[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 112 (Monday, August 31, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9674-S9676]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thought I might take just a moment to speak 
to the issue of the policy of the United States of America toward Iraq 
and Saddam Hussein.
  In the month or so that the Senate has been out of session, there has 
been a significant series of developments which cause me considerable 
concern about the direction of the administration's policy--or not 
policies, as the

[[Page S9675]]

case may be--and the requirements of the Senate to act in accordance.
  The President will recall that about 7 years ago the entire country 
was fixed on the problem of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and 
strongly supported the action of the President--at that time President 
Bush--to first engage in what was called Desert Shield and then later 
Desert Storm; the militarily significant rollback of the Iraqi forces 
in about 100 hours. I visited Saudi Arabia as that buildup of American 
forces was occurring. It was unprecedented really since the time of the 
Vietnam war. The success of the operation was one of the great 
successes of U.S. military history.
  I remember the parades all across America when our troops returned 
home. We were very proud of what we had done. We had turned back a 
difficult dictator who had engaged in unspeakable horrors against 
people in Kuwait, against the environment, and really against the rule 
of international law.
  We had disengaged from Iraq because the President had succeeded 
through the efforts of General Norman Schwarzkopf and the Secretary of 
Defense--at the time Richard Cheney--and Secretary of State Jim Baker 
to force Saddam Hussein into an agreement that would forever bar him 
from developing weapons of mass destruction, or the means to deliver 
them. That was an agreement that Saddam Hussein willingly entered into, 
although one could say it wasn't too willingly because we had about 
500,000 troops in his country at the time. But the deal was we will 
stop now if you will sign this agreement; otherwise we will have to 
continue our military operation. Saddam Hussein wisely decided to sign 
an agreement with the United States. That agreement was to allow U.N. 
inspectors to ensure that Iraq was not developing weapons of mass 
destruction, and that it would destroy the stocks that it had 
developed.
  We know that for the first few years world attention was focused on 
Saddam Hussein because of what he had done. The United Nations was 
focused on supporting and enforcing those inspections, and the United 
States on a couple of occasions either took or threatened to take 
military action to force Saddam Hussein to comply with his part of the 
bargain. America was united in that position. Now, the Bush 
administration policy at the time was called a policy of containment. 
The effort was not to get Saddam Hussein out of power per se but, 
rather, to prevent him from doing any damage to neighbors. But a 
concomitant to that policy was to ensure that he did not have the 
capability of causing his neighbors problems by virtue of the U.N. 
inspections.

  Slowly, over time, after the Clinton administration took office, that 
policy evolved. Now, they continued to call it containment, but a 
critical component of the policy was missing --the policy that denied 
Saddam Hussein the ability to conduct military operations against his 
neighbors--because over time the administration became less and less 
willing to ensure that the inspection regime called for under the 
agreement was actually carried out. UNSCOM is the name by which we know 
this, the acronym of the United Nations inspection regime. And the 
UNSCOM inspections eventually became very big news because Saddam 
Hussein saw that from time to time he could thwart the inspectors, 
prevent them from doing their job, and cause the United States to have 
to build up military forces in the region. And about the time we would 
spend a lot of money and effort and time to get these military forces 
in place, then he would agree to strike some kind of a deal. And as 
soon as we then brought the force level back down again, he would break 
the deal, and we would have to do the same thing all over again. He was 
jerking our chain.
  This administration, however, failed to develop a strategy to deal 
with that. Many of us in the Senate, through meetings with members of 
the administration, through correspondence, and through public hearings 
and statements, have tried to get the administration to focus on a 
long-term strategy that would have as its ultimate goal not containing 
Saddam Hussein but eliminating Saddam Hussein. No one believes that 
this is easy. It is a long-term project, and it takes a real 
commitment. This administration has not been willing to make that 
commitment.
  In February of last year, the administration again built up forces 
because again Saddam Hussein had refused to allow the inspectors to do 
their job under the agreement that he had made. Many of us in the 
Senate were concerned that if the administration simply lobbed a few 
cruise missiles into certain Iraqi facilities, it would be antithetical 
to our long-term goal. It would not do anything to ensure that the 
inspectors could do their job. It would probably kill a lot of innocent 
people. It would turn world opinion against the United States. And we 
need the support of our allies, support that we used to have when the 
Bush administration worked to get that support. But most importantly, 
military action would not be in furtherance of any particular strategic 
policy. It would waste money, it would not achieve anything, and in the 
end we would still have an empty policy.
  The administration continued to insist that our policy was one of 
containment. But containment is no policy if, in fact, you are at the 
same time allowing your opponent--in this case, Iraq--to build up 
military forces so that when they want to strike, they have the 
capability of doing so. And because we don't have forces in the area 
sufficient to stop aggression, again, it would have to be a reaction on 
the part of the free world in response to aggression by Saddam Hussein 
rather than preventive action to begin with.
  And so as time went on, the Iraqis continued to snub their nose at 
the United Nations inspectors, probably building up the capability to 
produce weapons of mass destruction and also to develop the missiles, 
or produce the missiles to deliver those weapons.

  The inspectors then have reported back to us. Richard Butler, who 
heads UNSCOM right now, and others have said that if we stop those 
inspections, it is only a matter of time before Iraq can develop the 
capability of producing these missiles and either has now or could 
quickly develop the chemical and biological weapons that would be 
necessary to threaten or cause harm to their neighbors. So the 
inspections are a key component of any strategy, including a strategy 
of containment. And it does no good to have a strategy of containment 
if you don't enforce the inspection regime called upon by the agreement 
with Saddam Hussein 7 years ago.
  Recently, Scott Ritter, a well known inspector on the UNSCOM team, 
has resigned in protest, and the reason, Mr. President, is because he 
has said that U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, have thwarted the inspections by specifically 
putting conditions on U.S. involvement with the inspectors and by 
conditioning the time, the place, and manner of inspections.
  Now, this is all wrapped up in diplomatic speak. The administration 
has flatly denied this is true. The administration, frankly, in this 
respect is not telling the truth, Mr. President. If Scott Ritter is to 
be believed, restrictions have been placed upon the American 
involvement in the inspections of these facilities. And it has been 
done because the administration doesn't want to have to follow up on 
what the inspections will demonstrate; namely, that action needs to be 
taken against Saddam Hussein.
  Or, failing that, if Saddam Hussein says, ``I am not going to allow 
you to inspect certain facilities,'' the administration will then be 
forced with the option of either doing nothing or of having to take 
some kind of action. And since the administration is unwilling, 
apparently, to take any kind of action, it therefore has to select the 
option of doing nothing. But it obviously cannot be perceived as doing 
nothing, so instead it sweeps the problem under the rug, says, ``We 
don't see any problem with Saddam Hussein.'' And of course you don't 
see any problem if you have your eyes closed, if you are not engaging 
in any inspections, or you are not allowing your inspectors to engage 
in the key inspections.
  Frankly, Mr. President, the administration's duplicity in this regard 
is something that the Congress should not permit and the American 
people need to be aware of. We ought to have the truth from the 
administration. Have we changed our policy with respect to Iraq? Have 
we decided not to enforce the agreement anymore? And

[[Page S9676]]

what are the implications of this policy?
  Scott Ritter has laid forth his allegations. The administration has 
responded simply with denials. And yet there are enough sources who 
confirm Scott Ritter's allegations to cause me to believe that the 
administration's denials are false, that in fact Secretary of State 
Albright has, in one way or another, discouraged the American 
inspectors from inspecting key facilities that the inspectors believe 
need to be inspected because of what would be revealed.
  So, Mr. President, here is where we are now. After the agreement that 
Saddam Hussein entered into, in which he agreed to allow inspections to 
ensure that he did not develop the capability to pose a threat to his 
neighbors, part of the containment policy--as a result of that 
agreement, the United States had enforced for a period of years the 
inspection regime through UNSCOM--we are now no longer doing that in 
practice. It is now a charade.
  The reason it is a charade is because we don't want to face the 
consequences of either, A, being denied the ability to engage in the 
inspections or, B, finding something we don't want to find, because in 
either event we would have to do something, and this administration is 
frozen into inaction in dealing with Saddam Hussein. If they can lob a 
few cruise missiles at a problem, as they did against the terrorist 
Osama bin Laden 10, 12 days ago, then they can say they have taken 
action.
  But that is not enough in dealing with Saddam Hussein. He is more 
clever. He knows that we lack patience. He knows that if he defies us 
long enough, eventually our allies will desert us because, A, we don't 
have the capability anymore of keeping the coalition together and, B, 
the American people will get tired of the issue and no longer be 
willing to support the kind of military action or long-term action that 
would be required to oust Saddam Hussein.
  The result of this is that the United States has, in fact, changed 
its policy with respect to Iraq without telling either the Congress or 
the American people. It apparently no longer intends to enforce the 
agreement that George Bush and his administration insisted Saddam 
Hussein make.
  The implications for peace in the world are significant, because when 
Saddam Hussein has been able to build up his weapons of mass 
destruction to the level where he can cause significant damage, he will 
either do so or he will threaten to do so. At that point, his 
capability will cause a lot of countries in the world, especially those 
close neighbors who fear that kind of activity on his part, to back off 
of any opposition to him. His neighbors are relatively unprotected and, 
not believing the United States is a reliable ally to protect them, 
they will accede to his demands. Then, rather than having one or two 
countries in the Middle East that we have to contend with, we will have 
one or two belligerents and a lot of neutral parties who no longer 
cooperate with us in restricting his activities and his aggression and 
his terrorism.
  We need these countries in the fight against terrorism. I am very 
concerned that by backing off of the enforcement of the agreement 
against Saddam Hussein we will have permitted terrorism to further its 
goals in the Middle East and around the world, especially against 
Americans; and will have advanced the day when Iraq decides to engage 
in yet another form of aggression.
  I think it is a sad day when not only do we see U.S. foreign policy 
in tatters, in shambles, with respect to a country that we know poses a 
threat to us, but an administration which is unwilling to come clean on 
its policy. I know these are harsh words, but the fact of the matter is 
the administration has not leveled with the American people on this 
problem. I believe that Scott Ritter is essentially correct in his 
assessment of the situation, especially the administration's decision 
to pull the plug on the inspections in any meaningful way. As a result, 
I think this matter deserves airing in the Senate, in the House, and 
before the American people. I expect, either as chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism or as a member of the 
Intelligence Committee, I will ask the administration to explain its 
position. I think the Senate will probably have to take some action 
before we adjourn in October to ensure that this country has a strong 
policy with respect to one of the rogue nations of the world.
  In conclusion, when discussing this in my home State of Arizona this 
last month, one of my friends said, ``Isn't it the obligation of the 
President to conduct the foreign policy and shouldn't the Congress 
leave that to the President?'' The answer is, as I said, as a general 
proposition, yes. But when an administration is frozen into inaction 
for one reason or another, whether the President is being distracted by 
other matters or whether it is simply too hard a problem for the 
administration to want to deal with, then the Senate, in its historic 
role as a partner in the administration of foreign affairs, needs to 
insert itself into the equation. To the extent we need to influence the 
development and execution of foreign policy in this area, the U.S. 
Senate will have to be involved.
  I would rather the administration develop a policy and a strategy and 
execute it with the cooperation of the Senate, but if the 
administration is unwilling to do that, then the Senate will have to 
get involved. It is not a happy day to have to talk about this kind of 
thing in this way. We would much rather cooperate with the 
administration. I hold myself out to be willing to do that at any time 
and any place. But the administration has to come clean with the 
American people on what its strategy really is in dealing with Iraq. 
Until that statement of strategy has been laid out in an honest way, 
the Senate is going to have to involve itself in this issue.
  I hope and pray we will be able to maintain peace in the Middle East 
and that we will be able to contain Saddam Hussein, but it is going to 
require commitment and will, not just of the American people, but of 
the American Government. I am hoping in the next few weeks we can help 
develop the policy so, between the administration and the Congress and 
the American people, we will jointly, together, unify and be able to 
confront this threat to peace in the world.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I welcome back the distinguished 
Presiding Officer and our staff on the Senate floor and hope that you 
all had as enjoyable an August recess as I did.
  I want to talk about three things this afternoon. The first is to 
express how saddened I am with the loss of a very key member of the 
staff of Senator Kent Conrad and somebody whom I knew and respected 
quite well.
  Secondly, I would like to talk about the agricultural situation in my 
State of South Dakota that I spent a good deal of time talking about as 
I was home.
  And then obviously, thirdly, I would like to discuss the agenda at 
hand and what my expectations and hopes are for the remaining 6 weeks 
of this session.

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