[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 90 (Thursday, July 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7873-S7876]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                AMERICA'S STRATEGY AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise tonight to make some comments about 
America's strategy in the long and vitally important struggle we are 
waging against illegal drugs. When it comes to ensuring a bright future 
for our children, there are very few things we can do that are more 
important than protecting them from drugs.
  Earlier today, President Clinton and Speaker of the House Gingrich 
unveiled a major billion-dollar advertising campaign, a campaign 
approved by this Congress to reach our children with a hard-hitting 
message about the dangers of drugs. Mr. President, in my view, this is 
a very worthwhile project; it is something that we should do; it is 
something that I believe will in fact make a difference. It comes not a 
moment too soon.
  Advertising is important in virtually every sector of our society. 
Those of us who run for public office use TV and radio; products are 
sold every day. I think the evidence is clear that we can reach our 
young people; we can reach everyone through very effective antidrug 
advertising.
  Mr. President, investing in antidrug education campaigns is 
important, but education is just one of the key components. It must be 
part of a balanced overall strategy if we are to truly fight drug 
abuse. To succeed, we have to rely on more than just creative minds on 
Madison Avenue. We need the help of teachers, doctors, parents, and 
many more, to help reduce demand through education and through 
treatment. We need the help of law enforcement officers, we need the 
help of prosecutors, judges, to arrest and then send drug pushers to 
prison. And we need drug enforcement agents, Coast Guard crews, and 
even members of our military to seize drugs at the source or in transit 
before they come into our country. It takes all these individuals, and 
so many more, to wage a comprehensive--to wage a balanced, effective 
war on drugs. History proves the fight against drugs is only successful 
when it is balanced and when it is in fact comprehensive.
  Mr. President, sadly--sadly--our overall drug strategy today is 
neither balanced nor comprehensive. Our drug strategy today is 
imbalanced because of a lack of commitment for the international and 
for the interdiction components of the antidrug effort. Let me repeat, 
I believe that we are not making enough effort in the international 
area and in the interdiction components of the antidrug effort.
  Now, what do I mean by the interdiction component? What do I mean by 
the international component? Let me define ``international effort,'' 
what I mean by that, and what I mean by ``interdiction efforts.''
  International efforts include any direct assistance, resources and 
training the United States provides to foreign countries specifically 
for counternarcotics matters.

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  By interdiction efforts, I mean to include the seizing of drugs, the 
disruption of drug-trafficking routes outside our borders from where 
the drugs are produced in source countries, through the so-called 
transit zones, then up until they reach our border.
  Basically, Mr. President, what we are talking about is everything 
from the production of the drugs all the way until they hit our border. 
It is in this effort in the past few years we have not made the effort, 
not made the sufficient effort.

  Sadly, the current administration, despite its promises in this area, 
has been either unwilling or unable to maintain the support needed for 
a successful comprehensive and balanced international and interdiction 
strategy.
  It is, Mr. President, because of this imbalance that the current 
administration has failed to uphold the tremendous successes of the 
Reagan and Bush administrations in reducing illegal drug use, 
particularly among young people. In fact, the evidence shows that drug 
use has been on the rise. This must be of great concern to all 
Americans.
  Mr. President, I am going to be talking in the balance of this speech 
about that lack of effort in the international area and that lack of 
effort in the interdiction area. I want to also say, though, that part 
of the problem has been that initially this administration did not 
focus on the drug problem. It was not a high priority. The President, 
for years, did not use the bully pulpit of the Presidency to talk about 
this issue. And I think this contributed to the problem as well.
  The fact is, over the course of the previous decade, international 
and interdiction programs beyond our borders were essential parts of a 
balanced plan to reduce drug use, a plan that also included drug 
education, drug treatment, and local law enforcement efforts. When we 
used all of these, Mr. President, we made some progress.
  But beginning in 1993, the administration abandoned this balanced 
approach and shifted resources away from the international and 
interdiction components of our antidrug efforts. Simply put, this 
administration has deemphasized effective strategies beyond our borders 
that are designed to keep drugs from entering our country and infecting 
our communities.
  Mr. President, I believe it is time to reverse this current policy. 
This evening, I call on my colleagues to join me in restoring--in 
restoring--a balanced drug control strategy that will put us back on a 
course toward ridding our schools and our communities of illegal and 
destructive drugs.
  By doing this, we can in fact make a difference. By restoring our 
prior commitment to source and transit zone interdiction efforts, we 
can once again reduce the trafficking of drugs.
  Let me address this issue in more detail. As I said at the beginning 
of my remarks, effective international and effective interdiction 
programs are a necessary and key component of any national drug control 
strategy.
  During the period from 1985 through 1992, the U.S. Government waged a 
comprehensive and a balanced antidrug effort. The evidence clearly 
shows that with a balanced strategy we were making great progress. We 
significantly reduced drug use.
  In 1987, the Federal drug control budget was divided as follows: 29 
percent for demand reduction programs. These, of course, include 
education, treatment, prevention. Thirty-eight percent of the budget in 
that year--38 percent of the budget--went for domestic law enforcement, 
and 33 percent went for international and interdiction efforts.
  The total national drug control budget at that time was $4.79 
billion. Now, what were the results of this very balanced--very 
balanced--approach? We achieved some progress, with some success.
  In 1988 to 1991, total drug use was down 13 percent, cocaine use 
dropped by 35 percent, marijuana use was reduced by 16 percent.

  How did interdiction contribute to this decline? First, major efforts 
to limit the easy access to drugs by street dealers caused the number 
of potential drug users to fall off. Second, limiting success through 
interdiction drove up the street price of drugs dramatically. Because 
of interdiction, drugs became more difficult to find and more expensive 
to buy.
  During this period of time, our drug interdiction strategy was 
serious business. President Bush called illegal drugs the ``gravest 
domestic threat facing our Nation today.'' In 1989, President Bush 
tasked the Defense Department to play an important role in the drug 
war. Specifically, the Defense Department was tasked to engage in the 
detection and monitoring of drugs in transit towards the United States. 
As a Member of the House of Representatives at that time, I can recall 
very well the investment we dedicated toward the international and 
toward the interdiction components of the war on drugs. These 
investments did make a difference.
  All this changed in 1993. The Clinton administration immediately 
pursued policies that upset this careful balance in drug funding. 
Although we have seen a considerable increase in the overall national 
drug control budget, the proportion of resources dedicated to 
international and to interdiction efforts has dramatically declined 
over the past 5 years.
  In addition, interdiction no longer remains a priority within the 
Department of Defense. In fact, the Defense Department currently ranks 
counternarcotics dead last in importance, dead last in its global 
military force policy.
  Let me spend a few minutes talking about this major shift in policy. 
Let me refer Members of the Senate to my second chart. Of the $13.3 
million national drug control budget for the year 1995, 35 percent was 
allocated for drug demand reduction programs--35 percent--53 percent 
for law enforcement, but only 12 percent for the international and the 
interdiction components combined. So we went from one-third of the 
total budget to 12 percent, a dramatic change. Think of it--only 12 
percent of the total drug control budget was dedicated to these 
efforts, down from 33 percent just a few years before. Although the 
overall drug budget increased threefold from 1987 to 1995, the piece of 
the drug budget pie allocated for international and interdiction 
efforts has dramatically decreased. This is not only unfortunate, it is 
also unacceptable.
  There was then and continues to be no real effort made, no real 
commitment made, no real resources given, for international and 
interdiction efforts. We are spending some money, but it has been a 
dramatic decrease in the message of our total effort. I believe the 
results are clear and the consequences have been devastating.
  Counternarcotics funding for defense fell 57 percent between 1992 and 
1995. Coast Guard funding fell 32 percent during that same period. As a 
result, a number of Defense Department and Coast Guard ship days 
devoted to drug interdiction dropped from 4,448 in fiscal year 1993 to 
2,845 in 1995. Further, not surprisingly, Coast Guard seizures dropped 
from a little over 90,000 pounds in 1991 to a little over 28,000 pounds 
in 1996. In addition, the number of flight hours by airborne warning 
and control systems, AWAC planes, dropped from 38,100 hours in fiscal 
year 1992, clear down to 17,713 hours in fiscal year 1996, a 54 percent 
reduction. Had it not been for the change in leadership in Congress in 
1995, this very troubling situation would have been far, far worse.

  However, the damage of an unbalanced strategy has been done. Cocaine 
seizures had dropped, the price of cocaine had dropped, and there was 
an increase in drug use. Overall drug use among teens aged 12-17 rose 
by 70 percent. Drug-abuse-related arrests more than doubled for minors 
between 1992 and 1996. Since 1992, there has been an overall 80 percent 
increase in illicit drug use among graduating high school seniors. This 
negative effect has sent shockwaves through our communities and our 
homes.
  The rise of drug use is not at all surprising. With the decline of 
emphasis on drug interdiction, it became far easier to bring drugs into 
the United States and thus far easier to purchase drugs. A significant 
price decline caused by the increased availability of cocaine and 
heroin made it easier for casual adult users and our youth to buy these 
drugs. The Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that small 
``pieces'' or rocks of crack once sold for $10 to $20 and are now 
available for $3 to $5.

[[Page S7875]]

  Mr. President, what disturbs me about this current national drug 
control strategy is that this unbalanced trend continues. As we can see 
in the second chart, in the late 1980s there was a generally balanced 
distribution among the three different functions--demand reduction, law 
enforcement, and international interdiction efforts. In 1987, you can 
see, they are fairly balanced. Compare that to the distributions for 
the years 1994, 1995, and then 1998. One can see that our previous 
balanced approach certainly no longer exists.
  The red on the chart is the international and interdiction 
components--again, Mr. President, basically our entire antidrug effort 
from the source countries to the transit zones, right up to the border 
of the United States. That is what this red represents. What you find 
is, it was basically a third when we started, when we looked at 1987, 
but by the time we get to 1995 and 1998 it is a much smaller 
percentage, down to as low as 12 percent. That is the problem.
  Our previous balanced approach simply no longer exists. The strategy 
has changed, and, sadly, so have the results. This really is the untold 
story of what has gone on in regard to our antidrug efforts during the 
past few years. It is a story that I think has to be told, and it is a 
story that I think the Senate, the House, and the American people 
simply have to pay attention to. We have to change this trend. We need 
to restore a balance, a balanced strategy.
  Let me make it clear that I strongly support funding to keep with the 
demand side of the drug situation; that is, finding a way to persuade 
Americans, particularly young people, that doing drugs is wrong, that 
it destroys lives, families, schools, and communities. Truly, in the 
end, reducing demand is the only permanent way to really overcome the 
threat of drugs. As long as there is demand for drugs, there will 
always be a supply. That is why education and treatment, both--
education and treatment--remain essential long-term goal components of 
our antidrug efforts.
  However, reducing the demand for drugs is not going to happen 
overnight. It will take many years to change minds regarding the use or 
abuse of drugs. I believe one way to reduce demand is to have an 
effective interdiction policy, one that will seriously reduce the level 
of drugs into this country. We must find ways to raise the costs of 
narcotics trafficking, making it far more difficult for drug lords to 
bring these drugs to our Nation and in making the drugs far more costly 
to buy.
  It is sad to say, the drug cartels don't have a budget process or a 
bureaucracy to slow them down. Unfortunately, the job is not getting 
done. As I have mentioned before, the Caribbean is becoming more and 
more the transit route of choice for drug traffickers. I have made two 
visits to the transit zone in the Caribbean in the past few months. 
During my last visit, I learned that our agents in the Bahamas seized 
more cocaine in the first 3 months of 1998 than in the previous 3 years 
combined. This may sound great, it may sound like we are making 
progress, but our agents there inform me that although they would like 
to take tremendous credit for these seizures, their belief, their 
concern, is that the higher amount seized represents probably just a 
small fraction of the total amount of drugs coming through this 
area. They told me that they think the amount of drugs coming through 
is significantly up, and they are only getting a fraction of what is 
coming through.

  For example, Mr. President, of the total drug air events in the 
Bahamas from April 1997 to April 1998, our U.S. agents told me that 
they believe there was only an 8 percent success rate in stopping drug 
air flights that had been detected. They are working hard and they are 
doing the best they can, but that means that over 92 percent got away. 
Without a doubt, there is a larger, larger flow of drugs entering the 
United States and a larger, larger flow of drugs coming through this 
part of the world.
  Mr. President, when I was in Key West for a short visit in May, I was 
briefed on specific interdiction efforts in the Eastern Pacific. I was 
surprised to find that in the Eastern Pacific the coast is literally 
clear today for the drug lords to do their business. We have virtually 
nothing going on to stop drug trafficking in this area. It is wide, 
wide open. This is simply unacceptable.
  The U.S. Government is not effectively dealing with this increasingly 
large threat in the eastern Pacific. We have virtually no presence 
because of a lack of funding and commitment. I was briefed about an 
operation called Caper Focus, which would have focused on interdiction 
efforts in the area. We would have had a number of surface assets and 
aircraft to patrol the waters and to do interdiction. This operation, 
unfortunately, was canceled--canceled before it started--because of a 
Department of Defense decision to send the needed surface assets 
elsewhere. To date, this issue has not been resolved and the coastal 
waters in the Eastern Pacific are wide open--wide open--for drug 
business.
  Mr. President, it is situations like this that greatly disturb me 
and, I think, should disturb all Americans. As a Nation, we are not 
doing all we can to fight drugs beyond our borders. The drug lords in 
South America are well aware that the United States no longer considers 
interdiction an important facet in its drug program. It is no 
exaggeration to say that they are having a field day. Although the 
Coast Guard and agencies can monitor drug trafficking operations, they 
stand by helpless because they lack the necessary equipment to turn 
detection into seizures and arrests.
  Mr. President, I believe it is time to provide the resources 
essential for our agencies to effectively complete the job that they 
have been assigned, and the job that they so desperately want to do--
the job to protect our borders from the importation of illegal 
narcotics. The most effective way to stop the drug business is to find 
ways to make it more difficult for them to engage in this illicit and, 
frankly, immoral practice. We need to have a renewed commitment and 
rededication of resources toward drug interdiction.
  Mr. President, there is a clear link between the rise in the drug use 
and the decline of resources devoted to interdiction. The interdiction 
efforts conducted from 1985 to 1992 made a difference in reducing drug 
use. Interdiction does drive up the price of doing business in drugs, 
and this drives up the price and drives down the purity of cocaine on 
the street, or any other drug. Also, it is important to note that 
seizing or destroying a ton of cocaine in source or transit areas is 
much more cost effective than trying to seize the same quantity of 
drugs at the point of sale. No doubt, interdiction is a key factor 
driving down drug use, and you do it by driving up drug prices.
  Mr. President, the answer to this current problem is clear: We need a 
balanced antidrug approach. That means we have to restore source 
country/transit zone interdiction efforts. I believe that we can in 
fact do this. I believe we can restore the strategy we had not so many 
years ago before the current administration hobbled these efforts. We 
need to reduce the flow of cocaine and heroin into the U.S., we need to 
drive up the cost of these drugs, and we need to reduce their 
availability and support efforts to reduce demand. This will work.
  Mr. President, I have been working with colleagues both in the Senate 
and the House in developing this comprehensive interdiction eradication 
and crop substitution program. So I intend to take the floor again soon 
and outline how we can restore our international interdiction efforts 
and how we can restore the balance we need to once again effectively 
fight the scourge of illegal drugs.
  Mr. President, Abraham Lincoln once said, ``We cannot escape 
history.'' Well, history shows that only with a comprehensive, balanced 
antidrug strategy can we actually reduce drug use. So it is time for 
our drug strategy to embrace history, not escape it.
  Mr. President, I will discuss this matter in the future in more 
detail and with more specifics, as far as what I think we need to do. 
But the bottom line is that we need that balanced approach. We need to 
get back to doing what we were doing a few years ago, when one-third of 
our budget was devoted to interdiction, stopping drugs before they 
reached the United States. We need to do everything--we need to have 
drug treatment, we need to have drug education, we need to have 
domestic law enforcement, and we need to work at our borders. All of 
these things

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are important. But we also must do the final thing. The final thing is 
to stop the drugs at the source, in the source country, and in transit.

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