[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 86 (Friday, June 26, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7325-S7333]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Armed Services Committee 
be discharged from further consideration of S. 2052 and the Senate 
proceed to its consideration. This is the intelligence authorization 
bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2052) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence related 
     activities for the U.S. government and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate 
consideration of the bill?
  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 2052, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, to authorize 
appropriations for intelligence-related activities and programs of the 
United States Government. This important legislation was reported 
favorably out of the Committee on May 7, 1998, by unanimous vote, 
consistent with the long-standing, bipartisan nature of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Following receipt of the President's budget, the Select Committee 
undertook a thorough review of the budget request for intelligence for 
fiscal year 1999. That review was informed, in part, by several 
hearings and briefings as well as the findings and recommendations of a 
group of outside experts--known as the Technical Advisory Group--that 
the distinguished Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kerrey, and I 
tasked last December to address key questions facing the Community.
  In addition, the Committee staff recently completed indepth audits 
and reviews of the use of ``cover'' by the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the administration of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978. These reviews and audits led to Committee action with respect to 
the authorities, applicable laws, and budget of the activity or program 
concerned.
  As a product of these reviews, the Committee came to some rather 
startling and disconcerting conclusions about the overall health and 
direction of the Intelligence Community. For example:
  First, the CIA's foremost mission of providing timely intelligence 
based on human sources (``HUMINT'') is in grave jeopardy. CIA case 
officers today do not have the training or the equipment needed to keep 
their true identities hidden, to communicate covertly with agents, or 
to plant sophisticated listening devices and other collection tools 
that will provide timely intelligence on an adversary's intentions.
  Second, what many see as the ``crown jewel'' of U.S. Intelligence--
the National Security Agent's SIGINT capability--likewise is in dire 
need of modernization. The digital and fiber-optic revolutions are 
here-and-now, but NSA is still predominantly oriented toward Cold War-
era threats. The Director of NSA, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, 
has recommended major changes in how NSA performs its vital mission--
changes our Committee endorses--but these changes were not reflected in 
the President's budget request.
  Third, promising technologies and systems for detecting missiles and 
other threats have been short-changed in the budget request. Likewise, 
robust funding for new tools for conducting information warfare, new 
sensors to detect and counter proliferation, and moving to smaller and 
cheaper satellites to support the war-fighter are not included in the 
budget request.
  And fourth, the quality of analysis within the Intelligence Community 
is poor and getting worse. Responding to the failure to predict the 
Indian nuclear tests, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned 
retired Admiral David Jeremiah to review what went wrong and why. Among 
other findings, Admiral Jeremiah concluded that intelligence community 
analysts were complacent; they based their analyses on faulty 
assumptions; and engaged in wishful thinking. It is my belief that such 
is the state of analysis as it relates to many issues and problems, 
including political-military developments in China, the ballistic 
missile threat, and more. We can and should expect more from the 
Intelligence Community.
  The Intelligence Community has been forced by budgetary pressures to 
choose between funding current operations (such as Bosnia) and 
investing in the future. This is the case even after personnel 
reductions of over 20 percent in the Intelligence Community have been 
made over the past decade. In many ways, then, the problem confronting 
U.S. Intelligence is similar to that confronting the Department of 
Defense: How to pay for the necessary investments in future, ``winning-
edge'' capabilities when the policymakers emphasize current operations? 
And, equally important, how to sustain the quality of life and skills-
level of personnel who are already stretched thin by high operations 
tempo and lengthy overseas deployments?
  To address these challenges, Senator Kerrey and I tasked the staff to 
find and cut any and all poorly justified or redundant programs out of 
the budget. And, in fact, significant cuts were made to a wide range of 
lower-priority intelligence programs and activities. If it was poorly 
justified, redundant, or low-priority, then we cut it. These actions 
are entirely consistent with our oversight responsibilities, and the 
American people would expect no less.

  The Select Committee then took those funds and applied them against 
the highest priority intelligence needs and targets. Earlier this year, 
Senator Kerrey and I prepared intelligence budget guidance to direct 
the staff's budget work. That guidance emphasized the need for 
strengthened investment in areas such as advanced research and 
development, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, personnel training, information operations, effective covert 
action, and enhanced analysis. These are precisely the areas the 
Committee has historically supported and the keys to future 
intelligence successes--whether to support military commanders, 
policymakers in Washington, or American diplomats.
  This approach of cutting low-priority projects and redirecting those 
funds into high-payoff, futuristic technologies and systems, is 
fiscally responsible and reflects the need for difficult choices in an 
era of scarce resources.
  This budget is full of tough choices. For example, the Committee 
recommended cutting certain ``legacy'' programs and activities at NSA 
in order to pay for the collection systems and processes of the future, 
as recommended in General Minihan's study of the future SIGINT 
architecture needs (the ``Unified Cryptologic Architecture''). 
Likewise, the Committee recommended cutting the number of CIA 
contractors, and reduced spending on costly infrastructure programs.
  None of these actions were easy--and in fact I am concerned that the 
Select Committee may have cut the intelligence budget too deeply in 
order to reach agreement with the Senate Armed Services Committee. That 
being said, this legislation is sound, it is balanced, and it is worthy 
of strong bipartisan support.

[[Page S7326]]

  My colleagues and the American people must come to understand that to 
save lives on the battlefield, to preclude terrorist attacks against 
Americans, to root out spies in our midst, and to give diplomats the 
information they need to forestall conflict in the first place, we need 
an effective, revitalized Intelligence Community. And that it is 
precisely what the Intelligence Authorization Act seeks to do.
  In summary, the Select Committee made the tough choices. We cut 
programs in order to invest in the future. We concluded that the 
intelligence budget can be cut, but it must be done in a careful, 
precise way, and based on specific programmatic recommendations. And we 
did it in a fully bipartisan manner.
  I applaud and appreciate the efforts of the Vice Chairman of the 
Committee, Senator Kerrey from Nebraska, and all the Members of the 
Committee, who labored long and hard on this bill. It is one of the 
most important pieces of legislation this body will consider this year, 
and I urge its passage.
  Pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, the Armed Services 
Committee has been discharged from consideration of the Intelligence 
Authorization Bill. Although the Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee and I had previously agreed that the Armed Services Committee 
would not report the Intelligence Authorization Bill until three days 
following completion of Senate Floor consideration of the Defense 
Authorization Bill, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee has 
informed me that his committee has completed its review of the 
Intelligence Authorization Bill and does not recommend any amendments. 
We agree that it is appropriate for the Senate to consider the 
intelligence Authorization Bill at this time. We also agree, however, 
that this unanimous consent agreement to discharge the Armed Services 
Committee from further review of the Intelligence Authorization Bill 
will not serve as a precedent for requiring the Armed Services 
Committee to report future Intelligence Authorization Bills until it 
has had an adequate amount of time to review such legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the cost 
estimate for the bill.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                     Washington, DC, May 14, 1998.
     Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
     Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2052, the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn 
     Sauter, who can be reached at 226-2840.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosure.

   S. 2052: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as 
 Reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 7, 1998


                                summary

       S. 2052 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 
     for intelligence activities of the United States government, 
     the Community Management Account, and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System 
     (CIARDS).
       This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
     the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting 
     S. 2052 would result in additional spending of $174 million 
     over the 1999-2003 period, assuming appropriation of the 
     authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill 
     would affect direct spending; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures 
     would apply. However, CBO cannot give a precise estimate of 
     the direct spending effects because data to support a cost 
     estimate are classified.
       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes 
     from application of the act legislative provisions that are 
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that 
     all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that 
     exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-
     sector mandates as defined by UMRA.


                estimated cost to the federal government

       The estimated budgetary impact of the unclassified portions 
     of S. 2052 is shown in the following table. CBO is unable to 
     obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs for 
     the entire bill because parts are classified at a level above 
     clearances held by CBO employees. The costs of this 
     legislation fall within budget function 050 (national 
     defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        1998         1999         2000         2001         2002         2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Spending Under Current Law for the
 Community Management Account:
    Budget Authority \1\..........           94            0            0            0            0            0
    Estimated Outlays.............          104           36            7            2            0            0
Proposed Changes:
    Authorization Level...........            0          174            0            0            0            0
    Estimated Outlays.............            0          108           52           10            3            0
Spending Under S. 2052 for the
 Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level \2\.......           94          174            0            0            0            0
    Estimated Outlays.............          104          144           59           12            3            0
 
                                           CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
 
Estimated Budget Authority........            0            0        (\2\)        (\2\)        (\2\)        (\2\)
Estimated Outlays.................            0            0        (\2\)        (\2\)        (\2\)        (\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1998 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ CBO cannot give a precise estimate of direct spending effects because data to support a cost estimate are
  classified.

       The bill would authorize appropriations of $174 million for 
     the Community Management Account. In addition, the bill would 
     authorize $202 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs 
     attributable to military service and various unfunded 
     liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, 
     and the authorization under this bill would be the same as 
     assumed in the CBO baseline.
       Section 401 of the bill would extend the CIA's authority to 
     offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire 
     or resign. This authority, which is currently scheduled to 
     expire at the end of fiscal year 1999, would be extended 
     through fiscal year 2001. Section 401 would also require the 
     CIA to make a deposit to the Civil Service Trust Fund equal 
     to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who accepts an 
     incentive payment. CBO estimates that these payments would 
     amount to less than $5 million. We believe that these 
     deposits would be sufficient to cover the cost of any long-
     term increase in benefits that would result from induced 
     retirements, although the timing of the agency payments and 
     the additional benefit payments would not match on a yearly 
     basis. CBO cannot provide a precise estimate of the direct 
     spending effects because the data necessary for an estimate 
     are classified.
       Section 501 of the bill would require the President to 
     inform certain federal employees and contract employees that 
     they may disclose classified and unclassified information to 
     Congressional oversight committees if they believe that 
     information provides direct and specific evidence of 
     wrongdoing. CBO estimates that the costs of implementing 
     section 501 would not be significant because the number of 
     employees covered by the bill would be small and the cost 
     associated with each notice would be minimal.
       For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that S. 2052 
     will be enacted by October 1, 1998, and that the full amounts 
     authorized will be appropriated for fiscal year 1999. Outlays 
     are estimated according to historical spending patterns for 
     intelligence programs.


                      pay-as-you-go considerations

       Section 401 of the bill would affect direct spending, and 
     therefore the bill would be subject to pay-as-you-go 
     procedures. CBO cannot estimate the precise direct spending 
     effects because the necessary data are classified.


              intergovernmental and private sector impact

       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes 
     from application of the act legislative provisions that are 
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that 
     all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that 
     exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-
     sector mandates as defined by UMRA.


                         previous cbo estimate

       On May 5, 1998, CBO issued an estimate for H.R. 3694, the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as 
     ordered reported by the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. CBO estimated that section 401 of that bill 
     would increase direct spending by

[[Page S7327]]

     $1 million or more in at least one year during the 2000-2003 
     period. Like section 401 in S. 2052, the provisions in H.R. 
     3694 would extend the CIA's authority to offer incentive 
     payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. 
     However, H.R. 3694 would not require the CIA to make a 
     deposit equal to 15 percent of final pay to the Civil Service 
     Trust Fund for each employee who receives an incentive 
     payment. The bills also authorize different amounts of 
     appropriations for the Community Management Account.
       CBO prepared a cost estimate on February 25, 1998, for S. 
     1668, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence on February 23, 1998. Section 501 of S. 2052 
     duplicates the provisions of S. 1668, a bill to encourage the 
     disclosure to Congress of certain classified and related 
     information. CBO's estimates for these provisions are 
     identical.
     Estimate prepared by
       Federal Costs: Estimate for Voluntary Separation Pay: Eric 
     Rollins (226-2820), and Estimate for Remaining Provisions: 
     Dawn Sauter (226-2840).
       Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo 
     (225-3220).
       Impact on the Private Sector: Bill Thomas (226-2900).
       Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to support 
the Intelligence Authorization Bill. This bill is the product of the 
Intelligence Committee's efforts to match national intelligence 
resources and activities with today's and tomorrow's threats. Under 
Chairman Shelby's leadership, the Committee has tried to move the 
Intelligence Community toward new technologies which address emerging 
threats like weapons proliferation, terrorism, and information 
operations, while at the same time keeping intelligence strong against 
the mature threats, such as Russian nuclear forces, which still can 
kill scores of millions of Americans.
  Most of this bill is secret, contained in a classified annex 
available to all Members for review in S-407. However, it has been 
reported that the bill authorizes less money for intelligence programs 
than the President requested. I am not pleased with this outcome. But 
as the national security budgets are currently organized, the 
Intelligence Authorization bill must respond to larger Defense 
requirements. The dependent relationship of intelligence to defense is 
anachronistic, in my view, but it exists and Chairman Shelby and I have 
worked with our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee to make the 
best of a bad budgetary situation for both Committees. Let me add, I am 
equally concerned that the Defense budget is skirting the level of 
inadequacy, especially with regard to our conventional forces. National 
security is the principal function of government, and we should fund it 
better.
  The Intelligence Committee looked at the way intelligence is 
collected--through imagery, signals, human, and measurements and 
signatures--and saw mature technologies which have served America well 
for many years pitted against revolutionary change in the collection 
environments. The Committee studied solutions to this imbalance. In 
addition to its own evaluation, the Committee gathered a group of 
outside scientific experts, including some who have had no previous 
connection to intelligence, to recommend solutions to our shortfalls in 
signals and human intelligence. This panel's recommendations are also 
reflected in this bill. So Chairman Shelby and I have a strong basis in 
evidence for the new technologies and initiatives which would be 
authorized by this bill.
  The recent nuclear tests in India brought accusations of 
``intelligence failure'' in our media. In fact, I think the episode 
might be more accurately called a policy failure, but intelligence 
could certainly have done a better job. Director of Central 
Intelligence Tenet quickly tasked Admiral David Jeremiah to review the 
Intelligence Community's performance, and a summary of his 
recommendations have been declassified at the Committee's request.
  The India nuclear case offers many lessons, but two are especially 
important to intelligence. The first is that the Director of Central 
Intelligence needs to run the national Intelligence Community to ensure 
agency efforts are focused and priorities across the individual 
agencies are clear. I am holding off on legislation to increase the 
DCI's management powers because new officials are in place in positions 
already created by Congress to help manage the Community better. I want 
to see what progress Deputy Director Joan Dempsey and her new Assistant 
Directors make in harnessing the DCI's existing powers, before Congress 
creates new ones. Congress and the American people hold the DCI 
accountable for these problems. We need the DCI to be in charge.
  The second India lesson is the tendency to ``mirror image'', to 
assume Indians, in this case, would behave as we do. This tendency 
increases when there is unanimity among analysts and no one is asking 
contrarian questions. To insure such questions are always asked during 
the analysis of significant intelligence, Chairman Shelby and I are 
offering an amendment today which, among other things, will require 
competitive analysis as an integral, routine part of the analytic 
process. The fundamental purpose of intelligence is to keep our 
policymakers and military commanders from being surprised. Competitive 
analysis should at least reduce the chance of surprise.
  Finally, Mr. President, I understand Chairman Shelby will introduce 
an amendment to name the CIA headquarters building after the only U.S. 
President who has also served as DCI, former President George Bush. 
While I am not enthusiastic about the current fad of naming things 
after living politicians, I make an exception in this case. In 
political terms, service as DCI carries considerable risk. Your 
apparent failures are big news, while your successes are secret and the 
fruits of your leadership are harvested by your successor. But in peace 
or war, George Bush never calculated risks when there was an 
opportunity to serve his country, and I think he particularly relished 
the hardest tasks. Naming his old headquarters in his honor is a 
fitting tribute which I am proud to support.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill, 
and I yield the floor.


               Amendments Nos. 3051 through 3053, en bloc

  Mr. LOTT. There are several manager amendments at the desk, and I ask 
they be considered and agreed to en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes amendments 
     No. 3051 through 3053, en bloc.

  The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

                           AMENDMENT NO. 3051

 (Purpose: To authorize the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Analysis and Production to direct competitive analysis of 
            analytical products having National importance)

       On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

     SEC. 307. AUTHORITY TO DIRECT COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF 
                   ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS HAVING NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

       Section 102(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403(g)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as 
     subparagraphs (E) and (F), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
     subparagraph (D):
       ``(D) direct competitive analysis of analytical products 
     having National importance;''.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 3052

   (Purpose: To require annual studies and reports on the safety and 
  security of Russian nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces)

       On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

     SEC. 307. ANNUAL STUDY AND REPORT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY 
                   OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR 
                   MILITARY FORCES.

       (a) Annual Study.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, on an annual basis, conduct a study of the safety and 
     security of the nuclear facilities and nuclear military 
     forces in Russia.
       (b) Annual Reports.--(1) The Director shall, on an annual 
     basis, submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (4) 
     an intelligence report assessing the safety and security of 
     the nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces in Russia.
       (2) Each report shall include a discussion of the 
     following:
       (A) The ability of the Russia Government to maintain its 
     nuclear military forces.
       (B) Security arrangements at civilian and military nuclear 
     facilities in Russia.
       (C) The reliability of controls and safety systems at 
     civilian nuclear facilities in Russia.
       (D) The reliability of command and control systems and 
     procedures of the nuclear military forces in Russia.
       (3) Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
     but may contain a classified annex.

[[Page S7328]]

       (4) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the 
     following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on 
     Armed Services, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     Committee on National Security, and Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 3053

        (Purpose: Relating to a quadrennial intelligence review)

         On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 307. QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.

         (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
         (1) the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
     Secretary of Defense should jointly complete, in 1999 and 
     every 4 years thereafter, a comprehensive review of United 
     States intelligence programs and activities;
         (2) each review under paragraph (1) should--
         (A) include assessments of intelligence policy, 
     resources, manpower, organization, and related matters; and
         (B) encompass the programs and activities funded under 
     the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint 
     Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts;
         (3) the results of each review should be shared with the 
     appropriate committees of Congress; and
         (4) the Director, in conjunction with the Secretary, 
     should establish a nonpartisan, independent panel (with 
     members chosen in consultation with the committees referred 
     to in subsection (b)(2) from individuals in the private 
     sector) in order to--
         (A) assess each review under paragraph (1);
         (B) conduct an assessment of alternative intelligence 
     structures to meet the anticipated intelligence requirements 
     for the national security and foreign policy of the United 
     States through the year 2010; and
         (C) make recommendations to the Director and the 
     Secretary regarding the optimal intelligence structure for 
     the United States in light of the assessment under 
     subparagraph (B).
         (b) Report.--(1) Not later than August 15, 1998, the 
     Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the 
     committees referred to in paragraph (2) the views of the 
     Director and the Secretary regarding--
         (A) the potential value of conducting reviews as 
     described in subsection (a)(1); and
         (B) the potential value of assessments of such reviews as 
     described in subsection (a)(4)(A).
         (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the 
     following:
         (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on 
     Armed Services, and Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate.
         (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     Committee on National Security, and Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.


                  the quadrennial intelligence review

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I strongly support an initiative to 
establish a Quadrennial Intelligence Review and an independent, 
nonpartisan National Intelligence Panel. This process can be modeled 
after the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1986 which passed the 
Senate by a unanimous vote of 100-0. This Act directed the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP) which 
conducted comprehensive reviews of all aspects of defense. These 
reviews have produced a much needed update of our defense strategy, a 
revised defense program, and a vibrant debate on the course of our 
defense capabilities.
  I believe that a process of internal and external comprehensive 
review fashioned on this QDR and NDP model can be equally effective in 
the area of intelligence. I intend to work with the Committee to 
develop a provision establishing a Quadrennial Intelligence Review and 
an independent National Intelligence Panel for inclusion in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.


                           Amendment No. 3050

 (Purpose: To provide for the designation of the Headquarters Building 
 of the Central Intelligence Agency as the George Herbert Walker Bush 
                    Center for Central Intelligence)

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, Senator Shelby has an additional amendment 
at the desk and I ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Shelby, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3050.

  Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

     SEC. 307. DESIGNATION OF HEADQUARTERS BUILDING OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE GEORGE HERBERT 
                   WALKER BUSH CENTER FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Designation.--The Headquarters Building of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency located in Langley, Virginia, shall be 
     known and designated as the ``George Herbert Walker Bush 
     Center for Central Intelligence''.
       (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
     document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 
     Headquarters Building referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
     deemed to be a reference to the George Herbert Walker Bush 
     Center for Central Intelligence.


     ``george herbert walker bush center for central intelligence''

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, this Amendment will add a section to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 that will designate 
the headquarters building of the Central Intelligence Agency as the 
``George Herbert Walker Bush Center for Central Intelligence.''
  I believe that this is a fitting tribute to a man that has had a 
remarkable and distinguished career in public service not only as 
President, but also as Vice President, Member of Congress, U.N. 
Ambassador, the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office to the Peoples' 
Republic of China, and Director of Central Intelligence.
  President Bush, of course, is the only Director of Central 
Intelligence to become President of the United States.
  I know that he has always been particularly proud of his tenure as 
the Director of Central Intelligence. I also know that he guided the 
Agency through a difficult time and continues to be held in high regard 
by not only CIA employees, but also the Intelligence Community at 
large.
  Currently, the headquarters building at Langley does not have a 
formal name and this would be the only facility in the Washington, D.C. 
area named after President Bush. This amendment has been cleared on 
both sides and I urge its immediate adoption.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the amendment be 
agreed to and, further, a classified change be incorporated in the 
classified schedule of authorizations which has been available for all 
Members' review.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3050) was agreed to.
  Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read 
the third time and the Intelligence Committee then be discharged from 
further consideration of H.R. 3694.
  I further ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to its 
immediate consideration, all after the enacting clause be stricken, and 
the text of S. 2052, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof. I ask 
consent that the bill be read the third time, and passed, the Senate 
insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House, and the 
Chair be authorized to appoint conferees, and I ask unanimous consent 
that the statements related to the bill appear in the Record and S. 
2052 be placed on the calendar.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (H.R. 3694), as amended, was considered read the third time, 
and passed, as follows:
       Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives 
     (H.R. 3694) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for 
     fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'', 
     do pass with the following amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.

[[Page S7329]]

Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Extension of application of sanctions laws to intelligence 
              activities.
Sec. 304. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as 
              security for intelligence collection activities.
Sec. 305. Modification of National Security Education Program.
Sec. 306. Technical amendments.
Sec. 307. Authority to direct competitive analysis of analytical 
              products having national importance.
Sec. 308. Annual study and report on the safety and security of Russian 
              nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces.
Sec. 309. quadrennial intelligence review.
Sec. 310. Designation of Headquarters Building of Central Intelligence 
              Agency as the George Herbert Walker Bush Center for 
              Central Intelligence.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of separation pay program for voluntary separation 
              of CIA employees.
Sec. 402. Additional duties for Inspector General of Central 
              Intelligence 
              Agency.

             TITLE V--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

Sec. 501. Encouragement of disclosure of certain information to 
              Congress.

      TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
                             INVESTIGATIONS

Sec. 601. Pen registers and trap and trace devices in foreign 
              intelligence and international terrorism investigations.
Sec. 602. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence 
              and international terrorism investigations.
Sec. 603. Conforming and clerical amendments.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

      SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 
     3694 of the One Hundred Fifth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the Executive Branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     for the Community Management Account of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of 
     $173,633,000.
       (2) Availability of certain funds.--Within such amount, 
     funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee, the Advanced Technology Group, and the 
     Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2000.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized a total of 283 full-time 
     personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such 
     elements may be permanent employees of the Community 
     Management Account element or personnel detailed from other 
     elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there is also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2000.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there 
     is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such 
     elements as of that date as is specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee of the United 
     States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the 
     staff of an element within the Community Management Account 
     from another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 
     shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
     Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the 
     Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the Center may not 
     be used in contravention of the provisions of section 
     103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority over center.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full 
     authority over the operations of the Center.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000''.

     SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL 
                   ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE 
                   COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     in the second sentence by striking out ``December 31, 1998'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``December 31, 2000''.

     SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Assistance for Counterproliferation Studies.--The David 
     L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 
     1901 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1901), by inserting 
     ``counterproliferation studies,'' after ``area studies,'' 
     each place it appears in subsections (b)(7) and (c)(2).
       (2) In section 802 (50 U.S.C. 1902)--
       (A) by inserting ``counterproliferation studies,'' after 
     ``area studies,'' each place it appears in paragraphs 
     (1)(B)(i), (1)(C), and (4) of subsection (a); and
       (B) by inserting ``counterproliferation study,'' after 
     ``area study,'' each place it appears subparagraphs (A)(ii) 
     and (B)(ii) of subsection (b)(2).
       (3) In section 803(b)(8) (50 U.S.C. 1903(b)(8)), by 
     striking out ``and area'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``area, and counterproliferation''.
       (4) In section 806(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1906(b)(1)), by 
     striking out ``and area'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``area, and counterproliferation''.
       (b) Revision of Membership of National Security Education 
     Board.--Section 803(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(b)) is 
     further amended--

[[Page S7330]]

       (1) by striking out paragraph (6); and
       (2) by inserting in lieu thereof the following new 
     paragraph (6):
       ``(6) The Secretary of Energy.''.

     SEC. 306. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 
     5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
     U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended--
       (A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 
     102(a)(2), subsections (c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections 
     (c)(6)''; and
       (B) by striking out ``(50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2)'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``(50 U.S.C. 403(a)''.
       (2) Section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by 
     striking out ``section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))''.
       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 
     201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 
     U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking out ``section 
     103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(c)(5))'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``section 
     103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(c)(6))''.

     SEC. 307. AUTHORITY TO DIRECT COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF 
                   ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS HAVING NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

       Section 102(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403(g)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as 
     subparagraphs (E) and (F), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
     subparagraph (D):
       ``(D) direct competitive analysis of analytical products 
     having National importance;''.

     SEC. 308. ANNUAL STUDY AND REPORT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY 
                   OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR 
                   MILITARY FORCES.

       (a) Annual Study.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, on an annual basis, conduct a study of the safety and 
     security of the nuclear facilities and nuclear military 
     forces in Russia.
       (b) Annual Reports.--(1) The Director shall, on an annual 
     basis, submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (4) 
     an intelligence report assessing the safety and security of 
     the nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces in Russia.
       (2) Each report shall include a discussion of the 
     following:
       (A) The ability of the Russia Government to maintain its 
     nuclear military forces.
       (B) Security arrangements at civilian and military nuclear 
     facilities in Russia.
       (C) The reliability of controls and safety systems at 
     civilian nuclear facilities in Russia.
       (D) The reliability of command and control systems and 
     procedures of the nuclear military forces in Russia.
       (3) Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
     but may contain a classified annex.
       (4) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the 
     following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on 
     Armed Services, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     Committee on National Security, and Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 309. QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary 
     of Defense should jointly complete, in 1999 and every 4 years 
     thereafter, a comprehensive review of United States 
     intelligence programs and activities;
       (2) each review under paragraph (1) should--
       (A) include assessments of intelligence policy, resources, 
     manpower, organization, and related matters; and
       (B) encompass the programs and activities funded under the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint 
     Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts;
       (3) the results of each review should be shared with the 
     appropriate committees of Congress; and
       (4) the Director, in conjunction with the Secretary, should 
     establish a nonpartisan, independent panel (with members 
     chosen in consultation with the committees referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2) from individuals in the private sector) in 
     order to--
       (A) assess each review under paragraph (1);
       (B) conduct an assessment of alternative intelligence 
     structures to meet the anticipated intelligence requirements 
     for the national security and foreign policy of the United 
     States through the year 2010; and
       (C) make recommendations to the Director and the Secretary 
     regarding the optimal intelligence structure for the United 
     States in light of the assessment under subparagraph (B).
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than August 15, 1998, the 
     Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the 
     committees referred to in paragraph (2) the views of the 
     Director and the Secretary regarding--
       (A) the potential value of conducting reviews as described 
     in subsection (a)(1); and
       (B) the potential value of assessments of such reviews as 
     described in subsection (a)(4)(A).
       (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the 
     following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on 
     Armed Services, and Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
     Committee on National Security, and Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 310. DESIGNATION OF HEADQUARTERS BUILDING OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE GEORGE HERBERT 
                   WALKER BUSH CENTER FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Designation.--The Headquarters Building of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency located in Langley, Virginia, shall be 
     known and designated as the ``George Herbert Walker Bush 
     Center for Central Intelligence''.
       (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
     document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 
     Headquarters Building referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
     deemed to be a reference to the George Herbert Walker Bush 
     Center for Central Intelligence.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF SEPARATION PAY PROGRAM FOR VOLUNTARY 
                   SEPARATION OF CIA EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Extension.--Subsection (f) of section 2 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 
     403-4 note) is amended by striking out ``September 30, 1999'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``September 30, 2001''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of that section 
     is amended by striking out ``fiscal year 1998 or fiscal year 
     1999'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal year 1998, 
     1999, 2000, or 2001''

     SEC. 402. ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       Section 17(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(c)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (4) and (5), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       ``(3) to review existing and proposed legislation relating 
     to the programs and operations of the Agency and to make 
     recommendations in the semiannual reports required by 
     subsection (d) concerning the impact of such legislation on 
     economy and efficiency in the administration of, or 
     prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in, the programs 
     and operations administered or financed by the Agency;''.

             TITLE V--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

     SEC. 501. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION 
                   TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Encouragement.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall take appropriate 
     actions to inform the employees of the covered agencies, and 
     employees of contractors carrying out activities under 
     classified contracts with covered agencies, that--
       (A) except as provided in paragraph (4), the disclosure of 
     information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals 
     referred to in paragraph (3) is not prohibited by law, 
     executive order, or regulation or otherwise contrary to 
     public policy;
       (B) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) are 
     presumed to have a need to know and to be authorized to 
     receive such information; and
       (C) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) may 
     receive information so disclosed only in their capacity as 
     members of the committees concerned.
       (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to 
     information, including classified information, that an 
     employee reasonably believes to provide direct and specific 
     evidence of--
       (A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation;
       (B) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material 
     fact; or
       (C) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, a flagrant 
     abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to 
     public health or safety.
       (3) Covered individuals.--The individuals to whom 
     information described in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are 
     the members of a committee of Congress having as its primary 
     responsibility the oversight of a department, agency, or 
     element of the Federal Government to which such information 
     relates.
       (4) Scope.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to information 
     otherwise described in paragraph (2) if the disclosure of the 
     information is prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules 
     of Criminal Procedure.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the actions taken under subsection (a).
       (c) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
     Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or 
     otherwise affect any reporting requirement relating to 
     intelligence activities that arises under the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) or any other 
     provision of law.
       (d) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covered agencies'' means the following:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (6) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, 
     determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) 
     of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal 
     function the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities.

      TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
                             INVESTIGATIONS

     SEC. 601. PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES IN FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
                   INVESTIGATIONS.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page S7331]]

       (1) by redesignating title IV as title VI and section 401 
     as section 601, respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after title III the following new title:

   ``TITLE IV--PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN 
                         INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 401. As used in this title:
       ``(1) The terms `foreign power', `agent of a foreign 
     power', `international terrorism', `foreign intelligence 
     information', `Attorney General', `United States person', 
     `United States', `person', and `State' shall have the same 
     meanings as in section 101 of this Act.
       ``(2) The terms `pen register' and `trap and trace device' 
     have the meanings given such terms in section 3127 of title 
     18, United States Code.
       ``(3) The term `aggrieved person' means any person--
       ``(A) whose telephone line was subject to the installation 
     or use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized 
     by this title; or
       ``(B) whose communication instrument or device was subject 
     to the use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
     authorized by this title to capture incoming electronic or 
     other communications impulses.


``pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and 
                 international terrorism investigations

       ``Sec. 402. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of title I of 
     this Act with respect to electronic surveillance under that 
     title as defined in section 101(f)(4) of this Act, the 
     Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government 
     may make an application for an order or an extension of an 
     order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a 
     pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation 
     to gather foreign intelligence information or information 
     concerning international terrorism which is being conducted 
     by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines 
     as the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order 
     No. 12333, or a successor order.
       ``(b) Each application under this section shall be in 
     writing under oath or affirmation to--
       ``(1) a judge of the court established by section 103(a) of 
     this Act; or
       ``(2) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of 
     title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by 
     the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to 
     hear applications for and grant orders approving the 
     installation and use of a pen register or trap or trace 
     device on behalf of a judge of that court.
       ``(c) Each application under this section shall require the 
     approval of the Attorney General, or a designated attorney 
     for the Government, and shall include--
       ``(1) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to use 
     the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the 
     application;
       ``(2) a certification by the applicant that the information 
     likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign 
     intelligence or international terrorism investigation being 
     conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under 
     guidelines approved by the Attorney General; and
       ``(3) information which demonstrates that there is reason 
     to believe that the telephone line to which the pen register 
     or trap and trace device is to be attached, or the 
     communication instrument or device to be covered by the pen 
     register or trap and trace device, has been or is about to be 
     used in communication with--
       ``(A) an individual who is engaging or has engaged in 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities that involve or may involve a violation of the 
     criminal laws of the United States; or
       ``(B) a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under 
     circumstances giving reason to believe that the communication 
     concerns or concerned international terrorism or clandestine 
     intelligence activities that involve or may involve a 
     violation of the criminal laws of the United States.
       ``(d)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, 
     the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as 
     modified, approving the installation and use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the 
     application satisfies the requirements of this section.
       ``(2) An order issued under this section--
       ``(A) shall specify--
       ``(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the 
     subject of the foreign intelligence or international 
     terrorism investigation;
       ``(ii) in the case of an application for the installation 
     and use of a pen register or trap and trace device with 
     respect to a telephone line--
       ``(I) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is 
     leased or in whose name the telephone line is listed; and
       ``(II) the number and, if known, physical location of the 
     telephone line; and
       ``(iii) in the case of an application for the use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device with respect to a 
     communication instrument or device not covered by clause 
     (ii)--
       ``(I) the identity, if known, of the person who owns or 
     leases the instrument or device or in whose name the 
     instrument or device is listed; and
       ``(II) the number of the instrument or device; and
       ``(B) shall direct that--
       ``(i) upon request of the applicant, the provider of a wire 
     or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or 
     other person shall furnish any information, facilities, or 
     technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation 
     and operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in 
     such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a 
     minimum amount of interference with the services that such 
     provider, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing 
     the person concerned;
       ``(ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or other 
     person--
       ``(I) shall not disclose the existence of the investigation 
     or of the pen register or trap and trace device to any person 
     unless or until ordered by the court; and
       ``(II) shall maintain, under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence pursuant to section 105(b)(2)(C) of this Act, 
     any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace 
     device or the aid furnished; and
       ``(iii) the applicant shall compensate such provider, 
     landlord, custodian, or other person for reasonable expenses 
     incurred by such provider, landlord, custodian, or other 
     person in providing such information, facilities, or 
     technical assistance.
       ``(e) An order issued under this section shall authorize 
     the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace 
     device for a period not to exceed 90 days. Extensions of such 
     an order may be granted, but only upon an application for an 
     order under this section and upon the judicial finding 
     required by subsection (d). The period of extension shall be 
     for a period not to exceed 90 days.
       ``(f) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any 
     provider of a wire or electronic communication service, 
     landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, 
     employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that 
     furnishes any information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance under subsection (d) in accordance with the terms 
     of a court under this section.
       ``(g) Unless otherwise ordered by the judge, the results of 
     a pen register or trap and trace device shall be furnished at 
     reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the 
     duration of the order to the authorized Government official 
     or officials.


                   ``authorization during emergencies

       ``Sec. 403. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     title, when the Attorney General makes a determination 
     described in subsection (b), the Attorney General may 
     authorize the installation and use of a pen register or trap 
     and trace device on an emergency basis to gather foreign 
     intelligence information or information concerning 
     international terrorism if--
       ``(1) a judge referred to in section 402(b) of this Act is 
     informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time 
     of such authorization that the decision has been made to 
     install and use the pen register or trap and trace device, as 
     the case may be, on an emergency basis; and
       ``(2) an application in accordance with section 402 of this 
     Act is made to such judge as soon as practicable, but not 
     more than 48 hours, after the Attorney General authorizes the 
     installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace 
     device, as the case may be, under this section.
       ``(b) A determination under this subsection is a reasonable 
     determination by the Attorney General that--
       ``(1) an emergency requires the installation and use of a 
     pen register or trap and trace device to obtain foreign 
     intelligence information or information concerning 
     international terrorism before an order authorizing the 
     installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace 
     device, as the case may be, can with due diligence be 
     obtained under section 402 of this Act; and
       ``(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under such 
     section 402 to approve the installation and use of the pen 
     register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, 
     exists.
       ``(c)(1) In the absence of an order applied for under 
     subsection (a)(2) approving the installation and use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device authorized under this 
     section, the installation and use of the pen register or trap 
     and trace device, as the case may be, shall terminate at the 
     earlier of--
       ``(A) when the information sought is obtained;
       ``(B) when the application for the order is denied under 
     section 402 of this Act; or
       ``(C) 48 hours after the time of the authorization by the 
     Attorney General.
       ``(2) In the event that an application for an order applied 
     for under subsection (a)(2) is denied, or in any other case 
     where the installation and use of a pen register or trap and 
     trace device under this section is terminated and no order 
     under section 402 of this Act is issued approving the 
     installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace 
     device, as the case may be, no information obtained or 
     evidence derived from the use of the pen register or trap and 
     trace device, as the case may be, shall be received in 
     evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or 
     other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
     department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative 
     committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, 
     or political subdivision thereof, and no information 
     concerning any United States person acquired from the use of 
     the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may 
     be, shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other 
     manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent 
     of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney 
     General if the information indicates a threat of death or 
     serious bodily harm to any person.


                   ``authorization during time of war

       ``Sec. 404. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     President, through the Attorney General, may authorize the 
     use of a pen register or trap and trace device without a 
     court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information for a period not to exceed 15 calendar days 
     following a declaration of war by Congress.


                          ``use of information

       ``Sec. 405. (a)(1) Information acquired from the use of a 
     pen register or trap and trace device installed pursuant to 
     this title concerning any

[[Page S7332]]

     United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal 
     officers and employees without the consent of the United 
     States person only in accordance with the provisions of this 
     section.
       ``(2) No information acquired from a pen register or trap 
     and trace device installed and used pursuant to this title 
     may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees 
     except for lawful purposes.
       ``(b) No information acquired pursuant to this title shall 
     be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such 
     disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such 
     information, or any information derived therefrom, may only 
     be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance 
     authorization of the Attorney General.
       ``(c) Whenever the United States intends to enter into 
     evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, 
     or other proceeding in or before any court, department, 
     officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the 
     United States against an aggrieved person any information 
     obtained or derived from the use of a pen register or trap 
     and trace device pursuant to this title, the United States 
     shall, before the trial, hearing, or the other proceeding or 
     at a reasonable time before an effort to so disclose or so 
     use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the 
     aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which 
     the information is to be disclosed or used that the United 
     States intends to so disclose or so use such information.
       ``(d) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof 
     intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose 
     in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any 
     court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other 
     authority of the State or political subdivision thereof 
     against an aggrieved person any information obtained or 
     derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace 
     device pursuant to this title, the State or political 
     subdivision thereof shall notify the aggrieved person, the 
     court or other authority in which the information is to be 
     disclosed or used, and the Attorney General that the State or 
     political subdivision thereof intends to so disclose or so 
     use such information.
       ``(e)(1) Any aggrieved person against whom evidence 
     obtained or derived from the use of a pen register or trap 
     and trace device is to be, or has been, introduced or 
     otherwise used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
     agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United 
     States, or a State or political subdivision thereof, may move 
     to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from the use of 
     the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may 
     be, on the grounds that--
       ``(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
       ``(B) the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, 
     as the case may be, was not made in conformity with an order 
     of authorization or approval under this title.
       ``(2) A motion under paragraph (1) shall be made before the 
     trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no 
     opportunity to make such a motion or the aggrieved person 
     concerned was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
       ``(f)(1) Whenever a court or other authority is notified 
     pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), whenever a motion is made 
     pursuant to subsection (e), or whenever any motion or request 
     is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute 
     or rule of the United States or any State before any court or 
     other authority of the United States or any State to discover 
     or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating 
     to the use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
     authorized by this title or to discover, obtain, or suppress 
     evidence or information obtained or derived from the use of a 
     pen register or trap and trace device authorized by this 
     title, the United States district court or, where the motion 
     is made before another authority, the United States district 
     court in the same district as the authority shall, 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law and if the 
     Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that 
     disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the national 
     security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte 
     the application, order, and such other materials relating to 
     the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the 
     case may be, as may be necessary to determine whether the use 
     of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may 
     be, was lawfully authorized and conducted.
       ``(2) In making a determination under paragraph (1), the 
     court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate 
     security procedures and protective orders, portions of the 
     application, order, or other materials relating to the use of 
     the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may 
     be, or may require the Attorney General to provide to the 
     aggrieved person a summary of such materials, only where such 
     disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of 
     the legality of the use of the pen register or trap and trace 
     device, as the case may be.
       ``(g)(1) If the United States district court determines 
     pursuant to subsection (f) that the use of a pen register or 
     trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized or 
     conducted, the court may, in accordance with the requirements 
     of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained 
     or derived from the use of the pen register or trap and trace 
     device, as the case may be, or otherwise grant the motion of 
     the aggrieved person.
       ``(2) If the court determines that the use of the pen 
     register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, was 
     lawfully authorized or conducted, it may deny the motion of 
     the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process 
     requires discovery or disclosure.
       ``(h) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection 
     (g), decisions under this section that the use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized 
     or conducted, and orders of the United States district court 
     requiring review or granting disclosure of applications, 
     orders, or other materials relating to the installation and 
     use of a pen register or trap and trace device shall be final 
     orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and 
     the several States except a United States Court of Appeals or 
     the Supreme Court.


                       ``congressional oversight

       ``Sec. 406. (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General 
     shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all uses 
     of pen registers and trap and trace devices pursuant to this 
     title.
       ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 
     also provide to the committees referred to in subsection (a) 
     and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with 
     respect to the preceding six-month period--
       ``(1) the total number of applications made for orders 
     approving the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices 
     under this title; and
       ``(2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied.''.

     SEC. 602. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
                   INVESTIGATIONS.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 601 of this Act, 
     is further amended by inserting after title IV, as added by 
     such section 601, the following new title:

``TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                                PURPOSES


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 501. As used in this title:
       ``(1) The terms `foreign power', `agent of a foreign 
     power', `foreign intelligence information', `international 
     terrorism', and `Attorney General' shall have the same 
     meanings as in section 101 of this Act.
       ``(2) The term `common carrier' means any person or entity 
     transporting people or property by land, rail, water, or air 
     for compensation.
       ``(3) The term `physical storage facility' means any 
     business or entity that provides space for the storage of 
     goods or materials, or services related to the storage of 
     goods or materials, to the public or any segment thereof.
       ``(4) The term `public accommodation facility' means any 
     inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that provides 
     lodging to transient guests.
       ``(5) The term `vehicle rental facility' means any person 
     or entity that provides vehicles for rent, lease, loan, or 
     other similar use to the public or any segment thereof.


   ``access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and 
                 international terrorism investigations

       ``Sec. 502. (a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall 
     be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make 
     an application for an order authorizing a common carrier, 
     public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or 
     vehicle rental facility to release records in its possession 
     for an investigation to gather foreign intelligence 
     information or an investigation concerning international 
     terrorism which investigation is being conducted by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as the 
     Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No. 
     12333, or a successor order.
       ``(b) Each application under this section--
       ``(1) shall be made to--
       ``(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a) of 
     this Act; or
       ``(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of 
     title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by 
     the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to 
     hear applications and grant orders for the release of records 
     under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and
       ``(2) shall specify that--
       ``(A) the records concerned are sought for an investigation 
     described in subsection (a); and
       ``(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain 
     is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
       ``(c)(1) Upon application made pursuant to this section, 
     the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as 
     modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds 
     that the application satisfies the requirements of this 
     section.
       ``(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose 
     that it is issued for purposes of an investigation described 
     in subsection (a).
       ``(d)(1) Any common carrier, public accommodation facility, 
     physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility shall 
     comply with an order under subsection (c).
       ``(2) No common carrier, public accommodation facility, 
     physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility, or 
     officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any 
     person (other than those officers, agents, or employees of 
     such common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical 
     storage facility, or vehicle rental facility necessary to 
     fulfill the requirement to disclose information to the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section) that the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained 
     records pursuant to an order under this section.


                       ``congressional oversight

       ``Sec. 503. (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General 
     shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all 
     requests for records under this title.
       ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 
     provide to the Committees on the

[[Page S7333]]

     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a 
     report setting forth with respect to the preceding six-month 
     period--
       ``(1) the total number of applications made for orders 
     approving requests for records under this title; and
       ``(2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied.''.

     SEC. 603. CONFORMING AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Conforming Amendment.--Section 601 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as redesignated by 
     section 601(1) of this Act, is amended by striking out 
     ``other than title III'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``other than titles III, IV, and V''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 is amended by striking out the items relating to title 
     IV and section 401 and inserting in lieu thereof the 
     following:

   ``TITLE IV--PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN 
                         INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

``401. Definitions.
``402. Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign 
              intelligence and international terrorism investigations.
``403. Authorization during emergencies.
``404. Authorization during time of war.
``405. Use of information.
``406. Congressional oversight.

``TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                                PURPOSES

``501. Definitions.
``502. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and 
              international terrorism investigations.
``503. Congressional oversight.

                       ``TITLE VI--EFFECTIVE DATE

``601. Effective date.''.

  The Presiding Officer (Mr. Enzi) appointed:
  Mr. Shelby, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Lugar, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe, 
Mr. Hatch, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Allard, Mr. Coats, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Glenn, 
Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Robb, Mr. Lautenberg, 
Mr. Levin, and from the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Thurmond.

                          ____________________