[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 90 (Thursday, July 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7893-S7898]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

 Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the real issue in the debate on 
NATO expansion is the very character of the alliance in the future. 
NATO has been successful in the past because its mission has been 
focused. Now, the Senate is being asked to give its stamp of approval 
to a mission-expanded NATO. Passing this resolution of ratification 
without the Ashcroft amendment will be ratifying a NATO to serve as a 
``force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa,'' to use the 
words of Secretary Albright. There have been misconceptions about my 
amendment in the Senate and in the press. Allow me to address some of 
those.
  First, let me emphasize that this amendment is based on the language 
of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. For the Administration, which is 
opposing this amendment, I have one question: what do you have in mind 
for NATO that is not contained within the treaty itself? All my 
amendment does is restate the language of the treaty, specifically 
article 4. My amendment will not restrict NATO's ability to respond to 
collective defense threats from outside NATO territory. My amendment 
will not restrict NATO from responding to the new threats of post-Cold 
War world like weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.
  The very purpose of NATO has been to prepare for collective defense 
threats emanating from outside the North Atlantic area. Any threat from 
outside the treaty area which posed the threat of an attack on NATO 
territory would be covered by the treaty and allowable under this 
amendment.
  This Administration, however, has something much different than 
collective defense in mind. NATO is in danger of changing, but the 
transformation is from Administration officials pushing for a global 
NATO. The United States Constitution has provisions for altering 
treaties, and it is called obtaining the Senate's advice and consent. 
If we want a global NATO, the treaty should be resubmitted for the 
Senate's consideration.
  For those of us who are concerned that NATO will get into far-flung 
operations, former officials Bill Perry and Warren Christopher write 
that the unanimous consent required among NATO members will guard 
against reckless deployments (New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997). For Mr. 
Perry and Mr. Christopher, the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is 
replaced by the NATO bureaucracy. Thank you, but I like the United 
States Constitution just fine.
  Secretary Acheson had it right in 1949--the treaty would be altered 
by constitutional processes. Acheson stated: ``. . . the impossibility 
of foretelling what the international situation will be in the distant 
future makes rigidity for too long a term undesirable. It is believed 
that indefinite duration, with the possibility that any party may 
withdraw from the treaty after 20 years and that the treaty as a whole 
might be reviewed at any time after it has been in effect for 10 years, 
provides the best solution'' (Letter transmitting the treaty to the 
President, April 7, 1949).
  Acheson recognized that the world would change. His answer for how 
NATO would respond--countries can withdraw from the treaty or the 
treaty could be reviewed. Notice Acheson did not mention a review of 
NATO's Strategic Concept, on which the Senate has no vote, but a review 
of the treaty, with any modifications subject to Senate advice and 
consent.
  If this treaty was so elastic as to be stretched to cover any 
conceivable military operation, why would Acheson even talk about 
reviewing the treaty? Acheson did have a view of an alliance 
established for a specific purpose, with a limited scope.
  In the letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, Secretary 
Acheson acknowledged the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly 
that the North Atlantic Council will have ``. . . no powers other than 
to consider matters within the purview of the treaty . . .'' (Letter to 
President Truman transmitting the NATO treaty, April 7, 1949). If 
Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why did he testify 
about the careful limits of the various articles? Why did he explicitly 
state that NATO could not consider matters outside the purview of the 
treaty?
  The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took 
pains to show NATO was not an ``old fashioned military alliance.'' The 
report states: ``. . . in both intent and language, it is purely 
defensive in nature. It comes into operation only against a nation 
which, by its own action, has proved itself an international criminal 
by. . .attacking a party to the treaty . . . If it can be called an 
alliance, it is an alliance only against war itself'' (SFRC Report, 
June 6, 1949).
  The Ashcroft amendment is designed to advance U.S. interests by 
keeping NATO focused on this historical mission of collective defense. 
Without the Ashcroft amendment, the Senate is setting NATO--the most 
successful military alliance in history--on the course of becoming a 
mini-UN with a standing army. My amendment will preserve the historical 
strength and effectiveness of NATO by keeping the alliance focused on 
the mission of the treaty itself. The Ashcroft amendment will only 
preclude the global policing operations outside the scope of the 
treaty.
  Drift in NATO is already underway. Frederick Bonnart writes of the 
Madrid summit in July 1997 where expansion was endorsed: `` . . . 
behind the euphoria, a hollowness has appeared that had not been 
evident before. The leaders seem unclear about the purpose of the 
organization, and therefore about the political and military shape it 
is to take. Worst of all, strains have shown

[[Page S7894]]

up in the alliance that indicate weaknesses in its most vital asset: 
its cohesion'' (Intl. Herald Tribune, July 25, 1997).
  Cohesion means something in a military alliance. If you want to turn 
NATO into the bureaucratic free-for-all of the UN, then oppose the 
Ashcroft amendment. If you want to keep NATO on a successful course, 
vote for this amendment.
  The Administration and some of my colleagues are arguing that NATO 
has no parameters, that's its mission can evolve, and that the Senate 
has no role to play in this evolution. Some of the Senators who are 
criticizing this amendment were championing the Senate's constitutional 
prerogatives during the ``reinterpretation'' debate over the ABM treaty 
in the 1980's.
  This Administration is setting NATO on a crash course to policing the 
brushfires of Europe and beyond. The lives of American soldiers are at 
stake if NATO is transformed into a mini-UN with a standing army. The 
first Somalia experience you have with NATO, and the alliance's 
credibility will be undermined.
  The historical setting for the establishment of NATO, the Senate 
record surrounding ratification, and the treaty language itself make it 
clear that collective defense was the clear mission of the alliance.
  Treaties are not formed in a vacuum. Two world wars were not enough 
for the United States to abandon a 149-year tradition of no peacetime 
military alliances. It took Soviet aggression in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Poland; a civil war in Greece which threatened to install a communist 
government; the coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948; the threat of 
communist victory in Italian elections in April, 1948; a tightening 
blockade of Berlin, and threatening moves by the Soviet Union to 
subjugate Norway to a non-aggression pact to bring the United States to 
the point of making a peacetime alliance with Europe.
  When analyzing the Treaty itself, you see a document that commits the 
U.S. to carefully defined military contingencies. NATO is given the 
flexibility to consult on an array of issues, it is charged with 
coordinating mutually constructive economic policies, it is allowed to 
invite new members to join when doing so would advance the security of 
the North Atlantic area. But when it comes to the use of military 
force, careful limits are placed on NATO's scope.
  Careful parameters are seen clearly in article 5, the heart of the 
Treaty: ``The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack 
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.''
  This article establishes the principal of collective defense. The use 
of armed force in this article and in other parts of the treaty is 
discussed only within this framework of collective defense: (1) The 
preamble of the treaty states that NATO allies ``are resolved to unite 
their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace 
and security;'' (2) Article 3 states that ``In order to more 
effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help 
and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack;'' (3) Article 9 establishes 
a council for the alliance, now called the North Atlantic Council, 
which is charged with establishing ``immediately a defence committee 
which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 
5,'' the two articles which outline the collective defense mission.
  Article 5 excluded NATO's involvement in civil wars in general. The 
Committee Report states ``. . . purely internal disorders or 
revolutions would not be considered `armed attacks' within the meaning 
of article 5.'' Article 5 applied only when a NATO member had an 
internal civil war aided by an outside power or when a civil war 
outside NATO threatened an attack on a member.
  NATO's geographical scope was defined carefully in article 6. Article 
6 goes on to define ``armed attack'' and the territorial parameters in 
which the armed attack must occur for Article 5 to be invoked to 
include the territory of any NATO member, the islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of 
the Tropic of Cancer, the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the 
Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe 
in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the 
date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
  As is clear in articles 5 and 6, when the deployment of U.S. troops 
was possible, the U.S. drafters of the Treaty took extra precaution to 
define parameters.
  Article 4, the article the Administration would use to create a 
global NATO, reinforces the alliance's collective defense mission. 
Article 4 states ``The parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.''
  This language is not the basis for a global NATO engaged in 
flashpoints from the Middle East to Central Africa. Article 4 
reinforces NATO's collective defense mission. Words like ``security'' 
and ``political independence'' were taken seriously in 1949. The world 
had lived through two world wars and the Cold War was beginning. 
Security was not given the casual, domino-theory definition of today. 
Take, for example, comments by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe 
Talbott: ``If there were to be instability and conflict of any kind, 
whatever the origin of it, in Central or Eastern Europe, it would be a 
threat to the Continent as a whole'' (Voice of America Interview, April 
10, 1997).
  As Lawrence Kaplan, perhaps the dean of NATO historians, writes:

       The alliance's preoccupation with expansion seemingly 
     prevents an exploration of the problems `out of area' issues 
     raise. The Rome Summit [1991 NATO summit at which the 
     Strategic Concept was adopted] did mention Article 4, which 
     calls for consultation whenever any member believes that its 
     territorial integrity, political independence or security is 
     threatened. But this article is too vague, compared with 
     Article 5 to serve as a guide for the future. (Lawrence 
     Kaplan. NATO & Out of Area Issue. March 13, 1998).

  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the NATO Treaty in 
1949 reinforces the careful limits of the Treaty language itself. The 
first paragraph of the Report, entitled ``Main Purpose of the Treaty,'' 
states:

       The basic objective of the treaty is to [make] clear the 
     determination of the members of the North Atlantic community 
     to safeguard their common heritage of freedom by exercising 
     collectively their inherent right of self-defense in the 
     event of an armed attack upon any of them . . .'' (U.S. 
     Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. 
     Pg. 1)

  With regard to article 3, the Report states,

       Questions have also been raised as to whether the United 
     States, under article 3, would be obligated to assist the 
     other parties to develop the capacity of their overseas 
     territories to resist armed attack. The objective of the 
     treaty is to maintain the peace and security of the North 
     Atlantic area. During the negotiations there were no 
     suggestions that this article should be interpreted as 
     applying to any other area. The United States is under no 
     obligation to assist the other parties . . . in resisting 
     armed attack outside the area defined in article 6 (U.S. 
     Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. 
     Pg. 11)

  With regard to article 4, in testimony on NATO in 1949, Senator 
Vandenberg stated that he wanted to make it clear in the Committee 
Report on the treaty that article 4 ``was as limited as the balance of 
the pact'' (Testimony before the SFRC, May 4, 1949).
  It is no surprise, then, that the SFRC Report carefully ties the use 
of article 4 to the collective defense mission of the alliance. The 
Report states that

       A situation arising anywhere might be cause for 
     consultation, provided that it constituted a threat to one or 
     more of the parties and might involve obligations under the 
     treaty. The committee underlines the fact that consultation 
     could be requested only when the element of threat is present 
     and expresses the opinion that this limitation should be 
     strictly interpreted.


[[Page S7895]]


  The Report goes on to state that

       Article 4 carries no obligation other than that of 
     consultation. (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty 
     Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 12)

  In discussing the obligation to consult, the Committee Report states 
that consultation takes place when a threat ``might involve obligations 
under the treaty.''
  It is important what those obligations were. Referring to the 
Committee report:

       1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by 
     means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, 
     the individual and collective capacity of the parties 
to resist armed attack (art. 3);

       2. To consult whenever, in the opinion of any of the 
     parties, the territorial integrity, political independence, 
     or security of any of them is threatened (art. 4);
       3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in 
     the North Atlantic area an attack against them all (art. 5); 
     and
       4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, 
     individually and in concert with the other parties, such 
     action as the United States deems necessary, including the 
     use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
     the North Atlantic area (art. 5).

  The obligation to consult is linked to other obligations in the 
treaty, all of which pertain to some aspect of collective defense. As 
Secretary Acheson said, article 4 was broader in scope than article 5 
and gave NATO flexibility to respond to out-of-area threats related to 
collective defense. Almost without fail, article 4 was discussed within 
the context of responding to aggression less than armed attack--
political aggression by a hostile power.
  Secretary Acheson himself linked article 4 to NATO's collective 
defense mission, stating that any action taken after consultation 
should be ``in the spirit of the treaty'' (Letter transmitting the 
treaty to the President, April 7, 1949).
  Floor statements by key Senators in 1949 make the limits of article 4 
clear. Comments by both Senators Connally and Vandenberg, the Chairman 
and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, reveal 
an understanding of article 4 in the light of NATO's collective defense 
mission.
  Senator Connally stated in his opening remarks on July 5, 1949 that

       I think that article 4 goes a long way to emphasize that 
     the period of dividing and conquering has come to an end. The 
     consultation provided for in that article addresses itself to 
     the threatening of the territorial integrity, the political 
     independence, or the security of any of the parties. 
     Consultation is not an unnecessary luxury; it is a logical 
     requirement to gain the objectives of the treaty. For one 
     thing, article 4 . . . rightly faces up to the brutal fact 
     that peaceful peoples have become more and more conscious of 
     a sinister kind of danger--indirect aggression. Let us not 
     forget that no bombs were dropped by the Soviet Union on 
     Bulgaria, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. (Congressional Record, 
     July 5, 1949, Pg. 8814)

  Senator Vandenberg stated in his opening remarks the following day 
that:

       The question arises whether articles IV and V of the pact 
     cover armed aggression against colonial or dependent or 
     otherwise related areas of the signatories outside the area 
     of the North Atlantic community as geographically defined in 
     article VI. My own understanding is clear and unequivocal. 
     The answer is ``No.'' There can be no other logical answer. 
     The doubts seem to have arisen because article IV, relating 
     solely to consultations, is unlimited in the circumference of 
     these consultations. But there is not a word of obligation in 
     it except to talk things over.'' (Congressional Record, July 
     6, 1949, Pg. 8896)

  Senator Vandenberg again:

       The obligations are spelled out in articles III and V. It 
     is significant, in this connection, that when article IX 
     establishes a council to implement the treaty, it directs the 
     council's attention specifically to articles III and V. It 
     omits article IV in this connection. This is as it should be. 
     It is by significant design. Our pledge of action under the 
     United Nations Charter is general . . . But out pledge of 
     action under the North Atlantic Pact is limited and specific. 
     It applies only to armed aggression in the area clearly 
     defined in article VI which is the North Atlantic community, 
     set up by metes and bounds. (Congressional Record, July 6, 
     1949, Pg. 8896)

  Moving to article 5, the Committee Report identifies Article 5 as the 
``heart of the treaty,'' and goes on to define what constitutes an 
armed attack. The Report states that ``article 5 would come into 
operation only when a nation had committed an international crime by 
launching an armed attack against a party to the treaty.'' (U.S. 
Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 13)
  The Committee Report's discussion of article 6 further reinforced the 
territorial basis of the Treaty, stating that ``Article 6 specifies the 
area within which an armed attack would bring the provisions of article 
5 into operation. Thus, the obligations under article 5 are strictly 
limited to the area described.'' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic 
Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 15)
  The Foreign Relations Committee obtained a commitment from the 
President in 1949 that the Senate would be able to give its advice and 
consent for new NATO members. New members are important, but new 
missions are just as critical. The mission of NATO is changing 
radically, and the Senate has not engaged in the debate.
  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO planners scrambled to 
find new missions for the alliance: countering the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, advancing the political ``interests'' of 
NATO members, NATO as a police force and crisis manager.
  The catch-phrase that defined this effort was that NATO must go 
``out-of-area or out of business.'' After the Cold War, NATO began 
evolving into an organization to pursue new missions.
  The Strategic Concept of 1991 pushed the traditional functions of 
NATO--to provide for collective defense and serve as a strategic 
balance in Europe--to the bottom of the list of the alliance s 
fundamental security tasks.
  The security task that rose to the top was for NATO to be ``one of 
the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe . . . in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce 
any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of 
force.'' (1991 Strategic Concept in NATO Handbook, p. 239)
  This is an amazing expansion of mission. No longer is collective 
defense the singular mission of the alliance, but NATO has the 
impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO 
and non-NATO Europe alike.
  In NATO's Strategic Concepts of the past, collective defense was 
paramount.
  The State Department has provided my office with the three NATO 
Strategic Concepts that preceded the 1991 version: the Strategic 
Concepts of 1950 (with a revised version in 1952), 1957, and 1967.
  The contrast between the first three Strategic Concepts and the 1991 
version is striking. The mission of collective defense permeates the 
first three Strategic Concepts. Collective defense is carefully defined 
as the North Atlantic area described in article 6 of the Treaty. When 
potential out of area security developments are discussed, they are 
mentioned in the context of NATO members having the capacity to 
maintain their commitments to NATO while individually addressing the 
out of area threats that may affect their interests.
  NATO's Strategic Concept of 1957 explicitly states that ``NATO 
defense planning is limited to the defense of the Treaty area. . .'' 
and that ``NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or 
authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by 
Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty'' (1957 Strategic Concept 
of NATO, p. 12).
  Throughout NATO's Strategic Concepts, the means of collective defense 
changed, from ``massive retaliation'' in the 1950's to ``forward 
defense and flexible response'' in the 1960's, but the mission itself 
remained the same.
  NATO has an uncertain course for the future, however. The New 
Strategic Concept of 1991 presented the first significant shift in NATO 
away from its traditional military mission. The Strategic Concept says 
that the ``. . . clear preparedness to act collectively in the common 
defense remains central to the Alliance's security objectives.'' The 
reliability of this assertion is belied by NATO s activity since 1991, 
however.
  Stan Sloan, one of the senior NATO analysts at CRS, states that since 
the formation of the New Strategic Concept in 1991, ``. . . most of 
NATO's military activities have been focused on `non-Article 5' 
requirements, most significantly in Bosnia.'' (Stanley Sloan. NATO's 
Evolving Role & Missions. CRS

[[Page S7896]]

rpt.97-708F. Mar. 4, 1998, Pg. 4) No longer is collective defense the 
singular mission of the alliance, but NATO is committing to the 
impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO 
and non-NATO Europe alike.
  Nelson Drew writes of this development:

       While the word ``peacekeeping'' did not appear in either 
     the new Strategic Concept or the Rome Declaration, it was 
     difficult to envision a means by which NATO or the NACC 
     [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] could make good on their 
     commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-
     Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role 
     in peacekeeping activities.'' (Nelson Drew. NATO Confronts 
     `Test Case from Hell.' INSS: McNair Paper 35)

  NATO was not created to douse regional brushfires in Europe, Asia, 
and the Middle East. When the deployment of NATO forces was considered, 
it was for collective defense. NATO's institutional development has 
followed the alliance's expanded mandate: NATO's goals as a police 
force and crisis manager have resulted in new institutional capacities. 
NATO has agreed to make its resources available, on a case by case 
basis, for brushfire operations under the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and the European Union (NATO 
Handbook, p. 332-34).
  In the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, 
and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, NATO has taken many positive 
steps to promote cooperation with other countries, but also has 
signaled that international policing actions will be an important part 
of NATO's activity in the future.
  This institutional transformation signals little strategic thinking. 
NATO signals its intention to be an international police force and 
crisis manager by its internal transformation. The Administration 
refuses to establish parameters for how far NATO expansion will 
proceed. Where are the limits on NATO's mission and membership? 
Alliance cohesion is at risk.
  The Administration views the Partnership for Peace as the ``path to 
[NATO] membership for countries wanting to join'' (U.S. Security 
Strategy for Europe and NATO, DOD, June, 1995). NATO makes brushfire 
troubleshooting an important part of the PFP and the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC). The Administration launches the Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to make it easier for NATO to engage in 
crisis management.
  The question must be asked as to how far NATO will expand its mission 
and membership. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was quoted in the 
Washington Post as saying that NATO should become a ``force for peace 
from the Middle East to Central Africa'' (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 
1998). President Clinton, in his recent trip to Africa, spoke of the 
need for some type of ``multi-national force'' for responding to 
African crises (White House Bulletin, March 27, 1998). Is this really 
the kind of mission the Administration wants NATO to have?
  Other countries take NATO signals seriously. For example, allow me to 
quote from the latest issue of Defense News: ``Kosovo Fray Forces NATO 
s Hand.'' ``The violent uprising in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo may 
force NATO to extend its military influence across the Balkan region. . 
.'' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). A U.S. official quoted in the 
article said ```Macedonia is a Partnership for Peace country 
potentially in trouble from external sources. It needs help. It is not 
out of the realm of possibility . . . that a NATO-led mission in 
cooperation with PFP countries could take over when the UN deployment 
withdraws on August 31.''
  On March 11, Albania called the first emergency consultation within 
the framework of the PFP. NATO diplomats responded with a plan for ``a 
robust Partnership for Peace program for rapid implementation in 
Albania.'' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). This PFP program reportedly 
will include military training and steps to secure Albania s northern 
border.
  If we want to send American soldiers into these cauldrons of ethnic 
unrest, then let's have that debate. Nothing in this amendment would 
preclude the U.S. from deploying its forces anywhere. This amendment 
has to do with preserving the integrity of NATO. Just don't use the 
banner of a successful military alliance to entangle U.S. troops in 
Europe's brushfires.
  Comments by both former and present senior Administration officials 
indicate a radical shift in the scope of NATO. Former Secretary of 
Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
stated in a New York Times editorial: ``Shifting the alliance s 
emphasis from defense of members territory to defense of common 
interests is the strategic imperative'' (New York Times, Oct. 21, 
1997).
  Secretary of State Albright has confirmed NATO's shift to defense of 
interests. I questioned her on two separate occasions before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Albright confirmed that 
advancing out-of-area interests would be the modus operandi for NATO, 
but gave no realistic limits. In other forums, Secretary Albright has 
been quoted as saying that NATO should evolve into ``a force for peace 
from the Middle East to Central Africa'' (WP, William Drozdiak. Feb. 
22, 1998). Strobe Talbott, one of the senior officials at the State 
Department, stated that geopolitical and military considerations can be 
put aside and ``other nonmilitary goals shape the new NATO" (Jesse 
Helms, Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1998). Talbott reportedly looks 
favorably on Russia joining NATO.
  Inconsistency in the Administration's policies is creating more 
confusion in the alliance, however, and hurting U.S. leadership in 
NATO. Take, for example, Administration policy to combat the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. almost goes to war against Iraq 
in February over the threat of WMD. The U.S. maintains a sizeable force 
in the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi aggression. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright states that fighting WMD should become the new 
``unifying threat" that binds NATO allies together (Washington Post, 
Feb. 22, 1998).
  The Administration's actions speak louder than words, however. In 
spite of the rhetoric and the object lesson of Saddam Hussein, the 
Clinton Administration has entered into nuclear cooperation with China, 
the world's worst proliferator of weapons of mass 
destruction technology (CIA report, June 1997). The President refused 
to halt nuclear cooperation even as China was caught trying to send 
Iran hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride.

  This material is used to enrich uranium to weapons grade and was 
being sent to Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research Center--the principal 
Iranian site to manufacture the explosive core of an atomic device 
(Washington Post, March 13, 1998). Clinton allows sensitive missile 
technology to be exported to China, undermining a Justice Department 
investigation of similar possible transfers by Loral Space and Hughes 
Electronics (New York Times, April 4, 1998).
  The missile technology possibly transferred by Loral and Hughes could 
be used on Chinese nuclear ICBM's (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) 
to reach the United States. Just so happens that Bernard Schwartz, CEO 
of Loral, is the DNC's largest personal contributor.
  With policies like that, U.S. has no credibility in tasking NATO with 
new mission to fight the proliferation of WMD.
  European comments on NATO's future mission are just as troubling. 
President Chirac, at the NATO/Russia Founding Act, stated: ``NATO, 
initially conceived to face a clear-cut and massive threat, is now a 
lighter, more flexible organization adapted to its new crisis 
management and peacekeeping missions.''
  In a telling statement about the current evolution of the alliance, 
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated ``NATO was born when Europe 
was divided, and now it has become a leading instrument in the 
reconstruction of the continent. This is an incredibly dynamic process. 
If this pace continues, it is hard to predict what NATO will be like 
just three years from now.'' (Washington Post, July 6, 1997)
  Crisis management and brushfire engagements are the kinds of missions 
and the kinds of problems NATO was never intended to address. As Mark 
Esper writes in the Washington Times: ``NATO was designed for 
collective defense of its member states, not for suppressing civil wars 
in peacekeeping

[[Page S7897]]

missions that jeopardize the alliance's core purpose.'' (Washington 
Times, Feb. 15, 1998)
  From the defense of territory to the defense of ``common interests'' 
is a quantum leap. Charging NATO to defend nebulously defined interests 
would have been unacceptable to the Senate in 1949 and it should be 
unacceptable for the Senate today.
  Resting on fifty years of NATO's success is not the way to ensure 
that U.S. interests are preserved and NATO remains a viable alliance in 
the future. ``Just trust us'' is essentially what the Administration is 
saying, as they transform NATO into a mini-United Nations with a 
standing army for ill-defined brushfire operations.
  Beware the Administration strong on NATO expansion but weak on 
defense. The U.S. is making a collective defense commitment to new NATO 
members while slashing defense. Those countries comprise 301,000 square 
miles of new territory and 2,612 miles of new NATO frontier to which 
the collective defense commitment is extended.
  Here are some of the statistics for U.S. defense cuts (in real 1999 
dollars) between 1990 and 1998:
  Military Personnel funding: fell by 28% (from $102 bn in 1990 to 
$71.7 bn in 1998);
  Procurement: fell by 53% (from $98 bn in 1990 to $45.5 bn in 1998); 
Total National Defense Spending: fell by 27% over last eight years 
(from $375 bn in 1990 to $273 bn in 1998);
  Army divisions reduced from 26 in 1991 to 18 in 1998;
  Active Air Force tactical wings reduced from 35 in 1991 to 20 in 
1998.
  The Clinton Administration is finding more things to do with a 
downsized force. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the 
Army conducted 10 ``operational events'' between 1960-91 and 26 since 
1991. The Marine Corps conducted 15 ``contingency operations'' between 
1982-89 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to the Army 
Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36% while 
increasing the number of deployed operations by 300% (CRS).
  Officers from deployable Army units now spend 180-190 days away from 
home annually. Shortly after announcing that U.S. troops would stay in 
Bosnia indefinitely, Clinton increased funding by 20% to expand U.S. 
influence overseas--not funding for military personnel, though, but 
money for the Peace Corps (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998). President 
Reagan's deputy undersecretary of defense, Dov Zakheim states: ``. . 
.like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, [the U.S.] will be 
tied down in so many parts of the world for so long that it will be 
hard-pressed to respond to major threats against which only 
overwhelming force would prove effective'' (Defense News, April 12, 
1998).
  Over-extension is hurting readiness. Misguided deployments harm 
readiness, inhibit weapons modernization, and undermine morale. The 
Army just completed its worst recruiting year since 1979. Just one 
third of the Army's women and just over half of the men believe that to 
fight and win in combat is the Army's principal mission (National 
Review, Feb. 9, 1998).
  The ``two major regional conflict'' strategy of this Administration 
is becoming increasingly unrealistic. The U.S. would be hard pressed to 
even replicate the Desert Storm operation.
  Hillen writes in the National Review: ``In 1998, almost all the 
active Army's heavy-tank and armored-cavalry units outside of Korea and 
Bosnia would have to go to the Persian Gulf in order to equal the 
fighting power of America's VII Corps in 1991. And VII Corps was only 
one of three American corps engaged in Desert Storm'' (National Review, 
Feb. 9, 1998).
  Inconsistent foreign policy is the root of the problem. Effective and 
credible diplomacy addresses potential crises before the deployment of 
U.S. troops is needed. This Administration's foreign policy 
inconsistency is almost reflexively compensated by the deployment of 
American armed forces. The National Defense Panel created by Congress 
in 1996 said of the Administration: ``. . .the current approach to 
addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and 
services too often and too quickly in situations that should have been 
resolved by nonmilitary means'' (Defense News, April 12, 1998).
  The Saddam Hussein's of the world that threaten the U.S. need to be 
dealt with, but the complacent policy of this Administration over the 
last six years has left U.S. troops dangling in the Persian Gulf. Our 
troops serving in Southwest Asia and Bosnia deserve better leadership 
from this Administration.
  The Administration's ``assertive multilateralism is a fig leaf for 
lack of leadership. This Administration has an instinct to strike for 
the capillaries, to use the phrase of Jonathan Clarke. Policy drift 
with no finality in addressing national security threats, coupled with 
the brush fire mentality of this Administration, is squandering U.S. 
national defense resources.
  The Administration wants to apply its foreign policy muddle to NATO, 
to hollow out the clear mission of the alliance just as the U.S. 
military is being stretched thin and to use NATO as another tool for a 
globalist agenda with little application to real U.S. national security 
interests.
  When U.S. armed forces are struggling, reliable cost estimates for 
NATO expansion become more important. There have been a wide range of 
cost estimates for NATO expansion. The Administration's initial 
estimate (Feb, 1997) was $27-35 billion, with a U.S. share $100-150 m 
per year for ten years. This initial Administration's estimate, not 
surprisingly, was revised downward last December: the U.S. now only has 
to pay $40 million per year over ten years.
  The estimate of Congressional Budget Office (March, 1996) was a bit 
different. Different scenarios ranging from minimal reinforcement of 
four new members ($60.6 bn total) to NATO stationing a limited number 
of forces forward in new member countries ($124.7 bn total)
  The wide range of cost estimates is more confusing than helpful, but 
one thing is clear: the cost estimates rise precipitously when NATO 
take steps to provide a limited defense to these new members. The 
Senate should not accept the lowball estimates. We should consider the 
ends of our actions in expanding NATO--the real costs of actually 
defending these countries.
  If U.S. resources are stretched too thin, will Europe take up the 
slack? Not some of our European NATO allies. NATO allies have agreed 
only to pay for the cheapest expansion estimate yet: the $1.5 billion 
price tag from the NATO cost study accepted by the North Atlantic 
Council in December, 1997. Beyond the paltry $1.5 bn estimate, French 
President Jacques Chirac has stated bluntly that ``France does not 
intend to raise its contribution to NATO because of the cost of 
enlargement'' (Washington Post, July 24, 1998).
  Not the new NATO members. These countries are still throwing off the 
vestiges of a command economy and don't want to commit the resources to 
a full scale modernization effort.
  Dale Herspring, an expert on the region, writes: ``. . .the East 
Europeans have done little to prepare themselves to meet NATO's 
military standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic in particular are 
trying to join NATO `on the cheap'. . .In fact, the military situation 
of all three countries is disastrous. Planes are crashing, morale is 
plummeting, and equipment is outdated. Unless the parliaments of these 
countries get serious or the West. . .decides to foot the bill, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary will never meet NATO standards.''
  The U.S. and other NATO allies are riding the bandwagon of 
``extending the borders of freedom in Europe'' and failing to see the 
reconstruction effort these countries face. What if a crisis comes, and 
we have to defend these countries with limited interoperability and 
even less effective command and control cooperation? The Washington 
Post reported on March 18 that all three countries would struggle to 
find a few hundred officers who speak English to NATO standards.
  Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to respond to several 
arguments I have heard during this debate against my amendment. First, 
there has been a document circulated outlining Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson's comments during a press conference on March 18, 1949.
  I am familiar with the document. Let me begin by saying that if you 
are basing your argument for a global NATO on a press interview 
transcribed in the second person, your argument is on

[[Page S7898]]

shaky ground indeed. A careful review of the record of this press 
interview with Secretary Acheson on March 18, 1949 reveals that his 
comments did not imply a global NATO beyond the careful scope of the 
treaty.
  Acheson states that Article 4 is broader than Article 5, which it is. 
Article 4 gives NATO the flexibility to respond to threats related to 
collective defense, but which may not be precipitated by an armed 
attack.
  When asked if there ``was no provision [in the treaty] which looked 
toward these Parties acting as a unit in regard to some matter not 
covered by the Treaty,'' Secretary Acheson, as paraphrased, said, and 
rightly so, that the allies ``might act as a unit or they might not, 
but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them to do 
so.'' Secretary Acheson reiterated in this very interview what he had 
said in his letter to the President transmitting the NATO treaty: that 
NATO only had authority to deal with matters under the purview of the 
treaty.
  This is essentially what I have said all along. The countries that 
make up NATO can act together on any security matter they desire. But 
NATO itself is designed for a specific mission. When asked if ``there 
was no provision for anything except consultation, except actual armed 
attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied that there were 
Articles one, two, three, and four.''
  These articles certainly identified some of the political and 
economic goals of NATO's collective defense mission. After looking at 
the careful language of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty, however, it is 
preposterous to argue that NATO can turn itself into a global policeman 
based on the general language of article 1.
  When Secretary Acheson says that there is no limiting clause, the 
transcript seems to indicate he is referring to article 4, which is not 
necessarily limited by geography. Acheson did not mean that the treaty 
had no limits. In the letter transmitting the treaty to President 
Truman, Acheson stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have 
``. . .no powers other than to consider matters within the purview of 
the treaty. . .'' (Letter to President Truman transmitting the NATO 
treaty, April 7, 1949). The articles of the treaty speak for themselves 
and don't imply in the slightest a military mission unrelated to 
collective defense.
  Second, some would try to portray a vote on this amendment as a vote 
on Bosnia. Let me state clearly that this amendment is not intended to 
be another vote on the Bosnia mission. The NATO mission in Bosnia is 
related to the out of area debate we are having today, but this vote is 
more about avoiding the Somalia's of NATO's future than rehashing the 
debate over Bosnia.
  The amendment I am offering explicitly refers to future NATO military 
missions. Making this another vote on Bosnia would miss the purpose: to 
keep NATO on a sound course for the future.
  One could argue that if you supported the Bosnia mission, you would 
not offer this amendment. I disagree. You may support Bosnia, but you 
may support NATO more and recognize the threats a Somalia experience 
poses to NATO. I doubt there is anyone in the Senate who has not grown 
more concerned with each missed deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Bosnia.
  There is nothing in this amendment that stops the U.S., unilaterally 
or with other countries, from engaging in ethnic conflicts like Bosnia. 
If we want to send our soldiers to the flashpoints of Europe and Asia, 
then let's have that debate. Don't cloak these missions in the banner 
of a successful military alliance not intended for such purposes. Don't 
entangle the U.S. in the brushfires of Europe, Asia, and Africa through 
NATO.
  Third, and on a somewhat related note, some would argue this 
amendment constrains the President as commander in chief. My amendment 
has nothing to do with the President's authority as Commander in Chief. 
Nothing in this amendment limits the President's ability to deploy U.S. 
forces unilaterally and in concert with other nations to defend the 
United States.
  This amendment has to do with the question of what the President can 
do through the North Atlantic Treaty. In that treaty, to which the 
Senate gave its advice and consent based on a shared understanding 
borne out by 40 years of alliance practice, the U.S. was making a 
security commitment limited by the mission of collective defense within 
a carefully defined geographical area.
  The Senate should give its advice and consent if NATO is to expand 
its mission.
  To conclude, these and other issues deserve extensive debate. The 
risks of an ill-defined NATO are real. The Senate should not allow this 
alliance to shift from collective defense to fitful multilateralism. 
This Administration is stretching NATO's scope to cover the globe. The 
Ashcroft amendment is the right answer to ``Treaty Creep.''
  The statements and policies of Administration officials belie a 
failure to grasp the purpose of a military alliance. There is no long-
term vision of where the expansion process will stop. The U.S. is 
slashing defense while increasing security obligations abroad. Beware 
the Administration strong on NATO expansion, but weak on defense.
  The resistance of Administration officials to define where the 
expansion of NATO's mission and membership will stop indicates how far 
Article 5 has diminished in importance. Secretary Albright has stated 
that ``. . .no European democracy will be excluded because of where it 
sits on the map.'' The Administration's dismissal of the logistical and 
strategic constraints of war may work for Foggy Bottom. In the real 
world, real soldiers die in defense of real borders.
  Treaty creep will cost American lives, harm U.S. interests, and 
undermine NATO. The drift in this Administration's foreign policy is 
threatening the future of a focused NATO which serves American 
interests. The Senate should not be complacent with fifty years of NATO 
success. This body has a role to play in the scope of U.S. treaty 
commitments.
  Changing NATO into a mini-UN with a standing army is not something 
the American people will support. We have been lucky in Bosnia. The 
first time NATO has a Somalia experience in pursuit of an expanded 
mission, U.S. support for the alliance will be undermined. Voting for 
the Ashcroft amendment is the best way to be clear about NATO's 
mission--the territorial defense of Western Europe. This amendment is 
the best way to advance U.S. interests through NATO.

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