[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 105 (Thursday, July 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9421-S9423]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
                        NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

  Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  It is a truism that despite the end of the Cold War, we live in a 
dangerous world. The ultimate danger we face, perhaps, is that nuclear 
weapons will be obtained--or even used--by unstable countries or 
terrorist groups.
  We must undertake a range of activities to reduce that danger. There 
is no magic bullet. No single program or initiative will rid the world 
of the threat of nuclear cataclysm at the hands of a new or unstable 
nuclear power.
  Rather, we need a coherent strategy with many elements--a strategy 
designed to reduce both the supply of nuclear weapons technology to 
would-be nuclear powers and the regional tensions that fuel their 
demand for those weapons.
  I would like to spend a few minutes today talking about one piece of 
that strategy that this body can implement: We can and should give our 
advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty. And we should do that promptly.
  In her speech on the 35th anniversary of John F. Kennedy's American 
University speech, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for 
U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Noting 
the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, she said that 
ratification was needed ``now, more than ever.''

[[Page S9422]]

  Senator Specter and I have also called for ratification now, both in 
floor statements and by drafting a resolution calling for expeditious 
Senate consideration of the Test-Ban Treaty.
  Why is the Test-Ban so crucial? Because it is directly related to the 
global bargain that is the heart of the global nonproliferation regime. 
Other countries will give up their ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, 
but only if the declared nuclear powers honestly seek to end their 
nuclear advantage. We have to keep up our side of the bargain--and that 
means ratifying and adhering to the comprehensive test ban--or the non-
nuclear weapons states will not feel bound to theirs.
  One lesson of this decade's nuclear developments in India, Pakistan, 
Iraq and North Korea is that very basic nuclear weapon design 
information is no longer a tightly held secret. The technology required 
to produce nuclear weapons remains expensive and complex, but it is 
well within the reach of literally scores of countries.
  To keep countries from producing what scores of them could produce, 
you need more than pressure or sanctions. You must constantly maintain 
their consent to remain non-nuclear weapons states.
  Ideally, we would maintain that consent by removing the security 
concerns that propel countries to seek nuclear weapons. But that is 
terribly difficult, be it in Kashmir or the Middle East, in the Balkans 
or the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Straits.
  In the world of today and of the foreseeable future, peace does not 
reign. Nuclear non-proliferation will not prevail in this world either, 
unless we convince states that nuclear weapons are not the key to 
survival, to status or to power.
  The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is not merely emblematic of 
the nuclear powers' commitment to the non-nuclear weapons states. It 
also will put a cap on the development of new classes of nuclear 
weapons by the nuclear powers.
  The test-ban treaty will also limit the ability of any non-nuclear 
weapons state to develop sophisticated nuclear weapons or to gain 
confidence in more primitive nuclear weapons if it were to illegally 
acquire or produce them. If you can't test your weapon, you are very 
unlikely to rely upon it as an instrument of war.
  These are important reassurances to the non-nuclear nations of the 
world. They are why those countries agreed to foreswear all nuclear 
tests and to accept intrusive on-site inspection if a suspicion arose 
that they might have tested a nuclear device.
  Will the Test-Ban Treaty also gradually reduce a country's confidence 
in the reliability of its nuclear weapons over the next 30 or 50 years, 
as some of its opponents assert? If so, that is actually reassuring to 
the non-nuclear weapons states, for it gives them hope of the eventual 
realization of that ``cessation of the nuclear arms race'' encouraged 
by Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So even the cloud that 
most frightens test-ban opponents has a silver lining: it helps keep 
the rest of the world on board the non-proliferation bandwagon.
  Now it is true, Mr. President, that some countries have never 
accepted the world non-proliferation bargain. The so-called ``threshold 
states'' of India, Pakistan and Israel all viewed nuclear weapons as 
essential to their national security, and India denounced the Non-
Proliferation Treaty because it did not require immediate nuclear 
disarmament.
  Still other countries, like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, signed the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty but maintained covert nuclear weapons 
programs.
  But the vast majority of the world's states, including many 
prospective nuclear powers, have gone along with this bargain. And it 
is vital to our national security that we maintain their adherence to 
the world non-proliferation regime. They must not become ``threshold 
states,'' let alone actually test nuclear weapons.
  So, how will we maintain the adherence of the world's non-nuclear 
weapons states to the nuclear proliferation regime? The Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear tests are a direct challenge to that regime. The 
regime--and the countries who support it--can only meet that challenge 
if the United States leads the way.
  On one level, we are already doing that. We have imposed severe 
sanctions on both India and Pakistan, and both of their economies are 
at risk. We have adjusted our sanctions to limit their effect upon 
innocent populations, and we are working to give the President the 
flexibility to lift them in return for serious steps by India and 
Pakistan toward capping their arms race and addressing their 
differences.
  On the world-wide level, however, our record is mixed. Some countries 
have joined us in imposing sanctions on India and Pakistan. We have 
also been joined in strong statements by countries ranging from Japan 
to Russia and China.
  Statements and resolutions by the G-8, the Organization of American 
States, the Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations Security 
Council have rightly condemned India and Pakistan's nuclear tests and 
called upon them to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to 
refrain from actual deployment of their weapons, to ratify the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to move toward a peaceful 
settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

  But the world is acutely aware of our failure to persuade more 
countries to impose sanctions, and also of our own failure, so far, to 
ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Until we ratify this Treaty, 
the nuclear hard-liners in India and Pakistan will be able to cite U.S. 
hypocrisy as one more reason to reject the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. And until we ratify the Treaty, the rest of the world will find 
it easier to reject U.S. calls for diplomatic and economic measures to 
pressure India and Pakistan.
  We must keep our part of that non-proliferation bargain, if we are to 
maintain U.S. leadership on non-proliferation, keep the rest of the 
world on board, and influence India and Pakistan. The truth is that we 
have little choice.
  If we fail to keep faith with the non-nuclear states because we 
cannot even ratify the Test-Ban Treaty, then we will also fail to keep 
them from developing nuclear weapons of their own. And in that case, 
Mr. President, we might as well prepare for a world of at least 15 or 
20 nuclear weapon states, rather than the 5 or 7 or 8 we have today. 
That is the stark reality we face.


                    the fate of the test-ban treaty

  But we need not fail, Mr. President. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty is a very sensible treaty that is clearly in our national 
interest. It binds the rest of the world to refrain from nuclear 
testing, just as we have bound our own government for the last 6 years.
  The Test-Ban Treaty forces us to rely upon so-called ``stockpile 
stewardship'' to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
weapons, but we are in a better position economically and 
scientifically to do that than is any other country in the world.
  Treaty verification will require our attention and our resources, but 
those are resources that we would have to spend anyway in order to 
monitor world-wide nuclear weapons programs.
  Indeed, the International Monitoring System under the Treaty may save 
us money, as we will pay only a quarter of those costs for monitoring 
resources that otherwise we might well have to finance in full.
  But we do have a problem. We have been unable to hold hearings on 
this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, even though committees 
with lesser roles have held them. And the Majority Leader has said that 
he will not bring this treaty to the floor.
  Why is that, Mr. President? I know that my good friends the chairman 
and the majority leader have raised arguments against the Treaty, but 
they seem curiously unwilling to make those arguments in the context of 
a proper committee or floor debate on a resolution of ratification.
  Could they be afraid of losing? Could they be afraid that, once the 
pros and cons are laid out with a resolution of ratification before us, 
two thirds of this body will support ratification? Perhaps; I know that 
I think the Treaty can readily get that support.
  For the arguments in favor of ratification look pretty strong. The 
conditions that the President has asked us to attach to a resolution of 
ratification will assure that we maintain our weapons and the ability 
to test them, and

[[Page S9423]]

that he will consider every year whether we must withdraw from the 
Treaty and resume testing to maintain nuclear deterrence.
  I also know, Mr. President, that the American people overwhelmingly 
support ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty. A nation-wide poll in mid-
May, after the Indian tests, found 73 percent in favor of ratification 
and only 16 percent against it. Later polls in 5 states--with 7 
Republican senators--found support for the Treaty ranging from 79 
percent to 86 percent.
  The May poll also found that the American people knew there was a 
risk that other countries would try to cheat, so the public is not 
supporting ratification because they wear rose-colored glasses. The 
people are pretty level-headed on this issue, as on so many others. 
They know that no treaty is perfect. They also know that this Treaty, 
on balance, is good for America.
  So perhaps those who block the Senate from fulfilling its 
Constitutional duty regarding this Treaty are doing that because they 
know the people overwhelmingly support this Treaty, and they know that 
ratification would pass.
  Perhaps they just don't like arms control treaties. Perhaps they 
would rather rely only upon American military might, including nuclear 
weapons tests. Perhaps they want a nation-wide ballistic missile 
defense and figure that then it won't matter how many countries have 
nuclear weapons. Perhaps they figure our weapons will keep us safe, 
even if we let the rest of the world fall into the abyss of nuclear 
war.
  I don't share that view, Mr. President. I believe we can keep non-
proliferation on track. I believe that we can maintain nuclear 
deterrence without engaging in nuclear testing, and that the 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is a small price for keeping the non-
nuclear states with us on an issue where the fate of the world is truly 
at stake.
  I cannot force a resolution of ratification on this Treaty through 
the Foreign Relations Committee and onto the floor of this body.
  But the American people want us to ratify this Treaty. They are 
absolutely right to want that. I will remind my colleagues--however 
often I must--of their duty under the U.S. Constitution and to our 
national security. I will make sure that the American people know who 
stands with them in that vital quest.
  My colleague, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, and I have 
drafted a resolution calling for expeditious consideration of this 
Treaty. So far, we have been joined by 34 of our colleagues as co-
sponsors of that resolution.
  We know that many others support us quietly, Mr. President, but 
hesitate to part company with their leaders. We are confident, however, 
that as more of them reflect on what is at stake, and on the need for 
continued U.S. leadership in nuclear non-proliferation, they will 
realize that they will do their leaders a favor by helping the Senate 
to do what is so clearly in the national interest.
  The Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The only question is when.
  The world is a dangerous place, Mr. President, and we must no 
underestimate the challenges our country faces. But the spirit of 
America lies in our ability to rise to those challenges and overcome 
them. The immediate challenge of non-proliferation is to bring forth a 
resolution of ratification on a useful treaty, Mr. President. We should 
show more of that American spirit in our approach to that task.

                          ____________________