[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 105 (Thursday, July 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9357-S9374]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

  The Senate continued with consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the defense bill.

[[Page S9358]]

  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2132) making appropriations for the Department 
     of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and 
     for other purposes.


                           Amendment No. 3397

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided on the 
Feingold amendment.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is about the National 
Guard. This amendment is about priorities in our Armed Forces, not 
about the merits of any aircraft proposed to be added to the Navy's 
aviation fleet. This amendment fills in almost all of the dangerous 
$225 million shortfall in the National Guard's O&M account. As an 
offset, we use the House's recommendation on Super Hornet procurement 
for the coming fiscal year.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment is supported by 25 State 
adjutants general. I hope my colleagues contact their State adjutants 
generals to get their opinion before casting their vote. I urge 
colleagues to support the National Guard and to vote against tabling 
this amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, this amendment will eliminate the Navy's 
highest priority, or I would say the Defense Department's highest 
priority for the Navy, the F-18 E/F. It would move that money into the 
National Guard. We have already increased the National Guard by more 
than $500 million above the budget request. So that approval of the 
National Guard Adjutants is a facade. This is to kill the F-18. I urge 
that the Senate support my motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table amendment No. 3397.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is absent because of illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
North Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``aye.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 80, nays 19, as follows: 

                     [Rollcall Vote No. 247 Leg.] 

                               YEAS--80 

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner 

                               NAYS--19 

     Bingaman
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Feingold
     Graham
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Wellstone
     Wyden 

                             NOT VOTING--1 

       
     Helms
       
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 3397) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, could we have order for just one moment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I want to inform the Senate that tomorrow 
there will be another funeral. It is the funeral for Officer Chestnut. 
The agreement today was we would not have any votes until 1 p.m. Then 
we made that 2 p.m. because of the Intelligence Committee meeting. But 
we are going to have the same agreement now that we will not vote on 
the amendments that we take up later this evening until tomorrow at 1 
p.m.
  I am soon going to seek agreement that all amendments will have to be 
debated tonight, and we will start voting tomorrow at 1 p.m. on those 
that require a vote. We will have taken over half--we have agreed to 
take over half the amendments we know of now, and we very soon hope to 
be able to know what amendments there are, but we will work out that 
time agreement.
  I think Senators should realize that without regard to anything else 
we do now, we are going to be here tomorrow, and we are going to start 
voting at 1 o'clock and not before. The alternative is if we get 
through these--we might be able to get through them tonight if Senators 
want to do that and be finished tonight. But we can't do that unless we 
see the amendments.
  Now, I have asked two or three times for an agreement that Senators 
bring amendments through, that we have a time limit on when they must 
be disclosed, and we will try that again after the next vote. But we 
have to have some certainty. If Senators want to, we are going to be 
here until Sunday, because I will never, never allow a defense bill to 
hang over a recess. It just will not do. And I think anybody who 
understands defense understands it cannot happen. So we are going to 
finish this bill tonight or tomorrow or Saturday or Sunday. My plane 
doesn't leave until Monday.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. STEVENS. What is the next vote?
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield, Mr. President?
  I inquire of the chairman of the committee, are we going to have 
votes this evening? Why wouldn't we vote on into the evening rather 
than having votes hanging over until tomorrow?
  Mr. STEVENS. We might be able to do that.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that no vote on this bill take 
more than 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DODD. Are we going to have votes then this evening, all into the 
evening?
  Mr. STEVENS. We are going to vote on amendments when they come up. 
Whenever they come up, we will vote on them. Most of them are going to 
be motions to table, I will tell you. Most of them are going to be 
motions to table because most of this stuff is not relevant to this 
bill at all. So you might as well be put on notice, Republican or 
Democrat, I am going to move to table any nonrelevant amendments.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. If I can question the floor manager relative to his 
intent, if we are in tomorrow and votes start at 1 o'clock, might it be 
possible to stack the votes in the event that actuality should be 
determined, because the last plane that I can catch is 2:20; otherwise, 
I have to leave the next day. And I don't request special 
consideration. On the other hand, it just means another day's delay. So 
if we did go into tomorrow and we start voting, the 2:20 plane is the 
last one I can catch.
  Mr. STEVENS. I tell my colleague I will do my best.
  I renew my unanimous consent request that all remaining first-degree 
amendments in order to be offered to this bill must be presented and 
offered before 5 p.m.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, objection. I object.
  Mr. STEVENS. There is the answer to my friend. I do not see how we 
can finish before 2:30 tomorrow afternoon unless we know what we are 
voting on.
  What is the next order of business, Mr. President?


                           Amendment No. 3124

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the Hutchinson 
amendment No. 3124. There are 2 minutes of debate equally divided.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I might say I am prepared to accept this. 
It is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment primarily.
  This is the Senator from Arkansas. I do have a tabling motion in 
place on this, do I not?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. STEVENS. I ask for the vote after 1 minute on each side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes equally divided.

[[Page S9359]]

  The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, the Senate is not in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  There are 2 minutes equally divided. The Senator deserves to be 
heard.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, thank you for bringing the Senate to 
order.
  This is an amendment that would simply deny visas and travel to those 
in the Chinese Government who the Secretary of State finds, by credible 
evidence, are involved in either forced abortions or religious 
persecution. It is not MFN, it is not IMF, it is not sanctions, but it 
would deny visas. China denies these practices are taking place. If 
that is the case, there would be no obstruction at all in diplomatic 
relations.
  We provide in the amendment, and I hope everybody will look closely 
at the amendment, a Presidential waiver if it is in the national 
interest. This amendment passed overwhelmingly in the House of 
Representatives. I think, since the President returned, the most recent 
round of arrests of democratic dissidents underscores the need for this 
amendment.
  It is a rifleshot, not a shotgun. We want to go after the bad guys, 
and that is all. It is not against trading. It doesn't deal with 
trading. A vote against tabling this amendment is a vote for freedom in 
China.
  I ask my colleagues to oppose the tabling motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on the motion to table.
  Mr. STEVENS. Senator Thomas has a minute on our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was under the impression the Senator 
from Alaska yielded back the time. If that is incorrect----
  Mr. STEVENS. No; I did not.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Senator from 
Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to follow the 
leadership of the floor leader and the bill leader here on this one. 
No. 1, it doesn't belong in this area. We are taking away all these 
amendments. I think that is the right thing to do.
  The second point is those of us who have been working in this area 
for a very long time feel as if there is a process that is going on to 
make things better with China, to make our relations better.
  No one disagrees with doing something about religious freedom. No one 
disagrees with any of these issues. The question is, How do you best do 
it? And the best way to do it is not to refuse to provide visas to the 
Chinese.
  I urge we table this amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion. The 
yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce the the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is absent because of illness.
  I further announcd that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
North Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
  The result was announced--yeas 29, nays 70, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 248 Leg.]

                                YEAS--29

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Domenici
     Feinstein
     Glenn
     Grams
     Hagel
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lugar
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thurmond

                                NAYS--70

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Biden
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Ford
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Helms
       
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 3124) was rejected.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am informed now there are at least two, maybe three, 
amendments that will be offered to this amendment. Under the 
circumstances, I would like to just suggest we set that aside for a 
minute and have the proponents of the second-degree amendments talk to 
the author of the first-degree amendment to see if we might work 
something out as to how we limit the time or deal with this, if that is 
agreeable. If it is, then I would ask it be temporarily set aside.
  I would like to take up the amendment No. 2964.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). Is that a unanimous consent 
request?
  Mr. STEVENS. It is a request. I ask unanimous consent that it be 
temporarily set aside, and we take them up one by one. Hopefully, they 
will talk while we are doing this.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Reserving the right to object, will the Senator yield 
for a question?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. When we temporarily set this aside and do the 
negotiations on the various second-degree amendments that are to be 
considered, when do you anticipate returning to----
  Mr. STEVENS. I say to the Senator, there are two other amendments we 
could act upon now. Your amendment will automatically be the order when 
we finish those.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order would bring back the 
amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the 
Senator from Alaska?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2964

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the next amendment would be amendment No. 
2964, offered by Senator Abraham. There was no request for time that I 
know of for this. We are prepared to and do ask that--are the yeas and 
nays ordered on that amendment? I do not think they have been ordered. 
Have they?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. I ask for the adoption of Senator Abraham's amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the Abraham amendment No. 2964.
  The amendment (No. 2964) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Was there one more amendment we had to dispose of before 
we come back to the regular order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is the Kyl amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. For the information of the Senate, Senator Kyl asked 
that his amendment be set aside temporarily because the Armed Services 
Committee is meeting to consider a similar amendment. We would like to 
have that set aside until Senator Kyl asks that it be brought up. I ask 
unanimous consent that Senator Kyl's amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  We have two amendments pending from the Senator from Texas, Mrs. 
Hutchison.
  Mr. STEVENS. There is one amendment on which the debate has been 
finished.
  May I inquire of the Senator from Texas, is debate finished on the 
one amendment?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is correct. I have spoken on the first 
amendment, No. 3409. I am happy to yield back time on that.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am informed there is reluctance to 
accept that amendment until the Bosnia amendment is considered. I ask 
unanimous consent to set it aside temporarily, also, until that is 
resolved.

[[Page S9360]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3124

  Mr. STEVENS. We come back, then, to the pending amendment. As I 
understand, it is the regular order. And that is the amendment that was 
not tabled.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, 
Mr. Hutchinson. The motion to table was not agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. That is open to amendment.
  Mr. President, I think they are following the suggestion and perhaps 
discussing those second-degree amendments. I ask unanimous consent 
that, again, that be the pending business but it be temporarily set 
aside until the sponsor of that amendment can return to the floor. I 
also ask unanimous consent that we proceed with the Bosnia amendment by 
the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment will 
be amendment No.--I ask the Senator from Texas, 3409 or 3413?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Amendment No. 3413 has to do with Bosnia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 3413.
  The Senator from Texas is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3413

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, amendment No. 3413 is to condition the 
use of appropriated funds for the purpose of an orderly and honorable 
reduction of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia.
  It is a fact that the U.S. Armed Forces have accomplished the 
military mission assigned to them as a component of the implementation 
and stabilization forces. The continuing and open-ended commitment of 
U.S. ground forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is subject 
to the oversight authority of Congress.
  Mr. President, this is the first time that Congress will vote on any 
kind of resolution that would establish some kind of policy on Bosnia 
since the President decided that it would be an unending mission.
  On November 27, 1995, the President said that America would be part 
of a multinational military implementation force that would terminate 
in about a year. The President declared the expiration of the mandate 
to be December 20, 1996.
  The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff at the time expressed the critical importance of establishing a 
firm deadline in the absence of which there is a potential for 
expansion of the mission of U.S. forces. That was a forceful statement 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He said it is a recipe for mission 
creep not to have a termination date.

  On October 3, 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced the 
intention of the United States to delay removal until March 1997. In 
November of 1996, the President announced that we would delay until 
June of 1998. The President did not request authorization by the 
Congress of a policy that would result in the further deployment of 
U.S. forces in Bosnia until June 1998.
  Notwithstanding the passage of two previously established deadlines, 
the reaffirmation of those deadlines by senior national security 
officials, and the endorsement by those same national security 
officials of the importance of having a deadline, nevertheless, the 
President announced on December 17, 1997, that establishing a deadline 
had been a mistake and that U.S. ground combat forces would be 
committed to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia for an indefinite amount of 
time.
  What my amendment does is very simple. It says that funds 
appropriated will not be made available except as conditioned below; 
that the President will bring the number of troops down to 6,500 by 
February of next year and 5,000 by October of 1999, so we are staying 
within this fiscal year. Now, the exceptions are very broad at the 
discretion of the President and the Secretary of Defense that U.S. 
forces would have enough forces to protect themselves as the drawdowns 
proceed. So we are, of course, going to give the protection to the 
forces as the drawdown goes forward.
  This doesn't take us out of Bosnia, which many in this body feel that 
we should do, that we should begin this at the base, for an honorable 
withdrawal. It just says, by the end of the fiscal year of the budget 
that we are considering, that our troop level would be down from about 
8,500 to about 5,000. This should start the process of working with our 
allies to have a better distribution and sharing of responsibility 
among our allies and the United States.
  This is a European security issue. The United States has 
approximately double the number of forces that any of our European 
allies have. We want to be a good ally. In fact, I don't want to pull 
up stakes and leave Bosnia without doing it in a responsible way. I 
think that is our responsibility. But, in fact, many of us have asked 
the President repeatedly to lay the groundwork with an established and 
clear mission that has a chance to succeed, a mission that has a finite 
term so that both our allies and any enemies of our cause would know 
exactly what to expect from America. That would not be possible at this 
time. We have said we were going to leave twice, and we have not left. 
We have not left, and we have not laid a proper base to leave.
  What I am asking the President to consider and what I ask the 
American people to consider is that we start the process of realigning 
the forces in Bosnia so that our contribution would be reduced and our 
allies in NATO would begin to take a greater share of the burden.
  Why is this important? We are looking at a time when our military 
readiness is being called into question. In fact, if you look at all of 
the responsibilities that America has in the world, we are spending too 
much on Bosnia and putting the future security of the United States and 
our ability to respond in the future in other places where America may 
have to respond, even unilaterally, in jeopardy. That is not the course 
we should be taking.
  It is most important that America start with the issue of Bosnia and 
address it in a way that we should by putting it in context with our 
overall responsibilities in the world. The Bosnia operation has already 
diverted nearly $10 billion from our national defense. A growing lament 
at the Pentagon among senior officers is that we are in danger of 
returning to the hollow forces of the militaries of the late 1970s.
  Let me mention some of the indicators that demonstrate our military 
is once again at risk. Last year, the military had its worst recruiting 
year since 1979. The Army failed to meet its objective to recruit 
infantry soldiers, the single most important specialty in the Army. A 
Senate Budget Committee investigator recently reported finding serious 
Army-wide personnel and readiness problems. At the National Training 
Center, where our troops go for advanced training, units rotating in 
typically come with a 60 percent shortage in mechanics and often a 50 
percent shortage in infantry. These shortages were blamed on the fact 
that these personnel, especially the mechanics, are deployed abroad for 
missions such as Bosnia.
  More than 350 Air Force pilots turned down the $60,000 bonuses they 
would have received to remain in the cockpit another 5 years--a 29 
percent acceptance rate. That is compared with 59 percent last year and 
81 percent in 1995. That is a stark trend. The Air Force is finding 
that whatever the perks, it can't hold its best pilots. Last year, 
about 500 pilots resigned. Most of them were lured by the airlines. 
This year the number will be 700, and the Air Force says it is not able 
to train enough new pilots to replace them.
  When I have gone and visited our bases overseas and at home and I ask 
our enlisted military men and women why we are losing our experienced 
people, almost every time the answer is: Too much time away from our 
families on operations that don't seem that necessary. A Senate Budget 
Committee investigator also found that some small units are now being 
led by junior people because sergeants are off on peacekeeping duty. As 
a result, subunits from basic squads on up do not train with the 
leaders they would go to war with--breaking the rule of training just 
as you would go to war.
  Since 1991, the United States has cut its Armed Forces by about a 
third. It may be more difficult, more risky, and possibly more costly 
to invade Iraq right now. We are going to debate and vote on a 
resolution today, hopefully, expressing our support for the President's 
strong actions toward Iraq. But

[[Page S9361]]

the fact is, if anything went wrong, we would have to divert troops 
from every theater in the world to prevail. Defense cuts of almost 50 
percent over the last decade have put our security at risk. But this 
has been made worse by the diversion of U.S. resources and readiness to 
places where there is no security threat to the United States, such as 
Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere.
  We have spent more time discussing Bosnia than missile defense, which 
is a security risk to our country. We are not developing a policy that 
is going to put our country in the best position to deal with the 
myriad of issues that will face this country and our security in the 
next century.
  President Clinton and his administration are missing a big-picture 
view of the world and the proper role for the United States. Our 
growing involvement in Bosnia is a good example of that. Just last 
week, U.S. forces were directly involved in tracking down and capturing 
a war criminal.
  The Dayton accords have made it clear that apprehension of war 
criminals would be the responsibility of the parties to Dayton--
civilian police and government officials. In fact, a little more than 1 
year ago now, the former NATO commander, George Joulwan, told the 
Congress this:

       The military are not policemen. And I think the proper 
     responsibility rests on the parties. That is what Dayton 
     says. . .[I]f we are not careful, we will go down this 
     slippery slope where the military will be put in the position 
     of hunting down war criminals. That is not within the 
     mandate.

  That is Gen. George Joulwan.
  I joined with many of my colleagues in the Senate to oppose the 
decision to send troops to Bosnia. One of our principal concerns was 
that, once there, our mission would be indefinite, and that it might 
lead to mission creep. We were bolstered in our concerns by former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, General Shalikashvili. They both warned that without a specific 
deadline for withdrawal there would be the potential for expanding the 
mission.
  I am concerned that Secretary Perry's warnings are coming true. While 
we were on a recent recess, the President announced that thousands of 
U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia after the June 30 deadline, 
remembering that the Senate had unanimously endorsed that deadline of 
June 30, 1998, which his administration had established.
  After 240 U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon in 1984, Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger established six principles upon which the 
decision to send U.S. ground troops should be based. Here is what he 
said:

       The U.S. should not commit forces unless the engagement is 
     in our vital national interest. If we do commit forces, we 
     should have clearly defined political and military 
     objectives. We should know how those objectives can be 
     accomplished, and we should send the appropriate forces to 
     complete the objectives. We must constantly reassess and 
     adjust our relationship between our objectives and forces, if 
     necessary. The commitment of troops should be a last resort, 
     not the first.

  We have violated virtually every one of Secretary Weinberger's 
principles in Bosnia. It was supposed to be a 1-year peacekeeping 
operation that would keep the factions apart until their own forces 
could come in and keep the peace from the ground up. They would have 
local elections and general elections for their national leadership. 
They would begin to resettle refugees.
  Dayton has long since passed. I was in Brcko a year ago, 1 week 
before the eruption there in which U.S. troops were harmed. I was able 
to see how far we had come. I have been to Bosnia four times.
  What I saw in Brcko was the resettling of refugees who did not even 
meet their next-door neighbors from the other factions, and I thought 
this is going to take a long time. The atrocities committed right in 
Brcko against thousands of Muslims are as bad as anything I have ever 
heard reported from the Nazi atrocities of World War II. Yet, we are 
trying to say ``come and live together like Americans do.'' It looks 
like we are trying to create multiethnic neighborhoods, forcing people 
to do this prematurely, after the atrocities that have occurred in that 
country. This in itself can be antipeaceful. I think it is going to 
prolong the uprisings if we try to force this before the people 
themselves are ready--before the wounds have healed.
  So I hope that we can let things settle, let the peace settle in, and 
let's do what we said we were going to do. Let's start training the 
people who are there to be a peacekeeping and police force. This could 
be done in an orderly way. We could begin with a NATO force that 
transitions and trains the forces that would come in behind them. They 
will be able to keep their peace, but it will not be an incentive for 
them to take over this job if they know that we are going to be there 
to do it for them.
  I hope that we can create the base for an honorable exit. My 
amendment just tries to get a more equitable distribution of forces so 
that the burden is more equally shared between the United States and 
our NATO allies in Europe. It validates the legitimate responsibility 
that Congress has to authorize the long-term deployment of forces 
around the world by requiring a vote on the President's plan.
  Without this amendment, we will be looking at American troops in 
Bosnia indefinitely. We will be looking at a never-ending commitment, 
and we will be taking resources that are vitally necessary for our own 
security and for our responsibilities around the world.
  It is most important that we establish a policy that can succeed. 
Keeping thousands of American troops in a 30,000-troop enclave in 
Bosnia in perpetuity is not good military strategy and is not based on 
good policy. Remember what Shalikashvili said: ``Having a defined 
deadline is important to avoid mission creep.'' We have learned that 
before and we should not forget the lesson. I think it is important for 
us to begin to act like the superpower that we are. When a superpower 
makes a commitment, it must be willing to back it up and do what it 
says it is going to do. It is so important that we act firmly. It was 
important in Iraq. It is important in Bosnia that when we set 
deadlines, we meet them, so that everyone knows what to expect. It is 
most important, Mr. President, that we look at our security forces and 
the money that we are spending on our defense. We are lowering our 
defense expenditures while increasing the OPTEMPO--increasing the 
operations we are getting involved in around the world. This is despite 
warning after warning from past Presidents, from past Chairmen of the 
Joint Chiefs, from the experts who have seen history and have learned 
from it.
  We can do things that no one else in the world can do. We can provide 
an umbrella of defense for ballistic missiles, for nuclear weaponry, 
but that takes a commitment of money and a commitment of will. If we 
are dissipating to the tune of about $3 billion a year in a 
peacekeeping mission, which can be done just as well by any of our 
other allies, we are walking away from the responsibility we have to 
our allies to protect them in a way that only we can, because only we 
have the resources to do it.
  Mr. President, I don't see how our colleagues can express alarm about 
the decline in U.S. readiness, and at the same time, ignore the 
policies that are causing the decline. It is our responsibility to act 
when our troops are going to be sent to an overseas conflict or 
missions of any kind when they are long-term. The President has now 
said it is going to be long-term--in fact, unending. If we don't have 
any set time, we will forget and the Bosnia operation will be in 
perpetuity. Those who are relying on us will continue to. Why shouldn't 
they? What incentive do they have to start the training of their own 
forces, which was envisioned in the Dayton accords?
  I hope my colleagues will look at this very small first step in 
exercising Congress' responsibility. This is a precedent that has been 
set by Congresses in the past. We have set time deadlines. We have 
stopped the funding for operations that Congress did not think should 
be continued. This has happened in Cambodia, Vietnam, Somalia, Rwanda, 
and even in Korea, in the Philippines, and in Japan. We have spoken. In 
the past, Congress has stepped up to its responsibility. I hope it will 
today.
  Mr. President, I will stop at this point because others want to 
speak. I do hope that my colleagues will focus carefully on this step. 
It is not even a major step of withdrawing from Bosnia. It is to just 
say we want our allies to accept more of the responsibility so that our 
troops will be able to do what

[[Page S9362]]

they do best, and that is to train for the contingency that only we can 
address; that we will have the money to be able to invest in the 
technology that will protect the world from ballistic missiles and 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and that we will not lose 
our most experienced personnel because they are worn out from mission 
fatigue on operations they do not see as threats to U.S. security.

  Mr. President, I thank you. I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the 
Hutchison amendment, No. 3413, to the DOD appropriations bill 
concerning Bosnia.
  I want to very sincerely commend the Senator from Texas for all the 
hard work she continues to devote to this important issue and for 
trying to craft a compromise that would be acceptable to a majority of 
our colleagues regarding the United States' ongoing presence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
  As my friend from Texas has already explained, this amendment 
mandates a withdrawal of U.S. forces participating in the NATO 
Stabilization Force, or S-FOR, requiring that that force, or any future 
multi-national successor force, shall not exceed 6,500 troops by 
February 2, 1999, and 5,000 troops by October 1, 1999. The amendment 
enforces these levels by tying any appropriated funds for the Bosnia 
mission to this troop reduction.
  This amendment represents something less than a funding cut-off for 
the mission, although that is a policy I have pursued in the past.
  Rather, it suggests a slow and careful drawdown of U.S. forces in the 
region. In fact, it allows for troops to stay there past October of 
next year!
  Mr. President, this is July 30. This is exactly 1 month after the 
date that we were supposed to be out of Bosnia in the first place. That 
isn't even accurate, because really we were supposed to be out of 
Bosnia in the first place, according to the promises that were made by 
both parties, by December 30, 1996. So we are way beyond that date.
  Our troops have been there since 1995--much longer than the original 
1-year mandate, and already longer than the expanded 18-month mandate 
for S-FOR--and I do not think anyone has a good idea how many more 
years we will be there.
  More significantly, the cost of our involvement in Bosnia has 
increased dramatically--easily more than quadrupling the original $2 
billion estimate to over $9 billion.
  The estimate is that it is now well over $9 billion for this 
commitment that has already been spent or obligated.
  Mr. President, I regret that the managers of this bill earlier today 
agreed to a provision that would allow $1.8 billion in additional funds 
for the Bosnia mission to be added to this bill with an emergency 
designation.
  Mr. President, the mission in Bosnia has clearly ceased to be an 
emergency, and this amendment even recognizes that fact.
  The fact that the emergency designation was inserted into the bill 
this morning unfortunately highlights the fact that we in Congress 
continue to be lax in establishing some kind of accountability for our 
continued operation in Bosnia, and particularly for the taxpayer 
dollars that are needed to support that operation, soon to approach the 
astounding figure of $10 billion.
  I recognize that my continued opposition to the mission in Bosnia is 
not shared by everyone in Congress. But I think all of us would agree 
that the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to provide a 
check on the manner in which the executive branch spends money.
  This is the way the President spends an annual budget request to the 
Congress with his plans for the following year's spending. From time to 
time there are emergencies that can not be foreseen, and we deal with 
those accordingly as emergencies.
  But let me repeat again, U.S. involvement in Bosnia has ceased to be 
an emergency.
  Rather, our presence in Bosnia has clearly become a substantial, 
long-term commitment. It is something the United States has, for better 
or worse, decided to do for the long-term. And we need to evaluate this 
operation on its merits accordingly, and not pretend that it is an 
appropriate occasion for an emergency designation.
  The amendment by the Senator from Texas can at least put some real 
pressure on the administration to develop plans for a reduction in 
troop levels in Bosnia. The amendment also would have a positive 
budgetary impact, because we would need fewer resources to support a 
smaller troop presence.
  Mr. President, with or without this amendment, I think we all 
recognize that there will be troops in Bosnia next year.
  So, this is not an emergency, and I think the Congress has a 
responsibility to face that fact and deal with it accordingly.
  I hope, therefore, that those of my colleagues who do support the 
mission in Bosnia will cease to resort to maneuvers regarding the 
funding of this mission that seek to avoid our budget spending caps! 
This has been going on far too long, and has eaten up too many of our 
resources--human, financial and otherwise. We cannot continue with this 
budgetary game.
  Mr. President, I am pleased once again to join the junior Senator 
from Texas in trying to assert some kind of accountability for this 
mission. I urge my colleagues to support her amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, it is with reluctance I rise to oppose the 
amendment offered by my colleague, the Senator from Texas, because we 
share much the same goal. We had the same concerns about the deployment 
of our troops to Bosnia initially. We had the same concerns about the 
Dayton accord, which, as presented to us, was transparent on its face. 
It was disingenuous on its face that we could accomplish the task 
incorporated in Dayton with a 1-year period of time of deployment of 
our troops on the ground, a timetable unachievable by any measure. The 
continued existence of our involvement in Bosnia is something that I 
don't support.
  But I believe that the amendment has a fatal flaw, and the fatal flaw 
is that it makes Congress the determiner of how many troops and what 
time period those troops will be deployed once that decision has been 
made by the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.
  I find it difficult to stand up here and defend the powers of the 
President of the United States, particularly at a time like this. But 
there are constitutional prerogatives and constitutional powers that I 
think need defending regardless of what your personal assessment is of 
any particular President.
  Second, I believe it is unwise policy for those of us to make 
decisions about the force levels of our troops or decisions that 
micromanage how those troops conduct themselves and how they accomplish 
their mission once the decision has been made. Clearly, our 
responsibility, if we disagree with the presence of those troops and 
the deployment of those troops, is to address that by eliminating the 
funding for those troops, but not to determine the force level of those 
troops, the kind of equipment they ought to have, and what their 
timetable ought to be.
  I quote from a letter from the Secretary of Defense dated May 21, 
1998, when he says, ``Our military commanders in the field have 
determined the level and type of force required to carry out the 
mission within acceptable risks. The mission force and guidance of the 
force currently planned for have been fully agreed to by military 
authorities. Military commanders''--under the amendment offered here--
``Military commanders would be forced to restructure their force and 
mission tasks based on an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on 
mission accomplishment, operational consideration, and the fluid 
tactical situations they face. In addition, legislating withdrawal 
would incite heightened intransigence and extremism.''
  Mr. President, we sadly learned in Somalia, to cite one example, the 
disastrous and tragic consequences of political decisions overriding 
military requests. We lost some brave Americans unnecessarily because 
the political decision was made to not provide those

[[Page S9363]]

forces with the necessary equipment and not base a sufficient force 
there until our mission was accomplished. I don't want to see us doing 
that again.
  We in Congress do not have the expertise to make that decision. Even 
if we did, we shouldn't make that decision. That is a decision that 
ought to be made by those who command the troops and make the decisions 
about their presence and what they need to be there.
  So I strongly, strongly urge my colleagues to vote to table this 
amendment, not because they necessarily agree or disagree with whether 
or not this is a proper deployment, not because this impacts our 
readiness, which it does, not because it is costing a lot of money, 
which it is, not because it was a bad decision to start with, and an 
unachievable mission and objective to start with, because it is, but 
because it tells our troops that we in Congress know more about what 
they need, what the troop levels should be, what the date of withdrawal 
should be, how we accomplish the mission of our military commanders. 
Those men and women in uniform who we put in harm's way have to have 
every advantage we can give them in terms of protecting their security, 
in terms of accomplishing their mission, and it is a decision that has 
to be made by people with military expertise and not Members of 
Congress. For that reason, I strongly urge that we table this well-
intended but, I think, misguided amendment.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the Bosnia 
amendment introduced by the junior Senator from Texas. Before I discuss 
the reasons for my opposition, I would like to commend the Senator for 
her continuing interest and involvement in U.S. foreign policy. The 
Senator is one of this body's most active Members, and while I have 
often opposed her legislative initiatives, which seemed to me 
unnecessarily to limit American involvement abroad, I value her 
enthusiasm and engagement.
  The amendment that Senator Hutchison has proposed today sets 
arbitrary caps on our troop strength in Bosnia and micromanages their 
duties from the vantage point of Washington, D.C.--4,000 miles from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina! The amendment is fatally flawed.
  Mr. President, the Hutchison amendment is predicated upon a false 
assertion: that the U.S. contribution to SFOR is inequitable and 
disproportionately large. I will return to that inaccurate claim in a 
moment.
  Moreover, the amendment makes several incorrect claims about the 
current situation in Bosnia, for example that NATO forces participate 
in law enforcement activities there.
  In circumscribing future activities, it also incorrectly implies that 
NATO forces are transferring refugees or that refugees are relocating 
in order to control the territory of the other Bosnian entity.
  But, Mr. President, the core of my opposition to the Hutchison 
amendment is the same as was my opposition last month to the Thurmond 
amendment to the Defense authorization bill.
  Put quite simply, if the United States wishes to remain the leader of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then it must continue to lead!
  Mr. President, leadership means being present in all aspects of NATO 
operations and sharing in the risks.
  The Hutchison amendment is a prescription for ``NATO a la carte.''
  By February 1999 it would allow exceptions in Bosnia to the arbitrary 
troop limits in Bosnia only for self-protection as we withdraw our 
forces, to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities, or in advisory support 
roles.
  That might work for a junior member of the Alliance, but not for the 
United States of America. Not for the leader of NATO.
  Let me return to the false assumption that underlies the Hutchison 
amendment--that our participation in SFOR is disproportionately large.
  As a matter of fact, Mr. President, while the U.S. contribution to 
SFOR remains the largest single national contribution, the proportion 
of U.S. forces within NATO forces in Bosnia has declined dramatically 
since initial deployment in December 1995.
  At the outset, U.S. troops made up fully one-third of IFOR. As a 
result of steady, measured reductions, U.S. participation has dropped 
to one-fifth of SFOR.
  In other words, our allies and other SFOR partners have agreed to the 
U.S. taking disproportionate cuts in force numbers at each milestone, 
while continuing to accept U.S. command of the overall force.
  At the current time, our European allies alone contribute more than 
three-and-one-half times the number of troops in SFOR than we do.
  Attempting to lower the U.S. proportion to equal or below that of any 
single European ally would almost certainly cost us our command 
position. Some Members of the Senate might welcome such a development. 
I would not.
  I want the United States to retain command of SFOR in order to ensure 
that the pace of implementing the Dayton Accords holds steady or 
accelerates.
  I want the United States to retain command of SFOR in order to 
maximize the effectiveness and protection of the U.S. forces in Bosnia.
  We are in Bosnia because helping to resolve the Bosnian problem is in 
our national interest.
  As was repeatedly pointed out by this Senator and many others during 
the debate on NATO enlargement last spring, that is the reason we are 
in Europe at all.
  In political, security, and economic terms, we are a European power. 
Our engagement in Europe, including Bosnia, is not a charity operation. 
Stability in Europe benefits us.
  The European allies of the United States are playing a major role in 
Bosnia.
  Because of our leadership role in NATO, and because of our superior 
logistical capabilities, we have maintained command of SFOR. This is 
how it should be.
  Like my colleagues, I am in favor of the speediest fulfillment of the 
Dayton Accords so that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a self-
sustaining democracy and all foreign troops may be withdrawn. American 
command of SFOR is the best guarantee that we can rapidly achieve this 
goal.
  The Hutchison amendment would, I submit, gravely undermine that 
American command in Bosnia and would set in motion a process that could 
ultimately result in loss of the position of SACEUR, the command of 
NATO land forces in Europe.
  For all these reasons, I oppose the Hutchison amendment, and I urge 
my colleagues to join me in defeating it.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I will take no more time. I know my friend from 
Arizona is about to make some comments.
  Last spring this was a bad idea. Nothing has caused it to become a 
good idea in the summer. It was a bad idea then; it is a bad idea now. 
I hope it will be tabled.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Delaware, who obviously is very 
knowledgeable on this issue and has stayed focused on these issues for 
many, many years.
  I also wish to thank the Senator from Indiana for his very forceful 
presentation.
  Mr. President, I believe everyone in this body knows that I have long 
had serious concerns about our mission in Bosnia. From the time the 
IFOR mission was first briefed to the Congress, I knew the job could 
not be completed in one year--nor against any arbitrary deadline. 
Instead, I urged the Administration to set concrete objectives and 
benchmarks for measuring success.
  Now, as many members have pointed out, we are in an open-ended and 
ill-defined military commitment. The Administration has scrapped all 
the artificial deadlines. But no clear set of objectives and well-
defined military missions has taken its place. We seem to drift in and 
out of going after war criminals, of using the military to resettle 
refugees, and of taking on a direct political role in parts of Bosnia 
in the name of supporting international civilian authorities. The role 
of our military has expanded, and there is no end in sight.
  The answer to this problem, however, is not to go back and set new 
artificial deadlines or troop levels. And make no mistake about it, Mr. 
President. The amendment before us is little different than the one the 
Senate rejected last month.

[[Page S9364]]

  Bosnia is a long-term, complicated problem. It involves not only the 
warring factions, but has direct effects on Croatia and Serbia, 
including Kosovo, and threatens to spill over to the wider Balkan 
region. The credibility of NATO and especially the United States is 
tied up with finding a solution for the Bosnia crisis. It would be 
sheer irresponsibility, probably leading to renewed warfare, if we were 
to precipitously pull Out of Bosnia after investing so much. It would 
be a betrayal of our commitment to cooperating with our Allies. And it 
could well lead to an even more costly and dangerous re-introduction of 
American forces to stop the renewed fighting.
  Dealing with the Bosnia crisis--even if though our objective is to 
get American troops out of there--requires treating Bosnia as a serious 
long-term challenge. It is not an issue that lends itself to artificial 
deadlines for withdrawal. Nor is there any rationale to forcing the 
Congress to vote by some artificial deadline. Worse still would be a 
funding cut-off, which would only punish our troops for the failure of 
policy makers in Washington to craft a viable long term policy.
  I would like to offer six principles that I believe should guide our 
policy:
  (1) The U.S. has no permanent national interests in Bosnia. We are 
not interested in nation-building for its own sake. All we want is to 
create a self-sustaining peace. We must carry out our responsibilities 
and then get out.
  (2) Our withdrawal must not precipitate renewed warfare in Bosnia.
  (3) There must be no phony deadlines--whether for a withdrawal date, 
a Senate vote, or anything else. We have all the power we need to act 
whenever we want. We don't need a deadline. We need sound policy.
  (4) There must be no funding cut-offs or troop limits. This would 
only hurt our troops on the ground. The real problem is policy making 
here in Washington. It needs to be solved here.
  (5) There must be no micro-management of the military. The Congress 
and Administration must provide political leadership. We must make the 
tough decisions and bear the consequences. The military's job is to 
implement our decisions as effectively as possible based solely on 
military considerations. The military has no business making political 
decisions for us, and we have no business making military decisions for 
them.
  (6) The U.S. must provide leadership. No other country in the world 
has the political, military, and moral authority to exert leadership. 
Simply packing our bags and walking away is not an option. We must not 
simply abandon our Allies. We must leave Bosnia, but with dignity and 
leadership, leaving behind a well-planned succession.
  Handling the Bosnia crisis requires us to look beyond just this 
fiscal year. It requires the United States to develop a multi-year 
strategy that sets Out our objectives, the means for achieving these 
objectives, and a target timetable for getting us there--but no phony 
deadlines. For the sake of our troops, we need to set out clearly the 
miltary and nonmilitary missions they are being asked to perform. 
`Creative ambiguity' may be useful in politics, but it is dangerous for 
soldiers. We need to be honest with ourselves about the risks we are 
asking our troops to face, and the costs to the taxpayers of continuing 
the mission.
  I am convinced that the direction we should be taking is to move 
toward a force made up of European nations inside Bosnia, with U.S. 
forces just ``over-the-horizon'' outside of Bosnia--providing a rapid 
response capability to deter security threats, and providing 
logistical, intelligence, and air support to the European forces inside 
Bosnia. This step would free up U.S. forces to prepare for other 
contingencies.
  But it is not possible to achieve this goal simply by setting 
arbitrary numbers, or even numbers arrived at through an averaging 
process involving contributions of countries with militaries' a 
fraction the size of our own, and deadlines for troop withdrawals. 
Doing so could provoke a crisis with our Allies and could have the 
effect of simply setting a timeable for restoring violence to Bosnia. 
Instead, achieving this goal requires working together with our Allies 
and realistically taking account of the situation inside Bosnia.
  Mr. President, the Senate already approved an amendment, of which I 
sponsored, that seeks to do exactly these things. It imposes a number 
of reporting requirements, designed to provide the basis for moving us 
in the direction we all want to go. According to the amendment already 
passed by the Senate just over one month ago, each time the 
Administration submits a budget request for funding military operations 
in Bosnia, the Administration must clearly state its best assessment of 
six items:
  (1) our overall objectives and multi-year timetable for achieving 
these objectives--taking account of the benchmarks already required 
under the supplemental appropriation passed earlier this year;
  (2) the military and nonmilitary missiosn the President has directed 
U.S. forces to carry out--including specific language on our policy on 
war criminals, returning refugees, police functions, and support for 
civil implementation;
  (3) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's assessment of the 
risks these missions present to U.S. military personnel;
  (4) the cost of executing our strategy over several fiscal years.
  (5) the status of plans to move forward a European force inside 
Bosnia with a U.S. force outside Bosnia that would deter threats and 
provide support to the European force; and
  (6) an assessment of the impact of reducing our forces according to 
the timetable proposed in the original Byrd-Hutchison amendment.
  This may seem like a detailed and onerous reporting requirement, but 
it is nothing more than the king of long-term planning the 
Administration should be doing anyway. And by requiring it in a report 
to Congress, we ensure that the Congress is operating off the same set 
of assumptions and plans as the Administration. This will give us an 
opportunity to look more thoughtfully at the real challenges in Bosnia 
and structure our decisions more appropriately. Instead of broad swipes 
through artificial deadlines or prohibitions on certain missions, we 
will be able to target our policy choices more effectively.
  Mr. President, I am not going to elaborate very much on what the 
Senator from Indiana had to say, except to ask unanimous consent that a 
letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, the chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, written by General Shelton and Secretary Cohen be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                      Washington, DC, 21 May 1998.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: We write to express our concerns with 
     any amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for 
     withdrawal or reduction of US forces from the NATO-led 
     mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more 
     difficult to accomplish the mission, which has been 
     remarkable successful to date.
       It is our intention to reduce our forces in Bosnia. Based 
     on the progress achieved to date, our commanders already have 
     been able to reduce US troop levels from almost 20,000 in 
     1996 to the 6,900 that will be deployed after the current 
     drawdown is completed in September. We will conduct regular 
     reviews of our force posture and progress toward the 
     benchmarks we have established, and we expect further 
     reductions will be possible. But that determination is best 
     based on the actual situation on the ground, the military 
     advice of our commanders in the field, and the approval of 
     the NATO military and political authorities, not an arbitrary 
     withdrawal or reduction dates determined long in advance.
       Our military commanders in the field have determined the 
     level and type of force required to carry out the mission 
     within acceptable risk. The mission, forces and guidance of 
     the force currently planned for June 1998 have been fully 
     agreed to by NATO political and military authorities. Under a 
     legislated approach, military commanders would be forced to 
     restructure their force and mission tasks based on an 
     arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission 
     accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid 
     tactical situation they face. In addition, while those 
     opposed to the Dayton Accords have been steadily isolated and 
     diminished in their influence, legislating withdrawal of 
     reduction dates would invite heightened intransigence and 
     extremism.
       Additional factors that Congress should consider in 
     reviewing any such amendment are the following:
       Under the proposed amendment, command of the SFOR operation 
     and its element in

[[Page S9365]]

     MND-North might well be transferred to a non-US officer early 
     next year.
       Shifting to a posture in which the US has much smaller 
     force levels in Bosnia but enhances its force presence in 
     regions surrounding Bosnia, as envisioned by the amendment, 
     will not save money and indeed could cost more than our 
     current operation in Bosnia. We are continually evaluating 
     the force posture for Bosnia, and do not consider an over-
     the-horizon force appropriate now.
       Accordingly, we strongly urge you to oppose any legislated 
     fixed date or timetable for withdrawal or reduction of US 
     forces in Bosnia.
       There is one other factor related to operations in Bosnia 
     of great concern to us, and that is funding. The Department 
     submitted an addition to the FY99 budget to fund a 6,900-
     person force in Bosnia. Authorizing that request is essential 
     to accomplishing the mission without significantly reducing 
     readiness in other areas. Without that funding, we would have 
     to choose between Bosnia operations and the overall readiness 
     of our Armed Forces.
           Sincerely,
     Henry H. Shelton.
     Bill Cohen.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in Secretary Cohen and General Shelton's 
letter the Senator from Indiana just referred to, it is very important 
to understand what they are saying here:

       Under a legislated approach, military commanders will be 
     forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on 
     an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission 
     accomplishment, operational considerations and the fluid 
     tactical situation they face. In addition, while those 
     opposed to the Dayton Accords have been steadily isolated and 
     diminished in their influence, legislating withdrawal of 
     reduction dates would invite heightened intransigence and 
     extremism.

  So that is the view of the people to whom we entrust the care of our 
men and women in the military.
  I think it would be very appropriate to have a vigorous and, I think, 
illuminating debate on the issue of whether the troops should be there 
at all. Congress clearly has the right to cut off funding for any 
military operation anywhere in the world. But I see nowhere in the 
Constitution where we have the right to, indeed, decide the levels of 
troops that should be there. I pride myself on the fact that I had some 
time in the service of our country wearing a uniform, but no way does 
that give me the expertise or the knowledge to set a troop level. That 
responsibility is entrusted to our civilian and military commanders.
  So it is with reluctance, because I agree with the thrust of what 
Senator Hutchison is saying, Mr. President, I move to table the 
Hutchison amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to speak on this 
amendment before he moves to table?
  Mr. McCAIN. Absolutely.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator also allow others who said they 
would like to speak on this amendment to speak and then move to table?
  Mr. McCAIN. I do not intend that the request--I will allow the 
distinguished manager of the bill. It is nearly 5 o'clock. We have 50 
pending amendments.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to be able to close.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withdraw the motion to table?
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair needs to know whether the Senator 
has withdrawn his motion to table.
  Mr. McCAIN. I withdraw my motion to table and I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I was trying to condition that motion to table. I know 
Senator Byrd is one of the original cosponsors, Senator Hutchison also. 
But we do have to move along. I am a cosponsor also. But I do think we 
have to have some time limit.
  Would the Senator be willing to have some discussion as to a time 
when we might be able to vote?
  Mr. BYRD. I, first of all, wish to thank the distinguished Senator 
from Arizona for withholding his motion. I would probably need 25 
minutes.
  Mr. STEVENS. And how much time does the Senator want?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Senator Inhofe and Senator Sessions 
have both asked to speak for approximately 10 minutes each, and then I 
would like to close on my amendment with about 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Senator Inhofe said he does not wish to speak on the 
amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. He has gone to a meeting.
  Mr. President, I would like to put some time restraints on this, if 
we could. I would like to see if we could have the vote take place no 
later than quarter to 6.
  Could we have that agreement?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, a lot of us 
withheld speaking against this amendment, and I hope that maybe just 
the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, would speak and then all 
those who already spoke refrain from speaking again so people such as 
me don't feel compelled to stand up and respond. We are trying to get 
this done. Because the Senator from Arizona was kind enough to withhold 
his motion to table, I hope we could agree that after the Senator from 
West Virginia speaks, and maybe the Senator from Texas takes a couple 
minutes to close out, we then let the Senator move. It would be 
helpful.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska has the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would then ask unanimous consent that 
Senator Byrd be recognized, and the Senator from Texas have whatever 
time is remaining, and the Senator from Arizona be recognized to make 
his motion to table at 5:30. And it is with the understanding that if 
the amendment is not tabled, there is no agreement on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. After Senator Byrd speaks, I would be allowed at 
least 5 minutes to close?
  Mr. STEVENS. That leaves 10 minutes, I might say to the Senator, in 
her control; 25 minutes in the control of the Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. That will be fine. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
unanimous consent agreement is accepted.
  The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. STEVENS. Pardon me. The agreement is the Senator from Arizona 
will be recognized, is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is part of the unanimous consent 
agreement.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Has the agreement 
been entered into?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes, it has. Is the Senator from Michigan upset?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would like 5 minutes, if I could.
  Mr. STEVENS. On which amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. On the pending amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator has not spoken on the amendment.
  May I extend him another 5 minutes. We will vote, then--let's put 
that off. When that time has expired, I do want to ask unanimous 
consent that we then proceed to the Hutchinson amendment in the second 
degree to his amendment, and following that, there will be a vote. I 
understand there is an agreement so I don't think we need a time 
agreement. But I would ask that the time on this expire at 5:40 and 
that we then proceed to the Hutchinson amendment in the second degree--
there will be three comments about that amendment--and that we vote on 
both of those amendments at 6 o'clock.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, why didn't the Senator just 
leave it at 5:30 the way you had it? I think the Senator from Michigan 
may be willing to take, say, a minute.
  Mr. STEVENS. Very well. At 5:30 he gets a minute, and we will go 
back. We still want to have a vote on the two amendments at the same 
time. I will renew that request later.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, but I will 
not object, could I just inquire, did I understand the Senator to say 
that the second degree will be in order if the amendment is not tabled?
  Mr. STEVENS. If it is not tabled. There is no second-degree amendment 
available because the Senator from Arizona will be recognized to table 
at the end of these statements.
  Mr. COATS. If not tabled, the second degree--
  Mr. STEVENS. If not tabled, the second degree is still in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from West Virginia.

[[Page S9366]]

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank all Senators, and I, again, thank 
the distinguished Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, for 
offering this amendment regarding the continued participation of U.S. 
forces in the NATO operation in Bosnia. She has been a persistent and 
thorough overseer of the situation there. I share her concern that 
Bosnia not become another forgotten war, another long term military 
mission whose purpose and even existence is largely ignored, unremarked 
upon unless something terrible happens. In that unhappy event, of 
course, much shouting and finger-pointing would ensue, amid calls to 
``bring our boys home, now.''
  It is Congress's Constitutional duty to provide for the maintenance 
of the military, as we are doing in this bill, and that includes those 
instances in which U.S. troops are pressed into service. We have an 
obligation to the men and women in our military services not only to 
provide for them, but also to provide our concurrence and oversight on 
the ways and places that they are employed. I believe that that calls 
for something more compelling than Sense of Congress resolutions, such 
as those that have been passed, one that has been passed during the 
debate on the Department of Defense Authorization bill last month, but 
I recognize that, sadly, the majority of my colleagues do not share my 
opinion. So I applaud Senator Hutchison for steaming ahead on the 
strength of her convictions, despite the somewhat daunting odds.
  U.S. troops have been in Bosnia since the Dayton Peace Accords were 
signed in December 1995. Some 25,000 U.S. troops formed the U.S. 
contingent of the NATO-led force that replaced the failing United 
Nations peacekeeping effort there since 1992. The original mission of 
the NATO force was quite limited--to separate the warring factions, 
contain the heavy weapons that were bombarding defenseless towns and 
cities, and begin to mark the hazardous and indiscriminately strewn 
minefields so that civilians could take over the arduous task of 
clearing mines. The U.S. had to lead, because our European allies would 
not rally behind anyone else. This task, we were assured at that time, 
would take ``about one year.'' And that was in 1995.
  As that initial year drew to a close, the military tasks were 
declared essentially complete, and the situation on the ground was, 
indeed, transformed. While far from enjoying the kind of security that 
we in the United States take for granted, people could at least seek 
water without dodging shells and gunfire. The civilian efforts to 
reestablish Bosnian society, however, had barely begun. NATO leaders 
agreed to leave substantial numbers of troops in place to keep the 
peace while the civilian rebuilding effort continued. That is 
understandable. Again, the U.S., we were assured, must take the lead, 
because if we left, our European NATO allies would march out right 
behind us. We were told that the troops would be needed only through 
June 1998. That was in 1996.
  Now it is July 1998, almost August. We have been told that the 
considerable progress being made in rebuilding a government and 
civilian infrastructure requires the continued reassurance of a NATO 
peacekeeping force. Elections are scheduled for September, and more 
work needs to be done to establish a competent and impartial justice 
system that has the trust of the populace. Therefore, the 
Administration announced a substantial shift in U.S. policy on Bosnia 
in December 1997--there would be no further estimates regarding the end 
of a U.S. presence in Bosnia. The U.S. and NATO would leave when 
sufficient progress was made in achieving certain benchmarks. The 
complete and detailed benchmarks are classified, but the unclassified 
summary that I have seen is fairly lengthy. It basically says that when 
Bosnian government and institutions resemble those of the United 
States, then our troops might leave.
  Mr. President, that is a pretty big order. Bosnia has never 
previously resembled the United States, with free press, alternative 
media, free and fair multiparty elections, a clean and impartial 
judiciary, free access throughout the country, and so forth. For most 
of this century, Bosnia was part of communist Yugoslavia. Prior to 
that, it was part of a monarchy, and before that, it was part of the 
Ottoman Empire. This leads me to suspect that U.S. troops might be in 
Bosnia for a very long time, indeed, before Bosnia becomes a happy, 
peaceful, multi-ethnic republic. And this assumes, of course, that 
everyone in Bosnia shares this same aspiration, and that no one will 
try to undermine the progress towards this utopian vision.
  Now, Mr. President, I do not want to create the impression that I am 
against helping the suffering people of Bosnia to establish a sound 
government that can lead them into a peaceful and prosperous future in 
the family of nations. The amendment of the Senator from Texas, Mrs. 
Hutchison, also does not call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Bosnia. This amendment appreciates the investment that has been made 
for peace in Bosnia and does not jeopardize that still fragile 
situation, but it also recognizes the considerable costs of that 
investment.
  I believe that Senator Hutchison's effort addresses three very basic 
questions regarding the continuing role of U.S. forces in Bosnia. These 
are the questions:
  First, does this Senate really want to acquiesce to an open-ended 
commitment in Bosnia for the foreseeable future? The United States has 
spent $8.6 billion, or about $2 billion a year, to maintain our 
presence in Bosnia from Fiscal Year 1996 through Fiscal Year 1999. If 
you include the U.S. share of the United Nations operation in Bosnia 
from 1992 through 1995, the total cost is about $9.5 billion.
  That is a lot of money. That is $9.50 for every minute since Jesus 
Christ was born, 2,000 years ago. For every minute since Jesus Christ 
was born, 2,000 years ago, $9.50. For every minute. That is what it 
equals.
  This bill provides $1.86 billion for Bosnia operating costs for 
Fiscal Year 1999, under an emergency declaration.
  There are approximately 6700 troops inside Bosnia now, down from 
almost 10,000, and another 3,000 more are supporting them from bases in 
Hungary, Italy, and on ships in the Mediterranean. These troops and 
these funds are not available to meet other crises that might arise, 
such as that developing in Kosovo, and they are not available to 
protect U.S. core national security interests. Further, the support 
troops employed in this mission are drawn heavily from the Guard and 
Reserves, creating hardships for our part-time military and their 
employers. The President will need to request continued Reserve call-up 
authority in August to maintain the Bosnia operation. These readiness 
questions must be measured against the estimate of how many troops are 
needed to provide continued reassurance for civilian reconstruction in 
Bosnia--what is the minimum number of troops required to provide that 
reassurance? And for how long? And at what cost? Let us not be 
satisfied with the status quo, if a lower number is adequate or if a 
shorter time is sufficient. There are too many other demands being 
placed upon U.S. Armed Forces for us to be spendthrifts in this regard.
  Second, does the Senate wish to continue to allow the United States 
to be led by the reluctance of others? Must the United States continue 
to provide a substantially greater number of troops than any of the 
other NATO allies, as is now envisioned? If we cannot pass the baton of 
leadership because our European allies will not lead, then should we 
not at least push them into carrying an equal military burden for a 
situation that is, after all, on their borders, not on ours? I know 
that it is easier to be a follower than a leader, easier to be a critic 
rather than a playwright, but as the Bosnia operation settles into a 
routine, surely some of this burden could be assumed by our allies.
  Third, does the Senate want to abstain from placing limits on the 
role that U.S. forces should play in Bosnia? Or do we want to enhance 
the safety of the men and women we are supporting on the ground there 
by prohibiting them from performing the kinds of activities that put 
them in harm's way by making them appear to side with one ethnic group 
over another? NATO forces have played an increasing role in the capture 
of war criminals, and have taken over radio transmission towers linked 
with propaganda practices. A news story from early July reported that 
U.S. special operations teams

[[Page S9367]]

came very close to mounting a ``snatch and grab'' exercise designed to 
capture Serb military leaders before commanders on the ground declared 
that the intelligence was insufficient to ensure a reasonable chance of 
success. The longer we stay in Bosnia, and the more manpower we have to 
spare, the more such jobs we will be drawn into doing. It is the 
American way, to say, ``we'll pitch in.'' And we are suckers for the 
underdog. But that can be dangerous in a place as rife with centuries-
old animosities as Bosnia. These ethnic and religious factions know how 
to carry a grudge, how to nurse an injustice, through centuries if need 
be.
  With these questions in mind, consider the current situation in the 
Balkans, as Senator Hutchison has. Bosnia is relatively stable. No one 
is shooting at each other, and no one is shooting at the NATO forces. 
But, Kosovo, on its borders, is not stable. There, the situation is 
rapidly degenerating. Already more than 10,000 refugees have fled into 
neighboring Albania to seek refuge from Serbian dominated Yugoslav 
military forces who are ruthlessly squashing a separatist movement in 
ethnically Albanian Kosovo, which had been an autonomous region of 
Yugoslavia until 1989. The situation is complex and, frighteningly, 
contains the potential to draw in neighboring nations and even NATO 
members. This is the dreaded ``spillover'' that was much discussed when 
the ethnic conflagration in Bosnia erupted in 1992.
  NATO officials have already contemplated what forces might be 
necessary to contain the conflict in Kosovo. Even with over 20,000 
troops spread along the mountainous border between Kosovo and Albania, 
they concluded, the probability of success would be low. Air strikes 
are under consideration. Diplomatic efforts are ongoing, but the 
Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic has an unsavory history of playing 
both ends against the middle to achieve his goals.
  It is clear that the cost of maintaining a large presence in Bosnia 
could be fairly high if forces are needed to contain the conflict in 
Kosovo and keep it from engulfing a large part of the Balkans. Our NATO 
allies will happily continue to let the U.S. carry the heaviest load in 
addition to the burdens of leadership, if all it takes is to threaten 
to beat us through the exit door, should we decide to leave. To hear 
them say it, it would be quite a stampede, no matter what the 
consequences are for Bosnia and their own continent's future.
  The amendment offered by Senator Hutchison calls for a gradual 
ramping down of the U.S. presence in Bosnia, reducing our forces there 
to 5,000 by October 1, 1999, a number roughly equivalent to that of 
Britain, the next largest contributor to the NATO mission. The 
amendment of the Senator from Texas also limits the mission of those 
remaining forces to the security role assigned to them in 1995. This 
honors U.S. NATO commitments in Bosnia, protects our men and women in 
the military from being put in a position of playing favorites and 
therefore creating enemies, while freeing up troops, energy, and funds 
for other pressing security matters.
  The United States cannot continue to pick up the largest burden of 
every NATO military mission. While our allies have been reducing their 
military budgets and forces since the cold war ended, the United States 
military has been strained by the increasing number of calls to respond 
to crises around the world--in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq, Bosnia, 
and next, perhaps, in Kosovo. Our generosity in picking up the bulk of 
the tab has, I fear, marked us as a patsy, a patsy who can be suckered 
into bankrolling everyone's problems with funds and troops. If we keep 
doing it, what incentive is there for anyone else to develop the 
expertise, training, and tools to take over appropriate parts of that 
role?
  I wish that the administration would put its support behind this 
amendment. I think it would strengthen the administration's position in 
talking with our allies in Europe, and it would seem to me that would 
be a very beneficial thing, insofar as the administration is concerned.
  Mr. President, I believe that Senator Hutchison has offered a 
blueprint for the continued U.S. participation in Bosnia that supports 
our NATO commitment, even our leadership role, but not at the cost of 
maintaining a disproportionate force size. The most important thing we 
can do here today is to let the soldiers and airmen out there so far 
away know that we are watching, and that we care enough about them to 
act in their best interests. They are not America's forgotten heroes, 
out of sight and out of mind unless trouble comes their way. We are 
there with them, in thought and in deed, and we will not keep any more 
of them engaged in lengthy and lonely overseas deployments for any 
longer than is absolutely necessary. I will vote for the Hutchison 
amendment. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I want to say a couple things that I think are very important. I 
think this amendment is much more important than it may appear to some 
who probably will be casting their vote on it. We are a great Nation, 
the greatest Nation in the history of the world. This body, this 
Senate, has traditionally been involved in American foreign policy and 
American national defense. We are spending a very large sum of money on 
this mission which is ill-defined and provides little immediate benefit 
to our Nation. Other nations which have a far clearer and more direct 
interest in it are contributing far less to it.
  This mission has exceeded $10 billion, money which comes from the 
American taxpayers. We went through a BRAC process, a base-closing 
process of which the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Oklahoma, 
who is here today, are all quite aware. We saved $9 billion. We spent 
more than that already on Bosnia, an operation that has very little 
vision. The President has articulated very poorly and inadequately, in 
my opinion, any justification for an extended mission with no end in 
sight.
  As the President said in remarks earlier, it was a political decision 
to move into this area of the world. Therefore, it is a decision quite 
appropriate for this body to respond to. I say it is time for us to 
confront the issue, demand some answers, require the President to be 
responsible, and assert our rightful role as a U.S. Senate in American 
national defense. I am, frankly, disappointed that a Senator would move 
to table and cut off debate on this issue.
  I think we ought to say a lot more about it, and we ought to have a 
lot of time talking about it, not be cutting off this debate. Maybe 
some of them have made up their minds, they think they know what is 
best for everybody else here, but I am not so certain they do. So I 
don't know.
  I do not have much time. I know others do. And we are going to have 
the vote on the motion to table shortly. And I just feel very strongly 
about it. We have a role in this world, not to be the policemen. We 
have ballistic missile defense. We have chemical, biological weapons. 
We have strategic capabilities that we must fulfill. We cannot just 
drift into this without a clear understanding of our mission.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I yield up to 3 minutes to the Senator 
from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Texas for yielding the time. It 
is very precious time. There isn't nearly time to get into the 
seriousness of this issue. The Senator from Alabama is exactly right, 
there is no issue before this body that is more significant than this 
particular issue.
  We have stood here and debated this at least once a month since 
November of 1995. If I could criticize the Senator from Texas, I would 
say this isn't strong enough. But I know she knows it is not strong 
enough either. We should have a date. We should be out of there. And it 
isn't being hardhearted, it isn't being uncompassionate.
  This is something where the times are different now than they were 
back in 1995. If you just look at a very recent development, the 
Rumsfeld report came out. And if you will remember,

[[Page S9368]]

the national intelligence estimate that came out in 1995, that said we 
would have a good 3 years' warning, in 3 years, to participate in 
preparing for a national missile defense system. Now the Rumsfeld 
report has come out and said that isn't true at all, that we are out of 
time, we are naked--if we started today to deploy a system and put it 
into effect, we would not be able to do it.
  What has that got to do with Bosnia? It is very simple, because in 
Bosnia right now they are using up our military assets to the extent 
that we are not able to carry out the minimum expectations of the 
American people, which would be to defend America on two regional 
fronts.
  If you do not believe this, go to the 21st TACOM in Germany. They are 
responsible for the ground support, anything that will happen in that 
theater. That theater includes Iraq. That means that if something 
should happen, we should have to surgically strike Iraq--I do not think 
there is a person in America who does not believe that is a 
possibility--we would eventually have to go in on the ground and clean 
it up.
  How do you do that? If you go to the 21st TACOM in Germany, they will 
say we are right now over 100 percent capacity in just supporting 
Bosnia. We have M-915 trucks that have a million miles on them right 
now trying to carry the support over there and support Bosnia on the 
ground. Until we are able to get that out, we are not going to be able 
to adequately meet the defense needs.
  I hope that you read, Mr. President, just in this morning's Inside 
the Pentagon: ``The Navy's ability to retain its carrier aviators has 
hit its lowest historical annual rate. . . .''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thought I had 3 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We believe the time allocated to the Senator 
was 2 minutes. If it was 3, the Senator may continue.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I had 10 minutes. I authorized up to 3 minutes for 
Senator Sessions and up to 3 for the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may continue.
  Mr. INHOFE. I will wrap up real quickly. I think the point is here in 
today's report. We talk about the fact that only 27 eligible carrier 
pilots had applied for the ACP agreements. The minimum expectation of 
the Navy was 82. That means that approximately one-third are re-upping 
for this particular duty.
  It costs $6 million to put a new pilot in the seat of an F-16. We are 
at the lowest retention rate in the history of America. And if you look 
at the exits surveys, they will say it is not because of pay, it is 
because of the type of operation they are having to do to support 
Bosnia. And they are unable to carry out the red flag training and all 
the serious training that would be necessary should we have to send 
them into combat.
  So I do support this. I would like a much stronger amendment than 
this, but I would certainly support--this is the best thing out there.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas--the Chair would advise 
we have restored the time taken in discussing the misallocation of time 
back to the Senator. The Senator now has 4 minutes remaining.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I will withhold until the Senator from Michigan uses his time that 
was allocated, and then I will finish.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand I have been allocated 1 
minute. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment would set arbitrary dates 
for reductions of troops. It runs smack against the advice of our top 
military officials, both uniformed and civilian.
  In a letter which has been quoted by a number of Senators, including 
the Senator occupying the Chair, General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, 
on May 21, told us the following:

       Under a legislated approach, military commanders would be 
     forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on 
     an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission 
     accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid 
     tactical situation they face.

  Mr. President, that is why military commanders, including our top 
commander, oppose this amendment. That is why General Shelton opposes 
this amendment. It is why Secretary Cohen opposes this amendment. It 
would be mandating an arbitrary date for a troop reduction. That 
jeopardizes the well-being of our forces in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I want to talk about a number of provisions in the 
amendment with which I disagree.
  First of all, I want to correct an impression that I believe is 
created by the findings in this amendment. The findings imply that 
Congress has not played any role nor exercised its oversight authority 
since U.S. forces were first deployed to Bosnia. I would remind my 
colleagues of the provisions that were included in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 and the National Defense 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Those Acts required the 
President to certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed forces 
in Bosnia, after June 30, 1998, is required in order to meet the 
national security interests of the United States and that it is the 
policy of the United States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, 
or be used as, civil police in Bosnia. It also required the President 
to submit to Congress a report on why the U.S. armed forces' presence 
in Bosnia was in the U.S. national security interests, the expected 
duration of such deployment, the mission and objectives of the U.S. 
armed forces, the exit strategy of such forces, and a number of other 
matters.
  The President submitted the required certifications and report to 
Congress on March 3, 1998. In detailing the exit strategy for U.S. 
forces, the report contained 10 benchmarks that were the goal of the 
NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia. The report stated that ``These 
benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their achievement will 
enable the international community to rely largely on traditional 
diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives and 
disincentives, confidence-building measures, and negotiation to 
continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term.'' I ask 
unanimous consent that the 10 benchmarks from the President's March 3, 
1998 report to Congress be printed in the Record immediately following 
my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Those 10 benchmarks, however, were established 
unilaterally by the Administration and were not shared with or agreed 
upon by our NATO allies. Accordingly, I offered an amendment when the 
Senate was considering the emergency supplemental bill at the end of 
March. That amendment, which was accepted and eventually became part of 
the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, urged the 
President to seek concurrence among the NATO members on the ten 
benchmarks, on estimated target dates for achieving the benchmarks, and 
on a process for NATO to review progress towards achieving the 
benchmarks. It also required the President to submit to Congress a 
report on these matters by June 30, 1998 and semiannually thereafter so 
long as U.S. ground combat forces remain in the Stabilization Force in 
Bosnia.
  Mr. President, two days ago the President submitted that report as 
required by the amendment to the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescissions Act. That report advises that benchmarks parallel to ours 
have been incorporated in NATO's Operation Plan or OPLAN for the post-
June 1998 mission in Bosnia. The OPLAN requires SFOR to develop 
detailed criteria for each of those benchmarks, to be approved by the 
North Atlantic Council.
  The President's report also advises that the NATO allies agreed on 
June 10 to the United States' proposal that the NATO military 
authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for 
the implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton 
Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. During his testimony before 
the Armed Services Committee on June 4, General Wes Clark, NATO's 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, stated that the development and 
approval of the criteria and estimated

[[Page S9369]]

target dates should take two or three months.
  The President's report further advises that the benchmark criteria 
will be used during NATO's regular six-month review of the Bosnia 
mission in December. The President added that, although not required by 
the amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Steering 
Board of the Peace Implementation Council has included language that 
corresponds to the benchmarks in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9. 
The Peace Implementation Council also called on the High Representative 
to submit a report on the progress being made in meeting those goals by 
mid-September. This means that both General Shinseki, the NATO on-scene 
commander, and High Representative Westendorp, the international 
community's senior civilian in Bosnia, will be using the same framework 
and that the North Atlantic Council will have the benefit of the 
judgment of both of these officials.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President's July 28, 
1998 report to Congress be printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See 
Exhibit 2)
  Mr. LEVIN. Finally on this point, I would note that the Senate 
adopted an amendment during its consideration of the Defense 
Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 1999 that expressed the sense of 
Congress that, among other things, stated that the President should 
work with our NATO allies to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from 
Bosnia within a reasonable period of time, consistent with the safety 
of those forces and the accomplishment of SFOR's military tasks. That 
amendment passed by a vote of 90-5 on June 24--a little more than a 
month ago.
  Mr. President, I thought that it was important to get that 
information on the record to correct any impression that Congress has 
not paid attention to the participation of U.S. military forces in the 
NATO-led force in Bosnia. But it is far more important, in my view, to 
focus on the other sections of the amendment, particularly the 
mandatory reduction of U.S. ground elements from Bosnia to a level of 
6,500 by February 2, 1999, and 5,000 by October 1, 1999.
  First, I think it would be useful to put the size of the U.S. 
contingent in Bosnia in perspective. It should be noted that the United 
States provided about 20,000 of NATO's Implementation Force in 1996--or 
about 33 percent of the total force. Up until approximately June of 
this year, the United States provided about 8,500 troops to NATO's 
Stabilization Force--or about 25 percent of the total force. By 
September of this year, the United States will provide about 6,900 
troops--or about 22 percent of the total force. So the percentage of 
the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led force has been declining over 
time--from 33 to 25 to 22 percent.
  The amendment before us, however, would use the power of the purse to 
reduce the number of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia by another 400 by 
February 2 of next year and then by an additional 1,500 by October 1 of 
next year. That is the main purpose and impact of this amendment. That 
is also what makes this amendment unacceptable to the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should make 
it unacceptable to us. When the Armed Services Committee was 
considering a series of amendments during its markup of the Defense 
Authorization bill earlier this year, we sought the views of the 
Department of Defense. Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, in their 
letter of May 21, 1998, gave us their views and I would like to quote 
from a few parts of their letter:

       We write to express our concerns with any amendment that 
     would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or 
     reduction of US forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. 
     Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish 
     the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and 
     progress toward the benchmarks we have established, and we 
     expect further reductions will be possible. But that 
     determination is best based on the actual situation on the 
     ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field, 
     and the approval of the NATO military and political 
     authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction dates 
     determined long in advance.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Under a legislated approach, military commanders would be 
     forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on 
     an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission 
     accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid 
     tactical situation they face.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the May 21, 1998 letter 
from Secretary Cohen and General Shelton be printed in the Record 
following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it so ordered. (See Exhibit 
1)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton said it 
well. I agree with them--Congress should not mandate troop reduction by 
arbitrary dates.
  Mr. President, I also disagree with other sections of this amendment 
dealing with exceptions to the mandated drawdown and limitations on 
support for law enforcement activities in Bosnia.
  Finally, I would note that the Statement on Administration Policy 
states that the President's senior advisors would recommend veto of 
this bill if it contains a provision that would prescribe a arbitrarily 
scheduled force drawdown in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, for all these reasons I will vote against this 
amendment and I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment as 
well.

                               Exhibit 1

                             Ten Benchmarks

       1. The Dayton cease-fire remains in place, supported by 
     mechanisms for military-to-military transparency and 
     cooperation.
       2. Police in both entities are restructured, re-integrated, 
     re-trained and equipped in accordance with democratic 
     standards.
       3. An effective judicial reform program is in place.
       4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions (e.g. Herceg Bosnia, 
     Strategic Reserve Office, Centreks and Selek Impeks) are 
     dissolved and revenue and disbursement mechanisms under 
     control of legitimately elected officials.
       5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic 
     standards; independent/alternative media are available 
     throughout B-H.
       6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic 
     standards, and results are implemented.
       7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and 
     banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal 
     barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated.
       8. A phased and orderly minority return process is 
     functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having 
     accepted significant returns.
       9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning 
     and a secure environment for returns is established.
       10. The Parties are cooperating with ICTY in the arrest and 
     prosecution of war criminals.
       These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their 
     achievement will enable the international community to rely 
     largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil 
     personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence-
     building measures, and negotiation to continue implementing 
     the Dayton Accords over the longer term.

                               Exhibit 2

     To the Congress of the United States:
       Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing 
     this report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to meet 
     the goals set forth therein.
       With my certification to the Congress of March 3, 1998, I 
     outlined ten conditions--or benchmarks--under which Dayton 
     implementation can continue without the support of a major 
     NATO-led military force. Section 7 of Public Law 105-174 
     urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on: (1) the 
     bench-marks set forth with the March 3 certification; (2) 
     estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks; and 
     (3) a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving 
     those benchmarks. NATO has agreed to move ahead in all these 
     areas.
       First, NATO agreed to benchmarks parallel to ours on May 28 
     as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
     military plan (OPLAN 10407). Furthermore, the OPLAN requires 
     SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of these 
     benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, 
     which will provide a more specific basis to evaluate 
     progress. SFOR will develop the benchmark criteria in 
     coordination with appropriate international civilian 
     agencies.
       Second, with regard to timelines, the United States 
     proposed that NATO military authorities provide an estimate 
     of the time likely to be required for implementation of the 
     military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based 
     on the benchmark criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on 
     June 10. As SACEUR General Wes Clark testified before the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, the development and 
     approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should 
     take 2 to 3 months.
       Third, with regard to a review process, NATO will continue 
     the 6-month review process that began with the deployment of 
     the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, 
     incorporating the benchmarks and

[[Page S9370]]

     detailed criteria. The reviews will include an assessment of 
     the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the 
     parties with the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress 
     against the benchmark criteria being developed by SFOR, 
     recommendations on any changes in the level of support to 
     civilian agencies, and recommendations on any other changes 
     to the mission and tasks of the force.
       While not required under Public Law 105-174, we have sought 
     to further utilize this framework of benchmarks and criteria 
     for Dayton implementation among civilian implementation 
     agencies. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
     Council (PIC) adopted the same framework in its Luxembourg 
     declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as 
     the civilian implementation agenda for the next 6 months, now 
     includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks in the 
     March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR OPLAN. 
     In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High 
     Representative to submit a report on the progress made in 
     meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be 
     considered in the NATO 6-month review process.
       The benchmark framework, now approved the military and 
     civilian implementers, is clearly a better approach than 
     setting a fixed, arbitrary end date to the mission. This 
     process will produce a clear picture of where intensive 
     efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-
     sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina for which 
     a major international military force will no longer be 
     necessary. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines 
     can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who 
     would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Realistic 
     target dates, combined with concerted use of incentives, 
     leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain 
     the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an 
     enduring peace. While the benchmark process will be useful as 
     a tool both to promote and review the pace of Dayton 
     implementation, the estimated target dates established will 
     be notional, and their attainment dependent upon a complex 
     set of interdependent factors.
       We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed 
     upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The 
     continuing 6-month reviews of the status of implementation 
     will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with 
     Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated 
     timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent 
     reports submitted pursuant to Public Law 105-174. I look 
     forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing 
     U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
                                               William J. Clinton,
                                   The White House, July 28, 1998.

                               Exhibit 3


                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, May 21, 1998.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Carl: We write to express our concerns with any 
     amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for 
     withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led 
     mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more 
     difficult to accomplish the mission, which has been 
     remarkably successful to date.
       It is our intention to reduce our forces in Bosnia. Based 
     on the progress achieved to date, our commanders already have 
     been able to reduce U.S. troop levels from almost 20,000 in 
     1996 to the 6,900 that will be deployed after the current 
     drawdown is completed in September. We will conduct regular 
     reviews of our force posture and progress toward the 
     benchmarks we have established, and we expect further 
     reductions will be possible. But that determination is best 
     based on the actual situation on the ground, the military 
     advice of our commanders in the field, and the approval of 
     the NATO military and political authorities, not an arbitrary 
     withdrawal or reduction dates determined long in advance.
       Our military commanders in the field have determined the 
     level and type of force required to carry out the mission 
     within acceptable risk. The mission, forces and guidance of 
     the force currently planned for June 1998 have been fully 
     agreed to by NATO political and military authorities. Under a 
     legislated approach, military commanders would be forced to 
     restructure their force and mission tasks based on an 
     arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission 
     accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid 
     tactical situation they face. In addition, while those 
     opposed to the Dayton Accords have been steadily isolated and 
     diminished in their influence, legislating withdrawal of 
     reduction dates would invite heightened intransigence and 
     extremism.
       Additional factors that Congress should consider in 
     reviewing any such amendment are the following:
       Under the proposed amendment, command of the SFOR operation 
     and its element in MND-North might well be transferred to a 
     non-U.S. officer early next year.
       Shifting to a posture in which the U.S. has much smaller 
     force levels in Bosnia but enhances its force presence in 
     regions surrounding Bosnia, as envisioned by the amendment, 
     will not save money and indeed could cost more than our 
     current operation in Bosnia. We are continually evaluating 
     the force posture for Bosnia, and do not consider an over-
     the-horizon force appropriate now.
       Accordingly, we strongly urge you to oppose any legislated 
     fixed date or timetable for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. 
     forces in Bosnia.
       There is one other factor related to operations in Bosnia 
     of great concern to us, and that is funding. The Department 
     submitted an addition to the FY99 budget to fund a 6,900-
     person force in Bosnia. Authorizing that request is essential 
     to accomplishing the mission without significantly reducing 
     readiness in other areas. Without that funding, we would have 
     to choose between Bosnia operations and the overall readiness 
     of our Armed Forces.
           Sincerely,
     Henry H. Shelton.
     Bill Cohen.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma, the Senator from 
Alabama, the Senator from West Virginia, who have all made very strong 
statements about their commitment and the commitment of Congress to 
support our troops. It is our responsibility to do this.
  I want to answer a couple of points that were made. Somalia--the 
argument was made that troops were not provided equipment and we lost 
18 rangers. That is exactly correct. I would hold up Somalia as the 
very reason that we should be doing something today to protect our 
troops in the field--because, in fact, in Somalia Congress was never 
consulted. The decision not to send the equipment was made by the 
Pentagon. It is precisely because Congress was not consulted and was 
not committed to this that it failed so miserably. The mission creep in 
Somalia is exactly what we are trying to avoid in Bosnia today. And 
that is why I have this amendment on the floor.
  Let us talk about precedent. On July 31, 1989, there was a resolution 
requiring the President to reduce the number of U.S. forces in Korea. 
That is exactly what I would hope that we would do today. Nine years 
ago, almost to the day, Congress met its responsibility. This was an 
amendment that specifically asked the President to come forward with a 
plan to have gradual reductions in the number of U.S. military 
personnel stationed in the Republic of Korea.
  This is exactly what we are doing today. We are saying, in this 
appropriations bill for this fiscal year, that we should reduce the 
number of forces so that the President can go to our allies and start 
negotiating for a more equitable spread. That is exactly what we did in 
Korea.
  With Korea we said, ``The Republic of Korea should assume increased 
responsibilities for its own security.'' This was an amendment that was 
sponsored by Senator McCain, Senator Nunn, Senator Warner, Senator 
Exxon, Senator Dixon, Senator Wirth, Senator Shelby, Senator Thurmond, 
Senator Cohen, Senator Wallop, Senator Gorton, Senator Lott, and 
Senator Coats.
  This is exactly what I hope we will do today. It is the 
responsibility of Congress to provide support for our troops. We cannot 
stand by and watch our military disintegrate, lose our most experienced 
warriors, put them in harm's way, and do nothing.
  Have we lost our backbone in 9 years? Or have we lost our compass? 
Have we lost the will to do what is right for this country?
  Congress is responsible for providing the support for our troops. And 
I hope that we will meet our responsibility today.
  Thank you, Mr. President. And I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Nearing the moment, I think, according to the previous 
unanimous consent agreement, for me to make a motion to table, I would 
just like to make one quick point.
  Back several years ago, in 1990, I was speaking in support of an 
amendment--in support of the Bush administration, the President of the 
United States, not in opposition. And it was a peacetime deployment to 
Korea, a rearrangement of forces, not the situation in Bosnia. An 
important factor is, I was supporting the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of Defense.
  The Hutchison amendment is in opposition to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, as well as the President 
of the

[[Page S9371]]

United States. I think there is a significant difference there.

  Second, one of the Members came to the floor and said that we need to 
debate this more. As the Senator from Indiana pointed out, this is the 
same amendment we voted on last May; basically, fundamentally the same 
thing. We did have lots of debate on it.
  As the distinguished chairman of the committee pointed out, we have 
50 or 60 amendments that we need to address between tonight and 
tomorrow, all of which deserve also very thorough debate and 
discussion, as well, if we expect to get out at a reasonable timeframe 
either tomorrow or Saturday or Sunday, as the distinguished chairman 
and ranking member point out.
  The hour of 5:30 having arrived, I move to table the Hutchison 
amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. I want to announce, there appears there now is a second-
degree amendment to the Hutchison amendment that could be offered and 
may settle the issue with regard to the previous amendment which was 
not tabled.


                Amendment No. 3419 to Amendment No. 3124

  Therefore, I ask unanimous consent the Senate now turn to the 
Hutchinson amendment in the second-degree and that there be a short 
period of debate. Can you tell me how long you think it will take?
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think the amendment has been agreed to and would 
not need debate, from my standpoint.
  Mr. STEVENS. I think we should have at least 10 minutes equally 
divided between the Senator from Arkansas and the Senators from 
Michigan and Delaware, and I am informed it will require a rollcall 
vote.
  I ask unanimous consent there be that period now for 10 minutes on 
this amendment that Senator Hutchinson will offer, and following that 
time that the rollcall on his amendment take place after the rollcall 
vote on the motion to table that has just been made by the Senator from 
Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in 
order for me to offer an a second-degree amendment numbered 3419, and I 
send that amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Hutchinson], for himself and 
     Mr. Levin, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Biden and Mr. Lieberman proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3419 to amendment 3124.

  The amendment is as follows:
       Strike all after the word ``Title'' and insert the 
     following:

                                   IX

                         HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

                 Subtitle A--Forced Abortions in China

       Sec. 9001. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Forced 
     Abortion Condemnation Act''.
       Sec. 9002. Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime 
     against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
       (2) For over 15 years there have been frequent and credible 
     reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization in 
     connection with the population control policies of the 
     People's Republic of China. These reports indicate the 
     following:
       (A) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of 
     the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced 
     sterilization have no role in the population control program, 
     in fact the Communist Chinese Government encourages both 
     forced abortion and forced sterilization through a 
     combination of strictly enforced birth quotas and immunity 
     for local population control officials who engage in 
     coercion. Officials acknowledge that there have been 
     instances of forced abortions and sterilization, and no 
     evidence has been made available to suggest that the 
     perpetrators have been punished.
       (B) People's Republic of China population control 
     officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit 
     officials, routinely monitor women's menstrual cycles and 
     subject women who conceive without government authorization 
     to extreme psychological pressure, to harsh economic 
     sanctions, including unpayable fines and loss of employment, 
     and often to physical force.
       (C) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized 
     children include fines in amounts several times larger than 
     the per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's 
     Republic of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine 
     is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual income. 
     Families which cannot pay the fine may be subject to 
     confiscation and destruction of their homes and personal 
     property.
       (D) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on 
     those whose resistance is motivated by religion. For example, 
     according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the 
     Catholic inhabitants of 2 villages in Hebei Province were 
     subjected to population control under the slogan ``better to 
     have more graves than one more child''. Enforcement measures 
     included torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of 
     resisters' relatives as hostages.
       (E) Forced abortions in Communist China often have taken 
     place in the very late stages of pregnancy.
       (F) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization have been 
     used in Communist China not only to regulate the number of 
     children, but also to eliminate those who are regarded as 
     defective in accordance with the official eugenic policy 
     known as the ``Natal and Health Care Law''.
       Sec. 9003. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Secretary of State may not utilize any funds appropriated 
     or otherwise available for the Department of State for fiscal 
     year 1999 to issue any visa to any official of any country 
     (except the head of state, the head of government, and 
     cabinet level ministers) who the Secretary finds, based on 
     credible and specific information, has been directly involved 
     in the establishment or enforcement of population control 
     policies forcing a woman to undergo an abortion against her 
     free choice, or forcing a man or woman to undergo 
     sterilization against his or her free choice policies 
     condoning the practice of genital mutilation.
       (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Attorney General may not utilize any funds appropriated or 
     otherwise available for the Department of Justice for fiscal 
     year 1999 to admit to the United States any national covered 
     by subsection (a).
       (c) The President may waive the prohibition in subsection 
     (a) or (b) if the President--
       (1) determines that it is in the national interest of the 
     United States to do so; and
       (2) provides written notification to Congress containing a 
     justification for the waiver.

                Subtitle B--Freedom on Religion in China

       Sec. 9011. (a) It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President should make freedom of religion one of the major 
     objectives of United States foreign policy with respect to 
     China.
       (b) As part of this policy, the Department of State should 
     raise in every relevant bilateral and multilateral forum the 
     issue of individuals imprisoned, detained, confined, or 
     otherwise harassed by the Chinese Government on religious 
     grounds.
       (c) In its communications with the Chinese Government, the 
     Department of State should provide specific names of 
     individuals of concern and request a complete and timely 
     response from the Chinese Government regarding the 
     individuals' whereabouts and condition, the charges against 
     them, and sentence imposed.
       (d) The goal of these official communications should be the 
     expeditious release of all religious prisoners in China and 
     Tibet and the end of the Chinese Government's policy and 
     practice of harassing and repressing religious believers.
       Sec. 9012. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Secretary of State may not utilize any funds appropriated 
     or otherwise available for the Department of State for fiscal 
     year 1999 to issue a visa to any official of any country 
     (except the head of state, the head of government, and 
     cabinet level ministers) who the Secretary of State finds, 
     based on credible and specific information, has been directly 
     involved in the establishment or enforcement of policies or 
     practices designed to restrict religious freedom.
       (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Attorney General may not utilize any funds appropriated or 
     otherwise available for the Department of Justice for fiscal 
     year 1999 to admit to the United States any national covered 
     by subsection (a).
       (c) The President may waive the prohibition in subsection 
     (a) or (b) with respect to an individual described in such 
     subsection if the President--
       (1) determines that it is vital to the national interest to 
     do so; and
       (2) provides written notification to the appropriate 
     congressional committees containing a justification for the 
     waiver.
       Sec. 9014. In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives.

  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I want to express my appreciation to 
the Senators on the other side of the aisle who, I think, have made 
very positive and productive suggestions to improve the amendment that 
I have offered regarding human rights abuses in China.
  The simple explanation for the changes that are made, we have made 
the bill generic in nature rather than country-specific. I have some 
reservations about that because I don't want to in any way dilute, I 
think, the proper attention that should be placed upon what our State 
Department says is the greatest abusers of human rights in the

[[Page S9372]]

world today. But at the same time, I think this makes this a very, very 
powerful human rights amendment applicable to all nations of the world. 
The ``finding'' section of the amendment remains in which we are able 
to outline some of the abuses evident in China today.
  We would add, I think, a positive suggestion, that the genital 
mutilation issue be added. So in addition to religious persecution and 
forced abortions, genital mutilation and those who would condone it 
would be added as criteria for those countries that would be denied 
their visas for those condoning that practice, the terrible practice 
that human rights advocates the world over and all people, I think, 
condemn.
  I want to thank Senator Biden for, I think, some very good 
suggestions regarding the ``definitions'' area on the Secretary's 
obligations in determining who would be denied these visas. The 
addition to the phrase ``credible information,'' adding ``and specific 
information,'' and adding to the phrase ``has been involved in the 
establishment or enforcement,'' the word ``directly''; so, ``has been 
directly involved in the establishment or enforcement of population 
control policies.'' I think that is a very helpful change that will 
make this much more enforceable and make it much more clear. I am 
grateful for that suggestion, as well.
  We have struck section 9012, which simply lists a number of 
associations and organizations which are agents of the government in 
carrying out some of these abuses. It is really unnecessary, an 
unnecessary provision that has caused confusion, because anyone, any 
individual, any official, who is involved in perpetrating persecution 
of religious minorities, coerced abortions or the genital mutilation 
would be covered by the amendment, without what is really extraneous 
language and unnecessary language.
  So I think these are all very positive changes and that is the 
content of the second-degree amendment. I think this is relevant. I 
think it is a very positive improvement to the appropriations bill. I 
appreciate the support of those on both sides of the aisle in the 
defeat of the motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. I want to thank the 
Senator from Arkansas. He has been a gentleman.
  His amendment is, I think, a good amendment and I thank him for 
considering some of the suggestions that I and a few others had.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin of Michigan, Senator Kerry 
of Massachusetts and Senator Biden of Delaware be added as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I particularly want to thank my friend from 
Arkansas for adding the prohibition, the ability to deny visas to those 
countries that engage in the heinous practice of engaging in female 
genital mutilation. I am not one who thinks we should be erecting 
sanctions all over the world, but there are certain things that are so, 
so contrary to our basic values--forced abortion, forced sterilization, 
mutilation of body parts--that I think that it is appropriate that we 
use sanctions in those circumstances.
  I also ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Connecticut, 
Senator Lieberman, be added as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. I realize I have a few more minutes, but in order to 
accommodate this bill moving along, again, I close by thanking the 
Senator from Arkansas for accommodating some of the changes that he has 
for his amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from 
Michigan is on his way.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me commend the Senator from Arkansas 
for the second-degree amendment, the modification in effect, which he 
has sent to the desk.
  I reluctantly voted to table his original amendment because I was 
troubled by his narrow focus on one country, when the problem exists 
not only in China, but a number of other countries. The problems he 
identifies in his amendment are real problems and they are problems we 
must be concerned with. He has shown that concern, and I think it is 
wise that we reflect the concern relating to people engaging in those 
practices that come from any country--China or anyplace else. And while 
I reluctantly voted to table his original amendment, the first-degree 
amendment, for the reason I just gave, I enthusiastically cosponsored 
the second-degree amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, and I hope it 
passes with a resounding vote.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time on the second-degree 
amendment? Time will be equally divided.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I now have before me here a managers' 
package that lists some 33 amendments. Following the next two votes, I 
intend to ask that no more amendments be in order. I urge Members to 
come and look at the list and see if their amendment is here. If there 
are more, fine. I urge Members to let us know if they intend to offer 
the amendments shown here. Secondly, if they intend to offer any other 
amendment, I am pleased to have them do that.
  Mr. President, as I understand it, the first vote will be on a motion 
to table offered by the Senator from Arizona, and the second will be 
the amendment in the second degree offered by the Senator from 
Arkansas.
  I ask for the yeas and nays on the second-degree amendment of the 
Senator from Arkansas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. If the pending motion to table is not carried, that 
amendment will still be open. If the amendment of the Senator from 
Arkansas passes in the second degree, I intend to ask that the--are the 
yeas and nays requested on the Senator's original amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Only on the motion to table the original 
amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Very well. If that is adopted, which I urge the Senate 
to adopt, then we will move to adopt the original amendment, as 
amended, with a voice vote. I call for the vote.


                           Amendment No. 3413

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back?
  Mr. STEVENS. I yield back any time I have left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table the amendment of the Senator from Texas.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is absent because of illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
North Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 68, nays 31, as follows:

                     [Rollcall Vote No. 249 Leg.] 

                                YEAS--68

     Abraham 
     Akaka 
     Baucus 
     Bennett 
     Biden 
     Bingaman 
     Boxer 
     Breaux 
     Brownback 
     Bryan 
     Bumpers 
     Burns
     Chafee 
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     D'Amato 
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Feinstein 
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings 
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry 
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman 
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun 
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller 
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Torricelli 
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--31

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coverdell 

[[Page S9373]]


     Craig
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Frist
     Gorton 
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison 
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Santorum
     Sessions 
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Helms
       
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 3413) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 
seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I failed to ask that Senator Feinstein of 
California be added as a cosponsor to the Hutchinson amendment. I ask 
unanimous consent she be added.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                             Change of Vote

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, on rollcall vote No. 249. I voted ``yea.'' 
It was my intention to vote ``no.'' Therefore, I ask unanimous consent 
that I be permitted to change my vote. This will in no way change the 
outcome of the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The foregoing tally has been changed to reflect the above order.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I believe the Senator from Delaware wished to be 
recognized for just one minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has been recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. He has been?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 3419

  Mr. STEVENS. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent the Senator 
from Virginia, Mr. Robb, be added as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the second-
degree amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas. The yeas and 
nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is absent because of illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
North Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``aye.''
  The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

                     [Rollcall Vote No. 250 Leg.]  

                               YEAS--99 

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett 
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan 
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats 
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato 
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi 
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn 
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel 
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe 
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey 
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin 
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski 
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles 
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum 
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR) 
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond 
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden 

                             NOT VOTING--1 

       
     Mr. Helms
       
  The amendment (No. 3419) was agreed to. 
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                 Vote on Amendment No. 3124, As Amended

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask for the immediate consideration of 
the first-degree amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question 
before the Senate is on the underlying amendment No. 3124, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 3124), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we have now exchanged lists. We have a 
managers' package which we will present in a moment. We have the two 
lists now from the two sides of the aisle.
  I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be the only 
first-degree amendments remaining in order, other than the managers' 
package, and that they be subject to only relevant second-degree 
amendments:

       D'Amato--Air Guard, Coast Guard Search & Rescue.
       Faircloth--Spend Fiscal Year 1998 fund (PFNA).
       DeWine--Drug interdiction.
       Mack--Electronic combat testing.
       Santorum--60mm mortar ?.
       Mack--Commercial Space Act.
       D'Amato G.Smith--Sanctions--Serbia/Montenegro.
       Coats--Sense of Senate.
       Coats--Next QDR.
       Stevens--relevant.
       Frist--LME.
       Baucus--Bear Paw development canal (20=divided).
       Bingaman--Dual use.
       Bingaman--White Sands.
       Bingaman--Health centers.
       Boxer--Relevant.
       Bumpers--Relevant.
       Byrd--Relevant.
       Byrd--Relevant.
       Daschle--Relevant.
       Daschle--Relevant.
       Daschle--Relevant.
       Dodd--Army pensions.
       Dodd--Lyme disease.
       Dodd--Relevant.
       Durbin--Land conveyance.
       Durbin--Military operations/war powers.
       Dorgan--Indian incentive program.
       Dorgan--Relevant.
       Ford--National Symphony.
       Graham--Land transfer.
       Graham--Relevant.
       Graham--Space.
       Harkin--Outlays.
       Harkin--P.O.O.
       Harkin--Veterans medals.
       Harkin--Gulf war illness research.
       Harkin--Smoking funding.
       Hollings--Environmental report.
       Inouye--Manager's amendment.
       Inouye--Manager's amendment.
       Inouye--Manager's amendment
       Kerrey--Sense of Senate on payroll tax.
       Kerry--Relevant.
       Kerry--Relevant.
       Leahy--JSAT.
       Reed--Environmental training.
       Robb--Reimbursement for Italy accident.
       Wellstone--Child soldiers.
       Wellstone--Domestic violence.
       Wellstone--Relevant.

  Mr. STEVENS. I further ask unanimous consent that following 
disposition of the listed amendments, the bill be advanced to third 
reading and the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of the 
House companion bill; that all after the enacting clause be stricken 
and the text of S. 2132, as amended, be inserted; and that the bill be 
advanced to third reading and passage occur without any further action 
or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, as I 
understand what the Senator from Alaska--
  Mr. STEVENS. I really can't hear the Senator, I am sorry.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Reserving the right to object, have you eliminated 
time on debate? I am not quite sure.
  Mr. STEVENS. We have not yet addressed the question of time on 
debate. The only real limitation here is that this list be the only 
first-degree amendments in order and that they only be subject to 
relevant second-degree amendments in the event they are considered and 
not adopted.
  Mr. FORD. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I have been 
trying

[[Page S9374]]

to work out on our side as it relates to amendments, and I have not 
seen this list yet. I want to be sure, when I have told my colleagues 
that their amendment has been accepted, I want it on the managers' list 
or I want it on the amendments yet to be worked out.
  Mr. STEVENS. I say to the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. President, many 
of the amendments that are on the list that have come from your side 
are, in fact, on the managers' list. But they will all be qualified if 
they are on the list you have given us.
  Mr. FORD. I want to be sure that all of these amendments--I have not 
seen the list, I say to my friend, and would like to work it out.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Will the Senator from Alaska yield?
  Mr. STEVENS. I will be happy to yield, Mr. President.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, my request is still pending.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, as I understand the unanimous consent 
request, what the Senator is saying is that after disposal of the last 
amendment, we go right to final passage; is that correct? But there is 
no limit on debate on amendments; is that correct?
  Mr. STEVENS. These listed amendments will be disposed of. Once they 
are disposed of, the bill will go to third reading. They will have to 
be either acted upon or withdrawn.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I understand. But there is no limit on debate on the 
individual amendments; is that correct?
  Mr. STEVENS. There is no limit there on debate time. I intend to do 
my best to do that.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I withdraw my objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. FORD. I reserved my right to object a moment ago, and I have no 
objection now. I thank the chairman for his courtesy.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I have been asked to amend my request and add this 
following portion--I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on 
its amendment, request a conference with the House on the disagreeing 
votes of the two Houses, and the Chair be authorized to appoint the 
following conferees on the part of the Senate: Senators Stevens, 
Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Hutchison, 
Inouye, Hollings, Byrd, Leahy, Bumpers, Lautenberg, Harkin, and Dorgan, 
and the foregoing occur without any intervening action or debate, and I 
further ask that when the Senate passes H.R. 4103, as amended, that S. 
2132 be indefinitely postponed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we are proceeding now to a look at the 
amendments that are not in the managers' package. I would like to 
address that issue with the Senate.
  It is my understanding that Senator Baucus has an amendment that he 
wishes to have 20 minutes equally divided; Senator Bingaman has two 
amendments; Senator Boxer's amendment that was on the list is in the 
managers' package; Senator Bumpers' amendment is on the list in the 
managers' package; Senator Byrd has two amendments which are to be in 
the managers' package; Senator Daschle's relevant amendments are 
withdrawn, as I understand it; Senator Dodd has one amendment dealing 
with Army pensions which we have not seen; Senator Durbin's amendment 
on land conveyance is in the package; his amendment on military 
operations and war powers will be opposed and we will have to deal with 
it; Senator Dorgan's amendment on Indian incentive program is in the 
package, and I understand his second amendment will not be offered; 
Senator Ford's amendment on National Symphony is not in the package and 
would have to be debated; Senator Graham has a land transfer amendment 
which is in the package now, and the space amendment, as I understand 
it, is the same as the amendment from Senator Mack, and that will have 
to be debated; Senator Harkin has the outlay amendment, and the POO 
amendment is in the package, the vets medals amendment we have not seen 
and we cannot discuss now; Senator Hollings' amendment will be 
accepted; Senator Inouye's manager's amendment is in the managers' 
package; Senator Kerrey's SOS payroll tax amendment cannot be accepted 
and will have to be debated; there are two relevant amendments by 
Senator Kerry which we have not seen; Senator Leahy's amendment cannot 
be accepted; Senator Reed's amendment we have not seen; and Senator 
Robb's amendment on reimbursement we would like to discuss with Senator 
Robb--it is in the House bill; we prefer not to take it up at this time 
if we can avoid it--and Senator Wellstone's amendment on child soldiers 
has been accepted, the domestic violence one has not been agreed to 
yet--we will have to discuss it with them.
  Those are the amendments on the Democratic side.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, would the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. I was trying to keep up with you, with the Senator. Senator 
Dodd has one as it relates to Lyme Disease.
  Mr. STEVENS. That is in the package.
  Mr. FORD. That is in the package?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. Then he still has two left.
  Mr. STEVENS. I realize the relevant one is just a place holder.
  Mr. FORD. I understand. That is correct.
  Mr. INOUYE. Will the chairman yield? I am now working on an amendment 
for Senator Carol Moseley-Braun. Can I discuss that with you later?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes. I would be happy to do that. The Senator has the 
right to an amendment in the managers' package. That may be the way 
that is considered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I wonder whether I could ask my colleague from Alaska 
whether he could include the child soldiers amendment in the managers' 
package since it has been accepted?
  Mr. STEVENS. It is in there.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I am sorry.
  Mr. STEVENS. The domestic violence one I do not think I have seen 
yet. That is also being reviewed by the Armed Services Committee and we 
cannot report that yet.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleague, I am ready to debate it if you 
want to, but let me know.
  Mr. STEVENS. I could not hear you.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleague, I am pleased to debate it if 
you want, but you just let me know.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, while the chairman is working on the list, I 
have a quick unanimous consent agreement we have worked out. I would 
like to go ahead and get that done while we have a break here.

                          ____________________