[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 14, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1291-E1292]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 14, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of 
my colleagues an important op-ed article on U.S. foreign policy 
sanctions, published in the June 19 edition of The Wall Street Journal. 
The article was written by Richard Haas of the Brookings Institution, 
who was a senior National Security Council official in the Bush 
Administration. Mr. Haas argues that unilateral sanctions are 
ineffective and costly, and he offers wise policy guidelines for future 
sanctions. The article follows:

                      Sanctions Almost Never Work

       Economic sanctions have never been more popular than they 
     are now. Congress imposes them; the executive branch 
     implements them; even state and municipal governments want to 
     get into the act. More than 75 countries with over two-thirds 
     of the world's population are subject to U.S. economic 
     sanctions--whether aimed at discouraging weapons 
     proliferation, bolstering human rights, deterring terrorism, 
     thwarting drug trafficking, discouraging armed aggression, 
     promoting market access, protecting the environment or 
     replacing governments.
       Sanctions are occasionally effective; they probably 
     hastened the end of South African apartheid and constrained 
     Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War. But the record strongly 
     suggests that sanctions often fail or make things worse. 
     Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve foreign-policy 
     objectives if the goals are ambitious or time is short.
       Unilateral sanctions almost never work. Secondary 
     sanctions--trying to compel others to join a sanctions effort 
     by threatening sanctions against them--can seriously harm 
     relationships with the secondary states. Sanctions have 
     caused humanitarian suffering (Haiti), weakened friendly 
     governments (Bosnia), bolstered tyrants (Cuba) and left 
     countries with little choice but to develop nuclear weapons 
     (Pakistan). From a domestic perspective they are expensive, 
     costing U.S. businesses billions of dollars a year and many 
     thousands of workers their jobs.


                             Use Sparingly

       For these reasons the U.S. should use the weapons of 
     sanctions sparingly if at all. Here are some principles 
     policy makers and Congress should follow:
       Avoid unilateral sanctions. The evidence is overwhelming 
     that unilateral sanctions achieve little. Target countries 
     can almost always find alternative sources of goods, capital 
     and technology. For this reason, Washington should rethink 
     its efforts against Cuba and should hold off on going it 
     alone against Nigeria.
       Resist resorting to secondary sanctions. It is an admission 
     of diplomatic failure to punish friendly nations that don't 
     comply with a sanction against a foe. It is also an expensive 
     response. The costs to U.S. foreign policy, including 
     relations with major trading partners and the World Trade 
     Organization, almost always outweigh the potential benefits

[[Page E1292]]

     of coercing friends. This is the lesson of U.S. secondary 
     sanctions imposed against Europe and Canada over their 
     refusal to support broad U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran 
     and Libya.
       Tailor sanctions narrowly. A focused response helps avoid 
     jeopardizing other interests and an entire bilateral 
     relationship over one area of disagreement. Such a response 
     also does less harm to innocent people and makes it easier to 
     garner multinational support. Sanctions designed to stem the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a prime 
     example. Where there are transgressions, the U.S. should 
     direct any sanction against the foreign firms involved. If 
     the government is to blame, Washington should cut off 
     technological cooperation or trade in the relevant 
     technologies. Political sanctions should be used sparingly if 
     at all. U.S. officials should resist the temptation to break 
     diplomatic relations or cancel high-level meetings. Such 
     interactions provide opportunities for U.S. officials to make 
     their case. All of this argues for narrowing the scope of 
     sanctions against India and Pakistan--and not canceling this 
     fall's planned presidential visit.
       Don't hold major bilateral relationships hostage to a 
     single issue. This is especially the case with a country like 
     China, with which the U.S. has to balance interests that 
     include maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, 
     discouraging any support for weapons of mass destruction or 
     missile programs of rogue states, managing the Taiwan-China 
     situation, and promoting trade, market reform and human 
     rights. A nearly identical argument could be made about 
     applying broad sanctions against Russia because of its 
     transgressions in the realm of missile exports.
       Include humanitarian exceptions in any comprehensive 
     sanctions. Innocents should not be made to suffer any more 
     than is absolutely necessary. Including an exception that 
     allows a target nation to import food and medicine should 
     also make it easier to win domestic and international 
     support. A humanitarian exception was made for Iraq--and one 
     should be made for Cuba.
       Issue a policy statement to Congress before or soon after a 
     sanction is put in place. Such statements should be clear as 
     to the purpose of the sanction; the required legal and 
     political authority; the expected impact on the target, 
     including its possible retaliation; the probable humanitarian 
     consequences and steps to minimize them; the expected costs 
     to the U.S.; the prospects for enforcing the sanction; and 
     the anticipated degree of international support or 
     opposition. In addition, policy makers should explain why a 
     particular sanction, as opposed to other policy tools, was 
     selected. Once sanctions are in place, policy makers should 
     prepare a similar report to Congress every year. The proposed 
     Sanctions Reform Act, sponsored by Sen. Richard Lugar (R., 
     Ind.) and Reps. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.) and Phil Crane (R., 
     Ill.) takes many of these steps.
       Include an exit strategy in every sanction plan. The 
     criteria for lifting the sanction should be clearly spelled 
     out. Current sanctions often lack this feature: The 1994 
     legislation that led to sanctions this year against India and 
     Pakistan lacks any road map for how the sanctions might be 
     reduced or lifted.
       Allow the president discretion in the form of waivers. This 
     would authorize the president to suspend or terminate a 
     sanction if he judged it was in the interests of national 
     security to do so. Such latitude is needed if 
     international relationships are not to become hostage to 
     one interest and if the executive is to have the 
     flexibility needed to explore whether the introduction of 
     limited incentives can bring about a desired policy goal. 
     Waivers have reduced some of the worst features of 
     legislation that penalizes non-American firms doing 
     business with Cuba, Iran and Libya. And the absence of 
     waivers is likely to haunt U.S. policy toward India and 
     Pakistan, making it more difficult to influence their 
     future decisions involving the deployment or use of 
     nuclear weapons.
       Challenge the authority of states and municipalities to 
     institute economic sanctions. The Constitution may not settle 
     the struggle between the executive and legislative branches 
     over the foreign-affairs power--but it clearly limits the 
     struggle to the federal government. Yet states and 
     municipalities are adopting selective purchasing laws that 
     prohibit public agencies from buying goods and services from 
     companies doing business in or with target countries. The 
     Clinton administration should support efforts to stop states 
     and cities from conducting foreign policy, such as a recently 
     filed lawsuit to enjoin Massachusetts from enforcing its law 
     that would effectively ban the state from doing business with 
     companies active in Burma.


                           Reflexive Tendency

       All of these proposals have one purpose: to reduce 
     Washington's reflexive tendency to impose sanctions whenever 
     political leaders are not prepared to use military force or 
     carry out more appropriate--but more controversial--policies. 
     Economic sanctions are a serious instrument of foreign 
     policy. They demand consideration as rigorous as that which 
     precedes military intervention. The likely benefits of a 
     particular sanction to U.S. foreign policy should be greater 
     than the anticipated economic and political costs. Moreover, 
     the relationship between how the sanction is likely to affect 
     U.S. interests should compare favorably to the likely 
     consequences of all other policies, including military 
     intervention, covert action, diplomacy, offering incentives 
     (used to manage North Korea's nuclear ambitions) or doing 
     nothing.
       U.S. politicians and policy makers often see sanctions as 
     an expressive tool. In fact, they are a form of intervention 
     that can cause great damage to innocent people, as well as to 
     U.S. businesses, workers and foreign-policy interests. In 
     addition, sanctions can reduce U.S. leverage. Elimination of 
     education, training and aid for foreign militaries, mandated 
     by Congress to express displeasure with Pakistan and 
     Indonesia, reduces U.S. influence with a powerful 
     constituency in both those countries.
       Foreign policy is not therapy. Its purpose is not to feel 
     good but to do good. America's leaders should keep this in 
     mind whenever they consider the imposition of sanctions.

     

                          ____________________