[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 113 (Tuesday, September 1, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9753-S9772]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 3506

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I believe the amendment of the Senator 
from Pennsylvania may be pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania does have the 
pending amendment. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I outlined the purpose of this amendment earlier 
today. What it does is provide for some $28.9 million of funding for 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission. There is not 
a problem with the funding coming out of unobligated funds of prior 
years.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is pending before the U.S. Senate. 
Senator Biden and I had submitted a resolution sponsored by some 36 
Senators which called for hearings before the Foreign Relations 
Committee and a vote by the Senate on ratification of the 
constitutional procedure.
  The matter now pending is somewhat different, and that is to provide 
funding for the Preparatory Commission. The problem with testing, which 
is going on now, has become very acute during the course of the past 
several months--when India initiated nuclear testing, followed by 
Pakistan--those two countries with all of their controversy are on the 
verge of real problems.
  I said earlier this morning that when Senator Brown and I traveled to 
India back in August of 1995 and talked to Prime Minister Rao, he was 
interested in having the subcontinent nuclear-free. Shortly thereafter, 
we visited Pakistan and saw their political leader, Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto, who had a similar view, but that situation has 
deteriorated materially.
  In asking for a vote on this matter, it is not only to strengthen the 
position in conference where we know that on a voice vote, sometimes 
the position in conference is not as strong. But, also in the absence 
of the Senate taking up the Treaty, to have a show of support for the 
Treaty as I think will be reflected at least in part; although, you 
could support this amendment without necessarily committing to the 
Treaty.
  Mr. President, at this time I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as I outlined earlier, my cosponsor is 
the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Senator Biden. He has come to 
the floor. At this time, I yield to him.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take much of the Senate's time. 
I think this debate is about the easiest debate the Senate can face. 
There is one simple reason to support the Specter amendment, of which I 
am a cosponsor, and the U.S. contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Preparatory Commission. It is real simple. It is in the national 
security interest of the United States. I reiterate what the Senator 
from Pennsylvania said. This is true whether or not you favor the test 
ban treaty or oppose it.

  Most of the funding requested for the Preparatory Commission is to be 
devoted to capital expenditures on the international monitoring system, 
the ability to monitor. Improving our nuclear test monitoring 
capabilities is clearly of benefit to the United States--again, whether 
you are for or against this treaty--as well as to the benefit of the 
world community.
  The recent nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan are a stark 
reminder of the importance of monitoring. The international monitoring 
system should improve the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests in India 
and Pakistan by nearly a full order of magnitude. That will lower the 
threshold of detectable yields by a factor between 5 and 10, depending 
on the test-site geology.
  So if the detection threshold is a yield of 200 tons today, it would 
be 20 to 40 tons a few years from now. Let me say that again. If the 
threshold at which we can detect today is 200 tons, if this monitoring 
system is improved, as we fully expect it would be assuming we fund our 
part, it would reduce that to be able to detect 20 to 40 tons--but only 
if we pay our contribution.
  The international monitoring system will also provide these improved 
monitoring capabilities in a more cost-effective manner than we can 
achieve them unilaterally. Countries other than the United States will 
bear roughly 75 percent of the costs. Where I come from, that is a 
pretty good deal. We pay three-quarters less than we would have to pay 
in order to be able to get 5 times the accuracy in terms of 
information, as much as 10 times the resolution we need to know if 
anybody has set off a nuclear test.
  In addition, some of the improvement is literally unattainable 
through U.S.-sponsored monitoring alone, as some of the international 
monitoring sites will be in countries that refuse to contribute to a 
U.S. unilateral monitoring system.
  The Preparatory Commission, Mr. President, is investing--is 
investing--now in an international monitoring system, even though the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty might not come into force for 
some years.
  There are two important reasons to support this. First, if we do 
consent to U.S. ratification of the treaty, we will want to be able to 
verify compliance as soon as the treaty enters into force. Any delay in 
funding the international monitoring system would translate into a 
delay in achieving the needed verification capabilities. Second, the 
improved monitoring achieved through new or upgraded sensor sites will 
contribute to U.S.--and world--monitoring capabilities as soon as they 
are in place, not just after the treaty enters into force.
  U.S. agencies need to monitor possible nuclear weapons tests 
worldwide whether or not we ratify the treaty. Even so, opponents of 
ratification should support this funding. What would we do if we were 
here on the floor and said, ``You know, there's going to be no test ban 
treaty. We just want to know what's going on in the rest of the world. 
We want to know. And guess what? A whole bunch of nations will join in 
with us to increase the capability of monitoring a test by roughly 
tenfold, a minimum of fivefold. And all we have to do is contribute, in 
this case, one-quarter of the cost''?
  Would we conclude not to do that? Would we sit here and say, ``No, 
no, no, we don't want to know; we don't want to pay 25 percent of the 
cost to increase our ability to detect testing that is up to 10 times 
more sensitive than what our capability now is''?
  What are we talking about here? I mean, what rationale can there 
possibly be? I suspect my friends will say, ``Well, you know, if we go 
ahead and do this, then we're on a slippery slope to ratifying that God 
awful treaty.'' I think it is a good treaty, but that is the best 
argument you can come up with unless you say, ``We don't want to know. 
We don't want to know whether or not a nation is detonating a nuclear 
device that is in the 20 to 40 ton range. We're satisfied knowing all 
they can do is under 200 tons. Once they get above that, that is when 
we'll pay attention to it.''
  Mr. President, in sum, the international monitoring system will make 
a real contribution to U.S. monitoring capabilities. That contribution 
will be much less expensive than sustaining those sites unilaterally. 
And it will come on line as soon as the equipment is installed.
  Lest anybody have to be reminded, we live in a very dangerous world. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is occurring and it is a real 
risk. It seems to me, Mr. President, again, whether or not you are for 
the test ban treaty, the national interests requires these monitoring 
investments. So I strongly urge--strongly urge--all of my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, the Senator from Pennsylvania has raised

[[Page S9754]]

a very important issue, one that has not been given sufficient 
attention by this body this year--that of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). Ratification of the CTBT is one of the single most 
important steps the Senate could take today to improve our national 
security and reduce the future threat of a missile attack. This treaty 
exists only because the United States made it a priority and put a lot 
of energy into its formulation. Entry into force of the treaty will now 
occur only if the U.S. Senate engages these issues directly and begins 
the ratification debate. I realize that many of my colleagues do not 
support the treaty. But I think most Senators would agree that this is 
an important debate, one that should not be allowed to slip off the 
Senate's fall agenda.
  The amendment before the Senate would fully fund the Administration's 
request for $28.9 million to cover the U.S. contribution to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Preparatory Commission. This organization will 
be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the CTBT signatories to 
monitor compliance with the treaty and seek to prevent break-out of the 
treaty. The organization plans to build 171 monitoring stations around 
the world, greatly enhancing the ability of the U.S. and other 
countries to detect a nuclear explosion.
  Not only is this function critically important to our national 
security, it comes at a bargain price: the U.S. pays only 25 percent of 
the cost of the Preparatory Commission. The remainder is borne by the 
other signatories to the treaty. As we struggle to stretch every 
defense dollar a bit further, I don't think we can afford to let this 
bargain escape us.
  Mr. President, I know there are many obstacles to entry into force of 
the CTBT. And without active, engaged U.S. leadership, it might never 
happen. But we have a lot at stake here, both for today's security 
needs and to prevent future nuclear weapons threats. It is much easier 
to prevent the emergence of such threats than it is to protect against 
them once they have been developed. I urge my colleagues to support 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, would the Senator from Oregon withhold 
just for a minute?
  Is the debate completed on the Specter amendment? I was thinking, 
since Mr. Smith of Oregon is here----
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. No 
one has risen to speak in opposition to the amendment as of this point. 
And in the event nobody does, I think the debate is concluded. The 
distinguished Senator from Delaware spoke; and I have spoken on two 
occasions. I think the issue is before the body. So, in the absence of 
any opposition, I think we are ready to go to a vote when that is 
convenient for the managers.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the Senator.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Specter amendment be temporarily set 
aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk 
and ask for their immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are the amendments offered en bloc?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. They are not, Mr. President. They are separate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Oregon ask unanimous 
consent that they be considered together?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I think they need to be considered separately. 
They are on entirely different issues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Which amendment does the Senator wish to 
present to the body at this time?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If the clerk will read the first one before him, 
I will proceed with that.


                           Amendment No. 3520

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the first amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Smith], for himself, Mr. 
     Thomas, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Allard, Mr. Bond, Mr. Grams, Mr. 
     Dodd, Mr. Sessions, Ms. Collins, Mr. Wyden and Mr. D'Amato, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3520.

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section, and renumber the remaining sections accordingly:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This section may be cited as the ``Equality for Israel at 
     the United Nations Act of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. EFFORT TO PROMOTE FULL EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
                   FOR ISRAEL.

       (a) Congressional Statement.--It is the sense of the 
     Congress that--
       (1) the United States must help promote an end to the 
     inequity experienced by Israel in the United Nations whereby 
     Israel is the only longstanding member of the organization to 
     be denied acceptance into any of the United Nations region 
     blocs, which serve as the basis for participation in 
     important activities of the United Nations, including 
     rotating membership on the United Nations Security Council; 
     and
       (2) the United States Ambassador to the United Nations 
     should take all steps necessary to ensure Israel's acceptance 
     in the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) regional bloc, 
     whose membership includes the non-European countries of 
     Canada, Australia, and the United States.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this legislation and on a semiannual 
     basis thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report which includes 
     the following information (in classified or unclassified form 
     as appropriate):
       (1) Actions taken by representatives of the United States, 
     including the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 
     to encourage the nations of the Western Europe and Others 
     Group (WEOG) to accept Israel into their regional bloc;
       (2) efforts undertaken by the Secretary General of the 
     United Nations to secure Israel's full and equal 
     participation in that body;
       (3) specific responses solicited and received by the 
     Secretary of State from each of the nations of Western Europe 
     and Others Group (WEOG) on their position concerning Israel's 
     acceptance into their organization; and
       (4) other measures being undertaken, and which will be 
     undertaken, to ensure and promote Israel's full and equal 
     participation in the United Nations.

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an 
amendment requiring the Secretary of State to report on actions taken 
by our Ambassador to the United Nations to push the nations of the 
Western Europe and Others Group to accept Israel into their group.
  As you may know, Israel is the only nation among the 185 member 
states that does not hold membership in a regional group. Membership in 
a regional group is the prerequisite for any nation to serve on key 
United Nations bodies such as the Security Council.
  In order to correct this inequality, I am introducing ``The Equality 
for Israel at the United Nations Act of 1998.'' I believe that this 
legislation will prompt our United Nations Representative to make 
equality for Israel at the United Nations a high priority.
  I am proud to be joined by Senators Brownback, Allard, Bond, Grams, 
Dodd, Sessions, Collins, Wyden, D'Amato and Thomas as original 
cosponsors of this important legislation.
  Mr. President, Israel has been a member of the United Nations since 
1949, yet it has been continuously precluded from membership in any 
regional bloc. Most member states from the Middle East would block the 
vote needed to join their own regional group.
  The Western Europe and Others Group, however, has accepted countries 
from other geographical areas such as the United States and Australia, 
for example.
  This year United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that 
``It's time to usher in a new era of relations between Israel and the 
United Nations * * * One way to rectify that new chapter would be to 
rectify an anomaly: Israel's position as the only Member State that is 
not a member of one of the regional groups, which means it has no 
chance of being elected to serve on main organs such as the Security 
Council or the Economic and Social Council. This anomaly would be 
corrected.''
  I believe it is time to back Secretary General Annan's idea with 
strong support from the United States Senate and I ask all my 
colleagues to join me in sending this message to the UN to stop this 
discrimination against Israel.

[[Page S9755]]

                           Amendment No. 3521

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Smith], for himself, Mr. 
     Biden, Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. Johnson, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3521.

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, add the following:

     SEC. . SANCTION AGAINST SERBIA-MONTENEGRO.

       (a) Continuation of Executive Branch Sanctions.--The 
     sanctions listed in subsection (b) shall remain in effect 
     until January 1, 2000, unless the President submits to the 
     Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations in the 
     Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives a certification 
     described in subsection (c).
       (b) Applicable Sanctions.--
       (1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United 
     States executive directors of the international financial 
     institutions to work in opposition to, and vote against, any 
     extension by such institutions of any financial or technical 
     assistance or grants of any kind to the government of Serbia-
     Montenegro.
       (2) The Secretary of State should instruct the United 
     States Ambassador to the Organization for Security and 
     Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to block any consensus to allow 
     the participation of Serbia-Montenegro in the OSCE or any 
     organization affiliated with the OSCE.
       (3) The Secretary of State should instruct the United 
     States Representative to the United Nations to vote against 
     any resolution in the United Nations Security Council to 
     admit Serbia-Montenegro to the Untied Nations or any 
     organization affiliated with the United Nations, to veto any 
     resolution to allow Serbia-Montenegro to assume the United 
     Nations' membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia, and to take action to prevent Serbia-
     Montenegro from assuming the seat formerly occupied by the 
     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (4) The Secretary of State should instruct the United 
     States Permanent Representative on the Council of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization to oppose the extension of the 
     Partnership for Peace program or any other organization 
     affiliated with NATO to Serbia-Montenegro.
       (5) The Secretary of State should instruct the United 
     States Representatives to the Southeast European Cooperative 
     Initiative (SECI) to oppose and to work to prevent the 
     extension of SECI membership to Serbia-Montenegro.
       (c) Certification.--A certification described in this 
     subsection is a certification that--
       (1) the representatives of the successor states to the 
     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have successfully 
     negotiated the division of assets and liabilities and all 
     other succession issues following the dissolution of the 
     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (2) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is fully complying 
     with its obligations as a signatory to the General Framework 
     Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (3) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is fully 
     cooperating with and providing unrestricted access to the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
     including surrendering persons indicted for war crimes who 
     are within the jurisdiction of the territory of Serbia-
     Montenegro, and with the investigations concerning the 
     commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
     Kosova.
       (4) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is implementing 
     internal democratic reforms.
       (5) Serbian, Serbian-Montenegrin federal governmental 
     officials, and representatives of the ethnic Albanian 
     community in Kosova have agreed on, signed, and begun 
     implementation of a negotiated settlement on the future 
     status of Kosova.
       (d) Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the United States should not restore full diplomatic 
     relations with Serbia-Montenegro until the President submits 
     to the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations in 
     the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and 
     International Relations in the House of Representatives the 
     certification described in subsection (c).
       (e) Exemption of Montenegro.--The sanctions described in 
     subsection (b)(1) should not apply to the Government of 
     Montenegro.
       (f) Definition.--The term ``international financial 
     institution'' includes the International Monetary Fund, the 
     International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
     International Development Association, the International 
     Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty 
     Agency, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development.
       (g) Waiver Authority.--
       (1) The President may waive the application in whole or in 
     part, of any sanction described in subsection (b) if the 
     President certifies to the Congress that the President has 
     determined that the waiver is necessary to meet emergency 
     humanitarian needs or to achieve a negotiated settlement of 
     the conflict in Kosova that is acceptable to the parties.
       (2) Such a waiver may only be effective upon certification 
     by the President to Congress that the United States has 
     transferred and will continue to transfer (subject to 
     adequate protection of intelligence sources and methods) to 
     the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
     all information it has collected in support of an indictment 
     and trial of President Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, 
     crimes against humanity, or genocide.
       (3) In the event of a waiver, within seven days the 
     President must report the basis upon which the waiver was 
     made to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on International Relations in the House of Representatives.

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, we have all watched the events in 
Kosovo with alarm and distress over the past several months. The 
situation on the ground continues to deteriorate and no progress has 
been made on a negotiated solution to the conflict.
  Serb paramilitary groups and Yugoslav army units are conducting 
offensives in Kosovo that have the effect of driving tens of thousands 
of Kosovar Albanians from their homes. Innocent civilians have been 
killed. Villages throughout the province have been razed. Humanitarian 
workers in Kosovo are in great danger as they try to fulfill their 
mission of delivering food, medicine, and other necessities to the 
refugee population.
  In fact, just recently, in a despicable act, three aid workers with 
the Mother Theresa Society in Kosovo were deliberately killed by 
Serbian forces as they attempted to deliver humanitarian assistance to 
Kosovars that had been displaced by the conflict. Fighting has occurred 
on the border with Albania, highlighting the potential for this 
conflict to spread throughout the Balkans, and even involve Greece and 
Turkey, two of our NATO allies.
  Mr. President, I lay the blame of this disaster on the shoulders of 
one man: Slobodan Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, currently President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, rose to power in 1989 by exploiting and 
manipulating Serbian nationalism in Kosovo--a process that led directly 
to the horrific war in Bosnia and resulted in the death of tens of 
thousands of Bosnians of all ethnic groups. In his desperate effort to 
hold onto power, Milosevic has reverted to his old tricks: he is using 
the status of Kosovo--a province which is overwhelmingly populated by 
ethnic Albanians--to consolidate and perpetuate his authority and 
position.
  The six-nation Contact Group charged with monitoring events in the 
former Yugoslavia has issued various sets of demands since the crisis 
began in February--demands which Milosevic repeatedly ignores. I am 
aware of the diplomatic effort underway to start the process of 
negotiating a settlement. Yet no solution will endure that does not 
guarantee the Albanians in Kosovo their full political rights and civil 
liberties.
  Mr. President, for several years, the Clinton Administration has 
maintained a policy of upholding the so-called ``outer wall'' of 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The FRY is what 
remains of socialist Yugoslavia, and consists of two republics, Serbia 
and Montenegro.
  The outer wall denies United States' support of FRY membership in 
international organizations. It denies United States' support for FRY 
access to economic assistance provided by international financial 
institutions. And the outer wall withholds full United States 
diplomatic relations with the FRY.
  The Administration has stated that the FRY and Mr. Milosevic must 
fulfill five conditions before the outer wall of sanctions is lifted. 
The amendment that we have before us today requires the President to 
certify these five conditions are met before any action is taken to 
lift or to weaken the outer wall.
  These five conditions as laid out by senior officials of the Clinton 
Administration are as follows. First, all succession issues due to the 
break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--in 
particular, the division of assets and liabilities--must be resolved

[[Page S9756]]

with the other republics that emerged from the dissolution of that 
country. Second, the FRY must comply with all of its obligations as a 
signatory of the Dayton Accords. Third, the FRY must cooperate with the 
War Crimes Tribunal that is investigating and prosecuting war criminals 
in the former Yugoslavia. Fourth, the FRY must make substantial 
progress in implementing democratic reforms. And finally, the FRY must 
make progress in resolving the situation in Kosovo.
  When discussing ``progress'' in Kosovo, I want to emphasize that 
progress does not mean the end of the Serbian policy of ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo. Nor does it mean Serbian paramilitary forces 
ceasing their operations directed at civilians in Kosovo. That is not 
progress. Progress is a negotiated settlement that allows ethnic 
Albanians to exercise their political rights.
  Let me be clear: the problem here is Mr. Milosevic, not the Serbian 
people. The Serbian people must not be blamed for the irrational 
policies promoted by Milosevic. I want to be helpful to those in Serbia 
who are courageously opposing the detrimental policies propounded by 
him. These individuals are trying to establish independent media that 
will provide unbiased reporting to the Serbian people; they are working 
to strengthen the democratic opposition, small though it is, to 
Milosevic's stronghold on power; they are trying to develop a civil 
society based on the rule of law. They need our help--and they deserve 
our help.
  But Mr. Milosevic--and the Serbian people--must understand that 
Milosevic either needs to comply with the five conditions laid out by 
the Administration or his country will continue to be isolated into the 
next century.
  Before continuing, Mr. President, I must take note of the positive 
developments that have occurred this year in Montenegro, Serbia's 
partner in the FRY. Montenegro has made great strides in implementing 
necessary reforms to make the transition from a socialist state with a 
centrally planned economy to a free market democracy.
  Events in Montenegro prove that democracy can take root and flourish 
in the FRY, but requires leaders that are committed to a pluralistic, 
multi-ethnic state. It is in our interests to support Montenegrin 
President Djukanovic in his effort to consolidate and accelerate the 
democratic reform process. Though Mr. Milosevic has made every attempt 
to frustrate President Djukanovic's efforts, the Montenegrin people 
have spoken--and their choice is democracy.
  Mr. President, the amendment we have before us clearly states exactly 
what Mr. Milosevic needs to do for his country to join the family of 
Western nations. This is not a secret to him. It has been the position 
of this Administration for several years. What is new, however, is that 
this amendment prohibits the FRY from joining international 
organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and prohibits the FRY from gaining 
access to assistance from international financial institutions until 
each of these five conditions are met.
  What we are asking for is responsible behavior. Before lifting the 
outer wall of sanctions--which in effect is a reward for Serbia--we 
should expect nothing less.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. President, I understand that these amendments may be accepted by 
the managers of the bill. So I will not ask for the yeas and nays.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Smith amendments are cleared on 
both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take any more of the Senate's 
time. I learned a long time ago from a former chairman named Russell 
Long that when you are about to accept something, let it be accepted.
  I rise to cosponsor an amendment that codifies the so-called outer 
wall of sanctions on the government of Serbia-Montenegro.
  Mr. President, as we know, for the last decade Slobodan Milosevic has 
pursued his mad dream of a Greater Serbia. The result has been hundreds 
of thousands dead, millions made homeless, and centuries-old Serbian 
culture eradicated from sections of the former Yugoslavia.
  And Milosevic is continuing his murderous policies in Kosovo, while 
playing games with us in Bosnia and frustrating democratic reforms in 
Serbia.
  The amendment that Senator Smith, Senator D'Amato, Senator Johnson, 
and I are proposing codifies five categories of sanctions.
  First, the Secretary of the Treasury is to instruct the U.S. 
executive directors of the international financial institutions to work 
in opposition to and vote against, any extension by these institutions 
of any financial or technical assistance or grants of any kind to the 
government of Serbia. Montenegro's reformist government is exempted 
from these sanctions.
  Second, the Secretary of State is to instruct the U.S. Ambassador to 
the OSCE--the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--not 
to join any consensus to allow the participation of Serbia-Montenegro 
in the OSCE.
  Third, the Secretary of State is to instruct the Representative to 
the United Nations to vote against any resolution in the U.N. Security 
Council to admit Serbia-Montenegro to the U.N.
  Fourth, the U.S. is to oppose the extension of the Partnership for 
Peace program to Serbia-Montenegro.
  Fifth, the U.S. is to oppose the extension of membership in the 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative to Serbia-Montenegro.
  How might Milosevic avoid these sanctions?
  The amendment would drop these sanctions if the President certifies 
that Serbia-Montenegro has taken five steps.
  First, Serbian representatives must be negotiating in good faith with 
the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia on the division of 
assets and liabilities and other succession issues.
  Second, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be complying fully 
with its obligations as a signatory to the Dayton Accords.
  Third, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be cooperating fully 
with, and providing unrestricted access to, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
  Fourth, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be implementing 
internal democratic reforms, including progress in the rule of law and 
independent media. In this regard it is worth noting that the 
government of the Republic of Montenegro is already in compliance.
  Fifth, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must meet the requirements 
on Kosovo enumerated elsewhere in this Act.
  Mr. President, Slobodan Milosevic has jerked this country around long 
enough. This amendment makes clear to him what he has to do in order to 
have the outer wall of sanctions removed.
  The ball is squarely in his court.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I compliment my friend from Oregon in leading the way 
on this. I think the balance here is real. I think it is very 
important. I think it is totally consistent with the direction we have 
been going in the way the Senate should act relevant to the sanctions 
and the exceptions we grant the President for other reasons relating to 
other than that very high bar of the national security test.
  I compliment him. I thank him for the modification.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendments of 
the Senator from Oregon?
  Does the Senator from Oregon wish them to be voted on en bloc?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Yes. Mr. President, I would make that request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the two amendments of the Senator from Oregon.
  The amendments (No. 3520 and No. 3521) were agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

[[Page S9757]]

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thought we were ready for a finite 
list of amendments, but apparently we are not. The Senator from 
Oklahoma has been waiting patiently for a couple of hours. The Senator 
from New York also would like to make just a brief comment on the IMF 
provision. I know that the Senator from Idaho has brief comments to 
make as well. I wonder if it is all right with the Senator from 
Oklahoma, since his amendment is going to be a contentious amendment, 
if we dispose of comments of the Senator from New York and the Senator 
from Idaho, which I understand are going to be quite brief.
  Mr. INHOFE. I have no objection.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, may I thank the distinguished manager of 
the legislation and my colleague and friend from Oklahoma for his 
courtesy.
  Mr. President, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill before us 
addresses a matter of the utmost urgency: the need to replenish the 
resources of the International Monetary Fund.
  Title VI of the bill provides $14.5 billion--the amount of the United 
States' quota increase--which will augment the general funds available 
to the IMF. The need for this measure is undeniable: the Fund's 
resources have been seriously depleted as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis--specifically, the $36.1 billion in assistance 
committed to Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea--and now nearly drained by 
ominous developments in Russia. Not to mention the potential 
``contagion'' effect. The bill also approves the United States' $3.36 
billion contribution to the New Arrangements to Borrow--a new fund that 
will provide additional resources to respond to financial crises of 
such consequence that they threaten the stability of the international 
monetary system. Unfortunately, we have entered a period in which 
crises of such magnitude are upon us.
  Action on the IMF funding request is surely overdue. The President 
sought these funds in his requested supplemental appropriation for 
Fiscal Year 1998. The Senate readily agreed, approving the IMF funding 
amendment offered by the distinguished floor manager, the Senator from 
Kentucky, by a resounding vote of 84-16. That was on March 26. 
Regrettably and incomprehensibly, the measure was then dropped in 
conference at the urging of the House. It is now more than five months 
later, with no action by the other body, and global financial markets 
are in yet more precarious positions.
  I spoke this morning with our esteemed Secretary of the Treasury, 
Secretary Rubin, who reiterated the importance of immediate action on 
this legislation. There is no end in sight to the Asian financial 
crisis, which began more than a year ago in Thailand. The President 
today is in Russia, which is on the brink of financial collapse. These 
events, particularly those in Russia in recent days, ought to convince 
us that this is not the time to put into jeopardy the IMF as an active 
participant in world financial matters.
  It is true that the Russian economy is small. As pointed out in 
Saturday's New York Times, the drop last week in the value of stocks on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange--some $241 billion--was roughly the size of 
the entire annual output of the Russian economy at present exchange 
rates. Western Europe's exports to Russia account for well under 0.4 
percent of their GDP. And for the United States, the amount is 
minuscule. Total U.S. exports to Russia in 1997 reached $3.4 billion, a 
mere 0.04 percent of our GDP.
  But it would be a serious mistake to minimize the potential impact of 
the current crisis in Russia. As The Financial Times pointed out last 
weekend, in its August 29-30, 1998 issue,

       Events in Moscow have moved with bewildering speed. The 
     rouble and stock market are plunging, and there is a run on 
     the banks. Most of the reformers seem to be out of the 
     government, replaced by politicians who can be relied on only 
     to set policies to meet the desires of Russia's oligarchs. . 
     . . However, it is already clear that the impact of this 
     crisis will be greatly disproportionate to Russia's size. At 
     worst, the crisis could trigger a new round of contagion, 
     sending western stock markets crashing, and the world into 
     recession . . .

And yet, the economic consequences of the current turmoil in Russia are 
not nearly as serious as the potential political consequences, which 
may have profound implications for the people of Russia--and indeed for 
the entire globe in this nuclear age.
  For instance, Dr. Murray Feshbach, who warned so presciently in the 
early 1980s about the troubles afflicting the Soviet Union, continues 
to document frightening Russian public health problems. The life 
expectancy of Russian men dropped from 62 years in 1989 to 57 years in 
1996. There is no historical equivalent. It has increased slightly in 
the last year, but remains at appalling levels. A century ago, a 16 
year-old Russian male had a 56 percent chance of surviving to age 60. 
In 1996, a 16 year-old Russian male had only a 54 percent chance of 
surviving to age 60. Two percent less than he would have had he been 
born a century earlier!
  The military is not spared the problems afflicting the Russian 
economy or the health of its citizens. Last month, an army major in 
central Russia took to the streets with a tank to protest the failure 
to pay wages. The first rule of government is pay the army. Russian 
soldiers are reduced to begging for food. The decrepit state of the 
military leaves Russia, for the most part, undefended. Except, Sir, for 
nuclear weapons, of which it has over 20,000.
  A recent National Security Blueprint, issued by President Boris 
Yeltsin on December 17, 1997, is a remarkable document. It is a 14,500-
word assessment of Russian national security published openly in an 
official paper. It acknowledges the ethnic tensions which exist in 
Russia and notes how the weak economy exacerbates those forces. It 
states:

       The critical state of the economy is the main cause of the 
     emergence of a threat to the Russian Federation's national 
     security. This is manifested in the substantial reduction in 
     production, the decline in investment and innovation, the 
     destruction of scientific and technical potential, the 
     stagnation of the agrarian sector, the disarray of the 
     monetary and payments system, the reduction in the income 
     side of the federal budget, and the growth of the state debt.

  It goes on to warn:

       The negative processes in the economy exacerbate the 
     centrifugal tendencies of Russian Federation components and 
     lead to the growth of the threat of violation of the 
     country's territorial integrity and the unity of its legal 
     area.
       The ethnic egotism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinism that are 
     displayed in the activities of a number of ethnic social 
     formations help to increase national separatism and create 
     favorable conditions for the emergence of conflict in this 
     sphere.

                          (Emphasis supplied.)

  Mr. President, the IMF, with its emphasis on economic reform, has a 
role to play here. Now is not the time to call into question the United 
States' commitment to that institution. We can debate whether the 
amounts provided in this bill will be enough. Indeed, a persuasive 
article in this morning's Washington Post by Susan Eisenhower, chairman 
of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies here in Washington, 
states:

       Simply put: The IMF multiyear ``bailouts'' were enough to 
     obligate Russia to implement Western-designed programs, but 
     not enough to do the job. Total Western assistance to Russia 
     has been a fraction of what West Germany has spent in East 
     Germany since unification.

  It may be time for us to concede that the situation in Russia merits 
a much more aggressive assistance program, on the order of the Marshall 
Plan that was so effective in reviving Western Europe. Fifty years ago, 
from 1948-1952, the United States gave about $3 billion a year to fund 
the Marshall Plan. A comparable contribution in round numbers, given 
the current size of the United States economy, would be about $100 
billion a year for five years. And yet, the United States' total 
bilateral assistance to Russia in the five-year period from fiscal 
years 1992 through 1996 was merely $3.1 billion.
  Certainly the 20,000 nuclear weapons in Russia's hands ought to 
persuade us that a more serious approach to Russia's economic problems 
is required. Without question, the first order of business must be the 
passage of this legislation, to secure funding for the IMF. And after 
that, we ought to begin a serious debate on what more can and should to 
be done.

[[Page S9758]]

  Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, thank you, very much. May I also thank 
the Senator from Oklahoma for his patience. He has an amendment to 
offer.
  I rise to thank the chairman, the Senator from Kentucky, and the 
ranking member, the Senator from Vermont, for his help on two 
amendments which I placed in this foreign ops bill, and also some very 
important language that they worked out with me with regard to the IMF.
  By way of explanation, the amendments require U.S. directors of 
international institutions (such as the IMF and Agency for 
International Development, AID) to use the voice and vote of the United 
States to encourage purchase of American products, commodities and 
equipment. This legislation requires that our directors of 
international organizations use their influence to encourage purchase 
of U.S. ag commodities.

  The amendments also require the Secretary of the Treasury to report 
to Congress annually on the efforts of the heads of federal agencies 
and the U.S. executive directors of international financial 
institutions to promote the purchase of American commodities. We can't 
just tell these directors to promote our products, we must also have 
some accountability, so we can encourage and see the results of U.S. 
agricultural commodities actually being purchased.
  This is strong, unambiguous language. The concept and language of 
this amendment affecting surplus commodities should be applied to the 
equally important issue that funds made available through this bill 
should purchase American agricultural products.
  If we are going to ask American farmers and ranchers to pay their 
taxes to support the financial assistance provided in this bill, then 
we should ask their American representatives in these international 
financial institutions to urge the purchase of American agriculture 
commodities with the funds made available with this bill.
  The foreign operations bill also attempts to increase exports of 
American products and also seeks to make sure that the International 
Monetary Fund will not subsidize the foreign semiconductor industry to 
the detriment of American semiconductor companies. Specifically, the 
provisions require the Secretary of Treasury to certify to Congress 
that no IMF resources will support semiconductor and other key 
industries in any form, and that the Secretary of the Treasury will 
instruct the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to use the voice and 
vote of the United States to oppose disbursement of further funds if 
such certification is not given.
  Mr. President, I thank the chairman and the ranking member again for 
working with me on this particular language which is critically 
important to the semiconductor industry. Senator Craig and I have met 
with a number of individuals from the U.S. Treasury, including the 
Secretary of Treasury, Robert Rubin, prior to his trip to Asia. I 
believe that he delivered a very strong message to the countries in 
Asia.
  As we have talked about the semiconductor business, the transparency 
issue of the International Monetary Fund, as well as agriculture, they 
are all linked together because when we met with a number of the 
national ag commodity groups, they all said there is a crisis that 
exists in agriculture today, and one of the elements that they stressed 
that was important was to see the recovery of economies around the 
world, certainly in Asia so that those markets, again, are available to 
U.S. agricultural commodities.
  So, again, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for his great help and 
leadership on this issue.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I, too, thank and congratulate the 
Senator from Idaho for his amendments and his good work in this regard.
  Now, the long-suffering Senator from Oklahoma is next.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished Senator for 
yielding.


                           Amendment No. 3366

 (Purpose: To require a certification that the signing of the Landmine 
Convention is consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the 
                   armed forces of the United States)

  Mr. INHOFE. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3366.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 82, line 16, after the end period insert: ``This 
     subsection shall not apply unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
     and the unified combatant commanders certify in writing to 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives that the signing of the Convention is 
     consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the 
     armed forces of the United States.''.

  Mr. INHOFE. There is some language that was put on this bill by the 
very distinguished Senator from Vermont. I will read that language to 
you. The language states:

       Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the United States 
     Government to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
     Mines and on Their Destruction as soon as practicable.

  My amendment merely agrees to that language but adds, provided ``the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders certify in 
writing to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives that'' 
such a step ``is consistent with the combat requirements and safety of 
the armed forces of the United States.''
  So essentially what we are doing is saying that we agree that the 
language is--even though I would prefer the language not be in there, 
the language remain in there, but it be qualified. I am always a little 
bit confused and disturbed when I see the qualifier ``as practicable.'' 
I don't know what ``as practicable'' means, and so I think this 
actually would improve the language that was put in by the Senator from 
Vermont giving some qualifications.
  I think also that the Senator from Vermont has a lot of passion on 
this issue. I certainly understand that. When I was a freshman, I was 
seated up there where the President is seated right now and listened to 
his comments for about an hour. I know his concern comes from the 
heart. I think he is also equally concerned about the safety of troops 
deployed overseas, thousands of troops in South Korea and troops all 
around the world.
  A statement that was made by the Senator from Vermont, referring to 
the Ottawa Treaty, was: I think we can get to it sooner, and I and 
others will be pushing to do so. So I think there is going to be an 
ongoing effort to get to this treaty sooner than some of us would want 
to do that.
  The fact is that our senior military commanders, both those currently 
in uniform and many of those now in retirement, have already put us on 
notice: The U.S. military requires the ability to make responsible use 
of self-destructing APLs. This is particularly true in those situations 
where American forces are forced to operate in hostile territory, often 
severely outnumbered. The alternative to the responsible use of 
antipersonnel landmines is to have their positions overrun, to 
beachhead loss and heavy casualty loss unnecessarily sustained.
  So, Mr. President, here is what every Member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and every one of the unified combatant commanders wrote last 
year, and I am quoting right now.

       Self-destructing landmines are particularly important to 
     the protection of early entry and light forces which must be 
     prepared to fight outnumbered during the initial stages of 
     deployment. The lives of our sons and daughters should be 
     given the highest priority when deciding whether or not to 
     ban unilaterally the use of self-destructing APLs.

  I ask unanimous consent to have the full text of this extraordinary 
letter dated July 10 of 1997 printed in the Record.

[[Page S9759]]

  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                    The Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                    Washington, DC, July 10, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: We are seriously concerned about the new 
     legislative proposal to permanently restrict the use of funds 
     for new deployment of antipersonnel landmines (APL) 
     commencing January 1, 2000. Passing this bill into law will 
     unnecessarily endanger U.S. military forces and significantly 
     restrict the ability to conduct combat operations 
     successfully. As the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Bill and 
     other related legislation are considered, your support is 
     needed for the Service members whose lives may depend on the 
     force protection afforded by such landmines.
       We share the world's concern about the growing humanitarian 
     problem related to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use 
     of a lawful weapon, non-self-destructing APL. In fact we have 
     banned non-self-destructing [dumb] APL, except for Korea. We 
     support the President's APL policy which has started us on 
     the road to ending our reliance on any anti-personnel 
     landmines. Having taken a great step toward the elimination 
     of APL, we must at this time, retain the use of self-
     destructing APL in order to minimize the risk to U.S. 
     soldiers and marines in combat. However, we are ready to ban 
     all APL when the major producers and suppliers ban theirs or 
     when an alternative is available.
       Landmines are a ``combat multiplier'' for U.S. land forces, 
     especially since the dramatic reduction of the force 
     structure. Self-destructing landmines greatly enhance the 
     ability to shape the battlefield, protect unit flanks, and 
     maximize the effects of other weapons systems. Self-
     destructing landmines are particularly important to the 
     protection of early entry and light forces, which must be 
     prepared to fight outnumbered during the initial stages of a 
     deployment.
       This legislation, in its current form, does not 
     differentiate between non-self-destructing and self-
     destructing APL. Banning new deployments of APL will prevent 
     use of most modern U.S. remotely delivered landmine systems 
     to protect U.S. forces. This includes prohibiting use of most 
     antitank landmine systems because they have APL embedded 
     during production. Self-destructing APL are essential to 
     prevent rapid breaching of antitank mines by the enemy. These 
     concerns were reported to you in the recent ``Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff Report to Congress on the Effects of a 
     Moratorium Concerning Use by Armed Forces of APL.'' Also of 
     concern is that the bill's definition of an APL jeopardizes 
     use of other munitions essential to CINC warplanes.
       We request that you critically review the new APL 
     legislation and take appropriate action to ensure maximum 
     protection for our soldiers and marines who carry out 
     national security policy at grave personal risk. Until the 
     United States has a capable replacement for self-destructing 
     APL, maximum flexibility and warfighting capability for 
     American combat commanders must be preserved. The lives of 
     our sons and daughters should be given the highest priority 
     when deciding whether or not to ban unilaterally the use of 
     self-destructing APL.
           Sincerely,
         Joseph W. Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
           Staff; Dennis J. Reimer, General, U.S. Army, Chief of 
           Staff; Ronald R. Fogleman, General, USAF, Chief of 
           Staff; J.J. Sheehan, General, USMC, Commander in Chief, 
           U.S. Atlantic Command; James L. Jamerson, General, 
           USAF, U.S. Deputy Commander in Chief, Europe; Henry H. 
           Shelton, General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. 
           Special Operations Command; Howell M. Estes, III, 
           General, USAF, Commander in Chief, NORAD/USSPACECOM; 
           Walter Kross, General, USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. 
           Transportation Command.
         John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
           Staff; Jay L. Johnson, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of 
           Naval Operations; C.C. Krulak, General, U.S. Marine 
           Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps; J.H. Binford 
           Peay, III, General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. 
           Central Command; J.W. Prueher, Admiral, U.S. Navy, 
           Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Wesley K. 
           Clark, General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. 
           Southern Command; Eugene E. Habiger, General, USAF, 
           Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command; John H. 
           Tilelli, Jr., General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, 
           United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command.

  Mr. INHOFE. As I said, I don't want to change the language. I don't 
think I want to change the intent of the language of the Senator from 
Vermont, but nonetheless this does put language in there that would 
take our troops out from harm's way.
  I know that the Senator from Vermont has some comments to make 
perhaps in opposition to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thought the Senator was going to be 
speaking longer.
  Mr. President, I would like to read what is in the bill. It says:

       It is the policy of the U.S. Government to sign the 
     Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
     Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
     Destruction as soon as practicable.

  That is a convention that has now been signed by some 129 nations, 
including every one of our NATO allies except Turkey and every other 
Western Hemisphere country except Cuba. It says we will sign it as soon 
as practicable. It does not set a deadline. Other nations far less 
powerful than the United States have said they can sign it, but we have 
not signed it. We have said that even though we are the most powerful 
nation history has ever known, we are not powerful enough to sign the 
anti-landmine treaty, but we wish other nations would. And we have 
encouraged other nations to give up their landmines, in laudatory 
fashion--nations nowhere near as powerful as we, nations that face a 
lot more threats on their borders than we.
  Mr. President, I happen to disagree with the President of the United 
States in that regard. I do agree with my friend from Oklahoma that 
both he and I are concerned about the men and women that we send into 
combat. My son is a marine. He is a rifleman in the Marine Corps. When 
he was called up for Desert Storm, his MOL was carry the SAW, light 
machine gun, and he was listed as a ``casualty replacement,'' 
encouraging terminology for parents of all young marines who are so 
listed--the idea that they are the ones who go first into combat 
carrying a gun with others behind them to pick up the guns, the 
weapons, and so on, if the first one falls, which in this instance 
would have been our son.
  Now, we are fortunate the war ended so quickly that neither he nor 
the others in his unit ended up in harm's way. But I have to assume he 
may be called up again. And as a parent and a U.S. Senator, the last 
thing in the world I want to do is anything that increases the threat 
to our own troops or that in any way diminishes our ability to defend 
ourselves.
  But having said that, I am also struck by the number of generals, the 
number of combat leaders, including the retired commander in chief in 
Korea, including the former supreme allied commander of NATO in Europe, 
including a number of others who have called for such a ban on 
landmines because it has become such a double-edged sword, aside from 
the fact that most people who are killed by landmines today are 
civilians, not combatants.
  The United States was the first Nation in the world to actually pass 
landmine ban legislation, legislation that banned the export of 
landmines from this country, something hotly contested in this Chamber. 
And in a rollcall vote, 100 Senators voted for that amendment, voted 
for the Leahy law, and it became law--100 U.S. Senators across the 
political spectrum. In fact, many have said that that legislation was 
the trigger that got us to where we are today, where 129 nations have 
signed the Ottawa Treaty.
  We expect 40 ratifications by next month. That is the fastest that 
any international humanitarian law or arms control treaty has ever in 
history come into force. I think that shows the tremendous 
international support and momentum for this treaty and for the end to 
the endless slaughter of innocent people by landmines.
  Now, the United States has not signed it, and even if the United 
States does sign it, even if the United States does sign it, it then 
has to come to the Senate where two-thirds of the Senators present and 
voting have to vote to approve such a treaty before the President can 
ratify it. The President of the United States cannot ratify such a 
treaty unless two-thirds of the Senators present and voting vote to 
allow him to ratify it. And actually, if we did, he still doesn't have 
to ratify it but, of course, would.
  Mr. President, even though a majority of the Senators in this body 
have signed legislation, cosponsored legislation that would ban United 
States use of anti-personnel mines except in Korea, in an attempt to 
work closely with the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and particularly General Ralston for whom I have immeasurable respect, 
the President of

[[Page S9760]]

the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security 
Adviser, I worked hard to agree on an approach that was acceptable to 
everyone. The language in this bill, which the Senator from Oklahoma 
wants to modify, is consistent with that agreement. My language simply 
says it is our policy to sign the treaty as soon as practicable. And 
that reflects the understanding that the administration is searching 
aggressively for alternatives to landmines. And General Ralston has 
assured me that they are doing that and I have confidence in him.
  Incidentally, several types of landmines we use are not prohibited by 
the Ottawa Treaty, neither command detonated Claymore mines, nor anti-
tank mines. But I am concerned that my friend from Oklahoma now wants 
to give a veto to a whole lot of other people. The fact of the matter 
is, no treaty is going to come up here with any chance of being 
approved by two-thirds of the Senate unless the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and everybody else 
support it. But the Senator from Oklahoma wants to require that each of 
the unified combatant commanders has to agree--it apparently isn't 
enough that the Commander in Chief, or the Secretary of Defense, 
agrees.
  I have dealt in good faith with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
President and the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of 
Defense. My language reflects that. And I agreed not to oppose a waiver 
of my moratorium legislation, and other things that the Pentagon 
wanted. The amendment by the Senator from Oklahoma places that 
agreement in jeopardy.
  I know there may be others who wish to speak. I will give a longer 
tutorial on the landmines issue later today or tomorrow. But let's be 
clear. My language does not have us ratifying the Ottawa Treaty or 
anything like that. We are not ratifying it here, even though 40 of 
those nations will have done so very shortly, the fastest that any 
international law or arms control treaty has ever been agreed to come 
into force. No. Even with my language, the United States is still one 
of the lone holdouts in the world. Certainly among our NATO allies we 
are the most significant holdout.
  I tell my friend from Oklahoma, if he went to some of the parts of 
the world where we use the Leahy War Victims Fund and saw the numbers 
of civilians blown apart by landmines, he would understand my concerns. 
And if he received the letters or talked to the military officers I 
have talked to who have been injured, or seen their fellow soldiers 
killed or wounded by our own landmines, he would understand. And if he 
had heard some of the speeches by our allies who ask why the most 
powerful nation on Earth wants them to give up their landmines but 
refuses to give up ours, then he would also understand my concern.
  Mr. President, I will have more to say and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  I withhold that, Mr. President, if the Senator from Oklahoma wishes 
to speak. I withhold the suggestion of the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Vermont. Most of the things he 
stated so eloquently I do agree with. I would like to discuss a couple 
of them, however.
  The 125 nations or so that we are talking about that he referred to 
who signed this Ottawa Treaty--obviously, we have not. I don't think it 
is good policy for us to say that we didn't sign it ourselves but we 
encourage others to do it.
  I have not seen any documentation of that. If I did, it wouldn't 
really be too meaningful to me.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. INHOFE. Of course.
  Mr. LEAHY. We have encouraged others to give up their landmines. We 
have done this around the world, as we should. In the Ottawa Treaty, 
no; in fact, in the Ottawa Treaty, when it was being negotiated in 
Oslo, the United States came in at the last minute and expressed some 
interest but we did everything possible to thwart it up to that point.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator for that clarification.
  A statement that was made by the Senator from Vermont was that, if 
you go to parts of the world where you can see the damage inflicted by 
these, you perhaps will feel differently. I suggest to the Senator, I 
have been there, and I remember the problems we had in Nicaragua and 
Honduras. There is nothing that is more repugnant, nothing that is 
sadder than seeing the effect of landmines on individuals. However, 
what we are talking about now is many of those landmines were not U.S. 
landmines. Those were landmines that were made in other parts of the 
world. We are talking about self-destructing landmines, self-disarming 
landmines, and landmines that, in the opinion of our military leaders, 
are necessary to save the lives of Americans.
  As far as the alternatives, I hope that we are going to be able to 
come up with alternatives to landmines, even smart landmines. I will be 
the first one, when that time comes, to stand here on the floor of the 
Senate and change our policy so that we can more accurately use and 
effectively use these landmines. However, we can always change the law 
when that time comes.
  In addition, the statement that I read was endorsed by every member 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and every one of the unified combatant 
commanders, which was:

       Self-destructing landmines are particularly important to 
     the protection of early entry and light forces which must be 
     prepared to fight outnumbered during the initial stages of 
     deployment. The lives of our sons and daughters should be 
     given the highest priority when deciding whether or not to 
     ban unilaterally the use of destructive APLs.

  I think some of the same language was used by our Commander in Chief 
when the President said, it was a year ago this month I believe, Mr. 
President, he said:

       As Commander in Chief, I will not send our soldiers to 
     defend the freedom of our people and the freedom of others 
     without doing everything we can to make them as secure as 
     possible. There is a line that I simply cannot cross and that 
     line is the safety and security of our men and women in 
     uniform.

  Mr. KYL. Will the Senator from Oklahoma yield for a question?
  Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
  Mr. KYL. I have a copy of what I believe is the amendment that the 
Senator from Oklahoma has offered. I wonder if this is the amendment, 
and I am going to read what I have:

       This subsection shall not apply unless the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff and the unified combatant commanders certify in writing 
     to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives that the signing of the Convention is 
     consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the 
     armed forces of the United States.

  Is that the Senator's amendment?
  Mr. INHOFE. That is the language.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, it seems that we would all want the military 
leaders of our country to agree that any policy that we adopt is 
commensurate with both combat requirements and the safety of the Armed 
Forces of the United States. And if they are not willing to certify 
that, then I certainly wouldn't want to be on record as supporting a 
policy or a treaty or a law that they felt was inimical to the safety 
of the Armed Forces of the United States. I guess I am really wondering 
what the controversy is about. Maybe there isn't much controversy.
  Mr. INHOFE. I respond to the Senator from Arizona, at the very 
beginning when we opened our remarks, I said the language the Senator 
from Vermont put in this appropriations bill is left intact, but this 
one proviso is there. When we try to use the argument you are not going 
to be able to get the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs to agree, if they 
don't agree, I don't want to invoke this.
  I will say, yes, that is the intent and the letter of this amendment. 
It is very simple, and I can't imagine anyone will want to go on record 
saying that we want to stop the use of any kind of landmines if it is 
not in the best interest of our fighting troops over there as certified 
by the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if I can again ask the Senator from Oklahoma 
to yield, I certainly agree with that assessment. It seems to be a very 
reasonable proposition. I certainly hope our colleagues will agree with 
the amendment because of that.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Arizona.
  I would like to comment on a couple of other things. In addition to 
the letter that was sent by the Joint Chiefs, here is a letter that was 
sent to the

[[Page S9761]]

President last July by 24 of the Nation's most distinguished retired 
four-star ground combatant commanders, including a former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former supreme allied commander, Secretary 
of State, six former combatants of the Marine Corps, two former Chiefs 
of Staff of the Army, two recipients of the Congressional Medal of 
Honor and four service Vice Chiefs of Staff.
  This is what they said. A month ago this letter was received by the 
President:

       Studies suggest that U.S. allied casualties may be 
     increased by as much as 35 percent if self-destructing mines 
     are unavailable, particularly in the halting phase--

  The halting phase, we are talking about should the North Koreans come 
down south of the DMZ, we would have a phase where we would not be as 
prepared.
  They said:

       --particularly in the halting phase of operations against 
     aggressors. Such a cost is especially unsupportable since the 
     type of mines utilized by U.S. forces and the manner in which 
     they are employed by those forces do not contribute to the 
     humanitarian problem that impels diplomatic and legislative 
     initiatives to ban APLs.

  I find it difficult right now in light of what happened this last 
week, in terms of the missiles that were launched from North Korea and 
the accuracy of those missiles with two phases, that we can question 
whether or not there is a threat out there.
  These are the words that came from 24 of the Nation's most 
distinguished retired four-star ground combatant officers.
  They went on to say:

       Unfortunately, a ban on future deployment of APLs will in 
     no way diminish the danger imposed by tens of millions of 
     dumb landmines that have been irresponsibly sown where they 
     inflict terror and devastation on civilian populations. Only 
     the United States military and those of other law-abiding 
     nations will be denied a means through the use of marked or 
     monitored mine fields of reducing the costs and increasing 
     the probability of victory in future conflicts.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the full text of the 
letter from the retired generals dated July 21, 1997, printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                  An Open Letter to President Clinton

                                                    July 21, 1997.
     Hon. William Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We write to express our strong 
     opposition to U.S. participation in any international 
     agreement that would prohibit the defensive use by American 
     forces of modern, self-destructing anti-personnel landmines 
     (APLs) and/or the use of so-called ``dumb mines'' in the 
     Korean demilitarized zone. In our experience, such 
     responsible use of APLs is not only consistent with the 
     Nation's humanitarian responsibilities; it is indispensable 
     to the safety of our troops in many combat and peacekeeping 
     situations.
       We are also concerned about the implications of legislation 
     that would unilaterally deny the U.S. military the ability to 
     deploy any kind of anti-personnel landmines (except command-
     detonated Claymores and, provisionally, those in the Korean 
     DMZ). We agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have--as 
     stated by their Chairman, General John Shalikashvili--
     declared that a legislatively imposed moratorium on APL use: 
     ``. . . constitutes an increased risk to the lives of U.S. 
     forces, particularly in Korea and Southwest Asia, and 
     threatens mission accomplishment. It is the professional 
     military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
     geographic Combatant Commanders that the loss of APL which 
     occurs as a result of this moratorium, without a credible 
     offset, will result in unacceptable military risk to U.S. 
     forces.'' In fact, studies suggest that U.S./allied 
     casualties may be increased by as much as 35% if self-
     destructing mines are unavailable--particularly in the 
     ``halting phase'' of operations against aggressors. Such a 
     cost is especially unsupportable since the type of mines 
     utilized by U.S. forces and the manner in which they are 
     employed by those forces do not contribute to the 
     humanitarian problem that impels diplomatic and legislative 
     initiatives to ban APLs.
       Unfortunately, a ban on future deployments of APLs will in 
     no way diminish the danger posed by tens of millions of 
     ``dumb'' landmines that have been irresponsibly sown where 
     they will inflict terror and devastation on civilian 
     populations. Detecting and clearing such mines should 
     continue to receive urgent attention from our government and 
     others. The unverifiability and unenforceability of a ban on 
     production of such devices, however, virtually ensures that 
     this practice will continue in the future. Only the U.S. 
     military--and those of other law-abiding nations--will be 
     denied a means, through the use of marked and monitored 
     minefields, of reducing the costs and increasing the 
     probability of victory in future conflicts.
       Mr. President, we have fought our Nation's wars and our 
     battlefield experience causes us to urge you to resist all 
     efforts to impose a moratorium on the future use of self-
     destructing anti-personnel landmines by combat forces of the 
     United States.
           Sincerely,
       Robert H. Barrow, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commandant.
       Walter E. Boomer, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Assistant Commandant.
       Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), 
     Former Commandant.
       George B. Crist, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command.
       Raymond G. Davis, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Assistant Commandant, and Medal of Honor Recipient, (Korea).
       Michael S. Davison, General, United States Army, (Ret.), 
     Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
       John W. Foss, General, United States Army, (Ret.), 
     Commanding General, U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command.
       Alfred M. Gray, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commandant.
       Alexander M. Haig, Jr., General, United States Army (Ret.), 
     Former Supreme Allied, Commander, Europe, Former Secretary of 
     State.
       P.X. Kelley, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commandant.
       Frederick J. Kroesen, General, United States Army (Ret.), 
     Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
       Gary E. Luck, General, United States Army (Ret.), Former 
     Commander-in-Chief, United Nations, Command/Combined Forces, 
     Command, Korea.
       David M. Maddox, General, United States Army (Ret.), Former 
     Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
       Carl E. Mundy, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commandant.
       Glenn K. Otis, General, United States Army (Ret.), Former 
     Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
       Robert W. FisCassi, General, United States Army (Ret.), 
     Former Vice Chief of Staff.
       Crosbie E. Saint, General, United States Army (Ret.), 
     Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
       Donn A. Starry, General, United States Army (Ret.), Former 
     Commanding General, U.S. Army Readiness Command.
       Gordon R. Sullivan, General, United States Army (Ret.), 
     Former Chief of Staff.
       John W. Vessey, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former Chairman, 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       Louis C. Wagner, Jr., General, U.S. Army, Former Commanding 
     General, Army Materiel Command.
       Joseph J. Went, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Assistant Commandant.
       William C. Westmoreland, General, United States Army 
     (Ret.), Former Chief of Staff.
       Louis H. Wilson, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
     Commandant and Medal of Honor Recipient (World War II).

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, more recently, 16 of those generals have 
written a powerful open letter to the Senate opposing Senator Leahy's 
effort to legislate U.S. compliance with the Ottawa Treaty. They said 
in part:

       In our experience as former senior military commanders of 
     American ground forces, such a decision would likely 
     translate into the needless and unjustifiable death of many 
     of this country's combat personnel and possibly jeopardize 
     our forces' ability to prevail on the battlefield.

  I again ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letter from 
the generals dated June 16, 1997, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                      An Open Letter to the Senate

                                                    June 16, 1998.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: We understand that the Senate may 
     shortly be asked to consider an amendment to the FY 1999 
     Defense Authorization bill that would have the effect of 
     creating a statutory requirement for the U.S. military to 
     cease all use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) by 2006, if 
     not before. In our professional opinion as former senior 
     commanders of American ground forces, such a decision would 
     likely translate into the needless and unjustifiable death of 
     many of this country's combat personnel--and possibly 
     jeopardize our forces' ability to prevail on the battlefield.
       As you may know, we were among the twenty-four retired 
     four-star general officers who expressed to President Clinton 
     our concerns about such an initiative last summer. In an open 
     letter to the President dated July 21, 1997, we wrote: ``In 
     our experience, [the] responsible use of APLs is not only 
     consistent with the Nation's humanitarian responsibilities; 
     it is indispensable to the safety of our troops in many 
     combat and peacekeeping situations.'' The open letter went on 
     to note that:
       ``Studies suggest that U.S./allied casualties may be 
     increased by as much as 35% if self-destructing mines are 
     unavailable--particularly in the `halting phase' of 
     operations against aggressors. Such a cost is especially 
     unsupportable since the type of mines utilized by U.S. forces 
     and the manner in which

[[Page S9762]]

     they are employed by those forces do not contribute to the 
     humanitarian problem that impels diplomatic and legislative 
     initiatives to ban APLs.
       ``Unfortunately, a ban on future deployments of APLs will 
     in no way diminish the danger posed by tens of millions of 
     `dumb' landmines that have been irresponsibly sown where they 
     will inflict terror and devastation on civilian populations. 
     Detecting and clearing such mines should continue to receive 
     urgent attention from our government and others. The 
     unverifiability and unenforceability of a ban on production 
     of such devices, however, virtually ensures that this 
     practice will continue in the future. Only the U.S. 
     military--and those of other law-abiding nations--will be 
     denied a means, through the use of marked and monitored 
     minefields, of reducing the costs and increasing the 
     probability of victory in future conflicts.'' (Emphasis 
     added.)
       We were deeply troubled to learn that President Clinton has 
     recently agreed to impose constraints on and, within a few 
     years, to ban outright the use of even self-destructing anti-
     personnel landmines. This is all the more remarkable given 
     the opposition previously expressed by the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff and the Nation's Combatant Commanders to such 
     limitations and President Clinton's own statement of 
     September 17, 1997 when he announced his opposition to the 
     Ottawa treaty banning APLs, declaring:
       ``As Commander-in-Chief, I will not send our soldiers to 
     defend the freedom of our people and the freedom of others 
     without doing everything we can to make them as secure as 
     possible. . . . There is a line that I simply cannot cross, 
     and that line is the safety and security of our men and women 
     in uniform.''
       We urge you and your colleagues to reject any legislative 
     initiative that would have the effect of crossing the line--
     whether by endorsing new ``operational concepts'' (read, 
     accepting more U.S. casualties) or other measures--that would 
     jeopardize the safety and security of our men and women in 
     uniform by impinging upon the U.S. military's ability to make 
     responsible use of self-destructing/self-deactivating anti-
     personnel landmines and long-duration APLs in Korea.
           Sincerely,
         Robert H. Barrow, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), 
           Former Commandant.
         Raymond G. Davis, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), 
           Former Assistant Commandant and Medal of Honor 
           Recipient (Korea).
         Michael S. Davison, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
         John W. Foss, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Commanding 
           General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
         Alfred M. Gray, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
           Commandant.
         Alexander M. Haig, Jr., General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Former Secretary of 
           State.
         P.X. Kelley, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
           Commandant.
         Frederick J. Kroesen, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
         David M. Maddox, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.
         Carl E. Mundy, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
           Commandant.
         Robert W. RisCassi, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Vice Chief of Staff.
         Donn A. Starry, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Commanding General, U.S. Army Readiness Command.
         Gordon R. Sullivan, General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Chief of Staff.
         Louis C. Wagner, Jr., General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former 
           Commanding General, Army Material Command.
         Joseph J. Went, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Former 
           Assistant Commandant.
         Louis H. Wilson, General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), 
           Former Commandant and Medal of Honor Recipient (World 
           War II).

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, my concern here is that those individuals 
who are concerned--genuinely concerned--about the problems that exist 
over there are concerned about damage that is inflicted by these 
landmines, and certainly I am one of these individuals, are also 
concerned about the saving of American lives. We certainly should not 
contemplate doing so unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified 
combatant commanders formally change their minds and agree such a step 
can be taken without jeopardizing the U.S. forces.
  I also have written a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Shelton. This is just in the last few days. I have a 
letter back from General Shelton in which he talks about his opinion. 
In his response he said:

       In your third question, you noted General Norman 
     Schwarzkopf, who has been widely portrayed as a supporter of 
     a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines, has been quoted in 
     an interview with the Baltimore Sun as saying, ``I favor a 
     ban on the dumb ones. Those are the ones that are causing 
     humanitarian problems. I think the smart ones are a military 
     capability we can use.''

  Further quoting General Shelton, he said:

       My view again is that our smart mixed ATAV munitions are 
     critical to our efforts to protect our men and women in the 
     field.

  I ask unanimous consent that this letter also be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                  U.S. Special Operations Command,


                             Office of the Commander in Chief,

                              Macdill AFB, FL, September 13, 1997.
     Hon. James M. Inhofe,
     U.S. Senate, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Inhofe: Thank you for your letter of 12 
     September in which you state your concern about the 
     compatibility of the emerging Oslo treaty on anti-personnel 
     landmines (APL) with the military's requirements today and 
     for the foreseeable future. I appreciate the opportunity to 
     express my views on these issues as Commander in Chief, U.S. 
     Special Operations Command.
       Your first question asked for my view on the importance of 
     retaining the Korean exemption, limiting the systems covered 
     by the treaty to those ``primarily designed'' for anti-
     personnel purposes, and ensuring what we are able to continue 
     using self-destructing/self-deactivating APL when packaged 
     with anti-tank landmines.
       In my view, each of those positions is critical. Anti-
     personnel landmines are integral to the defense of the 
     Republic of Korea, and as long as there is risk of aggression 
     in Korea and we do not have suitable alternatives fielded, we 
     must ensure the best protection of our forces and those of 
     our allies. I also believe that an accurate definition of 
     anti-personnel (AP) landmines is essential to prevent the 
     banning of mixed munitions under the treaty. Finally, I 
     firmly believe that our anti-tank (AT) and anti-vehicle (AV) 
     munitions--which are mixed systems composed entirely of smart 
     AT and AP mines that self-destruct or self-deactivate in a 
     relatively short period of time--are vital to the protection 
     of our men and women in the field.
       Your second question asked whether I thought a landmine ban 
     that did not accommodate these positions would be in the 
     national security interest of the United States. I do not. I 
     believe that any treaty to which the United States agrees 
     must ensure that these valid national security concerns are 
     adequately addressed.
       In your third question, you noted that General Norman 
     Schwarzkopf--who has been widely portrayed as a supporter of 
     a complete ban on anti-personnel landmines--has been quoted 
     in an interview with the Baltimore Sun as saying: ``I favor a 
     ban on the dumb ones; those are the ones that are causing the 
     humanitarian problem. I think the smart ones are a military 
     capability we can use.'' You asked whether I agree with this 
     assessment.
       My view, again is that our smart, mixed AT/AV munitions are 
     critical to our efforts to protect our men and women in the 
     field. As I noted earlier, these systems are composed 
     entirely of smart mines that self-destruct or self-deactivate 
     in a relatively short period of time. The military utility of 
     these systems is, in my mind, unquestionable. Beyond that, 
     however, I do want to reiterate that, because of the unique 
     situation on the Korean peninsula, non-self-destructing (NSD) 
     or ``dumb'' mines are essential to our commanders in the 
     Republic of Korea as long as there is risk of aggression and 
     we have not fielded suitable alternatives to the NSD mines 
     used in Korea.
       In your final question, you asked whether I will work to 
     ensure that this capability is protected in any landmine 
     treaty the U.S. signs. In response, let me state again that I 
     firmly believe that any landmine treaty to which the United 
     States becomes party must ensure protection of ``smart'' 
     mixed systems.
       As always, I appreciate your support of our men and women 
     in uniform. With all best wishes from Tampa,
           Sincerely,

                                             Henry H. Shelton,

                                               General, U.S. Army,
                                               Commander in Chief.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, this is very simple. It is not a 
complicated thing to deal with. It simply says that we take the 
language that is supported and has been put in by the distinguished 
Senator from Vermont and add--I will read it one more time, these 
words--

       This subsection shall not apply unless the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff and the unified combatant commanders certify in writing 
     to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives that the signing of the Convention is 
     consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the 
     armed forces of the United States.

  So it is a very straightforward and simple amendment. Quite frankly, 
I want to have the input of the military when these decisions are made.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The Senator from 
Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. I will just respond briefly. Is the Senator speaking of 
holding onto landmines that the Joint Chiefs

[[Page S9763]]

have already said they are prepared to give up? Command detonated 
landmines are still available. We use those in Korea and elsewhere. 
Nothing bans those in this treaty. And as for self-destruct mines, the 
President has already said the Pentagon will give them up outside Korea 
by 2003, and in Korea by 2006. The Pentagon has also said it is 
searching aggressively for alternatives to the use of anti-personnel 
mines in mixed mine systems. These are self-destructing mines. So if 
there are military officers who are saying they oppose finding 
alternatives to these mines, they are speaking out of school. That is 
not consistent with the Pentagon's policy.
  My friend from Arizona speaks of having the military's input. Of 
course we should have the military's input. If we were to sign any 
treaty of this nature, we would. And we would require two-thirds of the 
Senators to vote for it before the President could even ratify such a 
treaty.
  A lot is made of Korea. Obviously we are concerned about the defense 
of Korea. But I say to my friends, talk to the former commander of our 
forces there, General Hollingsworth, or General Emerson. They say 
landmines caused more problems for our forces than they solved. Our 
forces are highly mobile. You don't want to impede their mobility by 
sowing a lot of landmines around. But anyway, the Pentagon has already 
said it is going to find alternatives to landmines in Korea.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment on land 
mines to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill offered by my 
colleague, the Senator from Oklahoma. This amendment, which seeks to 
preserve for our military commanders a weapons system which, among 
other things, mitigates the manpower disadvantage American forces 
routinely suffer, is needed now more than ever.
  Every day seems to bring fresh evidence of two facts we have known to 
be true for some time: First, that our military is currently too small 
and stretched too thin for the many missions assigned to it; and 
second, that the international security situation is more volatile than 
it has been in a generation. Both situations argue heavily in favor of 
this amendment.
  Even the most ardent defenders of our ongoing defense drawdowns 
cannot help but be alarmed at the sudden lack of trained manpower in 
our military. Recruiting goals are not being met and our long serving 
leaders--both officer and enlisted--are leaving the military in droves. 
One government report after another finds that our front line units are 
chronically undermanned. Next to these disturbing facts, we see that 
the situation in North Korea has recently taken a most frightening turn 
with their launch of a two-stage ballistic missile directly over the 
Japanese Islands. Japan has pulled out of the Light Water Reactor 
agreement which was our only real hope of keeping North Korea from 
resuming their nuclear weapons development program. Between our under 
strength military, and the new tension on the Korean Peninsula, it 
could be said that it has been many years since our military forces in 
South Korea have been in such an insecure and tenuous position. It is 
not idle hyperbole to say that South Koreans, and the forty thousand 
American troops who live at the pointy end of the spear in that 
country, depend on land mines for their lives.
  In light of these developments, I cannot think of a worse time to 
pass a Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill that includes a provision 
which would facilitate the signing of the Convention of the Prohibition 
of anti-personnel land mines, quote--``as soon as practicable.''--
unquote. A harmless sounding passage to be sure, but one which, in the 
hands of an administration prone to trading our national security for 
parchment, could be interpreted as clearance to sign that dangerous 
piece of paper.
  Senator Inhofe's amendment would simply require that, before the 
administration signed any treaty that would take this critically 
important weapons system from our military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
along with the Commanders in Chief of the various Combat Commands, 
certify that they can accomplish their missions without it.
  Not in the last two decades have tensions been so high in that part 
of the world, Mr. President. It would seem that every possible factor 
is now conspiring to place our troops on the precipice: Our military is 
undermanned and underfunded; our diplomatic initiatives with the 
world's totalitarian regimes are breaking down everywhere; ballistic 
missile and nuclear weapons technology is proliferating at breakneck 
speed; and in Asia, the terrible economic situation there only serves 
to raise tensions and reduce available peaceful alternatives. I cannot 
envision a worse time to be taking military options away from our 
commanders in the field. But let me be clear: Even under the best of 
circumstances I would be against any attempt to take away military 
options from those commanders. And I will feel this way with particular 
regard to anti-personnel land mines until the proponents of this ban 
can give me a cogent answer to a simple question: How will taking self-
destructing, self-deactivating land mines away from the United States 
military save one life in Angola, Cambodia or Afghanistan? Until I get 
a clear answer to that question, I will continue to defend our military 
from these misguided attempts to eliminate the means by which they 
accomplish the missions America deems fit to assign them, in the safest 
possible way. I support this amendment from the Senator from Oklahoma, 
and I encourage my colleagues to do so as well.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Lautenberg be added as an original cosponsor of amendment No. 3516, 
original cosponsor of amendment No. 3514, and amendment No. 3520.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I see my colleague from Kentucky, the 
distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, on the floor, so I yield to 
him.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I say to my colleague from Vermont, we have--I hate to 
interrupt the debate on this amendment, but we have a unanimous consent 
agreement that has been cleared on both sides limiting the amendments. 
If it is all right with them, I would like to propound that at this 
particular time.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the 
remainder of the Senate's consideration of S. 2334, the following 
amendments be the only remaining first-degree amendments, other than 
the pending amendment, in order and subject to relevant second degrees. 
I further ask that following the disposition of the listed amendments, 
the bill be advanced to third reading and a vote occur on passage of S. 
2334, all without intervening action or debate.
  The amendments listed, Mr. President, are two by Senator Brownback, 
one on Iran, one on Georgia; two by Senator Coverdell, one relevant, 
one on Black Hawk helicopters; Senator Craig, four relevant; Senator 
Coats on North Korea; Senator DeWine on Haiti, drugs, and Africa, three 
of them; Senator Faircloth on world economic conference; Senator 
Hutchison on North Korea; the Senator Inhofe amendment, which is 
pending, on landmines; Senator Kyl, IMF; two amendments by the majority 
leader; two amendments on North Korea by the Senator from Arizona, 
Senator McCain; two relevant amendments by myself; and one by Senator 
Shelby, and the pending Specter amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Hearing none, so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. There are some more.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Sorry, Mr. President. There is another page, 
including, interestingly enough, all the Democratic amendments. What an 
oversight.
  Mr. LEAHY. I knew you wanted to make sure those were in before you 
asked for unanimous consent.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Senator Biden, a relevant amendment; Senator Byrd, a 
relevant amendment; Senator Baucus, a relevant amendment; Senator Biden 
on another relevant amendment; Senator Daschle, two relevant 
amendments; Senator Dodd on Human Rights Information Act; Senator 
Feingold, two, one on Africa and one relevant; Senator Feinstein, child 
abduction; Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, relevant; my colleague, Senator 
Leahy, two relevant and one on GEF; Senator Moynihan, two, one relevant 
and one on IMF; Senator Reid, relevant; Senator Graham two, one on 
Haiti and one relevant.

[[Page S9764]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. If the managers have no objection, I would like to send an 
amendment to the desk.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                           Amendment No. 3366

  Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield, I would like to request the 
yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.


                           Amendment No. 3522

 (Purpose: To provide a substitute with respect to certain conditions 
                        for IMF appropriations)

  Mr. KYL. I send an amendment to the desk and I ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:
       Beginning on page 119, line 1 of the bill, strike all 
     through page 120, line 13, and insert the following:
       Section 601. Conditions for the Use of Quota Resources.--
     (a) None of the funds appropriated in this Act under the 
     heading ``United States Quota, International Monetary Fund'' 
     may be obligated, transferred or made available to the 
     International Monetary Fund until 30 days after the Secretary 
     of the Treasury certifies that the Board of Executive 
     Directors of the Fund have agreed by resolution that stand-by 
     agreements or other arrangements regarding the use of Fund 
     resources shall include provisions requiring the borrower--
       (1) to comply with the terms of all international trade 
     obligations and agreements of which the borrower is a 
     signatory;
       (2) to eliminate the practice or policy of government 
     directed lending or provision of subsidies to favored 
     industries, enterprises, parties, or institutions; and
       (3) to guarantee non-discriminatory treatment in debt 
     resolution proceedings between domestic and foreign 
     creditors, and for debtors and other concerned persons.

  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I advise the Senator from Vermont that this is the original 
committee language.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I apologize to my friend from Arizona. I 
had been momentarily distracted. I thought it was an amendment to the 
Inhofe amendment. I did not realize that had been set aside. I would 
not have required the reading of the amendment.
  Mr. KYL. That is quite all right. I am happy to make that 
clarification.
  At this time I would like to yield to the Senator from Indiana for 
the purpose of laying down an amendment and making his statement on 
that amendment before I make my statement on my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will soon send an amendment to the desk 
and then have it set aside. It doesn't have anything to do with 
landmines, but I would be happy to have the clerk read it.


                           Amendment No. 3523

 (Purpose: To reallocate funds provided to the Korean Peninsula Energy 
    Development Organization to be available only for antiterrorism 
                              assistance)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3523.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 31, line 7, strike ``and'' and all that follows 
     through ``(KEDO)'' on line 9.
       Beginning on page 32, strike line 10 and all that follows 
     through line 24 on page 33 and insert the following: ``That, 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the funds 
     appropriated under this heading not less than $56,000,000 
     shall be available only for antiterrorism assistance under 
     chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961.''.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I want to speak on a broader subject. I 
want to take a few moments to discuss what has been a dramatic change 
in administration policy regarding the war on terrorism. According to 
the administration's chronology of Osama bin Laden's terrorist attacks 
against U.S. facilities or U.S. citizens, this individual is connected 
in one way or another to a series of disturbing terrorist incidents. 
This chronology, by the way, was offered by our National Security 
Advisor, Mr. Berger. I am taking this from that chronology of terrorist 
incidents. He has conspired to kill U.S. servicemen in Yemen in 1992. 
He plotted the deaths of American and other peacekeepers in Somalia in 
1993. He assisted Egyptian terrorists who tried to assassinate Egyptian 
President Mubarak in 1995. He conducted a car bombing against the 
Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan in 1995. He plotted to blow up U.S. 
airliners in the Pacific and separately conspired to kill the Pope. He 
bombed a joint U.S. and Saudi military training mission in Riyadh in 
1995. He issued a declaration of war against the United States in 
August of 1996. He stated, ``If someone can kill an American soldier, 
it is better than wasting time on other matters.'' In February of this 
year, Osama bin Laden stated, he declared his intention to attack--his 
network--their intention to attack Americans and our allies, including 
citizens, civilians, anywhere in the world. And as we all know, last 
month he has been directly linked to the bombing of U.S. Embassies in 
Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi.
  Two weeks after this latest tragic incident, the U.S. launched a 
missile strike against one of bin Laden's facilities in Afghanistan, as 
well as against a Sudanese facility, which received initial financing 
from a bin Laden enterprise.
  I, along with most Americans, welcome this administration's change in 
policy as a necessary and long overdue response. However, it is not to 
say that there weren't legitimate questions raised concerning the 
timing of this attack--I was one of those who raised such questions--
and the timing of this policy change, coming as it did during the 
President's personal crisis. I was concerned that this sea change, this 
dramatic change in policy, might be misunderstood or misinterpreted by 
both allies and foes alike, thereby damaging and undermining the 
credibility of this administration's newly declared policy against 
terrorism.
  Make no mistake, Mr. President, it is appropriate to respond whenever 
innocent Americans are attacked in acts of political terrorism. The 
alternative serves only to encourage those who seek to do us harm in 
pursuit of their private agendas. I caution, however, that we must also 
be certain of our targets and political objectives, and careful to make 
sure that our response is to reinforce and not undermine our policies.
  Clearly, the U.S. strike and the administration's characterization of 
it as a ``war on terrorism'' is a notable departure from the policies 
and actions of the past several years. Rightly or wrongly, the Khobar 
Towers incident stands out as an example of U.S. inaction in the face 
of recent terrorist attacks.
  Certainly the Khobar Towers investigation has been delayed and 
complicated by the need for close cooperation with the Saudi 
Government. But the current White House crisis raises serious doubts 
for our allies and gives fuel to our adversaries whose focus is likely 
to be the difference in the U.S. response to the deaths of American 
military personnel at Khobar and those in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. 
There may very well be justification for the difference in response, 
but it clearly signals a change in policy and, for many of us, a 
welcome change in policy.
  More worrisome is that this newfound inclination to military action 
against terrorist organizations bears no resemblance whatsoever to the 
administration's so-called foreign policy priorities concerning rogue 
nations, such as Iraq and North Korea.
  On February 17, 1998, President Clinton addressed the Nation. He 
said, ``. . .this is not a time free from peril, especially as a result 
of reckless acts of outlaw nations and an unholy axis of terrorists, 
drug traffickers and organized international criminals * * * and they 
will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

[[Page S9765]]

and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to 
happen. There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, 
stability of his region and the safety of all the rest of us.''

  Yet, Mr. President, in the last few months, this administration has 
made what many see as a mockery of the inspection regime in Iraq, has 
failed to respond to the intelligence of an active nuclear program in 
North Korea, and has clearly allowed the North Koreans to continue to 
build a delivery system which will be capable of reaching the United 
States in its next phase of development.
  The President himself said last February that ``we have no business 
agreeing to any resolution of [the Iraqi crisis] that does not include 
free, unfettered access to the remaining sites by people who have 
integrity and proven competence in the inspection business.''
  This is a critical statement, one which I think bears repeating.
  The President himself said last February that ``we''--meaning the 
United States--``have no business agreeing to any resolution of [the 
Iraqi crisis] that does not include free, unfettered access to the 
remaining sites by people who have integrity and proven competence in 
the inspection business.''
  Yet, just last week, the lead inspector of the United States resigned 
in disgust at the pressure the Clinton administration has brought to 
bear to explicitly undercut the very inspection regime which the 
President said we have no business in changing. In his resignation 
letter, Scott Ritter, that inspector--someone who does have proven 
integrity and proven competence in the inspection business--said this:

       Iraq has lied to the special commission and the world since 
     day one concerning the true scope and nature of its 
     proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been 
     perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of 
     concealment. . . . the commission has uncovered indisputable 
     proof of a systematic concealment mechanism, run by the 
     President of Iraq, and protected by the Presidential security 
     forces. . . .
       The current decision by the Security Council and the 
     Secretary General, backed at least implicitly by the United 
     States, to seek a diplomatic alternative to inspection-driven 
     confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a 
     surrender to the Iraqi leadership . . . has succeeded in 
     thwarting the stated will of the United Nations.
       The illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms 
     control at all. What is being propagated by the Security 
     Council today in relation to the work of the special 
     commission is such an illusion, one which in all good faith I 
     cannot, and will not, be a party to. I have no other option 
     than to resign from my position here at the commission 
     effective immediately.

  That is a strong statement, Mr. President. It is a strong statement 
made by one who has a reputation for impeccable integrity and for total 
competence in the inspection business. Yet, he believed that his 
ability to carry out his assigned duties and his mission was undermined 
by the United Nations Security Council, with the implicit support of 
the U.S. Government, and he felt that the only course of action he had 
was to resign.
  Clearly, last month's strikes are a substantial change from the 
administration's largely restrained reactions to previous terrorist 
attacks on Americans. To be fair, circumstances and the need to 
cooperate with foreign governments were behind some of that earlier 
reticence.
  The President said: We must be prepared to do all that we can for as 
long as we can.
  There is no question that we will face attempts at reprisal over 
years and years. This is something that seems all the more certain 
given the reports that bin Laden has offered bounties for terrorist 
actions resulting in the deaths of Americans. So we, indeed, must be 
prepared to act for as long as we must.
  But we must recognize that in our endeavor to defeat terrorists, 
perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, our success will depend 
upon the ability to gather friends and allies together in a common 
struggle against this common enemy. Trust is the essential element in 
this equation. So it is imperative that the President of the United 
States be capable of establishing and maintaining the level of trust 
necessary to execute a successful policy against terrorism.
  At the same time, we will need to increase our readiness to defend 
against the wide range of potential attacks on our citizens and 
interests as well as those of our friends and allies anywhere in the 
world.
  Our planning and strategy must be sustainable over the long run. We 
need to find cheaper and more effective methods to attack terrorist 
infrastructures and planning. It seems woefully obvious that the use of 
costly weapons and defensive measures will have to be restricted to 
correspondingly grievous affects. Osama bin Laden unquestionably 
presents a significant and demonstrated threat to U.S. interests. But 
surely nations such as Iraq and North Korea represent a substantially 
greater magnitude of threat to our vital national interests. Moreover, 
these nations have demonstrated an intent to develop, and in the case 
of Iraq employ, weapons of mass destruction. Worse yet, these states 
seem willing to transfer such technology to other nations or groups who 
intend to use it against the United States and our allies.
  Secretary Albright declared that ``the risk that leaders of a rogue 
state will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against us or 
our allies is the greatest security threat we face.''
  That statement does not square with the allocation of national 
security resources to operations in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. It may 
be that these latter operations should enjoy some measure of emphasis. 
But, lacking a coherent foreign policy and corresponding national 
security strategy, it is difficult to judge and even more difficult to 
trust the rationale we are giving for our involvement in these 
operations.
  If leaders of these rogue states--Iraq and Korea--do pose, as 
Secretary Albright has said, the greatest security threat that we and 
our allies face, then we must ask legitimate questions about the 
deployment of our security resources and national security assets in 
places of lesser importance, unless, of course, we are willing to 
support both in a measure necessary to be prepared and to accomplish 
both objectives at the same time.
  Mr. President, let's take this new-found determination to combat 
terrorism, as declared by the President, at face value. In doing so, it 
is important, then, that the call to action must be more than mere 
rhetoric. It is important that the President articulate his policy and 
according strategy as well as initiate development of the capabilities 
that will be needed to affect that strategy. The current upside-down 
priorities wherein all too limited U.S. defense resources are spent on 
what are surely less critical operations in Bosnia and elsewhere need 
to be examined to reflect the serious threat to U.S. national interests 
that terrorism comprises, whether by rogue nations, states-sponsored 
groups, or actions of independents like bin Laden.
  Yet the question remains: What are the Nation's capabilities to 
execute this administration's change in foreign policy about terrorism? 
What has been done to enhance the interagency process to address the 
transnational threat of terrorism? Has the administration developed the 
intelligence capabilities and the military capabilities to support this 
policy?

  Some of our friends and allies rightly express the concern that the 
Clinton administration has not addressed some of these key issues, and 
that, therefore, when the United States starts to find out how hard and 
how expensive it is to pursue a long-term effort against terrorism, we 
will lose resolve and not sustain our efforts.
  Many of us fear that the administration will merely add the military 
tasks associated with counterterrorism to the Pentagon's already 
stretched list of missions, and will do so without providing the 
additional funding required. In short, we will throw yet another rock 
in the military's already overflowing rucksack and expect them to 
shoulder the burden with the same budget and the same forces.
  We must recognize the risk of pursuing such an approach with our 
military, a military that is currently ill-matched to this threat. 
Military budgets and force structure are down 35 percent to 40 percent 
since the cold war; while at the same time our peacetime commitments 
are up several hundred percent.
  And perhaps most importantly, defense procurement is down nearly 70 
percent from the Reagan administration when this Nation developed the

[[Page S9766]]

modernized, professional military that was victorious in the cold war. 
But we have been living off the Reagan buildup for nearly a decade, and 
the procurement holiday is over.
  The average age of our fleet of aircraft, ships, tanks, and trucks 
and other equipment has been increasing year by year, and our forces 
are having a difficult time maintaining that equipment. This is a major 
source of the readiness problems confronted by our military today.
  Yet, year after year this administration's budget falls short of its 
goal of procurement. And I project it will fall short again.
  Significantly, the report of the National Defense Panel last December 
highlighted that this administration needs to provide $5 billion to $10 
billion a year to transform our military so that our Nation can 
leverage advances in technology and will be prepared to address what 
are envisioned to be the fundamentally different operational challenges 
in the 21st century. One of those, and perhaps the most important of 
those, is terrorism.
  In short, we still have a military designed to fight the conventional 
wars of the past, and it is poorly prepared to conduct this war on 
terrorism. Transformation to a national security posture necessary to 
address the threats of the future is necessary and cannot be 
successfully accomplished without a reallocation of resources and a 
revision of policy.
  I, therefore, urge the President to prepare this Nation for this 
prolonged conflict against terrorism, but in doing so use more than 
just strong words, but prepare us in a way so that we have the 
resources in place to successfully account for this threat and protect 
the American people.
  We face a range of threats and potential defensive strategies. Some 
of the latter could affect traditional American freedoms.
  At the very least, there should be an open and serious debate over 
how far we can go, or how far we should go, in altering the security 
environment in America and at our facilities abroad. Although an 
easily-defended fortress sounds like a good idea for diplomatic 
security, it also restricts the very access that effective diplomacy 
often requires. And we must recognize this.
  Mr. President, we face a difficult road in pursuit of a war on 
terrorism.
  Like other Americans, I am committed to the elimination of this 
scourge of terrorism. But I cannot help but be somewhat skeptical of 
the administration's determination and their commitment, and 
unfortunately I fear that we will find few allies willing to risk their 
security and reputations on the strength of the current 
administration's say so. The ``say so'' must be followed with the ``do 
so.''
  Mr. President, hidden beneath the headlines of the last 2 weeks was 
yet another explosive revelation. North Korea has reportedly had as 
many as 15,000 people working to build what some suggest is a nuclear 
reactor or fuel reprocessing facility buried deep within a mountain.
  This, despite what the administration has touted as a landmark 
agreement stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons research and 
development program in exchange for food, energy, and the promise of 
two new light-water reactor power plants.
  The State Department, by stating that it sees no nefarious intent 
because the concrete for this facility has not yet been poured, is 
asking us to trust their assessment of the situation. Only 6 months 
ago, the President certified to Congress that ``North Korea is 
complying with the provisions of the Agreed Framework'' and ``has not 
significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for 
purposes for which it was not intended.''
  We are now told by administration officials that this new facility 
should not be considered a ``deal-breaker'' because its completion 
``will take half a decade or more.''
  To add insult to injury, we have learned that North Korea has test 
fired a 1,200-mile-ranged ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean, 
overflying Japan. And they did so just days after the Joint Chiefs 
issued their commentary on the Rumsfeld report in which they reasserted 
the administration's claims that there currently is no imminently 
discernible ballistic missile threat warranting a national missile 
defense. They state, moreover, their confidence that our intelligence 
community would provide ample warning to permit meeting such a threat 
in the context of the President's 3+3 strategy.
  North Korea's test launch of this ballistic missile has demonstrated 
the truth of that old adage that actions speak louder than words. 
Doesn't the testing of a two-stage ballistic missile suggest that there 
is something for us to be worried about? How much harder can it be to 
launch a three-stage system capable of reaching the United States?
  I am not nearly as cynical about our intelligence capabilities as 
some, and so it is not idle curiosity when I wonder out loud whether 
the State Department officials knew, as the Pentagon did, that North 
Korea was planning a missile test. And if so, did the State Department 
raise this issue with the North Koreans during last week's meetings on 
various subjects including that of the underground nuclear-related 
facility?
  I can tell you that whatever the answer, it does not reflect well on 
the administration or the Secretary of State. Secretary Albright's 
comments yesterday that the test is ``something that we will be raising 
with the North Koreans in the talks that are currently going on,'' are 
less than inspiring and they fail to address the essential issue of 
what the U.S. did or might have tried to do to forestall this test.
  Mr. President, I have sent an amendment to the desk. I have asked for 
it to be set aside. It addresses the question of the funding that is in 
this appropriation for North Korea related to development of 
nonthreatening nuclear facilities. Given the evidence and the 
information that we now have, these funds would be much better used on 
counterterrorism efforts, and this amendment seeks to transfer the 
funds for that purpose.
  I will be debating this amendment at a later time. And I understand 
two amendments currently have been offered and are awaiting a vote at 
some time in the future. But I want to alert my colleagues that I think 
this situation in North Korea is critical. I think the continuation of 
the current administration policy in this regard, in transferring U.S. 
tax dollars in accord with an agreement that was designed to terminate 
North Korean involvement in development of any nuclear facilities that 
could be used for purposes other than providing power to their nation 
is a serious matter. I don't think continuation of funds for that 
purpose is appropriate. I think that money is much better used to help 
prepare us to implement the administration's new policy on the war on 
terrorism, and we will be discussing that amendment at some point in 
the future.
  Mr. President, with that I yield the floor.
  Mr. BENNETT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. BENNETT. I understand we will now hear from the Senator from 
Arizona, Mr. McCain, but I wanted to notify Senators that following 
Senator McCain's presentation, it will be our intention to move to a 
vote with relation to the Specter amendment No. 3506 as quickly as 
possible, so that Senators might know that a vote following Senator 
McCain's presentation is pending.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Coats amendment 
is set aside. The Senator is now recognized to offer an amendment.


                    Amendment No. 3500, as modified

(Purpose: To restrict the availability of certain funds for the Korean 
    Peninsula Energy Development Organization unless an additional 
                           condition is met)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk in the 
nature of a substitute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCAIN], for himself, Mr. 
     Helms, and Mr. Murkowski, proposes an amendment numbered 
     3500, as modified.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S9767]]

  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 33, line 4, before the colon insert the following: 
     ``; and (4) North Korea is not actively pursuing the 
     acquisition or development of a nuclear capability (other 
     than the light-water reactors provided for by the 1994 Agreed 
     Framework Between the United States and North Korea) and is 
     fully meeting its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons''.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment on behalf of myself 
and Senator Helms and Senator Murkowski pertaining to recent events in 
North Korea:
  The announcement that U.S. intelligence has discovered a very sizable 
underground construction project in the mountains northeast of the 
nuclear complex at Yongbyon, and Monday's firing of an intermediate-
range ballistic missile over Japanese territory.
  Later I intend to propose another amendment expressing the sense of 
Congress that North Korea should be forcefully condemned for such an 
openly belligerent act while the United Nations is once again debating 
cooperative arrangements with the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang.
  This amendment adds to the certification requirements a Presidential 
certification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability. The distinction between what is currently in the bill and 
the provision in this amendment is crucial as it addresses new 
activities as opposed to those already identified and incorporated into 
the 1994 Agreed Framework.
  Mr. President, it is instructive to go back in time and review the 
history of North-South relations on the Korean peninsula. Last summer, 
I came to the floor and submitted for the Record a comprehensive list 
compiled by the Congressional Research Service of North Korean 
provocations since its inception following the Second World War. That 
list detailed numerous terrorist acts, intelligence-related submarine 
incursions into South Korean territory, kidnappings of Japanese 
nationals for intelligence purposes, and armed incursions across the 
demilitarized zone.
  At that point, I noted that the list illuminated an extraordinarily 
consistent North Korean pattern of alternating minor and manipulative 
gestures of goodwill with acts of terror and provocation toward its 
South Korean neighbor. To that list, we can now add new provocations 
towards Japan and the United States.
  And make no mistake--Monday's missile firing was a message to the 
Japanese and to us that North Korea can strike our vital interests 
throughout the region. Japan's declaration of intent to terminate 
funding in support of the Agreed Framework should be supported and 
followed in kind by the United States.
  At the time I spoke last summer, yet another North Korea-instigated 
border altercation had just transpired. Go back and look at the 
newspaper headlines pertaining to Korea at that time. The July 15, 
1997, Washington Post included an article titled ``U.S. Says it Will 
Double Food Aid to North Korea.'' The following day, wire stories were 
headlined ``Korea-Border Gunfire Exchanged.'' That contrast is 
discouragingly consistent. Offers to agree to negotiate a final peace 
agreement with the South or provisions of food aid for North Korea's 
starving people regularly alternate with serious, often bloody 
transgressions against the South. But, the missile firing, while not 
entirely unexpected, expands significantly the scale of the threat to 
regional peace and stability posed by North Korea.
  At the time the Agreed Framework was signed in October 1994, I 
expressed grave misgivings about its viability. I spoke at length on 
the floor of the Senate regarding North Korea's abysmal record of 
compliance with its previous commitments regarding its nuclear weapons 
program, listing nine such violations. Further, I emphasized the danger 
of an agreement that failed to adequately provide for full inspections 
of current and past nuclear sites, as well as of future such 
activities, prior to the provision of assistance to the North Koreans. 
Four years and $86 million later, we are no more confident than we have 
ever been about North Korea's intentions and capabilities in the 
nuclear realm. I predicted back then that North Korea would violate the 
spirit and the letter of the Agreed Framework, and I believe today that 
I was correct.
  A North Korean nuclear weapons capability is one of the most 
dangerous scenarios imaginable, and it's entirely possible such a 
capability already exists. Bribing hostile, totalitarian regimes to not 
take steps deleterious to our best interests seldom succeed, as the 
very nature of such regimes is what makes them worrisome and unworthy 
of the kind of trust the 1994 agreement demands.
  That is why the underground construction project is so troubling. Its 
precise nature is still a matter of speculation, but one thing is 
certain: North Korea does not have a history of concealing and 
protecting cultural activities and fast food restaurants. It does have 
a history of building underground military installations, including for 
the construction of ballistic missiles. North Korea does not deserve 
the benefit of the doubt. We have no option other than to assume that 
the excavation activities northeast of Yongbyon are designed with 
hostile intent.
  I will not mince words or phrase my beliefs diplomatically. I do not 
have confidence the administration has in the past or will in the 
future handle North Korea with the firmness and resolve necessary to 
prevent the development of the most ominous of scenarios.
  One U.S. official was quoted in 1996 with respect to the North 
Koreans as stating, ``They owe us some good behavior so we can continue 
to engage them.'' Mr. President, that is precisely the problem with the 
Administration's approach to North Korea. It ignores the underlying 
reality that the North Korean regime is inherently hostile and 
exceedingly belligerent. Temporary expressions of goodwill have not and 
will not translate into the kind of fundamental transformations in that 
regime necessary for us to ever have confidence that it will not 
exploit our goodwill. Any efforts of the international community to 
alleviate the suffering that North Korea itself has caused its people 
will be misused to allow it to maintain a military force that ensures 
the Korean peninsula will remain the most heavily fortified border in 
the world.
  Missile firings such as North Korea conducted only occur within the 
context of relations on the brink of war. That does not mean that I 
believe a North Korean attack is imminent. I have no such belief. The 
nature of the act, however, should be interpreted very cautiously. 
During the height of the cold war, the Soviet Union launched missiles 
aimed directly at the Hawaiian Islands. During the peak of a crisis 
with Libya, Mu'ammar Qhadafi launched a missile that impacted near 
Malta. And most recently, China fired missiles perilously close to 
Taiwan in response to the latter's pending democratic elections. And 
now we can add to the list Pyongyang's launching of a Taepo Dong I 
missile against Japan and, presumably, against U.S. forces stationed 
there and in Guam.
  If the new underground complex being constructed in North Korea is, 
in fact, for the purpose of establishing a new nuclear weapons complex, 
the testing of the missile takes on an even more ominous tone. As some 
analysts have pointed out, a series of missiles like the Taepo Dong-
class only make sense when armed with weapons of mass destruction. Even 
the psychological ramifications of these missiles stems entirely from 
North Korea's eventual ability to arm them with nuclear, chemical or 
biological warheads. We cannot afford to minimize the potential threat 
this new complex represents.
  The other countries I have mentioned that launched missiles under 
crisis circumstances or, in the case of the Soviet Union, within the 
context of greatly heightened tensions, were largely deterrable. They 
could, we calculated, be dissuaded from taking that final step into the 
abyss. Far less certain is the calculus involving the North Korean 
government. There is no reason to believe that the regime of Kim Jong 
Il is susceptible to the kind of delicate maneuvering and counter 
maneuvering

[[Page S9768]]

characteristic of relationships predicated upon a balance of terror. On 
the contrary, we are dealing with the most unpredictable regime on 
earth.
  Critics of missile defenses like to point out that deterrence through 
threat of retaliation is all that is needed to dissuade an opponent 
from crossing the ambiguous line that would trigger an overwhelming 
U.S. response, including our use of nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein was 
ultimately deterred from employing chemical weapons against U.S. and 
coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm by the implied threat of 
a U.S. nuclear response. Ignored by such critics, however, are 
historically important incidences where dictatorial regimes struck out 
in anger and defiance against the logic of deterrence. A defeated 
Germany fired missiles against England designated ``V'' for 
``Vengeance,'' and an equally defeated Iraq similarly lashed out 
against Israel with a barrage of missile attacks.
  North Korea is a defeated country in terms of the level of famine and 
the utterly wretched condition of its society. Its willingness to 
strike out irrationally must be assumed. That is why I offer these 
amendments here today. That is why I once again come to the floor of 
the Senate to decry this administration and the United Nation's 
handling of relations with North Korea. The situation on the Korean 
peninsula is too inflammatory, the North Korean regime too 
unpredictable and violent for Congress to take anything other than the 
strongest measures to demonstrate our resolve to confront the threat 
accordingly.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the following articles be 
printed in the Record: The Washington Post, Tuesday, September 1, 
``North Korea's Defiance''; today's, September 1, Wall Street Journal, 
``Pyongyang's Provocation''; New York Times, Wednesday, August 19, 
``North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions''; and August 24, a Washington Post 
editorial entitled ``Politics of Blackmail.''
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1998]

                         North Korea's Defiance

       North Korea is outdoing itself. In barely a week's time it 
     has been caught building a secret underground nuclear 
     facility, and now it has conducted a test of a new longer-
     distance missile. The North Koreans even had the effrontery 
     and the foolishness to fire the second stage of this missile 
     across sovereign Japanese soil--an unmistakable attempt to 
     intimidate a nervous neighbor and, indirectly, its patrons.
       The Stalinist regime's purpose seems clear. As it 
     acknowledges, it has little else of value to export except 
     the weapons it has accumulated to sustain its self-isolating 
     hedgehog pose. Its missile exports, put at $1 billion a year, 
     go to the rule-breaking countries, including Iraq, Iran, 
     Syria and Pakistan. The negotiation on freezing its bomb 
     capabilities that it has been conducting with a group of 
     countries led by the United States amounts to a demand that 
     it be paid off for doing the wrong thing--for rule-breaking. 
     It becomes an increasingly keen question whether American 
     accession to such a demand would be more of an incentive to 
     cheat or to comply.
       Ordinarily, in a negotiation, the arbitrary and hostile 
     raising of the stakes by one party, which is what North Korea 
     is doing, would be taken as a sign of bad faith and would 
     cast into doubt the party's commitment to the stated goals of 
     the negotiation. In this case the North Koreans are able to 
     argue that Japan and South Korea and the European Union, as 
     well as the United States, have been slow to pay as promised 
     for the light-water nuclear power reactors and the fuel oil 
     that make it possible for Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear 
     ambitions. But what slows those countries down is less bad 
     faith than understandable cash-flow problems and, at root, 
     the sickening feeling that North Korea is playing them for a 
     fool.
       Some suggest that the anti-proliferation countries should 
     be more sympathetic to the political requirements of Kim Jong 
     Il as he reaches to consummate the transition from heir 
     apparent to leader in his own right. This is absurd. The 
     leadership of North Korea, whatever it is, has assumed 
     national compliance obligations which, if they are not fully 
     binding, are valueless. The notion that North Korea's 
     defiance is a device intended to extract concessions from 
     Washington may have some truth to it. It puts an extra burden 
     on the Clinton administration to show that no concessions are 
     available by that route. If that threatens to upend the whole 
     negotiation--and it may--then North Korea alone will have to 
     account for it.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1998]

                        Pyongyang's Provocation

       North Korea test-fired a new long-range ballistic missile 
     over Japan Monday, prompting some stern words from Tokyo, but 
     earning rewards from almost everyone else concerned. That's 
     the way it works these days. Only last week, Washington and 
     Seoul told North Korea that its suspected new nuclear weapons 
     plant does not violate a 1994 agreement freezing the North's 
     bomb program. If building more nukes is no big deal, who's 
     going to complain about a few missiles to deliver them with?
       Among other things, lobbing a Daepodong I into the Pacific 
     was probably an advertisement by the world's leading missile 
     supplier to some of the world's scariest customers, including 
     Iraq, Iran, Syria and Pakistan. It also may have been a kind 
     of giant birthday candle ahead of next week's 50th 
     anniversary of North Korea's founding, and the possible 
     accession of dictator Kim Jong II to the presidency. Most 
     certainly, North Korea was telling the U.S., South Korea and 
     other partners in the ill-starred nuclear power plant and oil 
     giveaway consortium--also known as KEDO--that if those gifts 
     aren't forthcoming soon, there's always another missile in 
     Pyongyang's pipeline.
       It worked. Within hours of splashdown--originally reported 
     to be in the Sea of Japan--Seoul promised to pay 70% of the 
     $4.6 billion cost of building North Korea two nuclear power 
     plants, and Washington eagerly reconfirmed a pledge to 
     arrange the financing needed. Japan spoiled the party by 
     refusing to sign on for $1 billion of the reactor costs. But 
     what should upset Tokyo most is how Bill Clinton has ensured 
     that the U.S.--and by extension Japan and America's other 
     allies--has no hope of an effective theater missile defense 
     anytime soon. Looking around at the world today, in fact, it 
     would appear that millions survive only because no crazed 
     dictator or terrorist gang has got around to targeting them.
       At the state level, it is difficult to think of any outrage 
     that invites punishment these days. India and Pakistan, for 
     instance, are under patchy sanctions for testing nuclear 
     weapons last spring. But the countries and regions where 
     killing sprees are under way or threatened (Kosovo, Congo, 
     Sudan come immediately to mind) have generated little more 
     than handwringing.
       The Clinton Administration did interrupt its long streak of 
     inaction recently by firing some missiles at terrorist 
     training facilities in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan 
     said to be manufacturing chemical warfare components. At 
     the same time, however, we learned that the United States 
     was taking quite a different approach to Iraq's suspected 
     chemical warfare program, and many have been calling off 
     U.N. inspections of Saddam's facilities in an effort to 
     avoid a messy confrontation either with America's allies 
     or with the dictator Washington was vowing to bomb into 
     oblivion only six months ago.
       Although an American inspector with the U.N. team resigned 
     in disgust last week, there is no sign that his gesture of 
     displeasure with both U.N. and U.S. prevaricating over Iraq 
     will change the status quo. In one of the most bizarre 
     developments yet, a Sudanese official announced to the world 
     that there was no way the bombed factory was making chemical 
     weapons because it had the ultimate seal of approval in the 
     form a U.N. permit to export ``medicines''--to Iraq. At the 
     very least, that would seem to open up a very wide avenue for 
     examining the U.N.'s decision to pick that particular factory 
     for special exemption from sanctions so it could engage in 
     trade with a country suspected of making weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       But that would mean lifting up the same U.N. petticoats 
     that the United States is now used to hiding behind whenever 
     Washington can't or won't come up with policies of its own. 
     If you ask American officials why they have walked away from 
     the dangerous mess in Afghanistan, they will tell you that 
     they are supporting a U.N. process to bring peace to that 
     unhappy country. In Afghanistan's case, it amounts to an 
     excuse for doing nothing while an entire region veers toward 
     chaos. Meanwhile, senior policy makers have their minds free 
     to think about countries like North Korea--which have figured 
     out that while nickel-and-dime killers like Osama bin Laden 
     get bombed for their sins, if you fire a long-range ballistic 
     missile over Japan and revive your nuclear weapons program, 
     you get a strange new respect and an offer of $4.6 billion.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Aug. 19, 1998]

                    North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

       North Korea seems to have been caught preparing to betray 
     its 1994 commitment to trade in its nuclear weapons ambitions 
     for $6 billion in international assistance. American 
     intelligence agencies have detected construction of an 
     elaborate underground complex. If completed, the nuclear 
     reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant expected to be built 
     there could allow the North to produce as many as half a 
     dozen nuclear bombs two to five years from now. Washington 
     must insist that work on this project be halted immediately. 
     If North Korea wants economic cooperation from the United 
     States it must honor its promise to renounce all nuclear 
     weapons activity.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1998]

                         Politics of Blackmail

       It's doubly bad news that North Korea is building a secret 
     underground nuclear facility. First, the idea that North 
     Korea's Stalinist, hostile and repressive regime may once 
     again--or still--be committed to acquiring nuclear weapons is 
     ominous in its

[[Page S9769]]

     own right. But the report calls into question as well a 1994 
     U.S.-North Korea agreement that is the basis for all other 
     American dealings, with that isolated state.
       From the start, there's been a question of who was 
     stringing whom along with that agreement. Alarmed that North 
     Korea was accumulating weapons-grade plutonium, the United 
     States in 1994 agreed to lead a coalition of interested 
     nations that would provide the impoverished North Koreans 
     with two nuclear reactors of no military use, and a quantity 
     of fuel oil, in exchange for the mothballing of a plutonium-
     producing reactor and other weapons facilities. The idea was 
     to buy time, assuming that the world's last pure Stalinist 
     dictatorship couldn't last forever, and it was a chance worth 
     taking. But the danger was that the North Koreans were buying 
     time themselves, taking advantage of U.S. generosity while 
     pursuing their nuclear ambitions.
       Outside nations have faced a similar dilemma as they 
     confront famine in North Korea. There's little question that 
     thousands are dying of hunger; there's no question that this 
     starvation is entirely political, a result of North Korea's 
     wildly flawed economics and the regime's total denial of 
     freedom to its people. The West, including the United States, 
     provides free food nonetheless. This is in part out of 
     humanitarian principles and the belief that food should never 
     be a political weapon, but it is also out of fear that a 
     collapse in North Korea could cause the regime to lash out in 
     some lunatic and destructive way.
       On both counts, in other words, the North Korean regime 
     successfully has practiced the politics of blackmail. If 
     North Korea is taking the ransom--fuel and food--and going 
     ahead with its weapons program, then it becomes clear that 
     the blackmail policy has failed--clear that North Korea is 
     stringing America along and not the reverse. So far the 
     Clinton administration insists, at least in public, that 
     North Korea is not yet in violation of the 1994 agreement. 
     The legal technicalities it cites--such as that the 15,000 
     workers have not yet begun pouring cement for the new 
     facility's foundation--are not reassuring. We hope that in 
     private the administration is delivering a far firmer 
     message. If North Korea's nuclear program is continuing, it 
     shouldn't take long to figure that the whole deal must be 
     off.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, these are important articles. They point 
out the history of our relations with North Korea on this issue. Also, 
``. . . the ill-starred nuclear power plant and oil giveaway 
consortium--also known as KEDO--that if those gifts aren't forthcoming 
soon, there's always another missile in Pyongyang's pipeline.'' I think 
they are important additions to the record.
  (At the request of Mr. McCain, the following statement was ordered to 
be printed in the Record)
 Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President. I rise today in support of 
Senator McCain's amendment restricting the transfer of funds to the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (``KEDO'') until the 
President certifies that North Korea is not actively pursuing the 
acquisition or development of a nuclear capability and is fully meeting 
its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.
  Mr. President, it is unfortunate that such language is necessary. For 
almost four years, the United States has provided funding to KEDO under 
an ``Agreed Framework'' negotiated by this administration with the 
leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
  Although this framework agreement was never submitted to the Congress 
for ratification, the Administration has come to Congress each year to 
ask for more and more money to carry out the Framework provisions to 
supply the North Koreans with heavy fuel oil and to run KEDO. Each 
year, the Administration has said that this is money well spent because 
the Agreed Framework has frozen and stopped the North Korean nuclear 
program.
  I have been skeptical of the Agreed Framework since its inception. I 
have never understood how United States negotiators agreed to a deal 
that did not allow international inspectors immediate and complete 
access to North Korea's nuclear program, including the two suspected 
but undeclared nuclear waste sites. Not only did this failure to demand 
complete access mean that we might never know how much plutonium the 
North Koreans diverted prior to the 1994 crisis, but it has also led to 
this situation where the much heralded ``freeze'' may have provided 
convenient cover for North Korea's more sinister plans.
  In the year following the signing of the Agreed Framework, former 
Majority Leader Bob Dole and I successfully added amendments to 
prohibit North Korea from receiving foreign assistance until the 
President certified to Congress that North Korea's nuclear threat had 
been eliminated. Both times the amendments were dropped in conference 
at the insistence of the Clinton Administration. Senator McCain and I 
have come to the floor countless times since then to try and correct 
loopholes in the Agreed Framework. I felt then, as I feel today, that 
the Agreed Framework did nothing to eliminate the nuclear threat from 
North Korea.
  In the last several weeks, disturbing intelligence information has 
surfaced that North Korea is constructing a vast underground complex 
that may be the site of another nuclear facility. This development 
alarms, but does not surprise, the Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. President, the United States must demand immediate access to this 
site before another penny of taxpayer dollars goes to subsidize this 
terrorist regime.
  If the North Korean regime is ready to put aside its drive for 
nuclear arms and to move toward the family of nations, then I believe 
the United States should rightfully welcome such a move and offer 
``rewards.'' However, I strongly believe that North Korea must offer 
the concessions, and not the other way around.
  For too long, I believe we have let the North Korean government 
dictate the terms of negotiations, while they gained valuable time to 
push the suspected nuclear program ahead. From the track record, it is 
hard to tell which country is a tiny, isolated, terrorist regime 
violating international agreements and which country is a superpower 
pulling the weight for the international community. This must change.
  Mr. President, Senator McCain's amendment is a step in the right 
direction, and I urge its immediate adoption.
  Mr. McCain. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kyl 
be allowed to speak after the vote. I also ask unanimous consent that 
the vote on this amendment, the recorded rollcall vote on this 
amendment, be set aside pending the determination of the managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.


                           Amendment No. 3506

  Mr. BENNETT. I call for the regular order with respect to the Specter 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The pending 
amendment is No. 3506, offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John 
Bradshaw, who is a fellow in my office, be allowed the privilege of the 
floor for the duration of the debate on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3524

 (Purpose: To make available assistance for Georgia for infrastructure 
          for secure communications and surveillance systems)

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, one of the amendments on the list 
previously approved has been cleared on both sides, an amendment by 
Senator Brownback with regard to Georgia. I send it to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the clerk will 
report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


[[Page S9770]]


       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McCONNELL], for Mr. 
     Brownback, proposes an amendment numbered 3524.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 26, line 5, insert ``and infrastructure for secure 
     communications and surveillance systems'' after ``training''.

  Mr. McCONNELL. This amendment has been cleared on both sides, Mr. 
President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the amendment is 
agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3524) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the 
table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3506

  Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, we do have an 
amendment on which we are ready to vote. After brief remarks, I believe 
we will be prepared to go to a vote on that amendment.
  We will then go to the low-level waste compact between Texas, Maine 
and Vermont. I believe the vote will be on that tomorrow morning. There 
will be some time before the vote, but I believe it is 30 minutes 
equally divided, or I hope that will be the time for a recorded vote.
  Before we vote, though, I do want to urge my colleagues to oppose 
this amendment. First, there is no treaty to monitor, and there will 
not be one in the foreseeable future. Until all 44 specified nations 
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will not enter into force. 
So to be providing funds before we have anything to monitor seems very 
questionable to me.
  We have not acted on this treaty. And certainly something of this 
magnitude should be given very serious, careful and extensive thought 
by the committee of jurisdiction and by the full Senate. We should not 
provide the funding that prejudges whatever the Senate may or may not 
do before it takes up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Beyond that, I have grave reservations, I admit, about whether the 
CTBT is in America's national interest. I am not convinced it is 
effectively verifiable. I am convinced it will limit our ability to 
maintain the safety and reliability of our vital nuclear deterrent.
  There are strong signs that India's decision to test nuclear weapons 
was, in part, a response to pressure to sign the CTBT. Ironically, the 
most tangible result of this treaty seems to be a nuclear arms race in 
Southeast Asia. So I just think this is not the time or the place to 
debate this treaty. Anything less than 67 votes in support of this 
amendment will send a strong signal that the Senate is prepared to 
reject this treaty. So I question even the proponents of the treaty 
wanting to do this at this particular time.
  Whatever the arguments for or against the treaty, putting millions in 
this organization does not make sense at this time. So I urge the 
defeat of this amendment.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President. I believe we are prepared to go to 
the vote.
  (At the request of Mr. Lott, the following statement was ordered to 
be printed in the Record.)
 Mr. HELMS. I strongly oppose this amendment, which seeks to 
provide funds to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.
  As I advised the President on January 21, of this year, at the 
conclusion of Senate debate on NATO expansion, the Foreign Relations 
Committee would then turn its attention to several other critical, 
pressing matters which could affect the security of the American people 
and the health of the United States' economy. Chief among these are the 
agreements on Multilateralization and Demarcation of the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
  The President promised more than a year ago to submit these treaties 
for the Senate's advice and consent, but we are yet to see that promise 
fulfilled. Nevertheless, the Foreign Relations Committee intends to 
pursue hearings on a number of associated issues--such as the recent 
Rumsfeld Commission report--with the presumption that the President's 
promise will be honored in the near term.
  Indeed, Mr. President, in listening to various justifications for the 
proposed amendment (which discuss the ongoing development of nuclear 
weapons by India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, etc.) I was struck 
by the urgent need--not for another arms control treaty--but for a 
national missile defense to protect the United States from these 
nuclear weapons when they are mounted on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.
  Let me repeat that for the purpose of emphasis. The last thing the 
United States needs is another arms control treaty. In presuming to 
fund the Preparatory Commission, and in attempting to dictate to the 
Foreign Relations Committee that CTBT consideration take precedence 
over the planned ABM Treaty hearings, the Senator from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Specter) obviously is willing to place a higher priority on the 
test ban than on protecting the American people from ballistic missile 
attack.
  Sure, I have heard the White House and the liberal media attempt to 
spin India's and Pakistan's actions into a justification for the CTBT. 
And some seem to have bought it hook-line-and-sinker. But as the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee heard a week after the Indian tests, from 
several expert witnesses, India's nuclear tests demonstrate that the 
CTBT is a complete sham from a nonproliferation standpoint.
  Mr. President, this Senator will take no part in papering over 
India's actions with another ban on nuclear testing. The world already 
has one such treaty, called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
We should demand that India sign on to that treaty, which already has 
185 States Parties and has been in force since 1970, not a ``Johnny-
come-lately'' CTBT, which is--in all respects--a far weaker version of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The point is, Mr. President, there 
would be no cause for worry about Indian nuclear tests if India has 
agreed not to have these weapons in the first place.

  On the other hand, only less than two dozen countries have ratified 
the CTBT, of whom only 6 are on the list of the 44 key countries which, 
pursuant to Article 14 of the treaty, must ratify before it can enter 
into force. In other words any one of these 44 countries (for example, 
India, Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran) can single-handedly derail the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) entry into force.
  That is why, Mr. President, the CTBT is so low on the Committee's 
list of priorities. It has no chance of entering into force in the 
foreseeable future, regardless of what the U.S. Senate does, and 
regardless of whether we waste funds on the Preparatory Commission. I 
regret that it was necessary to come to the Senate floor and explain 
such an obvious fact.
  All of this, of course, is without respect to the fact that the CTBT, 
by preventing tests to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent, is a bad idea from a national security standpoint, 
but that is a debate better reserved for a time and place when the CTBT 
realistically has a chance of entering into force.
  In sum, Mr. President, I oppose the Specter amendment on both 
jurisdictional and substantive grounds. Now it is my understanding, on 
the basis of assurances given by the staff of the Foreign Operations 
subcommittee, that no funds can be provided to the Preparatory 
Commission without notification to and approval by the Foreign 
Relations Committee. However, that said, this amendment is part and 
parcel of the Clinton Administration's effort to cover up the collapse 
of its nonproliferation policy. By promoting the CTBT with no mention 
of the NPT, the Clinton Administration and Senator Specter propose a 
course of action

[[Page S9771]]

that will de facto legitimize Indian and Pakistani possession of these 
weapons, just so long as they are not caught testing them. Such a 
policy sets a poor precedent--if one is worried that other countries, 
such as Iran and Iraq, might seek to withdraw from the NPT, and escape 
international opprobrium by signing on to the CTBT as a declared 
nuclear power.
  Instead, the Senate should demand that India and Pakistan join the 
NPT, and should insist on vigorous international sanctions against 
proliferant countries, to be lifted only after their nuclear programs 
have been rolled back.
  India's nuclear testing also is compelling, additional evidence 
pointing to the need for a national missile defense to protect the 
United States. Because India can readily reconfigure its space-launch 
vehicle as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its actions 
clearly constitute an emerging nuclear threat to the United States. For 
this reason, it is time that the Foreign Relations Committee review the 
antiquated ABM Treaty, which precludes the United States from deploying 
a missile defense. Sad to say, the Specter amendment plays into the 
hands of those who seek to detract attention from this effort.
  Finally, Mr. President, India's (and Pakistan's) actions should make 
clear to all just how vital the U.S. nuclear deterrent is to the 
national security of the United States. What is needed, at this time, 
is not a scramble for an arms control treaty that prohibits the United 
States from guaranteeing the safety and reliability of its nuclear 
stockpile. What is needed is a careful, bottoms-up review of the state 
of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, which I fear is in sad repair after 
six years of a moratorium. I expect that, after undertaking such a 
review, the United States will find that the CTBT is the very last 
thing the United States should consider doing.
  Mr. President, I do hope Senators will oppose the Specter 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the Specter 
amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3506 offered by 
the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. 
Domenici), the Senator from Texas (Mr. Gramm), and the Senator from 
Arkansas (Mr. Murkowski) are necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms) is 
absent because of illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
North Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Bingaman), 
the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Glenn), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. 
Inouye) are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--49 yeas, 44 nays, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 254 Leg.]

                                YEAS--49

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Specter
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--44

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     DeWine
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bingaman
     Domenici
     Glenn
     Gramm
     Helms
     Inouye
     Murkowski
  The amendment (No. 3506) was agreed to.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


              the child survival and disease programs fund

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I would like to express my strong support 
for the Child Survival and Disease Program Fund. I understand that the 
House Committee on Appropriations, as a part of its Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Bill, has recommended that $650 
million be allocated to the Fund's programs for fiscal year 1999. On 
the House side, Subcommittee Chairman Callahan has taken the lead in 
protecting these child survival programs and I commend him for his 
leadership on this issue. The Clinton administration, however, has 
reduced direct funding for child survival programs. In order to 
preserve the benefits of these important programs for children 
worldwide, I believe the Senate should accept in conference the House 
language that was agreed to in Committee for this Fund.
  It is a tragedy that millions of children die each year from disease, 
malnutrition, and other consequences of poverty that are both 
preventable and treatable. The programs of the Child Survival Fund, 
which are intended to reduce infant mortality and improve the health 
and nutrition of children, address the various problems of young people 
struggling to survive in developing countries. It places a priority on 
the needs of the more than 100 million children worldwide who are 
displaced and/or have become orphans.
  The Fund includes initiatives to curb the resurgence of communicable 
diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. In the underdeveloped world, 
the Fund works towards eradicating polio as well as preventing and 
controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS.
  Aside from addressing issues of health, the Fund also supports basic 
education programs. An investment in education yields one of the 
highest social and economic rates of return--because it gives children 
the necessary tools to become self-sufficient adults. Each additional 
year of primary and secondary schooling results in a 10-20% wage 
increase and a 25% net increase in income.
  The programs supported by the Child Survival Fund are effective 
because they save three million lives each year through immunizations, 
vitamin supplementation, oral rehydration therapy, and the treatment of 
childhood respiratory infections, which are the second largest killer 
of children on earth. This year the Kiwanis International are leading a 
global campaign to raise seventy-five million dollars toward the 
elimination of Iodine Deficiency Disorder which is the world's most 
prevalent cause of preventable mental retardation in children. 
Eliminating the symptoms and causes of this poverty is not only the 
humane thing to do--it is also a necessary prerequisite for global 
stability and prosperity.
  In my view, Congress needs to maintain its support for these valuable 
programs. It is my hope that the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee 
will accept the House language. The Child Survival and Disease programs 
are effective and are important. They should be continued. I would like 
to commend Representatives Tony Hall of Ohio and Sonny Callahan of 
Alabama for their tireless leadership in the effort to eliminate global 
hunger.
  I see the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee on 
the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the Senator from Ohio for his statement. I 
have listened very carefully to his remarks, and I commend him for his 
tireless efforts in supporting children's causes, here in the United 
States and throughout the world. I would like to assure him that I will 
give every possible consideration to his request when we go to 
conference.
  Mr. DeWINE. I thank my distinguished friend from Kentucky, and I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S9772]]

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3525

 (Purpose: To require a report on Iraqi development of weapons of mass 
                              destruction)

  Mr. McCONNELL. Earlier today, due to a mistake, an amendment by 
Senator Bond was, we thought, approved but in fact was not sent to the 
desk. It is agreed to by both sides. So I would like to send the Bond 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for Mr. Bond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3525.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) Iraq is continuing efforts to mask the extent of its 
     weapons of mass destruction and missile programs;
       (2) proposals to relax the current international inspection 
     regime would have potentially dangerous consequences for 
     international security; and
       (3) Iraq has demonstrated time and again that it cannot be 
     trusted to abide by international norms or by its own 
     agreements, and that the only way the international community 
     can be assured of Iraqi compliance is by ongoing inspection.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the international agencies charged with inspections in 
     Iraq--the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
     United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) should maintain 
     vigorous inspections, including surprise inspections, within 
     Iraq; and
       (2) the United States should oppose any efforts to ease the 
     inspections regimes on Iraq until there is clear, credible 
     evidence that the Government of Iraq is no longer seeking to 
     acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means of 
     delivering them.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to 
     Congress on the United States Government's assessment of 
     Iraq's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs 
     and its efforts to move toward procurement of nuclear weapons 
     and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. The 
     report shall also--
       (1) assess the United States view of the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency's action team reports and other IAEA 
     efforts to monitor the extent and nature of Iraq's nuclear 
     program; and
       (2) include the United States Government's opinion on the 
     value of maintaining the ongoing inspection regime rather 
     than replacing it with a passive monitoring system.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the amendment is 
agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3525) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and move 
to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

                          ____________________