[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 98 (Tuesday, July 21, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8685-S8687]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     A NEW APPROACH FOR SOUTH ASIA

 Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President. With the recent nuclear tests in 
South Asia, we are closer to nuclear war than we have been at any time 
since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is a challenge which will compel 
the highest attention and the most subtle diplomacy. It requires 
extensive discussion with India and Pakistan. Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott has begun such a dialogue. He is a gifted diplomat; 
however, I must emphasize that despite the considerable talents of the 
Deputy Secretary, this is an issue which requires the President's close 
involvement.
  Congress must also be involved in addressing the issues which arise 
from the nuclear tests in South Asia. Legislation is required to lift 
the sanctions which these actions triggered. As such, I was pleased 
that my friend from Delaware, the ranking member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, has set out a very sensible approach to South 
Asia. In a recent speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Senator Biden challenges us to think anew about South Asia and 
calls on Congress to provide the President with the flexibility to 
negotiate in South Asia. This must entail providing him with broad 
authority to waive the present sanctions.
  Most importantly, Senator Biden calls on the President to make 
``arrangements to go to India.'' This is paramount and I hope that the 
President will note this wise counsel. The actions which we take to 
address this volatile situation will have profound repercussion on the 
future of the subcontinent and the world. Such stakes require the 
President's active participation. We must talk with them as a matter 
not just of their survival, but of our own as well. And we must stop 
supposing that sanctions are the answer. They are not.
  Mr. President, I commend the remarks of our colleague, Senator Biden, 
and ask that they be printed in the Record.
  The remarks follow:

                     A New Approach for South Asia

                       (By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)

       Two months ago, in the Rajasthan desert, the Government of 
     India claimed to have exploded five nuclear devices. Just 15 
     days later, the Government of Pakistan followed suit.
       These events, in a few short weeks, expanded the 
     acknowledged nuclear club by forty percent. They confront the 
     United States, as well as the rest of the international 
     community, with a monumental challenge, calling into question 
     decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
       Addressing this challenge--devising a new approach toward 
     South Asia--is the subject of my remarks today. I thank you 
     for the kind invitation.
       We can expect the policy community to dramatically increase 
     the time and attention it devotes to South Asia in the coming 
     months, but you at the Carnegie Endowment can credibly claim 
     that you were focusing on

[[Page S8686]]

     nuclear tensions long before it was even remotely 
     fashionable. If only more had listened.
       Clearly the tests by India and Pakistan require us to 
     reexamine many aspects of our foreign and national security 
     policy. We need to jettison some long-held beliefs that have 
     acted as self-imposed constraints on U.S. policy.
       Traditional approaches have not worked in the past in South 
     Asia and will not work in the present situation. We need to 
     think ``outside the box.'' Most of all, our national 
     interests throughout Asia dictate that we end our benign 
     neglect of South Asia. Let me outline the shortcomings of our 
     policy:
       First, we have not acknowledged or addressed the 
     fundamental sense of insecurity felt by both India and 
     Pakistan since the end of the Cold War.
       It is both facile and misleading to blame India's decision 
     to test solely on the election of the BJP government. While 
     the BJP certainly had a domestic political imperative to 
     test, there was already a consensus across the political 
     spectrum in India (except for the Communists) that India 
     needed to conduct tests.
       Why? Because of India's underlying perception in the 
     aftermath of the Cold War that it was isolated, vulnerable, 
     and not taken seriously.
       For much of the Cold War, but especially after the 1971 
     Indo-Pakistan war, a measure of stability prevailed with 
     China and the United States as key supporters of Pakistan, 
     and the Soviet Union as the chief ally of India. This set of 
     power relationships, combined with the threat of U.S. 
     sanctions, restrained India and Pakistan from either testing 
     or deploying nuclear weapons.
       With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet 
     Union, India could no longer rely on Moscow to balance China. 
     In addition, India perceives us--falsely, I believe--as 
     cultivating China as the regional hegemon that will preserve 
     Asian stability.
       The perceived U.S. preoccupation with China generates deep 
     concern in New Delhi. Remember: China defeated India in the 
     1962 war and occupied several thousand square kilometers of 
     disputed territory, a humiliation from which India has yet to 
     recover. And a decade ago Indian and China massed several 
     hundred thousand troops along their disputed border.
       India's sense of strategic encirclement was heightened by 
     reports of Chinese missile and nuclear transfers to Pakistan 
     and budding Chinese military and security ties to Burma 
     throughout the 1990s. Pakistan's test of a missile with a 
     1,000 kilometer range last April appeared to fit this pattern 
     even though U.S. officials pointed to North Korea as the real 
     source of the missile.
       To put this in context, how would China feel if the tables 
     were turned? What if India transferred its missiles to 
     Vietnam, fighter planes to Mongolia, or a nuclear bomb design 
     to Taiwan?
       In such an environment, India felt that it was on its own 
     and needed to demonstrate its capabilities, change the 
     strategic landscape, in order to be taken more seriously by 
     China, the United States, and other powers.
       Pakistan's motives for testing are far less complicated 
     than India's, but no less serious. Its strategic aim has been 
     to resist Indian hegemony and guarantee its survival. Just as 
     India's drive for a nuclear device can be traced to the 
     defeat it suffered at the hands of China in 1962 and China's 
     subsequent nuclear test in 1964, Pakistan's nuclear program 
     can be traced to the role India played in splitting Pakistan 
     into two with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
       Many in Pakistan believe that India has never accepted the 
     partition of the Indian subcontinent back in 1947. In 
     Pakistan, therefore, nuclear capability is seen as the 
     ultimate guarantor of its statehood.
       It should come as no surprise, then, that Pakistan felt it 
     needed to test to reestablish the deterrence that was 
     disrupted by India's tests.
       The end of the Cold War also made Pakistan feel abandoned 
     and isolated. The United States no longer needed Pakistan to 
     contain Soviet power. The Pressler amendment, invoked in 
     1990, banned aid to Pakistan and led directly to the erosion 
     of Pakistan's conventional arsenal. This was seen as a 
     betrayal, and has limited our influence with Pakistan ever 
     since.
       Unfortunately, we failed to acknowledge or act upon these 
     fundamental shifts affecting Pakistan, just as we ignored the 
     changes in India's security perceptions.
       The second shortcoming of our South Asia policy is that its 
     two chief elements--commerce and sanctions--are 
     contradictory. We use sanctions to punish proliferation at 
     the same time we are promoting commercial ties to take 
     advantage of long-overdue market openings in both countries.
       This policy is half right. The expansion of trade and 
     investment ties with India and Pakistan will help these 
     countries realize their full potential as well as benefit our 
     own economic interests.
       But the application of a one-size-fits-all non-
     proliferation policy is not appropriate to the special 
     circumstances in South Asia. It lumps India and Pakistan with 
     the far more dangerous outlaw states such as Libya and Iraq. 
     It ignores the great lengths both countries have been 
     prepared to go in order to achieve a basic sense of security. 
     It presumes our influence is much greater than it actually 
     is. Finally, it has prevented us from developing creative 
     approaches to stabilize nuclear and missile development in 
     the region.
       Legislation initiated by the Congress, and signed by 
     successive Presidents, is the basis for this rigid approach. 
     I voted for that legislation. But when viewed in the context 
     of Pakistan's and India's decision to test, I have to 
     conclude that while our approach worked for many years, it is 
     no longer working. It didn't stop them from testing, and it 
     provides no incentive for India and Pakistan to take positive 
     steps now.
       To be sure, sanctions, when carefully calibrated, are a 
     valuable policy tool. But I think it is clear that 
     multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral 
     sanctions. For example, the recent decision by the Group of 
     Eight to delay indefinitely World Bank loans for India and 
     Pakistan is more likely to produce results than unilateral 
     U.S. action.
       Given these defects in our policy, I believe we have no 
     choice but to construct a new conceptual framework. Here are 
     our options.
       First, we could maintain the status quo. That is, we retain 
     sanctions on India and Pakistan indefinitely, not recognize 
     their nuclear status, and keep the fundamentals of our Asia 
     policy unchanged. That would ``keep the faith'' on non-
     proliferation, but leave the underlying tensions in place and 
     set the stage for the next, perhaps more dangerous, crisis.
       A second approach that has been suggested is bolder: why 
     not enlist India as a potential strategic ally against a 
     ``China threat?'' But this runs the risk of becoming a self-
     fulfilling prophecy. China does not show signs of becoming 
     hostile, nor are china's interests necessarily in conflict 
     with our own. China prizes peace, stability, and economic 
     development above all else.
       I suggest a third approach. First, we should abandon our 
     one-size-fits-all non-proliferation policy that we have 
     applied to South Asia. We need to make distinctions between 
     India, Israel, and Pakistan on the one hand, and nations that 
     flout international norms such as Iraq and Libya on the 
     other. The former should not concern us as much as the 
     latter.
       We are better served by bringing India and Pakistan into 
     non-proliferation arrangements than by simply expecting them 
     to foreswear their nuclear programs. In practical terms, this 
     means that Congress should provide the President with the 
     flexibility to negotiate a package that would lift sanctions 
     in exchange for restraint by India and Pakistan in the areas 
     that matter most to us.
       We should seek agreement on five items: Formal commitments, 
     preferably through adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty, to refrain from further nuclear testing; pledges to 
     enter negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; 
     Assurances that both countries will continue to refrain from 
     spreading nuclear and missile technology; verifiable 
     commitments not to deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, 
     submarines, or aircraft; and a resumption of comprehensive 
     bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan aimed at 
     reducing tensions.
       Such a package would serve our twin objectives of repairing 
     the damage to the global non-proliferation regime, while not 
     indefinitely isolating one-fifth of humanity.
       Second, we need to distinguish between the relative 
     importance of India and Pakistan to our interests over the 
     long-term. Pakistan has been a good friend in the past, and 
     we should not forget that. Moreover, a policy that dismisses 
     Pakistan's legitimate security needs is bound to fail.
       In fact, I believe that when we eventually ease the 
     recently-imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan, we should 
     simultaneously waive the Pressler and Symington amendments, 
     which restrict military and economic aid to Pakistan. The 
     time has come to clear the decks in our relationship with 
     Pakistan and end a policy which is perceived as 
     discriminatory by Islamabad.
       Nor should we overlook the important strategic role 
     Pakistan could play as a secure transit route for the vast 
     oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin, if, and this is a 
     big if, peace can be secured in Afghanistan.
       But American national interests in the new multipolar world 
     dictate a different level of relations with India. Because of 
     its growing economic and political weight, India will become 
     a significant player in Asia and at the global level.
       Already India has a middle class approaching 200 million 
     people. If Indian governments make policy decisions that 
     continue to unleash the latent potential of a talented 
     population, then India will in time achieve the great power 
     status to which it has long aspired.
       Furthermore, if current trends hold, I believe that it is 
     only natural for some form of rivalry to persist, if not 
     intensify, between a growing India and China. Obviously, this 
     would diminish security and threaten U.S. interests across 
     Asia.
       To prevent it, two things must be done. First, the Sino-
     Indian rivalry must be channeled into a healthy and 
     constructive competition. Second, as both India and China 
     achieve great power status, they will need to ease the 
     anxieties of lesser powers.
       To deal with this emerging regional picture we must move 
     away from a focus on discrete bilateral relationships in 
     Asia, and broaden our vision with a more integrated region-
     wide approach that regards South Asia as an integral part of 
     Asia.
       I propose a new framework that would give a ``seat at the 
     table'' to all of the major players in Asia--India, China, 
     Japan, Russia,

[[Page S8687]]

     and the United States. The emphasis should not be so much on 
     formal structures, but on substance. The goal of this new 
     framework would be to promote greater consultation and 
     transparency among the countries.
       The two emerging powers in this group--India and China--
     should be encouraged to set an example of cooperation for the 
     rest of Asia. Such a system would also help them to realize 
     that along with great power status comes responsibility. They 
     must convince smaller nations of their peaceful intentions; 
     they must act to strengthen, not weaken, international norms; 
     and they must be seen as supporting an international 
     environment that promotes peace and prosperity for all.
       The ``Gujral doctrine'' demonstrates that India has the 
     potential to mature into a responsible great power. As 
     espoused by the previous Indian Prime Minister, this doctrine 
     called for India, as the dominant power in South Asia, to go 
     more than halfway in easing the fears of its smaller 
     neighbors. I hope that the new Indian government will not 
     stray from this far-sighted policy adopted by its 
     predecessor.
       The United States will need to take the lead in setting 
     this regional security mechanism into motion. It could begin 
     today with the President picking up the phone and speaking to 
     the leaders of India, Russia, and Japan about the insights he 
     gained from his trip to China and making arrangements to go 
     to India.
       Regular consultation among the key Asian countries could go 
     a long way toward dispelling anxieties and suspicions. It 
     would give everyone a stake in maintaining stability. It 
     would provide an incentive for regional powers to work toward 
     the settlement of long-standing disputes such as those over 
     the Sino-Indian border, the Kurile islands, the Korean 
     peninsula, and the South China Sea.
       Key countries could be encouraged to share information 
     about their armaments and defense budgets. If the other side 
     does not have information, it will assume the worst. This 
     inevitably leads to decisions and potentially dangerous 
     cycles of action and reaction that are predicated upon 
     assumptions that may be false.
       Let me conclude. Devising a new approach to South Asia will 
     not be easy, especially considering that it is being done in 
     response to actions we don't approve of--namely, the Pakistan 
     and Indian nuclear tests. But we have no choice, because the 
     status quo is not an option.
       We must show India and Pakistan that while we condemn their 
     tests, we understand their security concerns and are willing 
     to deal with them. If we don't devise a new approach, 
     tensions will grow and South Asia's endemic security problems 
     will undermine our long-term interests. And one thing is 
     clear: South Asian security is becoming inseparable from 
     Asian security.
       And, of course, Asia matters to the United States. Despite 
     recent economic setbacks, Asia will continue to be the most 
     dynamic region into the next century. Our economic links will 
     continue to grow. The regional balance of power and security 
     perceptions will also undergo dramatic changes. I believe 
     that we will need to find new mechanisms to preserve our 
     security interests.
       An effort that begins today in enlisting the key Asian 
     powers in advancing our common objectives of peace, 
     stability, and prosperity is one that could pay dividends far 
     into the next century. Now is the time to begin.

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