[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 85 (Thursday, June 25, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7081-S7096]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[[Page S7081]]
Senate
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (Continued)
BOSNIA LANGUAGE
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the
provisions of the Department of Defense authorization bill relating to
the United States military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The amendment
offered by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) expresses the
sense of the Congress that United States ground troops should not
remain in Bosnia indefinitely. The amendment offered by the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. Smith) would have required that none of the
funding authorized or appropriated for the Bosnia mission under this
bill be expended after March 31, 1999, unless both Houses of Congress
had voted on the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia.
I supported both of these amendments because I firmly believe that it
is of paramount importance for the Senate to go on record at every
opportunity with respect to the U.S. mission in Bosnia. It is
especially important that the Senate go on record as a part of the
Department of Defense authorization bill, which is perhaps the most
important piece of defense-related legislation that this body debates
each year because it is the framework under which our military will be
funded over the next fiscal year.
I have opposed the Bosnia mission since its inception because I did
not believe then--and I do not believe now--that the Administration has
presented a list of clear, achievable objectives and a definite exit
strategy to the American people. To date, taxpayers have paid more than
$9 billion for this ill-defined mission.
I am pleased that the second-degree amendment offered by the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. McCain) to the Thurmond amendment calls upon the
President to submit a report on the status of the Bosnia mission with
each future request for additional funding for this mission. To date,
the Administration has repeatedly come to the Congress seeking more and
more money for this mission and offering little justification in
return. The McCain language asks the Administration, with each
additional funding request, to provide specific information on the
Bosnia mission, including objectives for reaching a self-sustainable
peace and a schedule for achieving them, and future cost and risk
assessments involved with this mission.
Of course, I support our men and women in uniform and the commendable
job they have done to help to implement the Dayton Accords and to
achieve a lasting peace in Bosnia. What I cannot accept is the mission
creep and uncertainty that these men and women are forced to live with,
and the hefty price tag the American people have been forced to pay.
While I supported the Thurmond amendment, I would have liked to see
stronger language, including calling on the President to devise an exit
strategy that included a date certain for the transfer of chief
responsibility for this mission from United States forces to European
forces. It is my firm belief that the longer U.S. troops remain in the
region, the harder it will be for them to leave. We must call upon our
NATO allies to assume responsibility for this mission.
In the past, I have supported both a date certain for troop
withdrawal, and efforts to cut funding for this mission. I also have
come to the floor to express my concerns about the expanding nature of
this mission. I would also like to express again my continuing
frustration with the emergency designation for the funding for this
mission, which is clearly no longer an emergency.
I regret that the Administration chose to deploy troops to Bosnia in
1995 without seeking prior congressional approval. I also regret that
this mission has continued far past its original one-year time frame,
and that our troops have been asked once again to continue down an
uncertain path toward an ill-defined goal. In December 1997, the
President abandoned the purported June 1998 exit date and replaced it
with a series of so-called ``benchmarks'' for U.S. withdrawal. Today,
on the 25th day of June 1998, the end of this mission is nowhere in
sight. I hope that the Administration will hear clearly the sentiments
expressed by the Senate through the Thurmond amendment, which has been
adopted overwhelmingly by this body.
prohibition on expansion of sale of alcohol
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate adopted the
amendment I submitted to S. 2057 that puts the Senate on record in
opposition to the attempt being made to increase the number of military
stores that sell wine and beer. Although alcohol is available for sale
on military bases, it is not for sale in the commissary stores along
with the groceries. Specifically, my amendment would prohibit the
Secretary of Defense from conducting a survey of commissary patrons to
determine whether or not they would support the sale of beer and wine
in commissaries. In addition, the amendment would prohibit a
demonstration project to evaluate the merit of selling wine and beer in
commissary stores at exchange store prices. Mr. President, that is the
wrong direction in which to take our military. We should be trying to
deglamorize alcohol, not taking steps that tend to promote its use. An
expansion of accessibility will likely lead to an increase in the
military of all the problems that go hand and hand with alcohol use in
civilian life; the negative health consequences, the loss of
productivity, the cost to society, the increase in violence and crime,
and the increase in sexually transmitted diseases. Why in the world
would we want
[[Page S7082]]
to embrace such a policy as expansion of access to alcohol as official
government policy! Life in the military already has its share of
stress--long hours, a rigid hierarchy of command, constant training,
travel, and long deployments overseas. Let us not expand the
opportunities to pour more fuel on any smoldering embers of alcohol
abuse in our population and add to these stresses and strains. Let us
keep our soldiers fit and sober, clear-headed and ready to defend our
national security interests, and hope that such a policy sets an
example which other entities in our society will embrace.
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, the 1999 Defense Authorization bill
before us contains a demonstration project that would allow some DoD-
eligible retirees to join FEHBP plans, under a separate risk pool. It
is my understanding that this ensures that DoD retirees who enroll in
this demonstration project are able to choose from competing, private
sector FEHBP plans. It is also my understanding that retirees, like
other FEHBP-eligibles, will be able to choose among plans that offer
fully integrated health care benefits that use market-based competition
to control cost and improve quality of care.
Mr. THURMOND. Yes, we fully expect that OPM and DoD will conduct a
demonstration project that provides military retirees with the same
health care services provided through the same private sector delivery
systems that serve today's FEHBP beneficiaries.
Mr. SANTORUM. I thank the Chairman. I appreciate this clarification
and I look forward to evaluating the success of the FEHBP demonstration
along with the two other demonstration projects included in this bill.
Y-12 plant in oak ridge, tennessee
Mr. THOMPSON. I know the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
agrees with me that nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of our
national defense policy, and we should do everything we can to maintain
a strong, viable nuclear deterrent in this country. This requires a
robust nuclear weapons program, the ability to ensure that our weapons
are both safe and reliable, and the ability to remanufacture any
component of any weapon in the stockpile at any given time.
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Tennessee is correct. We must preserve
our capability to manufacture weapons and weapons components, and we
must maintain ongoing weapons surveillance and assessment activities.
The four weapons production plants--including the Y-12 plant in the
Senator's home state of Tennessee--are key to achieving these goals.
Mr. THOMPSON. As the Chairman knows, production activities at Y-12
were placed in a stand down mode on September 22, 1994, due to
procedural and criticality safety concerns identified by the Defense
Nuclear Safety Board. Since then, Y-12 has made significant progress
improving its operations throughout the plant. Since the stand down, Y-
12 personnel have worked tirelessly to restart operations in the
following mission areas: Receipt and Shipment, Disassembly and Storage
Operations, Depleted Uranium Operations, and Stockpile Surveillance,
while continuing to meet all defense mission requirements.
Mr. THURMOND. I agree with the Senator that the staff of Y-12 have
worked hard to bring operations back up to full speed. I was very
pleased to see that, earlier this month, Y-12 resumed the last of its
production missions: Enriched Uranium Operations.
Mr. THOMPSON. The Chairman is correct. On June 8, 1998, Y-12 cast its
first enriched uranium part since September, 1994. This achievement is
a credit to the dedication and commitment of everyone at Y-12, and is a
testament to the leadership and management expertise of Lockheed Martin
and their teammates at the Department of Energy. It is also critically
important to our national security, because Y-12 operations are crucial
to the success of our Stockpile Life Extension Program. In fact, Y-12
is currently involved in the life extension program for the Peacekeeper
Missile warhead, called the W87. Initial delivery of key components of
this weapon are due at the end of this year, and manufacturing will
continue for several years.
I am very pleased that operations at Y-12 are up and running again,
so that these critical national security missions can continue on
schedule and uninterrupted. In that vein, I want to express my concern
about any action on the Department of Energy's part that would disrupt
the progress that has been made at Y-12 and jeopardize the timely
completion of this very important Stockpile Life Extension project.
Mr. THURMOND. I share the Senator's concern, and I urge the
Department to make every effort not to disrupt the tremendous progress
that has been made at Y-12. The production activities taking place at
the plant are a critical component of our national security policy.
Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Chairman.
dod teacher quality
Mr. BINGAMAN. When the Armed Services Committee met to mark up the FY
1999 Defense Authorization bill, I introduced a measure designed to
encourage the Department of Defense schools to assure the high quality
of its faculty in DoD schools. Senator Coats and I have discussed ways
to improve the proposal and have agreed on words that we believe would
be appropriate to include in the Conference report on the Defense
Authorization bill.
Mr. COATS. That's correct, Senator Bingaman. I believe the words we
have agreed to here will encourage the Department to emphasize hiring
high quality instructors for the Department's schools. In my view, the
most appropriate vehicle at this point to incorporate this initiative
in the defense bill is to seek a provision in the Conference report.
Senator Thurmond, would you assist our efforts to do so during the
upcoming conference?
Mr. THURMOND. I appreciate your efforts to assure continued high
quality education in Department of Defense schools and I'll work to see
that the provision you seek is adopted in conference.
counternarcotics mission
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, in 1989, President George Bush called
drugs ``the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today.'' Almost
nine years later, that threat still exists.
That same year, President Bush tasked the Defense Department to play
an important role in the drug war. Specifically, the Defense Department
was tasked to engage in the detection and monitoring of drugs in
transit towards the United States. At that time, counter narcotics, and
drug interdiction were key components of our nation's drug control
strategy. As a member of the House of Representatives at that time, I
can recall very well the investments we dedicated toward the
international and interdiction components of the war on drugs. These
investments made a difference. We made a dent in the drug industry. The
price of cocaine increased. Drug use declined significantly.
That was 1989. In 1992, the focus and the level of commitment toward
a comprehensive drug control strategy has diminished. The drug threat
is as strong as ever, but the same cannot be said for our drug
interdiction efforts. It's not just a case of fewer resources, it's a
case of diminished priorities. In fact, in its list of priorities, the
Defense Department currently ranks counter-narcotics dead last in its
mission statement.
This is an unfortunate mistake.
Mr. President, it's time we re-ordered our priorities. That is why
last week, my friend and colleague from Florida, Senator Graham, myself
and Senator Grassley and Senator Helms, introduced an amendment to the
Defense Authorization bill. This amendment, which was adopted by the
Senate last week, simply states that a higher priority should be given
within the Defense Department to drug interdiction and counterdrug
activities. Specifically, our drug control mission should be ranked at
the same level as our peacekeeping operations. I thank my colleagues
for accepting my amendment by unanimous consent. It is my hope that the
final bill will contain similar language.
The facts bring us to no other conclusion--it's time to make drug
interdiction a priority again. In 1988, close to 2 million adolescent
Americans were drug users, and by 1992, that number was down by 25%. At
that time, we had a balanced drug control strategy--with sufficient
investments in the key components: interdiction, treatment, education
and law enforcement. During
[[Page S7083]]
that same period, marijuana use dropped by over 16 percent and cocaine
use was down 35 percent. Our efforts were concentrated and effective--
with inspiring results.
Mr. President, that progress ceased in 1992, and since that time,
teenage drug use has more than doubled--and the ramifications have been
far-reaching. For example, drug-abuse related arrests for those under
the age of 18 in 1996 were twice those of 1992. Health costs continue
to rise as this plague spreads uncontrollably.
Youth drug use is on the rise because drugs have increasingly become
both more available and more affordable. The Office of National Drug
Control Policy has reported that small ``pieces'' or ``rocks'' of
crack, once sold for ten to twenty dollars, are now available for three
to five dollars. The street price of drugs is decreasing and our
efforts to limit their supply are failing.
Mr. President, this increase in illicit drug use can be traced in
part to the decline in counter-narcotics as a priority for national
defense policy. In 1992, Department of Defense funding for counter-
narcotics activities in transit areas was over $500 million. A steady
trend in decreased funding brought it down to an all-time low of $214
million in 1995. Mr. President, that is more than a 50% decrease in
funds. Thankfully, due to efforts by my Senate and House colleagues,
last year's allocation was increased to $300 million. However, we are
nowhere near the 1992 levels.
In recent years, the Department of Defense has been called upon to
support counter narcotics activities in transit areas in the Caribbean.
However, assets critical to the drug interdiction effort have been
consistently diverted to matters considered a ``higher priority.''
Mr. President, this decrease in funding has had an unfortunate impact
on our drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. For example, the
number of days per year that our ships spend patrolling the Caribbean
has shrunk by two-thirds. Some of our key interdiction agencies have
reported that the ships and manpower needed for effective interdiction
are unavailable. Also, there radar system is less extensive--and even
if drug traffickers can be identified, we lack the manpower necessary
to intercept and seize the illegal drug imports. In 1996, only half of
the known maritime drug events detected resulted in apprehension or
seizure. Our defenses are down and the drug lords are taking advantage
of this weakness. Added to this decline in resources is the increase in
more sophisticated resources utilized by the drug cartels.
According to the State Department, about 760 metric tons of cocaine
were produced in South America in 1996. Of that, 608 tons were destined
for the United States through the transit zone. U.S. government
agencies that deal with cocaine seizures indicated that with additional
equipment, annual cocaine seizures can be significantly increased. The
Department of Defense, however, has indicated that it will not be able
to provide these additional assets because of other priorities.
Mr. President, this attitude was not acceptable in the late 1980's
and it should not be acceptable now. It is necessary that we once again
implement an effective transit zone operation as an integral measure to
limit the availability of illicit drugs to our youth.
It is time to renew drug interdiction efforts, provide the necessary
equipment to our drug-enforcement agencies, and make the issue a
defense priority again. I thank my colleagues for supporting this
amendment and helping turn the tide of the drug crisis in our country.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss language in the
DoD authorization report contained in the ``Additional Matters of
Interest'' section. The language in the DoD Authorization targets an
amendment Senator Wyden and I were able to get accepted during the
Superfund markup.
Earlier this year the EPW Committee marked up S. 8, which if passed
and signed into law would significantly improve the Superfund program.
At markup Senator Wyden and I proposed an amendment clarifying the
waiver of sovereign immunity currently contained in Section 120 of
Superfund. A waiver of sovereign immunity basically allows private
parties and state and local governments to bring suit against the
federal government for noncompliance.
This original waiver was added in 1986 when Superfund was last
reformed and was accepted with broad bipartisan support. The intent of
Section 120 is clear and unambiguous to those who research the
legislative history and read it faithfully. The words are plain and
they read: ``Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
section 9607 of this title.''
My reading of this is that the federal government needs to comply
with the law just like any private party or state or local entity.
As Senator Stafford said during passage of the 1986 Superfund
amendments, ``. . . the legislation recognizes the reality that, only
in unusual cases, th[at] national security may require issuance of
circumscribed Executive orders exempting a Federal facility from the
requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986. In all such cases, Executive orders should adopt the method of
protecting legitimate national security interests that maximize
compliance with the environmental and health requirements imposed by
the legislation. For example, it may be appropriate to require EPA
employees reviewing cleanup plans [to] obtain a national security
clearance, but it would not be appropriate to exempt such plans from
national cleanup standards simply because EPA employees are assigned to
ascertain what standards should apply to the cleanup.'' However, the
language in the '86 Amendments was not exact enough and wiggle room was
left for the Federal government to avoid their environmental
responsibilities. Unfortunately, even though our amendment is merely
clarifying, some in the Senate would like to maintain dual cleanup
standards, one for those who live near a private National Priority List
(NPL) site and another for those who live near an NPL site the federal
government has responsibility over. Simply put, that should not be
happening.
The Armed Services Committee has expressed concern with our Amendment
and has even gone so far as to include report language in their bill
commenting on legal language in another bill. Further they have asked
for a study on the cost of our amendment.
I provide the above background as context for my reply to the
Committee's characterization of our amendment to S. 8. In their report
the Armed Services Committee made several claims with which I disagree.
They also make claims which can be disputed which are outlined below:
(1) the report states that, ``[t]he amendment would require federal
facilities to comply with state and local substantive and procedural
requirements, rather than the uniform, national process described in
the National Contingency Plan.'' The implication is that federal
facilities would no longer be subject to the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) and that all cleanups would be done pursuant to state and local
law. That is not the case. What our amendment in Committee simply did
was allow state, local, and to some extent EPA the authority to enforce
compliance with current Superfund and similar State and local laws.
Enforce the current Superfund law including its implementing
regulations, the NCP, and similar state and local laws against federal
facilities just as they would against private parties. I have attempted
to make this point clear in the past and I will attempt to do so once
again, this amendment would ensure that Federal entities are held to
the same standard of compliance as local, state, and private parties.
Nothing more, nothing less.
(2) The report also states that, ``[u]nder current law, Federal
facilities are already subject to state laws concerning removal and
remedial action, including laws regarding enforcement (42 U.S.C.
9620(a)(4)), but state challenges must be brought after remedial action
is complete. (42 U.S.C. 9613 (g))[sic]'' The Federal government has not
followed this section of law faithfully, in reality they have argued
that it merely requires them to comply with
[[Page S7084]]
substantive sections of the law, for example, Applicable or Relevant
and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR's). As evidence of this is a letter
from the Chief Counsel for the National Guard Bureau on September 13,
1996 to Assistant Attorney General Steve Shackman, regarding Duluth Air
Force Base State Superfund Site. In this letter Mr. Hise asserts that,
``[c]ompliance with a state CERCLA law's substantive requirements, via
the ARAR's process [which includes provisions to waive ARAR's],
fulfills CERCLA's legal requirements.''
To state it once again, my concern is that, even though the report
asserts that States can take action under 113(h) after remedial action
is complete the federal polluters do not acknowledge this section means
what it says. Instead, they maintain it only requires them to comply
with state standards as ARARs. In fact, the only case in this area,
U.S. versus Colorado, held that the federal government could not escape
regulation under an authorized state RCRA program merely by listing on
the NPL. Clearly, clarification is necessary that Congress intended all
federal agencies to comply with this law in substance and procedure.
Beyond the merely incorrect statements in the report there is a
fundamental difference in philosophy. In my view the Federal government
needs to be held to the same standard as any other entity. If we are
going to have a Federal Superfund law then it should apply to everyone.
In other words everyone needs to be in the same bath tub with the same
scrub brush. I believe this was true when we made all laws applicable
to Congress and believe we need to make at the least this law
applicable to all Federal agencies.
When I proposed this amendment in Committee it was claimed that it
would cost the government too much money. In fact, if we examine what
has occurred under RCRA, which has had the same language in effect
since 1992, the conclusion is the opposite. A study done by the EPA
entitled, The Federal Facility Compliance Act: Enforcement Analysis of
RCRA Administrative Orders at Federal Facilities indicates that State
governments have been easier on the Federal government than the EPA.
The study found the following: while Federal orders averaged 369 days
before settlement, state orders averaged 196. Also, during the study
period the EPA fined Federal facilities over $9 million while states
fined Federal facilities only slightly over $4 million. In other words
those who claim the states will gold plate remedies have no basis for
that belief.
Finally, I note that the Armed Services Committee has asked for a
study which is due at the end of September outlining the additional
potential liability a Superfund waiver would incur. I'm not opposed to
such a study but I am sending a letter to the President's Council on
Environmental Quality bringing it to their attention and asking them to
oversee the collection of the data. I am certain that the authors of
the amendment wouldn't object to such oversight which would avoid the
perception of the fox guarding the chicken house.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the National Defense
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999. The need for a strong and
capable military was clearly demonstrated during the Iraqi crisis over
the UN-mandated inspections. Our forward-deployed forces were quickly
strengthened by additional personnel as the crisis deepened. The
diplomacy of United Nations Secretary General Khofi Annan, backed up by
the credible, on-scene forces of the United States Armed Forces,
successfully kept the peace.
This bill provides the proper support for our military forces while
maintaining a realistic balance between readiness to take care of
immediate needs, and the needed investment to develop and procure new
systems for the future.
The bill provides for those who serve in uniform today, and those who
gave this country so much during their careers in military service. A
fully funded and well-deserved 3.1% pay raise for military personnel is
included in the bill.
Additionally, the bill includes a provision for the Department of
Defense to initiate a comprehensive test plan to evaluate the best way
for us to provide health care to retired military personnel and their
families who have reached the age of 65. The plan will build on the
Medicare test program included in last year's Bipartisan Budget
Agreement. The new expanded plan will include test sites for
participation in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, the
Department of Defense's Tricare health care program, and a mail order
pharmacy program to reduce out-of-pocket costs.
The daily operations of our military forces have obvious risks and
dangers. All branches of the Armed Forces have made progress in
improving safety in the military, but more remains to be done. I
commend the Department of Defense for its accelerated installation of
needed additional safety systems on military aircraft that carry
passengers.
This bill also includes a worthwhile provision to evaluate the way
the Pentagon investigates aviation accidents. We must ensure that no
stone is left unturned in finding the cause of every accident and
taking the necessary corrective action to reduce the risk of future
accidents.
The growing frequency and sophistication of attacks on the Pentagon's
computer networks highlight the need for improved protection of
critical network infrastructures. This bill includes research and
development funding for the exploration and development of defenses
against cyber attacks. This step will greatly improve the Pentagon's
focus on this growing threat.
In the past eight years, the Navy-Marine Corps team has responded to
over 90 contingencies--almost one per month. As the Ranking Democrat on
the Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I am pleased
that the bill provides the support necessary for our naval forces as
they modernize to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
The bill includes the necessary advance procurement funding for
Fiscal Year 1999 for the Navy's next aircraft carrier, CVN-77. The
Navy's procurement schedule for the next carrier, revised from its
budget submission of last year, will be under the cost cap mandated in
last year's defense bill. Also, much of the new technology being
developed for the next generation aircraft carrier, the CVX, will be
included in CVN-77.
The budget request for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the
Marine Corps' MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft is fully funded. The
Super Hornet combines the outstanding characteristics of earlier F/A-18
models with cutting edge technology in an affordable aircraft with
significantly improved performance and endurance. The MV-22 Osprey is a
vertical take-off and landing aircraft designed to replace the Marine
Corps' aging fleet of CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters.
In contrast to these aspects of this bill, I do have concerns about
reductions in the Administration's budget request for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, demilitarization of chemical weapons, and the
nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship program. I hope that these
reductions will be corrected in the final bill.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is the most cost-effective
program for reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons. Thousands of
nuclear warheads remain in the nations of the former Soviet Union. The
Cooperative Threat Reduction program plays a key role in the control
and dismantling of these weapons. We must continue this all-important
program and ensure that every single nuclear warhead is secure, and
eventually destroyed.
Funding reductions in the chemical weapons de-militarization program
will endanger our ability to comply with the provisions of the Chemical
Weapons Conventions Treaty approved last year. As a world leader and
the only superpower, we have an obligation to lead the worldwide effort
to eliminate chemical weapons. I urge the restoration of these funds.
All of us have grave concerns over the recent nuclear testing in
India. Russia and the United States continue to work hard to reduce the
world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. India and other nations must also
be involved in the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear
weapons.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a major milestone on the road to
a nuclear free world. A cornerstone of the implementation of this
treaty is the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program. We
must be able
[[Page S7085]]
to certify that our remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons is reliable,
while reducing the number of nuclear weapons through START II and,
hopefully, a START III treaty.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the key component in
verification of the reliability of our nuclear weapons. The program has
experienced a fundamental shift in policy since the United States
ceased live testing of nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy is
developing new capabilities to complete this certification without live
testing of nuclear weapons. The funding cuts in the budget request will
hinder these efforts. I urge the restoration of these funds to the
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
In closing, I welcome the opportunity to commend the distinguished
services of the members of the Committee, particularly the
extraordinary services of the three members who will be leaving the
Senate at the end of this Congress. Their efforts have added
significantly to this year's Defense Authorization bill. The Airland
Subcommittee has benefited from the efforts and insights of Senator
Glenn and Senator Coats. Senator Kempthorne's able leadership of the
Personnel Subcommittee has ensured that the needs of our service men
and women are paramount in this legislation. It has been a privilege to
work with these able members of the Committee over the years, and we
will miss their leadership in the years ahead.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to say a few words about the
admirable work of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For the past two
years, we have had budget agreements that have forced the Committee to
make tough choices with shrinking resources. Under the able leadership
of Chairman Thurmond and the Ranking Member, Senator Levin, the
Committee has once again enhanced the quality of life for our brave men
and women in uniform and have invested in programs vital to our future
fighting forces. As the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations
Committee, I am constantly reminded of how vital a strong military is
to protecting American interests and security around the world. I have
said it before and I'll say it again, for diplomacy to be effective,
not only must it be adequately funded, it must also be backed by a
strong military and superior intelligence activities.
But, Mr. President, before I say any more about this bill, I want to
say a word or two about Chairman Thurmond. His service to this nation
has been truly remarkable. From the beaches of Normandy to the halls of
the U.S. Senate, he has shown an outstanding dedication and commitment
to doing the work of this nation. He and I worked together on the
Judiciary Committee for 12 years--he was Chairman for the first 6 years
and I was Chairman for the last 6. Then, as now, he has been a leader
by example. He is one of the most remarkable individuals I have ever
had the privilege of working with. We are not merely colleagues, we are
friends.
He has served on the Armed Services Committee for 40 years, the last
4 of which he has been its Chairman. This is his last year as Chairman,
so I want to say now what deep respect I have for the Senior Senator
from South Carolina's military expertise and for the able manner in
which he has worked with Senator Levin to keep our military strong. The
Committee, the Senate, and the American people have gained from Senator
Thurmond's leadership and his willingness to work with Senators from
both parties to put America's national security interests ahead of
partisan interests.
This bill is an example of that. It includes a 3.1 percent pay raise
for military personnel. It also includes an important increase in
hazardous duty incentive pay for mid- and senior level air crew
personnel. I thank my colleagues for joining me in addressing that
concern and showing these experienced personnel that we value their
unique and vital contribution to America's national interest.
In addition, there is an important $12 million increase in C-5
airlift squadrons research and development. This money is critically
needed by the Air Force to examine the needs of these crucial aircraft
as new technology becomes available to improve their performance. As
many already know, the C-5 is capable of carrying more cargo than any
other aircraft in our military. It has supported military operations
from Vietnam to Desert Storm to the current operations in Bosnia and
the Persian Gulf. I applaud the Committee's foresight in providing the
money necessary to maintain these planes at peak performance levels.
Mr. President, I also want to take a minute to talk about the health
care demonstration programs in this bill. With the growth in the number
of retired military personnel, the rising costs of health care in
general, and the closing of military bases, great strains have been
placed on military medical facilities. This, in turn, has placed in
some jeopardy the idea of guaranteeing high quality health care to our
military retirees.
Last year, Congress recognized this growing problem, and we took a
step in fixing it. Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a
demonstration project on Medicare subvention--where Medicare reimburses
military medical facilities for the treatment of retirees who are also
eligible for Medicare. I am pleased that the Dover Air Force Base in
Delaware has been selected as one of the six sites for this national
demonstration project.
Again, this was a first step. But, there are other ways that might
help us to fulfil our commitment to military retirees. And, so I
strongly support the three additional health care demonstration
projects in this bill--one to allow military retirees to participate in
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program once they reach age 65;
one to allow retirees to continue their eligibility for TRICARE and not
have to switch to Medicare when they turn 65; and one to allow military
retirees who are also eligible for Medicare to continue to participate
in the Department of Defense's mail order pharmacy program.
Providing health care is an obligation we owe to our military
retirees. It is a promise we made--but a promise that is now in
jeopardy. The health care demonstration projects in this bill will not
solve the problem we face. They are, after all, only demonstrations.
But, hopefully, they--along with last year's Medicare subvention
demonstration project--will help point the way to a solution so we can
ensure that the federal government upholds its commitment to the men
and women who so bravely served our country.
Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment that I joined with
four colleagues in voting against yesterday. It was a compromise Sense
of Congress resolution offered by Senator Levin, Senator Coats, and
Senator Thurmond, regarding budgeting for continued participation of
United States forces in NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The three cosponsors deserve credit for their hard work in having
crafted what was, in the main, a very well thought out amendment. It
contained several positive elements. And their compromise amendment was
far preferable, in my opinion, to another amendment on U.S. forces in
Bosnia, which Senator Hutchison and Senator Byrd were considering
introducing.
Nonetheless, I voted against the compromise amendment, and I would
like briefly to explain the reasoning behind my vote.
First, I agree with the amendment's intent to keep the pressure on
our European allies to constitute the bulk of ground forces in the
Stabilization Force, known popularly as SFOR. I want to clarify,
however, that non-American forces already make up approximately three-
quarters of the SFOR total.
Second, I am in complete agreement with the amendment's not giving a
date-certain for the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a date-certain would constitute the
worst kind of micro-management of military affairs by the Congress, and
would quite likely endanger the lives of American troops on the ground.
My principal reason for voting against the compromise amendment is
that I do not agree that our goal should be a withdrawal of all United
States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as a
NATO-led stabilization force remains in that country.
To be perfectly candid, Mr. President, I believe that such a move
would serve to undermine American leadership in NATO. Even Combined
Joint
[[Page S7086]]
Task Forces, commonly known by their CJTF acronym, should, unless there
are exceptional circumstances, have a U.S. ground combat force
component. While American air, naval, command and control, logistical,
and intelligence support, and even a ready reserve over-the-horizon
force in the region would be vital to any future mission, the
participation of some American combat ground forces will remain a vital
bona fide of U.S. commitment to Alliance operations.
In other words, for the United States to retain control of NATO-led
operations, we must be present in all components of missions, including
on the ground. This would apply to any follow-on force in Bosnia,
whether it is NATO-led or is a CJTF with the Western European Union.
Let me pose a question to my colleagues. If the Bosnia ground
operation becomes a purely European affair, do they not think that
pretty soon some of our European allies will begin to question whether
an American should continue to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR)?
I for one think the answer is yes. The compromise amendment, against
which I voted, may, I fear, begin to set in motion a process that will
severely erode American leadership in NATO.
Lest anyone thinks that my fears are far-fetched, I would remind my
colleagues that France has already called for a European to take over
command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples and that
initially the French were supported by several other European allies.
Keeping a contingent of U.S. ground combat troops in all NATO and
NATO-led missions is a powerful symbol of American leadership and is
recognized as such by allies and potential foes alike. We should think
long and hard before advocating a change in that policy.
Mr. President, I will conclude where I began. I compliment the
managers of this bill and the Armed Services Committee for providing a
bill that continues to strengthen our nation's national security. It
enhances the quality of life of our loyal and dedicated men and women
in uniform. It addresses important weapons systems needs and takes
steps toward finding the best way to meet our health care obligations.
While I disagree with the Bosnia provision added for the reasons I've
already mentioned, I think this bill gives America the strong military
it needs to support our diplomatic work and to promote our national
security interests.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, every year I come down to the floor of the
Senate and ruminate over the propensity of Members of Congress to add
programs to spending bills solely, or at least primarily, for parochial
reasons. The majority of us in Congress who supported the line-item
veto were ostensibly doing so as an overdue reaction to the profligate
spending practices that, over time, resulted in a $5.5 trillion federal
deficit. The fact that we have a balanced budget for the first time
since 1969 should not detract from the fact that we continue, as a
result of past spending practices, to pay as much per year in interest
on the federal debt as we do for national defense.
The practice of adding programs to spending bills for parochial
reasons has not abated, as a review of the ISTEA legislation reminds
us. For many of us in the Senate, however, there has been a growing
consensus that inadequate resources are being allocated for national
defense, and that the financial burden associated with foreign
operations like those in Bosnia and Southwest Asia, the funding for
which is repeatedly ignored in Administration preparation of annual
budget submissions, is seriously exacerbating readiness and
modernization problems stemming from the combination of shrinking force
structure and expanding commitments. When the stress from these
conflicting trends is combined with the fact that no funding was added
by Congress to the national defense portion of the federal budget for
the first time since President Clinton took office, the seeds of a
further, serious degradation in the state of our Armed Forces are
firmly planted.
Because Congress did not add to the Administration's request for
national defense, it would have seemed to be incumbent upon Members to
act with a modicum of responsibility and not perpetuate funding
problems with a business as usual approach. Unfortunately, we have once
again failed to live up to that relatively minor expectation. The bill
before us is one more example of why the President's failure to
adequately exercise his line-item veto authority last year has provided
Members every incentive to manipulate the budget process for the good
of individual districts or states and, often, at the expense of what is
best for the Armed Forces.
In my remarks last year, I was highly critical of the politicization
of the services' unfunded priorities lists. That concern remains to
some degree. My comments today include items that were added to the
Administration's request and are on the unfunded priorities list both
because of my concerns about the integrity of the process through which
those lists are produced and because the lists were always submitted in
the past within the context of congressionally-implemented additions to
the defense budget. As additions to the budget request this year had to
be offset within the 050 account, I have included projects added by
Members even if they are on the lists because, in some instances, they
are displacing funding from higher priority programs.
I commend the chairman of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee
for his valiant effort at minimizing the usual considerable damage to
science and technology programs that are the seed corn of our future.
Senator Santorum deserves credit for the manner in which he has
balanced the need to preserve high priority science and technology
spending with the usual onslaught of frivolous pet projects inserted
into the budget to mollify this university or that laboratory. It is
unfortunate that he could not be spared the onerous and wasteful task
of nevertheless finding funding for a number of highly questionable
projects. Spending $1.5 million to study the effects on missile
components of high frequency vibrations sounds reasonable. The only
problem is, we have been studying that issue with regard to every
missile and rocket designed since the dawn of the missile age. It is
inclusive in the development of every such weapon system. This is not a
better mousetrap; it s a classic waste of scarce resources.
Similarly, the $3 million added to the budget for research into
stainless steel double hull technologies ignores the fact that
privately-owned shipyards seeking to profit from the oil pollution act,
which mandated that all future oil tankers be double hulled, have
already conducted ample research into that area with financial
incentives courtesy of the Title XI loan guarantee program.
Additionally, what can the Navy learn from this project that it doesn't
already know from its years of experience with high strength, light
weight steels such as are used in the construction of submarines? Mr.
Chairman, this is precisely the type of spending the majority party was
supposed to oppose--the kind that helped create a huge federal deficit
while diverting funding from higher priority programs.
No better example of Congress operating at its fiscal worst exists
than the inclusion in the budget of more C-130J aircraft. The Air Force
has repeatedly emphasized its huge surplus of C-130s, yet is forced to
buy more completely irrespective of requirements and funding
priorities. The annual addition to the defense budget of C-130Js--and
we are buying enough of them to house the homeless in brand-new
fuselages--is fiscally irresponsible in the extreme. To see four new
aircraft added to the bill when the accompanying report is highly
critical of the C-130J due to cost overruns and developmental problems
sets a new standard for absurdity. What if we said, ``we don't need the
Sergeant York air defense gun, it was a developmental nightmare, we
can't afford it, it was canceled by the Reagan Administration, so let's
add the purchase of some to this budget?'' It would be the only thing
more incomprehensible than the continued acquisition of unrequested C-
130s.
Lest anyone think that I exaggerate the budgetary impact of
purchasing four unrequested, unneeded C-130J airframes, consider this:
The cost of those aircraft is over $200 million. That is a lot of money
at a time when we are struggling to pay for important quality of life
programs and maintain readiness. Yet, this is not even the most
[[Page S7087]]
egregious example of unnecessary, unrequested spending in the budget.
This bill also includes a $50 million down payment on a $1.5 billion
amphibious assault ship that was not requested by the Navy.
The defense authorization and appropriations bills cannot continue to
be the vehicle for pumping tax dollars into favored districts and
states. There are $2.5 billion in Member-adds in this bill, a bill, to
reiterate, that did not enjoy an increase in its top line. That means
that the funding for these programs had to be found within the Defense
Department s request. It means that the priorities of the military were
ignored in favor of channeling dollars toward projects of low or
nonexistent priority. How much more should we provide to the flat panel
display industry, which should be funding its own research? With all
due respect to Norway, a NATO ally, how long are we going to allow it
to leverage its weapons purchases from the United States against our
purchase of Penguin missiles, which the Navy has not requested?
Mr. President, there are a number of programs inserted into the
budget by Members of Congress that bear little or no relation to the
mission of providing for the common defense. There are programs that
arguably will, over time, contribute to our national security. I
further recognize that Congress does not exist to perfunctorily bless
whatever recommendations emerge from the federal agencies we are tasked
to oversee. The Constitution of the United States vests Congress with
the authority to raise and support Armies. That is a responsibility
some of us take very seriously. The practice of adding and earmarking
funding for programs and activities that marginally contribute to the
national defense in order to protect jobs, however, represents an abuse
of that authority we should not countenance. We should take no pride in
the fact that the Army was forced to accept the National Automotive
Center as the focal point for the development of automotive technology.
Why should the public not think the worst of us when they see their tax
dollars handled so cavalierly?
These statements, which I make on every spending bill, get tiresome
after a while. My colleagues don't like to hear them, and I certainly
don't win any popularity contests on account of them. I would like to
wax poetic about charging windmills, but I am under no illusions that
my Dulcinea waits outside the chamber or that a final reward awaits me
in the great beyond. All I ask is for it to stop. Adding ships, planes,
helicopters and the usual myriad of arcane research and development
projects to a defense bill at a time when the state of the Armed Forces
continues to suffer from high operational rates and contracting force
structure, when we struggle to provide military retirees the medical
care they were promised when they enlisted, when the services are
repeatedly telling us that they don't need what we insist they buy,
does not speak well of Congress as an institution. I urge my colleagues
to heed the warning not of me, but of the combatant commanders and the
men and women in the field who are tired and leaving the military
because we cannot get our priorities in order.
Mr. President, I will keep coming to the floor to rail against
wasteful federal spending because I believe it is warranted, and not
just a little cathartic. I thank you for indulging me once again and I
ask unanimous consent that this list of programs added to the budget,
most for the kind of questionable reasons to which I referred, be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Program In millions
Army procurement:
Aircraft procurement:
US-35 air transport aircraft (3 A/C)...........................15.9
UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters (8 A/C) \1\........................78.5
Modification of aircraft:
C-12 flight maintenance system..................................6.0
Apache longbow AH-64 training devices and modifications \1\....40.2
Weapons and other combat vehicles:
M249 armor machine gun 7.62mm \1\...............................6.5
MK-19 grenade launcher \1\......................................3.0
Tactical and support vehicles:
Family of medium tactical vehicles (600 units) \1\.............88.0
High mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle \1\................65.7
Medium truck extended program (1,085 units) \1\................63.9
Combat communications:
Army data distribution system (ADDS) \1\.......................28.0
SINCGARS tactical radio (reserves) \1\.........................61.9
ACUS modernization program (WIN-T/T) \1\.......................47.8
Electronic equipment--tactical survival:
Night vision devices \1\.......................................13.5
Navy procurement:
Combat aircraft:
F-14 lantirn targeting PODS \1\.................................8.0
AH-1W night targeting system \1\...............................11.0
EP-3 spares.....................................................2.0
P-3C ANIT--surface warface improvement..........................2.2
Weapons procurement:
Drones and decoys: 70 improved tactical air launched decoys....10.0
Penguin missile.................................................7.5
Surface mode upgrade: close in weapons system..................10.0
MOD 4 rotatable gun pool for cruiser conversions...............15.0
Shipbuilding and conversion:
LHD advance procurement........................................50.0
Air-cushioned landing craft life extention \1\.................16.0
Other procurement:
AN/WSN-7 inertial navigation system............................12.0
AN/BPS-154 surface search radar.................................9.0
Space warfare system center.....................................2.0
Submarine acoustic off-the-shelf processor insertion \1\.......25.0
Aegis support, computer lesson system...........................8.0
DDG-51 Smartship equipment.....................................12.0
NUKLA assembly qualification....................................1.0
Communications automation equipment (IT-21) \1\................20.0
Submarine connectivity equipment \1\...........................15.0
Naval shore communications equipment...........................20.0
Night vision goggles \1\.......................................22.6
Marine Corps Procurement:
MOD kits for tracked vehicles \1\...............................4.6
Night vision equipment \1\.....................................11.1
Carrier, electronics infrastructure, Marine email & year 2000 fix
\1\..........................................................84.1
Light Tactical vehicle (buys 672 units) \1\....................37.0
Avenger FLIR upgrade............................................7.6
Maritime technology.............................................5.0
Material handling equipment (forklifts) \1\....................10.4
New generators (1,311) \1\......................................9.5
Shop equipment contact maintenance \1\..........................5.4
Air Force Procurement:
Combat aircraft:
C-130J aircraft (2 aircraft)..................................157.5
WC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)..................................75.4
EC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)..................................85.0
Trainer aircraft:
Joint Primary aircraft training system--JPATS (3 A/C)...........9.1
Other aircraft:
E-8C JSTARS aircraft advanced procurement......................72.0
Modification of in-service aircraft:
F-15 aircraft (engine replacement) \1\.........................25.0
F-15 aircraft (ALQ-135 countermeasures set) \1\................25.0
F-16 aircraft reconnaissance system \1\........................13.3
Other aircraft:
DARP--Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program..................56.0
National Guard and Reserve Equipment:
$10 million per service........................................60.0
Modifications of in service missiles:
Minuteman III missile modifications............................46.0
Organization and base equipment:
Theater deployable communications \1\..........................17.7
Army Research Development, Test & Evaluation
Army missile defense systems integration:
Tactical high energy laser (THEL)..............................10.0
Space and missile defense battle lab............................7.0
Aluminum metal matrix research and development..................3.0
Future missile technology integration...........................6.0
RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, prototype #2 acceleration \1\........24.0
All source analysis system: Software integration..................2.2
Firefinder-accelerate software....................................0.9
Passive adjunct sensor capability.................................4.0
Advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) \1\.......12.5
Combat vehicle improvement programs: Flat panel display improvement
program.........................................................7.0
Materials technology: Hardened materials..........................3.0
Missile technology:
Scramjet technology.............................................3.0
Acoustics effects...............................................1.5
Environmental quality tech:
National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence...........24.0
Radford Environmental Development and Management Program (REDMAP3.5
Plasma Energy Pyrolis System (PEPS).............................5.0
[[Page S7088]]
Computer software technology: Software security...................0.5
Military engineering technology: Cold Regions Research Laboratory.1.2
Medical advanced tech: Nutrition research.........................2.0
Weapons & munitions advanced technology: Precision guided mortar
munitions.......................................................4.5
Advanced tactical computer science & sensor technology: Digital
intelligence technology.........................................2.5
Army technological test instrumentation & targets \1\.............7.0
Survivability/Lethality analysis: Intelligence and warning
vulnerability assessment........................................4.0
DOD high energy laser test facility, solid state laser \1\........8.0
Navy research, development test & evaluation:
Space and electronic warfare: Advanced communications and information
technology......................................................3.0
Space and electronic warfare: Global C4ISR visualization..........4.0
Precision strike and air defense technology.......................5.0
Joint strike fighter demonstration/validation: Alternate engine
program........................................................15.0
Integrated defense electronic counter measures (IDECM)...........10.0
Air & surface launched weapon technology: Pulse detonation engine
technology......................................................1.0
Ships, submarine & logistics technology: Stainless steel double hu3.0
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Thermal management
materials.......................................................1.5
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Electronic propulsion
technology......................................................2.0
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Carbon/carbon heat
shield..........................................................2.5
Medical development: Freeze dried blood research..................1.0
Non-lethal weapons demonstration/validation......................13.3
Medical development: Voice instructional devices..................1.0
Air Force research development, test & evaluation:
Ballistic missile technology......................................5.0
Advanced spacecraft technology:
Range improvements for liquid upper stage \1\...................5.0
Micro--SAT.....................................................10.0
Solar orbital transfer vehicle.................................10.0
National polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system:
Satellite survivability........................................30.0
Enhanced global positioning system--block IIF (space)............44.0
Space test program: Maneuver vehicle.............................10.0
Theater missile defenses: TAWS...................................12.0
Information systems security program.............................10.0
Electronic combat precision location and identification (PLAID)..14.0
Variable stability in-flight simulator test aircraft (VISTA)......7.0
Electronic warfare development: EC-130H..........................20.0
Target systems development: Big Crow program office..............10.0
Theater battle management system..................................5.0
Manned reconnaissance systems: U-2 upgrade.......................17.0
Aircrew laser eye protection......................................5.5
Materials: Friction welding.......................................1.5
Aerospace propulsion: Variable displacement vane pump.............2.0
Phillips Lab: HAARP...............................................9.0
Crew systems & personnel protection technology: Night vision
technology......................................................3.0
Defense-wide Research Development, Test & Evaluation
Support technologies: Wide band electronics......................14.0
Explosive demilitarization technology:
Blast chamber tech..............................................4.0
Portable blast chamber tech.....................................1.5
Counter terror tech support: PFNA.................................5.0
Counter proliferation support: HAARP..............................3.0
Support technologies:
Atmospheric interceptor tech...................................22.0
Space based laser demonstrator.................................94.0
Scorpius........................................................5.0
Excaliber.......................................................5.0
Navy Theater Wide Missile Defense System:
Navy upper tier acceleration...................................70.0
High power discriminator.......................................50.0
Ballistic missile defense technical operations: Advanced Research
Center..........................................................5.0
International cooperative programs: Arrow Interoperability.......12.0
Counter proliferation support.....................................4.0
Advanced sensor applications......................................2.0
Endurance U.A.V. (Global Hawk)...................................32.5
Chem-BIO Defense Program: Sensors.................................5.0
Medical free electron laser.......................................7.0
Biological warfare defense: Multimedia technology.................1.5
Chem-Bio Defense Program: Light weight detectors..................5.0
Chem-BIO Defense Programs: Safeguard..............................4.0
Integrated C2 technology: High definition system, flat panel displ8.0
Materials & electronics technology: Mixed mode electronics........6.0
Weapons of mass destruction related technology:
Core competencies..............................................10.0
Deep digger.....................................................3.0
Electro magnetic pulse..........................................2.0
Advanced electronic technology: Lithography......................10.0
Generic logistics R&D demands: Computer assisted technology transfer
(CATT)..........................................................4.0
High Performance Computer Modernization Program: High performance
technology.....................................................20.0
High performance computer modernization program: High performance VIZ
technology......................................................3.0
CALS initiative: IDE..............................................2.0
Joint robotics program............................................6.0
Joint simulation system...........................................4.5
Defense technology analysis: Commodity management technology......2.0
________
Total.......................................................2,494
\1\ Items were included on service unfunded priorities lists.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the bill before us.
In this bill the Armed Services Committee has--under unprecedented
fiscal austerity--ably worked to balance the many important yet
competing needs for scarce funding, maintaining a first-class military
and providing important benefits for personnel, their dependents, and
retirees.
Allow me to highlight several particularly good provisions in this
bill, for which Chairman Thurmond and Senator Levin should be
congratulated.
First, this measure wisely has full funding for National Missile
Defense for FY99. Treaty-friendly, affordable, effective NMD has always
had my strong support.
I am also pleased that funds have been added to begin to make up the
readiness funding deficit of the Army National Guard. The Guard Bureau
informs me these accounts were more than half a billion dollars short
in the FY99 budget request. I hope the funding added by the Committee
can be supplemented during conference.
Third, an additional $46 million has been included for Minuteman III
ICBM upgrades. The Minuteman III force will be service for decades to
come, and modernization must go forward. The Committee acted wisely
regarding the Guidance Replacement Program.
The Committee has also moved to accelerate key military construction
projects for North Dakota. These include $8.5 million for repair of the
taxiway at Minot AFB, and $3.65 million for renovation of a supply shop
for the North Dakota Air National Guard. George Lauffer and Mike McCord
on the Committee staff deserve thanks for their work on these items.
Additionally, the Authorization bill calls for demonstration programs
regarding allowing Medicare-eligible military retirees to enroll in the
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program.
Finally, but very importantly, I am pleased that the Senate has
approved an amendment bringing the pay raise in this bill up to the
level in the House bill, 3.6 percent.
However, there are a number of matters in this bill of great concern.
First, the Committee's bill would call for a cut of nearly $100M to
the Air Force's budget request for the Airborne Laser, a revolutionary
theater missile defense program, and top priority for the USAF.
Second, this bill provides inadequate funding for the B-52H bomber
force. Although I will not discuss this matter in detail at this time,
let me say this: today's thoroughly upgraded B-52H can deliver a
greater quantity and diversity of conventional and nuclear munitions a
greater distance at a lower cost than any other airborne combat
platform in the world today. Cutting the B-52 force doesn't make good
national security or fiscal sense, and I applaud Senator Stevens and
Senator Inouye--the distinguished leadership of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee--for acting to fund all 94 B-52s in the
FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill.
I hope that ABL and B-52 funding can be addressed in conference. Even
so, I am pleased to support this bill, especially in light of the
Committee's acceptance of my amendment regarding Russian tactical
nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, at this point I would like to speak briefly about the
amendment.
The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan serve as an unsettling
reminder that nuclear weapons continue
[[Page S7089]]
to be sought for their terrible destructive power and prestige. An
equally serious, if not greater, nuclear threat still lies to the north
of the Indian subcontinent, however--in Russia's enormous, ill-secured,
and potentially destabilizing non-strategic, or ``tactical,'' nuclear
arsenal.
As my colleagues may be aware, Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile
could be larger than ours by a factor of eight-to-one, and is not
covered by any arms control accord.
I believe it is time for the Congress to do three things.
First, go on record as concerned about the significant ``loose nuke''
dangers associated with Russia's tactical stockpile, and the growing
strategic relevance of Moscow's tactical arsenal.
Additionally, we must call for the Russians to make good on the 1991
and 1992 Gorbachev and Yeltsin promises to deeply reduce tactical
weapons, just as the US has followed through in good faith on President
Bush's similar promises in September 1991.
And finally, the Congress needs a detailed report, and the benefit of
the analysis of the Defense Department, the Intelligence Community, and
the US Strategic Command.
Today, I wish to thank the Armed Services Committee for accepting my
amendment earlier this week that does just these things.
I also wish to thank the following distinguished Members of the Armed
Services Committee, who have cosponsored my amendment: Senators
Kempthorne, Kennedy, Bingaman, and Levin. Glen Tait, Menda Fife, Bill
Monahan, and Madelyn Creedon, in addition to Monica Chavez with the
committee--deserve thanks for their good work.
Before asking unanimous consent that the full text of my amendment be
included after my statement, I would call the Senate's attention to the
testimony of the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic
Command, Gen. Eugene Habiger. Gen. Habiger, testifying before the Armed
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, responded to a question
regarding Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile by Senator Kempthorne--a
cosponsor of my amendment--by stating that ``it is time for us to get
very serious about tactical nuclear weapons.''
My amendment responds to the General's sage advice, advancing the
cause of getting deep reductions to Russia's non-strategic nuclear
arsenal. At the very least, we should ask them to come down to our
level--and prove it to us.
Before closing, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize that my
amendment should be properly viewed in context with the funding for the
vital Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat program in the FY99 Defense
Authorization bill. Senate passage of my amendment ensures that we send
to Russia a message of concern and cooperation.
Let me be clear: continuing the Nunn-Lugar program is absolutely
critical. I can think of no better investment of national security
dollars than simply expending money for the destruction of horrible
weapons capable of killing millions of Americans.
Continuing and fully funding the CTR program is especially important
in light of the Russian tactical nuclear dangers I have discussed.
Although there are arms control agreements requiring Russian strategic
force reductions, there are no arms control agreements requiring
reductions to Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile.
In addition to the diplomatic pressure called for in my amendment,
continuing and possibly expanding work under Nunn-Lugar on tactical
nuclear weapons is the best bet we've got to put this aspect of the
Russian nuclear genie back in the bottle. Funding for Nunn-Lugar is
vital, and I congratulate the committee for fully supporting this
program in their bill.
Again, Mr. President, I would thank my colleagues for approving my
amendment, and the amendment's cosponsors for their support. This is a
good bill--but a better bill because we have taken this initial step
toward eliminating the tactical nuclear dangers from the former Soviet
Union.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the Senate is now in the process of
creating arguably the most important legislation we produce all year,
the Defense Authorization Bill. We are authorizing the activities of
government which keep Americans free and safe, and we are authorizing
activities which are carried out by young Americans in a spirit of
courage and selfless service. So there is no more serious legislation
than this. My purpose today is to ask my colleagues as they deliberate
on this bill to consider the threats to our country as they are and as
they likely will be in the decade ahead, so we authorize armed forces
which will be able to deter or defeat those threats.
The arms forces we authorize in this bill keep America safe mainly by
their credible potential for overwhelming, focused, sustained violence.
We allocate the funds by categories such as training, operations and
maintenance, quality of life, readiness, but in actuality these funds
are to support the credibility of that potential for violence. It is a
potential to counter and, if necessary, defeat the threats which put at
risk our national life, the lives of Americans, and in some cases the
livelihoods and interests of Americans. It is a potential which is an
essential element of our national power.
Our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have taken on the
daunting task of measuring the forces the President has requested
against the threats we face. I say this is a daunting task because
while the threats are dynamic, there is a normal human trait to see the
threats as static, particularly when we are already heavily invested in
a technology or a family of weapons that have proven successful against
a particular threat in the past. It is our duty, Mr. President, to
resist that trait, to see the world as it is and to try our best to see
it as it will be. In our analysis our most useful tool is the
information produced by our Intelligence Community.
Let's look out across the world of the present and near future. We
see Russian nuclear forces, still deployed, still on alert, still
capable of killing scores of millions of Americans. We see growing
indiscipline in the way Russian nuclear weapons are stored and
maintained, combined with a hunger for plutonium and weapons-grade
uranium among the world's weapons proliferators. In China we see a much
smaller but still deadly Chinese nuclear force, reportedly with its
weapons targeted on the U.S. We depend heavily on the intelligence
community to monitor Russia's and China's nuclear status, for the
reason we always did: because our national survival could be at stake.
In Russia we see conventional forces in steep decline and in China
conventional forces which appear to be outmoded and immobile, compared
with U.S. forces. Looking more broadly, we see a small and diminishing
number of countries with capable conventional land or naval forces, but
an increasing number of countries and movements trying to develop
weapons of mass destruction. In the case of India and Pakistan, we see
vividly how successful proliferation efforts add to global danger. We
also see non-national and multi-national threats such as terrorist
movements and drug cartels posing greater threats to the safety of
Americans than the threats posed by the conventional military forces of
the few isolated, weak rogue states who claim to be our adversary.
Looking more broadly, past the ability of our potential adversaries to
do violence, we see a new world in which people increasingly do not
look to their national governments as the sole means of accomplishing
their goals in international matters. The age of imperialism, in which
national governments invaded each other's territory to extend their
power, seems a distant memory. Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait eight
years ago and the current nuclear tension between India and Pakistan
are two indicators that we must keep a sharp eye on relations between
states, and if our policymakers choose to intervene in such conflicts,
we must have armed forces capable of doing so. But we are in a world in
which nonnational actors--individuals as well as corporations and
movements have taken international relations into their own hands.
The global nature of the Internet and the global, not national,
outlook of the world's dominant corporations, are well known to all.
Daimler-Benz' recent purchase of a company which less than twenty years
ago we were bailing out as a patriotic duty, and the lack of concern in
this country about that purchase, underscores the point. At the
[[Page S7090]]
other, individual end of the scale, we see individual Irish citizens,
both north and south, looking beyond their governments and the borders
created by governments and seeing the advantage of direct personal and
commercial relationships, the advantage not just of peace but of lower
barriers. The relentless integration of Europe, most recently marked by
the introduction of a common currency, is a sharp contrast to the
conflicts and ancient rivalries which marked and divided Europe for
centuries. European conflict called forth the greatest armies America
ever raised, twice in this century. Today we are concerned with
residual ethnic disputes in isolated corners of Europe and in the case
of Bosnia even deploy military force in an effort to stabilize and
contain the conflict. But large-scale conventional conflict in Europe,
for the first time since the invention of gunpowder, is unthinkable.
Outside Europe, we see economic integration throughout Asia and in
our own hemisphere, and we see economic integration leading cultural
integration. The national boundaries are blurring. In this metropolitan
area, for example, there are cable TV stations broadcasting in Spanish,
Arabic, Japanese, and other languages. Even in Pakistan and India, the
elites who rattle nuclear weapons at each other are part of the same
global culture; their children are studying in American universities.
There are exceptions to the trend of global integration. There are
pockets of recalcitrance: dictatorships who retain power by force,
immature democracies in which crime rivals legitimate business and
creates internal civil wars, unscrupulous leaders in places like the
Middle East, South Asia, and the former Yugoslavia who manipulate
ethnic rivalries as a tool to retain power. These are the places likely
to generate conflicts which threaten our safety or our interests. These
are the places which, especially if economic disparity is added to
ethnic or religious differences, from which violence will emanate.
These are the places in which U.S. intelligence ought to provide
policymakers and warfighters the edge. Given that such places exist,
and given the enduring strategic threat we also face from Russia, what
should our armed forces be able to do?
First, our forces should be able to deter the threat of Russian and
Chinese nuclear weapons, along with the growing threat posed by
regional nuclear programs. The Wall may have fallen, but until
verifiable arms control agreements bring this nuclear episode of
military history to an end, we need modern, robust nuclear forces and
we need the intelligence to closely watch not just Russia and China,
but also the nuclear activities of proliferating countries. Good
intelligence is inextricably linked to a sound strategic defense, and
it is not cheap. Strong nuclear forces in the absence of nuclear
testing means a dependable Stockpile Stewardship Program. We and the
world must have absolute confidence in our nuclear capabilities. I will
therefore support the efforts of the Senator from New Mexico to restore
full funding to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Defending America from nuclear threats also means preventing fissile
materials from falling into the hands of those aspiring to develop
nuclear weapons, be they aspiring countries or terrorists. The Indian-
Pakistani attainment of nuclear weapons does not cease our efforts; it
means we should redouble them. In this sense, the security of Russia's
vast nuclear arsenal is very much in our interest. The Armed Services
Committee has long recognized this fact through the Nunn-Lugar program,
and I will support restoration of full funding for Nunn-Lugar in this
bill. Beyond the nuclear threat, the increasingly interconnected world
I described presents little likelihood of a clash of large conventional
forces. In addition to globalization, we see a reduction in
conventional forces of most countries. With the vitally important
exception of the United States, I also see a decline in recent years in
the fighting spirit in the remaining large conventional forces in the
world. All these trends suggest we will not see our military engaged in
a major conventional conflict in the foreseeable future. Certainly the
example of the Gulf War should dissuade other countries from putting a
large armored force into the field against the United States. Large-
scale conventional modernization can therefore safely be a lower
priority for us. However, smaller, highly mobile, highly ready
conventional forces will be a necessity.
Ethnic conflict will continue to erupt on the peripheries of global
integration. Because of America's unique power and because, as the
performance of our NATO allies in Bosnia prior to our arrival there
showed, other countries' militaries will not take forceful action
without an American example, we will be called upon for future
deployments much like the Bosnian mission. Certainly we cannot answer
every call. But if a conflict threatens a wider war which would require
an even greater American involvement, we must deploy to nip some
conflicts in the bud. It is an obligation of leadership. If we do it
right, others will imitate us and we will have to deploy less often.
In designing our forces we should bear in mind the characteristics of
the ideal deployable forces: highly capable (packing a strong punch),
highly mobile, highly trained, well maintained, closely connected to
national and theater intelligence, integrated with the command and
control systems of the allies with whom we will operate, rapidly
transportable to the theater of deployment, and supported by tailored
logistics. These forces should operate in an environment in which we
control the coasts and sea lanes in the vicinity and the airspace over
the vicinity, for purposes of support, surveillance, and air strikes if
necessary.
Beyond regional deployments, we face non-national threats such as
weapons proliferation, terrorism, and the casualties we continually
suffer from drug trafficking. As with the Russian nuclear threat, the
first line of defense against these threats is the best possible
intelligence. We require military forces that can respond to the
intelligence when policy makers so direct: agile, superbly trained and
equipped special operations forces. Increasingly the military future
belongs to the sophistication and stealth of the special operator,
rather than the armored masses of the past. Maintaining such forces in
all the services should be among our highest priority.
Mr. President, a new threat has materialized in recent years, the
threat of electronic attack against the communications systems and
computer networks which are increasingly the fundamental infrastructure
of our country. Recent Defense Department exercises have helped size
the potential problem and the Administration has a number of agencies
developing a response. As with every threat, intelligence plays a key
role in warning against and countering this threat. In developing our
defenses, we need units with great knowledge, the best equipment,
technically sophisticated people, and speed in both decision and
execution. Fortunately, these are American traits. In fact, those who
contemplate attacking us in the realm of information operations are
really attacking into one of our greatest national strengths. But we
should not be over confident. We need to defend in cyberspace, and the
forces authorized in this bill should do so.
The Armed Services Committee was faced with a tight budget and
difficult choices. I propose reviewing those choices with this
criterion: how does this or that program help create or sustain the
kind of military forces I have described, forces responsive to the
threats and global realities we face? We simply cannot afford to
allocate these scarce resources on the basis of other criteria. It is
not enough to state a particular class of equipment is wearing out or
should be replaced, we have always had that class of equipment, so we
should get a new modern version. We must ask: how does that class of
equipment respond to the threats we face and will face? It is not
enough to state, the defense plant in my state will lack work if we do
not buy a particular item. It is not enough to state, the military base
in my state must continue to operate at or above its current level of
manning, regardless of the national need. It is unfair to our service
members and their families, it is unfair to taxpayers, but above all it
is unfair to the nation we are pledged to defend, to force precious
defense funds to be spent on a basing system which is reportedly over
twenty percent larger than the nation requires.
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Mr. President, I will be looking closely at this legislation in terms
of its contribution to the forces we require. It is far more agreeable
to stay the course and stick with the traditional weapons and
organizations and bases which helped win the Cold War. With an
institution as large and complex as the Defense Department, change is
also a lengthy process. But we must lead change and make the defense
choices to align our forces with the world as it is and will be. Our
fighting men and women deserve it and our country should expect it of
us.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Fiscal Year 1999
Defense Authorization Act. This legislation focuses on the military of
tomorrow by establishing priorities that will allow American forces to
prepare for the conflicts of the 21st Century.
We consider this measure under the leadership of a remarkable Senator
whose personal sacrifice and professional insight have contributed to
the molding of the military in our time. The public life of Strom
Thurmond has reflected the evolution of conflict and war fighting
capabilities in the last half-century. Emerging as a Colonel from World
War II, he persevered through the traumas of Korea and Vietnam; the
turbulent ``hollow force'' years of the 1970s; the recovery of our
might under President Reagan; the collapse of imperial communism; and
the computer-age attacks during the Persian Gulf War.
Today, he manages a bill that capitalizes on the lessons of the
military history to which he contributed. The FY99 Defense
Authorization Act increases the speed, precision, and analytical
capacity of soldiers who will face post-Soviet adversaries as
determined or dictatorial, but more numerous, than those whom we have
confronted in the past.
While he steps down at the end of the year as Committee Chairman, his
leadership will resonate in our deliberations and hearings for years to
come. He brings an authorization before the Senate this week having
groomed three generations of successors in the byzantine ways of
defense legislation.
Mr. President, this bill includes several programs that enhance the
readiness and modernization of the military. Our Committee has worked
diligently during the 1990s to control the bleeding of funds from next-
generation procurement systems and the stress on our forces from
escalating peacekeeping commitments. President Clinton's out-year
budget projections bring defense outlays as a percentage of GDP to 2.7
percent, the lowest level in almost 50 years. The President targets the
military as the only federal function that sustains deep outlay
decreases between 1993 and 2003. While mandatory domestic expenditures
will increase over time by 23.6 percent, those for national defense
fall by exactly the same level.
In modernization accounts--those for weapons procurement--funding has
fallen by 67% since 1985. This trend, in constant dollars, means that
at the height of the Reagan build-up thirteen years ago, the Pentagon
obligated $138.7 billion for procurement. This spending fell to its
lowest point--$44.2 billion--in FY97. The FY99 budget finally increases
the account to $48.7 billion, and I commend Secretary Cohen for
submitting the first budget by this administration that brings
procurement back to the annual average threshold of $60.1 billion, as
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, starting in 2001.
Exploding expenditures for peacekeeping operations since the end of
the Persian Gulf War directly threaten spending for procurement and
modernization. To confirm this point, we only need to read the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Among all Pentagon programs, the QDR
singled out ``incremental costs of unplanned deployments and smaller-
scale contingencies'' as the ``least predictable operating expenses''
which ``displace funding previously planned for procurement.''
America's 29 contingency operations since the end of the Persian Gulf
War have cost us a total of $18 billion. Our Bosnia commitment alone
has consumed $7.2 billion. Even excluding Bosnia, the American
taxpayers gave another three billion dollars just to support U.N.
peacekeeping programs throughout the 1990's. The administration,
however, has never offered us a comprehensive readiness and mission
assessment of U.S. Contingency Operations (CONOPS) policy to justify or
rationalize the expenditure of this $21 billion, or eight percent of
the whole defense budget.
The Committee, therefore, supported an amendment that I offered along
with Senator Cleland during the mark-up session making the Pentagon
statutorily responsible for providing all congressional defense
committees with a Contingency Operations budgetary, mission, and
readiness assessment by January 31, 1999. We did not establish the
deadline by coincidence. I strongly believe that the Committee should
consider any CONOPS authorization or supplemental appropriations
requests next year only with the benefit of the president's strategic
analysis of how and why the Armed Services will obligate their
peacekeeping budgets.
This amendment subsequently directs the department to address five
issues: the effects of ongoing CONOPS on Service retention and
reenlistment rates; whether they cause sustained or significant
shortages of military personnel and equipment in other regions of the
world; the specific programmatic accounts on which the department has
relied to underwrite CONOPS deployments; what clear objectives guide
each of these undertakings; and the conditions, based on such
objectives, that would define the end of each operation.
Presidential Decision Direction 25 of May 1994, Mr. President,
outlined the scope and purpose of the administration's CONOPS policy.
It promised the application of strict standards to determine whether
the U.S. should participate in any overseas peace operation.
The reporting categories specified by my amendment intentionally
overlap with this directive. PDD-25 specifically declared that
potential CONOPS commitments would depend on whether our participation
advanced U.S. interests, the ``unique and general risks'' to American
personnel, if ``clear objectives'' could determine the role of our
forces, and the identification of an ``endpoint.''
We would not impose an unfair burden on the Defense Department by
mandating a pre-posture hearing or pre-budget request report on the
steps that the administration has taken to implement its own plan.
This year, the Committee received Posture Statements from the Navy
and the Air Force that contained warnings of potential negative
readiness impacts as a result of long CONOPS deployments. Secretary
Dalton cited the ``requirements of the Unified Commands''--those that
participate heavily in peacekeeping missions--as effecting the
readiness of non-deployed fleet units.
The number of Air Force personnel dedicated to contingency operations
grew fourfold since 1989 from 3,400 to 14,600 by FY97. ``Caution
indicators,'' as the report characterized it, have emerged in the areas
of retention, reenlistment, and depleted inventories of spare parts.
In addition, by October 1999, the Army, the Service most involved in
peacekeeping, could lack the heavy armored divisions designed for rapid
deployment to crisis areas. Two of the divisions that train full time
for this mission may have one-third of their troops on duty in Bosnia
or Kuwait.
Four years ago, the Army had 541,000 active duty soldiers and no
commitments in Bosnia. The Armed Services Committee, according to
former Chairman Nunn, considered this level the minimum necessary for
responding to two regional crises. Yet today, the Army faces the
challenge of preparing for two Major Theater Wars at a reduced force
strength of 491,000, coupled with a deployment in Bosnia.
Consider the exorbitant contingency operations costs that the Army
absorbed in just one fiscal year. The amount, $1.5 billion, represented
more than one-fifth of the entire research and development budget for
the Service. It exceeded the total Army aircraft procurement line by
almost two hundred million dollars. If we take these examples of the
strains imposed by peacekeeping commitments on Army research and
hardware programs, how can the administration state that it has
adequately weighed the ``unique and general risks'' of these missions,
as required under PDD-25, to our people in uniform?
[[Page S7092]]
Despite the alarming budgetary trends, the QDR predicts that
contingency efforts will dominate the Pentagon's planning agenda over
the next two decades. The law, Mr. President, must also move in this
direction by requiring a CONOPS policy rationale with a CONOPS budget
request. My amendment supports this transition by mandating the first
pre-budget report to Congress on the national security and OPTEMPO
implications of our increased contingency commitments.
Whether for contingency operations or more traditional missions,
naval modernization programs will remain vital to the overseas
projection of American forces. As a result, I salute the Chair of the
Seapower Subcommittee--Senator Warner--for this support of the $2.680
billion continuation of the DDG-51 multi-year destroyer procurement,
the $2.003 billion going to produce the second ship of the New Attack
Submarine class, and the $639 million going for the next LPD-17
Amphibious Transport Ship. In addition, I am pleased that the
Subcommittee fully authorized the Navy's $85 million DD-21 land-attack
destroyer Research and Development request to keep this new effort on
schedule and within budget.
These four programs meet the Navy's requirements for the type of
warfare that will dominate our military strategy of the future:
littoral operations near coastal plains. Littoral engagements require
the Navy to maneuver ``close enough to influence events on shore if
necessary.'' This post-Soviet mission continues to match our force
structure with our security interests since 80 percent of the world's
population lives near the coastal areas and waterways that open into
the littorals.
Littoral concepts of war stem directly from the changing worldwide
political environment in which the United States operates. Soviet power
no longer threatens the open plains of Central Europe. Soviet ships and
submarines no longer prepare for platform-to-platform battles on the
open seas. For the first time since the end of World War II, a Pentagon
planning document, the QDR, steered the military in the direction of
deterring conflict and instability wherever it might occur rather than
containing a single enemy force.
The surface ship and submarine programs authorized in this bill will
provide the Navy more firepower and endurance at a lower cost. Smooth
and modular construction materials will deceive the enemy radars that
can detect the hard angles of older vessels. Electronic integrators
will give ships and submarines split-second systems for communications
and munitions targeting. A new series of rapid transporters will bring
unprecedented levels of forces and weapons to the shorelines of
instability or humanitarian rescue. From safe distances at sea, smaller
crews will program missiles for strategic inland targets.
A littoral Navy, Mr. President, also corresponds with lower life-
cycle costs. Carriers and surface combatants will carry more firepower
and fewer people. This development, in addition to a greater reliance
on commercial ``off-the-shelf'' technologies, holds the promise of
decreasing maintenance expenditures by between 50 and 70 percent.
We also cannot forget that political limitations as well as political
changes shape the new Navy. The visible and invisible forward presence
provided by the Fleet assumes greater importance in an age when we no
longer enjoy permanent bases throughout Europe or Southern Asia. As a
result, the administration will increasingly rely on the Navy as a key
agent of force behind our diplomacy.
For this reason, I was honored to participate in a Subcommittee
markup that also expanded naval air programs. To stabilize the
transition from the Nimitz-class of nuclear aircraft carriers to the
new-generation CVX system, the Subcommittee allocated $124.5 million
for acceleration of advance procurement and component construction of
the CVN-77 system. We furthermore instructed the Navy to invest carrier
research and development budgets in a way that will directly enhance
the planned capabilities of the CVX. Our mark-up also placed the P-3
Orion Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program on an efficient 12-month
modification track.
The changing mix of threats to our national security represented by
these maritime and other high-technology defense programs finally
influenced the Committee vote against authorizing another base closure
(BRAC) round.
This amendment tried to address two of the many problems with the
BRAC process: the fact that no law guarantees the proper investment of
any quantifiable returns from base closures, and the president's
temptation to manipulate commission rulings in his own political
interest.
But the Committee rejected the BRAC amendment because it did not, nor
could it, solve the fatal flaws in the process. No base closure round,
Mr. President, has yielded the taxpayers any clear or proven savings.
We do not need to rely on the claims of congressional BRAC opponents to
demonstrate this point. We only need to consider the conclusion of the
leading advocate of BRAC: The Department of Defense. DoD's April 1998
base closure report to Congress states explicitly that ``no audit
trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end
use of each dollar saved through BRAC.''
We can also turn to the findings of independent evaluators. Last
summer, the GAO flatly told us that ``DoD accounting systems are not
designed to track savings.'' The Congressional Budget Office concluded
in December 1996 that the Pentagon ``is unable to report actual
spending and savings for BRAC actions.'' Accounting uncertainties, Mr.
President, have made apparent base closure savings a frustrating
mystery rather than a confirmed fact.
The Defense Department cannot continue to decide which installations
to downsize or close by making arbitrary comparisons to personnel
reductions. The standard should not focus, as DoD contends, on closing
36% of our bases if 36% of all people in uniform have left the military
since the peak of the Cold War. The standard must remain the adaptation
of infrastructure to new or developing security threats. But as it did
last year, the administration rests the argument for more base closures
on the premise that facility cuts have lagged behind those in personnel
by 15 percent.
A simple percentage, Mr. President, cannot answer the questions that
should determine the future of domestic military bases. What depots,
for example, do we require to provide competition with the private
sector and to insure the precision and endurance of fighter aircraft?
What shipyards can provide the Navy with a diversified industrial
base to sustain the next-generation modular vessels that will maneuver
in littoral waters?
What air bases must stay active to support our long-range power
projection capabilities now that we have a diminished forward presence
in Europe and Southern Asia?
These questions do not exhaust the list. But I raise them as examples
of the factors absent in most of the base closure assessments that have
come to Congress from the Pentagon.
Page one of the April base report estimates that the military could
save 21 billion dollars between 2008 and 2015 if we approve two more
BRAC rounds. Even if the Committee had accepted this projection, the
QDR acknowledges that it could re-capture $18 billion of this amount in
three ways: by following through with DoD management reforms and
technology upgrades, providing consistent guidance to the Services on
budget priorities, and controlling the costs of contingency operations.
The QDR indicated that this $18 billion dollar loss as from three
specific causes, came exclusively from procurement accounts. It
therefore has three specific plans, all of which relate to policy
changes and internal reforms, and none of which relate to base
closures, for restoring funds to modernization. The April base closure
report even admits that if the Pentagon could quantify BRAC savings,
there would be no guarantee that procurement programs might gain from
the extra dollars because the four separate Services make their own
investment decisions.
To assert that the department cannot save $18 billion dollars through
rigorous budget management, Mr. President, is to assert that it cannot
follow the mandates of the QDR, which called for ``reducing unneeded
standards and specifications,'' and the ``leveraging of commercial
technology.''
And how unreasonable or impractical is it to control the level of
unplanned expenditures on Bosnia through clear
[[Page S7093]]
policy objectives? According to the administration, while it predicts
extensive U.S. involvement in contingency operations beyond 2015, our
engagement ``must be selective, depending largely on the interests at
stake and the risk of major aggression elsewhere.''
The Clinton Administration advertises a commitment to multi-billion
dollar defense management reforms while asking for base closures to
generate savings that it can neither find nor re-invest. At the same
time, it has submitted very real Bosnia bills that now exceed seven
billion dollars and freeze our forces in a political vacuum.
By rejecting the BRAC amendment, the Committee invited the
administration to provide us with a more compelling plan that links
facility to mission needs. In the meantime, DoD can also realize
billions of dollars of savings through firm policy decisions about our
overseas strategic interests, internal reforms, and Service
programmatic goals. The Defense Department must continue to work
directly with Congress on the issues that will improve the military of
the next decade instead of shifting them to yet another panel for which
we can claim no responsibility.
Mr. President, the FY99 Authorization Bill accelerates the
modernization of the Armed Services while recognizing the strong
evidence of the degrading impact of open-ended contingency Operations
on Personnel Tempos and unit readiness. It ultimately holds the
Pentagon accountable for documented savings through policy and
management reforms rather than accepting the unproven promises of BRAC
savings that would come 15 years away. I therefore urge all of my
colleagues to vote in favor of this responsible legislation.
u.s. non-proliferation policy and condemnation of testing in south asia
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, my support for this amendment must be
qualified. I too am concerned about proliferation. However, I do not
welcome the potentially negative consequences relying strictly on U.S.
unilateral sanctions in this case. I strongly urge we combine sanctions
with engagement. This engagement must be based on comprehensive,
calculated non-proliferation policies.
I believe that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses
an imminent threat to U.S. and international security. The geopolitical
strings that contained states' individual aspirations of mass
destruction capabilities have been severed. The emerging multipolar
world--in which the U.S. is, without question, the dominant economic,
military and cultural power--creates new threats and offers new
opportunities.
Capitalizing on opportunities requires U.S. leadership. No other
nation has the wherewithal to facilitate the creation and
implementation of thoughtful and deliberate strategies to counter
threats to U.S. and international security. No other nation parallels
the power the U.S. can bring to bear in creating a stable international
order. There is no doubt that we live in an increasingly interdependent
world. Most major problems--economic, environmental, military--cannot
be handled by the U.S. alone, despite our dominant position.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one such problem.
This threat cannot be stemmed by unilateral U.S. actions. The dangers
of weapons of mass destruction proliferation--whether by rogue nations
or terrorist organizations--poses a threat to the U.S. military and
U.S. civilians, as well as the future of humanity. In light of the
changed global circumstances and the U.S. position as the global power,
we urgently need to rethink antiquated doctrines of defense and provide
a coherent approach to non-proliferation policies.
Our nuclear reality has radically changed in the past weeks. Recent
rumblings from the detonation of nuclear devices in Southeast Asia
should awaken us to a few simple realities: our non-proliferation
policies have failed; any country desirous of nuclear capability can
attain it; and sanctions alone are an inadequate deterrent and
potentially dangerous approach.
Sanctions alone will not suffice in deterring would-be proliferators.
When leaders of a country are willing to state that the people ``will
eat grass'' in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction capability,
this should be a sign of the relative impotence of U.S. unilateral
attempts to alter their behavior.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--the lynchpin of nuclear
control--is under assault. North Korea, Iraq, India and Pakistan sent
clear signals--nuclear proliferation is a threat now. How obvious do
the warning signs have to be to evoke an effective response?
The U.S. should be taking the lead in formulating national and
multilateral efforts to contain proliferation. If not contained, the
recent events in India and Pakistan will become a common occurrence in
the world of the near future.
As stated by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in recent defense
Appropriation hearings, India's actions could set off a chain
reaction--not solely of a fissile nature but nonetheless having similar
cataclysmic ramifications. Without swift and multilateral intervention
this chain reaction could easily lead to a nuclear arms race between
India and Pakistan that would spillover into other countries' strategic
calculations.
More ominous is that Indian and Pakistani defiance will set the tone
for other less developed states. It is clearly in the U.S. interest to
prevent uncontrolled proliferation. A U.S. response proportionate to
the threat would involve bringing all the policy tools we can bring to
bear in reducing that threat. In sum, this requires a reasonable,
consistent and aggressive non-proliferation strategy.
I would like to take a minute to look at India as an example of the
failures in U.S. non-proliferation policies. India's tests resulted
from international and domestic concerns. The international issues
point to problems in the form of lack of consistency in U.S. non-
proliferation policies.
First, India's strategic concerns are most succinctly formulated as
follows: China, Pakistan, and the former's assistance to the latter.
India has fought three wars in the last 50 years with Pakistan. These
two states' relations with one another at their best are more perilous
than U.S. relations with the Soviet Union were leading up to the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Moreover, India enjoys front row seats to observe how the existing
non-proliferation regimes fail to check China's transfer of controlled
technologies to Pakistan as well as another potential enemy, Iran. If
China enjoys unimpeded export of missile technologies to Pakistan, and
Pakistan proceeds to demonstrate its missile capabilities, why should
India refrain from flexing its nuclear muscle?
Second, India has repeatedly indicated its frustration with lack of
progress toward global nuclear disarmament. As my colleague, Senator
Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to India, recently suggested, India
rejects the discriminatory nature of the existing non-proliferation
regimes. Perhaps due to their frustration with the lack of progress on
disarmament, India believes that these tests would lend urgency to the
process.
The domestic dimension boils down to the nationalist and isolationist
inclinations of the political leaders in India at present. The election
manifesto of India's BJP states that it ``rejects the notion of nuclear
apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a hegemonistic
nuclear regime.'' India will not have its matters of security or its
exercise of the nuclear option dictated to it. Nor would any other
sovereign state.
While the world was generally appalled by India's actions, the
reaction among Indians bordered on euphoria. Even though only four
members of the BJP made the decision to test, that choice obviously
enjoys widespread support. We witnessed similar domestic jubilation for
Pakistan's response.
I agree with my colleague, Senator Moynihan, who suggested that the
U.S. should attempt to engage India and provide it with incentives to
join international non-proliferation regimes. The current government in
India only welcomes our sanctions. To approach the situation with India
by invoking sanctions only plays into the aims of the strong
nationalist and isolationist currents in that country.
Invoking sanctions on Pakistan raises even more serious concerns.
Pakistan is a poor and unstable country. Should our sanctions push it
over
[[Page S7094]]
the brink and induce a collapse--we would have nuclear weapons in the
possession of a desperate regime. As Henry Kissinger astutely observed,
non-democratic regimes often use external conflict to coalesce support
in the face of domestic unrest. Our sanctions may only force Pakistan's
hand.
The U.S. should temper its sanctions with constructive engagement.
And we should make the lifting of those sanctions contingent on India
and Pakistan's willingness to negotiate their entry into non-
proliferation regimes as is suggested in this amendment.
A comprehensive and effective non-proliferation policy would include
several elements.
The recent call made by the five nuclear powers for these states to
freeze their weapons development is a step in the right direction. The
U.S. must ensure that these multilateral efforts get the sustained and
clear commitment requisite to turn the tide of proliferation.
Our objectives should be clear:
First, we need to induce relations between India and Pakistan with
the objective of preventing an arms race on the Subcontinent. We must
convince them that their security is NOT enhanced by the weaponization
or deployment of these devices.
Second, we should capitalize on recent overtures made by these
countries to negotiate their entry into numerous non-proliferation
regimes. We should focus particular attention on a fissile materials
cutoff agreement as well as India and Pakistan's commitment to cease
testing.
Third, the negotiations among the nuclear powers must take bold
actions to address the discriminatory nature of the existing Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This reality was a longstanding and central
reason for India remaining outside of the regime. We must assume that
other nations recognize the discrimination codified in this regime, and
we must begin to address it.
The implementation of these policies will be anything but easy, but
they are critical to international stability and security. To be
successful, U.S. non-proliferation policy must utilize the full array
of policy tools available; it must be consistent and aggressive; and it
must take into account other nations' perspectives and cost-benefit
calculations. Imposing sanctions and muddling through simply will not
suffice.
Meeting U.S. security needs in the 21st Century will require renewed
commitment and more complex strategies than those that sufficed for the
last several decades. Make no mistake about it though, these issues
must be addressed now, and our commitment must be unwavering.
I concur with Senator Moynihan in one other important respect. In the
case of India, we should not be focusing on the intelligence failure,
but rather the major failure in our statecraft, or lack thereof.
Statecraft in the form of addressing these problems as a leader, as
the dominant global power. If the U.S. does not step up to the plate,
the new millenium will be characterized by nations--both hostile and
friendly--being armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver those weapons to our doorstep.
The 21st century will either witness widespread proliferation of mass
destruction capabilities or the building of international norms and
consensus to scale back incentives to acquiring costly and dangerous
weaponry. The U.S. is the only country in a position to take a
leaderhip role in defining the course and shape of the future
international order.
If we don't act now, the 21st Century will, indeed, be the era of
weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I support the amendment
currently before the Senate. However, this support is qualified. I do
not assume that our condemnation and unilateral economic sanctions will
be adequate to turn the tide. I support the provisions centered on
reduing tensions between India and Pakistan, urging multilateral
efforts to address proliferation threats and expressing the need for
U.S. leadership. We must act now. We must be consistent and vigilant.
And we must utilize all policy tools available to achieve our aims.
Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Amendment No. 3010
(Purpose: To permit recipients of Naval Reserve Officers' Training
Corps scholarships to attend the participating college or university of
their choice)
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm] proposes an amendment
numbered 3010.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place, add the following:
SEC. . ATTENDANCE OF RECIPIENTS OF NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS'
TRAINING CORPS SCHOLARSHIPS AT PARTICIPATING
COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES.
Section 2107 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(i)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any
policy or regulation of the Department of Defense or of the
Department of the Navy, recipients of Naval Reserve Officers'
Training Corps scholarships who live in the state which has
more scholarships awardees than slots available under the
Navy quotas in their state colleges or universities may
attend any college or university of their choice in their
state to which they have been accepted, so long as the
college or university is a participant in the Naval Reserve
Officers' Training Corps program.
``(2) The Department of Defense and the Department of the
Navy are prohibited from setting maximum limits on the number
of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarship
students who can be enrolled at any college or university
participating in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps
program in such state.''
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, this amendment is a very important
amendment, at least to this Senator. I would like to very briefly
outline the problem I am trying to deal with. I have narrowed the
solution to this problem so we might get a place holder in the bill.
Then, our conferees can fix the Nation's problem in conference.
We cannot get an agreement on a final solution now. I think my
colleagues, when they hear my argument, will agree to my amendment. I
simply want a place holder, so this problem can be fixed in every
school in every State in the Union.
Mr. President, what is happening is that the Navy is engaged in
setting quotas in allowing students to attend colleges and universities
under Naval ROTC scholarship programs. It is interesting, because the
quotas are very similar to the problem we have with having more
facilities than we have military personnel and functions. This is
really very similar to the whole base closing crisis that we have
faced.
The basic problem is we have 69 colleges and universities that
participate in the Navy ROTC scholarship program. Many of these schools
are schools that do not have large numbers of students who would like
to attend them. Historically, the selection process, which has not
changed, is a process whereby young men and women, the best and the
brightest in America, apply for a Navy ROTC scholarship.
Here is how the system works, here is the change that has been made,
here is the problem, and here is my proposed beginning of a solution. I
hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will take this amendment.
Under our current program, a young man or woman who graduated from
high school in America, who has excellent SAT scores, extremely high
grades, and who has taken a strong scientific curriculum in high
school, can apply for a scholarship through the Navy ROTC scholarship
program. The selection is made by the Navy on a national basis. For
example, for this coming year, 206 young men and women from my State
have been selected by the Navy to receive a Navy ROTC scholarship--206.
Now, the way the Navy ROTC scholarship program worked prior to the
implementation of quotas was that a young man or woman received a Navy
ROTC scholarship and then chose to attend one of the 69 colleges that
participated in the program. As the Navy has reduced the number of
people participating in the ROTC scholarship program, rather than
evaluating university programs and shutting down those
[[Page S7095]]
programs that enroll literally two or three students per year, what the
Navy is doing is setting a scholarship cap on each university's Navy
ROTC program. The Navy ROTC scholarship programs that has been
historically popular have been the program at MIT, the program at Notre
Dame, the program at Purdue, the program at Texas A&M. The Navy has
said, if we let students choose, 250 students would go to MIT and 250
students would go to Texas A&M.
Now, I fail to see the problem. Here is the point--by setting a cap
of 25 students who can attend any one of the participating colleges,
what happens in my State is two things. No. 1, we have 206 young men
and women who have just won a Navy ROTC scholarship, one of the biggest
things ever to happen to them in their lives.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. GRAMM. Yes.
Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator dispenses pretty quick, we will accept the
amendment and move on.
Mr. LEVIN. Apparently, Senator Byrd wants to be heard. Will you
withhold?
Mr. GRAMM. Then I will continue.
Basically, the problem I am trying to deal with is the following
problem.
Mr. McCAIN. Senator Byrd does not wish to talk on your amendment.
Mr. GRAMM. I have completed my remarks.
I thank my colleagues.
Mr. McCAIN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is there an amendment pending?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has an amendment
pending.
Mr. BYRD. That amendment is open to an amendment in the second
degree?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment is open
for a second degree.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will have an amendment in the second
degree. First, I will talk about my amendment.
Mr. President, earlier this month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
announced a plan that he believes will improve initial entry training
programs and policies of the U.S. military services. Secretary Cohen's
plan will implement about 95 percent of the recommendations put forth
by the Kassebaum-Baker panel. The 95 percent I refer to is not an exact
mathematical term here. It is just a figure of speech to indicate that
the great majority of the recommendations that were recommended by the
Kassebaum panel will be put into effect.
This was a panel directed to assess the current training programs and
policies, with an eye to correcting the structural problems that had
allowed truly scandalous situations to occur involving the harassment
of female recruits. The membership of former Senator Kassebaum's panel
was selected directly by Secretary Cohen himself.
While many of the policies under the Secretary's plan are to be
commended, debate has been brewing over those core recommendations that
remain and that were not put into effect by Secretary Cohen. That
deviation pertains to Secretary Cohen's support, in the face of the
report of the Kassebaum Commission to the contrary, for continuing the
practice of men and women undergoing basic training together, and
allowing coed barracks. Not only does this stance counter specific
recommendations made by the Kassebaum/Baker panel, but it counters
legislative provisions approved by the House of Representatives. In my
view, it also counters plain common sense.
Similar to recommendations in the Kassebaum report, the House of
Representatives' Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense (DOD)
Authorization Bill includes provisions that would require separate
living facilities for men and women during basic training; prohibit
after-hours access to barracks by the opposite sex, including drill
sergeants; and separate training of men and women at the basic level.
Senator Brownback yesterday offered an amendment to the Senate Defense
Authorization Bill that would require separate barracks for men and
women, and limit access to these barracks by members of the opposite
sex.
Secretary Cohen has announced that he is strongly opposed to the
House provisions. But regardless of the Secretary's position in the
debate, one looming fact remains: Sex scandals are plaguing our
military training facilities. The papers are filled with headlines
involving sexual misconduct in the services--misconduct involving
extensive investigations and trials, and high-profile ends to military
careers. This is a serious situation, a situation that, in all
probability, must have negative ramifications for our overall national
security. That is what we should be concerned about, not political
correctness, not social engineering, not social theory, not social
planning--not political correctness, but the military security of our
country. That is why we have a military.
While some may claim that most of the sexual misconduct is not
occurring during basic training but during follow-on training programs,
that claim misses the point. It is my opinion that day 1 of training is
a good place to start--day 1. I strongly support a policy that directly
states the rules and values of our military services to new recruits on
day 1. This policy should clearly dictate to new recruits that the U.S.
military is about service, honor, and integrity.
The sad sagas in the press about sexual misconduct in the military
and the sorry disrespect on the part of some members for the dignity of
and the courtesies owed to other members of the military, including
women recruits, can only serve to undermine the appeal of the U.S.
military to our young men and women.
If we want the brightest and the best recruits, we must be committed
to ensuring that the U.S. military service delivers on its recruiting
promises of outstanding career opportunities. The best and the
brightest will demand no less.
But that is only part of the issue, as far as I am concerned. While
we must implement policies that attract cream-of-the-crop recruits and
that carry through on the promise of providing them with world-class
training, we must also remember that the objective of military service
is the defense of the Nation. That is the objective of the military
service. That is what it is all about. That defense, that security,
must be the paramount aim of the Military Establishment. All other
goals must be secondary to the goal of establishing the best fighting
force that our Nation can field.
I have grave concerns--particularly in light of the Kassebaum
report--that our current policy is failing to keep its eye on that
paramount concern.
The Kassebaum panel stated:
There is no more valuable military resource than its
personnel, making training indisputably a top priority.
The panel further noted:
The principal objective of the military's training programs
is to produce an effective, efficient, and ready force. In
order to achieve this objective, the training programs must,
first and foremost, emphasize and instill discipline.
I heartily agree with those conclusions. And the Kassebaum report's
recommendations supporting separate barracks for men and women during
basic training, as well as calling for some same-gender platoons, seem
to me to be in the best interest of the troops, as well as providing
the right atmosphere for sound and serious training. I believe we need
to do what is best for our national security and what is best for the
men and women who join our military forces and whose very lives depend
upon the quality of the training they receive.
Mr. President, last year, I worked with Senator Kempthorne on the
Senate Armed Services Committee. I joined with him on an amendment to
the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill that created an
independent blue-ribbon body to thoroughly examine, review, and
evaluate the reasons for the ongoing number of sex scandals in training
commands. This blue-ribbon panel is also chartered to examine
fraternization and adultery issues. This panel has been created with
unquestioned credentials. I believe that the report generated from this
group will be a significant contribution to the body of work on gender
policy. I regret that that report will not be completed until next
year. And if its recommendations mirror, or reflect, those of
Kassebaum-Baker, it is likely also to be ignored by the powers that be.
[[Page S7096]]
I also favor the language included in the House of Representatives
fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense authorization bill that provides
for the separation of men and women in training at the basic level.
Echoing my priority in this regard, the Kassebaum report concludes:
. . . separating the recruits at the operational training
unit level should provide a better environment for teaching
military values, including professional relations.
Again, the bottom line must be about ensuring that military service
is a profession of service, honor, and integrity. Let us also remember
this--let me say it again--the purpose of our Military Establishment,
which costs us scores of billions of dollars, is to protect the
national security of these United States, the security interests of the
United States of America.
Our military is not an equal employment opportunity commission. It
does not exist to ensure perfect political correctness by responding
affirmatively to the demands of this group or that interest group or
some other interest group. It is the ultimate protector of the
sovereignty of this mighty Nation and the ultimate protector of the
freedoms of her people. That is quite a heavy responsibility and one
that needs the most conscientious and vigilant attention to be
adequately addressed.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in taking a
constructive first step towards cleaning up the mess in the military
and putting some common sense back into the service training regime. I
like the way the Marines do it. And I think we ought to take a page out
of their book.
Mr. President, I will have more to say possibly on this amendment. As
of now, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the debate on the Brownback amendment
yesterday some Armed Services Committee members observed that the
Brownback amendment would adopt recommendations of the Kassebaum/Baker
commission report by passing the Senate's own commission created last
year. It was said that doing so makes a ``mockery'' of the Senate's own
action, and wastes the time of the 10 members of the commission.
Well, Mr. President, Secretary Cohen has flouted the recommendations
of the Kassebaum/Baker report that he himself commissioned. He has
promised to implement the easiest recommendations in that report while
publicly repudiating its core recommendations. He has not waited for
the Senate commission's report either. He got out in front of it.
Senator Brownback's amendment, and the amendment that I have
prepared, would say if you are in for a penny, you are in for a pound.
If the report has merit--and Secretary Cohen has acknowledged that at
least parts of it do have merit in his estimation--then we ought not to
reject those parts of the report that do not seem politically correct.
In fact, the Kassebaum/Baker report notes that ``the committee has made
recommendations regarding gender integration in training where
appropriate, but has also made recommendations regarding the large
number of other issues that we concluded have an impact on the
effectiveness of the overall training program. It is the committee's
intention that its recommendations be viewed as a complete package
since training is a building-block process beginning with the quality
of the recruit.''
Other Members have reported the objections of senior military
officials to the recommendations in the Kassebaum/Baker report. And
they have stated their strong support for keeping mixed-gender training
just the way it currently is.
I would remind those officials and my colleagues that not so long ago
the military trained women completely separately from men. It was only
since the early to mid-1980's that the military began mixing the sexes
during the early training phases. I believe, if I recall it correctly,
that Army women were trained together at Fort McClellan, which is now
closing as a part of the base realignment and closure process.
The great social experiment of putting men and women together from
day 1 in the training process is not, therefore, some hallowed military
tradition. It is a policy, and if that policy gets in the way of a
process that is designed to remold these undisciplined young
individuals into focused disciplined soldiers, then we should not
hesitate to change it.
Our focus must be on national security--not political correctness;
not social policy. And the basic safety and security of our recruits
should not be compromised.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment may be
temporarily laid aside so that others may call up other amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
____________________