[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8088-S8090]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SATELLITE EXPORTS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am going to provide an update on the
investigations that have been proceeding by four of our committees into
this U.S. policy toward satellite exports. We have not reached any
final determinations. I want to emphasize that. The good counsel is
that we have made some progress. We are learning some things, but there
is a good deal more work that needs to be done. I believe the
Intelligence Committee has an open hearing scheduled tomorrow. Senator
Cochran's subcommittee has hearings scheduled I believe next week. So
we will continue this. We are going to be thorough and we are going to
be cautious. We should not jump to conclusions.
In this connection, I recently came across the following statement
from 1989 concerning the Bush administration's decision to allow export
licenses for three United States satellites: ``Allowing these launches
is not in the best interests of our country or of our relationship with
China. It casts a long shadow that distorts beyond recognition what the
United States ought to represent to our own people and to the people
fighting for democracy in China.'' This statement was made by then-
Senator Al Gore. He obviously has changed his position.
What we have to examine is whether the policy of allowing the export
of U.S. satellites as implemented by the Clinton-Gore administration
adequately protects American national interests.
Let me start with the bottom line. Senate investigations have only
begun. Lack of cooperation from the Administration has hampered our
efforts. Thirteen hearings with 32 witnesses have been held by four
committees. I have met with the committee chairmen and other members of
our informal task force on China. At this point, five major interim
judgments can be made based on what we already know.
First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites
are wholly inadequate. They have not protected sensitive U.S.
technology. National security concerns are regularly downplayed and
even ignored.
Second, in violation of stated United States policy, sensitive
technology related to satellite exports has been transferred to China.
We know what the case is.
Third, China has received military benefit from United States
satellite exports.
Every day, there continues to be additional information that comes
out in this area.
In fact, in today's Washington Times, there is a news article that
says ``U.S. Technology Builds `Bridge' for China Missile.''
Fourth, the administration has ignored overwhelming information
regarding Chinese proliferation, and has embarked on a de facto policy
designed to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions
under U.S. proliferation law. We have a statement from White House
official to that effect.
Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to
influence the American political process. This new information should
remove all resistance to naming an independent counsel to investigate
the evidence and the allegations.
The administration has failed to fully cooperate with the Senate
investigation, even though they have indicated that they would, and
there is still time for that. But on May 22, 1998, along committee
chairmen of jurisdiction, I sent letters requesting administration
documents from the White House, the Departments of State, Commerce,
Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On June 1, 1998,
a letter was sent to the Department of Justice requesting documents. On
June 2, 1998, a letter was sent requesting documents from the Customs
Service. On June 12, 1998, Senators Shelby and Kerrey sent letters
requesting information from eight Governmental agencies and the White
House as part of the Select Committee on Intelligence investigation.
The letters I joined in sending requested documents in three areas:
First, all issues associated with the export of satellites to China,
including waivers of U.S. law governing such exports and the decision
to transfer control of satellite exports from the Department of State
to the Department of Commerce; second, issues associated with China's
proposed membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR; and
third, information on Chinese proliferation activities which indicate
possible violations of U.S. laws.
A significant amount of documents have been provided concerning some
areas of satellite exports--particularly from the White House and
particularly on the presidential waivers allowing satellite exports.
But virtually no information has been provided concerning the transfer
of export controls from State to Commerce--from the White House or any
other agency. And virtually no information has been provided on Chinese
membership in the MTCR, or on Chinese proliferation activities in
violation of U.S. law.
A review of executive branch compliance with our document requests
demonstrates how limited the cooperation really has been.
Until Friday of last week, the Department of Commerce only provided
an initial limited set of documents. More has been promised, but the
response has again glacial and incomplete. The documents they have
provided contain redactions that limit their utility, quite frankly.
The Department of Justice has provided nothing to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, and has insisted on reviewing virtually all
documents provided by any other Government agencies--significantly
slowing down the process in this area.
The Department of State has provided also virtually nothing.
Classified documents, according to a July 2, 1998, letter, would not be
provided to the Congress. Instead, documents could be read only at the
Department of State. Given that far more sensitive information is
routinely provided for the use of the Senate in Senate spaces, this can
only be seen as bureaucratic obstruction.
The White House has not responded to the Intelligence Committee.
Neither has ACDA, Customs, or State. Defense and Commerce have only
provided limited information.
The White House initially declassified some documents concerning
waiver decisions in June, but has provided nothing since then.
The Department of Defense has provided only a very limited number of
documents.
The Customs Service has provided nothing other than a June 23, 1998,
letter stating that they would not meet our June 15, 1998, deadline,
but we haven't gotten that information as of yet.
After a review of the Clinton administration's compliance with our
requests for information, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
delay has become the standard operating procedure. Once again, it is
going to make it difficult for us to get the information we need so we
can make a clear determination about the damage that has been done with
this technology transfer. After an initial show of good faith by the
administration, we have not had a lot more cooperation since then.
We will be forced to consider other measures to compel enforcement. I
don't plan to move nominees of these non-cooperative agencies until our
legitimate oversight requests are honored. We are actively examining
the possibility of subpoena options. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to continue with the very productive hearings that we have
had without this cooperation.
Now, I would like to address the five points I raised earlier in some
greater detail. Again, these are preliminary conclusions and we are
seeking additional information.
First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites
are simply inadequate. There has not been adequate protection of
sensitive U.S. technology. National security concerns are regularly
downplayed and even ignored. Hearings before several committees have
detailed the shortcomings in the development and implementation of
export controls of satellites.
For example, a senior official of the Defense Trade and Security
Administration testified before the Committee
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on Governmental Affairs on June 25, 1998, that ``over the past six
years, the formal process to control dual-use items has failed in its
stated mission--to safeguard the national security of the United
States.''
Transferring the control of satellite exports from the State
Department to the Commerce Department in 1996 really resulted in
dramatic changes. According to the General Accounting Office testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 10, 1998,
the transfer reduced the influence of the Defense Department. It
eliminated Congressional notification. It exempted satellite exports
from certain sanctions. Technical information is not as clearly
controlled, leading to uncertainty on the part of aerospace companies
and to more technology transfer than previously allowed.
Testimony on July 8, 1998, before the Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security, has established that the
Department of Defense monitors are not required to be present at
satellite launches. This is directly contrary to previous
administration claims. No statute, policy, or regulation requires U.S.
Government monitors.
At least three U.S. satellites have been launched in China with no
U.S. monitors present. No one in the U.S. Government knows what
transpired at these launches or if U.S. laws and policies on technology
transfer were followed. No one in our Government is even attempting to
examine what occurred at these unmonitored satellite launches. Looking
at these unmonitored launches, I think, would be a critical element of
the next phase of our investigation.
Today's satellite export control system relies on the good will of
the Commerce Department, a department which has repeatedly demonstrated
its willingness to ignore national security concerns on satellite
exports. This is an area where we need to take a close look at how we
are going to proceed in the future and what is going to be expected of
the Commerce Department.
For example, Commerce has unilaterally removed items subject to
interagency license review without notice to other affected agencies.
Commerce has also refused to send approved licenses to Defense so
officials there can evaluate the final product. When it involves
satellites and technology, clearly the Defense Department should be a
part of this process.
Second, sensitive technology related to satellite exports has been
transferred to China. In at least two cases, U.S. companies analyzed
Chinese launch failures and communicated with Chinese officials. In
1995, Hughes analyzed the ``APSTAR 2'' launch failure. Commerce now
concedes that this analysis should have been subject to State and
Defense Department reviews before a Commerce official gave it to the
Chinese. Commerce only provided the report, concluded in 1995, 2 hours
before a Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International
Proliferation hearing on July 8 of this year.
The 1996 Loral launch failure is the subject of a Justice Department
review for possible illegal transfer of technology. Compliance with the
law is the province of the Justice Department. So we are looking into
the impact on American national securities. It is very important that
the Justice Department complete that work.
I agree with three assessments by three elements of the State and
Defense Departments that China derived significant benefits from their
technical exchanges with U.S. companies after the Long March crash in
1996, exchanges which are likely to lead to improvements in the
reliability of their ballistic missile, and especially their guidance
systems. So we have to be concerned very much about this transfer.
Third, China has received military benefit from U.S. satellite
exports. There is a division within the executive branch agencies over
how much China has benefited. But there seems to be agreement that
certainly some benefit was derived.
The New York Times has reported that U.S. satellites are being used
by the Chinese military for its internal coded communications.
Administration officials concede that China is using American-made and
exported satellites for their military communications. This is a clear
and uncontested military benefit for China. The New York Times also
reports that an additional satellite export that could enhance the
Chinese military's ability to eavesdrop on phone conversations is under
review by the Clinton administration.
The administration has ignored overwhelming information regarding
Chinese proliferation and has embarked on what appears to be a de facto
policy to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions
under our U.S. proliferation law. For instance, on June 11, 1998, the
Committee on Foreign Relations heard testimony from the former director
of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Clinton administration has used ``almost any measure'' to block
intelligence judgments that China had transferred missiles to
Pakistan--a clear violation of U.S. law that requires the imposition of
sanctions. Intelligence analyses ``were summarily dismissed by the
policy community.''
According to the testimony, the intelligence community is ``virtually
certain that this transfer had taken place . . .'' I am convinced,
after a personal investigation, that it did take place, and it was a
very dangerous for Pakistan to be receiving these missiles. Why has
that been the case, and why hasn't the administration been willing to
take actions providing sanctions where clearly that information has
been provided?
Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to
influence the American political process. This new information should
remove any doubt about the need for an independent counsel in this
area.
It has already been reported that FBI Director Freeh has indicated
his view that an independent counsel should be appointed. It is time to
renew attention on the Attorney General. It is time for an outside,
impartial investigation by an independent counsel into the serious and
credible charges of direct Chinese Government financing or involvement
in the 1996 elections. We have very good committees that are working
together in a bipartisan way and looking into these very important
questions. I urge them to continue to do so, and to do it in a calm and
methodical way. It is essential that we get cooperation from the
administration to provide the additional information that we requested,
the additional evidence. And we will carry out our constitutional
responsibilities. Nothing less should be expected of us.
In view of the inquiries we had about how these are proceeding, what
information we have been getting, what is outstanding, and also what is
our plan, as far as future hearings, I thought it was important that I
give some review of what has transpired.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in light of the statements that have just
been made and the time consumed by the majority leader, I ask unanimous
consent that each side have 10 minutes to debate the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will have the opportunity to discuss,
in greater detail, the remarks just made by the distinguished majority
leader. Let me just say that our interest, too, is to have a bipartisan
review of the actions taken with regard to the technology transfer in
China. But I do hope that it will be bipartisan. The majority leader
gave what I would view to be a pretty partisan report this morning with
regard to the allegations pending on this particular matter, and I will
have a very thorough response to the majority leader at some point
today. I do believe that the issue warrants our review. As he said,
this is a constitutional responsibility, but it also warrants
objectivity and very thoughtful and careful consideration of the facts.
Many of the reports the distinguished majority leader cited were
allegations that have yet to be proven, allegations reported--he
mentioned the New York Times on a number of occasions--allegations
reported, citing unidentified sources, and what I would consider to be
very questionable sources with regard to the information reported in
some cases. So we are going to have to be very careful about the
distinction between allegation and fact, the distinction between what
has actually occurred and what is reported or what is
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alleged to have occurred. So I hope that we can do that, as he noted,
in a bipartisan way, thoroughly and very carefully examining the facts
and coming to some conclusion prior to the time we issue any reports.
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