[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 111 (Friday, August 7, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1610]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            CRISIS IN CYPRUS

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. ED WHITFIELD

                              of kentucky

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, August 6, 1998

  Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Speaker, we are on the verge of yet another crisis 
in Cyprus.
  The Greek Cypriots propose to purchase new S-300 missiles from 
Russia, and by all accounts, Russia intends to proceed with delivery of 
the missiles this fall. The installation of these sophisticated new 
antiaircraft missiles and accompanying powerful air surveillance radars 
needlessly escalates the level of military confrontation in Cyprus, and 
pushes the two sides further away from a more sensible path of mutual 
arms reductions. It also raises the disastrous prospect of conflict 
between two of our NATO allies, Turkey and Greece. Indeed, the 
placement of these missiles in Cyprus seems intended for no other 
reason than to provoke conflict.
  The Cyprus problem has been with us for a long time. United Nations 
peacekeeping forces have been there for a quarter of this century. Some 
of our European allies have invested, and continue to invest, 
considerable effort in finding a long-term solution there. The United 
States, of course, is also actively engaged in diplomatic efforts in 
Cyprus. The problem is daunting and filled with frustrations. For 
example, I was disturbed to read last week that the Foreign Minister of 
Greece had referred to the President's efforts in Cyprus as ``utter 
lies''. These kinds of remarks from senior government officials are not 
helpful.
  I wish the Greek Cypriots would reconsider their decision to deploy 
these dangerous new missiles, but I fear that they will not. 
Unfortunately, restraint has not been a common feature of Cyprus' 
history. In light of this, I am very troubled that Russia will allow 
this sale to go forward. Russia is a member of the United Nations 
Security Council, and I simply cannot understand why President Yeltsin 
would permit these missiles to be sent into this explosive 
environment--particularly after repeated Security Council resolutions 
expressing concern about the introduction of sophisticated weaponry in 
Cyprus, and admonitions to all parties to avoid further expansion of 
military forces and armaments.
  Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues and I have sent a letter today to 
the President urging him to speak directly to President Yeltsin about 
this crisis, and to prevail upon him to cancel the S-300 missile 
transfer. At a time when Russia is looking to the United States and 
other members of the international community for help with its 
financial crisis, I think that Russia should understand that 
international cooperation is not a one-way street and not limited to 
the subject of finance. Like all of us, Russia has a responsibility to 
promote solutions, not new crises. I hope that President Yeltsin will 
see that this missile sale threatens to damage Russia's goodwill in the 
United States, and this makes it more difficult for us to cooperate on 
other issues.
  A few weeks ago, some of my colleagues here spoke of the Cyprus 
problem, but the common message was not solution-oriented. Instead, we 
heard that one side in Cyprus was to blame for all its problems, and 
the other side was innocent. I want to suggest to my colleagues that 
taking sides in this old and complex problem is not constructive, and 
will not enhance the ability of the United States to be an effective 
catalyst for solutions. I also want to point out that the history is 
not so clear as some have suggested.
  Even before this most recent crisis was precipitated by a weapons 
purchase from Russia, the last major crisis in 1974 began for reasons 
that some of us have forgotten. The American Secretary of State at the 
time, Henry Kissinger, succinctly summarized the events in his book, 
``Years of Upheaval'':

       After World War II, the old enemies Greece and Turkey were 
     allies in NATO with a common stake in the security of the 
     eastern Mediterranean. But their atavistic bitterness found a 
     focus in the island of Cyprus, forty-four miles from mainland 
     Turkey, with a population 80 percent Greek and about 20 
     percent Turk--a lethal cocktail.
       As in many other nations of mixed nationalities, a tenuous 
     civil peace had been possible while the island was under 
     foreign rule. But when the British granted independence to 
     the island in 1960, with Britain, Greece, and Turkey as 
     guarantors of its internal arrangements, the subtle Greek 
     Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III, leader of the Greek Cypriot 
     community and of the campaign against British rule, found 
     himself obliged to concede a degree of self-government to the 
     Turkish minority, offensive to all his notions of government 
     or nationality. He did not have his heart in it, and with 
     independence he systematically reneged on what he promised, 
     seeking to create in effect a unitary state in which the 
     Turkish minority would always be outvoted. The history of 
     independent Cyprus was thus plagued by communal strife, and 
     in 1967 Turkey's threat to intervene militarily was aborted 
     only at the last moment by a strong warning from President 
     Johnson. It had become since an article of faith in Turkish 
     politics that this submission to American preferences had 
     been unwise and would never be repeated. I had always taken 
     it for granted that the next communal crisis in Cyprus would 
     provoke Turkish intervention.
       Makarios nevertheless continued to play with fire. In 1972 
     he introduced Czech arms on the island for the apparent 
     purpose of creating a private paramilitary unit to 
     counterbalance those set up by the constitution. In 1974 he 
     again took on the Greek-dominated National Guard in an effort 
     to bring them under his control. Greece was then governed by 
     a military junta, violently anti-Communist, deeply suspicious 
     of Makarios's flirtation with radical Third World 
     countries, which it took to be a sign of his pro-Communist 
     sympathies. It therefore encouraged plans to overthrow him 
     and install in Cyprus a regime more in sympathy with 
     Greece, oblivious to the fact than an overthrow of the 
     constitutional arrangement on Cyprus would free Turkey of 
     previous restraints. . . .
       On July 15--six days after my return from the Soviet Union 
     and Europe--Makarios was overthrown in a coup d'etat just as 
     he returned from a weekend in the mountains; he was nearly 
     assassinated. He was replaced by an unsavory adventurer, 
     Nikos Sampson, known as a strong supporter of union with 
     Greece. A crisis was now inevitable.
       There was nothing we needed less than a crisis--especially 
     one that would involve two NATO allies. Whomever we supported 
     and whatever the outcome, the eastern flank of the 
     Mediterranean would be in jeopardy. . . .
       During the week of July 15 I therefore dispatched Joe Sisco 
     to London, Ankara, and Athens. Britain, as one of the 
     guarantor powers, was seeking to mediate between the parties. 
     Sisco's mission was to help Britain start a negotiating 
     process that might delay a Turkish invasion and enable the 
     structure under Sampson in Cyprus to fall of its own weight. 
     But Turkey was not interested in a negotiated solution; it 
     was determined to settle old scores. On July 19 it invaded 
     Cyprus, meeting unexpectedly strong resistance. . . .
       During the night of July 21-22, we forced a cease-fire by 
     threatening Turkey that we would move nuclear weapons from 
     forward positions--especially where they might be involved in 
     a war with Greece. It stopped Turkish military operations 
     while Turkey was occupying only a small enclave on the 
     island; this created conditions for new negotiations slated 
     to start two days hence, with the Turkish minority obviously 
     in an improved bargaining position and with some hope of 
     achieving more equitable internal arrangements.
       On July 22, the junta in Athens was overthrown and replaced 
     by a democratic government under the distinguished 
     conservative leader Constantine Karamanlis. Within days, the 
     mood in America changed. The very groups that had castigated 
     us for our reluctance to assault Greece now wanted us to turn 
     against Turkey over a crisis started by Greece, to gear our 
     policies to the domestic structures of the government in 
     Athens and Ankara regardless of the origins or merits of the 
     dispute on Cyprus, to take a one-sided position regardless of 
     our interest in easing the conflict between two strategic 
     allies in the eastern Mediterranean. . . . For two weeks we 
     maintained our tightrope act, but during the weekend 
     following Nixon's resignation the crisis erupted again, 
     culminating in a second Turkish invasion of the island. While 
     Ford struggled to restore executive authority over the next 
     months, a freewheeling Congress destroyed the equilibrium 
     between the parties we had precariously maintained; it 
     legislated a heavy-handed arms embargo against Turkey that 
     destroyed all possibility of American mediation--at a cost 
     from which we have not recovered to this day. . . .

  What I learn from this is that we do a disservice to ourselves and to 
the cause of peace in Cyprus by being too quick to take sides in the 
matter. The situation requires a steady hand and an honest broker, and 
we do not contribute either if the Congress of the United States is 
waving the flag of one of the parties to the dispute.
  I hope the President can persuade our friends in Russia to adopt this 
same approach, and to abandon this very dangerous new transfer of 
weapons to Cyprus.




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