[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 107 (Monday, August 3, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H6923-H6925]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FINDING GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 54) finding the Government of Iraq
in unacceptable and material breach of its international obligations.
The Clerk read as follows:
S.J. Res. 54
Whereas hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on
February 28, 1991, and the conditions governing the cease-
fire were specified in United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 686 (March 2, 1991) and 687 (April 3, 1991);
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 687
requires that international economic sanctions remain in
place until Iraq discloses and destroys its weapons of mass
destruction programs and capabilities and undertakes
unconditionally never to resume such activities;
Whereas Resolution 687 established the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to uncover all aspects of
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and tasked the
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to
locate and remove or destroy all nuclear weapons systems,
subsystems or material from Iraq;
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 715,
adopted on October 11, 1991, empowered UNSCOM to maintain a
long-term monitoring program to ensure Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs are dismantled and not restarted;
Whereas Iraq has consistently fought to hide the full
extent of its weapons programs, and has systematically made
false declarations to the Security Council and to UNSCOM
regarding those programs, and has systematically obstructed
weapons inspections for seven years;
Whereas in June 1991, Iraqi forces fired on International
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and otherwise obstructed and
misled UNSCOM inspectors, resulting in UN Security Council
Resolution 707 which found Iraq to be in ``material breach''
of its obligations under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 for failing to allow UNSCOM inspectors access
to a site storing nuclear equipment;
Whereas in January and February of 1992, Iraq rejected
plans to install long-term monitoring equipment and cameras
called for in UN resolutions, resulting in a Security Council
Presidential Statement of February 19, 1992 which declared
that Iraq was in ``continuing material breach'' of its
obligations;
Whereas in February of 1992, Iraq continued to obstruct the
installation of monitoring equipment, and failed to comply
with UNSCOM orders to allow destruction of missiles and other
proscribed weapons, resulting the Security Council
Presidential Statement of February 28, 1992, which reiterated
that Iraq was in ``continuing material breach'' and noted a
``further material breach'' on account of Iraq's failure to
allow destruction of ballistic missile equipment;
Whereas on July 5, 1992, Iraq denied UNSCOM inspectors
access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, resulting in a
Security Council Presidential Statement of July 6, 1992,
which declared that Iraq was in ``material and unacceptable
breach'' of its obligations under UN resolutions;
Whereas in December of 1992 and January of 1993, Iraq
violated the southern no-fly zone, moved surface to air
missiles into the no-fly zone, raided a weapons depot in
internationally recognized Kuwaiti territory and denied
landing rights to a plane carrying UN weapons inspectors,
resulting in a Security Council Presidential Statement of
January 8, 1993, which declared that Iraq was in an
``unacceptable and material breach'' of its obligations under
UN resolutions;
Whereas in response to continued Iraqi defiance, a Security
Council Presidential Statement of January 11, 1993,
reaffirmed the previous finding of material breach, followed
on January 13 and 18 by allied air raids, and on January 17
with an allied missile attack on Iraqi targets;
Whereas on June 10, 1993, Iraq prevented UNSCOM's
installation of cameras and monitoring equipment, resulting
in a Security Council Presidential Statement of June 18,
1993, declaring Iraq's refusal to comply to be a ``material
and unacceptable breach'';
Whereas on October 6, 1994, Iraq threatened to end
cooperation with weapons inspectors if sanctions were not
ended, and one day later, massed 10,000 troops within 30
miles of the Kuwaiti border, resulting in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 949 demanding Iraq's withdrawal
from the Kuwaiti border area and renewal of compliance with
UNSCOM;
Whereas on April 10, 1995, UNSCOM reported to the Security
Council that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons
program, and had failed to account for 17 tons of biological
weapons material resulting in the Security Council's renewal
of sanctions against Iraq;
Whereas on July 1, 1995, Iraq admitted to a full scale
biological weapons program, but denied weaponization of
biological agents, and subsequently threatened to end
cooperation with UNSCOM resulting in the Security Council's
renewal of sanctions against Iraq;
Whereas on March 8, 11, 14, and 15, 1996, Iraq again barred
UNSCOM inspectors from sites containing documents and
weapons, in response to which the Security Council issued a
Presidential Statement condemning ``clear violations by Iraq
of previous Resolutions 687, 707, and 715'';
Whereas from June 11-15, 1996, Iraq repeatedly barred
weapons inspectors from military sites, in response to which
the Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1060, noting the ``clear violation on United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715'' and
in response to Iraq's continued violations, issued a
Presidential Statement detailing Iraq's ``gross violation of
obligations'';
Whereas in August 1996, Iraqi troops overran Irbil, in
Iraqi Kurdistan, employing more than 30,000 troops and
Republican Guards, in response to which the Security Council
briefly suspended implementation on United Nations Security
Council Resolution 986, the UN oil for food plan;
Whereas in December 1996, Iraq prevented UNSCOM from
removing 130 Scud missile engines from Iraq for analysis,
resulting in a Security Council presidential statement which
``deplore[d]'' Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM;
Whereas on April 9, 1997, Iraq violated the no-fly zone in
southern Iraq and United Nations Security Council Resolution
670, banning international flights, resulting in a Security
Council statement regretting Iraq's lack of ``specific
consultation'' with the Council;
Whereas on June 4 and 5, 1997 Iraqi officials on board
UNSCOM aircraft interfered with the controls and inspections,
endangering inspectors and obstructing the UNSCOM mission,
resulting in a UN Security Council presidential statement
demanding Iraq end its interference and on June 21, 1997,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1115 threatened
sanctions on Iraqi officials responsible for these
interferences;
Whereas on September 13, 1997, during an inspection
mission, an Iraqi official attacked UNSCOM officials engaged
in photographing illegal Iraqi activities, resulting in the
October 23, 1997, adoption of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1134 which threatened a travel ban on Iraqi
officials responsible for non-compliance with UN resolutions;
Whereas on October 29, 1997, Iraq announced that it would
no longer allow American inspectors working with UNSCOM to
conduct inspections in Iraq, blocking UNSCOM teams containing
Americans to conduct inspections and threatening to shoot
down U.S. U-2 surveillance flights in support of UNSCOM,
resulting in a United Nations Security Council Resolution
1137 on November 12, 1997, which imposed the travel ban on
Iraqi officials and threatened unspecified ``further
measures'';
Whereas on November 13, 1997, Iraq expelled U.S. inspectors
from Iraq, leading to UNSCOM's decision to pull out its
remaining inspectors and resulting in a United Nations
Security Council presidential statement demanding Iraq revoke
the expulsion;
Whereas on January 16, 1998, an UNSCOM team led by American
Scott Ritter was withdrawn from Iraq after being barred for
three days by Iraq from conducting inspections, resulting in
the adoption of a United Nations Security Council
presidential statement deploring Iraq's decision to bar the
team as a clear violation of all applicable resolutions;
Whereas despite clear agreement on the part of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein with United Nations General Kofi
Annan to grant access to all sites, and fully cooperate with
UNSCOM, and the adoption on March 2, 1998, of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1154, warning that any violation
of the agreement with Annan would have the ``severest
consequences'' for Iraq, Iraq has continued to actively
conceal weapons and weapons programs, provide misinformation
and otherwise deny UNSCOM inspectors access;
Whereas on June 24, 1998, UNSCOM Director Richard Butler
presented information to the UN Security Council indicating
clearly that Iraq, in direct contradiction to information
provided to UNSCOM, weaponized the nerve agent VX; and
Whereas Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction
programs threaten vital United States interests and
international peace and security: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of
its international obligations, and therefore the President is
urged to take appropriate action, in accordance with the
Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring
Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton), each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
[[Page H6924]]
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
S.J. Res. 54 is the Senate companion of H.J. Res. 125 which Speaker
Gingrich and I introduced on June 25, 1998.
We introduced our resolution in response to the mounting evidence
that Iraq continues to defy the decisions of the United Nations
Security Council with regard to its weapons of mass destruction.
The most recent example is the revelation in late June that Iraq has
placed VX poison gas into missile warheads. That fact was established
by lab testing in our Nation of missile warhead fragments which U.N.
inspectors found in Iraq. This evidence proves that Iraq remains in
violation of its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687
to disclose and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs and
capabilities. It also demonstrates that Iraq continues even now to
misrepresent to the United Nations and to the world about the history
of its weapons of mass destruction programs.
There is nothing new about this, however. Iraq's record of continued
evasion and obstruction of U.N. resolutions is spelled out in the 28
``whereas'' clauses contained in our measure.
It quickly becomes apparent, from these 28-some clauses, that there
has been a continuous and uninterrupted pattern of Iraqi noncompliance
with Security Council resolutions going back as far as 1991. This
problem emphatically has not been resolved by the agreement put
together by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan just last February.
My colleagues will recall that earlier this year the Clinton
Administration was on the verge of using military force to compel
Saddam Hussein to comply with his international obligations. That
threat was withdrawn after Kofi Annan went to Baghdad and came back
with Saddam Hussein's promises of better behavior by Iraq for the
future.
It now turns out that those promises were not even worth the paper
they were printed on. The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Richard Butler,
is in Iraq today, this very day, meeting with Iraqi officials about
what they must do to comply with U.N. resolutions. It is apparent from
news reports coming out of Iraq this morning that Saddam Hussein
continues to resist international inspections and to reject his
obligations under pertinent Security Council resolutions.
The purpose of S.J. Res. 54 is to draw attention to the fact that
Saddam Hussein's behavior has not improved and that he remains in
material and unacceptable breach of his international obligations. The
international community cannot continue to look the other way.
S.J. Res. 54 is both timely and unassailable in its facts. It
incorporates changes to the original text of H.J. Res. 125 that were
negotiated among the interested members of the Committee on
International Relations.
{time} 1515
And it is not opposed by the Clinton administration. Accordingly, I
urge my colleagues to fully support S.J. Res. 54.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S.J. Res. 54. All of us in this
Chamber recognize that we have a very serious problem with Iraq. It
will likely become more serious in the months to come. Iraq is
violating U.N. Security Council resolutions, it is engaging in
unacceptable behavior, and it is certainly appropriate that Congress go
on the record to express its strong objection to Iraq's conduct.
The administration, as I understand it, welcomes the support of
Congress for actions that the President may have to take to get Iraq to
comply with its international obligations. The administration, however,
is concerned about the foreign policy implications of the President
signing a joint resolution stating that Iraq is in material breach of
its international obligations. Taking such a unilateral position
strains U.S. relations with other U.N. Security Council members and
jeopardizes a solid U.N. Security Council front against Iraq.
I do have three concerns with the resolve clause. First, I share the
administration's concern over the statement that the government of Iraq
is in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations.
My problem with this formulation is that, as I understand it, most
Security Council members take the position that only the Council can
make a finding of material breach of Security Council resolutions. This
is not a determination that the United States alone can or should make.
There are implications to making such a statement.
For one thing, our U.N. Security Council colleagues will interpret
this resolution as the United States getting ahead of the rest of the
Council. If we make a unilateral determination of material breach, we
make it more difficult to win international support for the use of
force against Iraq.
For another, a finding of material breach is a clear signal that the
Security Council is prepared to support the use of force to bring Iraq
into compliance with Security Council resolutions.
In January 1993, President Bush carried out a series of successful
military strikes against Iraq shortly after the U.N. Security Council
formally found Iraq in material breach.
I think our message would be stronger if we used our own words, such
as ``grave violations,'' and not use the words ``material breach,''
words that signal in the U.N. support for immediate military action.
Second, and building on my concerns with the first part of the
resolve clause, the resolution broadly urges the President of the
United States to take appropriate action.
My problem with this part of the resolve clause is the Congress
identifies a serious problem, expresses its displeasure and then punts.
I appreciate the work of the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell)
to find compromise language here. He, like I, was uncomfortable with
the original language urging the President to act accordingly. He
narrowed and, I think, somewhat improved the resolve clause. But it
still falls short of Congress fulfilling its legitimate and important
role in foreign policy because it provides no meaningful guidance to
the executive.
The resolution would have been much improved if we called on the
President to consult with Congress prior to using force rather than
handing him a blank check and taking ourselves essentially out of the
picture in case of future action in the Gulf.
Third, the process for considering this joint resolution does not
measure up to the importance of the matter at hand. This resolution
goes to the heart of the most important problem that government must
address, the commitment of military forces abroad. Yet, we are debating
it under a suspension of the rules, which we generally avoid when
considering bills that merit serious and extensive debate.
No one here would dispute that Iraq has violated its international
obligations. The recitation of Iraq's misconduct in this resolution is
an important contribution. It is appropriate and worthwhile to spell
out the record of Iraqi failure to comply with U.N. resolutions.
This resolution has merit in its expression of political support for
Presidential action. The President should get support here for taking
prudent and necessary action to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf. But
this detailed condemnation of Iraq is followed by a policy statement
that is simply astonishing in its vagueness.
This resolution is an absolutely classic example of how Congress
deals with foreign policy. We complain, we point out the problem, we
offer no solution, and we shift the entire burden to the President of
the United States.
Congress is a coequal branch of government. We have an equal voice
under the Constitution to set the direction of American foreign policy.
But in this resolution we do not measure up to our constitutional
responsibilities. In effect, we say, ``Mr. President, this is a very
big problem, you go figure it out.''
[[Page H6925]]
This resolution endorses the use of force, but it states no objective
for the use of force. We create trouble for ourselves when we are
imprecise about policy and about the use of force and when we fail to
articulate what we believe policy should be based on specific facts and
specific objectives.
It would be better, I think, for the Congress to call on the
President here to consult with Congress prior to using force. We would
know at that time, and we do not know now, what circumstances require
use of U.S. military forces in the Gulf. We would fulfill our role as a
coequal branch of government if we leave authorization for such time. I
understand this is not an authorization bill.
I am uncomfortable voting for this resolution, principally because I
think it does not measure up to the way a responsible Congress should
engage in foreign policy making. I am even less comfortable, however,
voting against it.
I do not want to go on record against the use of force, first,
because I think we are going to come up to this point again with Iraq
in the months ahead; second, because of the egregious violations of the
U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq and its pattern of avoidance
and duplicity; and, third, because a vote against the resolution
suggests that we are not prepared to use force against Iraq, and I
think that would be unwise. Therefore, I will support the resolution
with the reservations I have suggested.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time and,
in closing, I just want to remind our colleagues to let us concentrate
on the fact that the government of Iraq's actions are unacceptable and
a material breach of their obligations and, accordingly, this measure
before us with regard to Iraq's continuing programs of building up
weapons of mass destruction threaten our own vital interests and we
should be supporting the measure.
I urge a supporting vote for S.J. Res. 54.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House
suspend the rules and pass the Senate joint resolution, Senate Joint
Resolution 54.
The question was taken.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that, I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
____________________