[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 96 (Friday, July 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8468-S8470]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SENATE'S CHINA INVESTIGATIONS

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as every Senator is aware, a number of 
Committees are investigating the national security impacts of two parts 
of the U.S. relationship with China: the launching of American 
commercial satellites on Chinese rockets, and the so-called ``China 
Plan'' to influence the American political process through campaign 
donations.
  Earlier this week the Majority Leader came to the floor to announce 
what he called ``major interim judgments'' of his task force 
coordinating this investigation. His remarks sparked a round of debate 
and speculation that may have clouded the real issues at hand, and I 
would like to take a moment to respond.
  These are unquestionably significant issues that merit serious, 
objective review. For me and for the Democratic Senators on our 
investigation task force, the objective is simple: national security.
  We want the national security to be enhanced; we want American lives 
and American interests protected.
  If the Senate's work on the satellite export issue reveals flaws in 
our export controls that endanger national security, we want those 
flaws corrected--now.
  If the facts warrant, we will gladly join with our Republican 
colleagues to that end. But there should be no place for politics, for 
partisan political maneuvering, when it comes to national security.
  We also want U.S. law to be enforced without fear or favor. If the 
law was violated in campaign financing for the 1996 election, 
Democratic Senators want the guilty held accountable. The best way to 
ensure this occurs is not to discuss classified information associated 
with these cases, and thereby avoid impeding or damaging the FBI's and 
the Justice Department's ability to investigate and build cases.
  In short, we care about this investigation because we care about 
national security.
  One of the most important guardians of national security is the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is a unique committee, 
Mr. President. It is not set up like others. It has a vice-chairman, 
not a ranking member. Its makeup gives the majority party just a one-
vote advantage regardless of the composition of the Senate.
  We try to keep partisanship out of most things we do, but in the case 
of this Committee, Mr. President, we insist on it, because Americans 
are more safe when Congress can conduct oversight of intelligence 
functions in a manner that is not just bipartisan, but nonpartisan.
  It is for this reason that I agreed with the Majority Leader's 
decision to assign primary responsibility to the vital China 
investigation to the Intelligence Committee. And it is also for this 
reason that I am so gravely disappointed when its nonpartisan tradition 
is violated.
  That tradition makes the assertion earlier this week that ``interim 
judgments'' had been reached in the China matter particularly 
disturbing. The Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the 
senator from Nebraska, said they most assuredly had not, a fact 
subsequently confirmed by the Chairman.
  The Democratic priority is national security. National security is a 
complex and demanding topic in today's world. While several Senate 
committees consider the effect on Chinese ballistic missiles of 
launching American commercial satellites in China, this nation faces 
many other equally grave and immediate threats to our national 
security.
  For example, Russia, which is now in an economic and military 
tailspin, has thousands of nuclear warheads and many tons of fissile 
material from which warheads could be made at stake and perhaps in 
jeopardy.
  The temptation in Russia today to look the other way while such 
materials quietly migrate to rogue states must be acute. That's one way 
in which Russia's problems threaten the United States.
  Other threats appear in the headlines for a few days and then recede 
from public view, but they are still out there: the very unstable 
nuclear confrontation in South Asia, the development of weapons of mass 
destruction by Iran and other rogue states, the growing conflict in 
Kosovo, the growing tension between the Koreas, the still-tense Bosnia 
situation.
  We are also threatened today by non-nation state actors, the 
terrorist organizations who plot to kill or kidnap Americans overseas, 
and the crime cartels who use today's increasingly open international 
borders to bring narcotics and other criminal activity to our shores. 
Information warfare and the relationship between computers and our 
national infrastructure is another arena in which hostile nations, 
movements, or even individuals can threaten us.
  All these threats present greater challenges to the defense, 
intelligence, and law enforcement establishments than they encountered 
during the cold war.
  At the same time, the haystack is growing, the needles are as small 
as ever. We need to support and strengthen our capabilities in these 
areas. We need to be able to react quickly to changing threats and 
develop the brainpower to master environments ranging from now-obscure 
foreign cultures at one extreme, to global cyberspace at the other.
  The one thing we should not do is stand pat, as if winning the cold 
war gives us the right to relax.
  Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the elements of 
government that defend against, deter, or counter the threats: the 
world's most capable military forces, informed by the world's leading 
intelligence services, as well as law enforcement entities which are 
second to none. It is our responsibility in Congress to fund these 
activities, to guide their continued improvement, and to oversee what 
they do.
  If these departments and agencies are essential to our national 
security--and they are--then our Congressional authorization, 
appropriation and oversight processes for these activities are also 
essential to national security.
  The need to address these issues underscores the importance of the 
Intelligence Committee's mandate. To approach these matters in a spirit 
of partisanship arguably puts the national security at risk.
  As for the China inquiry, to my knowledge, none of the four 
committees that have conducted hearings on the matter has reached any 
conclusions, interim or otherwise. Many documents already in the 
possession of Congress have not even been reviewed. Other documents 
have not yet been received from the administration, which is working 
hard to comply with the sweeping document requests they have gotten 
from Congress.
  So it is premature to reach even interim conclusions. To do so 
subverts the Congressional oversight process.
  I would prefer not to be here discussing ongoing investigations. But 
I think it is important to correct the record so that from this point 
on we can let the committees do their work.
  It has been suggested this week on the Senate floor that the Clinton 
administration's export controls for satellites are wholly inadequate. 
That statement should be considered in its historical context.
  The policy of exporting satellites for launch on Chinese rockets was 
initiated in 1988 under President Reagan and has continued under 
Presidents Bush and Clinton. President Bush authorized the export of 9 
satellites to China in three years. Each of these satellites could only 
be exported after President Bush determined that the transaction was in 
the U.S. national interest and that the Tianamen sanctions should be 
waived.
  President Clinton did make some changes in the licensing process for 
the export of commercial communications satellites.
  President Bush transferred licensing authority for over one-half of 
all commercial satellites from State to Commerce and recommended that 
serious consideration be given to moving the rest over to Commerce. 
President Clinton completed this transfer and issued

[[Page S8469]]

an executive order that greatly increased the role of the Defense 
Department in these decisions. In recent testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, a witness, otherwise critical of the Clinton 
administration, acknowledged that the United States has the strongest 
and best export controls in the world!
  Does this mean the system is perfect? Certainly not. No multi-agency 
process involving thousands of decisionmakers and difficult technical 
and political issues can be. In fact, as a result of some of the 
information disclosed in the early stages of the hearings, I believe 
some modification is probably in order. For example, the Departments of 
Defense and State should see the final text of all licenses.
  However, these are minor fixes in a system that, according to State, 
Commerce, Defense, and the intelligence community, is working well.
  Second, it has been asserted that sensitive technology related to 
satellite exports has been transferred to China. Under the Clinton 
administration, all requests to launch U.S. satellites aboard Chinese 
rockets go through an exhaustive and careful scrutiny. The Departments 
of Defense and State must approve all licenses and always place U.S. 
national security in the forefront of their decision process. Their 
primary role in this process is to specifically design procedures to 
ensure that China's access to U.S. technology is limited solely to what 
is needed to mate the U.S. satellite to the Chinese launcher.
  If these procedures are properly followed, the Chinese learn little, 
if anything, about our satellites or the technology they contain. 
Indeed, the Chinese gain no direct access to our satellites and only 
take ownership of the U.S. satellites they purchase from us after they 
are successfully placed in orbit.
  Third, it has been charged that China has received military benefit 
from U.S. satellite exports, and reference has been made to Chinese 
missiles pointed at U.S. nuclear cities. These very same missiles were 
developed years before President Reagan decided to allow U.S. 
satellites to be placed atop Chinese launchers.
  Furthermore, Intelligence Committee hearings have been held on this 
very issue. And I might say all of them were closed hearings, and 
public accounts of those hearings fail to substantiate this sensational 
charge. There is no public account, to my understanding, that 
substantiates the sensational charges made earlier by people on this 
floor.
  The final specific charge I will address today is the assertion that 
new evidence has come to light about a Chinese plan to influence our 
political process, and that this new evidence should lead the Attorney 
General to appoint an independent counsel. Unfortunately, the ``new'' 
evidence cited is highly classified and cannot and should not be 
discussed publicly.
  Mr. President, publicly characterizing classified information under 
any circumstance is dangerous. Using it to make charges against which 
the accused are unable to defend themselves is even more so.
  Classification is a misunderstood, sometimes frustrating, thing. It 
is difficult to explain and understand why we keep some things secret. 
Well, the reason is simple. Americans, and our friends around the 
world, quite literally risk their lives to gather this information 
because we promise to protect them.
  When classified information is characterized, the sources who collect 
intelligence and the methods by which they do so are in danger. 
Furthermore, because the information involved was classified, those 
citing it are fully aware that the individuals involved cannot, under 
law, use that information to reply.
  I will resist the temptation to place on the Record my own 
characterization of this new classified information. Instead, I will 
simply make the point that we have heard Republican Members make 
equally ominous proclamations about the China-plot in the past only to 
see that these facts fail to substantiate their own allegations.
  Moreover, Attorney General Janet Reno has access to all relevant 
information, classified and unclassified. She has not been reluctant to 
call for a special prosecutor in the past, and I am confident that 
should the facts warrant, she will not hesitate to do so in this case.
  These observations cover my concerns about what has been voiced by 
critics of this administration's export policies. However, my greatest 
reservation is the result of what has not been stated. These critics 
repeatedly fail to mention that the last six Presidents--Democratic and 
Republican alike--have each concluded it is in our national interest to 
engage China, not isolate it.
  Specifically, every President since Ronald Reagan has agreed that our 
national security is enhanced as a result of allowing the Chinese to 
place U.S. satellites in orbit.
  Based on current information, I agree with this assessment. I believe 
it is in our national interest to dominate the world's commercial 
satellite market. This is a strategic industry vital to our defense. We 
simply cannot be the dominant power in today's high-tech world without 
this industry and others like it.
  This industry also produces tens of thousands of challenging, high-
paying jobs for Americans. So when the Chinese choose an American 
satellite instead of a foreign satellite, that is good for our security 
as well as our economy. But the underlying point is that congressional 
committees are taking a fresh look at all these issues. Therefore, I 
will reserve final judgment pending their findings.
  The China investigations now underway could have significant, 
positive benefit for national security. That is my goal and the goal of 
the Democratic task force. We look forward to working with Senator Lott 
and Republican members of his task force to get an outcome that makes 
America safer.
  I applaud many members of our task force and the work done by members 
of the committee. The next speaker, Mr. President, deserves special 
commendation. He is not only a member of the Intelligence Committee, 
but he is our ranking member on the Armed Services Committee. I do not 
know of anyone who has put more time and effort into sifting through 
these facts and attempting as best as he can, in as objective a manner 
as he can, what the facts are. He has done so in a fashion that is 
commensurate with his reputation. I commend him again for his studious 
and thoughtful analysis and the work that he has provided not only to 
our task force but to the committee.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. First, let me thank the Democratic leader for those kind 
comments.
  It is my intention just to briefly amplify what the Democratic leader 
said here this afternoon. And I am greatly appreciative for the 
tremendous support that he has given to an effort to achieve a 
bipartisan approach to an issue which should be approached in a 
bipartisan manner. There is no justification for partisanizing this 
issue. It will weaken our security if we do so. And the Democratic 
leader's effort to insist that we approach this issue in a bipartisan 
way, I hope, will produce some results.
  Mr. President, the statement that was released last Tuesday by the 
majority leader was a highly partisan approach to the multiple hearings 
which we have had in the Senate relative to the export of satellites to 
China.
  I happen to sit on three of the four Senate committees that have held 
these hearings, so I speak from personal experience when I say that the 
majority leader's statement omitted some of the most important 
testimony that those committees received.
  His statement also conveyed the false impression that the statement 
was a bipartisan product, when to the best of my knowledge not a single 
Democrat was consulted or even knew that the statement was being 
prepared.
  The majority leader's statements claim that he was being careful not 
to rush to judgment, but then he offered such unequivocal conclusions 
as:

       The Clinton Administration's export controls for satellites 
     are wholly inadequate, [and that] they have not protected 
     sensitive U.S. technology, [and that] national security 
     concerns are regularly downplayed and even ignored, [and 
     that] sensitive technology related to satellite exports has 
     been transferred to China, [and that] China has received 
     military benefit from U.S. satellite exports.


[[Page S8470]]


  To my knowledge, Mr. President, not one of the Senate committees 
investigating these issues has reached those conclusions. The evidence 
that the majority leader offered to support his conclusions ignored 
some of the most important testimony that we received, obviously, 
because it contradicted their conclusions offered.
  For example, the majority leader's statement ignored testimony by 
senior Department of Defense and State officials on June 18 and 25 and 
on July 8 that the 1996 Clinton Executive order ``strengthened'' the 
Department of Defense's role in Commerce export licenses, rather than 
weakening it, and also ignored the fact that those Department of 
Defense and State Department officials believed ``it would be a bad 
thing'' to return to State licensing of commercial satellites.
  In a June 18 hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Security on which I sit, when responding 
to a question on whether commercial satellite export licensing should 
be returned to the State Department, Department of Defense, Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Jan Lodal testified that ``I think it 
would be a bad thing to do.'' And Assistant Under Secretary of State 
for International Security John Holum, testified, ``I agree. . . . I 
would recommend against that.''
  Mr. President, the statement of the majority leader last Tuesday also 
ignored the Department of Defense and State Department letters which 
were included in the June 18 Governmental Affairs Committee 
subcommittee hearing record and which stated that each agency has an 
adequate opportunity to revise and support the issuance of all 
satellite export licenses actually issued by Commerce since 1990.
  The majority leader's statement ignored testimony on June 18 by 
senior State and DOD officials, stating that they are unaware of any 
transfer of sensitive U.S. satellite technology to China that has 
harmed U.S. national security.
  Mr. Holum testified, ``[W]e do not believe that any launch of a 
commercial satellite under this policy since 1988 has resulted in a 
transfer of significant technology or assistance to Chinese either 
space-launch vehicle capabilities or missile capabilities.''
  Mr. Lodal testified, ``I agree. We're not aware of any situation in 
which such transfer harmed U.S. security.'' Yet the majority leader's 
statement ignores that kind of testimony.
  Now, the majority leader's statement cited testimony critical of U.S. 
export control from a June 25 hearing before the Governmental Affairs 
Committee by an individual that the majority leader described as a 
``senior official of the Defense Trade and Security Administration,'' 
without mentioning testimony the following week before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee revealing that this individual, Dr. Peter Leitner, 
had been demoted by the Bush administration from a senior policy 
position to a lower-level licensing officer within that office. The 
statement of the majority leader also omitted testimony on June 25 and 
on July 9 by some of Dr. Leitner's current and former superiors at the 
Department of Defense contradicting Mr. Leitner's facts and assertions.
  The majority leader's statement cites testimony by the GAO before the 
Senate Intelligence Committee on June 10, but omitted testimony from 
the same hearing indicating that the General Accounting Office has not 
reached a conclusion on whether current export controls are adequate to 
protect national security, and he omitted to say that the Intelligence 
Committee had requested the General Accounting Office to conclude that 
analysis. Now, the relevant testimony came from Katherine Schinasi, the 
Associate Director of the International Affairs Division at the General 
Accounting Office. Responding to a question about Department of 
Defense's ability to effectively advocate national security interests 
in the current export control process, she testified on behalf of the 
General Accounting Office that, ``We have not looked at how that 
process has operated.''
  The majority leader's statement indicates that moving satellites from 
the State Department to the Commerce Department eliminated the 
requirement that Congress receive notice of individual export licenses. 
The statement failed to mention the legal requirement that the 
President must notify Congress of all national security waivers 
authorizing commercial satellite exports to China, whether the export 
license is issued by State or by Commerce. The majority leader's 
statement also failed to note that Congress has, in fact, received 
timely notice of every waiver granted to export a satellite to China; 
and that Congress has received timely notice of the decisions in 1992 
and 1996 to transfer satellites from the State Department to the 
Commerce Department. It fails to acknowledge that despite receiving all 
those notices, Congress took no action to express disagreement with the 
decisions made.
  The majority leader's statement also omitted mention of the National 
Security Council letter included in the July 9 Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing record, stating that the National Security Council 
conducts the same waiver review process for commercial satellite 
exports to China, whether the export license is issued by the State 
Department or by the Commerce Department.
  The majority leader's report omitted testimony on June 18 and July 8 
before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on international security, 
by senior Defense and State Department officials that, after the 3 
unmonitored satellite launches took place in China, a policy decision 
was made in 1996 and remains in effect today, requiring the Defense 
Department to monitor all satellite launches, whether or not a 
satellite contains sensitive technology.
  Mr. Lodal, speaking for the Defense Department, testified on June 18 
that

       Communication [satellite] licenses include strong 
     safeguards, including DOD monitoring . . . DOD currently 
     reviews all communication satellite licenses to ensure that 
     the proposed export would be consistent with U.S. national 
     security interests . . . [A]fter the implementation of the 
     1992 Bush administration decision to transfer to Commerce 
     purely commercial satellites, and before the 1996 revision, 
     there were three launches that were not monitored . . . We're 
     not aware of any transfer of technology from these 
     unmonitered launches that contributed to China's missile and 
     military satellite capabilities.

  He continued, speaking for the Defense Department:

       Nevertheless, DOD did conclude that full monitoring would 
     be a strong safeguard at relatively low cost to the 
     companies, and that it should be applied to all license 
     cases, even those that did not require Department of State 
     licenses. And this was agreed by all agencies and 
     incorporated as a requirement in 1996, when jurisdiction was 
     transferred to Commerce for all commercial communications 
     satellites. . . .''

  The majority leader's statement identified the major ``military 
benefit'' of China launches of U.S.-made commercial satellites to be 
the access gained by the Chinese military to an improved commercial 
telephone system, without acknowledging that that same so-called 
military benefit would have accrued if China had instead launched 
European-made commercial satellites.
  The majority leader's statement ignored testimony from Clinton 
administration critics on July 9 before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that the United States export control system is still the 
``best'' and most restrictive in the world.
  Now, the majority leader has the right to say whatever he wishes on 
the subject of satellite exports to China. But he is wrong to suggest, 
as his statement did, that his conclusions were bipartisan, or that 
they were reached by the Senate committees examining this issue. His 
statement struck a major blow to whatever hopes there were that the 
Senate committees would proceed in this matter in a bipartisan way, 
with emphasis on the facts rather than on partisan politics.
  Mr. President, I hope that a bipartisan approach can still be 
salvaged. But I think it is fair to say that that goal, that effort 
which is so important to the national security of this Nation, was 
given a set-back by the highly partisan comments of the majority leader 
on this floor last Tuesday.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

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