[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 114 (Wednesday, September 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9837-S9847]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                Amendment No. 3500, As Further Modified

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my 
amendment, and the modification is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator's amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:
       On page 33, line 4, before the colon insert the following: 
     ``; and (4) North Korea is not actively pursuing the 
     acquisition or development of a nuclear capability (other 
     than the light-water reactors provided for by the 1994 Agreed 
     Framework Between the United States and North Korea).

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the modification, by the way, takes out 
the provision, at the request of the administration and others, that 
requires that the North Koreans be fully meeting their obligations 
under the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I did that 
with some reluctance, but, at the same time, the important aspect of 
this amendment is that the President must certify that North Korea is 
not actively pursuing the acquisition or development of nuclear 
capability, other than light-water reactors provided for in the 1994 
Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.
  I think it is the desire of the distinguished manager that we vote on 
this amendment. First of all, I ask, if it has not taken place, that 
the Hutchison second-degree amendment be voice voted at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Hutchison 
amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. If the Senator from Arizona will withhold for just a 
moment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will make some additional remarks which 
are so compelling, and as soon as the Senator from Kentucky desires, I 
will yield so that we can proceed with this vote. I know the Senator 
from Kentucky is very interested in concluding this legislation, as are 
the rest of us. Given the conditions in the world today, I argue this 
is one of the most important pieces of legislation that we will 
consider in the Senate.
  Yesterday there was an article in the New York Times, parts of which 
I think are important to note.
  It is titled ``Missile Test By North Korea: Dark Omen for 
Washington.'' Part of the article says:

       The officials and arms experts said the test also suggested 
     that North Korea had made real progress towards building 
     Taepodong-2, which is reportedly capable of traveling 2,400 
     to 3,600 miles and could strike targets throughout Asia and 
     as far away as Alaska.
       Henry D. Sokolski, the executive director of the 
     Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, said 
     the ability to build rockets in stages opened the door to 
     intercontinental missiles, which in theory have virtually 
     unlimited range.
       ``We're entering a new era,'' Mr. Sokolski said.
       Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on 
     Nuclear Arms Control, another research organization in 
     Washington, said the missile test was ``a clear sign'' of 
     North Korea's intent to develop nuclear weapons, despite its 
     1994 agreement with the United States to stop in exchange for 
     energy assistance.
       Mr. Milhollin said a two-stage missile was too costly to 
     build simply for delivering conventional weapons. ``It means 
     they plan to put a nuclear warhead on it or export it to 
     somebody who will,'' he said. ``The missile makes no sense 
     otherwise.''

  Mr. President, these are important statements. Some argue that 
perhaps the North Koreans are just simply building a missile and they 
are not pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
  As Mr. Milhollin said, it doesn't make sense. Why else would they be 
building a two-stage rocket without planning also to have that missile 
armed with a weapon of mass destruction?--from what we have seen in the 
past, most likely a nuclear weapon.
  I don't want to go through the litany of my complaints about this 
agreement that was made with North Korea in 1994. I spoke at length on 
the floor of the Senate and with the media. I did not see any 
indication that the North Koreans were serious. I did see indications 
they were in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which they 
were signatories and that we were basically providing them with a 
bribe. I also believed and still believe that unless the North Koreans 
understand they have to pay a significant price, then they will 
continue in this most destabilizing activity.
  The Florida Times Union on August 28 said:

       An argument could be made that Pyongyang feels it must 
     renew its nuclear program to keep people warm, but it also 
     claims it cannot feed its people and has been begging 
     successfully for free rice. If it doesn't have enough money 
     to feed its people, how can it have enough money to build 
     expensive nuclear facilities and two-stage rockets? Pyongyang 
     presumably is taking money that would have been spent on food 
     and heat if not for western charity in building a nuclear 
     arsenal.
       Unfortunately, the administration made it easy for 
     Pyongyang to cheat. The agreement does not require 
     inspections to verify North Korean compliance. Oddly enough, 
     Pyongyang threatened earlier this month to pull out of the 
     agreement over the U.S. failure to lift economic sanctions 
     quickly enough. It has also complained about the lack of 
     progress toward diplomatic ties. Those sound more like 
     excuses to me for cheating on an agreement rather than 
     reasons to break it. Not once since its inception in the 
     aftermath of World War II has North Korea proven itself 
     trustworthy. That makes it difficult for the United States to 
     continue making agreements based purely on trust.

  Mr. Hoagland, probably one of the most respected, if not the most 
respected, individual commentators on the issues of national security, 
said:

       The U.S.-negotiated agreement that froze North Korea's 
     nuclear weapons development in 1994 is coming apart.
       With their economy in trouble, South Korea and Japan have 
     been having second thoughts about the high levels of economic 
     aid the deal mandates, and Congress has always been unhappy 
     about the fuel oil shipments the administration agreed to 
     make without congressional consultation. These concerns were 
     undermining the accord even before the discovery this month 
     that North Korea has been working on an underground secret 
     facility that almost certainly violates the accord.
       That discovery could be the nail in the coffin of the 
     agreement, which pulled North Korea and the United States 
     back from a military confrontation that could soon resume.

  Mr. President, Mr. Charles Krauthammer, a man whom I have great 
respect for, also wrote on August 30:

       Consider North Korea. In 1994, it broke the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty and embarked on nuke building. How did 
     Clinton react? By agreeing to supply North Korea indefinitely 
     with free oil while the United States and allies build for it 
     two brand new (ostensibly safer) $5 billion nuclear reactors 
     in return for a promise to freeze its weapon program.
       Now it turns out that while taking this gigantic bribe 
     North Korea was building a huge new nuclear facility inside a 
     mountain. The administration, inert and dismayed by such 
     ungentle manliness, refuses to call this a violation of the 
     agreement. Why? Because concrete has not been poured.

  Today the Los Angeles Times editorial reads, ``Time to Rethink North 
Korea Policy'':
       If ever there was a time for Washington to reappraise its 
     policy toward North Korea, it is now. In the midst of 
     meetings between American and North Korean negotiators in New 
     York, the Pyongyang regime fired a new, longer-range missile 
     across the Sea of Japan and over the Japanese mainland. That 
     provocative act constitutes a major setback in diplomatic 
     efforts to draw hostile North Korea into the world community.
       The missile was discussed at Monday's meeting in New York, 
     which focused on implementation of a 1994 accord under which

[[Page S9838]]

     the United States, South Korea, Japan and the European Union 
     would help North Korea build two nuclear power reactors of no 
     military use in exchange for a freeze on nuclear weapons 
     development. U.S. representatives did not say Monday what, if 
     any, explanation was given by Pyongyang. On Tuesday, North 
     Korea declined to meet.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       U.S officials, curiously, said they were not surprised by 
     the test and had warned of it in advance. Military analysts 
     pointed to the range capability that North Korea has now 
     shown and said that chemical, biological and even nuclear 
     warheads could be put on such a missile. The test came only a 
     few weeks after U.S. intelligence satellites uncovered 
     activity at a huge, supposedly shuttled nuclear facility.
       Perhaps Pyongyang fired the missile as a ploy to get 
     Washington to fully deliver on its pledge to provide 500,000 
     tons of fuel oil this year as part of the reactor deal. If 
     so, the tactic has backfired. Members of Congress who had 
     balked at paying for the fuel now are irate.
       North Korea may have also been advertising its missile to 
     other renegade nations. Military sales are one of the few 
     money-making ventures left for the impoverished country, 
     which has been warning that it may have to restart its 
     nuclear weapons program. The episode smacks of blackmail, not 
     diplomacy. All the more reason for the Clinton administration 
     to reconsider its long, patient persuasion of Pyongyang.

  Mr. President, on July 8, 1998, Secretary of State Albright said:

       Regional security is another matter on which dialogue with 
     Beijing has enhanced cooperation and fostered progress. For 
     example, the People's Republic of China has consistently 
     supported the Agreed Framework that has frozen North Korea's 
     dangerous nuclear weapons program, and has urged the North to 
     continue complying with it.

  Secretary Albright said, on March 4, 1998:

       Our request this year includes $35 million for the Korean 
     Energy Development Organization. The Agreed Framework has 
     succeeded in freezing North Korea's dangerous nuclear 
     program. Now it has begun that program one step at a time--
     having secured over 90% of the program's spent fuel, which 
     represents several bombs' worth of weapons-grade plutonium 
     after reprocessing.

  Secretary Albright, on February 10, 1998:

       We believe our FY99 budget request for $35 million for KEDO 
     is both necessary and justified to maintain U.S. leadership 
     within KEDO, ensure that KEDO continues to fulfill its 
     important mission, and secure continued DPRK compliance with 
     its nonproliferation obligations under the U.S. DPRK Agreed 
     Framework.

  She said, on February 12, 1997:

       Let me just say this is obviously a very complex subject, 
     but I believe that the framework agreement is one of the best 
     things that the administration has done because it stopped a 
     nuclear weapons program in North Korea.

  Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal on Friday, August 21, said 
North Korea's nukes--

       In essence, what was signed in 1994 was an arms-control 
     agreement that suffered from the central flaws common to all 
     such efforts: Even when verification is possible--and in this 
     case it was specifically excluded--there is no way to enforce 
     compliance. More to the point, there is no will to enforce 
     it. So much effort and face and prestige goes into getting 
     these deals signed that when something goes wrong, nobody 
     wants to admit it.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       North Korea is different only because Pyongyang openly 
     conducts foreign policy through blackmail. Earlier this year, 
     it threatened to resume its nuclear weapons program and 
     declared it would keep selling missiles to clients like Iran 
     and Iraq unless the U.S. lifted economic sanctions. It also 
     has demanded more fuel oil and more food for its hungry 
     population. A group of U.S. Congressmen in North Korea for a 
     whirlwind official famine tour this week came away convinced 
     that millions are near starvation and hundreds of thousands 
     of others have already died of hunger. As terrible as this 
     is, it is all the more horrifying when you consider that the 
     Stalinist regime is spending what little money it does have 
     building long-range missiles that will be able to hit the 
     United States, according to a commission appointed by the 
     U.S. Congress. Or on that giant new underground complex where 
     nuclear weapons production was ``frozen'' in 1994.
       It may turn out that the complex is not a nuclear-weapons 
     plant after all. Even so, the administration's timely 
     retaliation in Afghanistan and the Sudan will have two 
     beneficial effects. It will signal the North Koreans that 
     America's patience is not unlimited, and that consequently 
     they may wish to rethink their current strategy of trying to 
     blackmail the U.S. into coughing up more aid by playing the 
     nuclear card.

  Mr. President, the fact is that no one understands North Korea. No 
one understands what goes on inside that Orwellian country. And it is 
impossible to predict what the thinking is that would cause them to 
have a delegation in New York supposedly in serious negotiations and at 
the same time launch this two-stage missile. I cannot imagine the 
reaction of the American people if a foreign country launched a missile 
one stage of which hit on one side of Florida and the other one hit on 
the other side of Florida.
  Mr. President, I think the American people would be incredulous and 
greatly disturbed over such an event. Well, that is what the North 
Koreans just did vis-a-vis Japan, a country that had pledged to provide 
the bulk of several billion dollars worth of construction of a nuclear 
powerplant.
  This is a serious situation. Obviously, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is one of the 
greatest challenges we face in this post-cold war era. We have to bring 
this threat to a halt. I hope that the administration, as the Los 
Angeles Times recommends, rethinks the North Korean policy. In the 
meantime, we cannot continue to fund any program that would provide any 
encouragement as well as financial assistance to a country that clearly 
has time after time after time broken its word and has committed acts 
of provocation and aggression.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. But, Mr. President, 
before I do that, I want to say that I would like to move this 
amendment as soon as possible, and hope that we can do so. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if my colleague will yield, I have an 
amendment I would like to offer. If my colleague from Arizona has 
completed his debate on this, I would ask----
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I am told by staff 
here that they would prefer to wait until the manager of the bill comes 
to the floor before that permission be granted. So I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I defer to the managers to make a proper 
motion to temporarily set aside the McCain amendment for the purposes 
of offering and debating at this point my amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, we have an understanding with the 
distinguished Senator from Connecticut that at whatever point the two 
democratic Senators who are requesting an opportunity to be heard on 
the McCain amendment arrive on the Senate floor, we can go back to the 
McCain amendment and dispose of that. With that understanding with the 
distinguished Senator from Connecticut, I have no objection to 
temporarily laying aside the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. I inform my colleagues I know there are other Members who 
want to be heard on this amendment, and I certainly would not ask for a 
vote on this amendment until other Members have had a chance to be on 
it. Specifically, my colleague from Alabama, Senator Shelby, and 
possibly others, will speak in opposition, I am told, to this 
amendment. I will not make an attempt to have the amendment disposed of 
until they have had an opportunity to be heard.


                           Amendment No. 3527

(Purpose: Establish a procedure for the declassification of information 
                 pertaining to Guatemala and Honduras)

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for himself, and 
     Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Kerry, and Mr. Leahy, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 3527.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill add the following new 
     section:

[[Page S9839]]

     SEC.   . RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE AVAILABLE HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   RECORDS PURSUANT TO PENDING REQUESTS.

       (a) Guatemala and Honduras.--
       (1) The United States has received specific written 
     requests for human rights records from the Guatemala 
     Clarification Commission and the National Human Rights 
     Commissioner in Honduras, and from American citizens and 
     their relatives who have been victims of gross violations of 
     human rights in those countries.
       (2) Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, each agency shall review all requested human rights 
     records referred to in subsection (a)(1) which it has not yet 
     located or reviewed for the purpose of declassifying and 
     disclosing such records to the public except as provided in 
     subsection (b).
       (b) Postponement of Public Disclosure.--
       (1) Grounds for postponement of public disclosure of human 
     rights records.--An agency may only postpone public 
     disclosure of a human rights record or portions thereof that 
     are responsive to the pending requests--
       (A) pursuant to the declassification standards contained in 
     section 6 of P.L. 102-526, or
       (B)(i) if its public disclosure should be expected to 
     reveal the identity of a confidential human source,
       (ii) however it shall not be grounds for withholding from 
     public disclosure relevant information about an individual's 
     involvement in a human rights matter solely because that 
     individual was or is an intelligence source, however, the 
     public disclosure of the fact that the individual was or is 
     such a source may be withheld pursuant to this section.
       (2) Review of decision to withhold records.--The 
     Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel 
     (hereinafter in this section the ``Panel''), established 
     under Executive Order No. 12958, shall--
       (A) review all decisions to withhold the public disclosure 
     of any human rights record that has been identified pursuant 
     to requests referred to in subsection (a)(1), subject to the 
     declassification standards referred to in subsection (b)(1);
       (B) notify the head of the agency in control or possession 
     of the human rights record that was the subject of the review 
     of its determination and publish such determination in the 
     Federal Register;
       (C) contemporaneously notify the President of its 
     determination, who shall have the sole and nondelegable 
     authority to review any determination of the Panel, and whose 
     review shall be based on the declassification standards 
     referred to in subsection (b)(1). Within 30 calendar days of 
     notification, the President shall provide the Panel with an 
     unclassified certification setting forth his decision and the 
     reasons therefor; and
       (D) publish in the Federal Register a copy of any 
     unclassified written certification, statement, and any other 
     materials that the President deems appropriate in each 
     instance.
       (3) References.--For purposes of this section, references 
     in sections 6 and 9 of P.L. 102-526 to ``assassination 
     records'' shall be deemed to be references to ``human rights 
     records''.
       (c) Creation of Positions.--(1) For purposes of carrying 
     out the provisions of this section, there shall be two 
     additional positions on the Panel. The President shall 
     appoint individuals, not currently employees of the United 
     States Government, who have substantial human rights 
     expertise and who are able to meet the requisite security 
     clearance requirements for these positions.
       (2) The rights and obligations of such individuals on the 
     Panel shall be limited to matters relating to the review of 
     human rights records and their service on the panel shall end 
     upon completion of that review.
       (d) Definitions.--In this Section:
       (1) Human rights record.--The term ``human rights record'' 
     means a record in the possession, custody, or control of the 
     United States Government containing information about gross 
     violations of internationally recognized human rights 
     committed in Honduras and Guatemala.
       (2) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any agency of the 
     United States Government charged with the conduct of foreign 
     policy or foreign intelligence, including the Department of 
     State, the Agency for International Development, the Defense 
     Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Justice, the 
     National Security Council, and the Executive Office of the 
     President.
       (3) Gross violations of internationally recognized human 
     rights.--The term ``gross violations of internationally 
     recognized human rights'' has the same meaning as is 
     contained in section 502(B)(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I have brief remarks about this amendment. 
It is focused on two countries, Guatemala and Honduras. It is not 
worldwide. It is designed to try to have documents declassified, dating 
back to a decade ago. Many people recall the tragedies of the conflict 
in Central America. It actually goes back more than two decades. In the 
case of Guatemala, it goes back 30 or 40 years.
  Civil wars have now been concluded. There are democratically led 
governments moving in a direction to try to address their underlying 
economic and social needs. The conflict that plagued these countries 
and ourselves cost the lives of thousands of people, as well as 
thousands more who were injured and brutalized in those conflicts.
  We are seeking with this amendment to declassify certain information 
that might allow us, in the case particularly of an American citizen 
who was brutalized in that conflict almost a decade ago, to gather 
necessary information so that those who perpetrated the crimes against 
her could be brought to the bar of justice.
  The Clinton administration has already agreed in principle to assist 
the Guatemalan and Honduran authorities investigating past human rights 
abuses that occurred during this period. These investigations are 
critical to these societies being able to complete the process of 
reconciliation and establish a credible foundation on which to build 
democratic institutions which truly reflect the rule of law and to put 
an end to impunity.
  While some U.S. agencies have already responded very fully and 
positively to these requests, others appear to have done little or 
nothing meaningful to review and turn over materials that could be 
critical to the success of this exercise. The slowness of certain 
agencies in the production of materials, in some cases which are 
totally nonresponsive to these requests, have caused a level of 
cynicism about the commitment of some agencies to fully support this 
effort.
  I know my colleagues, Senator Leahy and Senator McConnell, are very 
familiar with the case of the American citizen, Sister Diana Ortiz, who 
was abducted and brutally raped and tortured while serving in a rural 
community in Guatemala in 1989. Not surprisingly, Sister Ortiz's life 
has never been the same. Her efforts to shed light on the details of 
the crimes against her have been met with indifference, at best. As is 
too often the case in rape cases, she believes that rather than being 
viewed as the victim, she has been treated by certain government 
officials as a perpetrator of some crime or involved in nefarious 
behavior. I don't think the 101 cigarette burns on her back would 
indicate necessarily at all that someone was the perpetrator rather 
than the victim.
  Just today, I received a very moving letter from Sister Ortiz. 
Attached to her letter was a statement that she recently gave laying 
out some of the new information about her case. Let me quote from her 
letter, because I think it helps explain why I am offering this 
amendment today. Sister Ortiz writes:

       Despite my efforts, I still don't know the truth of why I 
     was abducted and tortured. It is true that government 
     agencies have released documents to me. They consist of such 
     public items as articles written by the press, human rights 
     reports from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, documents 
     relating to cases other than my own, and letters written to 
     Members of Congress. I have also received blank sheets of 
     white paper.

  Mr. President, this is not just some isolated document. This is 
basically what a lot of the released documents look like here. This is 
declassified human rights documents, blank pages: ``Honduran armed 
services human rights and corruption.'' A blank page.
  Here is another example of the declassified documents released on her 
case:

       A U.S. ally has received U.S. Embassy and Honduran 
     government support.

  It goes on. That has little or nothing to do with the situation 
involving Sister Ortiz. The rest is blank.
  This is one of the released documents:

       Press reports of January 1988 indicate that the 316 
     battalion was deactivated in September 1987 to quell 
     speculation following allegations of death squad activities 
     made against the battalion.

  The rest is blank, as if this were some highly pertinent document. 
This is obviously not readable here at all. For the purpose of 
demonstrating to my colleagues, here is what we are talking about. I 
could go through this quickly. These are all blank pages. I am not 
filling these in. These are sheets of blank pages that come up on this 
report.
  Now, obviously, there are legitimate concerns that intelligence 
agencies can have about just releasing any and all documents that 
people would like to have access to. You can't tolerate that, even in a 
case as moving as that of Sister Ortiz.
  This amendment says that within 120 days of enactment of the 
underlying bill it would search the documents for

[[Page S9840]]

relevant material in Honduras and Guatemala if documents are discovered 
and found, and the agencies, for whatever reasons--there are a list of 
reasons--adopted in law where methods and sources could be revealed and 
other important information that could be harmful to U.S. interests. 
Then there is a panel made up of representatives from the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of 
Defense, the Archivist of the United States and the Justice Department, 
which would review that request from the agency objecting to the 
release of certain documents. So there is a system whereby they would 
review whether or not, in fact, the decision not to release information 
was worthwhile.
  So there is a process in place here. It is not worldwide. It is, in 
fact, situations surrounding these two countries. It involves an 
American citizen who was brutally tortured and would like to get to the 
bottom of what happened to her--an American nun working in Honduras and 
in Guatemala doing work that she and others felt made a significant 
contribution to the well-being of people there. She would like to find 
out why it happened. It is not asking too much, in the case of these 
two countries, for the declassification of documents which could help 
her pursue this case, again, allowing for a very legitimate process to 
be in place so that there is not the unintentional release of documents 
that could in some way compromise the interests of the United States.
  That is the sum and substance of this amendment, Mr. President. I 
hope that our colleagues will see fit to be supportive of it. It 
doesn't go too far, in my view. As I said, it is limited in scope, in 
terms of the countries involved, and also there is a process in place 
in this amendment that would allow for the information, in cases where 
it should not be released, to be withheld.
  I also point out, Mr. President, that I am particularly grateful to 
my colleagues, Senators Leahy, Mikulski, Kerry of Massachusetts and 
Kerrey of Nebraska, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
who is a cosponsor of this amendment, along with Senator Harkin and 
several others who have joined with me in this effort.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter from Sister 
Ortiz, as well as the very moving testimony that she gave on June 25, 
1998, be printed in the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                September 2, 1998.
     Senator Christopher J. Dodd,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Dodd: I cannot begin to thank you enough for 
     being in the forefront of the struggle for the Human Rights 
     Information Act. Thousands upon thousands of Guatemalans and 
     Hondurans await the outcome of Senate action on this 
     legislation which is of so much importance to them. It is, of 
     course, of great importance to me as well.
       It may seem to many in Congress that my search for justice 
     is never-ending. This is hardly surprising for it is exactly 
     how it has felt to me during these past nine long years. 
     Despite my best efforts, I still don't know the truth of why 
     I was abducted and tortured nor have I obtained any 
     information on the identity of ``Alejandro.'' It is true that 
     various government agencies have released documents to me. 
     Now, let me tell you a little about them. They consist of 
     such (public) items as articles written by the press, human 
     rights reports from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, documents 
     relating to cases other than my own, and letters written to 
     members of Congress. I have also received black white sheets, 
     and a few messages from former Ambassador Thomas Stroock--one 
     written a week after I was abducted that stated: ``Her story, 
     as told is not accurate.'' Other cables from Stroock's 
     office/State Department describe me as a political 
     strategist, who had perhaps staged my own abduction to secure 
     a cut--off of U.S. aid to the Guatemalan military. These are 
     examples of ``relevant documents'' which have been released 
     to me.
       In the summer of 1996, the Justice Department conducted a 
     criminal investigation. What I learned only during my 
     participation was that I was to be the subject of the 
     investigation and not those who abducted and tortured me. 
     During my testimony before the House Human Rights Caucus on 
     June 24th of this year, I spoke publicly of the treatment I 
     received at the hands of DOJ officials. I am enclosing that 
     testimony as both description of and further witness to how 
     my case has, in fact, been investigated.
       Now, on top of all this, I have been told by a legislative 
     aide to another Senator that members of the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee are saying that only 3 or 4 documents 
     (pages) have been withheld from me. At this moment, a 284+ 
     page Classified Report pertaining to my case remains in the 
     hands of the Justice Department, which has been made 
     available to the Intelligence Oversight Board, the former 
     Ambassador to Guatemala, Thomas Stroock, and who knows how 
     many others. But I, on the other hand, am denied access to it 
     in order to protect my privacy and that of their sources, or 
     so I am told (refer to June 24th Statement enclosed).
       Again Senator Dodd, I thank you for your efforts on behalf 
     of all who seek the truth. Like countless Guatemalans and 
     Hondurans, this is all I seek. By calling on my government to 
     declassify documents, I am simply pleading with it to allow 
     us to heal. I want to put this nightmare behind me. I want to 
     be able to have a good night's rest. I want peace--for myself 
     and for the people of Guatemala and Honduras. And I don't 
     think that is too much to ask.
       In a spirit of gratitude,
                                                     Dianna Ortiz,
     OSU.
                                  ____


         Congressional Human Rights Caucus Briefing on Torture

                        (By Sister Dianna Ortiz)

       Thank you all for coming. As a survivor of torture, I want 
     to urge you to support declassification of United States 
     government documents that shed light on human rights abuses. 
     Simply by declassifying documents, our government can save 
     lives. Survivors of human rights violations need to know as 
     much as possible about who committed the atrocities against 
     them. With this information, justice is possible, and only 
     justice can lay the foundation for reconciliation, stability, 
     and peace. Guatemala and Honduras are two countries that 
     would benefit immeasurably from full declassification. The 
     sticking point in these instances seems to be that the US has 
     supported the abusers.
       Take my case, for example. In 1989, while I was working as 
     a missionary in Guatemala, I was abducted and brutally 
     tortured by Guatemalan security agents. My back was burned 
     over 100 times with cigarettes. I was gang-raped repeatedly. 
     I was beaten, and I was tortured psychologically as well--I 
     was lowered into a pit where injured women, children, and men 
     writhed and moaned, and dead decayed, under swarms of rats. 
     Finally, I was forced to stab another human being.
       Throughout the ordeal, my Guatemalan torturers said that if 
     I did not cooperate, they would have to communicate with 
     Alejandro. My last minutes in detention, I met Alejandro, 
     whom the torturers referred to as their boss. He was tall and 
     fair skinned and spoke halting Spanish, with a thick American 
     accent. His English was American, flawless, unaccented. When 
     I asked him if he was an American, his answer was evasive: 
     ``Why do you want to know?''
       He told me to get into his jeep and said he would take me 
     to a friend of his at the United States embassy, who would 
     help me leave the country. During the ride, he enjoined me to 
     forgive my torturers and said if I didn't, there would be 
     consequences for me. He reminded me that may torturers had 
     made videotapes and taken photos of the parts of the torture 
     I was most ashamed of. He said if I didn't forgive my 
     torturers, he would have no choice but to release those 
     photos and tapes to the press. At that point, I jumped out 
     the jeep and ran.
       For the last nine years, I have tried to stop running. I 
     have tried to face the torturers head on and demand answers, 
     demanded justice. Instead of ``forgiving'' my torturers, I 
     filed suit against the Guatemalan government and called for 
     an investigation. Like so many investigations in Guatemala, 
     it led nowhere. Guatemalan and US officials alike said in 
     public and in private that I was a lesbian who had never been 
     tortured but had sneaked out for a tryst. The 111 cigarette 
     burns on my back were the result of kinky sex.
       Two years ago, I held a five-week vigil before the White 
     House, asking for the declassification of all US government 
     documents related to human rights abuses in Guatemala since 
     1954, including documents on my own case. I asked to know the 
     identity of Alejandro. The Justice Department had begun an 
     investigation August 1995, and the Intelligence Oversight 
     Board had been investigating my case for more than a year, 
     but I still had no answers. Finally, after weeks of fasting 
     and camping day and night before the White House, a number of 
     State Department documents were released to me. The following 
     year, various FBI documents were declassified, but none of 
     these documents contained anything about the identities of my 
     torturers or of their boss, Alejandro.
       Efforts to obtain information through US government 
     investigations also led nowhere. The Department of Justice 
     interviewed me for more than forty hours, during which time 
     DOJ attorneys accused me of lying. They interrogated my 
     friends and family members and generally made it clear that I 
     was the culprit, I was the one being investigated, not the US 
     government officials who might have acted wrongly in my case. 
     Ultimately, the investigators seemed unable to comprehend the 
     effects on a torture survivor of testifying in intricate 
     detail for hours on end. Extremely dangerous and painful 
     flashbacks were the consequence in my case. A torture 
     survivor should never be asked to re-enter the torture 
     chamber, to relive the brutal abuse. After I had given the 
     great majority

[[Page S9841]]

     of my testimony, I felt compelled to withdraw from direct 
     participation in the DOJ investigation. The investigators had 
     the sketches I had made with the help of a professional 
     forensic artist, delineating the characteristics of each 
     torturer, including Alejandro, and the investigators had my 
     testimony, in detail. The responsibility for finding answers 
     lay with them.
       Because I could no longer subject myself to the 
     retraumatization brought on by the investigators' questions 
     and manner, the DOJ closed my case. Exactly what the DOJ's 
     final conclusions were, I do not know. I do know that as a 
     result of the investigation, the DOJ came up with a 200+page 
     report, which is classified. The Department of Justice told 
     me the report was classified to protect sources and methods 
     and to protect my own privacy. Dan Seikely, who was in charge 
     of the Department of Justice investigation, said only three 
     people would be able to see the report: Attorney General 
     Janet Reno, the deputy attorney general, and himself. Only 
     four copies of the report existed, he said, and they would be 
     kept under lock and key.
       In recent months, however, it has become clear to me that a 
     number of other people have read the report. A government 
     official recently told me that he had seen the report and 
     added that officials in the State Department also had seen 
     it, as had Thomas Stroock, the US ambassador to Guatemala at 
     the time I was abducted. I can't help but wonder how my 
     government intends to protect my privacy by releasing the 
     report to such individuals. It was under Stroock's command 
     that an embassy staff member told a visiting religious 
     delegation--``I'm tired of all these lesbian nuns coming down 
     to Guatemala.'' It was Stroock who said, a week after I was 
     abducted, before any embassy member had interviewed me, ``Her 
     story as told is not accurate.'' It was Stroock who told the 
     State Department that my motives were questionable, that I 
     had perhaps staged my own abduction to secure a cut-off of US 
     aid to the Guatemalan army. Yet it is Stroock to whom the US 
     government gives the report--a report so private that even I 
     cannot see it. After he had read the DOJ report, Stroock 
     spoke to a journalist, who in turn called me. Stroock was 
     informing the press of his access to the report. In spite of 
     his questionable right to see it, he was making no secret of 
     the privileges he enjoyed. There are things in the report 
     that I have kept secret, that I have been ashamed of--
     things that I didn't tell DOJ investigators but that my 
     friends revealed as they were being interrogated--and I 
     have lived under this tacit blackmail: If I push for more 
     answers in my case, or if I even file a Freedom of 
     Information Act request to get the DOJ report 
     declassified, the secret information the investigators 
     have will be leaked.
       Instead of having that information leaked, let me simply 
     tell you: I got pregnant as a result of the multiple gang 
     rapes by my torturers, and unable to carry within me what 
     they had engendered, what I could view only as a monster, the 
     product of the men who had raped me, I turned to someone for 
     assistance and I destroyed that life. Am I proud of this 
     decision? No. But if I had to make the decision again, I 
     believe I would again decide as I did eight years ago.
       I had little choice. My survival was so precarious at that 
     time that to have to grow within me what the torturers had 
     left me would have killed me. I tell you this simply to free 
     myself so that I can proceed to uncover the truth. Today, I 
     am filing a FOIA to demand the DOJ report on my case. After 
     such anguish that the DOJ interviews caused me, I have the 
     right to know what was learned in my case, what conclusions 
     were reached and why. I demand access to the report, the same 
     access that members of the State Department, Thomas Stroock, 
     and members of the Intelligence Oversight Board have had, in 
     spite of Seikely's guarantee of confidentiality.
       I want to be able to evaluate the thoroughness of the 
     investigation so that I can make informed decisions about 
     what step to take next. My torturers were never brought to 
     justice. It is possible that, individually, they will never 
     be identified or apprehended. And in some senses, I would 
     like to resign myself to this fact and move on. I have a 
     responsibility, however, to the people of Guatemala and to 
     the people of the world, a responsibility to insist on 
     accountability where accountability is possible. If the US 
     government was involved in my torture in Guatemala, in what 
     other countries of the world are torturers receiving orders 
     from Americans? We have to know what the United States has 
     done and where. For our own peace of mind as US citizens and 
     for the good of the citizens of the world, we need the files 
     released. If the US has done nothing wrong, then we can all 
     rest easy. If the US is culpable, we must know this and 
     expose this and take steps to ensure that our government 
     never again collaborates with or hires torturers, in any 
     place, for any reason.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, again, at the request of the managers of the 
bill, at this point, I will yield the floor. I presume what will happen 
is that there are other Members who may show up to debate the McCain 
amendment, and then there would be a vote on that, and then there may 
be another amendment that would be disposed of. If I could be notified 
by my staff, or others, as to when the appropriate time to come back 
and engage in a further debate with those who have a differing point of 
view, I am happy to do that.
  Mr. McCONNELL. If my friend has completed his remarks, we will simply 
lay aside his amendment. Senator Thomas is here to speak on the McCain 
amendment.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Kentucky very, very much for his 
courtesies in this, and my colleagues, as well, who have other 
amendments pending. I appreciate it very much.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Dodd 
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.


                Amendment No. 3500, As Further modified

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I rise to address briefly the McCain 
amendment on S. 2334. I will talk a little bit about the situation in 
North Korea and the bill relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization, KEDO. I have been chairman of the 
Subcommittee on East Asia for almost 4 years, and we have held five 
hearings on North Korea during that time--more than any other single 
country, with the exception of China. In all of that time, I have 
continued to be amazed at and concerned by the dangerous, unpredictable 
and unbalanced nature of the regime in North Korea. Despite widespread 
starvation and disease, the Government continues to adhere to the very 
economic policies which have led to famine in the first place. Despite 
the worldwide reputation of communism, the Government continues to 
revolve around sort of a Stalinist cult of personality slavishly 
devoted to Kim Jong Il.
  Despite international norms and conventions, the North Koreans 
continue to sell nuclear and conventional missile technology to such 
rogue states as Iraq and Libya in violation of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty. Despite the terms of the Agreed Nuclear Framework 
with the United States, North Korea continues to develop its program 
aimed at producing nuclear missiles.
  Mr. President, I have been sort of a begrudging supporter of the 
Agreed Framework since its inception. Although the agreement is far 
from perfect, I supported it because I believed that, in the end, it 
was in our best interest and in the best interest of the East Asia 
region to do so. I supported it through its fits and starts. I 
supported it when the North diverted oil deliveries to military use and 
when the North showed signs of restarting their nuclear program. I 
supported it because, on the whole, North Korean movement forward in 
the Four-Party Talks and cooperation in the nuclear area outweighed the 
North's traditional tendency to always push the envelope with us.
  Mr. President, when North Korea fired off a missile last week over 
Japanese air space, it was kind of the straw that broke the camel's 
back. This is what I consider to be a clearly belligerent act and 
should drive home the fact to this body that the Agreed Framework has 
been gutted by North Korea. At present, it seems no better than the 
paper on which it was written. Time after time, the DPRK has broken its 
commitment under the agreement. While the North took our oil and 
dragged its heels, it has constructed underground facilities to test 
both propulsion and warhead systems with only one purpose: the 
development of long- and short-range nuclear weapon capabilities.

  Frankly, I have a sinking feeling that they have used us, played us 
for a fool, and have played it very well. Mr. President, I intend to 
meet with the Defense Intelligence Agency this week, and to hold a 
hearing next week in our subcommittee to examine the present situation 
and to ask the State Department and Defense Department some tough 
questions.
  If these questions can't be answered to our satisfaction, and if we 
can't be convinced that adherence to the Agreed Framework under the 
circumstances are in our best interests, then our support, I am sure, 
will evaporate very quickly.
  I am pleased that we are considering it here. I am supportive of the 
McCain amendment. I look forward to having a chance to vote on it.
  I yield the floor.

[[Page S9842]]

  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona offered his 
amendment yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock. We are trying to make 
progress on the bill.
  I understand there is one person who desires to speak on the other 
side.
  In fairness to everyone, with the concurrence of the Senator from 
Arizona, if we can't bring this to conclusion, I am going to make a 
motion to table the McCain amendment at 3 o'clock so that we can get an 
expression of opinion on the amendment of the distinguished Senator 
from Arizona.
  In the meantime, Mr. President, I think we have some amendments that 
have been cleared on both sides which I will shortly send to the desk: 
a Brownback amendment on Iran; DeWine amendment on alternative crop 
development; three Craig amendments; a Reed-Reid amendment on 
scholarships; and a DeWine amendment on Haiti.


             Amendments Numbered 3528 through 3534 En Bloc

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send the amendments to the desk, and 
ask that they be considered en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McCONNELL] proposes 
     amendments numbered 3528 through 3534, en bloc.

  The amendments (Nos. 3528 through 3534) are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3528

       The Senate finds that:
       According to the Department of State, Iran continues to 
     support international terrorism, providing training, 
     financing, and weapons to such terrorist groups as Hizballah, 
     Islamic Jihad and Hamas;
       Iran continues to oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process and 
     refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist;
       Iran continues aggressively to seek weapons of mass 
     destruction and the missiles to deliver them;
       It is long-standing U.S. policy to offer official 
     government to government dialogue with the Iranian regime, 
     such offers having been repeatedly rebuffed by Tehran;
       More than a year after the election of President Khatemi, 
     Iranian foreign policy continues to threaten American 
     security and that of our allies in the Middle East;
       Despite repeated offers and tentative steps toward 
     rapprochement with Iran by the Clinton administration, 
     including a decision to waive sanctions under the Iran-Libya 
     Sanctions Act and the President's veto of the Iran Missile 
     Proliferation Sanctions Act, Iran has failed to reciprocate 
     in a meaningful manner.
       Therefore it is the sense of the Senate that:
       (1) the Administration should make no concessions to the 
     government of Iran unless and until that government moderates 
     its objectionable policies, including taking steps to end its 
     support of international terrorism, opposition to the Middle 
     East peace process, and the development and proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and
       (2) there should be no change in U.S. policy toward Iran 
     until there is credible and sustained evidence of a change in 
     Iranian policies.


                           amendment no. 3529

(Purpose: To provide additional resources for enhanced alternative crop 
                  development support in source zone)

       On page 10 line 19, insert ``Provided further, That of the 
     funds appropriated under the previous proviso not less than 
     $80,000,000 shall be made available for alternative 
     development programs to drug production in Colombia, Peru and 
     Bolivia.


                           amendment no. 3530

   (Purpose: To establish a Joint United States-Canada Commission on 
Cattle and Beef and dairy products to identify, and recommend means of 
    resolving, national, regional, and provincial trade-distorting 
   differences between the countries with respect to the production, 
processing, and sale of cattle, beef, and dairy products, and for other 
                               purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert:

     SEC.   . JOINT UNITED STATES-CANADA COMMISSION ON CATTLE AND 
                   BEEF.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a Joint United 
     States-Canada Commission on Cattle, Beef and Dairy Products 
     to identify, and recommend means of resolving, national, 
     regional, and provincial trade-distorting differences between 
     the United States and Canada with respect to the production, 
     processing, and sale of cattle, beef, and dairy products, 
     with particular emphasis on--
       (1) animal health requirements;
       (2) transportation differences;
       (3) the availability of feed grains;
       (4) other market-distorting direct and indirect subsidies;
       (5) the expansion of the Northwest Pilot Project;
       (6) tariff rate quotas; and
       (7) other factors that distort trade between the United 
     States and Canada.
       (b) Composition.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall be composed of--
       (A) 3 members representing the United States, including--
       (i) 1 member appointed by the Majority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (ii) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (iii) 1 member appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture;
       (B) 3 members representing Canada, appointed by the 
     Government of Canada; and
       (C) nonvoting members appointed by the Commission to serve 
     as advisers to the Commission, including university faculty, 
     State veterinarians, trade experts, producers, and other 
     members.
       (2) Appointment.--Members of the Commission shall be 
     appointed not later than 30 days after the date of enactment 
     of this Act.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the first 
     meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit a 
     report to Congress and the Government of Canada that 
     identifies, and recommends means of resolving, differences 
     between the United States and Canada with respect to tariff 
     rate quotas and the production, processing, and sale of 
     cattle and beef, and dairy products.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3531

    (Purpose: To describe the circumstances under which funds made 
   available under the legislation may be available to any tribunal)

       On page 82, line 10, strike ``Yugoslavia.'' and insert the 
     following: ``Yugoslavia: Provided further, That the drawdown 
     made under this section for any tribunal shall not be 
     construed as an endorsement or precedent for the 
     establishment of any standing or permanent international 
     criminal tribunal or court: Provided further, That funds made 
     available for the tribunal shall be made available subject to 
     the regular notification procedures of the Committees on 
     Appropriations.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3532

 (Purpose: To express the Sense of the Senate concerning the operation 
         of agricultural commodity foreign assistance programs)

       At the appropriate place, insert:

     SEC.  . SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       (a) It is the Sense of the Senate that:
       (1) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the GSM-
     102 credit guarantee program to provide 100 percent coverage, 
     including shipping costs, in some markets where it may be 
     temporarily necessary to encourage the export of U.S. wheat.
       (2) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should increase the 
     amount of GSM export credit available above the $5.5 billion 
     level (as it did in the 1991/1992 period). In addition to 
     other nations, extra allocations should be made in the 
     following amounts to:
       (A) Pakistan--an additional $150 million;
       (B) Algeria--an additional $140 million;
       (C) Bulgaria--an additional $20 million; and
       (D) Romania--an additional $20 million.
       (3) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the PL-
     480 food assistance programs to the fullest extent possible, 
     including the allocation of assistance to Indonesia and other 
     Asian nations facing economic hardship.
       (4) Given the President's reaffirmation of a Jackson-Vanik 
     waiver for Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should 
     consider Vietnam for GSM and PL-480 assistance.


                           amendment no. 3533

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following: 
     ``That of the funds made available by prior Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations Acts, not to exceed $750,000 shall 
     be made available for the Claiborne Pell Institute for 
     International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina 
     University.''


                           amendment no. 3534

   (Purpose: to prohibit the availability of funds for Haiti unless 
                      certain conditions are met)

       Beginning on page 90 line 1, after the word ``the'' insert 
     ``central''.
       On page 91, line 11, after the word ``ratified'' insert 
     ``or is implementing''.
       On page 91, strike lines 19 through 20, and insert ``for 
     the Haitian National Police, customs assistance, humanitarian 
     assistance, and education programs.''
       On page 91, line 22, after the word ``available'' insert 
     ``to the Government of Haiti''.
       On page 92, line 5 strike everything after the word 
     ``council'' through the ``period'' on line 7 and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``that is acceptable to a broad spectrum of 
     political parties and civic groups.''
       On page 92, line 8, after the word ``Parties'' insert ``and 
     Grass Roots Civic Organizations.''
       On page 92, line 13 after the word ``parties'' insert ``and 
     for the development of grass roots civic organizations''.
       On page 92, insert new section (e):
       ``(e)(1)Availability of Administration of Justice 
     Assistance.--Funds appropriated under this act for the 
     Ministry of Justice shall only be provided if the President 
     certifies to the Committee on Appropriations and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations and the

[[Page S9843]]

     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that Haiti's 
     Ministry of Justice:
       (A) Has demonstrated a commitment to the 
     professionalization of judicial personnel by consistently 
     placing students graduated by the Judicial School in 
     appropriate judicial positions and has made a commitment to 
     share program costs associated with the Judicial School;
       (B) Is making progress in making the judicial branch in 
     Haiti independent from the executive branch, as outlined in 
     the 1987 Constitution; and
       (C) Has re-instituted judicial training with the Office of 
     Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT).
       (2) The limitation in subsection (e)(1) shall not apply to 
     the provision of funds to support the training of 
     prosecutors, judicial mentoring, and case management.
       On page 92, line 14, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
       On page 93, strike section (f) and all that follows.

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this amendment reflects a significant 
change in course on how we administer U.S. assistance in Haiti. From a 
practical standpoint, the amendment will not decrease our total 
commitment to the people of Haiti. However, it does place very clear 
restrictions on assistance to the Haitian government.
  To best understand the reasons for this amendment--and why we have 
chosen to place more conditions on direct aid to the government of 
Haiti--it is important to first talk about the current situation in 
Haiti.
  Mr. President, I have visited Haiti six times in the past three 
years. I have taken a great interest in assisting the people of Haiti 
as they establish, develop and sustain democracy, economic stability 
and a better quality of life. Through these visits, I have had the 
opportunity to see what changes have taken place and the general 
direction of events in Haiti.
  My colleagues may recall that on April 3, 1998, I provided the Senate 
an update on the current economic, and political state of Haiti. At 
that time, I stated that Haiti's political system was not stable. 
Little has changed for the better since then. This continued 
instability is of direct concern to the United States. The concern of 
course is that this unstable democracy could descend into outright 
chaos. If this occurs, the result could be an exodus of boat people 
coming to our shores.
  Mr. President, let me mention a few key facts to describe the current 
situation there.
  First, it has been over 14 months since then Haitian Prime Minister 
Rosny Smarth resigned due to his frustration with the government's 
inability to resolve an electoral dispute and implement his economic 
modernization plan. Since then, a Prime Minister has not been confirmed 
by the Parliament.
  The Prime Minister is designated as the Chief Executive of the 
Government. He appoints the Cabinet and basically runs the government. 
Without a Prime Minister, the country simply cannot function. Bills 
that may be passed by the Haitian Parliament cannot be signed into law 
and the privatization of any government industries cannot be fully 
implemented.
  It is truly unfortunate, that to date, this vacancy has not been 
filled. The current Education Minister has been nominated for the 
position. It is, however, unclear if he will be confirmed by the 
Haitian Senate. One of the main reasons for this continued delay stems 
from the Haitian government's inability to resolve the serious 
discrepancy surrounding the April 1997 elections.
  This current political impasse stems from pervasive fraud and 
improper vote tabulation regarding elections held in April of 1997. Not 
only have the Haitian opposition political parties demanded that the 
April 1997 elections be annulled, the international community, 
including the United Nations, has also deemed the elections--which 
produced only a meager five percent turnout--fraudulent. The opposition 
political parties continue to insist that they will not move forward to 
confirm a Prime Minister until the April 1997 electoral dispute is 
resolved.
  This paralysis in government is being felt everywhere: economic 
reform efforts have stalled. The legislature still has not passed a 
budget. It has not enacted structural reforms needed to free up over 
$100 million in foreign assistance, nor has it approved loans for 
millions in technical assistance. The process of privatizing key 
government industries is dramatically slow, as are plans to downsize 
the public sector. With progress impeded by a political stalemate it is 
no surprise that potential investors who could play a key role in 
uplifting Haiti's economic development are discouraged from going 
forward.
  Complicating matters even more was an upcoming national/municipal 
election in Haiti slated for November 1998. Hundreds of seats were up, 
including the entire lower chamber of the Haitian Parliament, up to 
two-thirds of the Senate and all municipal seats. Since there continues 
to be no resolution to the irregularities surrounding the previous 
election, however, the elections that constitutionally should be held 
in November have not been scheduled nor is there reason to believe that 
they will occur any earlier than next spring. All of this raises even 
more questions and concerns on Haiti's ability to administer future 
elections, including the presidential elections scheduled for the year 
2000.
  Democracy literally is at a standstill in Haiti. And it will remain 
stagnant until previous electoral disputes are resolved, and a 
credible, nonpartisan, competent electoral commission to oversee 
elections is established.
  The composition of the electoral commission is the key source of 
controversy. A number of opposition parties in Haiti would like to have 
some representation on the commission, or at least make sure that the 
commission is neutral and not biased.
  Mr. President, I understand that Haitian President Preval recently 
said he will move forward with naming a provisional electoral council. 
There is concern that he intends not to consult with all opposition 
parties--meaning that the interests of other political parties will 
likely be excluded. This step would not seem to be an effective way to 
resolve the current political impasse.

  When I spoke about Haiti last April, I urged that no U.S. assistance 
be used to underwrite the proposed November elections until a 
settlement of the April 1997 electoral dispute is reached--and until a 
fair and independent Electoral Council is established in accordance 
with the constitution. I am pleased that these conditions on funding 
are currently in the pending Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, as 
well as in the House version.
  Even if the electoral disputes are resolved and an electoral 
commission appointed, democracy cannot be sustained as long as lethal 
violence is seem as an effective tool to achieve political goals. To 
date, not one single case of the dozens of political killings that have 
occurred in Haiti since the early 1990's have been resolved. As a 
result, no one has been convicted and sentenced for any one of these 
crimes.
  Mr. President, according to a House International Relations Committee 
staff report released just last week, fears of a new wave of political 
killings are on the rise following the recent murder of a Catholic 
priest who was a vocal critic of the current government, as well as of 
former President Aristide. The report also states that ``A key 
opposition leader expressed concern that three other political figures 
may be targeted for assassination.''
  Not only have opposition political leaders been allegedly threatened, 
Haitians working for democratic institutions such as the International 
Republican Institute have also been targeted for intimidation and 
threats on their lives. One Haitian IRI employee was even held at 
gunpoint for his involvement in democratic activities in Haiti.
  Mr. President, I also am concerned about new reports of drug 
corruption within the Haitian government. Specifically, there have been 
numerous reports in Haitian newspapers that Haitian National Police 
employees were arrested for involvement in drug trafficking. Haiti has 
become increasingly attractive as a transit point for international 
drug traffickers. Unless we address this situation soon, Haiti could 
turn into a full-fledged narco-state. And that means more and more 
illegal drugs coming through Haiti to the United States.
  Mr. President, I have given you a brief outline and assessment of the 
current political situation in Haiti.
  It has been the policy of this Congress for three years that until 
the Haitian government is able to meet specific economic, political and 
social reforms, our assistance to that government should be extremely 
limited. The money, instead should go to benefit Haitians directly.

[[Page S9844]]

  That was the fundamental purpose of an amendment originally offered 
by our former Majority Leader, Bob Dole in 1995. Under the original 
Dole amendment, benchmarks for reform had to be met if assistance was 
to be provided. If these conditions were not met, government assistance 
would be transferred to non-governmental organizations, of NGOs. In the 
end, the President called for and received from Congress the power to 
waive these conditions and allow aid to go forward if he believed 
restricting aid to the Haitian government posed a national security 
concern to the United States. Congress included this national security 
waiver with the hope that things would improve in Haiti. Each year for 
the past three years, we have renewed the Dole amendment with some 
marginal modifications. Each year, the President has exercised his 
waiver authority to keep U.S. aid flowing to the Haitian government. 
And each year we hope the Haitian government will finally get its act 
together.
  Well, Mr. President, three years have gone by. And the situation 
remains bleak. Based on a review of that situation, I now believe that 
it is necessary to go back to the original Dole proposal by removing 
the national security waiver. We have tried--patiently--for three years 
to work with the Haitian government to establish and sustain democracy 
there. Yet, I find it extremely difficult to invest in a government 
that is not willing to make changes to advance democracy and its 
economic health. We have spent well over $2 billion in the past four 
years in Haiti.
  We should continue to fund programs through NGOs that will benefit 
Haitians. But giving the government money for programs if they are not 
willing to implement needed political and economic reforms is wasted 
money.
  Mr. President, let me turn now to an explanation of my amendment to 
the this bill. Let me first make it clear that this amendment does not 
prohibit assistance to Haiti. Just like current law, this amendment 
conditions our assistance to the Government of Haiti--but not the 
Haitian people. That means that any funds distrtibuted to Haiti through 
NGOs for the benefit of Haitians will not be threatened nor compromised 
in any manner.
  Let me first outline the important general conditions that the 
Haitian government must meet before we believe it receives any 
additional funding from the US government. These conditions are 
outlined--almost verbatim--in the pending Senate and House Foreign 
Operations Approprations bill.

  These general conditions include:
  First, the Haitian government must re-sign the Agreement on Migration 
Interdiction and Operations with the United States and must cooperate 
with the US in halting illegal emigration from Haiti. It has been 
nearly four years since this agreement expired and the US government 
has been waiting for Haiti to resign this agreement.
  The second condition is that the Haitian government must conduct 
thorough investigations of extrajudicial and political killings and 
that it must cooperate with US authorities in these investigations. 
There have been dozens of political murders in Haiti over the past 
several years. Not a single one has been solved. That has got to 
change.
  Third, the Haitian government must take action to remove from the 
Haitian National Police, and other national palace and ministerial 
guards, individuals who are credibly alleged to have engaged in or 
conspired to conceal gross violations of human rights or to have 
engaged in narcotics trafficking.
  Fourth, that the Haitian government must complete privatization of at 
least three major public entities. The Haitian government is now years 
behind its own drafted scheduled in privatizing several key public 
entities.
  The final condition is that the Haitian government must implement the 
counter-narcotics agreements recently signed between both countries 
last October. There are a total of six counter-narcotics agreements 
including the Ship Rider and Maritime Pursuit Agreements which allow US 
law enforcement to patrol Haitian waters for drug interdiction matters. 
These agreements basically allow for instantaneous implementation of 
drug enforcement activities between the two countries.
  These are very important and reasonable conditions that must be met 
before the US government releases any general assistance directly to 
the government of Haiti. Many of them are not new.
  Let me now address a more controversial question--whether the 
Administration can waive these conditions for national security 
reasons, and allow funding to go forward. For the past three years, the 
Administration has exercised its waiver authority to allow funding to 
go to the government. The pending bill before us continues this waiver; 
the pending House bill does not. My amendment would adopt the House 
version on this point. We must send a message to the government of 
Haiti that we cannot continue to give them money if they lack political 
will to make necessary reforms.
  Mr. President, while my amendment would remove the national security 
interest waiver; there are several important exceptions to this 
amendment as well as in the pending bill that would enable the US 
government to continue funding certain important government programs. 
Taken together, these exceptions include--counter-narcotics assistance; 
support for the Haitian National Police's Special Investigative Unit; 
the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program; 
customs assistance; anti-corruption programs; urgent humanitarian 
assistance; and education. There is also a separate provision on 
conditioning electoral and administration of justice assistance to the 
government of Haiti under a separate set of conditions.
  One additional point I want to make is while I have included several 
additional exceptions to the Limitation of Assistance provision to the 
government of Haiti--I intend to explore during the conference of this 
bill the possible need to limit the total amount of money the Haitian 
government can receive if conditions set for in this amendment are not 
met while assistance to the government in these areas continues to 
flow.
  Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to mention two 
essential assistance programs that we provide to Haiti through NGO's.
  First and foremost, US assistance through P.L. 480 Title II feeding 
programs to the poor is absolutely critical and should be continued. 
There are impoverished people in Haiti--particularly children--who 
desperately need help. They are not responsible for the country's 
political crisis. They should not have to suffer because of it.
  Mr. President, there has been a proliferation of facilities in Haiti 
which must care not only for a vast number of orphans but also for an 
increasing number of abandoned and neglected children. The capital 
city, Port-au-Prince, has seventy orphanages--all of these which are 
run by only one relief organization, Christian Relief Services (CRS). 
There are many other orphanages throughout the entire country which 
take care of thousands and thousands of orphaned and abandoned children 
in Haiti.
  I have visited these facilities in Haiti and I can give you a first-
hand account of the heart breaking stories. The flow of desperate 
children into these orphanges is constant and these institutions face 
an increasing challenge in accommodating all of these needy children. 
The sad part is that these many of these orphanages get no other means 
of support other than the food administered to them through CRS, which 
in turn receives its resources through AID.

  Last year and again this year, I have worked with Senators Cochran 
and Bumpers--the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Agriculture 
Appropriations Subcommittee--to ensure we continue the emergency 
feeding programs in Haiti through the PL 480 Title feeding program. I 
thank Chairman Cochran and Senator Bumpers for their assistance in 
funding this program last year and for doing so again in this year's 
bill.
  Similarly, I have worked with Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy to 
include up to $250,000 to support a pilot program to assist Haitian 
children in orphanages. The objective behind the program is to find 
ways to help orphanages better organize and manage themselves to seek 
outside help for resources for these children. I thank the Chairman, 
and Senator Leahy for funding this initiative last year and for doing 
so again in the pending bill.
  Another very important assistance program that should be maintained, 
if

[[Page S9845]]

not expanded, is agricultural assistance programs. Agricultural 
production in Haiti is extremely low. In the long run, agricultural 
production is necessary if Haiti is to provide jobs and food for its 
population.
  Haiti today imports two thirds of its food. Every day, thousands of 
Haitians leave rural areas where they are unable to provide for 
themselves, and flood into the cities which are unable to sustain the 
population pressures. In the long run, agricultural and rural 
development is crucial to the goal of providing jobs, income and food 
for Haiti's people.
  To further develop the rural and agricultural sectors of Haiti, 
attention needs to be given to a decentralized development strategy. I 
believe that continued focus on non-governmental organizations is 
appropriate. In fact, current USAID funding for agriculture and 
environmental programs in Haiti is all administered through NGOs. I 
believe that we should be promoting regional development and that 
associations linking private sector interests with local government 
need to be established. One way to do this is to link our own 
successful foundations and institutions of higher education together 
with local Haitians interested in pursuing this goal.
  Given the importance of developing and expanding sound agriculture 
and environment programs in Haiti, I intend to work with Chairman 
McConnell and Senator Leahy to ensure that at least 20% of our total 
assistance for Haiti be for the promotion of agriculture and 
environment programs in Haiti. It is my hope that they will accept this 
request in conference report language.
  Mr. President, I cannot overestimate enough the need to continue 
assistance programs to Haiti through the NGO community. We want to help 
Haitians in terms of feeding programs, agriculture and environment 
programs, and other initiatives such as basic health and education.
  Mr. President, as you can see from the specifics of my speech, I have 
given serious thought to our assistance policy toward Haiti. U.S. 
policy toward Haiti is complicated. As I said at the beginning of these 
remarks, establishing, developing and sustaining democracy in Haiti is 
an important national interest.
  One thing is clear: The U.S. cannot do for Haiti what it will not do 
for itself. The Haitians first have to realize the need to solve their 
political crisis. They clearly have not yet hit rock bottom; maybe 
that's what it will take to create the political will to move forward. 
Unfortunately, I do not yet see the requisite political will and 
determination in Haiti.
  In the meantime, we cannot just walk away from Haiti completely. We 
must find ways to help the Haitian people, primarily through NGO's--
since the Haitian Government has proven itself to be incapable of 
providing for its own people.
  There's a tough road ahead for Haiti. With this amendment, we are 
helping to set some realistic conditions whereby that country can 
succeed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed 
to.
  The amendments (Nos. 3528 through 3534) en bloc were agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I heard the distinguish Senator from 
Kentucky say--and I know we have word of those who wish to speak. The 
Senator from Kentucky and I have been on the floor, as have other 
Senators, since early yesterday morning on this bill. We are within 
sight of land, and we would kind of like to get some things moving.
  If people have a matter they wish to add to the debate, or a matter 
that they wish to say, or things that they feel the Senate should 
consider for this side of the aisle, I would strongly urge them to come 
to do that, because there will be the effort of the chairman and myself 
to wrap this bill up as soon as we can.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Vermont that as 
far as we are aware there are only three more amendments that may 
require a rollcall vote, and then we would be ready to go to final 
passage. So we can, indeed, see the light at the end of the tunnel.


                Amendment No. 3500, As further modified

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, while waiting for others, I note with 
regard to the North Korea McCain amendment that I stand behind no 
Member of this body in my respect for my friend from Arizona, and 
certainly I know no one who has followed the situation in North Korea 
closer than he has. I give him a great deal of weight for his insight. 
I understand his concerns. I share them. I suspect that most Senators 
do, especially as we watched the unbelievably irresponsible activity on 
the part of North Korea in their recent missile firing.
  Unfortunately, this amendment would prevent the United States from 
fulfilling its obligations under the Korea nuclear reactor agreement. 
Maybe the Congress will make that decision to do that. Of course the 
Congress can. But I hope that Senators would think long and hard before 
we go down that road. This North Korea agreement is not perfect. There 
is no disagreement about that on this side of the aisle. There is also 
no disagreement about the behavior of the North Korean Government. It 
is reprehensible. At times it seems inexplicable. It is certainly the 
most irresponsible activity of any country on Earth today. They almost 
seem to want the United States to back out of this agreement.
  But I think the questions we should ask, if I could have the 
attention of my friend from Arizona, would be just these:
  Does the Secretary of Defense support this amendment? Does the 
commander of our forces in Korea support the amendment? What do they 
think the level of danger between the United States and North Korea 
will be with this amendment?
  I ask this because I share the frustration of the Senator from 
Arizona toward North Korea.
  Mr. McCAIN. First of all, I appreciate the efforts of the 
distinguished Chairman of the subcommittee who mentioned he has had 
five hearings on this issue. We obviously paid close attention to the 
Senator from Wyoming who now feels that the time has come to support 
this amendment. I believe that the commander of the forces in Korea, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, probably the national 
security adviser, and even the President, if he knows about the 
amendment, is probably in opposition.
  I want to tell the Senator from Vermont this agreement was flawed 
from the beginning. I stood on the floor of the Senate and said it 
would fail. It was a bribe. It was kicking the can down the road. There 
was no inspections required. The reality is that North Korea, which is 
the most Orwellian, bizarre government in history, they have a ruler 
who is--well, he likes to kidnap Japanese movie actresses. We are 
supposed to trust the word of these people? And they just launched a 
missile--a two-stage missile--which every arms control expert in 
America will tell you that you don't build these kind of missiles 
unless they are armed with weapons of mass destruction.

  This thing was wrong from the start, and everything that we have seen 
has proven that to be the case, including every major newspaper in 
America--the L.A. Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and, 
frankly, the former national security adviser, Mr. Brzezinski, and many 
others; Dr. Kissinger, and many others.
  For each expert that the Senator from Vermont could present, I could 
give you one who is as well regarded, or more highly regarded, who 
feels that it is time that we at least demand that they stop building 
nuclear weapons.
  I reply to the Senator from Vermont. The amendment simply says that 
we won't continue to pay them millions of dollars if they in return 
continue to try to build nuclear weapons, which is what the whole 
agreement was about, supposedly, to start with.
  I thank the Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Senator for his answer, which is precisely 
what I anticipated. I am not suggesting experts are in opposition. I 
merely wanted, for purposes of debate, to have that.
  He speaks of these Orwellian, bizarre people. I suspect it is giving 
the North Korean leadership the benefit of the doubt to call them 
Orwellian and bizarre. They are worse than that. We can't ignore what 
has happened there.

[[Page S9846]]

 But we are not dealing with rationale people.
  Had I been the one to write the agreement we have with them, I would 
like to think that I would have written it a lot differently than it 
is. But I also understand the concerns that countries like South Korea, 
Japan, and others have put a lot more money and a lot more effort into 
this agreement than the United States has.
  I do not want to give the North Korean Government an excuse to make 
the situation we now have a lot worse.
  We have done some things with this agreement. The North Korean 
nuclear facility at Yongbyon and Taechom have been frozen under the 
IAEA inspection. Virtually all of the spent fuel in the Yongbyon 
reactor has been safely canned under IAEA seals. Those are spelled 
forth.
  At the same time, this is a country which I think both the Senator 
from Arizona and I would agree has the ability to make inspections. The 
ability to determine what they are doing is probably as difficult as 
any country in the world. What makes it worse, unlike some other 
countries where it is difficult to find out what they are doing, they 
are not countries with the potential nuclear power and potential 
nuclear weapons power.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  I withhold the suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I see the 
Senator from Arizona on the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, is it still the desire of the Senator from 
Vermont that--does Senator Levin still wish to speak on this?
  Mr. LEAHY. I wonder if the Senator from Arizona and the distinguished 
chairman would mind if we put in a quorum call for 2 minutes. If at 
that time we do not hear from the Senator, I will not do anything to 
delay this further.
  Mr. McCONNELL. And then there will be no objection to lifting it 
later?
  Mr. LEAHY. No.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, if I may, I wish to make another comment 
or so on this amendment.
  I understand the notion that you want to make this thing work, and we 
have tried for quite a long time. It just seems to me that around the 
world right now in a number of places we are having these kinds of 
countries with the dictators sort of testing the United States, saying, 
``You have told us certain things, we have made certain agreements, but 
we are not going to keep them, and what are you going to do about it?''
  I feel as if that is an increasing tendency around the world, and 
this is one of them, as well as Iraq and some other places. So I think 
we want to continue to work, we would like to have the KEDO agreement, 
we would like to go ahead with the light-water reactor to avoid the 
nuclear development in North Korea, but that is the deal. And if that 
isn't being adhered to, then I think you have to do something. I think 
we have to take a tougher position than we have in the past.
  I just do not see that it is good for the United States in the future 
to be making agreements with these sorts of rogue countries, trying to 
make things better, going ahead and doing our part, and them not doing 
theirs. I think that is what this amendment is about. And what we are 
challenged with, frankly, is to say, ``We have things that need to be 
done, we are willing to work with you, but you have to keep up your 
part of the bargain.'' I think that is what this is all about.
  I yield the floor.
  By the way, if I may take that back, I was also listening to Senator 
Dodd's proposal that has to do with things in Central America that have 
been kept secret, and I am very much interested in part of that myself, 
the Sister Ortiz thing that really needs to be declassified, in my 
judgment. So I just wanted to comment that I speak in support of the 
Dodd amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I move to table the McCain amendment 
and ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table the McCain amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. 
Coverdell), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), the Senator 
from Alaska (Mr. Murkowski), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Kempthorne), 
and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) are necessarily absent.
  I also anounce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms) is 
absent because of illness.
  I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Bingaman), 
the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Glenn), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. 
Inouye) are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 11, nays 80, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 257 Leg.]

                                YEAS--11

     Akaka
     Biden
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Daschle
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--80

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Bingaman
     Brownback
     Coverdell
     Domenici
     Glenn
     Helms
     Inouye
     Kempthorne
     Murkowski
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 3500), as further 
modified, was rejected.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I voted to table the McCain amendment 
because I believe it undermines the agreement we have in place with 
North Korea that is designed to denuclearize North Korea. This could 
effectively give North Korea an excuse to produce plutonium that it 
could use for nuclear weapons, which would be absolutely contrary to 
our most basic national security interests.
  The McCain amendment would add a requirement for a certification 
relative to North Korea that would undermine the Agreed Framework that 
has frozen North Korea's nuclear weapons plutonium production program, 
because it would change the terms of that agreement. Before any of the 
fiscal year 1999 funds for implementation of that Agreed Framework 
could be spent, the McCain amendment would require the President to 
certify that North Korea is essentially denuclearized, which is not yet 
the case but which is the very goal of the Agreed Framework.
  The Agreed Framework stipulates that North Korea must freeze its 
plutonium production facilities, namely three graphite-moderated 
nuclear reactors (either operating or under construction) and a 
plutonium reprocessing facility, in exchange for an international 
consortium (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or 
KEDO) providing two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear power 
reactors.
  Before the U.S. delivers key nuclear components to the North Korean 
light-water reactor program, North Korea must come into full compliance 
with its nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
It was understood from the outset that it would take a number of years, 
and probably

[[Page S9847]]

not before the year 2003, before North Korea would come into full 
compliance with its obligations under the NPT.
  The whole idea of the Agreed Framework was in fact to bring North 
Korea into full compliance with the NPT and to go beyond the NPT's 
requirements by requiring North Korea to freeze and then dismantle its 
plutonium production facilities, and to place all its spent nuclear 
fuel in canisters safeguarded and monitored by the IAEA and eventually 
remove that spent fuel from North Korea. These represent significant 
security gains for the United States and we should honor our 
commitments under the agreement to realize these gains.
  We should not give North Korea an excuse to walk away from its 
obligations under the Agreed Framework and to resume the production of 
plutonium for nuclear weapons. I believe that is what the McCain 
amendment would do, and that is why I voted to table the McCain 
amendment.


                           Amendment No. 3526

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, is the Senator from Kentucky correct 
that the pending amendment is the Hutchison amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. McCONNELL. It is my understanding Senator Hutchison may want to 
modify her amendment.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I would like to offer a modification 
to my amendment that will be argued and offered by Senator Coats from 
Indiana. It is acceptable to me as a modification of my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to modify the 
amendment.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. There is apparently some question about clearing this 
amendment, which we believe is not objectionable to anybody. But I have 
just been informed it is cleared. I would like to----
  Mr. LEAHY. I tell the Senator from Indiana he is correct on that.
  Mr. COATS. I thank the Senator.
  I would like a brief amount of time in which to explain what the 
modification is, because it is relevant to the action that was just 
taken by the Senate and I think important and determinative perhaps of 
action that will be taken subsequent to the disposition of this bill by 
the Senate in the conference. I am willing to do that at whatever time 
is appropriate. I know the majority leader is here, and I defer to him 
on that or to any other business that the----
  Mr. McCONNELL. Would the Senator yield?
  Mr. COATS. Yes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The majority leader would like to make a few comments, 
if you would just withhold.
  Mr. COATS. I would be more than pleased to.
  Mr. LOTT. I know other Senators may want to speak briefly also on 
this subject.

                          ____________________