[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 89 (Wednesday, July 8, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7668-S7670]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, our relationship with the People's 
Republic of China is perhaps the most complex of any within the realm 
of foreign policy. Absent the scale of confrontation the United States 
experienced with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, U.S. 
diplomacy must, for the foreseeable future, walk a very fine line 
between cooperation and challenge with the world's most populous 
nation. The very nature of the Soviet threat provided a level of 
clarity absent in our attempts at formulating a long-term policy for 
dealing with China. There is no justification for a policy of 
containment when there is no reason to believe that Chinese foreign 
policy is inherently expansionist. Indeed, there is no reason to 
believe that China's external ambitions extend beyond those with which 
we are already familiar: island chains in the South China Sea and the 
most dangerous issue of all dividing our two countries, the status of 
Taiwan.
  The complexity inherent in U.S.-China relations simply allows for 
neither the demonization of China, as many here would have it, nor the 
kind of alliance we enjoy with our closest allies. The issues are too 
varied, and the emotions surrounding them run too deep. The issues with 
which the United States takes exception relative to China, especially 
in the area of human rights and religious persecution, are too central 
to our values as a nation for us to ignore. With every dissident thrown 
into prison, for every item produced with forced prison labor, for the 
memory of those killed in Tiananmen Square, those charged with the 
conduct of American foreign policy must take the government in Beijing 
to task and demand, not ask, a measure of justice none of us really 
expects to materialize soon enough. And therein lies the dilemma we 
face in dealing with China: We demand of it something it has never 
had--freedom.
  President Jiang Zemin made clear the high priority his government 
places on social stability at the expense of personal liberty. 
President Clinton, to his credit, offered an articulate defense of the 
emphasis the United

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States places on freedom, and he placed it squarely in the context of 
an emerging world power struggling with the dichotomies of economic 
development and dictatorship. Economic freedom cannot forever coexist 
with authoritarian dictates in the political, social and cultural 
realms.
  The kind of technological innovation and rapid transition from 
laboratory to marketplace common to advanced industrialized countries 
is not possible when individual freedom is constrained and lacking 
essential legal protections. China's poor record on protection of 
intellectual property is symptomatic of this phenomenon. Furthermore, 
that it views religious and political freedom as a threat is a sign 
that it has some distance to go before it can join the community of 
nations represented in the G-7, as no nation can reach its full 
potential that fears the free expression of ideas by its own people.
  To a very large degree, the ongoing controversy involving technology 
transfers to China has its seeds in the inability of dictatorial 
societies to draw upon reservoirs of talent that cannot be created 
where the flow of information is tightly controlled and where the kind 
of intellectual exchanges that resulted in the great technological 
innovations of the 20th Century are constrained. It is no accident that 
the wealthiest nations on Earth are those that, since the Second World 
War, have pursued market economies within the framework of democratic 
forms of government. Japan and Singapore are completely lacking in 
natural resources, yet enjoy among the highest standards of living in 
the world. The Asian economic crisis is a serious warning of the need 
to reform certain government policies and business practices, but the 
accomplishments of the economic systems still warrant respect.
  President Clinton's trip to China has to be viewed within the context 
of what could realistically be expected of China. In one significant 
respect, his trip was a success. The access afforded him to the Chinese 
public was unprecedented, and the President did a fine job of 
expressing the importance of democratic values to the Chinese people. 
He further deserves gratitude for his denunciation of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, an event of singular importance for post-Cold War 
relations between the two countries. The events of May and June 1989, 
occurring as they did while the central front of the Cold War was 
undergoing dramatic transformations that would reshape most of the 
world, were a sad reminder of the extremes to which governments that do 
not rule with the consent of the people will go to maintain their hold 
on power. By conveying the message directly to the Chinese people that 
the leader of what has historically been known as the ``Free World'' 
condemns the events of 4 June 1989, President Clinton communicated to 
pro-democracy elements in China the vital message that the United 
States supports their efforts.
  To the extent the President is criticized for a mission for which the 
only success was symbolic, it must be admitted there is little of 
substance to show for the effort. It is apparent that his sights were 
set low, and his achievements accordingly modest. To be fair, the kinds 
of change we hope to witness in China will not materialize over night; 
China is a country that thinks in terms of its thousands of years of 
history, and that history is replete with repression, foreign invasion 
and civil war. It is a deeply scarred nation, neither willing nor able 
to lose sight of its legacy of exploitation at the hands of others. But 
China today stands on the brink of becoming one of the world's premier 
powers and, as such, must understand that more is expected of it. The 
role it seeks to play, regionally and globally, must be firmly rooted 
in a moral foundation in which the worth of the individual lies at the 
center of its system of governance. Repression is alien to such a 
system, as is the insecurity all too often manifested in expressions of 
external aggression. If its goal is to instill in its neighbors a fear 
of its looming shadow, all it will have to show for its efforts is an 
element of regional hegemony in a region where countries have fought 
ferociously to resist such intimidation. It will then suffer 
economically, with the risk of social instability that President Jiang 
emphasized is one of his greatest concerns.
  The areas of trade, proliferation, the status of Tibet, and the 
future of Taiwan all remain largely unresolved--the latter dangerously 
so. The President's rejection of Taiwanese independence is consistent 
with previous Administration statements and U.S. policy going back to 
1972, but only if loosely interpreted. United States policy remains 
``one China,'' but the context in which the President's statement was 
made and the manner in which it was declared were painfully close to 
resolving the issue of Taiwan's status by fiat and in Beijing's favor.
  Taiwan is a complex country. It is torn internally between an 
historically indigenous Formosan population that claims independence 
from mainland China, and the large segment of the population that 
represents the mass migration from the mainland following the communist 
victory in 1949. The latter claims to be the legitimate government of 
all of China. The reality on the ground, of course, does not allow for 
a policy predicated upon such a claim. To have reaffirmed as the 
President did the so-called ``three noes'' policy, however, served only 
to exacerbate concerns in Taiwan about its security--legitimate 
concerns irrespective of where one stands on the issue of its 
independence--while possibly emboldening Beijing. Given how close our 
two nations came to armed confrontation in March 1996 over Taiwan's 
security and right to exist as a democratic country, a more sensitive 
articulation of U.S. policy was in order.
  Since coming to Congress, I have been a staunch advocate of free 
trade. The unprecedented period of economic growth that the United 
States has experienced is owed in no small part to our level of trade. 
We cannot and should not, however, expect the American public to 
countenance a level of Chinese imports that is not reciprocated. Trade 
deficits that result from the natural dynamics of free market 
mechanisms should not be feared; deficits that occur as a result of 
systematic imposition of barriers to free trade must be confronted. In 
this respect, the President's trip was an abject failure. U.S. 
companies must have unfettered access to the Chinese market, and ought 
not be compelled to compete with companies owned by the Chinese 
military, which comprise a disappointing number of those in the 
southern economic zone.
  On the extremely contentious issue of technology transfers, an 
entirely separate discussion is warranted to do it justice. At issue as 
far as U.S. exports are concerned is dual-use technology that, by its 
nature, presents considerable regulatory difficulty. As we in the 
Congress press the Department of Defense to make more use of commercial 
technologies, we should not be surprised that the Chinese are doing 
precisely that. The Commerce Committee will be holding hearings into 
the export licensing process, and I am aware of the number of hearings 
held in both chambers of Congress by various committees. Suffice to say 
for now, though, that we need to get a better handle on this issue. For 
American companies, the stakes are high; for our national security, 
they are higher. The latter must take precedence. It is questionable 
whether the President agrees with that supposition.
  This Administration's handling of export controls warrants close 
examination, as there is considerable evidence that dual-use 
technologies are finding their way into Chinese weapon systems. While I 
do not fear the kind of global confrontation with China that existed 
relative to the Soviet Union, I fear the threat to regional stability 
that can and will arise should Chinese military modernization enable it 
to project military power at the expense of its neighbors. And I fear 
for the future of Taiwan should China develop the means to militarily 
subdue that democratic bastion. China has a right to defend itself; it 
has a right to a modern army. The Pacific Rim is too fraught with 
tension, however, to ignore the regional and global implications of 
modernization untempered by moral or practical constraints.
  In the area of proliferation, the outcome of the China summit is 
unclear. China's continued refusal to join the Missile Technology 
Control Regime augurs ill for our ability to rein in its

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export of destabilizing military technologies. The recent nuclear 
detonations by India and Pakistan were testament to the dangers 
implicit in policies that seek to resolve border disputes through the 
brandishing of ever more destructive forms of weaponry. China's support 
of other countries' nuclear weapons programs is extremely dangerous. 
Its support of their development of the means of delivering those 
weapons is even more so.
  The one true consensus in the realm of national security affairs is 
the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery. A cloud will continue to hang over U.S.-China 
relations until we are confident that China respects our concerns, as 
it expects us to respect its concerns. We should certainly not be 
exacerbating that problem through exports of our own to China that 
benefit its military-industrial complex. Administration policies in 
this regard deserve the close scrutiny they are now receiving.
  China will always act in its self-interest. It will always view the 
world through the prism of its own unique history, and through its own 
unique culture. Such perspective does not excuse its repressive 
domestic policies, and U.S. policy ought not make allowances for those 
policies. We should be under no illusions that China will be a 
strategic partner; in all likelihood, it will not. It is a relationship 
that should be managed, and that should start from the premise that 
Chinese foreign policy will, at times, run counter to our own. Our 
export policy must take that into account, even if that comes at the 
expense of business.
  Mr. President, it is sometimes said that the business of government 
is business. It is not. There is no constitutional prerogative for 
governmental intervention in the marketplace. There is a constitutional 
prerogative to provide for the common defense. As in any area of life, 
to some degree there is an element of balance that needs to be 
maintained. The current Administration's great failing is its inability 
to appreciate that fundamental requirement and to provide for the 
common defense. We should and do work with China for our mutual 
benefit. We must do so, however, without losing sight of the nature of 
the Chinese regime. President Jiang may prove an able leader; effusive 
praise usually reserved for Jeffersonian democrats, however, obscures 
the depth of the chasm that remains in the Sino-American relationship 
and the origins of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. That 
is not ideologically-driven rhetoric; it is a view of a dictatorial 
government through the prism of history.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona for 
his remarks. For a moment, I want to respond to some of what my 
colleague from Arizona said. He need not stay, but I did want to 
amplify on some of his remarks.
  I have had the honor of being able to work closely with Congresswoman 
Pelosi, who I think has been a very courageous leader in the human 
rights area. I have worked with a lot of human rights organizations, 
and Wei Jingsheng and others in China, who have had the courage to 
speak up. I, too, want to give credit where credit is due. I think it 
is terribly important that the President speak out about human rights--
terribly important. I think it was perhaps even more important that 
this was on television and radio and people in China had an opportunity 
to hear this discussion.
  I also believe, however, that really the question is, What next? I 
think that is really the question in regard to the whole issue of 
weapons of mass destruction and exporting of technology --dangerous 
technologies--in regard to trade. I think last year China exported 
something like $40 billion worth of products to our country and we 
exported $15 billion to China. That is clearly a policy that doesn't 
serve the people in our country well at all.
  I think also in the human rights area, which is very near and dear to 
my heart, I wish the President had met with some of the human rights 
advocates in China. I wish he had met with some of the families of the 
victims of Tiananmen Square or, for that matter, of those who are now 
in prison. But most important, on the ``what next'' part, I really hope 
that we will see some changes. There are, at minimum, some 2,000 men 
and women in prison in China just for the practice of their religion or 
because they have spoken out; many have spoken out for democracy, which 
is what we cherish in our country. We just celebrated 222 years of our 
noble experiment in self-rule. Those prisoners of conscience should be 
released.
  We meet all the time in our country very courageous men and women, 
now living in the United States of America. Many of them can't go back 
to China. They have been ``blacklisted.'' They should be able to go 
back to their country. It is not enough to say, because the Government 
released Wei Jingsheng, who served 16, 17, 18 years in prison because 
he had the courage to stand alone and to speak out for democracy, that 
this represents progress, because he is now in exile. He can't go back 
to his country to see his family, to see his loved ones.
  Quite clearly, the discussion about Tibet was good, but what we 
absolutely have to see are some negotiations with the Dalai Lama, a 
specific timetable to put an end to what has been absolute pressure on 
the people in Tibet. Last year, things got worse in Tibet. There has 
been no improvement whatsoever in human rights. Every time I have an 
opportunity to speak out about human rights on the floor of the Senate, 
I don't miss that opportunity.
  I say to the President that I appreciated someone who was pushing and 
pushing the President to speak out on human rights. I am glad he did. I 
think the credit should be given to the President for raising a lot of 
other terribly important questions that deal with our national security 
and our national defense. I also believe, however, in the human rights 
equation, which I think should be part of the foundation of our foreign 
policy. The whole way we need to measure the success of the President's 
trip is, what next? What next? The proof will be in the pudding. We 
have to wait and see. We have to continue to press and press and press.

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