[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 14, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1285]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E1285]]



                          FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY

                                 ______
                                 

                      HON. JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 14, 1998

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
of the United States of America states: ``Congress has the power to lay 
and collect . . . Duties and to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations.'' Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United 
States of America states: ``Treaties with foreign governments shall be 
confirmed by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.'' However, over time, 
Congress has given away its Constitutional authority and 
responsibilities to the Executive Branch.
  Take fast-track authority, for example. Fast-track proponents claim 
that this legislative authority is needed to expedite the negotiating 
process as well as consideration of the implementing legislation 
through the establishment of deadlines for various legislative stages, 
a prohibition on amendments, a limit on debate, and a requirement for 
an up-or-down vote. There are several myths and untruths associated 
with this argument, however.
  The big myth is that the President needs fast track to negotiate 
trade agreements. The President already has the Constitutional power to 
conduct foreign affairs and negotiate international trade agreements. 
However, because Congress must approve any changes to U.S. law that 
result from trade agreements, fast track proponents purport that fast 
track is needed to strengthen the President's stance during trade 
negotiations and expedite consideration of the implementing 
legislation. The truth is, the President needs fast track so he can 
ignore the opinions of the vast majority of Members of Congress.
  Fast-track authority, in theory, protects Congress from the 
delegation of Constitutional authority through the notifications and 
consultations the President must provide to Congress prior to, and 
during, trade negotiations. In practice, however, Congress has handed 
over its Constitutional powers on a silver platter. The President has 
ignored the directives of large minorities in Congress regarding 
environmental protection, labor standards and American jobs, then 
bought the votes of a few with personal promises to gain the simple 
majority needed for passage.
  The fact is, the archetype fast-track legislative authority was 
designed to give the President additional authority to negotiate 
customs classifications only. Experience has shown item-by-item 
consideration of the tariff schedule by Congress to be an arduous 
process, so the President was granted the ability to negotiate the 
small points. The bottom line is, the original fast-track was never 
intended to grant the President the broad authority over a vast array 
of non-tariff issues he enjoys today.
  Another myth claims that fast-track process is needed not only to 
negotiate, but to simply get the trade agreement through the 
legislative process. Converse to popular thought, however, the fast-
track procedure has rarely been implemented. Over 200 trade agreements 
have been enacted without fast track authority while only five trade 
agreements have been enacted under this procedure.
  Clearly, fast-track authority has digressed from the original 
intentions of Congress. The President now has broad authority, while 
Members' hands are tied. Consultations are with a privileged few and 
merely a formality for the body as a whole. I have introduced 
legislation to authenticate fast-track legislative authority.
  The Trade Act of 1974 recognizes the fast track mechanism as an 
``exercise of the rule-making power of the House . . .'' and maintains 
the ``constitutional right of either House to change its rules at any 
time, in the same manner and to the same extent as any other rule of 
the House.'' In other words, the House may change its rules as it sees 
fit. The erosion of fast-track legislative intent is more than enough 
reason for the House to change its rules.
  The legislation, H. Res. 497, amends the rules of the House to 
require a two-thirds majority vote on any legislation that either 
authorizes the President to enter into a trade agreement that is 
implemented pursuant to fast-track procedures, or that implements a 
trade agreement pursuant to such procedures. By requiring a two-thirds 
vote rather than a simple majority, the President will no longer be 
able to ignore the concerns of the vast majority of Members during 
negotiations and sweeten the agreement later. Trade agreements will 
take a consensus of both the legislative and executive branches to 
negotiate--a constitutionally sound solution of which the Founding 
Fathers would be proud.

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