national security
interests. The Treaty contributes to our strategic stability
with Russia and, for the immediate future, does not hinder
our development program. Consistent with US policy that NMD
development be consistent with the ABM Treaty, the Department
has an ongoing process to review NMD tests for compliance.
The integrated testing will precede a deployment decision has
not yet gone through compliance review. Although a final
determination has not been made, we currently intend and
project integrated system testing that will be both fully
effective and treaty compliant. A deployment decision may
well require treaty modification which would involve a
variety of factors including the emerging ballistic missile
threat to the United States (both capability and intent), and
the technology to support an effective national missile
defense.
Again, the Chiefs and I appreciate the opportunity to offer
our views on the assessment of emerging ballistic missile
threats and their relation to national missile defense.
Sincerely,
Henry H. Shelton.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, part of the Joint Chiefs' letter is the
following:
* * * we reaffirm our support for the current [National
Missile Defense] policy and deployment readiness program.
Those are the key words.
Based on these considerations, we reaffirm our support for
the current [National Missile Defense] policy and deployment
readiness program.
Then General Shelton wrote the following:
Our program represents an unprecedented level of effort to
address the likely emergence of a rogue ICBM threat. It
compresses what is normally a 6-12 year development program
into 3 years with some additional development concurrent with
a 3-year deployment. This emphasis is indicative of our
[[Page S10050]]
commitment to this vital national security objective. The
tremendous effort devoted to this program is a prudent
commitment to provide absolutely the best technology when a
threat warrants deployment.
Given the present threat projections and the potential
requirement to deploy an effective limited defense, we
continue to support the ``three-plus-three'' program. It is
our view that the development program should proceed through
the integrated system testing scheduled to begin in late
1999, before the subsequent deployment decision consideration
in the year 2000.
Then he points out that:
Additional funding would not buy back any time in our
already fast-paced schedule.
Finally, General Shelton said the following:
The [ABM] Treaty contributes to our strategic stability
with Russia and, for the immediate future, does not hinder
our development program.
Mr. President, our program now calls for the development of defenses
against long-range missiles. Let no one misunderstand that, or misstate
that. That is our current program.
We are moving as quickly as possible. Indeed, it is a high-risk move
that we are making because we have collapsed this development schedule
so much. We are not going to speed up this schedule 1 day by
threatening to destroy the ABM Treaty. All we will do, if this bill
passes, is to contribute to the threat of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons on the soil of Russia. That is not in our security interest. I
hope we do not proceed to the consideration of this bill.
I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the distinguished
Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of this amendment. I
believe that it is a very important amendment. Other countries are
going forward and developing missile systems. Can we afford not to do
it? For the sake of our people and the sake of this Nation, we should
seize this opportunity to go forward on this matter promptly. It is in
the interest of our Nation and the people of this country that we take
that step.
I thank the Senator, very much, for yielding to me.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President.
I regret that we are on such a tight constraint, because I think this
is the most significant issue this Senate will be addressing certainly
this year. We are talking about the lives of American citizens.
As one who is from Oklahoma and can see what type of terrorist
devastation can take place, and realizing that the devastation in
Oklahoma was one-thousandth of the power of the smallest nuclear
warhead known, it is a very scary thing.
I believe right now--I don't think there is a Senator here who
doesn't believe this--that there could very well be a missile headed
our direction as we speak. It is not a matter of a rogue nation
learning how to make missiles to deliver the weapons of mass
destruction that we know they have. It is a matter of just getting that
technology and those systems from a country that already does. China is
such a country.
China fully has missiles that can reach Washington, DC, from any
place in the world. We have no way in the world of knocking them down.
We know that China is trading technology systems with countries like
Iran--countries that would not hesitate to use missiles against us.
I wish I were speaking last, because there are going to be some
things said about the exorbitant costs of such a system. We can
complete a system to protect us against a limited missile attack for
about $4 billion. In the case of our AEGIS ship system, we have 22
AEGIS ships that have the capability of knocking down a missile, but
not an ICBM. We have a $50 billion investment in that system, and for
only $4 billion more we could have that system to protect Americans.
I hope that people will give consideration to this resolution. I
think it is the most significant resolution we will be considering this
year.
I ask unanimous consent that three items pertaining to this matter be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[April 15, 1998]
Pakistan's First Test of Its New Ballistic Missile
(By Rahul Bedi, New Delhi and Duncan Lennox, London)
The first test of Pakistan's new ballistic missile, the
Hatf 5 or `Ghauri', took place on 6 April. Statements from
the Pakistani government said that the missile has a maximum
range of 1,500km, a payload of 700kg and a launch weight of
16,000kg.
Some earlier statements had implied that the `Ghauri' might
also be used as the basis for a satellite launch vehicle.
Currently described by government officials as ``a research
effort for the time being'', its indigenous development and
research status means that ``no international sanctions or
regimes apply to its development or production''.
Claims that the missile was tested over land are confusing
as the length of Pakistan's territory does not allow for the
range attributed to `Ghauri'. Other reports have indicated
that the missile was test launched from a location near
Jhelum in northeast Pakistan to the area southwest of Quetta,
a range of about 800km to 1,000km, which would agree with the
reported flight time of around eight minutes.
An earlier secret test of the `Ghauri' missile in January
was reported by the Islamabad News, which said that further
tests would be made before a public demonstration of the
missile on 23 March. The ``secret'' test probably refers to a
static motor firing and systems check-out, and is unlikely to
have been a flight test.
The `Ghauri' missile was not displayed during Pakistan's
National Day parade on 23 March. A missile similar to the
Hatf 1 short-range missile was the only ballistic missile
displayed.
Pakistani official statements are limited to the maximum
range, payload and launch weight. From the pictures released,
the missile is similar in shape to the earlier Hatf 1 design,
which is also similar to the Chinese M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15). The
launch weight of 16,000kg makes `Ghauri' much heavier than
the M-9, which has a launch weight of 6,000kg. This would
appear to support the payload weight quoted for `Ghauri' of
700kg over the maximum range of 1,500km.
It appears to be a scaled-up Hatf 1 single or two-stage
solid-propellant missile that may use some Chinese
technologies. The missile shown does not bear any resemblance
to the Chinese CSS-2 (DF-3), which uses liquid propellants
and has a launch weight of 64,000kg.
An alternative option might be that `Ghauri' is based on
the Chinese CSS-5 (DF-21) and CSS-N-3 (JL-1) ballistic
missile design, which has a launch weight of 15,000kg, a
payload of 600 kg and a maximum range of between 1,700km and
1,800km. The CSS-N-3 SLBM version entered service in 1983 and
the CSS-5 in 1987.
The Iranian `Shahab 3' ballistic missile project has a
similar range and payload to `Ghauri', and, although the
Iranians have never quoted a launch weight for `Shahab 3', it
might be in the 16,000kg bracket.
`Shahab 3' is believed to be an Iranian-developed single-
stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, based on North
Korea's `Nodong 1' design, and a series of motor tests were
reported last year.
It is not clear whether Pakistan and Iran have shared
missile technologies, but their development approaches appear
to have followed relatively similar lines and in similar
timescales.
Unconfirmed reports have suggested that Pakistan and Iran
may have received either missiles or technologies associated
with the Chinese solid-propellant M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) and M-9
programmes, and it is to be expected that there might have
been some assistance given both ways.
____
[From the Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 8, 1998]
Vulnerable and at Risk
Recently, U.S. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Tulsa, asked Gen. Henry
H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to comment
on a new report questioning U.S. readiness to deal with a
long-range missile attack. The general's response was
illuminating, particularly so in light of North Korea's
subsequent test of a missile capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
Inhofe raised the issue after release of the Rumsfeld
Commission Report, warning a missile threat may come sooner
than many in the U.S. government think. The panel said it's
possible an enemy could develop a ballistic missile program
in a way that would give the United States little or no
warning before an attack.
In fairness, Shelton and the joint chiefs answer to Bill
Clinton, so it's not surprising they echo his
administration's soft-line on missile defense.
Shelton reiterated to Inhofe that the chiefs don't think a
real threat is near. They believe the United States should
continue to
[[Page S10051]]
comply with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and they
support Clinton's ``3-plus-3'' plan for a national missile
defense. The policy calls for three years of development with
another three years for deployment--if a missile threat is
identified. ``We remain confident that the Intelligence
Community can provide necessary warning of . . . an ICBM
threat,'' Shelton wrote.
Inhofe points out that U.S. intelligence was surprised by
India's nuclear testing this summer and considered attacks on
embassies in Africa unlikely. As for the ABM treaty, Inhofe
says it ``reinforces the discredited policy of mutual-assured
destruction at a time when the U.S. is being targeted by
numerous potentially undeterrable rogue states and
terrorists.''
Inhofe's ally on missile defense, U.S. Rep. Floyd Spence,
R-S.C., cut to the dangers of the Clinton administration's
ostrich-like approach to missile defense in an interview with
Frank Gaffney, director of the Center for Security Policy.
``The first warning of a heart attack is a heart attack,''
Spence said. ``The Clinton administration's response to all
this is that we are working on a system and we are going to
experiment for about three years. And if the threat arises,
we will decide at that time whether or not to deploy. My God,
the threat is right now here, this minute, this moment, not
some time in the future.''
The Oklahoman urges Inhofe, Spence and other patriots in
Congress to hold hearings highlighting America's
vulnerability to missile attack.
Bold action is needed to counter Clinton's idle approach to
defending the U.S. against a grave and growing threat.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 1998]
Shooting Stars
``Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at
without success,'' Winston Churchill once famously said.
Perhaps. But the Japanese might have a different take, having
now had North Korea fire a missile over their heads. In a
world where Pathan tribesmen with rifles have been replaced
by rogue states with ballistic missiles, Churchill would have
been the first to argue that the leader of the free world
needs more going for him then the other guy's bad aim. To
wit, a missile defense.
If the events of the past few weeks have taught us
anything, it is that the bad guys out there--Saddam Hussein,
Kim Jong II, Osama bin Laden and the like--are not kidding
when they threaten to blow up Americans. What we don't yet
know is just how many of them have the capability to follow
through on their threats, though recent tests by both North
Korea and Iran confirm that some are not that far away. We
shouldn't have to wait until a missile lands in Times Square
to find out.
Unfortunately that is precisely what Democratic Senators
have been doing. Back in March, GOP Senator Thad Cochran
introduced a bill calling for the U.S. ``to deploy as soon as
is technologically possible an effective National Missile
Defense System capable of defending the territory of the
United States against limited ballistic missile attack.''
When the motion to move it to the floor for debate and
amendments came up, it fell just one vote shy of the 60
needed. All 41 opposed were Democrats. While bin Laden bombs,
the Democrats filibuster.
They have a chance to redeem themselves when the
reintroduced petition comes up for a vote tomorrow. Events
since the March 13 filibuster have tragically underscored
just how irresponsible a move it was: India and Pakistan have
exploded nuclear bombs; Iran and North Korea have tested
ballistic missiles; Saddam Hussein has forced U.N. inspectors
to a standstill; and bin Laden blew up two American embassies
in Africa.
Indeed, it has lent a prophetic tone to the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission, a team of defense experts which in July
warned that America's enemies could deliver a ballistic
missile threat to the U.S. within five years of any decision
to acquire such a capability. More ominously, the Rumsfeld
report warns that ``during several of those years, the U.S.
might not be aware that such a decision has been made.''
In face of these tangible threats, the continued Democratic
preference for arms control agreements in the bush over real
defense capabilities in the hand is baffling. And our guess
is that an American public that has now watched North Korea
and seen for itself some of bin Laden's handiwork also would
be a hard sell. We wouldn't be surprised, then, if these
developments, coupled with a President suffering from a
severe loss of moral authority, might lead some of these
Democrats to consider whether they want to continue to block
debate about ways to protect Americans--especially the 13
Democratic Senators up for re-election which follow:
Up for Re-election
Democratic senators who voted against closure on the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
Barbara Boxer, California.
John Breaux, Louisiana.
Thomas A. Daschle, S. Dakota.
Christopher J. Dodd, Connecticut.
Byron L. Dorgan, N. Dakota.
Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin.
Bob Graham, Florida.
Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont.
Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland.
Carol Moseley-Braun, Illinois.
Patty Murray, Washington.
Harry Reid, Nevada.
Ron Wyden, Oregon.
Source: Coalition to Defend America.
Bill Clinton might have his own second thoughts. It is
worth asking whether Mr. Clinton could even have taken the
limited action he did against sites in Afghanistan and the
Sudan had bin Laden somehow managed to buy a missile of his
own--or pay the North Koreans or Iranians to shoot one off
for him.
Likewise, could George Bush have prosecuted the Gulf War if
Saddam Hussein had had a missile capability? As Mr. Clinton
has had impressed on him, just four or five warheads in hands
like Kim Jong II's pose a far more immediate and practical
threat to American lives and interests than the 2,000 or so
in the Russian arsenal. Especially given North Korea's
willingness to sell its missiles to anyone with cash.
Providing an American President with the wherewithal to
shoot down a ballistic missile on its way to an American city
shouldn't be a partisan issue. But if the Democrats decide
again to make it one in the coming vote, that would be a
persuasive Republican argument for a filibuster-proof
Republican Senate. If we ever get a missile defense system
this country needs, we may owe more to Monica Lewinsky and
Osama bin Laden than we do to our Democratic Senators.
Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield Senator Conrad 4 minutes.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise as a strong supporter of national
missile defense. But I also rise as a strong opponent of the Cochran
bill that is before us. I believe so strongly in national missile
defense that I have introduced legislation promoting national missile
defense that has passed the U.S. Senate.
I support national missile defense because we have an unpredictable
and rapidly emerging ICBM threat to this country from the so-called
rogue states. The Rumsfeld Commission recently alerted us to the
growing need for national missile defense. As I have said many times on
the Senate floor, we must be prepared before we are surprised.
But the bill before us is fatally flawed because it does not include
the correct criteria for a decision to deploy. It says that we should
deploy ``as soon as technologically possible.'' Mr. President, that
isn't the right test. Let's make sure that we deploy the best initial
system, not simply the first one off the shelf. The first one off the
shelf may be significantly inferior to one that follows soon thereafter
that would be a far more effective system of national missile defense.
Further, the Cochran bill is also seriously flawed because it has
only one criterion--``as soon as technologically possible.'' It
completely disregards three other vital criteria for national missile
development:
No. 1, treaty compliance. As the Joint Chiefs have said in several
letters, the ABM Treaty and START accords must not be endangered. Mr.
President, I direct my colleagues' attention to a statement by General
Henry Shelton, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He said that
the effect that ``NMD deployment would have on arms control agreements
and nuclear arms reductions should be included in any bill on national
missile defense.''
Are we going to listen to the top military leadership of our country
on this question? I hope so. I hope we are going to listen to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The second key criterion is cost. A system we can't afford, such as
one with space-based weapons, is a fantasy in the short run and
protects no one. We need to have a system that we can afford.
The third criterion is use of proven technology to ensure performance
and contain costs. We ought to use technology we know will work. Again,
rushing to failure will not protect one single American family.
Mr. President, we are in a development stage on national missile
defense, and that is where our efforts must be. I applaud our
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee
for fully funding aggressive development of national missile defense.
However, the Cochran bill, at this point, is counterproductive because
it applies the wrong criteria to the decision to deploy. The Senate
should again vote no on cloture.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor and give back the remainder of
my time.
[[Page S10052]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 4 minutes to Senator Dorgan.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this debate and this vote are not about
whether we support research on a missile defense system. I am on the
Appropriations Committee. I am on the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee. The Defense appropriations bill has over $3 billion for
research and development of theater and national missile defense
programs. I expect all Members of the Senate support that. I do.
But this bill presents us with a different question. This bill would
put the Senate on record saying there must be a deployment of a
national missile defense system--there must be a deployment as soon as
``technologically feasible.'' And we must then deploy.
Well, 25 years ago, we had an antiballistic missile system in North
Dakota. I guess that particular system was technologically feasible
then. Of course, that system would have used nuclear bombs to intercept
and destroy incoming missiles. But it was built, at the cost of over
$20 billion in today's terms. Thirty days after it was declared
operational, it was mothballed. That system was too expensive and too
controversial.
Let's keep that cautionary tale in mind as we consider this bill.
If this bill were to pass, the question is, What is technologically
feasible? What kind of technology? At what cost? Does cost have any
relevance at all? How will the bill affect arms control? Will this bill
crowd out spending on other ways of dealing with terrorism? What other
defense programs that respond to terrorist threats or rogue nations
will then lack funding because we forced deployment of a system when
someone said we now have the technology, and we forced deployment
notwithstanding costs?
Frankly, a rogue nation or a terrorist state is much more likely to
pose a threat to us with a suitcase nuclear bomb planted in the trunk
of a rusty Yugo car at a dock in New York City. The threat is much more
likely to be a nuclear weapon put on top of a cruise missile--not an
ICBM, but a cruise missile. There is far greater proliferation of
cruise missiles and greater access to them. Will this defend against
cruise missiles? No. Will it do anything about the suitcase bomb? No.
What about a fertilizer bomb in a truck parked in front of a building?
No. What about a vial of the most deadly biological agents? Again, no.
There are a lot of terrorist and rogue nation threats that we ought
to be concerned about, and we ought to worry about developing missile
defense--and we are. But rushing to say we must deploy now, as soon as
it is technologically feasible, notwithstanding any other
consideration, makes no sense.
The Senator from Michigan was asking what this bill would do to arms
control. I want to hold up a chart of unclassified pictures to try and
show what arms control means. This is a photo from March 26, 1997. It
shows the launching of an SSN-20 missile from a Russian submarine in
the Barents Sea. The submarine launched a missile, and within minutes
the missile was destroyed. And the last picture here shows the
missile's pieces falling into the sea.
Why was that missile destroyed? Because of arms control agreements
that we have reached with Russia. There was a whole series of these
``launch-to-destruction'' launches, because they were an inexpensive
way for Russia to destroy its submarine-launched missiles and for us to
verify their destruction. That is the way to deal with these threats--a
reduction of nuclear weapons, reduction of delivery vehicles. This is
the kind of thing, with Nunn-Lugar and other efforts, especially arms
control agreements, that results in a real reduction of threat.
The question is, What will the vote today do to arms control? Will it
mean more delivery systems, more nuclear weapons? A greater arms race?
I don't think anybody in this Chamber has that answer. My colleague,
Senator Conrad, put it well. To those who support--and I think almost
all of us do--theater missile defenses and the research on national
missile defense, it doesn't make any sense to say that notwithstanding
any other consideration we must deploy as soon as technologically
feasible. That is not, in my judgment, the right thing or the
thoughtful thing to do in order to defend this country.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield Senator Bingaman 3 minutes.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Michigan for
yielding me time. I want to join my colleagues in resisting S. 1873,
this proposal. In my view, what this proposal would do is to put our
Defense Department in an untenable position. It essentially says that,
in this case, in the case of national missile defense, as distinguished
from all other cases, they should ignore the criteria that they use for
deciding which programs to go ahead and deploy. Those criteria are that
they maintain a sensible balance among cost, schedule, and performance
considerations, given affordability constraints.
Now, that is the criteria the Department of Defense has set up. This
proposal by my colleague from Mississippi would have them ignore those
provisions and rush ahead to develop this as soon as it is
technologically feasible. We have some experience with efforts by
Congress to turn up the political pressure on the Department of Defense
and to urge them to rush ahead with development of programs before they
can be safely deployed. The most recent example is one that many of us
are familiar with; it is the THAAD Program, Theater High Altitude Area
Defense Program. In that case, again, we were anxious to get this
program fielded. The Congress put increased pressure on the Department
of Defense to move ahead. Accordingly, we have had disaster. In that
case, the program is 4 years behind schedule. There have been five
consecutive flight test failures of the THAAD interceptor. The cost of
the program has risen from $10 billion to $14 billion today.
General Larry Welch, who reviewed this missile defense program and
other programs indicated that one reason is that there was a very high
level of risk, that we were, in fact, engaged in what he called a
``rush to failure'' in the THAAD Program. We do not need a rush to
failure in the national missile defense program to follow onto the rush
to failure in the THAAD Program. We need a program that the Department
of Defense can develop on an urgent basis, but on a reasonable basis. I
believe they are on that course. I believe when General Shelton asks us
to refrain from this kind of a legislative proposal, I think we should
take his advice. I hope we will defeat the proposal by the Senator from
Mississippi.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Biden.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, whatever our views on a nationwide
ballistic missile defense, it seems to me that we should reject S.
1873.
Were that bill to pass, deploying a national missile defense system
could, in my view, break the back of the economy at a moment when we
finally have gotten a handle on things.
A week ago, General Lyles warned that our current programs are over
budget and ``may not be all affordable.''
We spent years getting some budget discipline. We have finally
achieved that. We must not throw that all away.
This bill would require deployment even without a threat of new
strategic missiles; and it would throw taxpayers' money at the first
available technology, rather than the best technology.
As Dr. Richard L. Garwin warns, the first technology will be
vulnerable to missiles with penetration aids, which Russia surely has
and others can easily develop. Missile defense is expensive;
penetration aids are cheap.
This bill will also guarantee what General Welch calls a ``rush to
failure.'' Five test failures with the THAAD theater defense system are
a reminder of how difficult it is to develop any missile defense. A
policy of deploying the first ``technologically possible'' system is
almost bound to fail.
Finally, this bill does not even permit consideration of the negative
consequences of deployment. S. 1873 would destroy the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, and thus end any hope of implementing START Two or of
achieving START Three.
[[Page S10053]]
``Star Wars'' may seem easier than the hard, patient work of reducing
great power armaments and stabilizing our forces. But the ``easier''
path can also be the dangerous path.
Last week, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to share real-time
data on third-country missile launches, to reduce the risk of
accidental nuclear war. That is a good, sensible initiative.
But what happens if we say we will deploy a national missile defense?
We may call it just a defense, but others will see it as a second-
strike defense that enables us to mount first-strike nuclear attacks.
Russia and China will adopt a hair-trigger, ``launch on warning''
posture to overwhelm that defense, and the risk of nuclear war will
rise.
Now, some day we may need a nation-wide ballistic missile defense.
That is why the Defense Department has the ``3+3'' policy of developing
technology that would permit deployment within three years of finding
an actual threat on the horizon.
Some of my colleagues believe we cannot wait for that. But Iran's
missiles will hit the Middle East and parts of Europe. North Korea's
missiles will hit Japan and Okinawa. Despite recent missile tests,
these countries are several years away from threatening even the far
western portions of Alaska and Hawaii, as General Shelton made clear in
his letter of August 24.
And should a real threat materialize, there are far cheaper
alternatives to fielding a national missile defense. So, while sensible
policy on ballistic missile defense is perfectly feasible, S. 1873 is
not such a sensible policy.
Mr. President, the Senate has real work to do. Americans deserve a
Patient's Bill of Rights; we can enact campaign finance reform that
even the House of Representatives had enough sense to pass; and we must
stop the slaughter of our teenagers by Big Tobacco.
Let us get back to legislation that meets real, current needs and
that will not destroy the balanced budget. Let us reject cloture on the
motion to debate S. 1873, and get this Senate back to work.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the legislation before
the Senate, I rise in strong support of the objectives set forth in
this bill. As we all know, this legislation would establish a policy
for the U.S. to develop and deploy a national missile defense as soon
as technologically possible. This system will defend all 50 states
against any limited ballistic missile threats.
Mr. President, allow me to offer a couple of observations about the
changed international and national security environment which directly
impact U.S. defense needs. The original impetus for a national missile
defense system was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union during
the cold war.
Although some assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
continued thaw in previously frosty relations with Russia have rendered
such defensive capabilities unnecessary, this view is naive. I believe
that in many respects the threat has actually increased.
The increased threat results from several interrelated factors. The
collapse of the bipolar geopolitical order defined by U.S.-Soviet
confrontation has ushered in multipolar instability. The threats we
confront today as a nation are diffuse. Moreover, our potential enemies
are abundant in a world where interstate relations are no longer
delineated according to membership in one of two ideological camps.
I would like to emphasize a further change brought about by changes
in the international environment. An additional aspect of the post-
cold-war world is the rapid and, in some cases, uncontrollable
diffusion of advanced technologies. While earlier non-proliferation
efforts relied heavily on stringent export control regimes, heavy
reliance on multilateral controls is insufficient to protect U.S.
interests.
The U.S. continues to maintain a complex and multi-layered system of
export controls as a deterrent to would-be proliferators or rogue
nations. However, an export control regime is only as strong as its
weakest link. Furthermore, rogue nations--such as North Korea--who
already possess threatening capabilities, are more than willing to sell
their know-how to others.
I am aware of others' predictions that ballistic missile capability
will not present a threat for more than another decade. I believe,
however, that these predictions rely too heavily on the assumption that
export controls will keep rogue nations at bay. Without the technology,
our potential enemies are presumably impotent. I think this is an
overly optimistic view.
More than 15 nations already possess short-range ballistic missiles.
Many of these same nations are pursuing weapons of mass destruction to
accompany these missile capabilities. Several of these same countries
are hostile to U.S. interests.
Any country with the know-how to launch low-orbit satellites is also
capable of achieving long-range delivery of a nuclear or other type of
warhead. In contrast to the CIA's earlier prediction, the recently
released Rumsfeld Report stated that the threat is only five years
away. Moreover, the Rumsfeld Commission determined that the U.S. may
not be able to identify the source of a threat, thus having little or
no warning.
Let me simply offer one concrete example why the Administration's
current policy is dangerous. The Administration assumes it will have
three years warning of a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. Although
U.S. intelligence previously believed that Iran could not field a
medium-range missile until 2003, this system was flight-tested in July.
According to intelligence sources, the light-weight alloys as well as
equipment for testing these Iranian missiles came from Russia.
If we assume the predictions about othe5r countries; lack of
technological capacities are accurate and postpone implementation of
our own defensive capabilities based on these assumptions, the U.S.
will be rendered vulnerable while we test the accuracy of these
predictions. If these assumptions are proven false, the results would
be devastating.
This is a risk to U.S. security and a risk to U.S. civilians that I
personally am not willing to take.
It has been an enduring objective of U.S. defense policy to achieve
the capability to defend our country from ballistic missiles, whether
the threat be from deliberate, accidental or unauthorized launch.
A further reality we confront under changed circumstances is the
steady deterioration of Russia's system of command and control over its
nuclear warheads.
Although the Russian situation presents a potential threat now and
deployment is not slated for another several years, no one can assume
that the command-and-control elements in any state possessing weapons
of mass destruction and long-range delivery capability will remain
impenetrable and secure. This is one more reason that devising and
deploying missile defense makes sense.
There has been sufficient debate as to whether this bill is necessary
in addition to the Defense Department's three-plus-three program. I
believe it is for the following reasons:
First, although the three-plus-three program provides for development
of national missile defense (NMD) technology, it does not commit to
deployment.
Under the Administration's program, the U.S. would achieve the means
to deploy an NMD system, but would await an imminent threat to do so.
Capability that is not deployed opens a window of vulnerability.
Certainly the plans of an attack on the U.S. by a hostile nation are
not going to include a great deal of advanced warning. By not providing
a commitment to deployment, as is the objective of this legislation, we
are deliberately creating an indefinite phase of vulnerability.
Second, opponents to this legislation firmly believe that by
committing to deployment we may end up with an inadequate or faulty
system. This bill neither prematurely locks the U.S. into specific
technological solutions nor does it freeze our missile defense options.
We already are deploying systems, even though the technologies
involved continue to evolve. The specific technologies utilized and the
defense capabilities achieved are in no way determined by this
legislation. Further development and improvements to the system are
anticipated, and this legislation allows for that.
[[Page S10054]]
An additional strategic consideration is that the lack of a U.S. NMD
system may actually provide an additional incentive to would-be rogues.
If the U.S. implements an NMD system early enough, this may serve as a
deterrent to these states.
As mentioned, I believe that predictions regarding the technical
mediocrity of hostile nations are excessively optimistic. However, I
also firmly believe that a national missile defense system undoubtedly
raises the bar on the technological capability necessary to inflict
damage.
Any nation hostile to the U.S. would not only have to achieve long-
range capability, but they would also have to be sophisticated enough
in their delivery system to defeat a defensive shield. The financial
and technical means necessary to accomplish this goal does, indeed,
comprise a substantial deterrent.
More importantly, a missile defense system places strategic stability
on a more reliable and less adversarial foundation. The cold war
deterrence relied on vulnerability and threats of retaliation. Missile
defenses create a shield of protection, while the maintenance of a
reliable stockpile underpins our credibility in threats of retaliation
if attacked.
Arms reductions can only achieve objectives of stable U.S.-Russian
relations if these reductions are accompanied by national missile
defense deployment. With such a system in place, possible non-
compliance and third party threats are not as pertinent. This would
provide the confidence necessary to achieve even greater reductions.
Mr. President, based on these concerns about U.S. national security
in conjunction with my commitment to disarmament objectives I
cosponsored and fully support the legislation before us today.
National missile defense will provide the necessary additional
security requisite in an unstable and transitional global environment
where hostile nations are rapidly amassing threatening and
sophisticated weapons capability. The objectives set forth in this
legislation achieve that goal.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 1873, the
American Missile Protection Act. This bill is simple, but extremely
important. It makes it clear that it is the policy of the United States
to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a national missile
defense system which is capable of defending the entire territory of
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
We voted on cloture earlier this year--the motion fell one vote shy.
Well, as is common in this business, we are dealing with changed
circumstances. North Korea continues to defy rational behavior. As we
all know, it recently fired a multi-stage missile over Japan!
Starvation in North Korea is rampant, and many North Korea watchers
have long predicted that government's imminent collapse. Well, Mr.
President, the North Korean Government continues to defy the odds--but,
what concerns me is the old adage that ``desperate times often call for
desperate measures.'' If North Korea is truly desperate, to what extent
will it go to try to hold on to its grasp of power?
We have almost 80,000 American troops in the Asia/Pacific Theater.
Most of these troops are already in the range of current North Korean
missile technology. As their missile development program advances, we
can expect more American lives and territory to be at risk. We cannot
stand idly by and wait! We need to be prepared so that we can protect
our citizens and our territory from such a reckless or accidental
strike by North Korea or some other nation.
Alaskans have been justifiably concerned with this issue for some
time. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this
time a resolution passed by the Alaska State Legislature which calls on
the Administration to include Alaska and Hawaii in all future
assessments of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United
States. More than 20 percent of our domestic oil comes from Alaska, all
of it through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Alaskans are concerned, as
should the rest of the country be concerned, that a strike at the
pipeline could have dire consequences to our domestic energy
production.
There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:'
State of Alaska--Legislative Resolve No. 36
Whereas Alaska is the 49th State to enter the federal union
of the United States of America and is entitled to all of the
rights, privileges, and obligations that the union affords
and requires; and
Whereas Alaska possesses natural resources, including
energy, mineral, and human resources, vital to the prosperity
and national security of the United States; and
Whereas the people of Alaska are conscious of the State's
remote northern location and proximity to Northeast Asia and
the Eurasian land mass, and of how that unique location
places the state in a more vulnerable position than other
states with regard to missiles that could be launched in Asia
and Europe; and
Whereas the people of Alaska recognize the changing nature
of the international political structure and the evolution
and proliferation of missile delivery systems and weapons of
mass destruction as foreign states seek the military means to
deter the power of the United States in international
affairs; and
Whereas there is a growing threat to Alaska by potential
aggressors in these nations and in rogue nations that are
seeking nuclear weapons capability and that have sponsored
international terrorism; and
Whereas a National Intelligence Estimate to assess missile
threats to the United States left Alaska and Hawaii out of
the assessment and estimate; and
Whereas one of the primary reasons for joining the Union of
the United States of America was to gain security for the
people of Alaska and for the common regulation of foreign
affairs on the basis of an equitable membership in the United
States federation; and
Whereas the United States plans to field a national missile
defense, perhaps as early as 2003; this national missile
defense plan will provide only a fragile defense for Alaska,
the state most likely to be threatened by new missile powers
that are emerging in Northeast Asia;
Be it resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests the President of the United States to
take all actions necessary, within the considerable limits of
the resources of the United States, to protect on an equal
basis all peoples and resources of this great Union from
threat of missile attack regardless of the physical location
of the member state; and be it
Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests that Alaska be included in every
National Intelligence Estimate conducted by the United States
joint intelligence agencies; and be it
Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests the President of the United States to
include Alaska and Hawaii, not just the contiguous 48 states,
in every National Intelligence Estimate of missile threat to
the United States; and be it
Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature urges
the United States government to take necessary measures to
ensure that Alaska is protected against foreseeable threats,
nuclear and otherwise, posed by foreign aggressors, including
deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to protect
Alaska; and be it
Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature conveys
to the President of the United States expectations that
Alaska's safety and security take priority over any
international treaty or obligation and that the President
take whatever action is necessary to ensure that Alaska can
be defended against limited missile attacks with the same
degree of assurance as that provided to all other states; and
be it
Further resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests that the appropriate Congressional
committees hold hearings in Alaska that include defense
experts and administration officials to help Alaskans
understand their risks, their level of security, and Alaska's
vulnerability.
Copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable
Bill Clinton, President of the United States; the Honorable
Al Gore, Jr., Vice-President of the United States and
President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable
Ted Stevens, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations; the Honorable Bob Livingston, Chair of the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations;
the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chair of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Floyd Spence,
Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
National Security; and to the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S.
Senator, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Last year North Korean defectors indicated that the
North Korean missile development program already poses a verifiable
threat to American forces in Okinawa and seems on track to threaten
parts of Alaska by the turn of the Century. The Taepodong missile,
which is under development, would have a range of about 3,100 miles.
From certain parts of North Korea, this weapon could easily target many
of the Aleutian islands in
[[Page S10055]]
western Alaska, including the former Adak Naval Air Base.
The Washington Times reported earlier this year that the Chinese have
13 of 18 long-range strategic missiles armed with nuclear warheads
aimed at American cities. This is incredible, Mr. President. Opponents
to the motion to invoke cloture somehow fail to understand that this
threat is real and that we have a responsibility to protect the United
States from attack, be it deliberate or accidental. Without question,
the threat of an attack on the United States is increasingly real, and
we must act now to make certain that it is the policy of the United
States to construct a national missile defense system with the
capability of intercepting and deterring an aggressive strike against
American soil from all parts of the United States--as soon as possible.
Finally, Mr. President, I would mention for a moment that S. 1873 is
not, and I repeat not, in any way a strike at Russia. The ABM treaty
was crafted and agreed to when the United States and the Soviet Union
were the only nuclear powers. The mutually assured destruction system
was agreed to under the understanding that we were dealing with the
Soviet Union, and not third parties. Times have changed; there are
countless more players that have complicated the issues. We have a
responsibility to protect ourselves, and we must act now to do so.
Mr. President, I support the motion to proceed to the bill and hope
that my colleagues will vote overwhelmingly in favor of this
legislation this morning and pass it in the near future.
Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of S.1873,
the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 drafted by Senators Cochran
and Inouye. While I have been an ardent supporter of a vigorous missile
defense program with a specific architecture and under a specific
deployment schedule, a sufficient minority of members has been able to
derail this effort over the last few years. Therefore, the modest
proposal under consideration today, is an attempt to compromise by
affirmatively establishing as U.S. policy the deployment of an
effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system as soon as
technologically possible.
I have long argued that such a system is both necessary and prudent
because the threat of an attack or an inadvertent launch did not end
with the termination of the cold war, but is real and continues to
grow. In fact, the threat is greater today than any time in United
States history. The technology revolution aids equally those who want
to bring good into the world, as well as those who would do harm.
Recent activities in Africa, namely the bombing of our embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and the launch of ballistic missiles (or a
satellite) by North Korea, as well as the shoot-down of two unarmed
American aircraft in the Florida straits two years ago, reminds us of
the threat the United States and our allies face from rogue and
terrorist states, and non-state actors.
Beyond these, the future of Russia and China remains unclear. While
we wait to see if the forces of freedom and democracy prevail in the
internal struggles happening in these countries, we must remember that
they maintain the capability to launch weapons of mass destruction.
Other states continue efforts to develop destructive capabilities.
Recently, Iran has made dramatic progress in its missile development.
We know that China's proliferation has aided the development of
Pakistan's nuclear program, adding to the instability of South Asia.
My primary concern with the Administration's ``plan'' on deploying an
anti-ballistic missile defense system is that it is premised on
deploying a system within three years of clearly identifying an
emerging threat. I believe the Administration greatly overestimates its
intelligence gathering capability.
In early 1997, a CIA official testified that Iran was not expected to
have the capability to field a medium range ballistic missile until
2007. Less than a year later, that nine year time frame was
significantly reduced by the CIA, and another Administration official
predicted Iran could have the capability in as early as one-and-a-half
years. Similarly, in 1997 the Department of Defense only credited
Pakistan with a 300 km capability. However, less than six months later
Pakistan launched a missile capable of traveling 1,500 km.
Based on past performance, I am very hesitant to base the fielding of
a missile defense system on the Administration's determination of the
existence of an emerging threat. I believe such a plan is grossly
inadequate and could have catastrophic consequences for the American
people.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, last May, in the wake of India's nuclear
weapons tests, the Senate rejected by one vote a motion to allow us to
consider the need for a national missile defense. At that time I came
to the floor and urged my colleagues to support defending our nation
against missile attack. I recalled how the President, in his State of
the Union address, underscored the importance of foresight and the need
to prepare ``for a far off storm.'' The President wasn't talking about
weapons proliferation and national missile defense, but I suggested he
should have been--and that the thunder clouds of proliferation were
gathering.
Since that vote in May, the storm has picked up force and is not so
``far off.'' That weapons proliferation is a serious threat to our
nation is more obvious today that even a few month ago.
Allow me to remind my colleagues of a few developments since the
Senate last considered missile defense:
Following India's nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted six of its own
tests. The South Asian subcontinent--rife with smoldering disputes--is
now perched on the edge of a nuclear arms race.
The following month, in June, North Korea blatantly announced that it
was selling, and would continue to sell, ballistic missiles to any and
all comers. The only requirement is cash on the barrel-head.
In July, the Congress received stark warning of our under-
preparedness from the Rumsfeld Commission. This distinguished, bi-
partisan, group of experts concluded that our assessment of the missile
threat to America was inadequate, and that hostile countries were
closer to developing and deploying ballistic missiles than we thought.
As if to prove the Rumsfeld Commission right, Iran test-launched its
Shahab-3 missile that same month. This weapon was based on a North
Korean design and updated with Russian and Chinese assistance. It is
capable of striking U.S. allies and troops in the Middle East. Iran
also continues its work on the Shahab-4, which will be able to reach
central Europe.
Then, just a few weeks ago, North Korea test-launched its Taepo-Dong
1 missile--and they shot it right over our key ally, Japan. The Taepo-
Dong 1 is a huge breakthrough for North Korea. It is a multi-stage
rocket that puts North Korea over a critical technology threshold.
Their next missile, already under development, is the Taepo-Dong 2
which will be capable of striking American shores.
When I spoke on this subject in May, I cautioned that developments
such as these were on the horizon. Indeed, I noted a few of them
specifically. But I truly did not expect to stand here this soon and
recount that so many dangerous developments actually occurred. My
friends, the past few months demonstrate that the threats from weapons
of mass destruction and missiles with increasingly greater range are an
imminent threat. We have consistently underestimated that threat and
must proceed with development and deployment of a national missile
defense as soon as possible.
I do not know if there will be another proliferation development to
report this month. Given the recent track record, it's very likely
there will be. It's certain that missile development in hostile
countries will continue apace. Moreover, world events are becoming more
and more chaotic each day. The instability in Russia and Asia and the
continuing proliferation activities of countries like China and North
Korea only heightens the prospect that dangerous weapons technology
will be sold to rogue actors.
President Clinton was recently quoted in the press that requiring
certification regarding other countries' actions only creates the need
for the Administration to ``fudge'' its reporting. More recently, it
appears the Administration took an active role to limit weapons
inspections in Iraq, despite all its rhetoric to the contrary. Mr.
President, events like these are
[[Page S10056]]
highly worrisome because they suggest the President is less than
forthcoming to the American people, to our allies and to our foes on
issues of national defense and foreign policy. Perhaps even more
worrisome, however, is the possibility that Administration policy
makers may be fooling themselves. In the case of missile defense, this
appears to be so. Their defense policy is based on hollow rhetoric and
delusion. It is based on the hope of a three-year advanced warning. My
friends, we're receiving our warnings now--over and over again. It's
time to act.
It's time to wake up and it's time to act. The technology to develop
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is widely available. If
we do not prepare today, when the day arrives that America is paralyzed
by our vulnerability to ballistic missile attack, or when an attack
actually occurs, we will be reduced to telling the American people--and
history--that we had hoped this would not happen. We will have to say
we had ample evidence of a growing threat, but did not act for whatever
reason.
Mr. President, if we're going to err on this issue, we should err on
the side of caution. If our choices are to deploy a missile defense
either too early or too late, let's make it early. The first step in
raising our guard is to pass S. 1873, the American Missile Protection
Act, and commit the United States to a policy of deploying national
missile defenses.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as I listen to the debate on S. 1873, two
observations come to my mind. First, it appears that a rigid adherence
to ideology seems to be trumping the judgment of this nation's most
senior military leaders. Second, advocates of S. 1873 apparently lack
confidence in their own publicly stated position. They are insisting
that the critical and costly decision about whether we deploy a
national missile defense should be based on a single criterion--
technological feasibility--a simplistic test that the bill's supporters
are unwilling to use for any other federal program.
The Senate should act as it did in May. We should oppose cloture and
move on to the Patients' Bill of Rights, campaign finance reform,
education, agricultural relief, and the environment--all issues of
greater urgency for working families in this country.
The proponents of this latest attempt to deploy ballistic missile
defenses at all costs have entitled this bill the American Missile
Protection Act. But let's be clear, enactment of this bill will provide
precious little if any additional protection. If the Senate were to
immediately adopt this bill, we would not be a single day closer to
actually having a national missile defense. In fact, as stated by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
recent letters to Congress, deployment of national missile defenses at
this time is unnecessary, premature, and could effectively increase the
nuclear threats this country faces.
Quoting from S. 1873, ``the United States should deploy as soon as is
technologically possible an effective national missile defense
system.'' In the eyes of the sponsors of this bill, the only standard
that must be met in deciding whether to deploy defenses is that they be
technologically possible.
Mr. President, I cannot find a clear definition of effective defenses
in S. 1873. That troubles me greatly, though it apparently doesn't
trouble the bill's supporters. They are strangely silent when it comes
to establishing even the most minimal performance requirements for
missile defenses. Many of these bill supporters are the same people who
reject important domestic programs such as health care and school
construction because they fail to meet their stringent--sometimes
logically impossible--set of conditions.
This irony is not lost on me, nor should it be lost on the rest of
the Senate. As I noted in May when we last debated this bill, the
attitude displayed by the proponents of S. 1873 is cavalier even by
military spending standards. Some research by the Department of Defense
shows that S. 1873 would make history. For the first time ever, we
would be committing to deploy a weapons system before it had been
developed, let alone thoroughly tested.
An additional irony is that most experts believe that a rush to
judgment on ballistic missile defenses will not necessarily lead to the
deployment of the most effective system. According to General John
Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ``if
the decision is made to deploy a national missile defense system in the
near term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited
capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be avoided, the
Defense Department can continue to enhance the technology base and the
commensurate capability of the missile defense system that could be
fielded on a later deployment schedule.''
In addition to its silence on the effectiveness issue, there is not a
word in S. 1873 about the costs of this system. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the deployment of even a very limited
system could cost tens of billions of dollars. And given that so much
of the necessary technology remains unproven, history tells us the real
cost could be much, much more. Despite the hefty price tag and the
questionable technology, proponents of this bill essentially say, ``the
costs be damned, full speed ahead.'' Yet when it comes to proven
proposals to improve our nation's schools, increase the quality of
health care, or enhance the environment, the first question out of the
mouths of the proponents of S. 1873 is, ``how much does it cost?''
Mr. President, S. 1873 also says absolutely nothing about how a U.S.
declaration that it plans to unilaterally deploy national missile
defenses will affect existing and future arms control treaties. It
should be clear to every one in this chamber that if the United States
unilaterally abrogates the ABM Treaty, which is what S. 1873 states we
will do, the Russians will effectively end a decades-long effort to
reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They will back out of START I. They
will not ratify START II. And they will not negotiate START III. In
other words, a unilateral U.S. deployment of national missile defenses
could end the prospect for reducing Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal
from its current level of 9,000 weapons down to as few as 2,000.
I find it hard to believe that many of my colleagues are willing to
forego the opportunity to eliminate thousands of Russian nuclear
weapons today in exchange for the possibility that we might some day be
able to deploy a system that can intercept a few missiles. This is much
too steep a price to pay for a course of action that at present is
unproven, unaffordable, and unnecessary.
Supporters of S. 1873 have argued that the Senate should reconsider
its position on this issue as a result of three major developments
since May--the nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan, the
Rumsfeld Commission report on the threat posed by ballistic missiles,
and North Korea's test of a medium-range ballistic missile. In reality,
none of these events suggests we should go forward with premature
deployment of national missile defenses. The tests of nuclear weapons
by India and Pakistan as well as the larger issue of proliferation of
nuclear weapons can best and most directly be addressed by swift
consideration and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Adoption of S. 1873 does not directly address this situation and will,
in fact, lead to more, not less, nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the
majority side of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not seen
fit to conduct a single hearing on this issue, let alone report out
this treaty for consideration by the full Senate.
As for the remaining two events, I commend to all members of the
Senate an excellent letter from General Shelton, this nation's most
senior military leader. General Shelton and the rest of the service
chiefs take issue with the Rumsfeld Commission's findings and reaffirm
their support for the Clinton Administration's current missile defense
policy and deployment readiness program. As for the recent Korea
missile test, although the letter was written prior to the test, the
Chairman's conclusions were explicitly based on the assumption that
North Korea would continue the development and testing of their missile
program. Quoting General Shelton, the North Korean missile program,
``has been predicted and considered in the current examination.''
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to reflect on the advice of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and vote against
cloture on S. 1873.
[[Page S10057]]
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor and strong supporter
of S. 1873, the American Missile Protection Act, and I urge all my
colleagues to vote in favor of this much needed legislation.
Let me begin by being blunt--the United States cannot defend its
borders against a single ballistic missile attack. This leaves all
fifty states, especially Alaska and Hawaii, defenseless against any
country that wants to threaten the U.S. with ballistic missiles.
We will hear that there is no need for a national missile defense
because the Soviet Union is gone. This is true, but the USSR's demise
has given rise to many nations ready to take their place. Russia has
25,000 nuclear warheads and recent reports show that their technology
and warheads are readily available. Just as problematic is that 25
nations have or are developing nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons. Over 30 nations have ballistic missiles, with many more
attempting to strengthen their weapon of mass destruction capability.
Until just recently, China, with its over 400 warheads, had strategic
nuclear missiles targeted at the United States. However, these missiles
could be red-targeted within minutes if so desired. Just last week,
North Korea placed all of South Asia on high alert due to their missile
test. They now have demonstrated the capability to build two-stage
missiles, which is significant because adding stages increases missile
range. While the Administration plays down the threat, I cannot. This
leaves the region and our over 80,000 troops in the area vulnerable to
attack. Also, according to ``Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems,'' North
Korea is developing long-range missile capability that could threaten
southern Alaska and with additional assistance from Russia could later
develop missiles with ranges which could threaten the west coast of the
U.S.
Opponents will also argue that a missile defense system cannot defend
the United States against suitcase nukes or terrorist attacks on our
own soil. They are right, and we need to do more to detect this form of
terrorism, but it should not be done at the risk of a ballistic missile
attack. To quote William Safire, ``. . . nations like China, Iran,
Iraq, North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not been investing heavily
in suitcases.'' These countries are spending money on long range
missiles. While many of these countries may never threaten the United
States, we should not base all of our future threats on the present.
Opponents also point out that non-proliferation agreements will end
the need for a missile defense. The problem is that not all countries
abide by these agreements, or even sign at all. Presently, China, North
Korea, and Russia are all engaged in the transfer of missile components
and technologies. Despite past denials, North Korea now admits to
testing and selling missiles in an effort to help build the arsenals of
Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Again, despite the threats and pleadings of the
Administration, North Korea has refused to stop developing, testing,
and deploying missiles.
Lastly, opponents of a missile defense system point to the
Administration's 1995 National Intelligence Estimate which stated that
the United States would not face a threat of a missile attack for at
least 15 years. However, to come to this conclusion, they had to
exclude any threat to Alaska and Hawaii. This intentional omission is
deceptive at best. We must not sacrifice the protection of U.S.
citizens living in Alaska and Hawaii just to score political points. By
leaving one state vulnerable, we leave the country vulnerable. This is
unacceptable.
While I am a strong supporter of the capability of our intelligence
community, they are not perfect. In May, the U.S. intelligence
community was caught by surprise when India conducted a series of
nuclear tests on the 11th and 13th of that month. In another surprise,
despite intelligence estimates that Iran could not field its medium
range ballistic missile until 2003, Iran flight-tested this system on
July 22nd of this year. Also, it has been reported that Iran is
developing a longer-range version capable of reaching Central Europe.
Again, the Administration believes that we will have at least 3 years
warning before any missile attack would be feasible. However, on July
15th, the Congressionally mandated bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission
concluded that the United States could get little to no warning of
ballistic missile deployments from several emerging powers. The
Commission stated that ``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has
been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community.''
It also warns that, ``The warning times the U.S. can expect of new,
threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. . . . the
U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational
deployment.''
While it may be difficult, we must admit that we live in an era of
unstable international politics. The U.S. should never initiate a
ballistic missile attack, but we cannot be sure that other nations are
like-minded. The United States must be able to defend itself. I believe
the world would be a better place without these weapons. In the
meantime though, we must live with the reality that they do exist and
in the wrong hands will be used.
The bottom line is that if the United States is on the receiving end
of a missile attack, we are defenseless. I believe it is wrong to
understate the danger still lurking in the world. We must do all that
is possible to protect all Americans. We must develop a true national
missile defense as soon as technologically possible. To do anything
less would be to shirk our duties to provide for the common defense of
the United States and all its citizens.
Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, how we vote is not always clear to
Americans. For the average citizen it is not easy to keep straight
whether a ``yea'' is for or against something--whether it is a vote to
pass a bill or table it. It also can be difficult to sort out where
their senators stand when a particular vote covers many provisions in
one ``package.'' Which provision was the ``yea'' vote for or the ``no''
vote against?
But, Mr. President, the vote on cloture of the American Missile
Protection Act (S. 1873) this morning is not at all one of those
``confusing'' votes. I can think of no vote where it can be seen more
clearly exactly where each senator stands. This morning's vote was
black and white. This morning's vote shows who takes the most important
function of the Federal Government--national security--seriously. The
Senate failed for a second time this year to invoke cloture on the
bill. Forty-one Senators, all Democrats, voted against protecting
American families from the greatest threat to our homeland.
Nothing can be more frightening than the thought of an attack on our
homes by another nation using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
Not thinking about it or pretending that it won't happen are absolutely
not grownup ways to deal with this reality.
Opponents of the American Missile Protection Act claim concern with
the fact that the bill mandates deployment of a National Missile
Defense system. They claim that this bill ties our hands because when
we finally do develop the capability to deploy a system, there might
not be a need for it.
Might not be a need?? Let me be completely up-front. It's a myth that
we have plenty of time to build a missile defense capability and hold
off deployment until some potential future threat develops. The
American people need to get that scenario out of their minds. The
system is needed today, right now, and it is time for this
Administration to get off its slow-track development program.
Just two months ago, the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States concluded that ``ballistic missiles
armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States.''
The commission did not say there might be a future threat, it said
there is a present threat. Further, India and Pakistan have conducted
nuclear tests, North Korea just launched a two-stage missile over
Japan, and we don't know Iraq's chemical weapons capability because the
inspectors have not been allowed to look. If these events do not
convince my colleagues on the other side of the aisle of our need for a
National Missile Defense system, what will it take to convince them? Do
they actually have to see a missile strike?
[[Page S10058]]
So, Mr. President, I do not take seriously this criticism that S.
1873 is flawed because it mandates deployment of a missile defense
system that may not be needed. This sounds more like a smoke screen. I
believe that the Democrat's real hope is to try and resuscitate the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was voided by the breakup of the
Soviet Union. Getting back the ABM Treaty seems to be all consuming for
some senators, and a U.S. National Missile Defense system gets in the
way of their goal.
Mr. President, after today's vote it is very clear to American
families that their senators either support real national security
action or are trying to convince the citizens that a paper treaty will
be sufficient to protect them--there is no middle ground.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 15 seconds remaining; the
majority a minute and a half.
Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose cloture on the
Cochran bill.
I will agree at the outset that the many cosponsors of this bill,
though haling overwhelmingly from a single party, probably believe they
have the best interests of the nation in mind by giving their support
to this bill. So I am not here today to challenge their motives or to
impugn their character. I am here instead to state as concisely and
sincerely as I can how and why I believe they are simply wrong.
This bill is fatally flawed because it bases a profound national
security decision--that is, the decision to deploy a missile defense
system spanning the entire territory of the United States--upon one
single consideration . . . its technological possibility.
Voters across the land sent us here to Washington because here is
where the tough decisions are made that face all Americans. They are
tough decisions precisely because they rarely if ever involve only one
consideration. They are tough because they often entail tough trade-
offs in the pursuit of goals that our country simply cannot achieve all
at once. As members of Congress, we have to consider politics,
economics, short-term and long-term effects, impacts on other policies,
legal issues, and other factors. We have to weigh all these
considerations and reach a judgment on what will serve the interests of
the nation.
Yet here we are today, deliberating a decision that could well lead
to the expenditure of tens or potentially hundreds of billions of
dollars solely on the basis of a wish on a star. And that star is Star
Wars.
This is my main objection to the bill--I just do not think it is wise
to base fundamental national security decisions on simply one
criterion, especially one so notoriously ill-defined as the notion of a
``technological possibility.''
But I have other concerns as well. These relate to the potential cost
of the policy enshrined in this bill. And they focus on the dubious
technological objective that lies at the heart of what is known as
``National Missile Defense.'' I think it is certainly appropriate to
ask some tough questions--as the Rumsfeld Commission did--about the
foreign missile threat to determine if this threat is so grave or so
imminent that it requires throwing twin babies out with the bath water:
first, by abandoning standard US government procurement laws and
procedures when it comes to acquiring major technological systems, and
second by setting America on a course that is contary to our nation's
arms control treaty obligations. And with respect to the consideration
of what is actually possible, I also want to call my colleagues'
attention to an article in the New York Times dated July 28 by Richard
Garwin, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission. The article makes a
persuasive point: that we cannot--must not--depend on a system for our
defense which, even under the best circumstances, cannot accomplish its
mission. In fact, it is not at all clear that any system we design
could ever deal with all of the varied threats from different quarters.
Mr. President, the American people are not dummies. I am convinced
that when they listen carefully to both sides on this issue, they will
recognize that nobody has yet come up with an improvement on existing
US policy for missile defense. They will come to this conclusion
precisely because our current policy is premised upon all of the many
considerations I have just summarized . . . not just one.
Americans understand that it makes sense not to force the government
to buy costly, high-risk technologies that simply have the possibility
of being effective.
They understand that America's national security decisions must not
be made without considering the impacts of these decisions on the
defense choices that will be left open to other countries.
They understand that in an age of balanced budgets, large new public
sector commitments will jeopardize funding prospects for a multitude of
other precious national goals.
They will know how to assess the incorrect claim so frequently made
by missile defense advocates that America is allegedly ``defenseless''
against the foreign missile threat. The closer they look at the $270-
plus billion that we are spending each year on the nation's defense
(not to mention the additional billions that we are investing in our
diplomatic and intelligence capabilities), the sooner they will see the
fallacy in the idea of a defensless America.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield the time remaining on our side to
the distinguished Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, for closing
our debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from
Mississippi for his leadership.
Which of these actions would be the act of a strong and powerful
nation led by men and women of vision and foresight: a nation that
constantly reassesses its security threats and tailors its defense to
meet those threats, or a nation that sits back and says let's see what
the threat is, then we will assess it and then we will address it?
Mr. President, it was the latter thinking that caused us to go to a
hollow military after World War II, and we paid the price with
thousands of lives in the Korean war--lives of our men and women,
because we hadn't planned for the future.
Mr. President, we have gotten the wake-up call. It is the Rumsfeld
report that Congress commissioned, which said that we have failed to
estimate how long it would take rogue nations to develop ballistic
missiles. That is the wake-up call. Are we going to meet the security
threats of this country? The greatest security threat we have is
incoming ballistic missiles. If we put our mind to the technology, we
can prioritize our defense spending to say to the American people that
we will protect you from incoming ballistic missiles to our shores, or
to any theater where our Armed Forces are present. We can do no less if
we are men and women of vision and foresight for the greatest Nation on
Earth.
I urge your support for the Cochran visionary amendment that would
protect our country at the earliest opportunity.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Coats be added as a cosponsor of S. 1873.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
CLOTURE MOTION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, pursuant to rule XXII,
the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the
clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provision of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the Missile Defense
System legislation.
Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad
Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry E. Craig,
Ted Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson,
Jim Inhofe, Connie Mack, Robert F. Bennett, and Jeff
Sessions.
CALL OF THE ROLL
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum
call has been waived.
VOTE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate
that debate on a motion to proceed
[[Page S10059]]
to Senate bill 1873, the missile defense bill, shall be brought to a
close?
The yeas and nays are required under the rule. The clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 262 Leg.]
YEAS--59
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Faircloth
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--41
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are
41. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
Mr. GORTON. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The distinguished Senator from
Washington is recognized.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the distinguished President pro tempore
has asked for 5 or 10 minutes to speak as in morning business. I ask
unanimous consent that you recognize him for that purpose.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The distinguished Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
____________________