[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 107 (Monday, August 3, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H6918-H6922]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT OF 1998

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3743) to withhold voluntary proportional assistance for 
programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
relating to the development and completion of the Bushehr nuclear power 
plant in Iran, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 3743

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of 
     international terrorism and is on the Department of State's 
     list of countries that provide support for acts of 
     international terrorism.
       (2) Iran has repeatedly called for the destruction of 
     Israel and Iran supports organizations, such as Hizballah, 
     Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, which are responsible 
     for terrorist attacks against Israel.
       (3) Iranian officials have stated their intent to complete 
     at least 3 nuclear power plants by 2015 and are currently 
     working to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant located 
     on the Persian Gulf coast.
       (4) The United States has publicly opposed the completion 
     of reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant because the 
     transfer of civilian nuclear technology and training could 
     help to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.
       (5) In an April 1997 hearing before the Subcommittee on 
     Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate, the former Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, stated that 
     through the operation of the nuclear power reactor at the 
     Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran will develop substantial 
     expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
       (6) Construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was 
     halted following the 1979 revolution in Iran because the 
     former West Germany refused to assist in the completion the 
     plant due to concerns that completion of the plant could 
     provide Iran with expertise and technology which could 
     advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.
       (7) Iran is building up its offensive military capacity in 
     other areas as evidenced by its recent testing of engines for 
     ballistic missiles capable of carrying 2,200 pound warheads 
     more than 800 miles, within range of strategic targets in 
     Israel.
       (8) In January 1995 Iran signed a $780,000,000 contract 
     with the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to 
     complete a VVER-1000 pressurized-light water reactor at the 
     Bushehr nuclear power plant.
       (9) In March of 1998, Russia confirmed its intention to 
     complete work on the two reactors at the Bushehr nuclear 
     power plant and agreed in principle to the construction of 2 
     more reactors at the Bushehr site.
       (10) At least 1 reactor could be operational within a few 
     years and it would subsequently provide Iran with substantial 
     expertise to advance its nuclear weapons program.
       (11) Iran ranks 10th among the 105 nations receiving 
     assistance from the technical cooperation program of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (12) Between 1995 and 1999, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency has provided and is expected to provide a total of 
     $1,550,000 through its Technical Assistance and Cooperation 
     Fund for the Iranian nuclear power program, including 
     reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
       (13) The United States provides annual contributions to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency which total more than 25 
     percent of the annual assessed budget of the Agency and the 
     United States also provides annual voluntary contributions to 
     the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the 
     Agency which total approximately 32 percent ($16,000,000 
     in 1996) of the annual budget of the program.
       (14) The United States should not voluntarily provide 
     funding for the completion of nuclear power reactors which 
     could provide Iran with substantial expertise to advance its 
     nuclear weapons program and potentially pose a threat to the 
     United States or its allies.
       (15) Iran has no need for nuclear energy because of its 
     immense oil and natural gas reserves which are equivalent to 
     9.3 percent of the world's reserves and Iran has 
     73,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas, an amount second 
     only to the natural gas reserves of Russia.

     SEC. 3. WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
                   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR PROGRAMS 
                   AND PROJECTS IN IRAN.

       Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2227) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), the limitations of 
     subsection (a) shall apply to programs and projects of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran.''.

     SEC. 4. ANNUAL REVIEW BY SECRETARY OF STATE OF PROGRAMS AND 
                   PROJECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
                   AGENCY; UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO PROGRAMS 
                   AND PROJECTS OF THE AGENCY IN IRAN.

       (a) Annual Review.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall undertake a 
     comprehensive annual review of all programs and projects of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in the countries 
     described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and shall determine if such programs 
     and projects are consistent with United States nuclear 
     nonproliferation and safety goals.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter for 5 
     years, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress 
     a report containing the results of the review under paragraph 
     (1).
       (b) Opposition to Certain Programs and Projects of 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.--The Secretary of State 
     shall direct the United States representative to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency to oppose the following:
       (1) Programs of the Agency that are determined by the 
     Secretary under the review conducted under subsection (a)(1) 
     to be inconsistent with nuclear nonproliferation and safety 
     goals of the United States.
       (2)(A) Technical assistance programs or projects of the 
     Agency designed to develop or complete the Bushehr nuclear 
     power plant in Iran.
       (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to 
     programs or projects of the Agency that provide for the 
     discontinuation, dismantling, or safety inspection of nuclear 
     facilities or related materials, or for inspections and 
     similar activities designed to prevent the development of 
     nuclear weapons by Iran.

     SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter 
     for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     United States representative to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency, shall prepare and submit to the Congress a 
     report that--
       (1) describes the total amount of annual assistance to Iran 
     from the International Atomic Energy Agency, a list of 
     Iranian officials in leadership positions at the Agency, the 
     expected timeframe for the completion of the nuclear power 
     reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and a summary of 
     the nuclear materials and technology transferred to Iran from 
     the Agency in the preceding year which could assist in the 
     development of Iran's nuclear weapons program; and
       (2) contains a description of all programs and projects of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in each country 
     described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and any inconsistencies between the 
     technical cooperation and assistance programs and projects of 
     the Agency and United States nuclear nonproliferation and 
     safety goals in these countries.
       (b) Additional Requirement.--The report required to be 
     submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an 
     unclassified form, to the extent appropriate, but may include 
     a classified annex.

     SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
     Government should pursue internal reforms at the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency that will ensure that all 
     programs and projects funded under the Technical Cooperation 
     and Assistance Fund of the Agency are compatible with United 
     States nuclear nonproliferation policy and international 
     nuclear nonproliferation norms.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from

[[Page H6919]]

New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 3743.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Menendez) for introducing this measure and moving it through the 
committee, and I thank the ranking minority member, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) for his cooperation.
  I am pleased to support the bill, which amends current law to ensure 
that the United States does not provide funding for the completion of 
nuclear power reactors in Iran. We all know that the Iranians have 
dedicated significant resources to completing at least three nuclear 
power plants by the year 2015, and are now at work, with Russian 
assistance, to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
  Our Nation is opposed to completion of the reactors of the Bushehr 
facility because the transfer of civilian nuclear technology and 
training would help to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program. Between 
1995 and 1999 it is anticipated that the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA, will have provided over $1.5 million to the Iranian 
nuclear power program through its Technical Assistance and Cooperation 
Fund.
  Our Nation provides annual voluntary contributions to that fund, 
totaling $16 million in 1996. This legislation does not halt our 
voluntary contributions to the IAEA, but it does require that none of 
our funds may be used to fund IAEA programs and projects in Iran.
  That is exactly the right policy. Our Nation should not voluntarily 
provide any funding which would help Iran complete nuclear power 
reactors that could assist them in developing a nuclear weapons program 
which could pose a threat to our Nation or to our allies.
  This measure also establishes two important reporting requirements. 
One would provide the Congress with a comprehensive report on IAEA 
assistance to Iran. The second requirement would direct the Secretary 
of State to review IAEA programs, and ensures that they are consistent 
with our United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Based 
on that review, the Secretary shall direct the U.S. representative to 
IAEA to oppose establishing any program that is not consistent with 
U.S. policy.
  Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to fully support this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), the chief deputy whip.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking Democrat on the 
Committee on International Relations for yielding me time, even though 
I know he does not support my bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations, for both calling the bill up for consideration as well as 
for his support here today.
  First let me say that as the sponsor of the bill, I recognize the 
importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its role in 
ensuring the safety of nuclear sites around the world. In recent months 
we have witnessed their struggle to carry out inspections in Iraq.
  This bill, however, will not affect the IAEA's safeguard program. The 
bill does not seek to withhold any funds to IAEA's safeguard programs 
in Iran or elsewhere. The only funds affected by this bill are 
voluntary, not assessed, contributions to the IAEA's Technical 
Assistance and Cooperation Fund for Iran.
  Prior to 1994, U.S. law required the withholding of proportional IAEA 
voluntary funds to all countries on our list of terrorist states, and, 
despite the change in the law, the administration continued to withhold 
those funds for two more years, until 1996.
  What this bill does is require the administration to reinstate 
proportional withholding of IAEA's voluntary funds for Iran. It also 
requires our Secretary of State to undertake a comprehensive review of 
all IAEA programs and projects in other states which sponsor 
international terrorism to determine if the IAEA is sponsoring any 
other projects which conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and 
safety goals.
  As it is, since the IAEA's inception more than $52 million for the 
Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund has gone to countries on the 
U.S. list of states which sponsor terrorism. The United States is the 
largest supporter of the IAEA. We provide them with more than 25 
percent of their annual budget.
  In the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund we contribute in 
addition 32 percent, or $16 million annually, in voluntary funds, and 
it is from those funds that the IAEA intends to provide $1.5 million to 
assist in the development of the Bushehr power plant between 1997 and 
1999.
  Now, the Clinton Administration has publicly stated its opposition to 
Iran's development of nuclear reactors and its concern about the 
development of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. In Senate testimony 
last year, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Einhorn explained,

       In our view, this is a large reactor project. It will 
     involve hundreds of Russians being in Iran, hundreds of 
     Iranians or more being in Moscow being trained, and this 
     large scale kind of project can provide a kind of commercial 
     cover for a number of activities that we would not like to 
     see, perhaps much more sensitive activities than pursuing 
     this power reactor project. It also will inevitably provide 
     additional training and expertise in the nuclear field for 
     Iranian technicians. In our view, given Iran's intention to 
     acquire nuclear weapons, we do not want to see them move up 
     the nuclear learning curve at all, and we believe this 
     project would contribute to them moving up that curve.

  In essence, this technical cooperation assistance is in fact helping 
them move up that learning curve that the Assistant Secretary spoke 
about. Given Iran's historic support for terrorism, coupled with the 
fact that Iran boasts immense oil and natural gas reserves, and the 
seismic activity near Bushehr which just recently took place, we must 
question Tehran's motives for constructing expensive nuclear reactors.
  Moreover, the development of the nuclear reactors has been an 
economic nightmare for the Iranians. Clearly Iran does not need 
additional energy sources, nor is nuclear energy an economic choice for 
Iran.
  So we need to ask a few basic questions. Given Iran's test last week 
of a medium range ballistic missile and reports that Iran is seeking 
technology for a long range missile, is it responsible to take Iran's 
word that it is also not developing nuclear weapons?
  Despite the IAEA's presence in Iraq, we were surprised to learn of 
that country's extensive chemical and biological warfare programs. Why 
do we trust Iran?
  Given the recent trial and imprisonment of the Mayor of Tehran, a 
political ally of President Khatami, do we really think President 
Khatami can control extremist elements in Iran?
  And, lastly, does it make sense for the United States and U.S. 
taxpayers to provide any kind of support for the construction of a 
nuclear reactor which we clearly and justifiably oppose, or any type of 
technical assistance in the operation of such a plant that we do not 
want to see? The answer clearly must be no.
  This bill seeks to protect the U.S. taxpayers from assisting 
countries like Iran who sponsor international terrorism, denounce the 
United States, and seek to develop weapons of mass destruction which 
may be used against us or our allies. It is ludicrous for the United 
States to support in any way a plant, even indirectly, which could pose 
a threat to the United States and to stability in the Middle East.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

[[Page H6920]]

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
  Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank our chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), and my very good friend, the sponsor of this bill, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3743, the Iran Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1998. It is emblematic of the serious 
need to pass this bill that on July 22 of this year, the same day that 
the bill was considered and passed by the Committee on International 
Relations, Iran tested a missile capable of striking American troops 
throughout the Middle East. I do not think I have to explain to any of 
my colleagues here in the House, or to any American, for that matter, 
the implications of an Iranian nuclear missile.
  H.R. 3743 rightfully seeks to prevent U.S. tax dollars from being 
used to help Iran develop nuclear technology, specifically nuclear 
power plants. Helping Iran develop its nuclear technology through U.S. 
taxpayer dollars, or in any other way, is like training a known 
assassin how to use an AK-47 assault rifle and expecting him to only 
use it for defensive purposes.
  The only reason that Iran, one of the most oil-rich countries on the 
planet, is developing nuclear power technology is to advance its 
offensive missile technology program. To think that Iran is developing 
nuclear technology for civilian power needs is naive and dangerous, 
dangerous to the United States of America.
  The Iranian Shahab-3 missile, which was successfully tested only two 
weeks ago, will reportedly have a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 
kilometers and be capable of carrying a 750 to 1,000 kilogram warhead.

                              {time}  1445

  According to various intelligence reports, Russia is now helping Iran 
develop its technology that will put Shahab missiles within range of 
U.S. troops throughout the Middle East. If Iran combines their nuclear 
technology with these Shahab missiles, like the one fired just 2 weeks 
ago, the threat to our troops and the region will be unthinkable. The 
lives of American soldiers, sailors, U.S. allies, and ultimately, 
American citizens, would be in needless and mortal peril.
  Let us send a message to the Iranians: The United States Congress 
still has its eye on the ball. We are not fooled by their President's 
statements of moderation, as welcome as those statements may be; 
statements made, however, at the same time they are trying to build 
weapons of mass destruction.
  If they want to be friends with the United States of America they 
should behave as a friend, and they should let their actions speak 
louder than their words of moderation, which contradict their efforts 
to develop nuclear technology.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of H.R. 3743.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3743. I do so with some 
reluctance because of my admiration for the sponsor of this bill, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), his very strong contributions 
over a period of time to the work of the Committee on International 
Relations, and his leadership on a variety of issues before this body.
  I recognize the strong popular support for this bill, but I rise in 
opposition, because I really am not able to point to anything very 
positive about the bill that it will accomplish.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is not going to stop, it is not going to slow 
Iran's civilian nuclear power reactor program. It will not make Iran's 
nuclear facilities any safer. It will not prevent the troublesome 
Bushehr facility from being developed, and it will not bring any 
greater international consensus on curbing Iranian actions on the 
weapons of mass destruction programs which trouble all of us.
  I do see several down sides to this bill. It will, I think, 
politicize and polarize the IAEA at the very time that the United 
States has fought off attempts in the IAEA to politicize technical 
assistance to Israel. It will be seen in the IAEA as an effort to 
punish Iran, just at the time that Iran has agreed to new anytime, 
anywhere, IAEA safeguards and inspections.
  The bill will make it more difficult for the United States to get 
information about Iran's nuclear program. It will make Iran's nuclear 
program less safe if the IAEA is forced to curtail its safety and 
regulatory assistance.
  It will make it more difficult for the United States to convince 
other countries to contribute to the IAEA technical assistance and 
cooperation fund, and it will make it more difficult to convince other 
countries of the merits of IAEA safeguards when the United States is 
trying to block safety and regulatory assistance to a country that is 
party to the nonproliferation treaty.
  I think the bill directly harms the U.S. role in the IAEA. We are the 
single most influential member of the IAEA. We must remain the most 
influential member. When we introduce political issues into the IAEA, 
we undercut our own efforts to keep this institution focused on its 
technical responsibilities.
  The IAEA has a critical mission to promote international peace, 
security, and safety. We rely on the IAEA to promote and improve 
nuclear safeguards, to expand the number of countries and activities 
subject to safeguard controls and inspections, to halt illicit 
trafficking in nuclear materials, to support the negotiation of 
international treaties on nuclear power safety and radioactive waste 
management, to provide technical assistance to developing countries on 
nuclear safety and handling nuclear waste, and to address problems that 
know no boundaries, such as environmental pollution and eradication of 
insect pests that can affect U.S. agriculture. This international 
agency, then, serves very important U.S. interests.
  In a few minutes we will complete consideration of a joint resolution 
on Iraq. The IAEA, as everyone here knows, plays a very key role in 
investigating Iraq's nuclear program. This is the wrong time to 
undermine the IAEA's authority or U.S. support for that agency. By 
reducing U.S. support for this agency and by undermining U.S. 
leadership in it, the bill will make the IAEA less effective in meeting 
its responsibilities for international safety and security.
  The chief argument put forward by the proponents of the bill is that 
it sends a message to Iran. We have sent a message to Iran a thousand 
times, for the past 20 years. There is not any doubt about that 
message. Everyone in the world knows what we do not like about Iran's 
policies.
  This is a feel-good bill. We think we are doing something about a 
problem when in fact we are not. This bill will have zero impact on 
whether Iran builds a civilian nuclear reactor. It will mean less 
information for us about Iran's nuclear programs, and the bill hurts 
the one international organization that works to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons.
  Another argument put forward by proponents of the bill is that the 
IAEA should give no assistance whatever to help Iran operate civilian 
nuclear power reactors. When Iran builds those reactors, it is in the 
interests of the United States and in the interests of the entire world 
that those civilian power reactors operate safely. I do not understand 
why we are better off if Iran learns nuclear safety from the same 
people who brought us Chernobyl.
  Every Member of this body shares exactly the same goals on Iran: stop 
terrorism, stop weapons of mass destruction, and stop Iran's opposition 
to the Middle East peace process. The problem is that the U.S. policy 
is not working. Twenty years of isolation have not changed Iran's 
objectionable policies. We need a better policy to protect and promote 
the American national interest. We have to get beyond a policy of just 
saying no to Iran.
  There are forces in Iran today debating that country's future. That 
debate is heated. We have a decided interest in the outcome of that 
debate and the direction Iran's leaders choose. We certainly cannot 
determine that outcome, but our actions, our rhetoric, and our 
legislation on Iran do matter.
  Secretary Albright was exactly right in her speech 6 weeks ago: The 
United States should move, step-by-step, on a

[[Page H6921]]

reciprocal basis, to seek an improvement in relations in Iran, and move 
toward an authoritative dialogue. It will not be an easy or quick 
journey to settle the many differences we have with Iran, but we should 
not ignore the largest and most important state in the Gulf region.
  As part of that dialogue, I believe that we should communicate to 
Iran that we will not block Iran's purchase of nuclear power reactors 
for civilian purposes, so long, of course, as all nuclear facilities in 
Iran are under safeguards, and as long as Iran responds to all special 
inspections and requests for information about its nuclear activities.
  We should, of course, continue to oppose any effort to strengthen 
Iran's nuclear weapons program. And if we adopt the policy I have 
indicated, we would then have the support of our friends and allies, 
and we would have an effective program to block Iran's nuclear weapons 
program. Today no one can claim that we have an effective policy or 
program.
  The administration strongly opposes this bill. I quote from the 
letter from the Department of State:
  ``We oppose H.R. 3743. . . . The Department strongly objects to a 
bill requiring that the U.S. withhold the portion of our IAEA 
contribution used to fund International Atomic Energy Agency activities 
in Iran. Enactment of this legislation would harm our bipartisan effort 
to put a halt to any Iranian nuclear weapons program.
  ``Enactment of this legislation would be counterproductive to the 
Administration's efforts to cut off nuclear projects that might provide 
cover for an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The IAEA monitors 
commercial nuclear projects to help ensure that such projects do not 
benefit a covert nuclear weapons program. The IAEA has not, nor will 
it, provide support for construction of nuclear power plants in Iran or 
any other Nation. The IAEA has been careful to design its technical 
cooperation programs so that no assistance in potentially sensitive 
areas occurs. Recently Iran has agreed to new IAEA ``anytime, 
anywhere'' verification measures that will provide one of our only 
windows on Iran's commercial nuclear programs. This bill would 
therefore deny us this important nonproliferation tool.''
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us provides no benefits to the United 
States. It does pose several risks. We will only succeed in stopping 
weapons programs in Iran with the close cooperation and support of our 
friends and allies. We will not succeed in stopping that program by 
acting unilaterally. We should not waste our time on punishing the IAEA 
and starting needless fights with the very same countries whose support 
we will need if we are going to have an effective policy to stop Iran's 
weapons program.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the bill's defeat, and I reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  First of all, I respectfully clearly disagree with my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton), although I 
respect fully his thoughtful, as always, analysis of the issues from 
his perspective.
  I do want to not let a few things go unbalanced. Number one is it has 
been said that the safeguards are at risk here. Our contributions, our 
mandatory contributions to the IAEA is about safeguards, and those go 
untouched, untouched by this bill. So whatever we are providing by way 
of safeguards we will continue to provide.
  What we do not want to see, and I think even the administration would 
agree with my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Indiana, in 
his analysis of maybe we should permit nuclear reactors for civilian 
use, we have the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Einhorn, saying that 
this is not a project that we want to see built. This is not a project 
that we want to see built. He talks about the learning curve.
  In essence, this is more than about sending a message to Iran. This 
is about slowing down, in any possible way, that learning curve that 
gets them to the point to put this reactor project online.
  Also, we cannot believe that when the United States provides over 25 
percent of the IAEA's budget, and 32 percent in addition, of its funds, 
that $1.5 million is going to make a dramatic difference to the IAEA, 
and that the IAEA is going to collapse, or that the U.S. role in the 
IAEA is going to be significantly diminished. I do not believe that 
that is possible.
  We cannot have it both ways. Either this assistance is of value to 
Iran, in which case we should be looking not to provide assistance that 
is of value, or it is of no value, in which case we should not be 
spending our money on it.
  The fact of the matter is that President Hatemi may be the hope we 
have for an Iran that is democratic in the future. He may be the hope 
that we have for a democratic Iran in the future, but he does not have 
the power. Recent analysis, statements by the administration, in fact 
say that whether or not he continues in power, that the missiles that 
we talked about today and that were recently tested in Iran will be in 
fact consummated.
  The question is, do we want those missiles, as dangerous as they 
already are, to carry a nuclear warhead, have the potential to carry a 
nuclear warhead? Do we in any way want to assist those countries that 
are on our list of terrorist states in helping them in that learning 
curve? I would suggest we clearly do not want to have U.S. taxpayer 
dollars for that purpose.
  This is not about safety. Safety is part of our regular program. We 
will continue to provide safety.

                              {time}  1500

  This is still continuing to have a major U.S. role in the IAEA, but 
it is an attempt to slow down the learning curve, not have any U.S. 
assistance, involuntary assistance to what the administration witnesses 
before the committee, when I questioned them, said, yes, we are 
providing assistance that in fact helps in an operational nature.
  Why would we provide assistance in an operational nature to something 
that we do not want to see operate, to something that the 
administration has testified against? If this is unsafe, then why did 
the administration after 1994, when it was no longer the law, continue 
to withhold funds for 2 years? Clearly, during that period of time, if 
the argument is true, it could be said that it was unsafe to withhold 
funds.
  This is not about safety. It is about having the United States not 
participate with its taxpayer dollars to assist a terrorist state that 
we may have hopes for that will be democratic in the future but that is 
not now, and having a learning curve that permits a nuclear reactor to 
be developed.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Moran.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, in 1953, the United States was 
already competing in an international arms race. Recognizing that the 
danger of a buildup of nuclear weapons posed considerable, risk to the 
United States, President Eisenhower proposed not merely eliminating the 
use of nuclear technology for military purposes, but a mechanism to 
remove nuclear technology from the hands of soldiers and place it in 
the hands of those who could adapt it to the art of peace. The entity 
formed to accomplish this task was the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
  Under the auspices of the IAEA, nuclear technology has made 
substantial contributions to sustainable development across many 
sectors, including energy, health, agriculture and hydrology. It has 
also provided a platform for nuclear states to verify and monitor each 
other's compliance with nonproliferation treaties. This is why I oppose 
H.R. 3743, the so-called Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
1998.
  Cutting U.S. contributions to the IAEA will not advance any 
legitimate United States interest, but it will increase risk to the 
United States and to civilians living in the Middle East. Without IAEA 
supervision, Iran will certainly turn to the Russians for help in 
constructing nuclear reactors. Would we really prefer that Iran's 
reactors be constructed by those responsible for Chernobyl? No offense 
to the Russians, but that would not even be in their own security 
interests.
  If the IAEA withdraws from assisting Iran, as the sponsors of this 
bill would

[[Page H6922]]

have it do, there will be even fewer organizations interacting with 
Iran. I would suggest that this is precisely the wrong course of 
action. The past few months have brought tentative first steps toward a 
more engaging relationship with Iran. We should not now push them away. 
We should try to find whatever positive opportunities there exists. I 
know the difficulties, but we need to support the moderates in Iran and 
not to give support, unintentionally, but in reality, to the most 
extreme elements. This bill, in fact, will give ammunition to the most 
extreme elements just as these kinds of resolutions directed toward 
Cuba, only serve to strengthen Fidel Castro's hold.
  Lastly, Mr. Speaker, we are undeniably subjecting the IAEA's actions 
to domestic politics. I suppose that we should not be surprised, 
because in the same way that U.N. dues are held hostage every year to 
family planning and abortion debates, IAEA funding is now fair game for 
those that may disagree with its programs in Iran or Cuba or other 
nations who are fair game to political sanctions.
  This is an irresponsible and dangerous road to go down, Mr. Speaker. 
Nuclear safety is simply too important to be held hostage to the 
political whims of Congress. This Congress should vote against this 
resolution.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Let me simply observe that the whole purpose of this bill is to cut 
the U.S. funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency by an amount 
equal to that agency's funding of safety projects. Of course it affects 
the safety of that project. It is quite clear, I think, by the terms of 
the legislation that it does.
  Finally, may I say that all of the arguments the gentleman makes are 
premised on the basis that the United States is the only country in the 
world that can furnish this technology. There are dozens of countries 
that can furnish it. Nuclear technology today is not the province of 
the United States, no matter what we do in this country.
  The project is going to go forward with the assistance of many other 
countries. What we have today is a policy that is not effective and has 
not been effective for 20 years in stopping the development of nuclear 
weapons programs in Iran. Let us rethink the problem.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez) again 
for pointing out some of the pertinent aspects of this measure. I would 
like to remind the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Hamilton), that what we are doing is merely to restore the policy 
that we had prior to 1993 and up to 1993, to make certain that we 
withhold any funding based on any violation of the prior agreements.
  I would also like to note for our colleagues that last year before 
the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, the former Director of Central 
Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, stated that through the operation of the 
nuclear power reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power Plant, Iran will 
develop substantial expertise relevant to the development of nuclear 
weapons.
  I would also like to note that the construction of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant had initially been halted back in 1979 because the 
former West Germany refused to assist in the completion of the plant, 
due to concerns that the completion of the plant would provide Iran 
with expertise and technology which could advance Iran's nuclear 
weapons program.
  We are all aware of the recent testing by Iran of a long range 
missile, missiles that could reach more than 800 miles, an 800-mile 
range, and be able to hit strategic targets throughout the Middle East, 
particularly Israel, at a time when we are trying to bring peace to 
that region.
  In closing my argument, I would just like to urge our colleagues to 
fully support the Menendez measure that is before us now, in the 
interest of peace throughout that part of the world and throughout the 
entire world, because they say that eventually long range missiles 
being developed by Iran could reach the entire European continent and 
possibly our own shoreline in the future.
  I urge full support for this measure.
  Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, currently, with the assistance of funding 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran is seeking to 
complete construction of two nuclear reactors at the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant. In addition to the two reactors currently under 
construction, just a few months ago, Russia agreed to assist in 
building two more reactors at the Bushehr site. The legislation that we 
are consistently today, H.R. 3743, would withhold U.S. proportional 
voluntary assistance to the IAEA for programs assisting Iran with this 
and other projects.
  Undoubtedly, if we continue to fund the IAEA's plans to assist Iran 
in building these nuclear reactor, we threaten our own national 
security interests as well as those of Israel and much of Europe. The 
transfer of civilian nuclear technology and training could help to 
advance Iran's nuclear weapons program. This is simply not acceptable. 
In fact, Iran suggests that it needs these reactor as a source of 
energy for its population. In reality, Iran has oil and gas reserves so 
large that it is second only to Russia in the depth of its energy 
supply.
  The United States has an obligation to support our very loyal and 
only democratic ally in the Middle East Israel. We have a key 
responsibility to think long term--the long term security of Israel and 
the Middle East, as well as for our own national security here in the 
United States.
  In fact, within just the past week, Iran successfully tested a 
missile with a range of about 800 miles.This range would allow a 
missile with nuclear warheads to hit any city in Israel or Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, this test makes it clear that Iran is interested 
in acquiring and show casing the ability to deliver nuclear weapons. We 
must not allow this to occur, and we most certainly should not aid them 
in advancing their knowledge of this technology. I have attached a CNN 
report about last week's Iranian missile test for the record.
  It is imperative that we protect our allies by stopping the advance 
of Iran's nuclear program. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3743 so 
that we can protect ourselves, and our allies such as Israel, from the 
proliferation of Iranian nuclear weapons or mass destruction.

                 [From CNN Interactive, July 23, 1998]

    Report: Iran Tested Weapon That Could Reach Israel, Saudi Arabia

       New York.--Iran this week successfully tested a missile 
     with a range of about 800 miles, meaning it could hit Israel 
     or Saudi Arabia, The New York Times reported Thursday.
       The test comes a month after Secretary of State Madeleine 
     Albright praised Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, a 
     moderate who took office last summer and who has confronted 
     considerable resistance from religious and other 
     conservatives.
       A U.S. spy satellite detected Wednesday morning's test of 
     the medium-range missile the Iranians call Shahab-3, the 
     Times reported, citing unidentified Clinton administration 
     officials.
       ``This weapon would allow Iran to strike all of Israel, all 
     of Saudi Arabia, most of Turkey and a tip of Russia,'' a 
     senior administration official told the Times.
       The officials, while sure of the test, could not provide 
     immediate information on the location of the launch or 
     landing, both inside Iran.
       Intelligence experts investigating the launch believe Iran 
     bought the missile from North Korea, which has said it would 
     sell to any nation with hard currency.
       Iran also has bought technology from Russia and China, and 
     wants not to strike its enemies but to be seen as a political 
     and military force in the Middle East, officials said.
       Israel is the only nuclear power in the region, and its 
     missiles are believed to be capable of striking any nation in 
     the Middle East.
       Iran is working on developing a nuclear warhead but is 
     believed to be years away from building and testing a weapon, 
     the Times said.
       ``This test shows Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear 
     weapons, because no one builds an 800-mile missile to deliver 
     conventional explosives,'' Gary Milhollin, an expert on the 
     spread of weaponry, told the newspaper.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House 
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3743, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, on that, I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.




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