[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 113 (Tuesday, September 1, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9783-S9788]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. ROTH (for Mr. Biden, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Helms, Mr. Stevens, 
        Mr. Cochran, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Specter, Mr. 
        Faircloth, Mr. Durbin, and Mr. Ford):
  S. J. Res. 55. A joint resolution requesting the President to advance 
the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy 
to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 
during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. 
Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World

[[Page S9784]]

War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all 
other senior officers who served impositions of command during World 
War II, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.


  joint resolution relative to rear admiral husband kimmel and major 
                          general walter short

 Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, on Wednesday, September 2, 1998 the 
U.S.S. Missouri, arguably our nation's most famous battleship, will be 
permanently berthed at Pearl Harbor. The Missouri, with its remarkable 
and gallant history of naval combat in the United States Navy, will 
serve as a fitting monument to those Americans who fought and died in 
the name of freedom, liberty, and justice.
  However, I must confess that the remembrance of the events 
surrounding the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor also rekindles a 
painful memory of one of the great injustices that occurred within our 
own ranks during World War II, an injustice that still remains, an 
injustice that continues to tarnish our nation's military honor.
  Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short were the two senior 
commanders of U.S. military forces deployed in the Pacific at the time 
of the disastrous surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. In the immediate 
aftermath of the attack, these two commanders were unfairly held 
singularly responsible for the success of the attack. They were 
scapegoated.
  First, they were publicly accused of dereliction of duty by a hastily 
conducted investigation. Then, when subsequent investigations conducted 
during World War II exonerated these officers, those findings were kept 
secret on the grounds that they undercut the war effort.
  But, what is most unforgivable is that after the end of World War II, 
this scapegoating was given a near permanent veneer when the President 
of the United States declined to advance Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short on the retired list to their highest ranks of war-time command--
an honor that was given to every other senior commander who served in 
war-time positions above their grade. As Commander-in-Chief of the 
Pacific and United States Fleets, Admiral Kimmel, a two star, served as 
a four star commander. Major General Short, also a two star, served as 
a three star commander when he was the Commanding General of the Army's 
Hawaiian Department.
  Today, this singular exclusion from advancement on the military's 
retired list only perpetuates the myth that Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short were derelict in their duty and singularly responsible for the 
success of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is a distinct and 
unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two of the finest officers 
who have served in the Armed Forces of the United States. It is clearly 
inconsistent with the most basic notion of fairness and justice. Such 
scapegoating is inconsistent with this great nation's unmatched 
military honor.
  It is high time that this injustice suffered by General Short and 
Admiral Kimmel be rectified. Toward that end, I introduce on behalf of 
myself, Senator Biden, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee, the Chairman of the Veterans Committee and 
Senators Inouye, Cochran, Hollings, Faircloth and Durbin, a joint 
resolution intended to right this longstanding injustice.
  The joint resolution calls upon the President to posthumously advance 
on the retirement list Major General Short's grade to Lieutenant 
General--his rank of command as Commanding General of the Army's 
Hawaiian Department and Rear Admiral Kimmel's grade to Admiral--his 
rank of command as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
  The facts that constitute the case of Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short have been remarkably documented over time--which is one the 
reasons that I am disappointed that after fifty-seven years this 
injustice has not been rectified.
  Since the attack on Pearl Harbor back in December of 1941, there have 
been numerous investigations and histories on the job performance of 
Kimmel and Short. These include nine official governmental 
investigations and reports and one inquiry conducted by a special Joint 
Congressional Committee. Findings of six of these inquiries are noted 
in the resolution.
  Perhaps the most flawed, and unfortunately most influential 
investigation, was that of the Roberts Commission. Less than 6 weeks 
after the Pearl Harbor attack, it presented a hastily prepared report 
to the President accusing Kimmel and Short of dereliction of duty--a 
charge that was immediately and highly publicized.
  Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the 
Roberts Commission later and disavowed its report, stated that Admiral 
Kimmel and General Short were ``martyred'' and ``if they had been 
brought to trial, they would have been cleared of the charge.''
  Later, Admiral J.O. Richardson, who was Admiral Kimmel's predecessor 
as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote:

       In the impression that the Roberts Commission created in 
     the minds of the American people, and in the way it was drawn 
     up for that specific purpose, I believe that the report of 
     the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and 
     deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government 
     Printing Office.

  The highly publicized accusation of that infamous investigation 
contributed to the inaccurate myth that these two officers were 
singularly responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  Since 1941 a number of official investigations provided clear 
evidence that these two commanders were unfairly singled out for blame 
that should have been widely shared with their senior commanders. These 
reports include, among others, a 1944 Navy Court of Inquiry, a 1944 
Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, a 1946 Joint Congressional 
Committee Report, and more recently a 1991 Army Board for the 
Correction of Military Records. The findings of these official reports 
are described in the Resolution and can be summarized as four principal 
points.
  First, the investigations provide ample evidence that the Hawaiian 
commanders were not provided vital intelligence that they needed and 
that was available in Washington prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Their senior commanders had critical information about Japanese 
intentions, plans, and actions, but neither passed this on nor took 
issue or attempted to correct the disposition of forces under Kimmel's 
and Short's commands.
  Second, the disposition of forces in Hawaii were consistent with the 
information that was made available to Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short. Based on the information available to the Hawaiian commanders, 
the forces under their command at Pearl Harbor were properly disposed.
  In my review of this case, I was most struck by the honor and 
integrity demonstrated by General George Marshall who was Army Chief of 
Staff at the time of the attack. General Short interpreted a vaguely 
written war warning message sent from the high command in Washington on 
November 27, 1941 as suggesting the need to defend against sabotage. 
Consequently, when he concentrated his aircraft away from perimeter 
roads to protect them, he inadvertently increased their vulnerability 
to air attack. When he reported his preparations to the General Staff 
in Washington, the General Staff never took steps to clarify the 
reality of the situation.
  The Report of the Joint Congressional Committee of 1946 is testament 
to General Marshall's sense of honor and integrity. General Marshall 
testified that as Chief of Staff, he was responsible for ensuring the 
proper disposition of General Short's forces. He acknowledged that he 
must have seen General Short's report, which would have been his 
opportunity to issue a corrective message, and that he failed to do so.
  Mr. President, I only wish that the force of General Marshall's 
integrity and sense of responsibility had greater influence over the 
management of the case of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
  A third theme of these investigations concerned the failure of the 
Department of War and the Department of the Navy to properly manage the 
flow of intelligence. The Dorn Report completed in 1995 for the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense at the request of Senator

[[Page S9785]]

Thurmond stated that the handling of intelligence in Washington during 
the time leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor was characterized by 
``ineptitude * * * limited coordination * * * ambiguous language, and 
lack of clarification and follow-up,'' among other serious faults. The 
bottom line is that poor command decisions and inefficient management 
structures and procedures blocked the flow of essential intelligence 
from Washington to the Hawaiian commanders.

  The fourth and most important theme that permeates the aforementioned 
reports is that blame for the disaster at Pearl Harbor cannot be placed 
only upon the Hawaiian commanders. Some of these reports completely 
absolved these two officers. While others found them to have made 
errors in judgement, all the reports subsequent to the Roberts 
Commission cleared them of the charge of dereliction of duty.
  And, Mr. President, all those reports identified significant failures 
and shortcomings of the senior commanders in Washington that 
contributed significantly--if not predominantly--to the success of the 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Dorn Report put it best, stating 
that ``responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall 
solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, 
it should be broadly shared.''
  Mr. President, I would like to emphasize two points about these 
investigations. First, these two officers were repeatedly denied their 
requests--their requests--for courts martial.
  Second, the conclusions of the 1944 Naval Court of Inquiry and the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board--that Kimmel's and Short's forces had been 
properly disposed according to the information available to them and 
that criticized their superior officers for not sharing important 
intelligence--were kept secret on the grounds that they were 
detrimental to the war effort.
  For reasons unexplainable to me, the scapegoating of Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short has survived the cleansing tides of history. It is an 
unambiguous fact that responsibility for the success of the Pearl 
Harbor attack lies with the failure of their superiors situated in 
Washington to provide them the intelligence that was available.
  One can make the case that back in the midst of World War II, 
allowing blame to fall and remain solely on Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short helped prevent the American people from losing confidence in 
their national leadership. But perpetuating the cruel myth that Kimmel 
and Short were singularly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor 
is not only unfair, it blemishes the military honor of our nation.
  This issue of fairness and justice has been raised not only by 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel and their surviving families today, 
but also by numerous senior officers and public organizations around 
the country.
  Mr. President, allow me to submit for the Record a letter endorsing 
our resolution from five living former naval officers who served at the 
very pinnacle of military responsibility. They are former Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Admiral William 
J. Crowe and former Chiefs of Naval Operations Admiral J.L. Holloway 
III, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt and Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost.
  The efforts of these and other officers have been complemented by the 
initiatives of many public organizations who have called for posthumous 
advancement of Kimmel and Short. At various times down through the 
years, they have included the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Retired 
Officers Association, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Pearl 
Harbor Commemorative Committee, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, and the 
Pearl Harbor Survivors Association.
  I submit for the Record a moving resolution passed by the Delaware 
Chapter of the VFW last June calling for the posthumous advancement of 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel and a letter from the President of the 
VFW to the President of the United States making the same request.
  Mr. President, Admiral Kimmel and General Short have been unjustly 
stigmatized by our nation's failure to treat them in the same manner 
with which we treated their peers. To redress this wrong would be fully 
consistent with this nation's sense of justice.
  The message of our joint resolution is about justice, equity, and 
honor. Its purpose is to redress an historic wrong, to ensure that 
these two officers are treated fairly and with the dignity and honor 
they deserve, and to ensure that justice and fairness fully permeate 
the memory and lessons learned from the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.
  The President should advance the ranks of Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short on the retired list to their highest war-time ranks, as was done 
for all their peers. After 57 years, this correction is long overdue.
  I urge my colleagues to support this joint resolution.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint 
resolution, the VFW resolution, and letters of support be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 55

       Whereas, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the 
     Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the 
     Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, possessed an 
     excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in 
     the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941 attack 
     on Pearl Harbor;
       Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the 
     Commander of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, 
     possessed an excellent and unassailable record throughout his 
     career in the United States Army prior to the December 7, 
     1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;
       Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on 
     Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and 
     Lieutenant General Short were not provided with the necessary 
     and critical intelligence available that foretold of war with 
     Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have 
     alerted them to prepare for the attack, including such 
     essential communiques as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot 
     message of September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the 
     Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador 
     in the United States from December 6-7, 1941, known as the 
     Fourteen-Part Message;
       Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant 
     General Short were relieved of their commands and returned to 
     their permanent ranks of rear admiral and major general;
       Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a 
     member of the investigating commission known as the Roberts 
     Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General 
     Short of ``dereliction of duty'' only six weeks after the 
     attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report 
     maintaining that ``these two officers were martyred'' and 
     ``if they had been brought to trial, both would have been 
     cleared of the charge'';
       Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry 
     exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that his military 
     decisions and the disposition of his forces at the time of 
     the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor were proper ``by 
     virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand 
     which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of 
     an air attack on Pearl Harbor''; criticized the higher 
     command for not sharing with Admiral Kimmel ``during the very 
     critical period of 26 November to 7 December 1941, important 
     information . . . regarding the Japanese situation''; and, 
     concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was 
     attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the 
     naval service;
       Whereas on June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by 
     Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the 
     Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that 
     essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war 
     plans was available in Washington but was not shared with 
     Admiral Kimmel;
       Whereas on October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of 
     Investigation determined that Lieutenant General Short had 
     not been kept ``fully advised of the growing tenseness of the 
     Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity 
     for better preparation for war''; detailed information and 
     intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were 
     available in ``abundance'' but were not shared with the 
     General Short's Hawaii command; and General Short was not 
     provided ``on the evening of December 6th and the early 
     morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating 
     an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample 
     time to have accomplished this'';
       Whereas the reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and 
     the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept 
     secret, and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short were 
     denied their requests to defend themselves through trial by 
     court-martial;
       Whereas the joint committee of Congress that was 
     established to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and 
     Lieutenant General Short issued, on May 23, 1946, a 1,075-
     page report which included the conclusions of the committee 
     that the two officers had not been guilty of dereliction of 
     duty;
       Whereas the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L. 
     Holloway, Jr., on April 27, 1954,

[[Page S9786]]

     recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in 
     accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act 
     of 1947;
       Whereas on November 13, 1991, a majority of the members of 
     the Board for the Correction of Military Records of the 
     Department of the Army found that Lieutenant General Short 
     ``was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor 
     disaster'' and that ``it would be equitable and just'' to 
     advance him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired 
     list'';
       Whereas in October 1994, the then Chief of Naval 
     Operations, Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his 1988 
     recommendation against the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and 
     recommended that the case of Admiral Kimmel be reopened;
       Whereas the Dorn Report, a report on the results of a 
     Department of Defense study that was issued on December 15, 
     1995, did not provide support for an advancement of Rear 
     Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade, it did set 
     forth as a conclusion of the study that ``responsibility for 
     the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the 
     shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it 
     should be broadly shared'';
       Whereas the Dorn Report found that ``Army and Navy 
     officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese 
     diplomatic communications . . . which provided crucial 
     confirmation of the imminence of war''; that ``the evidence 
     of the handling of these messages in Washington reveals some 
     ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimations, 
     limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of 
     clarification and follow-up at higher levels''; and, that 
     ``together, these characteristics resulted in failure . . . 
     to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii 
     the sense of focus and urgency that these intercepts should 
     have engendered'';
       Whereas, on July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson 
     (United States Navy, retired) responded to the Dorn Report 
     with his own study which confirmed findings of the Naval 
     Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of 
     Investigation and established, among other facts, that the 
     war effort in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive 
     intelligence distribution policy, and the degree to which the 
     commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not 
     alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly 
     attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral 
     Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short;
       Whereas the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in establishing 
     a promotion system for the Navy and the Army, provided a 
     legal basis for the President to honor any officer of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States who served his country as a 
     senior commander during World War II with a placement of that 
     officer, with the advice and consent of the Senate, on a 
     retired list with the highest grade held while on the active 
     duty list;
       Whereas Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are the 
     only two eligible officers from World War II who were 
     excluded from the list of retired officers presented for 
     advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime 
     ranks under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;
       Whereas this singular exclusion from advancement on the 
     retired list serves only to perpetuate the myth that the 
     senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and 
     responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, a 
     distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two 
     of the finest officers who have served in the Armed Forces of 
     the United States;
       Whereas Major General Walter Short died on September 23, 
     1949, and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel died on May 14, 1968, 
     without the honor of having been returned to their wartime 
     ranks as were their fellow veterans of World War II; and
       Whereas the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor 
     Survivors Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the 
     Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Retired Officers 
     Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee, 
     and other associations and numerous retired military officers 
     have called for the rehabilitation of the reputations and 
     honor of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through 
     their posthumous advancement on the retired lists to their 
     highest wartime grades: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR 
                   GENERAL SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS.

       (a) Request.--The President is requested--
       (1) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to 
     the grade of admiral on the retired list of the Navy; and
       (2) to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short to 
     the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list of the 
     Army.
       (b) Additional Benefits Not To Accrue.--Any advancement in 
     grade on a retired list requested under subsection (a) shall 
     not increase or change the compensation or benefits from the 
     United States to which any person is now or may in the future 
     be entitled based upon the military service of the officer 
     advanced.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL 
                   PERFORMANCE OF ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT 
                   GENERAL SHORT.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel performed his 
     duties as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, 
     competently and professionally, and, therefore, the losses 
     incurred by the United States in the attacks on the naval 
     base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on the island 
     of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a result of 
     dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then 
     Admiral Kimmel; and
       (2) the late Major General Walter C. Short performed his 
     duties as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
     competently and professionally, and, therefore, the losses 
     incurred by the United States in the attacks on Hickam Army 
     Air Field and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other targets 
     on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not 
     a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by 
     the then Lieutenant General Short.
                                  ____


      Resolution Adopted by the Delaware Veterans of Foreign Wars

       Whereas, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. 
     Short were the Commanders of record for the Navy and Army 
     forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941 when the 
     Japanese Imperial Navy launched its attack; and
       Whereas, following the attack, President Franklin D. 
     Roosevelt appointed Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts to 
     a Commission to investigate such incident to determine if 
     there had been any dereliction of duty; and
       Whereas, the Roberts Commission conducted a rushed 
     investigation in only five weeks. It charged Admiral Kimmel 
     and General Short with dereliction of their duty. These 
     findings were made public to the world; and
       Whereas, the dereliction of duty charge destroyed the honor 
     and reputations of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and 
     due to the urgency of the war neither man was given the 
     opportunity to defend himself against the accusation of 
     dereliction of duty; and
       Whereas, other investigations showed that there was no 
     basis for the dereliction of duty charges, and a 
     Congressional Investigation in 1946 made specific findings 
     that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short had been 
     ``derelict in his duty'' at the time of the bombing of Pearl 
     Harbor; and
       Whereas, it has been documented that the United States 
     Military had broken the Japanese codes in 1941. With the use 
     of a cryptic machine known as ``Magic,'' the Military was 
     able to decipher the Japanese diplomatic code known as 
     ``Purple'' and the military code known as JN-25. The final 
     part of the diplomatic message that told of the attack on 
     Pearl Harbor was received on December 6, 1941. With this 
     vital information in hand, no warning was dispatched to 
     Admiral Kimmel or General Short to provide sufficient time to 
     defend Pearl Harbor in the proper manner; and
       Whereas, it was not until after the tenth investigation of 
     the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed in December of 1995, 
     that the United States Government acknowledged in the report 
     of Under Secretary of Defense Edwin S. Dorn, that Admiral 
     Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible for the 
     disaster but that responsibility must be broadly shared; and
       Whereas, at this time the American public have been 
     deceived for the past fifty-six years regarding the unfounded 
     charge of dereliction of duty against two fine military 
     officers whose reputations and honor have been tarnished; 
     now, therefore be it
       Resolved, That the Veterans of Foreign Wars urges the 
     President of the United States to restore the honor and 
     reputations of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter 
     C. Short by making a public apology to them and their 
     families for the wrongful actions of past administrations for 
     allowing these unfounded charges of dereliction of duty to 
     stand. Be it
       Resolved, That the Veterans of Foreign Wars urges the 
     President of the United States to take the necessary steps to 
     posthumously advance Admiral Kimmel and General Short to 
     their highest wartime ranks of Four-Star Admiral and Three-
     Star General. Such action would correct the injustice 
     suffered by them and their families for the past fifty-six 
     years.
                                  ____

     Re the honor and reputations of Admiral Husband Kimmel and 
     General Walter Short.
     Honorable Members of the United States Senate.
       Dear Senators: We ask that the honor and reputations of two 
     fine officers who dedicated themselves to the service of 
     their country be restored. Admiral Husband Kimmel and General 
     Walter Short were singularly scapegoated as responsible for 
     the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor December 
     7, 1941. The time is long overdue to reverse this inequity 
     and treat Admiral Kimmel and General Short fairly and justly. 
     The appropriate vehicle for that is the current Roth-Biden 
     Resolution.
       The Resolution calls for the posthumous advancement on the 
     retired list of Admiral Kimmel and General Short to their 
     highest WWII wartime ranks of four-star admiral and three-
     star general as provided by the Officer Personnel Act of 
     1947. They are the only two eligible officers who have been 
     singled out for exclusion from that privilege; all other 
     eligible officers have been so privileged.
       We urge you to support this Resolution.
       We are career military officers who have served over a 
     period of several decades and

[[Page S9787]]

     through several wartime eras in the capacities of Chairman, 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or Chief of Naval Operations. Each 
     of us is familiar with the circumstances leading up to the 
     attack on Pearl Harbor.
       We are unanimous in our conviction that Admiral Husband 
     Kimmel and General Walter Short were not responsible for the 
     success of that attack, and that the fault lay with the 
     command structure at the seat of government in Washington. 
     The Roth-Biden Resolution details specifics of this case and 
     requests the President of the United States to nominate 
     Kimmel and Short for the appropriate advancement in rank.
       As many of you know, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were 
     the Hawaiian Commanders in charge of naval and ground forces 
     on Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack. After a hurried 
     investigation in January, 1942 they were charged with having 
     been ``derelict in their duty'' and given no opportunity to 
     refute that charge which was publicized throughout the 
     country.
       As a result, many today believe the ``dereliction'' charge 
     to be true despite the fact that a Naval Board of Inquiry 
     exonerated Admiral Kimmel of blame; a Joint Congressional 
     Committee specifically found that neither had been derelict 
     in his duty; a four-to-one majority of the members of a Board 
     for the Correction of Military Records in the Department of 
     the Army found that General Short had been ``unjustly held 
     responsible'' and recommended his advancement to the rank of 
     lieutenant general on the retired lost.
       This injustice has been perpetuated for more than half a 
     century by their sole exclusion from the privilege of the Act 
     mentioned above.
       As professional military officers we support in the 
     strongest terms the concept of holding commanders accountable 
     for the performance of their forces. We are equally strong in 
     our belief in the fundamental American principle of justice 
     for all Americans, regardless of creed, color, status or 
     rank. In other words, we believe strongly in fairness.
       These two principles must be applied to the specific facts 
     of a given situation. History as well as innumerable 
     investigations have proven beyond any question that Admiral 
     Kimmel and General Short were not responsible for the Pearl 
     Harbor disaster. And we submit that where there is no 
     responsibility there can be no accountability.
       But as a military principle--both practical and moral--the 
     dynamic of accountability works in both directions along the 
     vertical line known as the chain of command. In view of the 
     facts presented in the Roth-Biden Resolution and below--with 
     special reference to the fact that essential and critical 
     intelligence information was withheld from the Hawaiian 
     Commanders despite the commitment of the command structure 
     to provide that information to them--we submit that while 
     the Hawaiian Commanders were as responsible and 
     accountable as anyone could have been given the 
     circumstances, their superiors in Washington were sadly 
     and tragically lacking in both of these leadership 
     commitments.
       A review of the historical facts available on the subject 
     of the attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrates that these 
     officers were not treated fairly.
       1. They accomplished all that anyone could have with the 
     support provided by their superiors in terms of operating 
     forces (ships and aircraft) and information (instructions and 
     intelligence). Their disposition of forces, in view of the 
     information made available to them by the command structure 
     in Washington, was reasonable and appropriate.
       2. Admiral Kimmel was told of the capabilities of U.S. 
     intelligence (MAGIC, the code-breaking capability of PURPLE 
     and other Japanese codes) and he was promised he could rely 
     on adequate warning of any attack based on this special 
     intelligence capability. Both Commanders rightfully operated 
     under the impression, and with the assurance, that they were 
     receiving the necessary intelligence information to fulfill 
     their responsibilities.
       3. Historical information now available in the public 
     domain through declassified files, and post-war statements of 
     many officers involved, clearly demonstrate that vital 
     information was routinely withheld from both commanders. For 
     example, the ``Bomb Plot'' message and subsequent reporting 
     orders from Tokyo to Japanese agents in Hawaii as to 
     location, types and number of warships, and their replies to 
     Tokyo.
       4. The code-breaking intelligence of Purple did provide 
     warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor, but the Hawaiian 
     Commanders were not informed. Whether deliberate or for some 
     other reason should make no difference, have no bearing. 
     These officers did not get the support and warnings they were 
     promised.
       5. The fault was not theirs. It lay in Washington.
       We urge you, as Members of the United States Senate, to 
     take a leadership role in assuring justice for two military 
     careerists who were willing to fight and die for their 
     country, but not to be humiliated by its government. We 
     believe that the American people--with their national 
     characteristic of fair play--would want the record set 
     straight.
           Thank you.
     Thomas H. Moorer,
                                        Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
                           Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
                                 Former Chief of Naval Operations.
     William J. Crowe,
                                        Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
                           Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     J.L. Holloway III,
                                        Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
                                 Former Chief of Naval Operations.
     Elmo R. Zumwalt,
                                        Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
                                 Former Chief of Naval Operations.
     Carlisle A.H. Trost,
                                        Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
     Former Chief of Naval Operations.
                                  ____

                                          Veterans of Foreign Wars


                                         of the United States,

                                    Washington, DC, June 26, 1998.
     Mr. Edward R. Kimmel,
     Wilmington, DE.
       Dear Mr. Kimmel: Thank you for your letter to Mr. Larry 
     Rivers, Adjutant General, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the 
     United States, dated January 2, 1998. Your letter addressed 
     Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's comments made in a 
     letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee, dated November 18, 1997.
       Attached is a copy of a letter VFW Commander-in-Chief John 
     E. Moon recently sent to Secretary Cohen. This letter 
     supports the proposal, lead by Senators Joseph R. Biden and 
     William V. Roth, Jr. in May 1998, asking that Admiral Husband 
     Kimmel and General Walter Short not bear the full 
     responsibility for the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl 
     Harbor.
       We hope that the Secretary of Defense will act favorably on 
     the request of Senators Biden and Roth.
           Sincerely,
                                              Kenneth A. Steadman,
                                       Executive Director.
 Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, tomorrow is an important day for all 
who honor the valor and sacrifice Americans made in World War II. 
Tomorrow, the history of America's war in the Pacific is brought full 
circle. The U.S.S. Missouri, the ship on which the United States 
formally accepted Japan's surrender, will be permanently berthed at 
Pearl Harbor, the site of America's entry into the war against Japan 
following a devastating surprise attack.
  It is appropriate that in this same week I, along with my colleagues, 
Senators Roth, Thurmond, Inouye, Stevens, Hollings, Ford, Durbin, 
Specter, Helms, Cochran, and Faircloth, seek to close the circle for 
the two commanders at Pearl Harbor fifty-seven years ago, Admiral 
Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short. Today, we are introducing a 
resolution that seeks long overdue justice for these two fine officers.
  Now some of you will ask ``why now?'' The answer is not just because 
we are honoring the service and sacrifice of Americans who served in 
the Pacific campaign by permanently berthing the Missouri at Pearl 
Harbor. It is more basic than that--there can be no statute of 
limitations for restoring honor and dignity to men who spent their 
lives devoted to America's service and yet were unfairly treated. When 
it comes to serving truth and justice, the time must always be ``now''.
  I hope that most of you will read this resolution. The majority of 
the text details the historic case on behalf of Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short and expresses Congress's opinion that both officers 
performed their duty competently. Most importantly, it requests that 
the President submit the names of Kimmel and Short to the Senate for 
posthumous advancements on the retirement lists to their highest held 
wartime rank.
  Mr. President, this action would not require any form of 
compensation. Instead, it would acknowledge, once and for all, that 
these two officers were not treated fairly by the U.S. government and 
it would uphold the military tradition that responsible officers take 
the blame for their failures.
  I will address these points in more detail and will review some of 
the evidence regarding the soundness of Kimmel and Short's military 
decisions.
  First, I want to discuss the treatment of Kimmel and Short and who 
bore responsibility. Like most Americans, Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short requested a fair and open hearing of their case, a court martial. 
They were denied their request. After lifetimes of honorable service to 
this nation and the defense of its values, they were denied the most 
basic form of justice--a hearing.
  Let me review some of the facts. On December 18, 1941, a mere 11 days 
after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission was formed to determine 
whether derelictions of duty or errors of judgment by Kimmel and Short 
contributed to the success of the Japanese attack. This Commission 
concluded that both

[[Page S9788]]

commanders had been derelict in their duty and the President ordered 
the immediate public release of these findings.
  Several facts about the Roberts Commission force us to question its 
conclusions. First, Kimmel and Short were denied the right to counsel 
and were not allowed to be present when witnesses were questioned. They 
were then explicitly told that the Commission was a fact-finding body 
and would not be passing judgment on their performance. When the 
findings accusing them of a serious offense were released, they 
immediately requested a court-martial. That request was refused. It is 
difficult to imagine a fair review of the evidence given the rules of 
procedure followed by the Commission.
  I also think that it is important to note the timing here. It would 
be difficult to provide a fair hearing in the charged atmosphere 
immediately following America's entry into the war in the Pacific. In 
fact, Kimmel and Short were the objects of public vilification. The 
Commission was not immune to this pressure. One Commission member, for 
example, Admiral Standley, expressed strong reservations about the 
Commission's findings, later characterizing them as a ``travesty of 
justice''. He did sign the Report, however, because of concerns that 
doing otherwise might adversely affect the war effort. As you will see, 
the war effort played an important role in how Kimmel and Short were 
treated.

  The Roberts Commission was the only investigative body that found 
these two officers derelict in their duty.
  In 1944 an Army Board investigated General Short's actions at Pearl 
Harbor. The conclusions of that investigation placed blame on General 
Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of Pearl Harbor 
and in 1944. This report was sequestered and kept secret from the 
public on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the war effort.
  That same year, a Naval Court of Inquiry investigated Admiral 
Kimmel's actions at Pearl Harbor. The Naval Court's conclusions were 
divided into two sections in order to protect information indicating 
that America had the ability to decode and intercept Japanese messages. 
The first and longer section, therefore, was classified ``top secret.'' 
The second section was written to be unclassified and completely 
exonerated Admiral Kimmel and recognized that Admiral Stark bore some 
of the blame for Pearl Harbor because of his failure to provide Kimmel 
with critical information available in Washington. Then Secretary of 
the Navy James Forrestal instructed the Court that it had to classify 
both sections ``secret'' and not release any findings to the public.
  I won't go any further with this discussion of history, again I urge 
my colleagues to read the resolution. I hope that I have made my point 
that these officers were not treated fairly and that there is good 
reason to question where the blame for Pearl Harbor should lie.
  The whole story was re-evaluated in 1995 at the request of Senator 
Thurmond by Under Secretary for Defense Edwin Dorn. In his report, Dorn 
concluded that responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor should 
be broadly shared. I agree. Where Dorn's conclusions differ from mine 
and my cosponsors, is that he also found that ``the official treatment 
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantively temperate and 
procedurally proper.'' I disagree.
  These officers were publicly vilified and never given a chance to 
clear their names. If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the 
truth, then there would be no need for the President to take any action 
today. But we don't. We live in an open society. Eventually, we are 
able to declassify documents and evaluate our past based on at least a 
good portion of the whole story. One of our greatest strengths as a 
nation comes from our ability to honor truth and the lessons of our 
past.
  Like most people, I can accept that there was a good case for the 
need to protect our intelligence capabilities during the war. I cannot 
accept that there is a reason for continuing to deny the culpability of 
others in Washington at the expense of these two officers' reputations 
57 years later. Continuing to falsely scapegoat two dedicated and 
competent officers dishonors the military tradition of taking 
responsibility for failure. The historic message sent is that the truth 
will be suppressed to protect some responsible parties and distorted to 
sacrifice others.
  One point I want to make here is that we are not seeking to place 
blame. This is not a witch-hunt aimed at those superior officers who 
were advanced in rank and continued to serve, despite being implicated 
in the losses at Pearl Harbor. I think the historic record has become 
quite clear that blame should be shared.
  The unfortunate reality is that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were 
blamed entirely and forced into early retirement.
  After the war, in 1947, they were singled out as the only eligible 
officers from World War II not advanced to their highest held wartime 
ranks on the retirement lists, under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. 
By failing to advance them, the government and the Departments of the 
Navy and Army perpetuate the myth that these two officers bear a unique 
and disproportionate part of the blame.
  The government that denied these officers a fair hearing and 
suppressed findings favorable to their case while releasing hostile 
information owes them an official apology. That's what this resolution 
calls for.

  The last point that I want to make deals with the military situation 
at Pearl Harbor. It is legitimate to ask whether Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short, as commanding officers, properly deployed their forces. 
I think reasonable people may disagree on this point. I have been 
struck by the number of qualified individuals who believe the 
commanders properly deployed based on the intelligence available to 
them. I will ask to enter this partial list of flag officers into the 
Record. Among those listed is Vice Admiral Richardson, a distinguished 
naval commander, who wrote an entire report refuting the conclusions of 
the Dorn Report. My colleagues will also see the names of four Chiefs 
of Naval Operations and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer. It was Admiral Moorer who observed that, 
``If Nelson and Napoleon had been in command at Pearl Harbor, the 
results would have been the same.''
  In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe this case is unique and 
demands our attention. As we honor those who served in World War II by 
permanently berthing the U.S.S. Missouri in Pearl Harbor, we must also 
honor the ideals for which they fought. High among those American 
ideals is upholding truth and justice. Those ideals give us the 
strength to admit and, where possible, correct our errors.
  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and move one step 
closer to justice for Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a partial list of flag 
officers be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

       The following is a partial listing of high-ranking retired 
     military personnel who advocate in support of the posthumous 
     advancement on the retired lists of Rear Admiral Husband 
     Kimmel and Major General Walter Short to Four-Star Admiral 
     and Three-Star General respectively:


                                Admirals

       Thomas H. Moorer; Carlisle A.H. Trost; William J. Crowe, 
     Jr.; Elmo R. Zumwalt; J.L. Hollaway III; Ronald J. Hays; T.B. 
     Hayward; Horatio Rivero; Worth H. Bargley; Noel A.M. Gayler; 
     Kinnaird R. McKee; Robert L.J. Long; William N. Small; 
     Maurice F. Weisner; U.S.G. Sharp, Jr.; H. Hardisty; Wesley 
     McDonald; Lee Baggett, Jr.; and Donald C. Davis.


                             Vice Admirals

       David C. Richardson and William P. Lawrence.


                             Rear Admirals

       D.M. Showers and Kemp Tolley.

                          ____________________