[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 96 (Friday, July 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8473-S8477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, Senator Rod Grams and 
Senator Fred Thompson and I traveled to Russia, preceded by 3 days in 
France. Senator Grams accompanied me to France; Senator Thompson, on 
the Russian part of the trip. We went to France and Russia to do very 
distinct things. In France, we wanted to talk about nuclear power and 
the nuclear fuel cycle, and if I have time this afternoon I will 
address that. If not, I will do that on another day. I would like to 
proceed with what we went to Russia for and what we determined and what 
recommendations and thoughts I have that come from that trip.
  Our primary goal when we went to Russia was to explore and develop 
options for the rapid disposition of Russian weapons-surplus plutonium. 
These materials represent a potential clear and present danger to the 
security of the United States and the world. The 50 tons that Russia 
has declared as surplus to their weapons program represents enough 
nuclear material for well over 5,000 nuclear weapons. Diversion of even 
small quantities of this material could fuel the nuclear weapons 
ambitions of many rogue nations and many nations in general.
  During our visit, we discovered that there was a very critical window 
of opportunity during which the United States can address the 
proliferation risks of this stock of weapons-surplus plutonium. We have 
urged that the administration, our President and our Vice President, 
seize on this opportunity. No one can reliably predict how long this 
window will stay open. We must act while it is open.
  Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and Russia 
currently have about 260 tons of plutonium--100 tons here and 160 tons 
in Russia. Much of this material is in classified weapons components 
which could be readily built into weapons.
  While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of nuclear 
weapons in Russia, much of which was with the assistance of the United 
States of America through our national laboratories, our visit 
confirmed the dire economic conditions in their closed cities, the 
cities that they used to provide ample resources on a high priority 
because they were the source of their nuclear strength. These 
conditions fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
  The United States has an immediate interest in ensuring that all 
Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well as ours, as well as highly 
enriched uranium that is theirs and that is ours, is secure. 
Furthermore, Mr. President, as soon as possible, that material must be 
converted into unclassified forms that cannot be quickly reassembled 
into nuclear weapons. Then the materials must be placed in safeguarded 
storage.
  These actions, plus a reduction in Russia's large nuclear weapons 
remanufacturing capability, are necessary precursors to future arms 
control limits on nuclear warhead numbers.
  The United States and Russia have declared 50 tons of weapons-grade 
plutonium as surplus. Current administration plans have asked in the 
budget for Congress to proceed with a program to use 3 tons per year of 
our surplus as mixed oxide, generally referred to as MOX fuel, for 
commercial nuclear reactors, while the Russians are focused on a 
program that would not use much of their plutonium as MOX. The process 
that is going on of negotiating between America and Russia is that 
Russia would have only 1.3 tons converted.
  So to summarize the concerns with the efforts thus far, I state the 
following with very grave concerns. No bilateral agreement is in place 
to control

[[Page S8474]]

each country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into 
unclassified shapes, and storage under international safeguards. We 
were told by the Russians that they were moving faster than the United 
States in this regard. But we need adequate transparency to assure our 
citizens on this count.
  The rates of MOX--mixed oxide--use that we propose and they propose 
are not equal and would in the long run exaggerate the larger Russian 
quantities. The planned mixed oxide use rate of Russian plutonium is so 
slow that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons that 
we have each declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation risk 
from this material exists as long as it is neither under international 
safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel. Thirty years is too long 
to wait for verifiable action on this material.

  On our trip, we explored whether other European entities would help 
with MOX fabrication and use in order to assist in increasing the 
plutonium disposition rate: We did not find a receptive audience that 
would consider introduction of this weapons plutonium into the European 
nuclear economy, where it would upset their goal of balance within 
their civilian nuclear cycle between plutonium recovered from spent 
fuel and plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
  We also discussed the French-German-Russian plan for relocation of a 
German MOX plant to Russia to provide their 1.3 ton capability. While 
the equipment and expertise are available, funding for this move has 
not been identified within the G-7 to date.
  As additional information, we learned from the Russian Minister of 
Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to use their surplus 
weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he favors saving it for use in 
future generations of advanced reactors. We learned that MOX 
fabrication and use in Russia will occur only with Western funding of 
their MOX plant and compensation to encourage their use of MOX in 
present reactors.
  The combination of Minister Adamov's vision combined with the 
economic situation in Russia provides an important opportunity to 
address mutual interests. I believe that he would support bilateral 
dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes to 
unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage. These steps 
must be accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency.
  These initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target 
goal of 10 tons per year. I also believe that Russia would accept MOX 
disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate that is currently 
planned, leaving most of their plutonium in storage for their 
subsequent generations of reactors. The United States, as well as other 
G-7 countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
  The program I've outlined would rapidly reduce potential threats from 
Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and verifiable way. It could 
move far faster than our current program that focuses on immediate use 
of converted material in MOX fuel.
  This new program would shift focus onto the rates of material 
involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and use. It would still 
continue with MOX use, at a slower pace than dismantlement, conversion, 
and safeguarded storage. The final move to MOX would remain part of an 
integrated disposition program. Minister Adamov strongly noted his 
views that use of the plutonium as MOX in reactors is the only credible 
final disposition route.
  The United States has failed to fully appreciate the opportunity that 
exists to permanently reduce the threat posed by inventories of 
weapons-grade plutonium in Russia. Furthermore, the United States 
should not proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our 
own weapons-surplus plutonium.
  Leadership from the White House will be essential to ensure success. 
These issues should be prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko 
meeting and the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit. Mr. President, I 
intend to work with you and our Senate colleagues to pursue actions 
towards these initiatives.
  One of our primary recommendations to President Clinton is that he 
designate a special envoy solely for the vital task of plutonium 
disposition in order to provide the full-time focused oversight and 
interagency coordination that is vital to achieving success. This envoy 
should also coordinate actions among the G-7 countries to ensure their 
participation in this challenge.
  It is evident that efforts in this Administration towards plutonium 
disposition have not been marked by a suitable level of urgency, 
commitment and attention. Designation of this special envoy is 
essential to address this serious issue.
  Finally, Mr. President, in our discussions within Russia, each 
Senator emphasized that many Russian actions are viewed in Congress as 
adding fuel to the fires of global weapons proliferation. We explained 
to our Russian hosts that Congressional concerns over their activities 
jeopardize the entire range of U.S.-Russia cooperative programs.
  These strong expressions of interest and concerns, directly from U.S. 
Senators to Russian leaders, should provide a framework within which 
the Administration can negotiate bilateral agreements that address 
these proliferation risks and truly enhance global security.
  I would just like to discuss with the Senate what went on in Russia, 
and further elaborate on the suggestions that I have. We were 
privileged to meet with the highest Russian officials who work in the 
area of atomic or nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. In these 
meetings, I believe it was mutually understood that there is a reason 
to take 50 tons of plutonium that they have from weapons, and 50 tons 
that we have, and if we cannot agree, and if the world will not 
accommodate efficiently more tons being converted to MOX fuel for reuse 
in nuclear powerplants, that we should establish in each country a 
storage facility that is internationally monitored, subject to 
international controls in both countries, where we will place this 
plutonium in changed forms so that in this new form it will be, as far 
as possible from being usable for military purposes and bomb 
production.
  What a gift we could make to the world if America and Russia could 
agree that, because of dismantlement--which is occurring, we have 50 
tons of plutonium, and I have just told you the number of weapons it 
could produce if it was used again for nuclear weapons--that we could 
both say dismantling the weapons system is working. We agree with each 
other; we are going to have some abiding principles of transparency and 
control, and we are going to start to take this out of circulation.
  There is one other item that came to our attention as we discussed 
this proposal. Some of us were familiar with the now-heralded Nunn-
Lugar proposal, whereby the United States helped Russia with some of 
the problems that it had with nuclear proliferation commodities and 
storage of fissionable materials in their country. The history of Nunn-
Lugar, although it recently is very successful, was that for a number 
of years it could not get off of center. It stayed kind of stuck 
because of the myriad of agency involvements and rules and regulations. 
Knowing of that, we recommend that a special envoy be appointed by the 
President to be in charge of this program of attempting to reach a 
bilateral agreement on getting rid of 50 tons of plutonium that could 
be reused for bombmaking.
  So, in summary, the recommendations we make to our President and to 
our Vice President as they begin to work anew with Russia are as I have 
described them. Frankly, we believe, the three of us--and one of the 
three is the occupant of the Chair who attended the entire visit to 
France and Russia with reference to nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons--we recommend that the President engage with and quickly reach 
agreement with the Russians on the disposition of 50 tons of plutonium; 
and that we commit, likewise, from our side, that this ultimately be 
done in a fashion whereby what cannot be turned, through MOX fuel, to a 
substance that cannot be used for bombs, that the remainder be changed 
in shapes and forms, but that the storage be monitored by international 
controls and international bodies so as to account for its safekeeping, 
and getting it out of circulation as potential use for nuclear weapons.
  In that regard, we have written to the President of the United 
States. The

[[Page S8475]]

letter which we wrote, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record, and I ask a similar letter to the Vice President receive 
similar treatment. The detailed letter that we prepared to the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Honorable 
Sandy Berger, which was transmitted to the President and the Vice 
President--I ask unanimous consent that all those be printed in the 
Record so any Senator trying to further assess what we are recommending 
will have a full display in front of that Senator of the various 
proposals and ideas.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
     The President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We recently traveled to Russia to 
     explore serious proliferation risks associated with Russian 
     surplus weapons plutonium. We urge that you seize a critical 
     opportunity that we found to dramatically reduce Russian 
     stocks of this material. We recommend that this opportunity 
     be carefully considered in the upcoming Presidential Summit 
     and in the Vice President-Prime Minister meeting.
       Your leadership will be essential to achieve success in 
     this key area. We will aggressively pursue this issue within 
     the U.S. Senate. We recommend that you appoint a special 
     envoy solely focused on oversight of these disposition 
     efforts to whom you delegate your authority to provide 
     coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a final 
     solution and to develop an integrated G-7 approach to these 
     issues.
       The attached letter to your National Security Advisor, Mr. 
     Sandy Berger, outlines details of our concerns with weapons-
     surplus plutonium and the current opportunity.
       A closely related non-proliferation opportunity arose in 
     our meetings that also deserves your attention. We expressed 
     serious reservations about Russian export of nuclear 
     technologies to nations like India and Iran. In addition to 
     nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions have been 
     raised as to whether or not Russia is complying with its 
     commitments with regard to uranium enrichment technology 
     transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian companies are 
     supplying equipment and materials for the design and 
     manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition, Russia has 
     rejected our export control assistance.
       Minister Adamov, of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, 
     discussed their strong concerns with proliferation of nuclear 
     technologies and sought to assure us that any actions on 
     behalf of the Russian government were consistent with the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
       We discussed with Minister Adamov creation of a Commission 
     to review nuclear export activities of signatories to the NPT 
     for potential proliferation impact. It was suggested that 
     such a Commission could evaluate specific cases, as well as 
     review the structure of the NPT to ensure that its 
     formulation adequately addresses modern international 
     proliferation challenges. We recommend that you pursue this 
     suggestion in your meetings, as well as reiterating that 
     Russia must make major improvements with regard to the export 
     of nuclear technologies and technologies of mass destruction.
       As we discussed Russian activities that can fuel 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons, we emphasized that 
     Congressional concerns over these activities jeopardize the 
     entire range of U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. We suggest 
     that you reinforce the gravity of these concerns and 
     potential consequences in your meetings.
       Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest 
     and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical 
     proliferation issues. We urge that your future interactions 
     with Russia build upon this foundation.
           Sincerely,
     Pete V. Domenici.
     Fred Thompson.
     Rod Grams.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
     The Vice-President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Vice-President: We recently traveled to Russia to 
     explore serious proliferation risks associated with Russian 
     surplus weapons plutonium. We urge that you seize a critical 
     opportunity that we found to dramatically reduce Russian 
     stocks of this material. We recommend that this opportunity 
     be carefully considered in the upcoming Presidential Summit 
     and in the Vice President-Prime Minister meeting.
       Your leadership will be essential to achieve success in 
     this key area. We will aggressively pursue this issue within 
     the U.S. Senate. We recommend that you appoint a special 
     envoy solely focused on oversight of these disposition 
     efforts to whom you delegate your authority to provide 
     coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a final 
     solution and to develop an integrated G-7 approach to these 
     issues.
       The attached letter to your National Security Advisor, Mr. 
     Sandy Berger, outlines details of our concerns with weapons-
     surplus plutonium and the current opportunity.
       A closely related non-proliferation opportunity arose in 
     our meetings that also deserves your attention. We expressed 
     serious reservations about Russian export of nuclear 
     technologies to nations like India and Iran. In addition to 
     nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions have been 
     raised as to whether or not Russia is complying with its 
     commitments with regard to uranium enrichment technology 
     transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian companies are 
     supplying equipment and materials for the design and 
     manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition, Russia has 
     rejected our export control assistance.
       Minister Adamov, of the Russian Ministry of Atomic energy, 
     discussed their strong concerns with proliferation of nuclear 
     technologies and sought to assure us that any actions on 
     behalf of the Russian government were consistent with the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
       We discussed with Minister Adamov creation of a Commission 
     to review nuclear export activities of signatories to the NPT 
     for potential proliferation impact. It was suggested that 
     such a Commission could evaluate specific cases, as well as 
     review the structure of the NPT to ensure that its 
     formulation adequately addresses modern international 
     proliferation challenges. We recommend that you pursue this 
     suggestion in your meetings, as well as reiterating that 
     Russia must make major improvements with regard to the export 
     of nuclear technologies and technologies of mass destruction.
       As we discussed Russian activities that can fuel 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons, we emphasize that 
     Congressional concerns over these activities jeopardize the 
     entire range of U.S.-Russian cooperative programs. We suggest 
     that you reinforce the gravity of these concerns and 
     potential consequences in your meetings.
       Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest 
     and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical 
     proliferation issues. We urge that your future interactions 
     with Russia build upon this foundation.
           Sincerely,
     Pete V. Domenici.
     Fred Thompson.
     Rod Grams.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1998.
     Hon. Sandy Berger,
     Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The 
         National Security Council, The White House, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Berger: Our recent visit to Russia uncovered a 
     critical window of opportunity during which the United States 
     can address the proliferation risks of weapons-surplus 
     plutonium. We urge that the Administration seize the 
     opportunity.
       Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and 
     Russia currently have about 260 tons of such plutonium; 100 
     tons here and 160 tons in Russia. Much of this material is in 
     classified weapons components, which could be readily rebuilt 
     into weapons. This material could be a significant threat to 
     the national security of the United States.
       While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of 
     nuclear materials in Russia, our visit confirmed the dire 
     economic conditions in their closed cities. These conditions 
     fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
       We believe that the United States has an immediate interest 
     in ensuring that all Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well 
     as their highly enriched uranium, is secure. Furthermore, as 
     soon as possible, that material must be converted to 
     unclassified forms that cannot be quickly re-assembled into 
     nuclear weapons. We believe that conversion of that material 
     and its placement in safeguarded storage, plus a reduction in 
     Russia's nuclear weapons re-manufacturing capability to bring 
     it more in line with our current capability, are necessary 
     precursors to future arms control limits on nuclear warhead 
     numbers.
       The United States and Russia have each declared 50 tons of 
     weapons-surplus plutonium as excess. Current Administration 
     plans call for a U.S. program to use 3 tons per year as mixed 
     oxide (or MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear reactors, while 
     the Russians are focused on a program that would initially 
     use only 1.3 tons per year as MOX.
       To summarize our major concerns with the Russian efforts 
     (while recognizing that bilateral progress is essential to 
     enable progress):
       No bilateral agreement is in place to control each 
     country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into 
     unclassified shapes, and storage under international 
     safeguards. We were told that Russia is moving faster than 
     the U.S. in this regard, but we need adequate transparency to 
     assure our citizens on this.
       The rates of MOX use are not equal, and only exaggerate the 
     larger Russian quantities.
       The planned MOX use rate of Russian plutonium is so slow 
     that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons 
     they have declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation 
     risk from this material exists as long as it is neither under 
     international safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel. 
     Thirty years is too long to wait for verifiable action on 
     this material.
       On our trip, we explored whether other European entities 
     would assist with MOX fabrication and use to increase the 
     planned disposition rates. We did not find a receptive 
     audience that would consider introduction of this weapons 
     plutonium into the European nuclear economy, where it would 
     upset their goal of balance within their civilian nuclear

[[Page S8476]]

     cycle between plutonium recovered from spent fuel and 
     plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
       We also discussed the French-German-Russian evaluation of 
     relocation of a German MOX plant to Russia to provide their 
     1.3 ton capability. While the equipment and expertise are 
     available, funding for this move has not been identified 
     within the G-7 to date.
       As additional information, we learned from the Russian 
     Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to 
     use their surplus weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he 
     favors saving it for use in future generations of advanced 
     reactors. We learned that MOX fabrication and use in Russia 
     will occur only with Western funding of their MOX plant and 
     compensation to encourage their use of MOX in present 
     reactors.
       However, we believe that he would support bilateral 
     dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes 
     to unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage 
     (for Russia, at their Mayak facility). These steps must be 
     accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency. These 
     initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target 
     goal of 10 tons per year. We also believe that Russia would 
     support MOX disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate 
     that is currently planned, leaving most of their plutonium in 
     storage for their subsequent generations to reactors. We 
     recognize that the United States, as well as other G-7 
     countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
       The program we outline would rapidly reduce potential 
     threats from Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and 
     verifiable way. It could move far faster than our current 
     program that focuses on immediate use of converted material 
     in MOX fuel, by shifting the program focus to the rates of 
     material involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and 
     use. And it would still proceed with MOX use, at a slower 
     pace than the dismantlement, conversion, and safeguarded 
     storage. The final use as MOX must remain part of an 
     integrated disposition program; certainly Minister Adamov 
     notes that use of the plutonium in reactors is the only 
     credible disposition route.
       We believe that the United States has failed to fully 
     appreciate the opportunity that exists to permanently reduce 
     the threat posed by inventories of weapons-grade plutonium in 
     Russia. We also believe that the United States should hot 
     proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our 
     own weapons-surplus plutonium.
       We intend to aggressively pursue these initiatives within 
     the Senate. Leadership from the White House will be essential 
     to ensure success. We further recommend that these issues be 
     prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko meeting and 
     the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit.
       In addition, we have recommended to the President that he 
     appoint a special envoy solely focused on oversight of this 
     disposition program to whom is delegated authority to provide 
     coordination across the multiple agencies involved in a a 
     final solution and to further coordinate G-7 actions on this 
     issue. We believe that this problem is of sufficient national 
     and global urgency to justify this appointment in the very 
     near future.
           Sincerely,
     Pete V. Domenici.
     Fred Thompson.
     Rod Grams.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Then, Mr. President, Senator Grams of Minnesota, 
Senator Thompson of Tennessee, and myself have written a letter to all 
of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, whereby we have once 
again summarized this situation that we find, this hope that we have 
that our President will pursue negotiations and quickly arrive at a 
bilateral agreement to give the world a gift, a present that says: We 
are now going to get rid of a huge portion of the dismantlement 
surpluses that can still be used in the future for nuclear bombs, 
ridding our world of that potential.
  We ask that our colleagues read our suggestions, and that they, too, 
become interested in this proposal.
  I ask unanimous consent that letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 15, 1998.
       Dear Colleague: The primary goal of our recent visit to 
     Russia was to explore and develop options for rapid 
     disposition of Russian weapons surplus plutonium. These 
     materials represent a potential clear and present danger to 
     the security of the United States and the world. The 50 tons 
     that Russia has declared as surplus to their weapons program 
     represent enough material for well over 5,000 nuclear 
     weapons. Diversion of even small quantities of this material 
     could fuel the nuclear weapons ambitions of may rogue states.
       During our visit, we uncovered a critical window of 
     opportunity during which the United States can address the 
     proliferation risks of weapons-surplus plutonium. We have 
     urged the Administration to seize the opportunity. No one can 
     reliably predict how long this window will stay open. We must 
     act while it is open.
       Unclassified sources estimate that the United States and 
     Russia currently have about 260 tons of such plutonium; 100 
     tons here and 160 tons in Russia. Much of this material is in 
     classified weapons components, which could be readily rebuilt 
     into weapons.
       While we saw significant ongoing progress on control of 
     nuclear materials in Russia, our visit confirmed the dire 
     economic conditions in their closed cities. These conditions 
     fuel concerns of serious magnitude.
       We believe that the United States has an immediate interest 
     in ensuring that all Russian weapons-grade plutonium, as well 
     as their highly enriched uranium, is secure. Furthermore, as 
     soon as possible, that material must be converted to 
     unclassified forms that cannot be quickly re-assembled into 
     nuclear weapons. We believe that conversion of that material 
     and its placement in safeguarded storage, plus a reduction in 
     Russia's nuclear weapons re-manufacturing capability to bring 
     it more in line with our current capability, are necessary 
     precursors to future arms control limits on nuclear warhead 
     numbers.
       The United States and Russia have each declared 50 tons of 
     weapons-grade plutonium as surplus. Current Administration 
     plans call for a U.S. program to use 3 tons per year as mixed 
     oxide (or MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear reactors, while 
     the Russians are focused on a program that would initially 
     use only 1.3 tons per year as MOX.
       To summarize our major concerns with the Russian efforts 
     (while recognizing that bilateral progress is essential to 
     enable progress):
       No bilateral agreement is in place to control each 
     country's rate of weapons dismantlement, conversion into 
     unclassified shapes, and storage under international 
     safeguards. We were told that Russia is moving faster than 
     the U.S. in this regard, but we need adequate transparency to 
     assure our citizens on this.
       The rates of MOX use are not equal, and only exaggerate the 
     larger Russian quantities.
       The planned MOX use rate of Russian plutonium is so slow 
     that it requires more than 30 years to dispose of the 50 tons 
     they have declared to be surplus. The potential proliferation 
     risk from this material exists as long as it is neither under 
     international safeguards nor used in a reactor as MOX fuel. 
     Thirty years is too long to wait for verifiable action on 
     this material.
       On our trip, we explored whether other European entities 
     would help with MOX fabrication and use in order to assist 
     with increasing the plutonium disposition rates. We did not 
     find a receptive audience that would consider introduction of 
     this weapons plutonium into the European nuclear economy, 
     where it would upset their goal of balance within their 
     civilian nuclear cycle between plutonium recovered from spent 
     fuel and plutonium expended as MOX fuel.
       We also discussed the French-German-Russian plan for 
     relocation of a German MOX plan to Russia to provide their 
     1.3 ton capacity. While the equipment and expertise are 
     available, funding for this move has not been identified 
     within the G-7 to date.
       As additional information, we learned from the Russian 
     Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov that he would prefer not to 
     use their surplus weapons plutonium as MOX. Instead, he 
     favors saving it for use in future generations of advanced 
     reactors. We learned that MOX fabrication and use in Russia 
     will occur only with Western funding of their MOX plant and 
     compensation to encourage their use of MOX in present 
     reactors.
       We believe, however, that he would support bilateral 
     dismantlement of weapons, conversion from classified shapes 
     to unclassified forms, and internationally verified storage 
     (for Russia, at their Mayak facility). These steps must be 
     accompanied by appropriate levels of transparency. These 
     initial steps could and should occur rapidly, with a target 
     goal of 10 tons per year. We also believe that Russia would 
     support MOX disposition of their plutonium at the slow rate 
     that is currently planned, leaving most of their plutonium in 
     storage for their subsequent generations of reactors. We 
     recognize that the United States, as well as other G-7 
     countries, may have to help Russia with resources.
       The program we outline would rapidly reduce potential 
     threats from Russian surplus plutonium in a transparent and 
     verifiable way. It could move far faster than our current 
     program that focuses on immediate use of converted material 
     in MOX fuel, by shifting the program focus to the rates of 
     material involved in the steps preceding MOX fabrication and 
     use. And it would still proceed with MOX use, at a slower 
     pace than the dismantlement, conversion, and safeguarded 
     storage. The final move to MOX must remain part of an 
     integrated disposition program. Minister Adamov strongly 
     noted that, in his view, use of the plutonium as MOX in 
     reactors is the only credible disposition route.
       We believe that the United States has failed to fully 
     appreciate the opportunity that exists to permanently reduce 
     the threat posed by inventories of weapons-grade plutonium in 
     Russia. We also believe that the United States should not 
     proceed with any unilateral program for disposition of our 
     own weapons-surplus plutonium.
       We will aggressively pursue these initiatives within the 
     Senate. Leadership from the White House will be essential to 
     ensure success. We further recommend that these issues be 
     prominently featured at the July Gore/Kiriyenko meeting and 
     the September Clinton/Yeltsin summit.
       We have recommended to the President that he designate a 
     special envoy solely for

[[Page S8477]]

     this vital task to provide the full-time focused oversight 
     and interagency coordination that is vital to achieving 
     success. Efforts to date towards plutonium disposition in 
     this country have not been marked by a suitable level of 
     commitment and attention within the Administration. Progress 
     on this vital area of national security will not occur short 
     of this action.
       Finally, in our discussions within Russia, each Senator 
     emphasized that many Russian actions are viewed in Congress 
     as adding fuel to the fires of global weapons proliferation. 
     We expressed serious reservations about Russian export of 
     nuclear technologies to nations like India and Iran. In 
     addition to nuclear reactor sales to Iran, serious questions 
     have been raised as to whether or not Russia is complying 
     with its commitments with regard to uranium enrichment 
     technology transfers. Also, reports persist that Russian 
     companies are supplying equipment and materials for the 
     design and manufacture of ballistic missiles. In addition, 
     Russia has rejected our export control assistance. We 
     explained to our Russian hosts that Congressional concerns 
     over their activities jeopardize the entire range of U.S.-
     Russian cooperative programs.
       Our visits within Russia served to indicate the interest 
     and concern of the Legislative Branch on these critical 
     proliferation issues. We have urged the Administration to 
     structure future interactions with Russia that built upon our 
     efforts.
           Sincerely,
     Pete V. Domenici.
     Fred Thompson.
     Rod Grams.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I will follow this up next week, and 
perhaps my friend who occupies the Chair could join me that day, 
because the first part of our visit was a visit to France, ultimately 
to Germany, to talk about the nuclear power fuel cycle. I want, next 
week, to go into some detail as to how well the French people and the 
French Government are handling nuclear power, and how poorly we have 
handled that issue in America. Just to whet one's appetite about what 
we visited and what we will be talking about, let me just say the 
country of France gets 80 percent of its power from nuclear 
powerplants--80 percent. It is the cleanest country, in terms of 
emissions. It is the least contributor to atmospheric pollution, which 
many in our country and around the world are concerned is causing 
global warming, because they don't burn any coal, they don't burn any 
oil. They produce most of their electricity from nuclear power.
  Isn't it interesting that they do not seem to be afraid? They have 
had no accidents of any consequence whatsoever. And we in America, who 
started this great technology, invented it, had the companies that were 
best at it--we sit idly by and claim we want to rid the atmosphere of 
the pollutants that might cause global warming and we essentially, 
through regulation and otherwise, have eliminated the prospect of 
nuclear power for some time in the United States. We will speak about 
that in more detail later.
  Mr. President, with reference to completing the Senate's business and 
then letting my good friend Senator Jeffords proceed with his speech as 
in morning business, I am going to proceed with the wrapup, which will 
include a privilege to the Senator to continue even after we have 
finished.


                       THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, 
Thursday, July 16, 1998, the federal debt stood at 
$5,531,079,562,651.15 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-one billion, 
seventy-nine million, five hundred sixty-two thousand, six hundred 
fifty-one dollars and fifteen cents).
  One year ago, July 16, 1997, the federal debt stood at 
$5,357,954,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred fifty-seven billion, 
nine hundred fifty-four million).
  Five years ago, July 16, 1993, the federal debt stood at 
$4,334,093,000,000 (Four trillion, three hundred thirty-four billion, 
ninety-three million).
  Twenty-five years ago, July 16, 1973, the federal debt stood at 
$455,344,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-five billion, three hundred forty-
four million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion--
$5,075,735,562,651.15 (Five trillion, seventy-five billion, seven 
hundred thirty-five million, five hundred sixty-two thousand, six 
hundred fifty-one dollars and fifteen cents) during the past 25 years.

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