[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 114 (Wednesday, September 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9851-S9853]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The honorable Senator from Indiana.


                    Amendment No. 3526, as modified

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I have a modification to the Hutchison 
amendment I would like to send to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any objection to the modification? 
Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3526), as modified, is as follows:
       Add the following proviso:
       (5) (a) North Korea is not providing ballistic missiles or 
     ballistic missile technology to a country the government of 
     which the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist 
     government for the purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms 
     Export Control Act or any other comparable provision of law.
       (b) Provision of Intelligence.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence will provide for review and consideration by the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
     International Relations Committee, House National Security 
     Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
     and Senate Armed Services Committee all relevant intelligence 
     bearing on North Korea's compliance with the provisions of 
     this amendment. Such provision will occur not less than 45 
     days prior to the President's certification as provided for 
     under this section.
       (c) Definition of Relevant Intelligence.--For the purposes 
     of this section, the term intelligence includes National 
     Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Memoranda, Findings and 
     other intelligence reports based on multiple sources or 
     including the assessment of more than one member of the 
     Intelligence Community.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to just briefly explain to my 
colleagues what I have attempted to do.
  Yesterday, I sent to the desk an amendment which would have 
transferred the $35 million that is appropriated in the foreign 
operations appropriations bill that is before us now, and reallocated 
that money from the currently earmarked Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization to the antiterrorist portion of funding 
contained within this bill. I did so because of the disturbing news 
that have been reported on by the New York Times and other 
organizations relative to violations, apparent violations of the 
agreement that we entered into with North Korea to freeze their nuclear 
development program.
  The New York Times--and I will recount some of that in a moment--
pointed out that U.S. intelligence agencies have detected a huge, 
secret, underground complex in North Korea that they believe is the 
centerpiece of an effort to revive the country's frozen nuclear weapons 
program.
  Members will remember that in return for a freeze on that program, 
the United States entered into an agreement with North Korea to provide 
certain items for humanitarian assistance, food aid, oil for energy 
production, as well as a commitment to put together a consortium which 
would build two light-water nuclear reactors to supply energy, but that 
could not be used for the purpose of developing material which might be 
used for weapons of mass destruction.
  The Times report cites a senior administration official saying, and I 
quote:

       ``The North had not yet technically violated the Agreed 
     Framework because there is no evidence that Pyongyang has 
     begun pouring cement for a new reactor or a reprocessing 
     plant . . .'' Nevertheless, an unidentified official has said 
     it is a serious development, to say nothing of it is an 
     incredibly stupid move, because it endangers both the nuclear 
     accord and humanitarian aid to North Korea.

  The Washington Post stated that the site that was discovered is huge, 
that some 15,000 reported North Koreans are at work on this underground 
cavern, and this comes only 6 months after the President of the United 
States has certified that North Korea is complying with the provisions 
of the Agreed Framework. That certification is what is necessary in 
order for these funds to be released.
  My amendment sought to take a portion of those funds, transfer it to 
the antiterrorism section of this bill in recognition of the fact that 
this Presidential certification was no longer relevant, now that the 
agreement had been violated.
  I am willing to withdraw that amendment in light of the fact that 
Senator McCain has offered an amendment adding language to the 
certification process so that the President, in addition to other items 
that he has to certify, will have to certify that North Korea is not 
engaged in a violation of the agreement. The exact wording is 
``pursuing the acquisition or development of nuclear capability other 
than the light-water reactors'' referred to in the agreement.
  I would have voted against the McCain amendment, or for the motion

[[Page S9852]]

to table had we not been able to work out language which I could now 
add to the amendment of the Senator from Texas which would add further 
conditions to this certification. The bottom line is, I think the 
certification has turned into an empty process. It is a process by 
which the so-called host country, in this case North Korea, essentially 
tells us everything is OK, and then we, on the basis of that, go ahead 
and certify. The term ``certification'' is not defined, but yet if we 
look at the use of the term that is used in the agreement that we have 
with the People's Republic of China regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
it simply says that the President certifies to the Congress that the 
Republic of China has provided clear and convincing evidence that they 
are in compliance with the agreement. And so the burden of proof is on 
the country which we are trying to determine whether or not they have 
violated the agreement, rather than on our ability to verify the fact 
that they have or have not complied with the agreement.
  President Reagan used to say trust but verify. Well, this is trust 
but not verify.
  And so what I am attempting to do with this modification, which goes 
to an amendment offered by the Senator from Texas, is to say that not 
less than 45 days prior to the President's certification as provided 
for in this bill, the Director of Central Intelligence will provide for 
review and consideration by the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, House International Relations Committee, House National 
Security Committee, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Appropriations Committee as 
well as the Senate Armed Services Committee, all relevant information 
bearing on North Korea's compliance with the provisions of this 
amendment.
  That gives us the opportunity in Congress to determine whether or not 
the certification is a legitimate certification. That gives us the 
information to determine whether or not North Korea is in full 
compliance with what they agreed to do. So I think this language is 
important.
  One last thing. I am withdrawing my amendment, partly because I 
believe the other body will take action on some deferral of this money 
and that this item can be handled in conference. It is clear that 
without that assurance we may get bogged down here in this process, and 
I don't want to hold up this appropriation. I thank the Senator from 
Kentucky for agreeing to this modification. I particularly thank the 
Senator from Texas for allowing me to make this modification to her 
amendment, which will then become part of the bill.
  I think this is a serious problem. If the New York Times report is 
substantiated, if it is correct, even remotely correct, it is a clear 
and direct violation of the promise and agreement made by North Korea 
to freeze its nuclear development capabilities. If that is the case, it 
is clear that this is a breach of promise which requires very serious 
reaction and response by the United States.
  The President of the United States and the Secretary of State have 
certified to us directly that there are no violations. Yet, we now 
receive this particular information. I have quotes here from the 
President of the United States and from the Secretary of State which 
have led us to believe that everything is in compliance. Yet, we now 
receive this report. So it is the credibility of the certification 
process that is at stake here, and I would say it is the credibility of 
this administration in evaluating the intelligence. Therefore, it is 
necessary that, at the very least, the Congress have access to all 
relevant intelligence regarding this particular agreement so in the 
future we can verify it, in addition to the trust that is placed by 
this administration on the word of North Korea.
  Mr. President, testifying before the House Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Committee on Appropriations on March 4, 1998, Secretary 
Albright stated:

       Our request this year includes $35 million for the Korean 
     Energy Development Organization. The Agreed Framework has 
     succeeded in freezing North Korea's dangerous nuclear 
     program.

  On May 8, 1998, James Foley, Department of State said:

       We, of course, closely monitor the Agreed Framework. We 
     are, until now, satisfied that the DPRK has indeed met its 
     obligations to the present.

  On May 13, 1998, Jamie Rubin said:

       We are confident that North Korea has not violated the 
     across-the-board freeze on its nuclear activities . . . and 
     the Agreed Framework is alive and well.

  On July 8, 1998, Secretary Albright testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that:

       The People's Republic of China has consistently supported 
     the Agreed Framework that has frozen North Korea's dangerous 
     nuclear weapons program. . . .

  On July 19, 1998, Jamie Rubin, Department of State, responding to a 
GAO report alleging North Korea was blocking inspections at sites 
covered by the Agreed Framework said:

       We have frozen and stopped the North Korean nuclear program 
     from moving in a direction that would have threatened the 
     world. The freeze is still being monitored and we believe it 
     is still in effect.

  Less than 1 month later on August 17, 1998, the New York Times broke 
the following story:

       U.S. Intelligence Agencies have detected a huge secret 
     underground complex in North Korea that they believe is the 
     centerpiece of an effort to revive the country's frozen 
     nuclear weapons program, according to officials who have been 
     briefed on the intelligence information.
       The finding also follows a string of provocations by the 
     north, including missile sales to Pakistan and the incursion 
     of a small North Korean submarine carrying nine commandos off 
     the South Korean coast this year.

  And what was the administration's reaction? According to the same New 
York Times article:

       A senior administration official said the north had not yet 
     technically violated . . . the Agreed Framework, because 
     there is no evidence that Pyongy Ang has begun pouring cement 
     for a new reactor or reprocessing plant. . . .

  The article continues:

       But spy satellites have extensively photographed a huge 
     work site 25 miles northeast of Yongbyon, the nuclear center, 
     where, until the 1994 accord, the north is believed to have 
     created enough plutonium to build six or more bombs. 
     Thousands of North Korean workers are swarming around the new 
     site, burrowing into the mountainside, American officials 
     said.

  And if that is not enough, Monday's test flight of the Taepo Dong-1 
over Japan demonstrates that North Korea has mastered the technology of 
delivering a nuclear warhead. Yesterday's New York Times reported the 
following:

       Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin project on nuclear arms 
     control . . . said the missile test was ``a clear sign'' of 
     North Korea's intent to develop nuclear weapons, despite its 
     1994 agreement with the United States to stop in exchange for 
     western assistance. Milhollin said a two-stage missile was 
     too costly to construct simply for delivering conventional 
     weapons. ``It means they plan to put a nuclear warhead on it 
     or export it to somebody who will,'' he said. ``The missile 
     makes no sense otherwise.''

  In short, this administration has negotiated an accord in 1994 that 
we cannot and do not even attempt to monitor and verify. As we have 
just been reminded this week by the resignation of a key U.S. arms 
inspector in Iraq, William Ritter, ``The illusion of arms control is 
more dangerous than no arms control at all.''
  Yet that is precisely where we are left. An illusion that the 
administration refuses to define as such. Certifications that are 
meaningless. Ronald Reagan reminded us to ``trust, but verify.'' The 
North Koreans insist by their reluctance to admit inspectors that we 
will not verify as a basic term of the agreement. So we are left simply 
with trust. Trust the North Korean regime which has just launched long 
range missiles over our allies. Trust of the administration. Trust that 
has been frivolously squandered and badly eroded.
  Again, I thank the participants in this for accepting this 
modification of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Coats for his addition 
to my amendment, because I do think it strengthens the base amendment. 
What Senator McCain has done is assure, in order to get this money, 
that there would be no nuclear proliferation by North Korea. My 
amendment then comes in and says we will not allow the ballistic 
missile technology to be sold by North Korea to terrorist nations. I 
think the amendment of Senator Coats

[[Page S9853]]

strengthens both of these by assuring the certification process is 
real.
  I think it is very clear that the Senate is speaking with a very loud 
voice that we are not going to continue to sit back and let North Korea 
break the agreement that they made, sell technology to terrorist 
nations that would use that technology against the United States or our 
allies anywhere in the world, and let them do it and reward them for 
it. We are not going to do it. The signal is clear. The Senate is 
speaking.
  I thank Senator Coats, I thank Senator McConnell, I thank Senator 
McCain for working together to send a very clear message that we want 
North Korea to abide by the agreement they made. If they do, we will 
reward them. If they do not, they will not get one penny of taxpayers' 
money from this country.
  Mr. President, I urge my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I understand there is no objection to the Hutchison 
amendment as modified by Senator Coats.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the Hutchison 
amendment? If not, without objection, the Hutchison amendment, as 
modified, is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3526), as modified, was agreed to.


          Amendment No. 3500, as further modified, as amended

  Mr. McCONNELL. I believe the pending amendment is now the McCain 
amendment. There are no objections to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. Is there objection to 
vitiating the yeas and nays on the McCain amendment?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  If there is no objection, the McCain amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3500), as further modified, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DORGAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3523

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the Coats amendment 
is withdrawn.
  Amendment No. 3523 was withdrawn.


                    Amendment No. 3532, As Modified

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have a technical correction to an 
earlier approved Craig amendment which has been cleared by both sides. 
I send it to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The previously agreed to amendment (No. 3532), as modified, is as 
follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert:

     SEC.  . SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       (a) It is the Sense of the Senate that:
       (1) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the GSM-
     102 credit guarantee program to provide 100 percent coverage, 
     including shipping costs, in some markets where it may be 
     temporarily necessary to encourage the export of US 
     agricultural products.
       (2) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should increase the 
     amount of GSM export credit available above the $5.5 billion 
     minimum required by the 1996 Farm Bill (as it did in the 
     1991/1992 period). In addition to other nations, extra 
     allocations should be made in the following amounts to:
       (A) Pakistan--an additional $150 million;
       (B) Algeria--an additional $140 million;
       (C) Bulgaria--an additional $20 million; and
       (D) Romania--an additional $20 million.
       (3) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the PL-
     480 food assistance programs to the fullest extent possible, 
     including the allocation of assistance to Indonesia and other 
     Asian nations facing economic hardship.
       (4) Given the President's reaffirmation of a Jackson-Vanik 
     waiver for Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should 
     consider Vietnam for PL-480 assistance and increased GSM.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senators from North Dakota have 
been waiting patiently on the floor and would like to address another 
issue for a few moments. I, therefore, yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask consent I be recognized to speak as 
in morning business and that my colleague from North Dakota, Senator 
Conrad, be recognized following my brief remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________