[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 96 (Friday, July 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8473-S8477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, Senator Rod Grams and
Senator Fred Thompson and I traveled to Russia, preceded by 3 days in
France. Senator Grams accompanied me to France; Senator Thompson, on
the Russian part of the trip. We went to France and Russia to do very
distinct things. In France, we wanted to talk about nuclear power and
the nuclear fuel cycle, and if I have time this afternoon I will
address that. If not, I will do that on another day. I would like to
proceed with what we went to Russia for and what we determined and what
recommendations and thoughts I have that come from that trip.
Our primary goal when we went to Russia was to explore and develop
options for the rapid disposition of Russian weapons-surplus plutonium.
These materials represent a potential clear and present danger to the
security of the United States and the world. The 50 tons that Russia
has declared as surplus to their weapons program represents enough
nuclear material for well over 5,000 nuclear weapons. Diversion of even
small quantities of this material could fuel the nuclear weapons
ambitions of many rogue nations and many nations in general.
During our visit, we discovered that there was a very critical window
of opportunity during which the United States can address the
proliferation risks of this stock of weapons-surplus plutonium. We have
urged that the administration, our President and our Vice President,
seize on this opportunity. No one can reliably predict how long this
window will stay open. We must act while it is open.
Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and Russia
currently have about 260 tons of plutonium--100 tons here and 160 tons
in Russia. Much of this material is in classified weapons components
which could be readily built into weapons.
While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of nuclear
weapons in Russia, much of which was with the assistance of the United
States of America through our national laboratories, our visit
confirmed the dire economic conditions in their closed cities, the
cities that they used to provide ample resources on a high priority
because they were the source of their nuclear strength. These
conditions fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
The United States has an immediate interest in ensuring that all
Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well as ours, as well as highly
enriched uranium that is theirs and that is ours, is secure.
Furthermore, Mr. President, as soon as possible, that material must be
converted into unclassified forms that cannot be quickly reassembled
into nuclear weapons. Then the materials must be placed in safeguarded
storage.
These actions, plus a reduction in Russia's large nuclear weapons
remanufacturing capability, are necessary precursors to future arms
control limits on nuclear warhead numbers.
The United States and Russia have declared 50 tons of weapons-grade
plutonium as surplus. Current administration plans have asked in the
budget for Congress to proceed with a program to use 3 tons per year of
our surplus as mixed oxide, generally referred to as MOX fuel, for
commercial nuclear reactors, while the Russians are focused on a
program that would not use much of their plutonium as MOX. The process
that is going on of negotiating between America and Russia is that
Russia would have only 1.3 tons converted.
So to summarize the concerns with the efforts thus far, I state the
following with very grave concerns. No bilateral agreement is in place
to control
[[Page S8474]]
each country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into
unclassified shapes, and storage under international safeguards. We
were told by the Russians that they were moving faster than the United
States in this regard. But we need adequate transparency to assure our
citizens on this count.
The rates of MOX--mixed oxide--use that we propose and they propose
are not equal and would in the long run exaggerate the larger Russian
quantities. The planned mixed oxide use rate of Russian plutonium is so
slow that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons that
we have each declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation risk
from this material exists as long as it is neither under international
safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel. Thirty years is too long
to wait for verifiable action on this material.
On our trip, we explored whether other European entities would help
with MOX fabrication and use in order to assist in increasing the
plutonium disposition rate: We did not find a receptive audience that
would consider introduction of this weapons plutonium into the European
nuclear economy, where it would upset their goal of balance within
their civilian nuclear cycle between plutonium recovered from spent
fuel and plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
We also discussed the French-German-Russian plan for relocation of a
German MOX plant to Russia to provide their 1.3 ton capability. While
the equipment and expertise are available, funding for this move has
not been identified within the G-7 to date.
As additional information, we learned from the Russian Minister of
Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to use their surplus
weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he favors saving it for use in
future generations of advanced reactors. We learned that MOX
fabrication and use in Russia will occur only with Western funding of
their MOX plant and compensation to encourage their use of MOX in
present reactors.
The combination of Minister Adamov's vision combined with the
economic situation in Russia provides an important opportunity to
address mutual interests. I believe that he would support bilateral
dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes to
unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage. These steps
must be accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency.
These initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target
goal of 10 tons per year. I also believe that Russia would accept MOX
disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate that is currently
planned, leaving most of their plutonium in storage for their
subsequent generations of reactors. The United States, as well as other
G-7 countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
The program I've outlined would rapidly reduce potential threats from
Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and verifiable way. It could
move far faster than our current program that focuses on immediate use
of converted material in MOX fuel.
This new program would shift focus onto the rates of material
involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and use. It would still
continue with MOX use, at a slower pace than dismantlement, conversion,
and safeguarded storage. The final move to MOX would remain part of an
integrated disposition program. Minister Adamov strongly noted his
views that use of the plutonium as MOX in reactors is the only credible
final disposition route.
The United States has failed to fully appreciate the opportunity that
exists to permanently reduce the threat posed by inventories of
weapons-grade plutonium in Russia. Furthermore, the United States
should not proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our
own weapons-surplus plutonium.
Leadership from the White House will be essential to ensure success.
These issues should be prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko
meeting and the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit. Mr. President, I
intend to work with you and our Senate colleagues to pursue actions
towards these initiatives.
One of our primary recommendations to President Clinton is that he
designate a special envoy solely for the vital task of plutonium
disposition in order to provide the full-time focused oversight and
interagency coordination that is vital to achieving success. This envoy
should also coordinate actions among the G-7 countries to ensure their
participation in this challenge.
It is evident that efforts in this Administration towards plutonium
disposition have not been marked by a suitable level of urgency,
commitment and attention. Designation of this special envoy is
essential to address this serious issue.
Finally, Mr. President, in our discussions within Russia, each
Senator emphasized that many Russian actions are viewed in Congress as
adding fuel to the fires of global weapons proliferation. We explained
to our Russian hosts that Congressional concerns over their activities
jeopardize the entire range of U.S.-Russia cooperative programs.
These strong expressions of interest and concerns, directly from U.S.
Senators to Russian leaders, should provide a framework within which
the Administration can negotiate bilateral agreements that address
these proliferation risks and truly enhance global security.
I would just like to discuss with the Senate what went on in Russia,
and further elaborate on the suggestions that I have. We were
privileged to meet with the highest Russian officials who work in the
area of atomic or nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. In these
meetings, I believe it was mutually understood that there is a reason
to take 50 tons of plutonium that they have from weapons, and 50 tons
that we have, and if we cannot agree, and if the world will not
accommodate efficiently more tons being converted to MOX fuel for reuse
in nuclear powerplants, that we should establish in each country a
storage facility that is internationally monitored, subject to
international controls in both countries, where we will place this
plutonium in changed forms so that in this new form it will be, as far
as possible from being usable for military purposes and bomb
production.
What a gift we could make to the world if America and Russia could
agree that, because of dismantlement--which is occurring, we have 50
tons of plutonium, and I have just told you the number of weapons it
could produce if it was used again for nuclear weapons--that we could
both say dismantling the weapons system is working. We agree with each
other; we are going to have some abiding principles of transparency and
control, and we are going to start to take this out of circulation.
There is one other item that came to our attention as we discussed
this proposal. Some of us were familiar with the now-heralded Nunn-
Lugar proposal, whereby the United States helped Russia with some of
the problems that it had with nuclear proliferation commodities and
storage of fissionable materials in their country. The history of Nunn-
Lugar, although it recently is very successful, was that for a number
of years it could not get off of center. It stayed kind of stuck
because of the myriad of agency involvements and rules and regulations.
Knowing of that, we recommend that a special envoy be appointed by the
President to be in charge of this program of attempting to reach a
bilateral agreement on getting rid of 50 tons of plutonium that could
be reused for bombmaking.
So, in summary, the recommendations we make to our President and to
our Vice President as they begin to work anew with Russia are as I have
described them. Frankly, we believe, the three of us--and one of the
three is the occupant of the Chair who attended the entire visit to
France and Russia with reference to nuclear energy and nuclear
weapons--we recommend that the President engage with and quickly reach
agreement with the Russians on the disposition of 50 tons of plutonium;
and that we commit, likewise, from our side, that this ultimately be
done in a fashion whereby what cannot be turned, through MOX fuel, to a
substance that cannot be used for bombs, that the remainder be changed
in shapes and forms, but that the storage be monitored by international
controls and international bodies so as to account for its safekeeping,
and getting it out of circulation as potential use for nuclear weapons.
In that regard, we have written to the President of the United
States. The
[[Page S8475]]
letter which we wrote, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record, and I ask a similar letter to the Vice President receive
similar treatment. The detailed letter that we prepared to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Honorable
Sandy Berger, which was transmitted to the President and the Vice
President--I ask unanimous consent that all those be printed in the
Record so any Senator trying to further assess what we are recommending
will have a full display in front of that Senator of the various
proposals and ideas.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
The President,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We recently traveled to Russia to
explore serious proliferation risks associated with Russian
surplus weapons plutonium. We urge that you seize a critical
opportunity that we found to dramatically reduce Russian
stocks of this material. We recommend that this opportunity
be carefully considered in the upcoming Presidential Summit
and in the Vice President-Prime Minister meeting.
Your leadership will be essential to achieve success in
this key area. We will aggressively pursue this issue within
the U.S. Senate. We recommend that you appoint a special
envoy solely focused on oversight of these disposition
efforts to whom you delegate your authority to provide
coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a final
solution and to develop an integrated G-7 approach to these
issues.
The attached letter to your National Security Advisor, Mr.
Sandy Berger, outlines details of our concerns with weapons-
surplus plutonium and the current opportunity.
A closely related non-proliferation opportunity arose in
our meetings that also deserves your attention. We expressed
serious reservations about Russian export of nuclear
technologies to nations like India and Iran. In addition to
nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions have been
raised as to whether or not Russia is complying with its
commitments with regard to uranium enrichment technology
transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian companies are
supplying equipment and materials for the design and
manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition, Russia has
rejected our export control assistance.
Minister Adamov, of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy,
discussed their strong concerns with proliferation of nuclear
technologies and sought to assure us that any actions on
behalf of the Russian government were consistent with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
We discussed with Minister Adamov creation of a Commission
to review nuclear export activities of signatories to the NPT
for potential proliferation impact. It was suggested that
such a Commission could evaluate specific cases, as well as
review the structure of the NPT to ensure that its
formulation adequately addresses modern international
proliferation challenges. We recommend that you pursue this
suggestion in your meetings, as well as reiterating that
Russia must make major improvements with regard to the export
of nuclear technologies and technologies of mass destruction.
As we discussed Russian activities that can fuel
proliferation of nuclear weapons, we emphasized that
Congressional concerns over these activities jeopardize the
entire range of U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. We suggest
that you reinforce the gravity of these concerns and
potential consequences in your meetings.
Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest
and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical
proliferation issues. We urge that your future interactions
with Russia build upon this foundation.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici.
Fred Thompson.
Rod Grams.
____
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
The Vice-President,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Vice-President: We recently traveled to Russia to
explore serious proliferation risks associated with Russian
surplus weapons plutonium. We urge that you seize a critical
opportunity that we found to dramatically reduce Russian
stocks of this material. We recommend that this opportunity
be carefully considered in the upcoming Presidential Summit
and in the Vice President-Prime Minister meeting.
Your leadership will be essential to achieve success in
this key area. We will aggressively pursue this issue within
the U.S. Senate. We recommend that you appoint a special
envoy solely focused on oversight of these disposition
efforts to whom you delegate your authority to provide
coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a final
solution and to develop an integrated G-7 approach to these
issues.
The attached letter to your National Security Advisor, Mr.
Sandy Berger, outlines details of our concerns with weapons-
surplus plutonium and the current opportunity.
A closely related non-proliferation opportunity arose in
our meetings that also deserves your attention. We expressed
serious reservations about Russian export of nuclear
technologies to nations like India and Iran. In addition to
nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions have been
raised as to whether or not Russia is complying with its
commitments with regard to uranium enrichment technology
transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian companies are
supplying equipment and materials for the design and
manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition, Russia has
rejected our export control assistance.
Minister Adamov, of the Russian Ministry of Atomic energy,
discussed their strong concerns with proliferation of nuclear
technologies and sought to assure us that any actions on
behalf of the Russian government were consistent with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
We discussed with Minister Adamov creation of a Commission
to review nuclear export activities of signatories to the NPT
for potential proliferation impact. It was suggested that
such a Commission could evaluate specific cases, as well as
review the structure of the NPT to ensure that its
formulation adequately addresses modern international
proliferation challenges. We recommend that you pursue this
suggestion in your meetings, as well as reiterating that
Russia must make major improvements with regard to the export
of nuclear technologies and technologies of mass destruction.
As we discussed Russian activities that can fuel
proliferation of nuclear weapons, we emphasize that
Congressional concerns over these activities jeopardize the
entire range of U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. We suggest
that you reinforce the gravity of these concerns and
potential consequences in your meetings.
Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest
and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical
proliferation issues. We urge that your future interactions
with Russia build upon this foundation.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici.
Fred Thompson.
Rod Grams.
____
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
Hon. Sandy Berger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The
National Security Council, The White House, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Berger: Our recent visit to Russia uncovered a
critical window of opportunity during which the United States
can address the proliferation risks of weapons-surplus
plutonium. We urge that the Administration seize the
opportunity.
Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and
Russia currently have about 260 tons of such plutonium; 100
tons here and 160 tons in Russia. Much of this material is in
classified weapons components, which could be readily rebuilt
into weapons. This material could be a significant threat to
the national security of the United States.
While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of
nuclear materials in Russia, our visit confirmed the dire
economic conditions in their closed cities. These conditions
fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
We believe that the United States has an immediate interest
in ensuring that all Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well
as their highly enriched uranium, is secure. Furthermore, as
soon as possible, that material must be converted to
unclassified forms that cannot be quickly re-assembled into
nuclear weapons. We believe that conversion of that material
and its placement in safeguarded storage, plus a reduction in
Russia's nuclear weapons re-manufacturing capability to bring
it more in line with our current capability, are necessary
precursors to future arms control limits on nuclear warhead
numbers.
The United States and Russia have each declared 50 tons of
weapons-surplus plutonium as excess. Current Administration
plans call for a U.S. program to use 3 tons per year as mixed
oxide (or MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear reactors, while
the Russians are focused on a program that would initially
use only 1.3 tons per year as MOX.
To summarize our major concerns with the Russian efforts
(while recognizing that bilateral progress is essential to
enable progress):
No bilateral agreement is in place to control each
country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into
unclassified shapes, and storage under international
safeguards. We were told that Russia is moving faster than
the U.S. in this regard, but we need adequate transparency to
assure our citizens on this.
The rates of MOX use are not equal, and only exaggerate the
larger Russian quantities.
The planned MOX use rate of Russian plutonium is so slow
that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons
they have declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation
risk from this material exists as long as it is neither under
international safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel.
Thirty years is too long to wait for verifiable action on
this material.
On our trip, we explored whether other European entities
would assist with MOX fabrication and use to increase the
planned disposition rates. We did not find a receptive
audience that would consider introduction of this weapons
plutonium into the European nuclear economy, where it would
upset their goal of balance within their civilian nuclear
[[Page S8476]]
cycle between plutonium recovered from spent fuel and
plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
We also discussed the French-German-Russian evaluation of
relocation of a German MOX plant to Russia to provide their
1.3 ton capability. While the equipment and expertise are
available, funding for this move has not been identified
within the G-7 to date.
As additional information, we learned from the Russian
Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to
use their surplus weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he
favors saving it for use in future generations of advanced
reactors. We learned that MOX fabrication and use in Russia
will occur only with Western funding of their MOX plant and
compensation to encourage their use of MOX in present
reactors.
However, we believe that he would support bilateral
dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes
to unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage
(for Russia, at their Mayak facility). These steps must be
accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency. These
initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target
goal of 10 tons per year. We also believe that Russia would
support MOX disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate
that is currently planned, leaving most of their plutonium in
storage for their subsequent generations to reactors. We
recognize that the United States, as well as other G-7
countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
The program we outline would rapidly reduce potential
threats from Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and
verifiable way. It could move far faster than our current
program that focuses on immediate use of converted material
in MOX fuel, by shifting the program focus to the rates of
material involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and
use. And it would still proceed with MOX use, at a slower
pace than the dismantlement, conversion, and safeguarded
storage. The final use as MOX must remain part of an
integrated disposition program; certainly Minister Adamov
notes that use of the plutonium in reactors is the only
credible disposition route.
We believe that the United States has failed to fully
appreciate the opportunity that exists to permanently reduce
the threat posed by inventories of weapons-grade plutonium in
Russia. We also believe that the United States should hot
proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our
own weapons-surplus plutonium.
We intend to aggressively pursue these initiatives within
the Senate. Leadership from the White House will be essential
to ensure success. We further recommend that these issues be
prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko meeting and
the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit.
In addition, we have recommended to the President that he
appoint a special envoy solely focused on oversight of this
disposition program to whom is delegated authority to provide
coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a a
final solution and to further coordinate G-7 actions on this
issue. We believe that this problem is of sufficient national
and global urgency to justify this appointment in the very
near future.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici.
Fred Thompson.
Rod Grams.
Mr. DOMENICI. Then, Mr. President, Senator Grams of Minnesota,
Senator Thompson of Tennessee, and myself have written a letter to all
of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, whereby we have once
again summarized this situation that we find, this hope that we have
that our President will pursue negotiations and quickly arrive at a
bilateral agreement to give the world a gift, a present that says: We
are now going to get rid of a huge portion of the dismantlement
surpluses that can still be used in the future for nuclear bombs,
ridding our world of that potential.
We ask that our colleagues read our suggestions, and that they, too,
become interested in this proposal.
I ask unanimous consent that letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, July 15, 1998.
Dear Colleague: The primary goal of our recent visit to
Russia was to explore and develop options for rapid
disposition of Russian weapons surplus plutonium. These
materials represent a potential clear and present danger to
the security of the United States and the world. The 50 tons
that Russia has declared as surplus to their weapons program
represent enough material for well over 5,000 nuclear
weapons. Diversion of even small quantities of this material
could fuel the nuclear weapons ambitions of may rogue states.
During our visit, we uncovered a critical window of
opportunity during which the United States can address the
proliferation risks of weapons-surplus plutonium. We have
urged the Administration to seize the opportunity. No one can
reliably predict how long this window will stay open. We must
act while it is open.
Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and
Russia currently have about 260 tons of such plutonium; 100
tons here and 160 tons in Russia. Much of this material is in
classified weapons components, which could be readily rebuilt
into weapons.
While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of
nuclear materials in Russia, our visit confirmed the dire
economic conditions in their closed cities. These conditions
fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
We believe that the United States has an immediate interest
in ensuring that all Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well
as their highly enriched uranium, is secure. Furthermore, as
soon as possible, that material must be converted to
unclassified forms that cannot be quickly re-assembled into
nuclear weapons. We believe that conversion of that material
and its placement in safeguarded storage, plus a reduction in
Russia's nuclear weapons re-manufacturing capability to bring
it more in line with our current capability, are necessary
precursors to future arms control limits on nuclear warhead
numbers.
The United States and Russia have each declared 50 tons of
weapons-grade plutonium as surplus. Current Administration
plans call for a U.S. program to use 3 tons per year as mixed
oxide (or MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear reactors, while
the Russians are focused on a program that would initially
use only 1.3 tons per year as MOX.
To summarize our major concerns with the Russian efforts
(while recognizing that bilateral progress is essential to
enable progress):
No bilateral agreement is in place to control each
country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into
unclassified shapes, and storage under international
safeguards. We were told that Russia is moving faster than
the U.S. in this regard, but we need adequate transparency to
assure our citizens on this.
The rates of MOX use are not equal, and only exaggerate the
larger Russian quantities.
The planned MOX use rate of Russian plutonium is so slow
that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons
they have declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation
risk from this material exists as long as it is neither under
international safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel.
Thirty years is too long to wait for verifiable action on
this material.
On our trip, we explored whether other European entities
would help with MOX fabrication and use in order to assist
with increasing the plutonium disposition rates. We did not
find a receptive audience that would consider introduction of
this weapons plutonium into the European nuclear economy,
where it would upset their goal of balance within their
civilian nuclear cycle between plutonium recovered from spent
fuel and plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
We also discussed the French-German-Russian plan for
relocation of a German MOX plan to Russia to provide their
1.3 ton capacity. While the equipment and expertise are
available, funding for this move has not been identified
within the G-7 to date.
As additional information, we learned from the Russian
Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to
use their surplus weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he
favors saving it for use in future generations of advanced
reactors. We learned that MOX fabrication and use in Russia
will occur only with Western funding of their MOX plant and
compensation to encourage their use of MOX in present
reactors.
We believe, however, that he would support bilateral
dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes
to unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage
(for Russia, at their Mayak facility). These steps must be
accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency. These
initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target
goal of 10 tons per year. We also believe that Russia would
support MOX disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate
that is currently planned, leaving most of their plutonium in
storage for their subsequent generations of reactors. We
recognize that the United States, as well as other G-7
countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
The program we outline would rapidly reduce potential
threats from Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and
verifiable way. It could move far faster than our current
program that focuses on immediate use of converted material
in MOX fuel, by shifting the program focus to the rates of
material involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and
use. And it would still proceed with MOX use, at a slower
pace than the dismantlement, conversion, and safeguarded
storage. The final move to MOX must remain part of an
integrated disposition program. Minister Adamov strongly
noted that, in his view, use of the plutonium as MOX in
reactors is the only credible disposition route.
We believe that the United States has failed to fully
appreciate the opportunity that exists to permanently reduce
the threat posed by inventories of weapons-grade plutonium in
Russia. We also believe that the United States should not
proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our
own weapons-surplus plutonium.
We will aggressively pursue these initiatives within the
Senate. Leadership from the White House will be essential to
ensure success. We further recommend that these issues be
prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko meeting and
the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit.
We have recommended to the President that he designate a
special envoy solely for
[[Page S8477]]
this vital task to provide the full-time focused oversight
and interagency coordination that is vital to achieving
success. Efforts to date towards plutonium disposition in
this country have not been marked by a suitable level of
commitment and attention within the Administration. Progress
on this vital area of national security will not occur short
of this action.
Finally, in our discussions within Russia, each Senator
emphasized that many Russian actions are viewed in Congress
as adding fuel to the fires of global weapons proliferation.
We expressed serious reservations about Russian export of
nuclear technologies to nations like India and Iran. In
addition to nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions
have been raised as to whether or not Russia is complying
with its commitments with regard to uranium enrichment
technology transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian
companies are supplying equipment and materials for the
design and manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition,
Russia has rejected our export control assistance. We
explained to our Russian hosts that Congressional concerns
over their activities jeopardize the entire range of U.S.-
Russian cooperative programs.
Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest
and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical
proliferation issues. We have urged the Administration to
structure future interactions with Russia that built upon our
efforts.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici.
Fred Thompson.
Rod Grams.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I will follow this up next week, and
perhaps my friend who occupies the Chair could join me that day,
because the first part of our visit was a visit to France, ultimately
to Germany, to talk about the nuclear power fuel cycle. I want, next
week, to go into some detail as to how well the French people and the
French Government are handling nuclear power, and how poorly we have
handled that issue in America. Just to whet one's appetite about what
we visited and what we will be talking about, let me just say the
country of France gets 80 percent of its power from nuclear
powerplants--80 percent. It is the cleanest country, in terms of
emissions. It is the least contributor to atmospheric pollution, which
many in our country and around the world are concerned is causing
global warming, because they don't burn any coal, they don't burn any
oil. They produce most of their electricity from nuclear power.
Isn't it interesting that they do not seem to be afraid? They have
had no accidents of any consequence whatsoever. And we in America, who
started this great technology, invented it, had the companies that were
best at it--we sit idly by and claim we want to rid the atmosphere of
the pollutants that might cause global warming and we essentially,
through regulation and otherwise, have eliminated the prospect of
nuclear power for some time in the United States. We will speak about
that in more detail later.
Mr. President, with reference to completing the Senate's business and
then letting my good friend Senator Jeffords proceed with his speech as
in morning business, I am going to proceed with the wrapup, which will
include a privilege to the Senator to continue even after we have
finished.
THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday,
Thursday, July 16, 1998, the federal debt stood at
$5,531,079,562,651.15 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-one billion,
seventy-nine million, five hundred sixty-two thousand, six hundred
fifty-one dollars and fifteen cents).
One year ago, July 16, 1997, the federal debt stood at
$5,357,954,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred fifty-seven billion,
nine hundred fifty-four million).
Five years ago, July 16, 1993, the federal debt stood at
$4,334,093,000,000 (Four trillion, three hundred thirty-four billion,
ninety-three million).
Twenty-five years ago, July 16, 1973, the federal debt stood at
$455,344,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-five billion, three hundred forty-
four million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion--
$5,075,735,562,651.15 (Five trillion, seventy-five billion, seven
hundred thirty-five million, five hundred sixty-two thousand, six
hundred fifty-one dollars and fifteen cents) during the past 25 years.
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