[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 105 (Thursday, July 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9444-S9447]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BIDEN:
  S. 2387. A bill to confer and confirm Presidential authority to use 
force abroad, to set forth procedures governing the exercise of that 
authority, and thereby to facilitate cooperation between the President 
and Congress in decisions concerning the use or deployment of United 
States Armed Forces abroad in situations of actual or potential 
hostilities; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                            use of force act

 Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation 
designed to provide a framework for joint congressional-executive 
decision-making about the most solemn decision that a nation can make: 
to send men and women to fight and die for their country.
  Entitled the ``Use of Force Act,'' the legislation would replace the 
war powers resolution of 1973 with a new mechanism that, I hope, will 
be more effective than the existing statute.
  Enacted nearly a quarter century ago, over the veto of President 
Nixon, the war powers resolution has enjoyed an unhappy fate--scorned 
by Presidents who questioned its constitutionality, and ignored by a 
Congress too timid to exercise its constitutional duty.
  That was not, of course, the intent of its framers, who sought to 
improve executive-congressional cooperation on questions involving the 
use of force--and to remedy a dangerous constitutional imbalance.
  This imbalance resulted from what I call the ``monarchist'' view of 
the war power--the thesis that the President holds nearly unlimited 
power to direct American forces into action.
  The thesis is largely a product of the cold war and the nuclear age: 
the view that, at a time when the fate of the planet itself appeared to 
rest with two men thousands of miles apart, Congress had little choice, 
or so it was claimed but to cede tremendous authority to the executive.
  This thesis first emerged in 1950, when President Truman sent forces 
to Korea without congressional authorization. It peaked twenty years 
later, in 1970, when President Nixon sent U.S. forces into Cambodia--
also without congressional authorization, but this time accompanied by 
sweeping assertions of autonomous Presidential power.
  President Nixon's theory was so extreme that it prompted the Senate 
to begin a search--a search led by Republican Jacob Javits and strongly 
supported by a conservative Democrat, John Stennis of Mississippi--for 
some means of rectifying the constitutional imbalance. That search 
culminated in the war powers resolution.
  Unfortunately, the war powers resolution has failed to fulfill its 
objective. If anything, the monarchist view has become more deeply 
ingrained with the passage of time.
  This trend was been on display throughout this decade. Before the 
gulf war, for example, with half a million American forces standing 
ready in Saudi Arabia--a situation clearly requiring congressional 
authorization--President Bush still refused to concede that he required 
an act of Congress before using force. Only at the last minute, and 
only grudgingly, did President Bush seek congressional support. Even 
then, he continued to assert that he sought only support, refusing to 
concede that congressional authorization was a legal necessity.
  Several years ago, the notion of broad executive power was claimed on 
the eve of a proposed invasion of Haiti--an invasion that, thankfully, 
was averted by a last-minute diplomatic initiative.
  In 1994, officials of the Clinton administration characterized the 
Haiti operation as a mere ``police action''--a semantic dodge designed 
to avoid congressional authorization--and a demonstration that the 
monarchist view prevails in the White House, without regard to 
political party.

  And, most recently, the Clinton administration asserted that it had 
all the authority it needed to initiate a military attack against 
Iraq--though it never publicly elaborated on this supposed authority.
  In this case, the question was not clear-cut--as it was in 1991. But 
two things emerged in the debate that reinforce the need for this 
legislation. First, it demonstrated that the executive instinct to find 
``sufficient legal authority'' to use force is undiluted.
  Second, it demonstrated that Congress often lacks the institutional 
will to carry out its responsibilities under the war power. Although 
there was strong consensus that a strong response was required to 
Saddam Hussein's resistance to U.N. inspections, there was no consensus 
in this body about whether Congress itself should authorize military 
action. Lacking such a consensus, Congress did nothing.
  Congress' responsibilities could not be clearer. Article one, section 
eight, clause eleven of the Constitution grants to Congress the power 
``to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal and to make 
rules concerning captures on land and water.''
  To the President, the Constitution provides in article two, section 
two the role of ``Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States.''
  It may fairly be said that, with regard to many constitutional 
provisions, the Framers' intent was ambiguous. But on the war power, 
both the contemporaneous evidence and the early construction of these 
clauses do not leave much room for doubt.
  The original draft of the Constitution would have given to Congress 
the power to ``make war.'' At the Constitutional Convention, a motion 
was made to change this to ``declare war.'' The reason for the change 
is instructive.
  At the Convention, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry argued for the 
amendment solely in order to permit the President the power ``to repel 
sudden attacks.'' Just one delegate, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, 
suggested that the President should be given the power to initiate war.
  The rationale for vesting the power to launch war in Congress was 
simple.

[[Page S9445]]

The Framers' views were dominated by their experience with the British 
King, who had unfettered power to start wars. Such powers the Framers 
were determined to deny the President.
  Even Alexander Hamilton, a staunch advocate of Presidential power, 
emphasized that the President's power as Commander in Chief would be 
``much inferior'' to the British King, amounting to ``nothing more than 
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,'' 
while that of the British King ``extends to declaring of war and to the 
raising and regulating of fleets and armies--all which, by [the U.S.] 
Constitution, would appertain to the legislature.''
  It is frequently contended by those who favor vast Presidential 
powers that Congress was granted only the ceremonial power to declare 
war. But the Framers had little interest, it seems, in the ceremonial 
aspects of war. The real issue was congressional authorization of war. 
As Hamilton noted in Federalist twenty-five, the ``ceremony of a formal 
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.''
  The conclusion that Congress was given the power to initiate all 
wars, except to repel attacks on the United States, is also 
strengthened in view of the second part of the war clause: the power to 
``grant letters of marque and reprisal.''

  An anachronism today, letters of marque and reprisal were licenses 
issued by governments empowering agents to seize enemy ships or take 
action on land short of all-out war. In essence, it was an eighteenth 
century version of what we now regarded as ``limited war'' or ``police 
actions.''
  The framers undoubtedly knew that reprisals, or ``imperfect war,'' 
could lead to an all-out war. England, for example, had fought five 
wars between 1652 and 1756 which were preceded by public naval 
reprisals.
  Surely, those who met at Philadelphia--all learned men--knew and 
understood this history. Given this, the only logical conclusion is 
that the framers intended to grant to Congress the power to initiate 
all hostilities, even limited wars.
  In sum, to accept the proposition that the war power is merely 
ceremonial, or applies only to ``big wars,'' is to read much of the war 
clause out of the Constitution. Such a reading is supported neither by 
the plain language of the text, or the original intent of the framers.
  Any doubt about the wisdom of relying on this interpretation of the 
intent of the framers is dispelled in view of the actions of early 
Presidents, early Congresses, and early Supreme Court decisions.
  Our earliest Presidents were extremely cautious about encroaching on 
Congress' power under the war clause.
  For example, in 1793, the first President, George Washington, stated 
that offensive operations against an indian tribe, the Creek Nation, 
depended on congressional action: ``The Constitution vests the power of 
declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of 
importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the 
subject, and authorized such a measure.''
  During the Presidency of John Adams, the United States engaged in an 
undeclared naval war with France. But it bears emphasis that these 
military engagements were clearly authorized by Congress by a series of 
incremental statutes.
  The naval war with France also yielded three important Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the scope of the war power.
  In 1799, Congress authorized the President to intercept any U.S. 
vessels headed to France. President Adams subsequently ordered the Navy 
to seize any ships traveling to or from France.
  The Supreme Court declared the seizure of a U.S. vessel traveling 
from France to be illegal--thus ruling that Congress had the power not 
only to authorize limited war, and but also to limit Presidential power 
to take military action.
  The court ruled in two other cases bearing on the question of limited 
war. Wars, the Court said, even if ``imperfect,'' are nonetheless wars. 
In still another case, Chief Justice Marshall opined that ``the whole 
powers of war [are] by the Constitution . . . vested in Congress . . . 
[which] may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial war.''
  These precedents, and the historical record of actions taken by other 
early Presidents, have significantly more bearing on the meaning of the 
war clause than the modern era.
  As Chief Justice Warren once wrote, ``The precedential value of 
[prior practice] tends to increase in proportion to the proximity'' to 
the constitutional convention.
  Unfortunately, this constitutional history seems largely forgotten, 
and the doctrine of Presidential power that arose during the cold war 
remains in vogue.
  To accept the status quo requires us to believe that the 
constitutional imbalance serves our nation well. But it can hardly be 
said that it does.
  As matters now stand, Congress is denied its proper role in sharing 
in the decision to commit American troops, and the President is 
deprived of the consensus to help carry this policy through.
  I believe that only by establishing an effective war powers mechanism 
can we ensure that both of these goals are met. The question then is 
this: How to revise the war powers resolution in a manner that gains 
bipartisan support--and support of the executive?
  In the past two decades, a premise has gained wide acceptance that 
the war powers resolution is fatally flawed. Indeed, there are flaws in 
the resolution but they need not have been fatal.
  In 1988, determining that a review of the war powers resolution was 
in order, the Foreign Relations Committee established a special 
subcommittee to assume the task.
  As chairman of the subcommittee, I conducted extensive hearings. Over 
the course of two months, the subcommittee heard from many 
distinguished witnesses: former President Ford, former Secretaries of 
State and Defense, former Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Members of 
Congress who drafted the war powers resolution, and many constitutional 
scholars.
  At the end of that process, I wrote a law review article describing 
how the war powers resolution might be thoroughly rewritten to overcome 
its actual and perceived liabilities.
  That effort provided the foundation for the legislation I introduced 
in the 104th Congress, and that I reintroduce today. The bill has many 
elements; I will briefly summarize it.
  First, the bill replaces the war powers resolution with a new 
version. But I should make clear that I retain its central element: a 
time-clock mechanism that limits the President's power to use force 
abroad. That mechanism, it bears emphasis, was found to be 
unambiguously constitutional in a 1980 opinion issued by the Office of 
Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
  It is often asserted that the time-clock provisions is 
``unworkable,'' or that it invites our adversaries to make a conflict 
so painful in the short run so as to induce timidity in the Congress.
  But with or without a war powers law, American willingness to 
undertake sustained hostilities will always be subject to democratic 
pressures. A statutory mechanism is simply a means of delineating 
procedure.
  And the procedure set forth in this legislation assures that if the 
President wants an early congressional vote on a use of force abroad, 
his congressional supporters can produce it.
  Recent history tells us, of course, that the American people, as well 
as Congress, rally around the flag--and the Commander-in-Chief--in the 
early moments of a military deployment.
  Second, my bill defuses the specter that a ``timid Congress'' can 
simply sit on its hands and permit the authority for a deployment to 
expire.
  First, it establishes elaborate expedited procedures designed to 
ensure that a vote will occur. And it explicitly defeats the ``timid 
Congress'' specter by granting to the President the authority he has 
sought if these procedures nonetheless fail to produce a vote.
  Thus, if the President requests authority for a sustained use of 
force--one outside the realm of emergency--and Congress fails to vote, 
the President's authority is extended indefinitely.
  Third, the legislation delineates what I call the ``going in'' 
authorities for the President to use force. One fundamental weakness of 
the war powers resolution is that it fails to acknowledge powers that 
most scholars agree are inherent Presidential powers: to repel an

[[Page S9446]]

armed attack upon the United States or its Armed Forces, or to rescue 
Americans abroad.
  My legislation corrects this deficiency by enumerating five instances 
where the President may use force:
  (1) To repel attack on U.S. territory or U.S. forces;
  (2) To deal with urgent situations threatening supreme U.S. 
interests;
  (3) To extricate imperiled U.S. citizens;
  (4) To forestall or retaliate against specific acts of terrorism;
  (5) To defend against substantial threats to international sea lanes 
or airspace;
  It may be that no such enumeration can be exhaustive. But the 
circumstances set forth would have sanctioned virtually every use of 
force by the United States since World War Two.
  This concession of authority is circumscribed by the maintenance of 
the time-clock provision.
  After sixty days have passed, the President's authority would expire, 
unless one of three conditions had been met:
  (1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory 
authorization;
  (2) The President has requested authority for an extended use of 
force but Congress has failed to act on that request, notwithstanding 
the expedited procedures established by this act:
  (3) The President has certified the existence of an emergency 
threatening the supreme national interests of the United States.
  The legislation also affirms the importance of consultation between 
the President and Congress and establishes a new means to facilitate 
it.
  To overcome the common complaint that Presidents must contend with 
``535 Secretaries of State,'' the bill establishes a congressional 
leadership group with whom the President is mandated to consult on the 
use of force.
  Another infirmity of the war powers resolution is that it fails to 
define ``hostilities.'' Thus, Presidents frequently engaged in a verbal 
gymnastics of insisting that ``hostilities'' were not ``imminent''--
even when hundreds of thousands of troops were positioned in the 
Arabian desert opposite Saddam's legions.
  Therefore, the legislation includes a more precise definition of what 
constitutes a ``use of force.''
  Finally, to make the statutory mechanism complete, the use of force 
act provides a means for judicial review. Because I share the 
reluctance of many of my colleagues to inject the judiciary into 
decisions that should be made by the political branches, this provision 
is extremely limited. It empowers a three-judge panel to decide only 
whether the time-clock mechanism has been triggered.
  The bill contains a provision granting standing to Members of 
Congress, a door that the Supreme Court appears to have largely closed 
in the case of Raines versus Byrd--the line-item veto challenge brought 
by the senior Senator from West Virginia. I believe, notwithstanding 
the holding of that case, that a Member of Congress would suffer the 
concrete injury necessary to satisfy the standing requirement under 
article three of the Constitution.
  The reason is this: The failure of the President to submit a use of 
force report would harm the ability of a Member of Congress to exercise 
a power clearly reposed in Congress under article one, section eight. 
That injury, I believe, should suffice in clearing the high hurdle on 
standing which the Court imposed in the Byrd case. No private 
individual can bring such a suit; if a Member of Congress cannot, then 
no one can.
  I have no illusions that enacting this legislation will be easy. But 
I am determined to try.
  The status quo--with Presidents asserting broad executive power, and 
Congress often content to surrender its constitutional powers--does not 
serve the American people well.
  More fundamentally, it does not serve the men and women who risk 
their lives to defend our interests. For that, ultimately, must be the 
test of any war powers law.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the section-by-section 
analysis be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the section-by-section analysis was ordered 
to be printed in the Record, as follows:

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

       Section 1. Short Title. The title of the bill is the ``Use 
     of Force Act (UFA).''
       Section 2. Table of Contents.
       Section 3. Findings. This section sets forth three findings 
     regarding the need to provide a statutory framework to 
     facilitate joint decisionmaking between Congress and the 
     President regarding decisions to use force abroad.
       Section 4. Statement of Purpose. The key phrase in this 
     section is ``confer and confirm Presidential authority.'' The 
     Use of Force Act is designed to bridge the long-standing--
     and, for all practical purposes, unresolvable--dispute over 
     precisely what constitutes the President's ``inherent'' 
     authority to use force. Whereas the War Powers Resolution 
     purported to delineate the President's constitutional 
     authority and to grant no more, the Use of Force Act sets 
     forth a range of authorities that are practical for the 
     modern age and sufficiently broad to subsume all presidential 
     authorities deemed ``inherent'' by any reasonable 
     constitutional interpretation.
       Section 5. Definitions. This section defines a number of 
     terms, including the term ``use of force abroad,'' thus 
     correcting a major flaw of the War Powers Resolution, which 
     left undefined the term ``hostilities.''
       As defined in the Use of Force Act, a ``use of force 
     abroad'' comprises two prongs:
       (1) a deployment of U.S. armed forces (either a new 
     introduction of forces, a significant expansion of the U.S. 
     military presence in a country, or a commitment to a new 
     mission or objective); and
       (2) the deployment is aimed at deterring an identified 
     threat, or the forces deployed are incurring or inflicting 
     casualties (or are operating with a substantial possibility 
     of incurring or inflicting casualties).


                      title i--general provisions

       Section 101. Authority and Governing Principles. This 
     section sets forth the Presidential authorities being 
     ``conferred and confirmed.'' Based on the Constitution and 
     this Act, the President may use force--
       (1) to repel an attack on U.S. territory or U.S. forces;
       (2) to deal with urgent situations threatening supreme U.S. 
     interests;
       (3) to extricate imperiled U.S. citizens;
       (4) to forestall or retaliate against specific acts of 
     terrorism;
       (5) to defend against substantial threats to international 
     sea lanes or airspace.
       Against a complaint that this list is excessively 
     permissive, it should be emphasized that these are the 
     President's initial authorities to undertake a use of force--
     so-called ``going in'' authorities--and that the ``staying 
     in'' conditions set forth in section 104 will, in most cases, 
     bear heavily on the President's original decision.
       Section 102. Consultation. Section 102 affirms the 
     importance of consultation between the President and Congress 
     and establishes new means to facilitate it. To overcome the 
     common complaint that Presidents must contend with ``535 
     secretaries of state,'' the UFA establishes a Congressional 
     Leadership Group with whom the President is mandated to 
     consult on the use of force.
       A framework of regular consultations between specified 
     Executive branch officials and relevant congressional 
     committees is also mandated in order to establish a ``norm'' 
     of consultative interaction and in hope of overcoming what 
     many find to be the overly theatrical public-hearing process 
     that has superseded the more frank and informal consultations 
     of earlier years.
       Note: An alternative to the Use of Force Act is to repeal 
     (or effectively repeal) the War Powers Resolution and leave 
     in its place only a Congressional Leadership Group. (This is 
     the essence of S.J. Res. 323, 100th Congress, legislation to 
     amend the War Powers Resolution introduced by Senators Byrd, 
     Warner, Nunn, and Mitchell in 1988.) This approach, which 
     relies on ``consultation and the Constitution,'' avoids the 
     complexities of enacting legislation such as the UFA but 
     fails to solve chronic problems of procedure or authority, 
     leaving matters of process and power to be debated anew as 
     each crisis arises. In contrast, the Use of Force Act would 
     perform one of the valuable functions of law, which is to 
     guide individual and institutional behavior.
       Section 103. Reporting Requirements. Section 103 requires 
     that the President report in writing to the Congress 
     concerning any use of force, not later than 48 hours after 
     commencing a use of force abroad.
       Section 104. Conditions for Extended Use of Force. Section 
     104 sets forth the ``staying in'' conditions: that is, the 
     conditions that must be met if the President is to sustain a 
     use of force he has begun under the authorities set forth in 
     section 101. A use of force may extend beyond 60 days only 
     if--
       (1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory 
     authorization;
       (2) the President has requested authority for an extended 
     use of force but Congress has failed to act on that request 
     (notwithstanding the expedited procedures established by 
     Title II of this Act);
       (3) the President has certified the existence of an 
     emergency threatening the supreme national interests of the 
     United States.
       The second and third conditions are designed to provide 
     sound means other than a declaration of war or the enactment 
     of specific statutory authority by which the President may 
     engage in an extended use of force.

[[Page S9447]]

     Through these conditions, the Use of Force Act avoids two 
     principal criticisms of the War Powers Resolution: (1) that 
     Congress could irresponsibly require a force withdrawal 
     simply through inaction; and (2) that the law might, under 
     certain circumstances, unconstitutionally deny the President 
     the use of his ``inherent'' authority.
       To defuse the specter of a President hamstrung by a 
     Congress too timid or inept to face its responsibilities, the 
     UFA uses two means: first, it establishes elaborate expedited 
     procedures designed to ensure that a vote will occur; second, 
     it explicitly defeats the ``timid Congress'' specter by 
     granting to the President the authority he has sought if 
     these procedures nonetheless fail to produce a vote. Thus, if 
     the President requests authority for a sustained use of 
     force--one outside the realm of emergency--and Congress fails 
     to vote, the President's authority is extended indefinitely.
       The final condition should satisfy all but proponents of an 
     extreme ``monarchist'' interpretation under which the 
     President has the constitutional authority to use force as he 
     sees fit. Under all other interpretations, the concept of an 
     ``inherent'' authority depends upon the element of emergency: 
     the need for the President to act under urgent circumstances 
     to defend the nation's security and its citizens. If so, the 
     UFA protects any ``inherent'' presidential authority by 
     affirming his ability to act for up to 60 days under the 
     broad-ranging authorities in section 101 and, in the event he 
     is prepared to certify an extended national emergency, to 
     exercise the authority available to him through the final 
     condition of section 104.
       Section 105. Measures Eligible for Congressional Priority 
     Procedures. This section establishes criteria by which joint 
     and concurrent resolutions become eligible for the expedited 
     procedures created by Title II of the UFA.
       A joint resolution that declares war or provides specific 
     statutory authorization--or one that terminates, limits, or 
     prohibits a use of force--becomes eligible if it is 
     introduced: (1) pursuant to a written request by the 
     President to any one member of Congress; (2) if cosponsored 
     by a majority of the members of the Congressional Leadership 
     Group in the house where introduced; or (3) if cosponsored by 
     30 percent of the members of either house. Thus, there is 
     almost no conceivable instance in which a President can be 
     denied a prompt vote: he need only ask one member of Congress 
     to introduce a resolution on his behalf.
       A concurrent resolution becomes eligible if it meets either 
     of the cosponsorship criteria cited above and contains a 
     finding that a use of force abroad began on a certain date, 
     or has exceeded the 60 day limitation, or has been undertaken 
     outside the authority provided by section 101, or is being 
     conducted in a manner inconsistent with the governing 
     principles set forth in section 101.
       While having no direct legal effect, the passage of a 
     concurrent resolution under the UFA could have considerable 
     significance: politically, it would represent a clear, 
     prompt, and formal congressional repudiation of a 
     presidential action; within Congress, it would trigger 
     parliamentary rules blocking further consideration of 
     measures providing funds for the use of force in question (as 
     provided by section 106 of the UFA); and juridically, it 
     would become a consideration in any action brought by a 
     member of Congress for declaratory judgment and injunctive 
     relief (as envisaged by section 107 of the UFA).
       Section 106. Funding Limitations. This section prohibits 
     the expenditure of funds for any use of force inconsistent 
     with the UFA. Further, this section exercises the power of 
     Congress to make its own rules by providing that a point of 
     order will lie against any measure containing funds to 
     perpetuate a use of force that Congress, by concurrent 
     resolution, has found to be illegitimate.
       Section 107. Judicial Review. This section permits judicial 
     review of any action brought by a Member of Congress on the 
     grounds that the UFA has been violated. It does so by--
       (1) granting standing to any Member of Congress who brings 
     suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia;
       (2) providing that neither the District Court nor the 
     Supreme Court may refuse to make a determination on the 
     merits based on certain judicial doctrines, such as political 
     question or ripeness (doctrines invoked previously by courts 
     to avoid deciding cases regarding the war power);
       (3) prescribing the judicial remedies available to the 
     District Court; and
       (4) creating a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court 
     and encouraging expeditious consideration of such appeal.
       It bears emphasis that the remedy prescribed is modest, and 
     does not risk unwarranted interference of the judicial branch 
     in a decision better reposed in the political branches. It 
     provides that the matter must be heard by a three-judge 
     panel; one of these judges must a circuit judge. 
     Additionally, the power of the court is extremely limited: it 
     may only declare that the 60-day period set forth in Section 
     104 has begun.
       In 1997, the Supreme Court held, in Raines v. Byrd, that 
     Members of Congress did not have standing to challenge an 
     alleged constitutional violation under the Line-Item Veto 
     Act. That case might be read to suggest that a Member of 
     Congress can never attain standing. But such a conclusion 
     would be unwarranted. First, the Court made clear in Raines 
     that an explicit grant of authority to bring a suit 
     eliminates any ``prudential'' limitations on standing. Raines 
     v. Byrd, 521 U.S. ____, ____, n.3 (1997) (slip op., at 8, 
     n.3) Second, a more recent decision of the Court suggests 
     that a Member of Congress could attain ``constitutional 
     standing'' (that is, meet the ``case or controversy'' 
     requirements of Article III) in just the sort of case 
     envisaged by the Use of Force Act. In Federal Election 
     Commission v. Akins, a case decided on June 1, 1998, the 
     Court permitted standing in a case where the plaintiffs 
     sought to require the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to 
     treat an organization as a ``political committee,'' which 
     then would have triggered public disclosure of certain 
     information about that organization. The Court held that 
     standing would be permitted where the plaintiff ``fails to 
     obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant 
     to statute.'' A case under the Use of Force Act would be 
     analogous--in that the plaintiff Members of Congress would 
     seek information in a ``Use of Force Report'' required to be 
     submitted to Congress by Section 103(a). Such information, 
     quite obviously, would be essential to Members of Congress in 
     the exercise of their constitutional powers under the war 
     clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), 
     a power they alone possess.
       Section 108. Interpretation. This section clarifies several 
     points of interpretation, including these: that authority to 
     use force is not derived from other statutes or from treaties 
     (which create international obligations but not authority in 
     a domestic, constitutional context); and that the failure of 
     Congress to pass any joint or concurrent resolution 
     concerning a particular use of force may not be construed as 
     indicating congressional authorization or approval.
       Section 109. Severability. This section stipulates that 
     certain sections of the UFA would be null and void, and 
     others not affected, if specified provisions of the UFA were 
     held by the Courts to be invalid.
       Section 110. Repeal of War Powers Resolution. Section 110 
     repeals the War Powers Resolution of 1973.


                     title ii--expedited procedures

       Section 201. Priority Procedures. Section 201 provides for 
     the expedited parliamentary procedures that are integral to 
     the functioning of the Act. (These procedures are drawn from 
     the war powers legislation cited earlier, introduced by 
     Senator Robert Byrd et al. in 1988.)
       Section 202. Repeal of Obsolete Expedited Procedures. 
     Section 202 repeals other expedited procedures provided for 
     in existing law.
                                 ______