Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 86 (Friday, June 26, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 86 (Friday, June 26, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7325-S7333]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Armed Services Committee
be discharged from further consideration of S. 2052 and the Senate
proceed to its consideration. This is the intelligence authorization
bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2052) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence related
activities for the U.S. government and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate
consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 2052, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, to authorize
appropriations for intelligence-related activities and programs of the
United States Government. This important legislation was reported
favorably out of the Committee on May 7, 1998, by unanimous vote,
consistent with the long-standing, bipartisan nature of the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Following receipt of the President's budget, the Select Committee
undertook a thorough review of the budget request for intelligence for
fiscal year 1999. That review was informed, in part, by several
hearings and briefings as well as the findings and recommendations of a
group of outside experts--known as the Technical Advisory Group--that
the distinguished Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kerrey, and I
tasked last December to address key questions facing the Community.
In addition, the Committee staff recently completed indepth audits
and reviews of the use of ``cover'' by the Central Intelligence Agency
and the administration of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978. These reviews and audits led to Committee action with respect to
the authorities, applicable laws, and budget of the activity or program
concerned.
As a product of these reviews, the Committee came to some rather
startling and disconcerting conclusions about the overall health and
direction of the Intelligence Community. For example:
First, the CIA's foremost mission of providing timely intelligence
based on human sources (``HUMINT'') is in grave jeopardy. CIA case
officers today do not have the training or the equipment needed to keep
their true identities hidden, to communicate covertly with agents, or
to plant sophisticated listening devices and other collection tools
that will provide timely intelligence on an adversary's intentions.
Second, what many see as the ``crown jewel'' of U.S. Intelligence--
the National Security Agent's SIGINT capability--likewise is in dire
need of modernization. The digital and fiber-optic revolutions are
here-and-now, but NSA is still predominantly oriented toward Cold War-
era threats. The Director of NSA, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan,
has recommended major changes in how NSA performs its vital mission--
changes our Committee endorses--but these changes were not reflected in
the President's budget request.
Third, promising technologies and systems for detecting missiles and
other threats have been short-changed in the budget request. Likewise,
robust funding for new tools for conducting information warfare, new
sensors to detect and counter proliferation, and moving to smaller and
cheaper satellites to support the war-fighter are not included in the
budget request.
And fourth, the quality of analysis within the Intelligence Community
is poor and getting worse. Responding to the failure to predict the
Indian nuclear tests, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned
retired Admiral David Jeremiah to review what went wrong and why. Among
other findings, Admiral Jeremiah concluded that intelligence community
analysts were complacent; they based their analyses on faulty
assumptions; and engaged in wishful thinking. It is my belief that such
is the state of analysis as it relates to many issues and problems,
including political-military developments in China, the ballistic
missile threat, and more. We can and should expect more from the
Intelligence Community.
The Intelligence Community has been forced by budgetary pressures to
choose between funding current operations (such as Bosnia) and
investing in the future. This is the case even after personnel
reductions of over 20 percent in the Intelligence Community have been
made over the past decade. In many ways, then, the problem confronting
U.S. Intelligence is similar to that confronting the Department of
Defense: How to pay for the necessary investments in future, ``winning-
edge'' capabilities when the policymakers emphasize current operations?
And, equally important, how to sustain the quality of life and skills-
level of personnel who are already stretched thin by high operations
tempo and lengthy overseas deployments?
To address these challenges, Senator Kerrey and I tasked the staff to
find and cut any and all poorly justified or redundant programs out of
the budget. And, in fact, significant cuts were made to a wide range of
lower-priority intelligence programs and activities. If it was poorly
justified, redundant, or low-priority, then we cut it. These actions
are entirely consistent with our oversight responsibilities, and the
American people would expect no less.

The Select Committee then took those funds and applied them against
the highest priority intelligence needs and targets. Earlier this year,
Senator Kerrey and I prepared intelligence budget guidance to direct
the staff's budget work. That guidance emphasized the need for
strengthened investment in areas such as advanced research and
development, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, personnel training, information operations, effective covert
action, and enhanced analysis. These are precisely the areas the
Committee has historically supported and the keys to future
intelligence successes--whether to support military commanders,
policymakers in Washington, or American diplomats.
This approach of cutting low-priority projects and redirecting those
funds into high-payoff, futuristic technologies and systems, is
fiscally responsible and reflects the need for difficult choices in an
era of scarce resources.
This budget is full of tough choices. For example, the Committee
recommended cutting certain ``legacy'' programs and activities at NSA
in order to pay for the collection systems and processes of the future,
as recommended in General Minihan's study of the future SIGINT
architecture needs (the ``Unified Cryptologic Architecture'').
Likewise, the Committee recommended cutting the number of CIA
contractors, and reduced spending on costly infrastructure programs.
None of these actions were easy--and in fact I am concerned that the
Select Committee may have cut the intelligence budget too deeply in
order to reach agreement with the Senate Armed Services Committee. That
being said, this legislation is sound, it is balanced, and it is worthy
of strong bipartisan support.

[[Page S7326]]

My colleagues and the American people must come to understand that to
save lives on the battlefield, to preclude terrorist attacks against
Americans, to root out spies in our midst, and to give diplomats the
information they need to forestall conflict in the first place, we need
an effective, revitalized Intelligence Community. And that it is
precisely what the Intelligence Authorization Act seeks to do.
In summary, the Select Committee made the tough choices. We cut
programs in order to invest in the future. We concluded that the
intelligence budget can be cut, but it must be done in a careful,
precise way, and based on specific programmatic recommendations. And we
did it in a fully bipartisan manner.
I applaud and appreciate the efforts of the Vice Chairman of the
Committee, Senator Kerrey from Nebraska, and all the Members of the
Committee, who labored long and hard on this bill. It is one of the
most important pieces of legislation this body will consider this year,
and I urge its passage.
Pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, the Armed Services
Committee has been discharged from consideration of the Intelligence
Authorization Bill. Although the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee and I had previously agreed that the Armed Services Committee
would not report the Intelligence Authorization Bill until three days
following completion of Senate Floor consideration of the Defense
Authorization Bill, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee has
informed me that his committee has completed its review of the
Intelligence Authorization Bill and does not recommend any amendments.
We agree that it is appropriate for the Senate to consider the
intelligence Authorization Bill at this time. We also agree, however,
that this unanimous consent agreement to discharge the Armed Services
Committee from further review of the Intelligence Authorization Bill
will not serve as a precedent for requiring the Armed Services
Committee to report future Intelligence Authorization Bills until it
has had an adequate amount of time to review such legislation.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the cost
estimate for the bill.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, May 14, 1998.
Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2052, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn
Sauter, who can be reached at 226-2840.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill,
Director.
Enclosure.

S. 2052: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as
Reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 7, 1998

summary

S. 2052 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999
for intelligence activities of the United States government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
S. 2052 would result in additional spending of $174 million
over the 1999-2003 period, assuming appropriation of the
authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill
would affect direct spending; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures
would apply. However, CBO cannot give a precise estimate of
the direct spending effects because data to support a cost
estimate are classified.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes
from application of the act legislative provisions that are
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that
exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-
sector mandates as defined by UMRA.

estimated cost to the federal government

The estimated budgetary impact of the unclassified portions
of S. 2052 is shown in the following table. CBO is unable to
obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs for
the entire bill because parts are classified at a level above
clearances held by CBO employees. The costs of this
legislation fall within budget function 050 (national
defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Spending Under Current Law for the
Community Management Account:
Budget Authority \1\.......... 94 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............. 104 36 7 2 0 0
Proposed Changes:
Authorization Level........... 0 174 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............. 0 108 52 10 3 0
Spending Under S. 2052 for the
Community Management Account:
Authorization Level \2\....... 94 174 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............. 104 144 59 12 3 0

CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING

Estimated Budget Authority........ 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
Estimated Outlays................. 0 0 (\2\) (\2\) (\2\) (\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1998 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ CBO cannot give a precise estimate of direct spending effects because data to support a cost estimate are
classified.

The bill would authorize appropriations of $174 million for
the Community Management Account. In addition, the bill would
authorize $202 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs
attributable to military service and various unfunded
liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory,
and the authorization under this bill would be the same as
assumed in the CBO baseline.
Section 401 of the bill would extend the CIA's authority to
offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire
or resign. This authority, which is currently scheduled to
expire at the end of fiscal year 1999, would be extended
through fiscal year 2001. Section 401 would also require the
CIA to make a deposit to the Civil Service Trust Fund equal
to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who accepts an
incentive payment. CBO estimates that these payments would
amount to less than $5 million. We believe that these
deposits would be sufficient to cover the cost of any long-
term increase in benefits that would result from induced
retirements, although the timing of the agency payments and
the additional benefit payments would not match on a yearly
basis. CBO cannot provide a precise estimate of the direct
spending effects because the data necessary for an estimate
are classified.
Section 501 of the bill would require the President to
inform certain federal employees and contract employees that
they may disclose classified and unclassified information to
Congressional oversight committees if they believe that
information provides direct and specific evidence of
wrongdoing. CBO estimates that the costs of implementing
section 501 would not be significant because the number of
employees covered by the bill would be small and the cost
associated with each notice would be minimal.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that S. 2052
will be enacted by October 1, 1998, and that the full amounts
authorized will be appropriated for fiscal year 1999. Outlays
are estimated according to historical spending patterns for
intelligence programs.

pay-as-you-go considerations

Section 401 of the bill would affect direct spending, and
therefore the bill would be subject to pay-as-you-go
procedures. CBO cannot estimate the precise direct spending
effects because the necessary data are classified.

intergovernmental and private sector impact

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) excludes
from application of the act legislative provisions that are
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that
exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or private-
sector mandates as defined by UMRA.

previous cbo estimate

On May 5, 1998, CBO issued an estimate for H.R. 3694, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as
ordered reported by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. CBO estimated that section 401 of that bill
would increase direct spending by

[[Page S7327]]

$1 million or more in at least one year during the 2000-2003
period. Like section 401 in S. 2052, the provisions in H.R.
3694 would extend the CIA's authority to offer incentive
payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign.
However, H.R. 3694 would not require the CIA to make a
deposit equal to 15 percent of final pay to the Civil Service
Trust Fund for each employee who receives an incentive
payment. The bills also authorize different amounts of
appropriations for the Community Management Account.
CBO prepared a cost estimate on February 25, 1998, for S.
1668, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on February 23, 1998. Section 501 of S. 2052
duplicates the provisions of S. 1668, a bill to encourage the
disclosure to Congress of certain classified and related
information. CBO's estimates for these provisions are
identical.
Estimate prepared by
Federal Costs: Estimate for Voluntary Separation Pay: Eric
Rollins (226-2820), and Estimate for Remaining Provisions:
Dawn Sauter (226-2840).
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo
(225-3220).
Impact on the Private Sector: Bill Thomas (226-2900).
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to support
the Intelligence Authorization Bill. This bill is the product of the
Intelligence Committee's efforts to match national intelligence
resources and activities with today's and tomorrow's threats. Under
Chairman Shelby's leadership, the Committee has tried to move the
Intelligence Community toward new technologies which address emerging
threats like weapons proliferation, terrorism, and information
operations, while at the same time keeping intelligence strong against
the mature threats, such as Russian nuclear forces, which still can
kill scores of millions of Americans.
Most of this bill is secret, contained in a classified annex
available to all Members for review in S-407. However, it has been
reported that the bill authorizes less money for intelligence programs
than the President requested. I am not pleased with this outcome. But
as the national security budgets are currently organized, the
Intelligence Authorization bill must respond to larger Defense
requirements. The dependent relationship of intelligence to defense is
anachronistic, in my view, but it exists and Chairman Shelby and I have
worked with our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee to make the
best of a bad budgetary situation for both Committees. Let me add, I am
equally concerned that the Defense budget is skirting the level of
inadequacy, especially with regard to our conventional forces. National
security is the principal function of government, and we should fund it
better.
The Intelligence Committee looked at the way intelligence is
collected--through imagery, signals, human, and measurements and
signatures--and saw mature technologies which have served America well
for many years pitted against revolutionary change in the collection
environments. The Committee studied solutions to this imbalance. In
addition to its own evaluation, the Committee gathered a group of
outside scientific experts, including some who have had no previous
connection to intelligence, to recommend solutions to our shortfalls in
signals and human intelligence. This panel's recommendations are also
reflected in this bill. So Chairman Shelby and I have a strong basis in
evidence for the new technologies and initiatives which would be
authorized by this bill.
The recent nuclear tests in India brought accusations of
``intelligence failure'' in our media. In fact, I think the episode
might be more accurately called a policy failure, but intelligence
could certainly have done a better job. Director of Central
Intelligence Tenet quickly tasked Admiral David Jeremiah to review the
Intelligence Community's performance, and a summary of his
recommendations have been declassified at the Committee's request.
The India nuclear case offers many lessons, but two are especially
important to intelligence. The first is that the Director of Central
Intelligence needs to run the national Intelligence Community to ensure
agency efforts are focused and priorities across the individual
agencies are clear. I am holding off on legislation to increase the
DCI's management powers because new officials are in place in positions
already created by Congress to help manage the Community better. I want
to see what progress Deputy Director Joan Dempsey and her new Assistant
Directors make in harnessing the DCI's existing powers, before Congress
creates new ones. Congress and the American people hold the DCI
accountable for these problems. We need the DCI to be in charge.
The second India lesson is the tendency to ``mirror image'', to
assume Indians, in this case, would behave as we do. This tendency
increases when there is unanimity among analysts and no one is asking
contrarian questions. To insure such questions are always asked during
the analysis of significant intelligence, Chairman Shelby and I are
offering an amendment today which, among other things, will require
competitive analysis as an integral, routine part of the analytic
process. The fundamental purpose of intelligence is to keep our
policymakers and military commanders from being surprised. Competitive
analysis should at least reduce the chance of surprise.
Finally, Mr. President, I understand Chairman Shelby will introduce
an amendment to name the CIA headquarters building after the only U.S.
President who has also served as DCI, former President George Bush.
While I am not enthusiastic about the current fad of naming things
after living politicians, I make an exception in this case. In
political terms, service as DCI carries considerable risk. Your
apparent failures are big news, while your successes are secret and the
fruits of your leadership are harvested by your successor. But in peace
or war, George Bush never calculated risks when there was an
opportunity to serve his country, and I think he particularly relished
the hardest tasks. Naming his old headquarters in his honor is a
fitting tribute which I am proud to support.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill,
and I yield the floor.

Amendments Nos. 3051 through 3053, en bloc

Mr. LOTT. There are several manager amendments at the desk, and I ask
they be considered and agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes amendments
No. 3051 through 3053, en bloc.

The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 3051

(Purpose: To authorize the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Analysis and Production to direct competitive analysis of
analytical products having National importance)

On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

SEC. 307. AUTHORITY TO DIRECT COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF
ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS HAVING NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

Section 102(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403(g)(2)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as
subparagraphs (E) and (F), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new
subparagraph (D):
``(D) direct competitive analysis of analytical products
having National importance;''.
____

AMENDMENT NO. 3052

(Purpose: To require annual studies and reports on the safety and
security of Russian nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces)

On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

SEC. 307. ANNUAL STUDY AND REPORT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR
MILITARY FORCES.

(a) Annual Study.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall, on an annual basis, conduct a study of the safety and
security of the nuclear facilities and nuclear military
forces in Russia.
(b) Annual Reports.--(1) The Director shall, on an annual
basis, submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (4)
an intelligence report assessing the safety and security of
the nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces in Russia.
(2) Each report shall include a discussion of the
following:
(A) The ability of the Russia Government to maintain its
nuclear military forces.
(B) Security arrangements at civilian and military nuclear
facilities in Russia.
(C) The reliability of controls and safety systems at
civilian nuclear facilities in Russia.
(D) The reliability of command and control systems and
procedures of the nuclear military forces in Russia.
(3) Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex.

[[Page S7328]]

(4) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the
following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on
Armed Services, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Committee on National Security, and Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
____

AMENDMENT NO. 3053

(Purpose: Relating to a quadrennial intelligence review)

On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the
following:

SEC. 307. QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
(1) the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense should jointly complete, in 1999 and
every 4 years thereafter, a comprehensive review of United
States intelligence programs and activities;
(2) each review under paragraph (1) should--
(A) include assessments of intelligence policy,
resources, manpower, organization, and related matters; and
(B) encompass the programs and activities funded under
the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts;
(3) the results of each review should be shared with the
appropriate committees of Congress; and
(4) the Director, in conjunction with the Secretary,
should establish a nonpartisan, independent panel (with
members chosen in consultation with the committees referred
to in subsection (b)(2) from individuals in the private
sector) in order to--
(A) assess each review under paragraph (1);
(B) conduct an assessment of alternative intelligence
structures to meet the anticipated intelligence requirements
for the national security and foreign policy of the United
States through the year 2010; and
(C) make recommendations to the Director and the
Secretary regarding the optimal intelligence structure for
the United States in light of the assessment under
subparagraph (B).
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than August 15, 1998, the
Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the
committees referred to in paragraph (2) the views of the
Director and the Secretary regarding--
(A) the potential value of conducting reviews as
described in subsection (a)(1); and
(B) the potential value of assessments of such reviews as
described in subsection (a)(4)(A).
(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the
following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on
Armed Services, and Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Committee on National Security, and Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

the quadrennial intelligence review

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I strongly support an initiative to
establish a Quadrennial Intelligence Review and an independent,
nonpartisan National Intelligence Panel. This process can be modeled
after the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1986 which passed the
Senate by a unanimous vote of 100-0. This Act directed the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP) which
conducted comprehensive reviews of all aspects of defense. These
reviews have produced a much needed update of our defense strategy, a
revised defense program, and a vibrant debate on the course of our
defense capabilities.
I believe that a process of internal and external comprehensive
review fashioned on this QDR and NDP model can be equally effective in
the area of intelligence. I intend to work with the Committee to
develop a provision establishing a Quadrennial Intelligence Review and
an independent National Intelligence Panel for inclusion in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.

Amendment No. 3050

(Purpose: To provide for the designation of the Headquarters Building
of the Central Intelligence Agency as the George Herbert Walker Bush
Center for Central Intelligence)

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, Senator Shelby has an additional amendment
at the desk and I ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Shelby,
proposes an amendment numbered 3050.

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

SEC. 307. DESIGNATION OF HEADQUARTERS BUILDING OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE GEORGE HERBERT
WALKER BUSH CENTER FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Designation.--The Headquarters Building of the Central
Intelligence Agency located in Langley, Virginia, shall be
known and designated as the ``George Herbert Walker Bush
Center for Central Intelligence''.
(b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
Headquarters Building referred to in subsection (a) shall be
deemed to be a reference to the George Herbert Walker Bush
Center for Central Intelligence.

``george herbert walker bush center for central intelligence''

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, this Amendment will add a section to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 that will designate
the headquarters building of the Central Intelligence Agency as the
``George Herbert Walker Bush Center for Central Intelligence.''
I believe that this is a fitting tribute to a man that has had a
remarkable and distinguished career in public service not only as
President, but also as Vice President, Member of Congress, U.N.
Ambassador, the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office to the Peoples'
Republic of China, and Director of Central Intelligence.
President Bush, of course, is the only Director of Central
Intelligence to become President of the United States.
I know that he has always been particularly proud of his tenure as
the Director of Central Intelligence. I also know that he guided the
Agency through a difficult time and continues to be held in high regard
by not only CIA employees, but also the Intelligence Community at
large.
Currently, the headquarters building at Langley does not have a
formal name and this would be the only facility in the Washington, D.C.
area named after President Bush. This amendment has been cleared on
both sides and I urge its immediate adoption.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the amendment be
agreed to and, further, a classified change be incorporated in the
classified schedule of authorizations which has been available for all
Members' review.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3050) was agreed to.
Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered read
the third time and the Intelligence Committee then be discharged from
further consideration of H.R. 3694.
I further ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to its
immediate consideration, all after the enacting clause be stricken, and
the text of S. 2052, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof. I ask
consent that the bill be read the third time, and passed, the Senate
insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House, and the
Chair be authorized to appoint conferees, and I ask unanimous consent
that the statements related to the bill appear in the Record and S.
2052 be placed on the calendar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill (H.R. 3694), as amended, was considered read the third time,
and passed, as follows:
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives
(H.R. 3694) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'',
do pass with the following amendment:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.

[[Page S7329]]

Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Extension of application of sanctions laws to intelligence
activities.
Sec. 304. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities.
Sec. 305. Modification of National Security Education Program.
Sec. 306. Technical amendments.
Sec. 307. Authority to direct competitive analysis of analytical
products having national importance.
Sec. 308. Annual study and report on the safety and security of Russian
nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces.
Sec. 309. quadrennial intelligence review.
Sec. 310. Designation of Headquarters Building of Central Intelligence
Agency as the George Herbert Walker Bush Center for
Central Intelligence.

TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of separation pay program for voluntary separation
of CIA employees.
Sec. 402. Additional duties for Inspector General of Central
Intelligence
Agency.

TITLE V--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

Sec. 501. Encouragement of disclosure of certain information to
Congress.

TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS

Sec. 601. Pen registers and trap and trace devices in foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations.
Sec. 602. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence
and international terrorism investigations.
Sec. 603. Conforming and clerical amendments.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R.
3694 of the One Hundred Fifth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the Executive Branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.

SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated
for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of
$173,633,000.
(2) Availability of certain funds.--Within such amount,
funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee, the Advanced Technology Group, and the
Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program shall
remain available until September 30, 2000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized a total of 283 full-time
personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such
elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Account element or personnel detailed from other
elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there is also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall
remain available until September 30, 2000.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there
is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as is specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee of the United
States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
staff of an element within the Community Management Account
from another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000
shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.
Within such amount, funds provided for research, development,
test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the
United States funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General
shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the
Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the Center may not
be used in contravention of the provisions of section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority over center.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full
authority over the operations of the Center.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000.

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000''.

SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
in the second sentence by striking out ``December 31, 1998''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``December 31, 2000''.

SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION
PROGRAM.

(a) Assistance for Counterproliferation Studies.--The David
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C.
1901 et seq.) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1901), by inserting
``counterproliferation studies,'' after ``area studies,''
each place it appears in subsections (b)(7) and (c)(2).
(2) In section 802 (50 U.S.C. 1902)--
(A) by inserting ``counterproliferation studies,'' after
``area studies,'' each place it appears in paragraphs
(1)(B)(i), (1)(C), and (4) of subsection (a); and
(B) by inserting ``counterproliferation study,'' after
``area study,'' each place it appears subparagraphs (A)(ii)
and (B)(ii) of subsection (b)(2).
(3) In section 803(b)(8) (50 U.S.C. 1903(b)(8)), by
striking out ``and area'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``area, and counterproliferation''.
(4) In section 806(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1906(b)(1)), by
striking out ``and area'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``area, and counterproliferation''.
(b) Revision of Membership of National Security Education
Board.--Section 803(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(b)) is
further amended--

[[Page S7330]]

(1) by striking out paragraph (6); and
(2) by inserting in lieu thereof the following new
paragraph (6):
``(6) The Secretary of Energy.''.

SEC. 306. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section
5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section
102(a)(2), subsections (c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections
(c)(6)''; and
(B) by striking out ``(50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2)'' and inserting
in lieu thereof ``(50 U.S.C. 403(a)''.
(2) Section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by
striking out ``section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section
201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50
U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking out ``section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5))'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``section
103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(6))''.

SEC. 307. AUTHORITY TO DIRECT COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF
ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS HAVING NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

SEC. 308. ANNUAL STUDY AND REPORT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR
MILITARY FORCES.

SEC. 309. QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary
of Defense should jointly complete, in 1999 and every 4 years
thereafter, a comprehensive review of United States
intelligence programs and activities;
(2) each review under paragraph (1) should--
(A) include assessments of intelligence policy, resources,
manpower, organization, and related matters; and
(B) encompass the programs and activities funded under the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts;
(3) the results of each review should be shared with the
appropriate committees of Congress; and
(4) the Director, in conjunction with the Secretary, should
establish a nonpartisan, independent panel (with members
chosen in consultation with the committees referred to in
subsection (b)(2) from individuals in the private sector) in
order to--
(A) assess each review under paragraph (1);
(B) conduct an assessment of alternative intelligence
structures to meet the anticipated intelligence requirements
for the national security and foreign policy of the United
States through the year 2010; and
(C) make recommendations to the Director and the Secretary
regarding the optimal intelligence structure for the United
States in light of the assessment under subparagraph (B).
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than August 15, 1998, the
Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the
committees referred to in paragraph (2) the views of the
Director and the Secretary regarding--
(A) the potential value of conducting reviews as described
in subsection (a)(1); and
(B) the potential value of assessments of such reviews as
described in subsection (a)(4)(A).
(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the
following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on
Armed Services, and Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Committee on National Security, and Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 310. DESIGNATION OF HEADQUARTERS BUILDING OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE GEORGE HERBERT
WALKER BUSH CENTER FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF SEPARATION PAY PROGRAM FOR VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION OF CIA EMPLOYEES.

(a) Extension.--Subsection (f) of section 2 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C.
403-4 note) is amended by striking out ``September 30, 1999''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``September 30, 2001''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of that section
is amended by striking out ``fiscal year 1998 or fiscal year
1999'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal year 1998,
1999, 2000, or 2001''

SEC. 402. ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Section 17(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(4) and (5), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3) to review existing and proposed legislation relating
to the programs and operations of the Agency and to make
recommendations in the semiannual reports required by
subsection (d) concerning the impact of such legislation on
economy and efficiency in the administration of, or
prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in, the programs
and operations administered or financed by the Agency;''.

TITLE V--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

SEC. 501. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION
TO CONGRESS.

(a) Encouragement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall take appropriate
actions to inform the employees of the covered agencies, and
employees of contractors carrying out activities under
classified contracts with covered agencies, that--
(A) except as provided in paragraph (4), the disclosure of
information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals
referred to in paragraph (3) is not prohibited by law,
executive order, or regulation or otherwise contrary to
public policy;
(B) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) are
presumed to have a need to know and to be authorized to
receive such information; and
(C) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) may
receive information so disclosed only in their capacity as
members of the committees concerned.
(2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to
information, including classified information, that an
employee reasonably believes to provide direct and specific
evidence of--
(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation;
(B) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material
fact; or
(C) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, a flagrant
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.
(3) Covered individuals.--The individuals to whom
information described in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are
the members of a committee of Congress having as its primary
responsibility the oversight of a department, agency, or
element of the Federal Government to which such information
relates.
(4) Scope.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to information
otherwise described in paragraph (2) if the disclosure of the
information is prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a report on the actions taken under subsection (a).
(c) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or
otherwise affect any reporting requirement relating to
intelligence activities that arises under the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) or any other
provision of law.
(d) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered agencies'' means the following:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(6) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof,
determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)
of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal
function the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities.

TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS

SEC. 601. PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES IN FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page S7331]]

(1) by redesignating title IV as title VI and section 401
as section 601, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after title III the following new title:

``TITLE IV--PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

``definitions

``Sec. 401. As used in this title:
``(1) The terms `foreign power', `agent of a foreign
power', `international terrorism', `foreign intelligence
information', `Attorney General', `United States person',
`United States', `person', and `State' shall have the same
meanings as in section 101 of this Act.
``(2) The terms `pen register' and `trap and trace device'
have the meanings given such terms in section 3127 of title
18, United States Code.
``(3) The term `aggrieved person' means any person--
``(A) whose telephone line was subject to the installation
or use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized
by this title; or
``(B) whose communication instrument or device was subject
to the use of a pen register or trap and trace device
authorized by this title to capture incoming electronic or
other communications impulses.

``pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations

``Sec. 402. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of title I of
this Act with respect to electronic surveillance under that
title as defined in section 101(f)(4) of this Act, the
Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government
may make an application for an order or an extension of an
order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a
pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation
to gather foreign intelligence information or information
concerning international terrorism which is being conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines
as the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order
No. 12333, or a successor order.
``(b) Each application under this section shall be in
writing under oath or affirmation to--
``(1) a judge of the court established by section 103(a) of
this Act; or
``(2) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of
title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by
the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to
hear applications for and grant orders approving the
installation and use of a pen register or trap or trace
device on behalf of a judge of that court.
``(c) Each application under this section shall require the
approval of the Attorney General, or a designated attorney
for the Government, and shall include--
``(1) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to use
the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the
application;
``(2) a certification by the applicant that the information
likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign
intelligence or international terrorism investigation being
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under
guidelines approved by the Attorney General; and
``(3) information which demonstrates that there is reason
to believe that the telephone line to which the pen register
or trap and trace device is to be attached, or the
communication instrument or device to be covered by the pen
register or trap and trace device, has been or is about to be
used in communication with--
``(A) an individual who is engaging or has engaged in
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities that involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States; or
``(B) a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under
circumstances giving reason to believe that the communication
concerns or concerned international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities that involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States.
``(d)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section,
the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as
modified, approving the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the
application satisfies the requirements of this section.
``(2) An order issued under this section--
``(A) shall specify--
``(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the
subject of the foreign intelligence or international
terrorism investigation;
``(ii) in the case of an application for the installation
and use of a pen register or trap and trace device with
respect to a telephone line--
``(I) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is
leased or in whose name the telephone line is listed; and
``(II) the number and, if known, physical location of the
telephone line; and
``(iii) in the case of an application for the use of a pen
register or trap and trace device with respect to a
communication instrument or device not covered by clause
(ii)--
``(I) the identity, if known, of the person who owns or
leases the instrument or device or in whose name the
instrument or device is listed; and
``(II) the number of the instrument or device; and
``(B) shall direct that--
``(i) upon request of the applicant, the provider of a wire
or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or
other person shall furnish any information, facilities, or
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation
and operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in
such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a
minimum amount of interference with the services that such
provider, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing
the person concerned;
``(ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or other
person--
``(I) shall not disclose the existence of the investigation
or of the pen register or trap and trace device to any person
unless or until ordered by the court; and
``(II) shall maintain, under security procedures approved
by the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence pursuant to section 105(b)(2)(C) of this Act,
any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace
device or the aid furnished; and
``(iii) the applicant shall compensate such provider,
landlord, custodian, or other person for reasonable expenses
incurred by such provider, landlord, custodian, or other
person in providing such information, facilities, or
technical assistance.
``(e) An order issued under this section shall authorize
the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace
device for a period not to exceed 90 days. Extensions of such
an order may be granted, but only upon an application for an
order under this section and upon the judicial finding
required by subsection (d). The period of extension shall be
for a period not to exceed 90 days.
``(f) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of a wire or electronic communication service,
landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer,
employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that
furnishes any information, facilities, or technical
assistance under subsection (d) in accordance with the terms
of a court under this section.
``(g) Unless otherwise ordered by the judge, the results of
a pen register or trap and trace device shall be furnished at
reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the
duration of the order to the authorized Government official
or officials.

``authorization during emergencies

``Sec. 403. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, when the Attorney General makes a determination
described in subsection (b), the Attorney General may
authorize the installation and use of a pen register or trap
and trace device on an emergency basis to gather foreign
intelligence information or information concerning
international terrorism if--
``(1) a judge referred to in section 402(b) of this Act is
informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time
of such authorization that the decision has been made to
install and use the pen register or trap and trace device, as
the case may be, on an emergency basis; and
``(2) an application in accordance with section 402 of this
Act is made to such judge as soon as practicable, but not
more than 48 hours, after the Attorney General authorizes the
installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, under this section.
``(b) A determination under this subsection is a reasonable
determination by the Attorney General that--
``(1) an emergency requires the installation and use of a
pen register or trap and trace device to obtain foreign
intelligence information or information concerning
international terrorism before an order authorizing the
installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, can with due diligence be
obtained under section 402 of this Act; and
``(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under such
section 402 to approve the installation and use of the pen
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be,
exists.
``(c)(1) In the absence of an order applied for under
subsection (a)(2) approving the installation and use of a pen
register or trap and trace device authorized under this
section, the installation and use of the pen register or trap
and trace device, as the case may be, shall terminate at the
earlier of--
``(A) when the information sought is obtained;
``(B) when the application for the order is denied under
section 402 of this Act; or
``(C) 48 hours after the time of the authorization by the
Attorney General.
``(2) In the event that an application for an order applied
for under subsection (a)(2) is denied, or in any other case
where the installation and use of a pen register or trap and
trace device under this section is terminated and no order
under section 402 of this Act is issued approving the
installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, no information obtained or
evidence derived from the use of the pen register or trap and
trace device, as the case may be, shall be received in
evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or political subdivision thereof, and no information
concerning any United States person acquired from the use of
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may
be, shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other
manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent
of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney
General if the information indicates a threat of death or
serious bodily harm to any person.

``authorization during time of war

``Sec. 404. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
President, through the Attorney General, may authorize the
use of a pen register or trap and trace device without a
court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence
information for a period not to exceed 15 calendar days
following a declaration of war by Congress.

``use of information

``Sec. 405. (a)(1) Information acquired from the use of a
pen register or trap and trace device installed pursuant to
this title concerning any

[[Page S7332]]

United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal
officers and employees without the consent of the United
States person only in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
``(2) No information acquired from a pen register or trap
and trace device installed and used pursuant to this title
may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees
except for lawful purposes.
``(b) No information acquired pursuant to this title shall
be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such
disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such
information, or any information derived therefrom, may only
be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance
authorization of the Attorney General.
``(c) Whenever the United States intends to enter into
evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in or before any court, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States against an aggrieved person any information
obtained or derived from the use of a pen register or trap
and trace device pursuant to this title, the United States
shall, before the trial, hearing, or the other proceeding or
at a reasonable time before an effort to so disclose or so
use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the
aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which
the information is to be disclosed or used that the United
States intends to so disclose or so use such information.
``(d) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof
intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the State or political subdivision thereof
against an aggrieved person any information obtained or
derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace
device pursuant to this title, the State or political
subdivision thereof shall notify the aggrieved person, the
court or other authority in which the information is to be
disclosed or used, and the Attorney General that the State or
political subdivision thereof intends to so disclose or so
use such information.
``(e)(1) Any aggrieved person against whom evidence
obtained or derived from the use of a pen register or trap
and trace device is to be, or has been, introduced or
otherwise used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, or a State or political subdivision thereof, may move
to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from the use of
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may
be, on the grounds that--
``(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
``(B) the use of the pen register or trap and trace device,
as the case may be, was not made in conformity with an order
of authorization or approval under this title.
``(2) A motion under paragraph (1) shall be made before the
trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no
opportunity to make such a motion or the aggrieved person
concerned was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
``(f)(1) Whenever a court or other authority is notified
pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), whenever a motion is made
pursuant to subsection (e), or whenever any motion or request
is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute
or rule of the United States or any State before any court or
other authority of the United States or any State to discover
or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating
to the use of a pen register or trap and trace device
authorized by this title or to discover, obtain, or suppress
evidence or information obtained or derived from the use of a
pen register or trap and trace device authorized by this
title, the United States district court or, where the motion
is made before another authority, the United States district
court in the same district as the authority shall,
notwithstanding any other provision of law and if the
Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that
disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the national
security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte
the application, order, and such other materials relating to
the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the
case may be, as may be necessary to determine whether the use
of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may
be, was lawfully authorized and conducted.
``(2) In making a determination under paragraph (1), the
court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate
security procedures and protective orders, portions of the
application, order, or other materials relating to the use of
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may
be, or may require the Attorney General to provide to the
aggrieved person a summary of such materials, only where such
disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of
the legality of the use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be.
``(g)(1) If the United States district court determines
pursuant to subsection (f) that the use of a pen register or
trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized or
conducted, the court may, in accordance with the requirements
of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained
or derived from the use of the pen register or trap and trace
device, as the case may be, or otherwise grant the motion of
the aggrieved person.
``(2) If the court determines that the use of the pen
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, was
lawfully authorized or conducted, it may deny the motion of
the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process
requires discovery or disclosure.
``(h) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection
(g), decisions under this section that the use of a pen
register or trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized
or conducted, and orders of the United States district court
requiring review or granting disclosure of applications,
orders, or other materials relating to the installation and
use of a pen register or trap and trace device shall be final
orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and
the several States except a United States Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court.

``congressional oversight

``Sec. 406. (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General
shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all uses
of pen registers and trap and trace devices pursuant to this
title.
``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall
also provide to the committees referred to in subsection (a)
and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with
respect to the preceding six-month period--
``(1) the total number of applications made for orders
approving the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices
under this title; and
``(2) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied.''.

SEC. 602. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 601 of this Act,
is further amended by inserting after title IV, as added by
such section 601, the following new title:

``TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES

``definitions

``Sec. 501. As used in this title:
``(1) The terms `foreign power', `agent of a foreign
power', `foreign intelligence information', `international
terrorism', and `Attorney General' shall have the same
meanings as in section 101 of this Act.
``(2) The term `common carrier' means any person or entity
transporting people or property by land, rail, water, or air
for compensation.
``(3) The term `physical storage facility' means any
business or entity that provides space for the storage of
goods or materials, or services related to the storage of
goods or materials, to the public or any segment thereof.
``(4) The term `public accommodation facility' means any
inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that provides
lodging to transient guests.
``(5) The term `vehicle rental facility' means any person
or entity that provides vehicles for rent, lease, loan, or
other similar use to the public or any segment thereof.

``access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations

``Sec. 502. (a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall
be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make
an application for an order authorizing a common carrier,
public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or
vehicle rental facility to release records in its possession
for an investigation to gather foreign intelligence
information or an investigation concerning international
terrorism which investigation is being conducted by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as the
Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No.
12333, or a successor order.
``(b) Each application under this section--
``(1) shall be made to--
``(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a) of
this Act; or
``(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of
title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by
the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to
hear applications and grant orders for the release of records
under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and
``(2) shall specify that--
``(A) the records concerned are sought for an investigation
described in subsection (a); and
``(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
``(c)(1) Upon application made pursuant to this section,
the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as
modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds
that the application satisfies the requirements of this
section.
``(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose
that it is issued for purposes of an investigation described
in subsection (a).
``(d)(1) Any common carrier, public accommodation facility,
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility shall
comply with an order under subsection (c).
``(2) No common carrier, public accommodation facility,
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility, or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any
person (other than those officers, agents, or employees of
such common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical
storage facility, or vehicle rental facility necessary to
fulfill the requirement to disclose information to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section) that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained
records pursuant to an order under this section.

``congressional oversight

``Sec. 503. (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General
shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all
requests for records under this title.
``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall
provide to the Committees on the

[[Page S7333]]

Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
report setting forth with respect to the preceding six-month
period--
``(1) the total number of applications made for orders
approving requests for records under this title; and
``(2) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied.''.

SEC. 603. CONFORMING AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Conforming Amendment.--Section 601 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as redesignated by
section 601(1) of this Act, is amended by striking out
``other than title III'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``other than titles III, IV, and V''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 is amended by striking out the items relating to title
IV and section 401 and inserting in lieu thereof the
following:

``TITLE IV--PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

``401. Definitions.
``402. Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations.
``403. Authorization during emergencies.
``404. Authorization during time of war.
``405. Use of information.
``406. Congressional oversight.

``TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES

``501. Definitions.
``502. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations.
``503. Congressional oversight.

``TITLE VI--EFFECTIVE DATE

``601. Effective date.''.

The Presiding Officer (Mr. Enzi) appointed:
Mr. Shelby, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Lugar, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe,
Mr. Hatch, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Allard, Mr. Coats, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Glenn,
Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Robb, Mr. Lautenberg,
Mr. Levin, and from the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Thurmond.

____________________