[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 95 (Thursday, July 16, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8281-S8283]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     CHINA TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I was disappointed by some of the actions of 
the majority leader's statement the day before yesterday in which he 
provided an update on the Senate inquiry into U.S. policy on satellite 
exports to China.
  In particular, some charged that the majority leader was engaging in 
partisan politics when he simply presented some of the things that we 
have learned in the 13 hearings and the numerous briefings and meetings 
held on that subject to date.
  As a member of the task force appointed by the leader, I can state 
conclusively, Mr. President, that this investigation is driven by a 
desire to safeguard our Nation's security, and it is not motivated by 
partisan politics.
  Let's examine the five main points that the leader raised in his 
remarks.
  Point one: The Clinton administration's export controls for 
satellites are inadequate and have not protected U.S. security.
  Many of us have been dismayed at the lax implementation and the 
irregular application of safeguards during launches of American 
satellites in China. For example, the Clinton administration has failed 
to require Defense Department monitors for every Chinese launch of U.S. 
satellites. Monitors are typically Air Force officers who are required 
to be present at all meetings with the Chinese launch service provider 
and the American satellite exporter. The monitor's presence is 
necessary because sensitive know-how can be inadvertently disclosed.
  Chinese officials make no secret of their desire to obtain high-tech 
information, and the incentive for an American company to provide 
information

[[Page S8282]]

necessary for a successful launch of a multimillion-dollar satellite is 
great, therefore a monitor can be extremely helpful in reducing the 
amount of information that is shared with Chinese engineers and 
scientists.

  Although Clinton administration officials routinely note the 
importance of monitors in testimony and briefings, under the current 
system, monitors are not required by statute, regulation, or 
international agreement. In fact, during three satellite launch 
campaigns conducted in China since 1995, monitors have not been present 
at any stage of the process. In three other launch campaigns in China, 
though not required by the government, monitors have been present only 
for the launch, but not the important technical exchange meetings 
dealing with mating the satellite to the launch vehicle and ensuring 
that it survives the stressful launch environment and is delivered 
intact to the intended orbit.
  The majority leader's point that export controls on satellites are 
inadequate is not merely endorsed by the members of the task force. As 
the New York Times said in an editorial on the issue on May 26, ``In 
its eagerness to improve relations with Beijing and expand American 
commerce in China, the White House has been careless about enforcing 
security protections.'' One month later, the New York Times again 
commented on the subject in another editorial on June 19 which stated,

       Evidence keeps mounting that the Chinese Army is exploiting 
     flawed American export controls to acquire sophisticated 
     satellite communications technology for military and 
     intelligence use. The Pentagon and State Department are now 
     questioning the pending sale of a Hughes communications 
     satellite whose upgraded design would let Chinese authorities 
     eavesdrop on mobile telephone conversations at home and 
     abroad. President Clinton should suspend this sale and the 
     licensing of any more satellite deals with China until export 
     control rules are tightened. In particular, he needs to put 
     the State and Defense Departments back in charge of export 
     approvals and diminish the role of the Commerce Department.

  That is the New York Times speaking. That is not the majority leader. 
It is obviously a sentiment he shares.
  This sentiment is shared on a bipartisan basis. During a hearing of 
the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Senator Cleland criticized the administration for shifting 
responsibility for regulating satellite exports from the State 
Department to the Commerce Department stating, ``I've got more and more 
concern about Commerce becoming the lead dog here. I'd rather hedge my 
bets and put national security first and commerce second.''

  The second point made by the leader day before yesterday was that in 
violation of stated United States policy, sensitive technology related 
to satellite exports has been transferred to China.
  Mr. President, this is also an accurate, objective statement that is 
widely shared. Additional hearings will be necessary to continue to 
gauge how much damage has been done to United States national security, 
but several launches have occurred in China without the necessary 
safeguards and at least two analyses conducted by American companies of 
failed launches have been sent to China without first being reviewed by 
the State or Defense Departments.
  As the Washington Post said on May 31,

       There is little dispute that some American know-how 
     inevitably seeped across to the Chinese, despite strict rules 
     covering what technology United States companies could share 
     with the Chinese and despite the monitoring of contracts by 
     United States Air Force specialists. The argument is over how 
     much seepage occurred and whether any of it helped China 
     improve its military rockets.

  Again, the majority leaders' comments are vindicated by the press.
  The third point made by the leader day before yesterday was that 
China has received military benefit from United States satellite 
exports.
  Additional information in this regard may be uncovered as the 
Senate's inquiry continues, but some key information has already come 
to light. Last month, in a front page story published on June 13, the 
New York Times broke the news that,

       For the past two years, China's military has relied on 
     American-made satellites sold for civilian purposes to 
     transmit messages to its far-flung army garrisons, according 
     to highly classified intelligence reports. The reports are 
     the most powerful evidence to date that the American 
     Government knew that China's Army was taking advantage of 
     the Bush and Clinton Administrations' decisions to 
     encourage sales of American high technology to Asian 
     companies.

  Again, the majority leader was not wrong. He is right.
  The fourth point made by the majority leader was that the 
administration has ignored overwhelming information regarding Chinese 
proliferation and has embarked on a de facto policy designed to protect 
China and United States satellite companies from sanctions under United 
States nonproliferation law.
  This is another objective observation about what we have learned from 
the hearings conducted so far. And again I turn to reports in the media 
in confirmation of the majority leader's point. As the Washington Post 
reported on June 12,

       The former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's 
     weapons counter-proliferation efforts told a Senate committee 
     yesterday that the Clinton Administration's determination not 
     to impose economic sanctions on China led it to play down 
     persuasive evidence that Beijing sold nuclear-capable M-11 
     missiles to Pakistan. ``There's no question in my mind'' that 
     China sold 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in November 1992, 
     Gordon Oehler, former director of the CIA's Nonproliferation 
     Center, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
     Intelligence agencies are ``virtually certain'' the sale 
     occurred he said, but ``intelligence analysts were very 
     discouraged to see their work was regularly dismissed'' by 
     Clinton aides.

  Yet despite this overwhelming evidence, the Clinton administration 
has not imposed sanctions and as a result of the transfer of authority 
over satellite exports from the State Department to the Commerce 
Department, satellite exports have been shielded from the effects of 
sanctions. Prof. Gary Milhollin made this point in testimony to the 
Armed Services Committee on July 9, stating,

       One of the main effects of this transfer has been to remove 
     satellites from the list of items that are subject to U.S. 
     sanctions for missile proliferation. In effect, the transfer 
     has given Chinese firms a green light to sell missile 
     technology to Iran and Pakistan. Chinese companies can now 
     sell components for nuclear-capable missiles without worrying 
     about losing U.S. satellite contracts.

  The administration has been interested in shielding China from the 
effects of United States nonproliferation sanctions for some time. 
According to a classified National Security Council memo reprinted in 
the Washington Times in March, the administration believed one of the 
benefits of United States support for China's membership in the Missile 
Technology Control Regime would be ``substantial protection from future 
U.S. missile sanctions.''
  And again what the majority leader said is on the record. It is 
vindicated. It is not wrong.
  The fifth and final point made by the majority leader day before 
yesterday was that new information has come to light about China's 
efforts to influence the American political process and that the 
Attorney General should name an independent counsel to investigate.
  I serve on the Intelligence Committee which recently received 
classified testimony from the Attorney General and the Director of 
Central Intelligence on this subject. While obviously I will not 
comment on that testimony here, I simply point out that over the past 
few months a great deal of troubling information has been published on 
the subject in the press. As the Senate investigation proceeds we may 
uncover additional information in this area, but in my view the 
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate these allegations 
is already long overdue.
  As I have tried to demonstrate today, attempts to portray the 
majority leader's statement or the work of the task force as partisan 
politics are simply invalid. The protection of our nation's security 
has been--and should be--our only concern. I urge my colleagues to 
examine the Record before leveling such charges. Although the Senate 
investigation will continue, it is clear that we must change the way we 
handle export controls on sensitive technology or risk further 
jeopardizing America's security.
  The bottom line, Mr. President, is that when the majority leader made 
his controversial remarks, he was right and the record needs to reflect 
that.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S8283]]

  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________