[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 114 (Wednesday, September 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9837-S9847]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 3500, As Further Modified
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment, and the modification is at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator's amendment is so modified.
The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:
On page 33, line 4, before the colon insert the following:
``; and (4) North Korea is not actively pursuing the
acquisition or development of a nuclear capability (other
than the light-water reactors provided for by the 1994 Agreed
Framework Between the United States and North Korea).
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the modification, by the way, takes out
the provision, at the request of the administration and others, that
requires that the North Koreans be fully meeting their obligations
under the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I did that
with some reluctance, but, at the same time, the important aspect of
this amendment is that the President must certify that North Korea is
not actively pursuing the acquisition or development of nuclear
capability, other than light-water reactors provided for in the 1994
Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.
I think it is the desire of the distinguished manager that we vote on
this amendment. First of all, I ask, if it has not taken place, that
the Hutchison second-degree amendment be voice voted at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Hutchison
amendment.
Mr. McCONNELL. If the Senator from Arizona will withhold for just a
moment.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will make some additional remarks which
are so compelling, and as soon as the Senator from Kentucky desires, I
will yield so that we can proceed with this vote. I know the Senator
from Kentucky is very interested in concluding this legislation, as are
the rest of us. Given the conditions in the world today, I argue this
is one of the most important pieces of legislation that we will
consider in the Senate.
Yesterday there was an article in the New York Times, parts of which
I think are important to note.
It is titled ``Missile Test By North Korea: Dark Omen for
Washington.'' Part of the article says:
The officials and arms experts said the test also suggested
that North Korea had made real progress towards building
Taepodong-2, which is reportedly capable of traveling 2,400
to 3,600 miles and could strike targets throughout Asia and
as far away as Alaska.
Henry D. Sokolski, the executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, said
the ability to build rockets in stages opened the door to
intercontinental missiles, which in theory have virtually
unlimited range.
``We're entering a new era,'' Mr. Sokolski said.
Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, another research organization in
Washington, said the missile test was ``a clear sign'' of
North Korea's intent to develop nuclear weapons, despite its
1994 agreement with the United States to stop in exchange for
energy assistance.
Mr. Milhollin said a two-stage missile was too costly to
build simply for delivering conventional weapons. ``It means
they plan to put a nuclear warhead on it or export it to
somebody who will,'' he said. ``The missile makes no sense
otherwise.''
Mr. President, these are important statements. Some argue that
perhaps the North Koreans are just simply building a missile and they
are not pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
As Mr. Milhollin said, it doesn't make sense. Why else would they be
building a two-stage rocket without planning also to have that missile
armed with a weapon of mass destruction?--from what we have seen in the
past, most likely a nuclear weapon.
I don't want to go through the litany of my complaints about this
agreement that was made with North Korea in 1994. I spoke at length on
the floor of the Senate and with the media. I did not see any
indication that the North Koreans were serious. I did see indications
they were in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which they
were signatories and that we were basically providing them with a
bribe. I also believed and still believe that unless the North Koreans
understand they have to pay a significant price, then they will
continue in this most destabilizing activity.
The Florida Times Union on August 28 said:
An argument could be made that Pyongyang feels it must
renew its nuclear program to keep people warm, but it also
claims it cannot feed its people and has been begging
successfully for free rice. If it doesn't have enough money
to feed its people, how can it have enough money to build
expensive nuclear facilities and two-stage rockets? Pyongyang
presumably is taking money that would have been spent on food
and heat if not for western charity in building a nuclear
arsenal.
Unfortunately, the administration made it easy for
Pyongyang to cheat. The agreement does not require
inspections to verify North Korean compliance. Oddly enough,
Pyongyang threatened earlier this month to pull out of the
agreement over the U.S. failure to lift economic sanctions
quickly enough. It has also complained about the lack of
progress toward diplomatic ties. Those sound more like
excuses to me for cheating on an agreement rather than
reasons to break it. Not once since its inception in the
aftermath of World War II has North Korea proven itself
trustworthy. That makes it difficult for the United States to
continue making agreements based purely on trust.
Mr. Hoagland, probably one of the most respected, if not the most
respected, individual commentators on the issues of national security,
said:
The U.S.-negotiated agreement that froze North Korea's
nuclear weapons development in 1994 is coming apart.
With their economy in trouble, South Korea and Japan have
been having second thoughts about the high levels of economic
aid the deal mandates, and Congress has always been unhappy
about the fuel oil shipments the administration agreed to
make without congressional consultation. These concerns were
undermining the accord even before the discovery this month
that North Korea has been working on an underground secret
facility that almost certainly violates the accord.
That discovery could be the nail in the coffin of the
agreement, which pulled North Korea and the United States
back from a military confrontation that could soon resume.
Mr. President, Mr. Charles Krauthammer, a man whom I have great
respect for, also wrote on August 30:
Consider North Korea. In 1994, it broke the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and embarked on nuke building. How did
Clinton react? By agreeing to supply North Korea indefinitely
with free oil while the United States and allies build for it
two brand new (ostensibly safer) $5 billion nuclear reactors
in return for a promise to freeze its weapon program.
Now it turns out that while taking this gigantic bribe
North Korea was building a huge new nuclear facility inside a
mountain. The administration, inert and dismayed by such
ungentle manliness, refuses to call this a violation of the
agreement. Why? Because concrete has not been poured.
Today the Los Angeles Times editorial reads, ``Time to Rethink North
Korea Policy'':
If ever there was a time for Washington to reappraise its
policy toward North Korea, it is now. In the midst of
meetings between American and North Korean negotiators in New
York, the Pyongyang regime fired a new, longer-range missile
across the Sea of Japan and over the Japanese mainland. That
provocative act constitutes a major setback in diplomatic
efforts to draw hostile North Korea into the world community.
The missile was discussed at Monday's meeting in New York,
which focused on implementation of a 1994 accord under which
[[Page S9838]]
the United States, South Korea, Japan and the European Union
would help North Korea build two nuclear power reactors of no
military use in exchange for a freeze on nuclear weapons
development. U.S. representatives did not say Monday what, if
any, explanation was given by Pyongyang. On Tuesday, North
Korea declined to meet.
* * * * *
U.S officials, curiously, said they were not surprised by
the test and had warned of it in advance. Military analysts
pointed to the range capability that North Korea has now
shown and said that chemical, biological and even nuclear
warheads could be put on such a missile. The test came only a
few weeks after U.S. intelligence satellites uncovered
activity at a huge, supposedly shuttled nuclear facility.
Perhaps Pyongyang fired the missile as a ploy to get
Washington to fully deliver on its pledge to provide 500,000
tons of fuel oil this year as part of the reactor deal. If
so, the tactic has backfired. Members of Congress who had
balked at paying for the fuel now are irate.
North Korea may have also been advertising its missile to
other renegade nations. Military sales are one of the few
money-making ventures left for the impoverished country,
which has been warning that it may have to restart its
nuclear weapons program. The episode smacks of blackmail, not
diplomacy. All the more reason for the Clinton administration
to reconsider its long, patient persuasion of Pyongyang.
Mr. President, on July 8, 1998, Secretary of State Albright said:
Regional security is another matter on which dialogue with
Beijing has enhanced cooperation and fostered progress. For
example, the People's Republic of China has consistently
supported the Agreed Framework that has frozen North Korea's
dangerous nuclear weapons program, and has urged the North to
continue complying with it.
Secretary Albright said, on March 4, 1998:
Our request this year includes $35 million for the Korean
Energy Development Organization. The Agreed Framework has
succeeded in freezing North Korea's dangerous nuclear
program. Now it has begun that program one step at a time--
having secured over 90% of the program's spent fuel, which
represents several bombs' worth of weapons-grade plutonium
after reprocessing.
Secretary Albright, on February 10, 1998:
We believe our FY99 budget request for $35 million for KEDO
is both necessary and justified to maintain U.S. leadership
within KEDO, ensure that KEDO continues to fulfill its
important mission, and secure continued DPRK compliance with
its nonproliferation obligations under the U.S. DPRK Agreed
Framework.
She said, on February 12, 1997:
Let me just say this is obviously a very complex subject,
but I believe that the framework agreement is one of the best
things that the administration has done because it stopped a
nuclear weapons program in North Korea.
Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal on Friday, August 21, said
North Korea's nukes--
In essence, what was signed in 1994 was an arms-control
agreement that suffered from the central flaws common to all
such efforts: Even when verification is possible--and in this
case it was specifically excluded--there is no way to enforce
compliance. More to the point, there is no will to enforce
it. So much effort and face and prestige goes into getting
these deals signed that when something goes wrong, nobody
wants to admit it.
* * * * *
North Korea is different only because Pyongyang openly
conducts foreign policy through blackmail. Earlier this year,
it threatened to resume its nuclear weapons program and
declared it would keep selling missiles to clients like Iran
and Iraq unless the U.S. lifted economic sanctions. It also
has demanded more fuel oil and more food for its hungry
population. A group of U.S. Congressmen in North Korea for a
whirlwind official famine tour this week came away convinced
that millions are near starvation and hundreds of thousands
of others have already died of hunger. As terrible as this
is, it is all the more horrifying when you consider that the
Stalinist regime is spending what little money it does have
building long-range missiles that will be able to hit the
United States, according to a commission appointed by the
U.S. Congress. Or on that giant new underground complex where
nuclear weapons production was ``frozen'' in 1994.
It may turn out that the complex is not a nuclear-weapons
plant after all. Even so, the administration's timely
retaliation in Afghanistan and the Sudan will have two
beneficial effects. It will signal the North Koreans that
America's patience is not unlimited, and that consequently
they may wish to rethink their current strategy of trying to
blackmail the U.S. into coughing up more aid by playing the
nuclear card.
Mr. President, the fact is that no one understands North Korea. No
one understands what goes on inside that Orwellian country. And it is
impossible to predict what the thinking is that would cause them to
have a delegation in New York supposedly in serious negotiations and at
the same time launch this two-stage missile. I cannot imagine the
reaction of the American people if a foreign country launched a missile
one stage of which hit on one side of Florida and the other one hit on
the other side of Florida.
Mr. President, I think the American people would be incredulous and
greatly disturbed over such an event. Well, that is what the North
Koreans just did vis-a-vis Japan, a country that had pledged to provide
the bulk of several billion dollars worth of construction of a nuclear
powerplant.
This is a serious situation. Obviously, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is one of the
greatest challenges we face in this post-cold war era. We have to bring
this threat to a halt. I hope that the administration, as the Los
Angeles Times recommends, rethinks the North Korean policy. In the
meantime, we cannot continue to fund any program that would provide any
encouragement as well as financial assistance to a country that clearly
has time after time after time broken its word and has committed acts
of provocation and aggression.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. But, Mr. President,
before I do that, I want to say that I would like to move this
amendment as soon as possible, and hope that we can do so. I yield the
floor.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if my colleague will yield, I have an
amendment I would like to offer. If my colleague from Arizona has
completed his debate on this, I would ask----
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I am told by staff
here that they would prefer to wait until the manager of the bill comes
to the floor before that permission be granted. So I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I defer to the managers to make a proper
motion to temporarily set aside the McCain amendment for the purposes
of offering and debating at this point my amendment.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, we have an understanding with the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut that at whatever point the two
democratic Senators who are requesting an opportunity to be heard on
the McCain amendment arrive on the Senate floor, we can go back to the
McCain amendment and dispose of that. With that understanding with the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut, I have no objection to
temporarily laying aside the McCain amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. I inform my colleagues I know there are other Members who
want to be heard on this amendment, and I certainly would not ask for a
vote on this amendment until other Members have had a chance to be on
it. Specifically, my colleague from Alabama, Senator Shelby, and
possibly others, will speak in opposition, I am told, to this
amendment. I will not make an attempt to have the amendment disposed of
until they have had an opportunity to be heard.
Amendment No. 3527
(Purpose: Establish a procedure for the declassification of information
pertaining to Guatemala and Honduras)
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for himself, and
Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Kerry, and Mr. Leahy, proposes
an amendment numbered 3527.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill add the following new
section:
[[Page S9839]]
SEC. . RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE AVAILABLE HUMAN RIGHTS
RECORDS PURSUANT TO PENDING REQUESTS.
(a) Guatemala and Honduras.--
(1) The United States has received specific written
requests for human rights records from the Guatemala
Clarification Commission and the National Human Rights
Commissioner in Honduras, and from American citizens and
their relatives who have been victims of gross violations of
human rights in those countries.
(2) Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, each agency shall review all requested human rights
records referred to in subsection (a)(1) which it has not yet
located or reviewed for the purpose of declassifying and
disclosing such records to the public except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Postponement of Public Disclosure.--
(1) Grounds for postponement of public disclosure of human
rights records.--An agency may only postpone public
disclosure of a human rights record or portions thereof that
are responsive to the pending requests--
(A) pursuant to the declassification standards contained in
section 6 of P.L. 102-526, or
(B)(i) if its public disclosure should be expected to
reveal the identity of a confidential human source,
(ii) however it shall not be grounds for withholding from
public disclosure relevant information about an individual's
involvement in a human rights matter solely because that
individual was or is an intelligence source, however, the
public disclosure of the fact that the individual was or is
such a source may be withheld pursuant to this section.
(2) Review of decision to withhold records.--The
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
(hereinafter in this section the ``Panel''), established
under Executive Order No. 12958, shall--
(A) review all decisions to withhold the public disclosure
of any human rights record that has been identified pursuant
to requests referred to in subsection (a)(1), subject to the
declassification standards referred to in subsection (b)(1);
(B) notify the head of the agency in control or possession
of the human rights record that was the subject of the review
of its determination and publish such determination in the
Federal Register;
(C) contemporaneously notify the President of its
determination, who shall have the sole and nondelegable
authority to review any determination of the Panel, and whose
review shall be based on the declassification standards
referred to in subsection (b)(1). Within 30 calendar days of
notification, the President shall provide the Panel with an
unclassified certification setting forth his decision and the
reasons therefor; and
(D) publish in the Federal Register a copy of any
unclassified written certification, statement, and any other
materials that the President deems appropriate in each
instance.
(3) References.--For purposes of this section, references
in sections 6 and 9 of P.L. 102-526 to ``assassination
records'' shall be deemed to be references to ``human rights
records''.
(c) Creation of Positions.--(1) For purposes of carrying
out the provisions of this section, there shall be two
additional positions on the Panel. The President shall
appoint individuals, not currently employees of the United
States Government, who have substantial human rights
expertise and who are able to meet the requisite security
clearance requirements for these positions.
(2) The rights and obligations of such individuals on the
Panel shall be limited to matters relating to the review of
human rights records and their service on the panel shall end
upon completion of that review.
(d) Definitions.--In this Section:
(1) Human rights record.--The term ``human rights record''
means a record in the possession, custody, or control of the
United States Government containing information about gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights
committed in Honduras and Guatemala.
(2) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any agency of the
United States Government charged with the conduct of foreign
policy or foreign intelligence, including the Department of
State, the Agency for International Development, the Defense
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Justice, the
National Security Council, and the Executive Office of the
President.
(3) Gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.--The term ``gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights'' has the same meaning as is
contained in section 502(B)(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I have brief remarks about this amendment.
It is focused on two countries, Guatemala and Honduras. It is not
worldwide. It is designed to try to have documents declassified, dating
back to a decade ago. Many people recall the tragedies of the conflict
in Central America. It actually goes back more than two decades. In the
case of Guatemala, it goes back 30 or 40 years.
Civil wars have now been concluded. There are democratically led
governments moving in a direction to try to address their underlying
economic and social needs. The conflict that plagued these countries
and ourselves cost the lives of thousands of people, as well as
thousands more who were injured and brutalized in those conflicts.
We are seeking with this amendment to declassify certain information
that might allow us, in the case particularly of an American citizen
who was brutalized in that conflict almost a decade ago, to gather
necessary information so that those who perpetrated the crimes against
her could be brought to the bar of justice.
The Clinton administration has already agreed in principle to assist
the Guatemalan and Honduran authorities investigating past human rights
abuses that occurred during this period. These investigations are
critical to these societies being able to complete the process of
reconciliation and establish a credible foundation on which to build
democratic institutions which truly reflect the rule of law and to put
an end to impunity.
While some U.S. agencies have already responded very fully and
positively to these requests, others appear to have done little or
nothing meaningful to review and turn over materials that could be
critical to the success of this exercise. The slowness of certain
agencies in the production of materials, in some cases which are
totally nonresponsive to these requests, have caused a level of
cynicism about the commitment of some agencies to fully support this
effort.
I know my colleagues, Senator Leahy and Senator McConnell, are very
familiar with the case of the American citizen, Sister Diana Ortiz, who
was abducted and brutally raped and tortured while serving in a rural
community in Guatemala in 1989. Not surprisingly, Sister Ortiz's life
has never been the same. Her efforts to shed light on the details of
the crimes against her have been met with indifference, at best. As is
too often the case in rape cases, she believes that rather than being
viewed as the victim, she has been treated by certain government
officials as a perpetrator of some crime or involved in nefarious
behavior. I don't think the 101 cigarette burns on her back would
indicate necessarily at all that someone was the perpetrator rather
than the victim.
Just today, I received a very moving letter from Sister Ortiz.
Attached to her letter was a statement that she recently gave laying
out some of the new information about her case. Let me quote from her
letter, because I think it helps explain why I am offering this
amendment today. Sister Ortiz writes:
Despite my efforts, I still don't know the truth of why I
was abducted and tortured. It is true that government
agencies have released documents to me. They consist of such
public items as articles written by the press, human rights
reports from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, documents
relating to cases other than my own, and letters written to
Members of Congress. I have also received blank sheets of
white paper.
Mr. President, this is not just some isolated document. This is
basically what a lot of the released documents look like here. This is
declassified human rights documents, blank pages: ``Honduran armed
services human rights and corruption.'' A blank page.
Here is another example of the declassified documents released on her
case:
A U.S. ally has received U.S. Embassy and Honduran
government support.
It goes on. That has little or nothing to do with the situation
involving Sister Ortiz. The rest is blank.
This is one of the released documents:
Press reports of January 1988 indicate that the 316
battalion was deactivated in September 1987 to quell
speculation following allegations of death squad activities
made against the battalion.
The rest is blank, as if this were some highly pertinent document.
This is obviously not readable here at all. For the purpose of
demonstrating to my colleagues, here is what we are talking about. I
could go through this quickly. These are all blank pages. I am not
filling these in. These are sheets of blank pages that come up on this
report.
Now, obviously, there are legitimate concerns that intelligence
agencies can have about just releasing any and all documents that
people would like to have access to. You can't tolerate that, even in a
case as moving as that of Sister Ortiz.
This amendment says that within 120 days of enactment of the
underlying bill it would search the documents for
[[Page S9840]]
relevant material in Honduras and Guatemala if documents are discovered
and found, and the agencies, for whatever reasons--there are a list of
reasons--adopted in law where methods and sources could be revealed and
other important information that could be harmful to U.S. interests.
Then there is a panel made up of representatives from the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the Archivist of the United States and the Justice Department,
which would review that request from the agency objecting to the
release of certain documents. So there is a system whereby they would
review whether or not, in fact, the decision not to release information
was worthwhile.
So there is a process in place here. It is not worldwide. It is, in
fact, situations surrounding these two countries. It involves an
American citizen who was brutally tortured and would like to get to the
bottom of what happened to her--an American nun working in Honduras and
in Guatemala doing work that she and others felt made a significant
contribution to the well-being of people there. She would like to find
out why it happened. It is not asking too much, in the case of these
two countries, for the declassification of documents which could help
her pursue this case, again, allowing for a very legitimate process to
be in place so that there is not the unintentional release of documents
that could in some way compromise the interests of the United States.
That is the sum and substance of this amendment, Mr. President. I
hope that our colleagues will see fit to be supportive of it. It
doesn't go too far, in my view. As I said, it is limited in scope, in
terms of the countries involved, and also there is a process in place
in this amendment that would allow for the information, in cases where
it should not be released, to be withheld.
I also point out, Mr. President, that I am particularly grateful to
my colleagues, Senators Leahy, Mikulski, Kerry of Massachusetts and
Kerrey of Nebraska, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
who is a cosponsor of this amendment, along with Senator Harkin and
several others who have joined with me in this effort.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter from Sister
Ortiz, as well as the very moving testimony that she gave on June 25,
1998, be printed in the Record at this time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
September 2, 1998.
Senator Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Dodd: I cannot begin to thank you enough for
being in the forefront of the struggle for the Human Rights
Information Act. Thousands upon thousands of Guatemalans and
Hondurans await the outcome of Senate action on this
legislation which is of so much importance to them. It is, of
course, of great importance to me as well.
It may seem to many in Congress that my search for justice
is never-ending. This is hardly surprising for it is exactly
how it has felt to me during these past nine long years.
Despite my best efforts, I still don't know the truth of why
I was abducted and tortured nor have I obtained any
information on the identity of ``Alejandro.'' It is true that
various government agencies have released documents to me.
Now, let me tell you a little about them. They consist of
such (public) items as articles written by the press, human
rights reports from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, documents
relating to cases other than my own, and letters written to
members of Congress. I have also received black white sheets,
and a few messages from former Ambassador Thomas Stroock--one
written a week after I was abducted that stated: ``Her story,
as told is not accurate.'' Other cables from Stroock's
office/State Department describe me as a political
strategist, who had perhaps staged my own abduction to secure
a cut--off of U.S. aid to the Guatemalan military. These are
examples of ``relevant documents'' which have been released
to me.
In the summer of 1996, the Justice Department conducted a
criminal investigation. What I learned only during my
participation was that I was to be the subject of the
investigation and not those who abducted and tortured me.
During my testimony before the House Human Rights Caucus on
June 24th of this year, I spoke publicly of the treatment I
received at the hands of DOJ officials. I am enclosing that
testimony as both description of and further witness to how
my case has, in fact, been investigated.
Now, on top of all this, I have been told by a legislative
aide to another Senator that members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee are saying that only 3 or 4 documents
(pages) have been withheld from me. At this moment, a 284+
page Classified Report pertaining to my case remains in the
hands of the Justice Department, which has been made
available to the Intelligence Oversight Board, the former
Ambassador to Guatemala, Thomas Stroock, and who knows how
many others. But I, on the other hand, am denied access to it
in order to protect my privacy and that of their sources, or
so I am told (refer to June 24th Statement enclosed).
Again Senator Dodd, I thank you for your efforts on behalf
of all who seek the truth. Like countless Guatemalans and
Hondurans, this is all I seek. By calling on my government to
declassify documents, I am simply pleading with it to allow
us to heal. I want to put this nightmare behind me. I want to
be able to have a good night's rest. I want peace--for myself
and for the people of Guatemala and Honduras. And I don't
think that is too much to ask.
In a spirit of gratitude,
Dianna Ortiz,
OSU.
____
Congressional Human Rights Caucus Briefing on Torture
(By Sister Dianna Ortiz)
Thank you all for coming. As a survivor of torture, I want
to urge you to support declassification of United States
government documents that shed light on human rights abuses.
Simply by declassifying documents, our government can save
lives. Survivors of human rights violations need to know as
much as possible about who committed the atrocities against
them. With this information, justice is possible, and only
justice can lay the foundation for reconciliation, stability,
and peace. Guatemala and Honduras are two countries that
would benefit immeasurably from full declassification. The
sticking point in these instances seems to be that the US has
supported the abusers.
Take my case, for example. In 1989, while I was working as
a missionary in Guatemala, I was abducted and brutally
tortured by Guatemalan security agents. My back was burned
over 100 times with cigarettes. I was gang-raped repeatedly.
I was beaten, and I was tortured psychologically as well--I
was lowered into a pit where injured women, children, and men
writhed and moaned, and dead decayed, under swarms of rats.
Finally, I was forced to stab another human being.
Throughout the ordeal, my Guatemalan torturers said that if
I did not cooperate, they would have to communicate with
Alejandro. My last minutes in detention, I met Alejandro,
whom the torturers referred to as their boss. He was tall and
fair skinned and spoke halting Spanish, with a thick American
accent. His English was American, flawless, unaccented. When
I asked him if he was an American, his answer was evasive:
``Why do you want to know?''
He told me to get into his jeep and said he would take me
to a friend of his at the United States embassy, who would
help me leave the country. During the ride, he enjoined me to
forgive my torturers and said if I didn't, there would be
consequences for me. He reminded me that may torturers had
made videotapes and taken photos of the parts of the torture
I was most ashamed of. He said if I didn't forgive my
torturers, he would have no choice but to release those
photos and tapes to the press. At that point, I jumped out
the jeep and ran.
For the last nine years, I have tried to stop running. I
have tried to face the torturers head on and demand answers,
demanded justice. Instead of ``forgiving'' my torturers, I
filed suit against the Guatemalan government and called for
an investigation. Like so many investigations in Guatemala,
it led nowhere. Guatemalan and US officials alike said in
public and in private that I was a lesbian who had never been
tortured but had sneaked out for a tryst. The 111 cigarette
burns on my back were the result of kinky sex.
Two years ago, I held a five-week vigil before the White
House, asking for the declassification of all US government
documents related to human rights abuses in Guatemala since
1954, including documents on my own case. I asked to know the
identity of Alejandro. The Justice Department had begun an
investigation August 1995, and the Intelligence Oversight
Board had been investigating my case for more than a year,
but I still had no answers. Finally, after weeks of fasting
and camping day and night before the White House, a number of
State Department documents were released to me. The following
year, various FBI documents were declassified, but none of
these documents contained anything about the identities of my
torturers or of their boss, Alejandro.
Efforts to obtain information through US government
investigations also led nowhere. The Department of Justice
interviewed me for more than forty hours, during which time
DOJ attorneys accused me of lying. They interrogated my
friends and family members and generally made it clear that I
was the culprit, I was the one being investigated, not the US
government officials who might have acted wrongly in my case.
Ultimately, the investigators seemed unable to comprehend the
effects on a torture survivor of testifying in intricate
detail for hours on end. Extremely dangerous and painful
flashbacks were the consequence in my case. A torture
survivor should never be asked to re-enter the torture
chamber, to relive the brutal abuse. After I had given the
great majority
[[Page S9841]]
of my testimony, I felt compelled to withdraw from direct
participation in the DOJ investigation. The investigators had
the sketches I had made with the help of a professional
forensic artist, delineating the characteristics of each
torturer, including Alejandro, and the investigators had my
testimony, in detail. The responsibility for finding answers
lay with them.
Because I could no longer subject myself to the
retraumatization brought on by the investigators' questions
and manner, the DOJ closed my case. Exactly what the DOJ's
final conclusions were, I do not know. I do know that as a
result of the investigation, the DOJ came up with a 200+page
report, which is classified. The Department of Justice told
me the report was classified to protect sources and methods
and to protect my own privacy. Dan Seikely, who was in charge
of the Department of Justice investigation, said only three
people would be able to see the report: Attorney General
Janet Reno, the deputy attorney general, and himself. Only
four copies of the report existed, he said, and they would be
kept under lock and key.
In recent months, however, it has become clear to me that a
number of other people have read the report. A government
official recently told me that he had seen the report and
added that officials in the State Department also had seen
it, as had Thomas Stroock, the US ambassador to Guatemala at
the time I was abducted. I can't help but wonder how my
government intends to protect my privacy by releasing the
report to such individuals. It was under Stroock's command
that an embassy staff member told a visiting religious
delegation--``I'm tired of all these lesbian nuns coming down
to Guatemala.'' It was Stroock who said, a week after I was
abducted, before any embassy member had interviewed me, ``Her
story as told is not accurate.'' It was Stroock who told the
State Department that my motives were questionable, that I
had perhaps staged my own abduction to secure a cut-off of US
aid to the Guatemalan army. Yet it is Stroock to whom the US
government gives the report--a report so private that even I
cannot see it. After he had read the DOJ report, Stroock
spoke to a journalist, who in turn called me. Stroock was
informing the press of his access to the report. In spite of
his questionable right to see it, he was making no secret of
the privileges he enjoyed. There are things in the report
that I have kept secret, that I have been ashamed of--
things that I didn't tell DOJ investigators but that my
friends revealed as they were being interrogated--and I
have lived under this tacit blackmail: If I push for more
answers in my case, or if I even file a Freedom of
Information Act request to get the DOJ report
declassified, the secret information the investigators
have will be leaked.
Instead of having that information leaked, let me simply
tell you: I got pregnant as a result of the multiple gang
rapes by my torturers, and unable to carry within me what
they had engendered, what I could view only as a monster, the
product of the men who had raped me, I turned to someone for
assistance and I destroyed that life. Am I proud of this
decision? No. But if I had to make the decision again, I
believe I would again decide as I did eight years ago.
I had little choice. My survival was so precarious at that
time that to have to grow within me what the torturers had
left me would have killed me. I tell you this simply to free
myself so that I can proceed to uncover the truth. Today, I
am filing a FOIA to demand the DOJ report on my case. After
such anguish that the DOJ interviews caused me, I have the
right to know what was learned in my case, what conclusions
were reached and why. I demand access to the report, the same
access that members of the State Department, Thomas Stroock,
and members of the Intelligence Oversight Board have had, in
spite of Seikely's guarantee of confidentiality.
I want to be able to evaluate the thoroughness of the
investigation so that I can make informed decisions about
what step to take next. My torturers were never brought to
justice. It is possible that, individually, they will never
be identified or apprehended. And in some senses, I would
like to resign myself to this fact and move on. I have a
responsibility, however, to the people of Guatemala and to
the people of the world, a responsibility to insist on
accountability where accountability is possible. If the US
government was involved in my torture in Guatemala, in what
other countries of the world are torturers receiving orders
from Americans? We have to know what the United States has
done and where. For our own peace of mind as US citizens and
for the good of the citizens of the world, we need the files
released. If the US has done nothing wrong, then we can all
rest easy. If the US is culpable, we must know this and
expose this and take steps to ensure that our government
never again collaborates with or hires torturers, in any
place, for any reason.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, again, at the request of the managers of the
bill, at this point, I will yield the floor. I presume what will happen
is that there are other Members who may show up to debate the McCain
amendment, and then there would be a vote on that, and then there may
be another amendment that would be disposed of. If I could be notified
by my staff, or others, as to when the appropriate time to come back
and engage in a further debate with those who have a differing point of
view, I am happy to do that.
Mr. McCONNELL. If my friend has completed his remarks, we will simply
lay aside his amendment. Senator Thomas is here to speak on the McCain
amendment.
Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Kentucky very, very much for his
courtesies in this, and my colleagues, as well, who have other
amendments pending. I appreciate it very much.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Dodd
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
Amendment No. 3500, As Further modified
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I rise to address briefly the McCain
amendment on S. 2334. I will talk a little bit about the situation in
North Korea and the bill relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization, KEDO. I have been chairman of the
Subcommittee on East Asia for almost 4 years, and we have held five
hearings on North Korea during that time--more than any other single
country, with the exception of China. In all of that time, I have
continued to be amazed at and concerned by the dangerous, unpredictable
and unbalanced nature of the regime in North Korea. Despite widespread
starvation and disease, the Government continues to adhere to the very
economic policies which have led to famine in the first place. Despite
the worldwide reputation of communism, the Government continues to
revolve around sort of a Stalinist cult of personality slavishly
devoted to Kim Jong Il.
Despite international norms and conventions, the North Koreans
continue to sell nuclear and conventional missile technology to such
rogue states as Iraq and Libya in violation of the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty. Despite the terms of the Agreed Nuclear Framework
with the United States, North Korea continues to develop its program
aimed at producing nuclear missiles.
Mr. President, I have been sort of a begrudging supporter of the
Agreed Framework since its inception. Although the agreement is far
from perfect, I supported it because I believed that, in the end, it
was in our best interest and in the best interest of the East Asia
region to do so. I supported it through its fits and starts. I
supported it when the North diverted oil deliveries to military use and
when the North showed signs of restarting their nuclear program. I
supported it because, on the whole, North Korean movement forward in
the Four-Party Talks and cooperation in the nuclear area outweighed the
North's traditional tendency to always push the envelope with us.
Mr. President, when North Korea fired off a missile last week over
Japanese air space, it was kind of the straw that broke the camel's
back. This is what I consider to be a clearly belligerent act and
should drive home the fact to this body that the Agreed Framework has
been gutted by North Korea. At present, it seems no better than the
paper on which it was written. Time after time, the DPRK has broken its
commitment under the agreement. While the North took our oil and
dragged its heels, it has constructed underground facilities to test
both propulsion and warhead systems with only one purpose: the
development of long- and short-range nuclear weapon capabilities.
Frankly, I have a sinking feeling that they have used us, played us
for a fool, and have played it very well. Mr. President, I intend to
meet with the Defense Intelligence Agency this week, and to hold a
hearing next week in our subcommittee to examine the present situation
and to ask the State Department and Defense Department some tough
questions.
If these questions can't be answered to our satisfaction, and if we
can't be convinced that adherence to the Agreed Framework under the
circumstances are in our best interests, then our support, I am sure,
will evaporate very quickly.
I am pleased that we are considering it here. I am supportive of the
McCain amendment. I look forward to having a chance to vote on it.
I yield the floor.
[[Page S9842]]
Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona offered his
amendment yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock. We are trying to make
progress on the bill.
I understand there is one person who desires to speak on the other
side.
In fairness to everyone, with the concurrence of the Senator from
Arizona, if we can't bring this to conclusion, I am going to make a
motion to table the McCain amendment at 3 o'clock so that we can get an
expression of opinion on the amendment of the distinguished Senator
from Arizona.
In the meantime, Mr. President, I think we have some amendments that
have been cleared on both sides which I will shortly send to the desk:
a Brownback amendment on Iran; DeWine amendment on alternative crop
development; three Craig amendments; a Reed-Reid amendment on
scholarships; and a DeWine amendment on Haiti.
Amendments Numbered 3528 through 3534 En Bloc
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send the amendments to the desk, and
ask that they be considered en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McCONNELL] proposes
amendments numbered 3528 through 3534, en bloc.
The amendments (Nos. 3528 through 3534) are as follows:
amendment no. 3528
The Senate finds that:
According to the Department of State, Iran continues to
support international terrorism, providing training,
financing, and weapons to such terrorist groups as Hizballah,
Islamic Jihad and Hamas;
Iran continues to oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process and
refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist;
Iran continues aggressively to seek weapons of mass
destruction and the missiles to deliver them;
It is long-standing U.S. policy to offer official
government to government dialogue with the Iranian regime,
such offers having been repeatedly rebuffed by Tehran;
More than a year after the election of President Khatemi,
Iranian foreign policy continues to threaten American
security and that of our allies in the Middle East;
Despite repeated offers and tentative steps toward
rapprochement with Iran by the Clinton administration,
including a decision to waive sanctions under the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act and the President's veto of the Iran Missile
Proliferation Sanctions Act, Iran has failed to reciprocate
in a meaningful manner.
Therefore it is the sense of the Senate that:
(1) the Administration should make no concessions to the
government of Iran unless and until that government moderates
its objectionable policies, including taking steps to end its
support of international terrorism, opposition to the Middle
East peace process, and the development and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and
(2) there should be no change in U.S. policy toward Iran
until there is credible and sustained evidence of a change in
Iranian policies.
amendment no. 3529
(Purpose: To provide additional resources for enhanced alternative crop
development support in source zone)
On page 10 line 19, insert ``Provided further, That of the
funds appropriated under the previous proviso not less than
$80,000,000 shall be made available for alternative
development programs to drug production in Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia.
amendment no. 3530
(Purpose: To establish a Joint United States-Canada Commission on
Cattle and Beef and dairy products to identify, and recommend means of
resolving, national, regional, and provincial trade-distorting
differences between the countries with respect to the production,
processing, and sale of cattle, beef, and dairy products, and for other
purposes)
At the appropriate place, insert:
SEC. . JOINT UNITED STATES-CANADA COMMISSION ON CATTLE AND
BEEF.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a Joint United
States-Canada Commission on Cattle, Beef and Dairy Products
to identify, and recommend means of resolving, national,
regional, and provincial trade-distorting differences between
the United States and Canada with respect to the production,
processing, and sale of cattle, beef, and dairy products,
with particular emphasis on--
(1) animal health requirements;
(2) transportation differences;
(3) the availability of feed grains;
(4) other market-distorting direct and indirect subsidies;
(5) the expansion of the Northwest Pilot Project;
(6) tariff rate quotas; and
(7) other factors that distort trade between the United
States and Canada.
(b) Composition.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall be composed of--
(A) 3 members representing the United States, including--
(i) 1 member appointed by the Majority Leader of the
Senate;
(ii) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) 1 member appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture;
(B) 3 members representing Canada, appointed by the
Government of Canada; and
(C) nonvoting members appointed by the Commission to serve
as advisers to the Commission, including university faculty,
State veterinarians, trade experts, producers, and other
members.
(2) Appointment.--Members of the Commission shall be
appointed not later than 30 days after the date of enactment
of this Act.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the first
meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit a
report to Congress and the Government of Canada that
identifies, and recommends means of resolving, differences
between the United States and Canada with respect to tariff
rate quotas and the production, processing, and sale of
cattle and beef, and dairy products.
AMENDMENT NO. 3531
(Purpose: To describe the circumstances under which funds made
available under the legislation may be available to any tribunal)
On page 82, line 10, strike ``Yugoslavia.'' and insert the
following: ``Yugoslavia: Provided further, That the drawdown
made under this section for any tribunal shall not be
construed as an endorsement or precedent for the
establishment of any standing or permanent international
criminal tribunal or court: Provided further, That funds made
available for the tribunal shall be made available subject to
the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
AMENDMENT NO. 3532
(Purpose: To express the Sense of the Senate concerning the operation
of agricultural commodity foreign assistance programs)
At the appropriate place, insert:
SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE.
(a) It is the Sense of the Senate that:
(1) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the GSM-
102 credit guarantee program to provide 100 percent coverage,
including shipping costs, in some markets where it may be
temporarily necessary to encourage the export of U.S. wheat.
(2) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should increase the
amount of GSM export credit available above the $5.5 billion
level (as it did in the 1991/1992 period). In addition to
other nations, extra allocations should be made in the
following amounts to:
(A) Pakistan--an additional $150 million;
(B) Algeria--an additional $140 million;
(C) Bulgaria--an additional $20 million; and
(D) Romania--an additional $20 million.
(3) The U.S. Department of Agriculture should use the PL-
480 food assistance programs to the fullest extent possible,
including the allocation of assistance to Indonesia and other
Asian nations facing economic hardship.
(4) Given the President's reaffirmation of a Jackson-Vanik
waiver for Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should
consider Vietnam for GSM and PL-480 assistance.
amendment no. 3533
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
``That of the funds made available by prior Foreign
Operations Appropriations Acts, not to exceed $750,000 shall
be made available for the Claiborne Pell Institute for
International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina
University.''
amendment no. 3534
(Purpose: to prohibit the availability of funds for Haiti unless
certain conditions are met)
Beginning on page 90 line 1, after the word ``the'' insert
``central''.
On page 91, line 11, after the word ``ratified'' insert
``or is implementing''.
On page 91, strike lines 19 through 20, and insert ``for
the Haitian National Police, customs assistance, humanitarian
assistance, and education programs.''
On page 91, line 22, after the word ``available'' insert
``to the Government of Haiti''.
On page 92, line 5 strike everything after the word
``council'' through the ``period'' on line 7 and insert in
lieu thereof ``that is acceptable to a broad spectrum of
political parties and civic groups.''
On page 92, line 8, after the word ``Parties'' insert ``and
Grass Roots Civic Organizations.''
On page 92, line 13 after the word ``parties'' insert ``and
for the development of grass roots civic organizations''.
On page 92, insert new section (e):
``(e)(1)Availability of Administration of Justice
Assistance.--Funds appropriated under this act for the
Ministry of Justice shall only be provided if the President
certifies to the Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations and the
[[Page S9843]]
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that Haiti's
Ministry of Justice:
(A) Has demonstrated a commitment to the
professionalization of judicial personnel by consistently
placing students graduated by the Judicial School in
appropriate judicial positions and has made a commitment to
share program costs associated with the Judicial School;
(B) Is making progress in making the judicial branch in
Haiti independent from the executive branch, as outlined in
the 1987 Constitution; and
(C) Has re-instituted judicial training with the Office of
Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT).
(2) The limitation in subsection (e)(1) shall not apply to
the provision of funds to support the training of
prosecutors, judicial mentoring, and case management.
On page 92, line 14, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
On page 93, strike section (f) and all that follows.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this amendment reflects a significant
change in course on how we administer U.S. assistance in Haiti. From a
practical standpoint, the amendment will not decrease our total
commitment to the people of Haiti. However, it does place very clear
restrictions on assistance to the Haitian government.
To best understand the reasons for this amendment--and why we have
chosen to place more conditions on direct aid to the government of
Haiti--it is important to first talk about the current situation in
Haiti.
Mr. President, I have visited Haiti six times in the past three
years. I have taken a great interest in assisting the people of Haiti
as they establish, develop and sustain democracy, economic stability
and a better quality of life. Through these visits, I have had the
opportunity to see what changes have taken place and the general
direction of events in Haiti.
My colleagues may recall that on April 3, 1998, I provided the Senate
an update on the current economic, and political state of Haiti. At
that time, I stated that Haiti's political system was not stable.
Little has changed for the better since then. This continued
instability is of direct concern to the United States. The concern of
course is that this unstable democracy could descend into outright
chaos. If this occurs, the result could be an exodus of boat people
coming to our shores.
Mr. President, let me mention a few key facts to describe the current
situation there.
First, it has been over 14 months since then Haitian Prime Minister
Rosny Smarth resigned due to his frustration with the government's
inability to resolve an electoral dispute and implement his economic
modernization plan. Since then, a Prime Minister has not been confirmed
by the Parliament.
The Prime Minister is designated as the Chief Executive of the
Government. He appoints the Cabinet and basically runs the government.
Without a Prime Minister, the country simply cannot function. Bills
that may be passed by the Haitian Parliament cannot be signed into law
and the privatization of any government industries cannot be fully
implemented.
It is truly unfortunate, that to date, this vacancy has not been
filled. The current Education Minister has been nominated for the
position. It is, however, unclear if he will be confirmed by the
Haitian Senate. One of the main reasons for this continued delay stems
from the Haitian government's inability to resolve the serious
discrepancy surrounding the April 1997 elections.
This current political impasse stems from pervasive fraud and
improper vote tabulation regarding elections held in April of 1997. Not
only have the Haitian opposition political parties demanded that the
April 1997 elections be annulled, the international community,
including the United Nations, has also deemed the elections--which
produced only a meager five percent turnout--fraudulent. The opposition
political parties continue to insist that they will not move forward to
confirm a Prime Minister until the April 1997 electoral dispute is
resolved.
This paralysis in government is being felt everywhere: economic
reform efforts have stalled. The legislature still has not passed a
budget. It has not enacted structural reforms needed to free up over
$100 million in foreign assistance, nor has it approved loans for
millions in technical assistance. The process of privatizing key
government industries is dramatically slow, as are plans to downsize
the public sector. With progress impeded by a political stalemate it is
no surprise that potential investors who could play a key role in
uplifting Haiti's economic development are discouraged from going
forward.
Complicating matters even more was an upcoming national/municipal
election in Haiti slated for November 1998. Hundreds of seats were up,
including the entire lower chamber of the Haitian Parliament, up to
two-thirds of the Senate and all municipal seats. Since there continues
to be no resolution to the irregularities surrounding the previous
election, however, the elections that constitutionally should be held
in November have not been scheduled nor is there reason to believe that
they will occur any earlier than next spring. All of this raises even
more questions and concerns on Haiti's ability to administer future
elections, including the presidential elections scheduled for the year
2000.
Democracy literally is at a standstill in Haiti. And it will remain
stagnant until previous electoral disputes are resolved, and a
credible, nonpartisan, competent electoral commission to oversee
elections is established.
The composition of the electoral commission is the key source of
controversy. A number of opposition parties in Haiti would like to have
some representation on the commission, or at least make sure that the
commission is neutral and not biased.
Mr. President, I understand that Haitian President Preval recently
said he will move forward with naming a provisional electoral council.
There is concern that he intends not to consult with all opposition
parties--meaning that the interests of other political parties will
likely be excluded. This step would not seem to be an effective way to
resolve the current political impasse.
When I spoke about Haiti last April, I urged that no U.S. assistance
be used to underwrite the proposed November elections until a
settlement of the April 1997 electoral dispute is reached--and until a
fair and independent Electoral Council is established in accordance
with the constitution. I am pleased that these conditions on funding
are currently in the pending Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, as
well as in the House version.
Even if the electoral disputes are resolved and an electoral
commission appointed, democracy cannot be sustained as long as lethal
violence is seem as an effective tool to achieve political goals. To
date, not one single case of the dozens of political killings that have
occurred in Haiti since the early 1990's have been resolved. As a
result, no one has been convicted and sentenced for any one of these
crimes.
Mr. President, according to a House International Relations Committee
staff report released just last week, fears of a new wave of political
killings are on the rise following the recent murder of a Catholic
priest who was a vocal critic of the current government, as well as of
former President Aristide. The report also states that ``A key
opposition leader expressed concern that three other political figures
may be targeted for assassination.''
Not only have opposition political leaders been allegedly threatened,
Haitians working for democratic institutions such as the International
Republican Institute have also been targeted for intimidation and
threats on their lives. One Haitian IRI employee was even held at
gunpoint for his involvement in democratic activities in Haiti.
Mr. President, I also am concerned about new reports of drug
corruption within the Haitian government. Specifically, there have been
numerous reports in Haitian newspapers that Haitian National Police
employees were arrested for involvement in drug trafficking. Haiti has
become increasingly attractive as a transit point for international
drug traffickers. Unless we address this situation soon, Haiti could
turn into a full-fledged narco-state. And that means more and more
illegal drugs coming through Haiti to the United States.
Mr. President, I have given you a brief outline and assessment of the
current political situation in Haiti.
It has been the policy of this Congress for three years that until
the Haitian government is able to meet specific economic, political and
social reforms, our assistance to that government should be extremely
limited. The money, instead should go to benefit Haitians directly.
[[Page S9844]]
That was the fundamental purpose of an amendment originally offered
by our former Majority Leader, Bob Dole in 1995. Under the original
Dole amendment, benchmarks for reform had to be met if assistance was
to be provided. If these conditions were not met, government assistance
would be transferred to non-governmental organizations, of NGOs. In the
end, the President called for and received from Congress the power to
waive these conditions and allow aid to go forward if he believed
restricting aid to the Haitian government posed a national security
concern to the United States. Congress included this national security
waiver with the hope that things would improve in Haiti. Each year for
the past three years, we have renewed the Dole amendment with some
marginal modifications. Each year, the President has exercised his
waiver authority to keep U.S. aid flowing to the Haitian government.
And each year we hope the Haitian government will finally get its act
together.
Well, Mr. President, three years have gone by. And the situation
remains bleak. Based on a review of that situation, I now believe that
it is necessary to go back to the original Dole proposal by removing
the national security waiver. We have tried--patiently--for three years
to work with the Haitian government to establish and sustain democracy
there. Yet, I find it extremely difficult to invest in a government
that is not willing to make changes to advance democracy and its
economic health. We have spent well over $2 billion in the past four
years in Haiti.
We should continue to fund programs through NGOs that will benefit
Haitians. But giving the government money for programs if they are not
willing to implement needed political and economic reforms is wasted
money.
Mr. President, let me turn now to an explanation of my amendment to
the this bill. Let me first make it clear that this amendment does not
prohibit assistance to Haiti. Just like current law, this amendment
conditions our assistance to the Government of Haiti--but not the
Haitian people. That means that any funds distrtibuted to Haiti through
NGOs for the benefit of Haitians will not be threatened nor compromised
in any manner.
Let me first outline the important general conditions that the
Haitian government must meet before we believe it receives any
additional funding from the US government. These conditions are
outlined--almost verbatim--in the pending Senate and House Foreign
Operations Approprations bill.
These general conditions include:
First, the Haitian government must re-sign the Agreement on Migration
Interdiction and Operations with the United States and must cooperate
with the US in halting illegal emigration from Haiti. It has been
nearly four years since this agreement expired and the US government
has been waiting for Haiti to resign this agreement.
The second condition is that the Haitian government must conduct
thorough investigations of extrajudicial and political killings and
that it must cooperate with US authorities in these investigations.
There have been dozens of political murders in Haiti over the past
several years. Not a single one has been solved. That has got to
change.
Third, the Haitian government must take action to remove from the
Haitian National Police, and other national palace and ministerial
guards, individuals who are credibly alleged to have engaged in or
conspired to conceal gross violations of human rights or to have
engaged in narcotics trafficking.
Fourth, that the Haitian government must complete privatization of at
least three major public entities. The Haitian government is now years
behind its own drafted scheduled in privatizing several key public
entities.
The final condition is that the Haitian government must implement the
counter-narcotics agreements recently signed between both countries
last October. There are a total of six counter-narcotics agreements
including the Ship Rider and Maritime Pursuit Agreements which allow US
law enforcement to patrol Haitian waters for drug interdiction matters.
These agreements basically allow for instantaneous implementation of
drug enforcement activities between the two countries.
These are very important and reasonable conditions that must be met
before the US government releases any general assistance directly to
the government of Haiti. Many of them are not new.
Let me now address a more controversial question--whether the
Administration can waive these conditions for national security
reasons, and allow funding to go forward. For the past three years, the
Administration has exercised its waiver authority to allow funding to
go to the government. The pending bill before us continues this waiver;
the pending House bill does not. My amendment would adopt the House
version on this point. We must send a message to the government of
Haiti that we cannot continue to give them money if they lack political
will to make necessary reforms.
Mr. President, while my amendment would remove the national security
interest waiver; there are several important exceptions to this
amendment as well as in the pending bill that would enable the US
government to continue funding certain important government programs.
Taken together, these exceptions include--counter-narcotics assistance;
support for the Haitian National Police's Special Investigative Unit;
the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program;
customs assistance; anti-corruption programs; urgent humanitarian
assistance; and education. There is also a separate provision on
conditioning electoral and administration of justice assistance to the
government of Haiti under a separate set of conditions.
One additional point I want to make is while I have included several
additional exceptions to the Limitation of Assistance provision to the
government of Haiti--I intend to explore during the conference of this
bill the possible need to limit the total amount of money the Haitian
government can receive if conditions set for in this amendment are not
met while assistance to the government in these areas continues to
flow.
Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to mention two
essential assistance programs that we provide to Haiti through NGO's.
First and foremost, US assistance through P.L. 480 Title II feeding
programs to the poor is absolutely critical and should be continued.
There are impoverished people in Haiti--particularly children--who
desperately need help. They are not responsible for the country's
political crisis. They should not have to suffer because of it.
Mr. President, there has been a proliferation of facilities in Haiti
which must care not only for a vast number of orphans but also for an
increasing number of abandoned and neglected children. The capital
city, Port-au-Prince, has seventy orphanages--all of these which are
run by only one relief organization, Christian Relief Services (CRS).
There are many other orphanages throughout the entire country which
take care of thousands and thousands of orphaned and abandoned children
in Haiti.
I have visited these facilities in Haiti and I can give you a first-
hand account of the heart breaking stories. The flow of desperate
children into these orphanges is constant and these institutions face
an increasing challenge in accommodating all of these needy children.
The sad part is that these many of these orphanages get no other means
of support other than the food administered to them through CRS, which
in turn receives its resources through AID.
Last year and again this year, I have worked with Senators Cochran
and Bumpers--the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Agriculture
Appropriations Subcommittee--to ensure we continue the emergency
feeding programs in Haiti through the PL 480 Title feeding program. I
thank Chairman Cochran and Senator Bumpers for their assistance in
funding this program last year and for doing so again in this year's
bill.
Similarly, I have worked with Chairman McConnell and Senator Leahy to
include up to $250,000 to support a pilot program to assist Haitian
children in orphanages. The objective behind the program is to find
ways to help orphanages better organize and manage themselves to seek
outside help for resources for these children. I thank the Chairman,
and Senator Leahy for funding this initiative last year and for doing
so again in the pending bill.
Another very important assistance program that should be maintained,
if
[[Page S9845]]
not expanded, is agricultural assistance programs. Agricultural
production in Haiti is extremely low. In the long run, agricultural
production is necessary if Haiti is to provide jobs and food for its
population.
Haiti today imports two thirds of its food. Every day, thousands of
Haitians leave rural areas where they are unable to provide for
themselves, and flood into the cities which are unable to sustain the
population pressures. In the long run, agricultural and rural
development is crucial to the goal of providing jobs, income and food
for Haiti's people.
To further develop the rural and agricultural sectors of Haiti,
attention needs to be given to a decentralized development strategy. I
believe that continued focus on non-governmental organizations is
appropriate. In fact, current USAID funding for agriculture and
environmental programs in Haiti is all administered through NGOs. I
believe that we should be promoting regional development and that
associations linking private sector interests with local government
need to be established. One way to do this is to link our own
successful foundations and institutions of higher education together
with local Haitians interested in pursuing this goal.
Given the importance of developing and expanding sound agriculture
and environment programs in Haiti, I intend to work with Chairman
McConnell and Senator Leahy to ensure that at least 20% of our total
assistance for Haiti be for the promotion of agriculture and
environment programs in Haiti. It is my hope that they will accept this
request in conference report language.
Mr. President, I cannot overestimate enough the need to continue
assistance programs to Haiti through the NGO community. We want to help
Haitians in terms of feeding programs, agriculture and environment
programs, and other initiatives such as basic health and education.
Mr. President, as you can see from the specifics of my speech, I have
given serious thought to our assistance policy toward Haiti. U.S.
policy toward Haiti is complicated. As I said at the beginning of these
remarks, establishing, developing and sustaining democracy in Haiti is
an important national interest.
One thing is clear: The U.S. cannot do for Haiti what it will not do
for itself. The Haitians first have to realize the need to solve their
political crisis. They clearly have not yet hit rock bottom; maybe
that's what it will take to create the political will to move forward.
Unfortunately, I do not yet see the requisite political will and
determination in Haiti.
In the meantime, we cannot just walk away from Haiti completely. We
must find ways to help the Haitian people, primarily through NGO's--
since the Haitian Government has proven itself to be incapable of
providing for its own people.
There's a tough road ahead for Haiti. With this amendment, we are
helping to set some realistic conditions whereby that country can
succeed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed
to.
The amendments (Nos. 3528 through 3534) en bloc were agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I heard the distinguish Senator from
Kentucky say--and I know we have word of those who wish to speak. The
Senator from Kentucky and I have been on the floor, as have other
Senators, since early yesterday morning on this bill. We are within
sight of land, and we would kind of like to get some things moving.
If people have a matter they wish to add to the debate, or a matter
that they wish to say, or things that they feel the Senate should
consider for this side of the aisle, I would strongly urge them to come
to do that, because there will be the effort of the chairman and myself
to wrap this bill up as soon as we can.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Vermont that as
far as we are aware there are only three more amendments that may
require a rollcall vote, and then we would be ready to go to final
passage. So we can, indeed, see the light at the end of the tunnel.
Amendment No. 3500, As further modified
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, while waiting for others, I note with
regard to the North Korea McCain amendment that I stand behind no
Member of this body in my respect for my friend from Arizona, and
certainly I know no one who has followed the situation in North Korea
closer than he has. I give him a great deal of weight for his insight.
I understand his concerns. I share them. I suspect that most Senators
do, especially as we watched the unbelievably irresponsible activity on
the part of North Korea in their recent missile firing.
Unfortunately, this amendment would prevent the United States from
fulfilling its obligations under the Korea nuclear reactor agreement.
Maybe the Congress will make that decision to do that. Of course the
Congress can. But I hope that Senators would think long and hard before
we go down that road. This North Korea agreement is not perfect. There
is no disagreement about that on this side of the aisle. There is also
no disagreement about the behavior of the North Korean Government. It
is reprehensible. At times it seems inexplicable. It is certainly the
most irresponsible activity of any country on Earth today. They almost
seem to want the United States to back out of this agreement.
But I think the questions we should ask, if I could have the
attention of my friend from Arizona, would be just these:
Does the Secretary of Defense support this amendment? Does the
commander of our forces in Korea support the amendment? What do they
think the level of danger between the United States and North Korea
will be with this amendment?
I ask this because I share the frustration of the Senator from
Arizona toward North Korea.
Mr. McCAIN. First of all, I appreciate the efforts of the
distinguished Chairman of the subcommittee who mentioned he has had
five hearings on this issue. We obviously paid close attention to the
Senator from Wyoming who now feels that the time has come to support
this amendment. I believe that the commander of the forces in Korea,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, probably the national
security adviser, and even the President, if he knows about the
amendment, is probably in opposition.
I want to tell the Senator from Vermont this agreement was flawed
from the beginning. I stood on the floor of the Senate and said it
would fail. It was a bribe. It was kicking the can down the road. There
was no inspections required. The reality is that North Korea, which is
the most Orwellian, bizarre government in history, they have a ruler
who is--well, he likes to kidnap Japanese movie actresses. We are
supposed to trust the word of these people? And they just launched a
missile--a two-stage missile--which every arms control expert in
America will tell you that you don't build these kind of missiles
unless they are armed with weapons of mass destruction.
This thing was wrong from the start, and everything that we have seen
has proven that to be the case, including every major newspaper in
America--the L.A. Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and,
frankly, the former national security adviser, Mr. Brzezinski, and many
others; Dr. Kissinger, and many others.
For each expert that the Senator from Vermont could present, I could
give you one who is as well regarded, or more highly regarded, who
feels that it is time that we at least demand that they stop building
nuclear weapons.
I reply to the Senator from Vermont. The amendment simply says that
we won't continue to pay them millions of dollars if they in return
continue to try to build nuclear weapons, which is what the whole
agreement was about, supposedly, to start with.
I thank the Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Senator for his answer, which is precisely
what I anticipated. I am not suggesting experts are in opposition. I
merely wanted, for purposes of debate, to have that.
He speaks of these Orwellian, bizarre people. I suspect it is giving
the North Korean leadership the benefit of the doubt to call them
Orwellian and bizarre. They are worse than that. We can't ignore what
has happened there.
[[Page S9846]]
But we are not dealing with rationale people.
Had I been the one to write the agreement we have with them, I would
like to think that I would have written it a lot differently than it
is. But I also understand the concerns that countries like South Korea,
Japan, and others have put a lot more money and a lot more effort into
this agreement than the United States has.
I do not want to give the North Korean Government an excuse to make
the situation we now have a lot worse.
We have done some things with this agreement. The North Korean
nuclear facility at Yongbyon and Taechom have been frozen under the
IAEA inspection. Virtually all of the spent fuel in the Yongbyon
reactor has been safely canned under IAEA seals. Those are spelled
forth.
At the same time, this is a country which I think both the Senator
from Arizona and I would agree has the ability to make inspections. The
ability to determine what they are doing is probably as difficult as
any country in the world. What makes it worse, unlike some other
countries where it is difficult to find out what they are doing, they
are not countries with the potential nuclear power and potential
nuclear weapons power.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
I withhold the suggestion of the absence of a quorum. I see the
Senator from Arizona on the floor.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, is it still the desire of the Senator from
Vermont that--does Senator Levin still wish to speak on this?
Mr. LEAHY. I wonder if the Senator from Arizona and the distinguished
chairman would mind if we put in a quorum call for 2 minutes. If at
that time we do not hear from the Senator, I will not do anything to
delay this further.
Mr. McCONNELL. And then there will be no objection to lifting it
later?
Mr. LEAHY. No.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, if I may, I wish to make another comment
or so on this amendment.
I understand the notion that you want to make this thing work, and we
have tried for quite a long time. It just seems to me that around the
world right now in a number of places we are having these kinds of
countries with the dictators sort of testing the United States, saying,
``You have told us certain things, we have made certain agreements, but
we are not going to keep them, and what are you going to do about it?''
I feel as if that is an increasing tendency around the world, and
this is one of them, as well as Iraq and some other places. So I think
we want to continue to work, we would like to have the KEDO agreement,
we would like to go ahead with the light-water reactor to avoid the
nuclear development in North Korea, but that is the deal. And if that
isn't being adhered to, then I think you have to do something. I think
we have to take a tougher position than we have in the past.
I just do not see that it is good for the United States in the future
to be making agreements with these sorts of rogue countries, trying to
make things better, going ahead and doing our part, and them not doing
theirs. I think that is what this amendment is about. And what we are
challenged with, frankly, is to say, ``We have things that need to be
done, we are willing to work with you, but you have to keep up your
part of the bargain.'' I think that is what this is all about.
I yield the floor.
By the way, if I may take that back, I was also listening to Senator
Dodd's proposal that has to do with things in Central America that have
been kept secret, and I am very much interested in part of that myself,
the Sister Ortiz thing that really needs to be declassified, in my
judgment. So I just wanted to comment that I speak in support of the
Dodd amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I move to table the McCain amendment
and ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table the McCain amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr.
Coverdell), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), the Senator
from Alaska (Mr. Murkowski), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Kempthorne),
and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) are necessarily absent.
I also anounce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms) is
absent because of illness.
I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from North
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Bingaman),
the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Glenn), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.
Inouye) are necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 11, nays 80, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 257 Leg.]
YEAS--11
Akaka
Biden
Chafee
Cleland
Daschle
Kerrey
Kohl
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Wellstone
NAYS--80
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--9
Bingaman
Brownback
Coverdell
Domenici
Glenn
Helms
Inouye
Kempthorne
Murkowski
The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 3500), as further
modified, was rejected.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I voted to table the McCain amendment
because I believe it undermines the agreement we have in place with
North Korea that is designed to denuclearize North Korea. This could
effectively give North Korea an excuse to produce plutonium that it
could use for nuclear weapons, which would be absolutely contrary to
our most basic national security interests.
The McCain amendment would add a requirement for a certification
relative to North Korea that would undermine the Agreed Framework that
has frozen North Korea's nuclear weapons plutonium production program,
because it would change the terms of that agreement. Before any of the
fiscal year 1999 funds for implementation of that Agreed Framework
could be spent, the McCain amendment would require the President to
certify that North Korea is essentially denuclearized, which is not yet
the case but which is the very goal of the Agreed Framework.
The Agreed Framework stipulates that North Korea must freeze its
plutonium production facilities, namely three graphite-moderated
nuclear reactors (either operating or under construction) and a
plutonium reprocessing facility, in exchange for an international
consortium (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or
KEDO) providing two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear power
reactors.
Before the U.S. delivers key nuclear components to the North Korean
light-water reactor program, North Korea must come into full compliance
with its nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
It was understood from the outset that it would take a number of years,
and probably
[[Page S9847]]
not before the year 2003, before North Korea would come into full
compliance with its obligations under the NPT.
The whole idea of the Agreed Framework was in fact to bring North
Korea into full compliance with the NPT and to go beyond the NPT's
requirements by requiring North Korea to freeze and then dismantle its
plutonium production facilities, and to place all its spent nuclear
fuel in canisters safeguarded and monitored by the IAEA and eventually
remove that spent fuel from North Korea. These represent significant
security gains for the United States and we should honor our
commitments under the agreement to realize these gains.
We should not give North Korea an excuse to walk away from its
obligations under the Agreed Framework and to resume the production of
plutonium for nuclear weapons. I believe that is what the McCain
amendment would do, and that is why I voted to table the McCain
amendment.
Amendment No. 3526
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, is the Senator from Kentucky correct
that the pending amendment is the Hutchison amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. McCONNELL. It is my understanding Senator Hutchison may want to
modify her amendment.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I would like to offer a modification
to my amendment that will be argued and offered by Senator Coats from
Indiana. It is acceptable to me as a modification of my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to modify the
amendment.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. There is apparently some question about clearing this
amendment, which we believe is not objectionable to anybody. But I have
just been informed it is cleared. I would like to----
Mr. LEAHY. I tell the Senator from Indiana he is correct on that.
Mr. COATS. I thank the Senator.
I would like a brief amount of time in which to explain what the
modification is, because it is relevant to the action that was just
taken by the Senate and I think important and determinative perhaps of
action that will be taken subsequent to the disposition of this bill by
the Senate in the conference. I am willing to do that at whatever time
is appropriate. I know the majority leader is here, and I defer to him
on that or to any other business that the----
Mr. McCONNELL. Would the Senator yield?
Mr. COATS. Yes.
Mr. McCONNELL. The majority leader would like to make a few comments,
if you would just withhold.
Mr. COATS. I would be more than pleased to.
Mr. LOTT. I know other Senators may want to speak briefly also on
this subject.
____________________