[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8088-S8090]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          SATELLITE EXPORTS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am going to provide an update on the 
investigations that have been proceeding by four of our committees into 
this U.S. policy toward satellite exports. We have not reached any 
final determinations. I want to emphasize that. The good counsel is 
that we have made some progress. We are learning some things, but there 
is a good deal more work that needs to be done. I believe the 
Intelligence Committee has an open hearing scheduled tomorrow. Senator 
Cochran's subcommittee has hearings scheduled I believe next week. So 
we will continue this. We are going to be thorough and we are going to 
be cautious. We should not jump to conclusions.
  In this connection, I recently came across the following statement 
from 1989 concerning the Bush administration's decision to allow export 
licenses for three United States satellites: ``Allowing these launches 
is not in the best interests of our country or of our relationship with 
China. It casts a long shadow that distorts beyond recognition what the 
United States ought to represent to our own people and to the people 
fighting for democracy in China.'' This statement was made by then-
Senator Al Gore. He obviously has changed his position.
  What we have to examine is whether the policy of allowing the export 
of U.S. satellites as implemented by the Clinton-Gore administration 
adequately protects American national interests.
  Let me start with the bottom line. Senate investigations have only 
begun. Lack of cooperation from the Administration has hampered our 
efforts. Thirteen hearings with 32 witnesses have been held by four 
committees. I have met with the committee chairmen and other members of 
our informal task force on China. At this point, five major interim 
judgments can be made based on what we already know.
  First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites 
are wholly inadequate. They have not protected sensitive U.S. 
technology. National security concerns are regularly downplayed and 
even ignored.
  Second, in violation of stated United States policy, sensitive 
technology related to satellite exports has been transferred to China. 
We know what the case is.
  Third, China has received military benefit from United States 
satellite exports.
  Every day, there continues to be additional information that comes 
out in this area.
  In fact, in today's Washington Times, there is a news article that 
says ``U.S. Technology Builds `Bridge' for China Missile.''
  Fourth, the administration has ignored overwhelming information 
regarding Chinese proliferation, and has embarked on a de facto policy 
designed to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions 
under U.S. proliferation law. We have a statement from White House 
official to that effect.
  Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to 
influence the American political process. This new information should 
remove all resistance to naming an independent counsel to investigate 
the evidence and the allegations.
  The administration has failed to fully cooperate with the Senate 
investigation, even though they have indicated that they would, and 
there is still time for that. But on May 22, 1998, along committee 
chairmen of jurisdiction, I sent letters requesting administration 
documents from the White House, the Departments of State, Commerce, 
Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On June 1, 1998, 
a letter was sent to the Department of Justice requesting documents. On 
June 2, 1998, a letter was sent requesting documents from the Customs 
Service. On June 12, 1998, Senators Shelby and Kerrey sent letters 
requesting information from eight Governmental agencies and the White 
House as part of the Select Committee on Intelligence investigation.
  The letters I joined in sending requested documents in three areas: 
First, all issues associated with the export of satellites to China, 
including waivers of U.S. law governing such exports and the decision 
to transfer control of satellite exports from the Department of State 
to the Department of Commerce; second, issues associated with China's 
proposed membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR; and 
third, information on Chinese proliferation activities which indicate 
possible violations of U.S. laws.
  A significant amount of documents have been provided concerning some 
areas of satellite exports--particularly from the White House and 
particularly on the presidential waivers allowing satellite exports. 
But virtually no information has been provided concerning the transfer 
of export controls from State to Commerce--from the White House or any 
other agency. And virtually no information has been provided on Chinese 
membership in the MTCR, or on Chinese proliferation activities in 
violation of U.S. law.
  A review of executive branch compliance with our document requests 
demonstrates how limited the cooperation really has been.
  Until Friday of last week, the Department of Commerce only provided 
an initial limited set of documents. More has been promised, but the 
response has again glacial and incomplete. The documents they have 
provided contain redactions that limit their utility, quite frankly.
  The Department of Justice has provided nothing to the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, and has insisted on reviewing virtually all 
documents provided by any other Government agencies--significantly 
slowing down the process in this area.
  The Department of State has provided also virtually nothing. 
Classified documents, according to a July 2, 1998, letter, would not be 
provided to the Congress. Instead, documents could be read only at the 
Department of State. Given that far more sensitive information is 
routinely provided for the use of the Senate in Senate spaces, this can 
only be seen as bureaucratic obstruction.
  The White House has not responded to the Intelligence Committee. 
Neither has ACDA, Customs, or State. Defense and Commerce have only 
provided limited information.
  The White House initially declassified some documents concerning 
waiver decisions in June, but has provided nothing since then.
  The Department of Defense has provided only a very limited number of 
documents.
  The Customs Service has provided nothing other than a June 23, 1998, 
letter stating that they would not meet our June 15, 1998, deadline, 
but we haven't gotten that information as of yet.
  After a review of the Clinton administration's compliance with our 
requests for information, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
delay has become the standard operating procedure. Once again, it is 
going to make it difficult for us to get the information we need so we 
can make a clear determination about the damage that has been done with 
this technology transfer. After an initial show of good faith by the 
administration, we have not had a lot more cooperation since then.
  We will be forced to consider other measures to compel enforcement. I 
don't plan to move nominees of these non-cooperative agencies until our 
legitimate oversight requests are honored. We are actively examining 
the possibility of subpoena options. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to continue with the very productive hearings that we have 
had without this cooperation.

  Now, I would like to address the five points I raised earlier in some 
greater detail. Again, these are preliminary conclusions and we are 
seeking additional information.
  First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites 
are simply inadequate. There has not been adequate protection of 
sensitive U.S. technology. National security concerns are regularly 
downplayed and even ignored. Hearings before several committees have 
detailed the shortcomings in the development and implementation of 
export controls of satellites.
  For example, a senior official of the Defense Trade and Security 
Administration testified before the Committee

[[Page S8089]]

on Governmental Affairs on June 25, 1998, that ``over the past six 
years, the formal process to control dual-use items has failed in its 
stated mission--to safeguard the national security of the United 
States.''
  Transferring the control of satellite exports from the State 
Department to the Commerce Department in 1996 really resulted in 
dramatic changes. According to the General Accounting Office testimony 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 10, 1998, 
the transfer reduced the influence of the Defense Department. It 
eliminated Congressional notification. It exempted satellite exports 
from certain sanctions. Technical information is not as clearly 
controlled, leading to uncertainty on the part of aerospace companies 
and to more technology transfer than previously allowed.
  Testimony on July 8, 1998, before the Governmental Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Security, has established that the 
Department of Defense monitors are not required to be present at 
satellite launches. This is directly contrary to previous 
administration claims. No statute, policy, or regulation requires U.S. 
Government monitors.
  At least three U.S. satellites have been launched in China with no 
U.S. monitors present. No one in the U.S. Government knows what 
transpired at these launches or if U.S. laws and policies on technology 
transfer were followed. No one in our Government is even attempting to 
examine what occurred at these unmonitored satellite launches. Looking 
at these unmonitored launches, I think, would be a critical element of 
the next phase of our investigation.
  Today's satellite export control system relies on the good will of 
the Commerce Department, a department which has repeatedly demonstrated 
its willingness to ignore national security concerns on satellite 
exports. This is an area where we need to take a close look at how we 
are going to proceed in the future and what is going to be expected of 
the Commerce Department.
  For example, Commerce has unilaterally removed items subject to 
interagency license review without notice to other affected agencies. 
Commerce has also refused to send approved licenses to Defense so 
officials there can evaluate the final product. When it involves 
satellites and technology, clearly the Defense Department should be a 
part of this process.
  Second, sensitive technology related to satellite exports has been 
transferred to China. In at least two cases, U.S. companies analyzed 
Chinese launch failures and communicated with Chinese officials. In 
1995, Hughes analyzed the ``APSTAR 2'' launch failure. Commerce now 
concedes that this analysis should have been subject to State and 
Defense Department reviews before a Commerce official gave it to the 
Chinese. Commerce only provided the report, concluded in 1995, 2 hours 
before a Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International 
Proliferation hearing on July 8 of this year.
  The 1996 Loral launch failure is the subject of a Justice Department 
review for possible illegal transfer of technology. Compliance with the 
law is the province of the Justice Department. So we are looking into 
the impact on American national securities. It is very important that 
the Justice Department complete that work.
  I agree with three assessments by three elements of the State and 
Defense Departments that China derived significant benefits from their 
technical exchanges with U.S. companies after the Long March crash in 
1996, exchanges which are likely to lead to improvements in the 
reliability of their ballistic missile, and especially their guidance 
systems. So we have to be concerned very much about this transfer.
  Third, China has received military benefit from U.S. satellite 
exports. There is a division within the executive branch agencies over 
how much China has benefited. But there seems to be agreement that 
certainly some benefit was derived.
  The New York Times has reported that U.S. satellites are being used 
by the Chinese military for its internal coded communications. 
Administration officials concede that China is using American-made and 
exported satellites for their military communications. This is a clear 
and uncontested military benefit for China. The New York Times also 
reports that an additional satellite export that could enhance the 
Chinese military's ability to eavesdrop on phone conversations is under 
review by the Clinton administration.
  The administration has ignored overwhelming information regarding 
Chinese proliferation and has embarked on what appears to be a de facto 
policy to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions 
under our U.S. proliferation law. For instance, on June 11, 1998, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations heard testimony from the former director 
of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 
Clinton administration has used ``almost any measure'' to block 
intelligence judgments that China had transferred missiles to 
Pakistan--a clear violation of U.S. law that requires the imposition of 
sanctions. Intelligence analyses ``were summarily dismissed by the 
policy community.''

  According to the testimony, the intelligence community is ``virtually 
certain that this transfer had taken place . . .'' I am convinced, 
after a personal investigation, that it did take place, and it was a 
very dangerous for Pakistan to be receiving these missiles. Why has 
that been the case, and why hasn't the administration been willing to 
take actions providing sanctions where clearly that information has 
been provided?
  Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to 
influence the American political process. This new information should 
remove any doubt about the need for an independent counsel in this 
area.
  It has already been reported that FBI Director Freeh has indicated 
his view that an independent counsel should be appointed. It is time to 
renew attention on the Attorney General. It is time for an outside, 
impartial investigation by an independent counsel into the serious and 
credible charges of direct Chinese Government financing or involvement 
in the 1996 elections. We have very good committees that are working 
together in a bipartisan way and looking into these very important 
questions. I urge them to continue to do so, and to do it in a calm and 
methodical way. It is essential that we get cooperation from the 
administration to provide the additional information that we requested, 
the additional evidence. And we will carry out our constitutional 
responsibilities. Nothing less should be expected of us.
  In view of the inquiries we had about how these are proceeding, what 
information we have been getting, what is outstanding, and also what is 
our plan, as far as future hearings, I thought it was important that I 
give some review of what has transpired.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in light of the statements that have just 
been made and the time consumed by the majority leader, I ask unanimous 
consent that each side have 10 minutes to debate the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will have the opportunity to discuss, 
in greater detail, the remarks just made by the distinguished majority 
leader. Let me just say that our interest, too, is to have a bipartisan 
review of the actions taken with regard to the technology transfer in 
China. But I do hope that it will be bipartisan. The majority leader 
gave what I would view to be a pretty partisan report this morning with 
regard to the allegations pending on this particular matter, and I will 
have a very thorough response to the majority leader at some point 
today. I do believe that the issue warrants our review. As he said, 
this is a constitutional responsibility, but it also warrants 
objectivity and very thoughtful and careful consideration of the facts. 
Many of the reports the distinguished majority leader cited were 
allegations that have yet to be proven, allegations reported--he 
mentioned the New York Times on a number of occasions--allegations 
reported, citing unidentified sources, and what I would consider to be 
very questionable sources with regard to the information reported in 
some cases. So we are going to have to be very careful about the 
distinction between allegation and fact, the distinction between what 
has actually occurred and what is reported or what is

[[Page S8090]]

alleged to have occurred. So I hope that we can do that, as he noted, 
in a bipartisan way, thoroughly and very carefully examining the facts 
and coming to some conclusion prior to the time we issue any reports.

                          ____________________