[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 94 (Wednesday, July 15, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1308-E1309]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE U.S. AND PANAMA BEYOND 1999

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. ELTON GALLEGLY

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, July 15, 1998

  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, over the July Fourth district work period 
some very disturbing and disheartening news reached us regarding 
negotiations between the United States and Panama as to the presence of 
the United States in Panama beyond 1999. And now, our State Department 
is about to inform the Government of Panama that talks may just be 
over. This could be a mistake and both sides should agree to take a 
time out and enter into a cooling off period.
  As my colleagues know, next year, on December 31, 1999, the Panama 
Canal Zone will be turned over to Panamanian control and all United 
States forces are to withdraw from that nation. However, for over a 
year, the United States and the Government of Panama, largely at the 
suggestion of the Panamanian President, Perez Balladares, have been 
negotiating a compromise which would permit a limited number of U.S. 
military personnel to remain in Panama.
  The negotiations were over the creation of a new multinational anti-
narcotics center which would be located at the Howard Air Force Base. 
Under the agreement, which was largely completed last January, some 
2,000 U.S. military personnel would be permitted to remain in Panama to 
staff the center which would provide regional air surveillance, 
intelligence information and direct counter-narcotics assistance to 
nations participating in the center. At the time, there was a good deal 
of optimism expressed by both sides that the agreement would satisfy 
each nation's specific needs. Panama would see the end of U.S. control 
of the Canal and would gain what it considered its final and total 
national sovereignty. The U.S. would retain a presence in Panama while 
not appearing to be retaining a strictly defined military base. For the 
United States, the retention of a small military profile in Panama 
would allow us to maintain our commitment to the preservation of 
democracy and stability in Central America and to continue the fight 
against the drug trade essentially in region. For Panama, the continued 
presence of U.S. personnel would serve as a confidence builder for 
foreign investors and those concerned over the future security of the 
canal.
  Interestingly, Panamanian public opinion seemed to favor such an 
agreement for largely the same reasons.
  Unfortunately, and despite the initial optimism, the agreement now 
appears to be in serious jeopardy as both sides seem to be having 
difficulty deciding what it is they really want. The Government of 
Panama, for its part, can't seem to make up its mind as to whether it 
really wants a continued U.S. presence beyond 1999 or for that matter, 
a counter-drug center on its territory. All of this is wrapped around 
internal political and Presidential politics with President Perez 
Balladares unable to determine whether such a center helps or hurts his 
standing within his own political party and whether it hurts or helps 
his reelection chances.
  The United States, for its part, cannot seem to decide whether it 
wants a military base or

[[Page E1309]]

an anti-narcotics center in Panama. The whole premise for supporting an 
anti-drug center was to reassure those in this country that wanted the 
U.S. to remain in Panama that it was possible to do so and to avoid the 
controversy within Panama of retaining a bona fide military base in 
that country beyond 1999 and in violation of the Panama Canal Treaties. 
A multinational, anti-drug center seemed to fit the bill with at least 
a wink and a nod. Even the other nations of the region, while 
supporting the concept of an anti-narcotics center, were not about to 
sign on if the center was simply a cover for a U.S. military base.
  Yet, the negotiations have broken down at least in part due to the 
Clinton Administration's insistence that it be allowed to conduct 
additional operations out of the center which are more closely 
associated with military operations than counter-narcotics operations. 
One can argue the finer points of search and rescue or humanitarian 
resupply, but to insist on them being part of a non-military base, 
anti-drug center, does give the Panamanian government a legitimate 
issue to argue over. It seems that both sides could compromise on this 
issue. The U.S. side could temporarily drop its insistence on the 
inclusion of other missions and just work on the anti-drug center, 
provided of course that the anti-drug center is the priority. The 
Government of Panama could commit, preferably in a side note, to take 
up the question of the other missions once the anti-drug center 
agreement is finalized, if it really wants such a center in Panama.
  Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is that both sides must determine what 
it really wants. President Balladares must face the voters. The Clinton 
Administration must face the American people. If the drug center is 
that important, and in many respects it is. And if the ability to 
retain some element of the U.S. military in Panama beyond 1999 is a 
political necessity, and it could be, then the Administration must 
decide the price in throwing away this opportunity solely because we 
may not be able to write into the agreement whether or not search and 
rescue training can be conducted once in a while in Panama over the 
next twelve years.

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