[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 114 (Wednesday, September 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9851-S9853]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The honorable Senator from Indiana.
Amendment No. 3526, as modified
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I have a modification to the Hutchison
amendment I would like to send to the desk and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any objection to the modification?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3526), as modified, is as follows:
Add the following proviso:
(5) (a) North Korea is not providing ballistic missiles or
ballistic missile technology to a country the government of
which the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist
government for the purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms
Export Control Act or any other comparable provision of law.
(b) Provision of Intelligence.--The Director of Central
Intelligence will provide for review and consideration by the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
International Relations Committee, House National Security
Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and Senate Armed Services Committee all relevant intelligence
bearing on North Korea's compliance with the provisions of
this amendment. Such provision will occur not less than 45
days prior to the President's certification as provided for
under this section.
(c) Definition of Relevant Intelligence.--For the purposes
of this section, the term intelligence includes National
Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Memoranda, Findings and
other intelligence reports based on multiple sources or
including the assessment of more than one member of the
Intelligence Community.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to just briefly explain to my
colleagues what I have attempted to do.
Yesterday, I sent to the desk an amendment which would have
transferred the $35 million that is appropriated in the foreign
operations appropriations bill that is before us now, and reallocated
that money from the currently earmarked Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization to the antiterrorist portion of funding
contained within this bill. I did so because of the disturbing news
that have been reported on by the New York Times and other
organizations relative to violations, apparent violations of the
agreement that we entered into with North Korea to freeze their nuclear
development program.
The New York Times--and I will recount some of that in a moment--
pointed out that U.S. intelligence agencies have detected a huge,
secret, underground complex in North Korea that they believe is the
centerpiece of an effort to revive the country's frozen nuclear weapons
program.
Members will remember that in return for a freeze on that program,
the United States entered into an agreement with North Korea to provide
certain items for humanitarian assistance, food aid, oil for energy
production, as well as a commitment to put together a consortium which
would build two light-water nuclear reactors to supply energy, but that
could not be used for the purpose of developing material which might be
used for weapons of mass destruction.
The Times report cites a senior administration official saying, and I
quote:
``The North had not yet technically violated the Agreed
Framework because there is no evidence that Pyongyang has
begun pouring cement for a new reactor or a reprocessing
plant . . .'' Nevertheless, an unidentified official has said
it is a serious development, to say nothing of it is an
incredibly stupid move, because it endangers both the nuclear
accord and humanitarian aid to North Korea.
The Washington Post stated that the site that was discovered is huge,
that some 15,000 reported North Koreans are at work on this underground
cavern, and this comes only 6 months after the President of the United
States has certified that North Korea is complying with the provisions
of the Agreed Framework. That certification is what is necessary in
order for these funds to be released.
My amendment sought to take a portion of those funds, transfer it to
the antiterrorism section of this bill in recognition of the fact that
this Presidential certification was no longer relevant, now that the
agreement had been violated.
I am willing to withdraw that amendment in light of the fact that
Senator McCain has offered an amendment adding language to the
certification process so that the President, in addition to other items
that he has to certify, will have to certify that North Korea is not
engaged in a violation of the agreement. The exact wording is
``pursuing the acquisition or development of nuclear capability other
than the light-water reactors'' referred to in the agreement.
I would have voted against the McCain amendment, or for the motion
[[Page S9852]]
to table had we not been able to work out language which I could now
add to the amendment of the Senator from Texas which would add further
conditions to this certification. The bottom line is, I think the
certification has turned into an empty process. It is a process by
which the so-called host country, in this case North Korea, essentially
tells us everything is OK, and then we, on the basis of that, go ahead
and certify. The term ``certification'' is not defined, but yet if we
look at the use of the term that is used in the agreement that we have
with the People's Republic of China regarding nuclear nonproliferation,
it simply says that the President certifies to the Congress that the
Republic of China has provided clear and convincing evidence that they
are in compliance with the agreement. And so the burden of proof is on
the country which we are trying to determine whether or not they have
violated the agreement, rather than on our ability to verify the fact
that they have or have not complied with the agreement.
President Reagan used to say trust but verify. Well, this is trust
but not verify.
And so what I am attempting to do with this modification, which goes
to an amendment offered by the Senator from Texas, is to say that not
less than 45 days prior to the President's certification as provided
for in this bill, the Director of Central Intelligence will provide for
review and consideration by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, House International Relations Committee, House National
Security Committee, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Appropriations Committee as
well as the Senate Armed Services Committee, all relevant information
bearing on North Korea's compliance with the provisions of this
amendment.
That gives us the opportunity in Congress to determine whether or not
the certification is a legitimate certification. That gives us the
information to determine whether or not North Korea is in full
compliance with what they agreed to do. So I think this language is
important.
One last thing. I am withdrawing my amendment, partly because I
believe the other body will take action on some deferral of this money
and that this item can be handled in conference. It is clear that
without that assurance we may get bogged down here in this process, and
I don't want to hold up this appropriation. I thank the Senator from
Kentucky for agreeing to this modification. I particularly thank the
Senator from Texas for allowing me to make this modification to her
amendment, which will then become part of the bill.
I think this is a serious problem. If the New York Times report is
substantiated, if it is correct, even remotely correct, it is a clear
and direct violation of the promise and agreement made by North Korea
to freeze its nuclear development capabilities. If that is the case, it
is clear that this is a breach of promise which requires very serious
reaction and response by the United States.
The President of the United States and the Secretary of State have
certified to us directly that there are no violations. Yet, we now
receive this particular information. I have quotes here from the
President of the United States and from the Secretary of State which
have led us to believe that everything is in compliance. Yet, we now
receive this report. So it is the credibility of the certification
process that is at stake here, and I would say it is the credibility of
this administration in evaluating the intelligence. Therefore, it is
necessary that, at the very least, the Congress have access to all
relevant intelligence regarding this particular agreement so in the
future we can verify it, in addition to the trust that is placed by
this administration on the word of North Korea.
Mr. President, testifying before the House Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Committee on Appropriations on March 4, 1998, Secretary
Albright stated:
Our request this year includes $35 million for the Korean
Energy Development Organization. The Agreed Framework has
succeeded in freezing North Korea's dangerous nuclear
program.
On May 8, 1998, James Foley, Department of State said:
We, of course, closely monitor the Agreed Framework. We
are, until now, satisfied that the DPRK has indeed met its
obligations to the present.
On May 13, 1998, Jamie Rubin said:
We are confident that North Korea has not violated the
across-the-board freeze on its nuclear activities . . . and
the Agreed Framework is alive and well.
On July 8, 1998, Secretary Albright testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that:
The People's Republic of China has consistently supported
the Agreed Framework that has frozen North Korea's dangerous
nuclear weapons program. . . .
On July 19, 1998, Jamie Rubin, Department of State, responding to a
GAO report alleging North Korea was blocking inspections at sites
covered by the Agreed Framework said:
We have frozen and stopped the North Korean nuclear program
from moving in a direction that would have threatened the
world. The freeze is still being monitored and we believe it
is still in effect.
Less than 1 month later on August 17, 1998, the New York Times broke
the following story:
U.S. Intelligence Agencies have detected a huge secret
underground complex in North Korea that they believe is the
centerpiece of an effort to revive the country's frozen
nuclear weapons program, according to officials who have been
briefed on the intelligence information.
The finding also follows a string of provocations by the
north, including missile sales to Pakistan and the incursion
of a small North Korean submarine carrying nine commandos off
the South Korean coast this year.
And what was the administration's reaction? According to the same New
York Times article:
A senior administration official said the north had not yet
technically violated . . . the Agreed Framework, because
there is no evidence that Pyongy Ang has begun pouring cement
for a new reactor or reprocessing plant. . . .
The article continues:
But spy satellites have extensively photographed a huge
work site 25 miles northeast of Yongbyon, the nuclear center,
where, until the 1994 accord, the north is believed to have
created enough plutonium to build six or more bombs.
Thousands of North Korean workers are swarming around the new
site, burrowing into the mountainside, American officials
said.
And if that is not enough, Monday's test flight of the Taepo Dong-1
over Japan demonstrates that North Korea has mastered the technology of
delivering a nuclear warhead. Yesterday's New York Times reported the
following:
Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin project on nuclear arms
control . . . said the missile test was ``a clear sign'' of
North Korea's intent to develop nuclear weapons, despite its
1994 agreement with the United States to stop in exchange for
western assistance. Milhollin said a two-stage missile was
too costly to construct simply for delivering conventional
weapons. ``It means they plan to put a nuclear warhead on it
or export it to somebody who will,'' he said. ``The missile
makes no sense otherwise.''
In short, this administration has negotiated an accord in 1994 that
we cannot and do not even attempt to monitor and verify. As we have
just been reminded this week by the resignation of a key U.S. arms
inspector in Iraq, William Ritter, ``The illusion of arms control is
more dangerous than no arms control at all.''
Yet that is precisely where we are left. An illusion that the
administration refuses to define as such. Certifications that are
meaningless. Ronald Reagan reminded us to ``trust, but verify.'' The
North Koreans insist by their reluctance to admit inspectors that we
will not verify as a basic term of the agreement. So we are left simply
with trust. Trust the North Korean regime which has just launched long
range missiles over our allies. Trust of the administration. Trust that
has been frivolously squandered and badly eroded.
Again, I thank the participants in this for accepting this
modification of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Coats for his addition
to my amendment, because I do think it strengthens the base amendment.
What Senator McCain has done is assure, in order to get this money,
that there would be no nuclear proliferation by North Korea. My
amendment then comes in and says we will not allow the ballistic
missile technology to be sold by North Korea to terrorist nations. I
think the amendment of Senator Coats
[[Page S9853]]
strengthens both of these by assuring the certification process is
real.
I think it is very clear that the Senate is speaking with a very loud
voice that we are not going to continue to sit back and let North Korea
break the agreement that they made, sell technology to terrorist
nations that would use that technology against the United States or our
allies anywhere in the world, and let them do it and reward them for
it. We are not going to do it. The signal is clear. The Senate is
speaking.
I thank Senator Coats, I thank Senator McConnell, I thank Senator
McCain for working together to send a very clear message that we want
North Korea to abide by the agreement they made. If they do, we will
reward them. If they do not, they will not get one penny of taxpayers'
money from this country.
Mr. President, I urge my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. I understand there is no objection to the Hutchison
amendment as modified by Senator Coats.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the Hutchison
amendment? If not, without objection, the Hutchison amendment, as
modified, is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3526), as modified, was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3500, as further modified, as amended
Mr. McCONNELL. I believe the pending amendment is now the McCain
amendment. There are no objections to that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. Is there objection to
vitiating the yeas and nays on the McCain amendment?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
If there is no objection, the McCain amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3500), as further modified, as amended, was agreed
to.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. DORGAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3523
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the Coats amendment
is withdrawn.
Amendment No. 3523 was withdrawn.
Amendment No. 3532, As Modified
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have a technical correction to an
earlier approved Craig amendment which has been cleared by both sides.
I send it to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The previously agreed to amendment (No. 3532), as modified, is as
follows:
At the appropriate place, insert:
SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE.
(a) It is the Sense of the Senate that:
(1) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the GSM-
102 credit guarantee program to provide 100 percent coverage,
including shipping costs, in some markets where it may be
temporarily necessary to encourage the export of US
agricultural products.
(2) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should increase the
amount of GSM export credit available above the $5.5 billion
minimum required by the 1996 Farm Bill (as it did in the
1991/1992 period). In addition to other nations, extra
allocations should be made in the following amounts to:
(A) Pakistan--an additional $150 million;
(B) Algeria--an additional $140 million;
(C) Bulgaria--an additional $20 million; and
(D) Romania--an additional $20 million.
(3) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the PL-
480 food assistance programs to the fullest extent possible,
including the allocation of assistance to Indonesia and other
Asian nations facing economic hardship.
(4) Given the President's reaffirmation of a Jackson-Vanik
waiver for Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should
consider Vietnam for PL-480 assistance and increased GSM.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senators from North Dakota have
been waiting patiently on the floor and would like to address another
issue for a few moments. I, therefore, yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask consent I be recognized to speak as
in morning business and that my colleague from North Dakota, Senator
Conrad, be recognized following my brief remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________