[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 84 (Wednesday, June 24, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6935-S6973]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of S. 2057, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2057) to authorize appropriations for the fiscal 
     year 1999 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 2975

    (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress regarding continued 
   participation of United States forces in operations in Bosnia and 
                              Herzegovina)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for 
     himself, Mr. Levin and Mr. Coats, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2975.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the committee has worked very hard to 
achieve consensus on an amendment----
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield just 
briefly?
  Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the clerk has not finished the reading of 
the amendment and there has been no unanimous consent request to ask 
that the reading of the amendment be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1064. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CONTINUED 
                   PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN 
                   OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The contributions of the people of the United States 
     and other nations have, in large measure, resulted in the 
     suspension of fighting and alleviated the suffering of the 
     people of Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1995.
       (2) the people of the United States have expended 
     approximately $9,500,000,000 in tax dollars between 1992 and 
     mid-1998 just in support of the United States military 
     operations in Bosnia to achieve those results.
       (3) Efforts to restore the economy and political structure 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina have achieved some success in 
     accordance with the Dayton Agreement.
       (4) In February 1998, the President certified to Congress 
     that the continued presence of United States forces in Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina after June 30, 1998, was necessary in order 
     to meet national security interests of the United States.
       (5) There is, however, no accurate estimate of the time 
     needed to accomplish the civilian implementation tasks 
     outlined in the Dayton Agreement.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States ground combat forces should not remain in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina indefinitely in view of the world-wide 
     commitments of the Armed Forces of the United States;
       (2) the President should work with NATO allies and the 
     other nations whose military forces are participating in the 
     NATO-led Stabilization Force to withdraw United States ground 
     combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina within a reasonable 
     period of time, consistent with the safety of those forces 
     and the accomplishment of the Stabilization Force's military 
     tasks;
       (3) a NATO-led force without the participation of United 
     States ground combat forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina might 
     be suitable for a follow-on force for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     if the European Security and Defense Identity is not 
     sufficiently developed or is otherwise considered 
     inappropriate for such a mission;
       (4) the United States may decide to provide appropriate 
     support to a Western European Union-led or NATO-led follow-on 
     force for Bosnia and Herzegovina, including command and 
     control, intelligence, logistics, and, if necessary, a ready 
     reserve force in the region;
       (5) the President should inform the European NATO allies of 
     this expression of the sense of Congress and should strongly 
     urge them to undertake preparations for establishing a 
     Western European Union-led or a NATO-led force as a follow-on 
     force to the NATO-led Stabilization Force if needed to 
     maintain peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
       (6) the President should consult closely with the 
     congressional leadership and the congressional defense 
     committees with respect to the progress being made toward 
     achieving a sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
     the progress being made toward a reduction and ultimate 
     withdrawal of United States ground combat forces from Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina.
       (c) Dayton Agreement Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``Dayton Agreement'' means the General Framework Agreement 
     for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with annexes 
     relating thereto, done at Dayton, November 10 through 16, 
     1995.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the committee has worked very hard to 
achieve consensus on an amendment that would represent the majority 
views of the committee. Since May 13, at the request of several 
Members, the committee has met at least five times to discuss possible 
amendments on Bosnia that would be offered to the defense bill. The 
committee also conducted a hearing with Ambassador Robert Gelbard and 
General Wesley Clark to discuss the status of progress in implementing 
the Dayton Agreement.
  Despite all meetings and discussions, the committee was not able to 
reach

[[Page S6936]]

consensus on an amendment on Bosnia. However, following the committee's 
meeting on June 19, Senator Coats and Senator Levin, met, and, using a 
compromise amendment that I had proposed as a starting point, continued 
the effort to craft an amendment, which I support and which I believe 
the Senate can support.
  While I am aware that there are Senators who would prefer to do more, 
I believe that this amendment represents the view of most Senators.
  I am pleased to join Senators Coats and Levin, and I urge the Senate 
to adopt it. Let me emphasize, this amendment does not represent a 
committee amendment, it merely represents the tireless efforts of 
several Members.
  This amendment would express the concerns of the Congress that U.S. 
ground combat forces should not be deployed indefinitely in Bosnia, and 
that efforts should be taken by the President to work with our Allies 
in Europe so that U.S. ground combat forces could withdraw in a safe 
and orderly fashion from Bosnia within a reasonable period of time. 
Additionally, the amendment would express our views that the European 
allies should take appropriate steps to develop forces to take on the 
responsibilities of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, if necessary, to 
continue to implement the Dayton Agreement.
  Mr. President, by December 1998, U.S. ground forces will have been 
deployed in Bosnia for three years, and the United States will have 
spent almost $9 billion dollars for its share of the operations. That 
is two years more than the President, Secretary Perry, Secretary 
Christopher and General Shalikashvili told us in 1995 that our forces 
would be in Bosnia, and $8.0 billion more than their original cost 
estimate.
  I believe it is imperative that the United States make strong efforts 
to work with our NATO and European allies to provide a situation where 
U.S. ground combat forces can leave Bosnia. The United States has 
world-wide commitments, and the continued deployment of U.S. forces in 
Bosnia is starting to take a toll on the readiness of our military 
forces. The deployment in Bosnia along with our other commitments 
produces an operational tempo which impacts heavily on the morale of 
our forces and our ability to retain personnel.
  I believe this amendment sends the message that we have been in 
Bosnia too long, and that we should begin working our way out. I also 
believe the amendment sends a message that our European allies should 
assume a more equitable leadership role on their borders, while at the 
same time ensuring some continued level of continued U.S. support.
  I believe this is a good amendment, and urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I, along with the 
chairman and others, have worked long and hard attempting to fashion a 
way in which this Congress could express its dissatisfaction with the 
prospect of an indefinite troop commitment in Bosnia.
  We now are going on the third year of that commitment at a cost that 
continues to escalate. I believe it is approaching, if it hasn't 
exceeded, $9 billion--this is despite the assurances of the 
administration that the troops would only be necessary to accomplish 
the military portion of the Dayton accords for 1 year.
  The then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shalikashvili, in testimony before our committee on October 18, 1995, 
said:

       NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to 
     complete its mission in twelve months and to withdraw.

  Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in testimony before the House 
National Security Committee on October 18, 1995, said:

       NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to 
     complete its mission in twelve months and to withdraw.

  Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, said in a speech to the 
National Press Club on November 9, 1995:

       We believe that twelve months is a reasonable period of 
     time for the implementation force to have accomplished its 
     mission.

  The President of the United States, President Clinton, in a letter to 
Speaker Gingrich dated December 13, 1995, said:

       NATO and U.S. military commanders believe and I expect that 
     the military mission can be accomplished in about a year. 
     Twelve months will allow IFOR time to complete the military 
     task assigned in the Dayton agreement and to establish a 
     secure environment. Within 1 year we expect that the military 
     provisions of the Dayton agreement will have been carried 
     out, implementation of the civil aspects and economic 
     reconstruction will have been firmly launched, free elections 
     will have been held under international supervision, and a 
     stable military balance will have been established.

  Those words from the President of the United States. He was supported 
by Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State, who 
negotiated the Dayton agreement. Mr. Holbrooke said:

       The President has given a very clear commitment on the 
     twelve months. That is our policy. It will remain our policy.

  General Shalikashvili once again said, in an article, in an interview 
with the Washington Post of April 3, 1996:

       I'm absolutely convinced that America will not participate 
     with military forces in Bosnia after the conclusion of this 
     year.

  On and on it goes. Yet it is now 1998. There is no indication of when 
our military forces will be removed from Bosnia. Their continued 
presence has come at considerable cost to the taxpayer--as I said, $9 
billion-plus and counting--and no indications by the administration 
that forces will be withdrawn at any time soon.
  There is little disagreement on this floor about the concern over the 
escalating costs and the indefinite commitment. The real question 
before the Senate is how we accomplish the goal of withdrawing those 
troops. It is clear that what was promised by the administration as a 
consequence of the Dayton accords has not been accomplished on the 
civil implementation.
  Our armed forces have done a marvelous job in meeting the military 
obligations. In fact, the military tasks were essentially accomplished 
in that first year. A poitical decision was made, however, that forces 
needed to remain in Bosnia to provide a secure environment so that the 
civilian portion of Dayton could be accomplished.
  I was one who voted against the use of our troops to enforce the 
Dayton accord. I did not provide that support. Senator Levin I believe, 
did provide that support. Yet today we are joining in attempting to 
send a message from the Congress to the President and to our allies 
that we do not want an indefinite commitment, that we believe the 
military mission has been successfully achieved--that it is time to 
begin the process of bringing our troops home. While there has been 
some progress in civil implementation, when I traveled last December 
with the President to Bosnia, I saw little evidence of successful 
civilian implementation.
  It has taken 2 years and an extraordinary amount of outside pressure 
to get the three nations involved to agree on a common license plate 
and a common foreign currency--what is seemingly the most easily 
defined civilian implementation aspects of that accord. Yet, the 
parties, over a 2-year period of time, could not even agree on what the 
license plate would look like that each of them would put on their 
vehicles, or what the currency would look like, in order to establish a 
common currency for that one country.
  So I stand here as one with grave concerns and deeply held doubts 
about whether or not we are ever going to accomplish what Dayton 
attempted and promised, and that is reunification of a country that 
appears to not want to reunify. Key issues such as resettlement of 
refugees; establishment of a civilian police force that, to date, has 
not been deemed effective in providing any kind of stability; 
establishment of judicial reforms that would provide a basis for 
enforcement of the law on an equal and fair basis. Resolution of many 
of these issues appear far down the road--if they are even achievable.
  I come back to the central question, which is, now that our troops 
are there, who makes the determination and what is our obligation as 
Members of Congress relative to establishing the continued presence, 
limiting that presence, or requiring that withdrawal? I happen to 
believe strongly that our responsibility, as defined by the 
Constitution, is to determine the funding, whether or not we will 
financially support the commitment that has been made by our Commander 
in Chief.

[[Page S6937]]

  Now, Senator Levin and I have wrestled with this question in terms of 
how we can best express a message to the President of the United States 
that we do not support an indefinite commitment, that we do believe 
that a transition should take place from an American presence to 
European support for whatever military forces are necessary to provide 
continued stability. But we do not believe that we are in a position; 
nor do we have the right to define a timetable or a troop level. We 
believe that is a decision that ought to be left to the military, ought 
to be left to the Commander in Chief, and that is where the 
responsibility lies. We do so because we don't believe we have the 
expertise to define what that troop level should be.
  When the discussion was undertaken relative to our placing troops in 
Bosnia, virtually every individual who represented the military, from 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to the Secretary of Defense, to the 
commanders who were called forward to testify, said we need the 
flexibility to determine what is necessary to accomplish our message 
and to provide for the security for the forces that are deployed in 
Bosnia. We need to make that decision based on our military expertise 
and based on what we see as the threat and what is necessary to provide 
for the security of those forces.
  This is not a decision that ought to be made by Congress, regardless 
of our own expertise or what expertise we think we might have, having 
served on the Armed Services Committee or learned through our 
association with the Department of Defense. We are not in a position to 
define that troop level number. This decision has to be left to the 
military commanders.
  We learned, by tragic experience, how political intervention and 
policy can sacrifice lives and place our troops in jeopardy. All of us 
have freshly imprinted on our minds the tragedy in Somalia, as a 
request by the commander of our forces in Mogadishu for armored forces 
to provide the force protection was denied primarily for political 
reasons, because they wanted to avoid the perception that the U.S. was 
enlarging our presence in Somalia, but that we were drawing down. We 
drew down too far and we lost some great Americans because we were not 
able to provide them with sufficient protection. It is not our decision 
as to what that level of protection should be.
  Secondly, Senator Levin and I--and he will speak for himself--believe 
that it is important that we not set an arbitrary timetable for 
accomplishment of the mission or for withdrawal of troops. That simply 
sends a signal to extremist forces and others who are intent on 
destabilizing the situation. All they have to do is wait until a 
certain date, pull back and give the appearance of stability, give the 
appearance of cooperation, knowing that when a certain date is reached, 
our troops will be withdrawn.
  We want to keep that indefinite. It doesn't mean the decision can't 
be made to remove the troops tomorrow, or the President can't sit down 
with our allies and discuss what the future force should be. I believe 
an amendment will be offered--if not to this bill, to the defense 
appropriations bill--by the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator 
from Texas to establish a certain level and a certain timetable. It may 
be that that is what our military commanders decide is in the best 
interests of accomplishing our military mission and protecting our 
forces. But that ought to be their decision, not ours.
  So those are the primary reasons--the protection of our forces, for a 
limited success, in stabilizing the war and to protect against the 
potential of extremist groups taking advantage of the knowledge they 
have of our force size and to protect against the concept that if we 
define a specific date through a statutory definition, that any hopes 
of accomplishing a mission that has been agreed to--as I said not by 
this Senator, but by the President and supported by a majority--can be 
realized.
  To conclude, our amendment essentially expresses the sense of 
Congress that the U.S. ground combat forces should not remain in Bosnia 
indefinitely, in view of the worldwide commitments that we have, the 
impact on our forces, on our readiness, on our deployment, and on our 
ability to address other needs; that the President should work with our 
NATO allies, and other nations who have military forces participating 
in the stabilization force, to withdraw ground combat forces from 
Bosnia within a reasonable period of time. The difference here is 
reasonable. We allow a reasonable period of time, leaving it again to 
the discretion of our military, rather than the fixed time. Consistent 
with the safety of those forces and the accomplishment of the 
stabilization force's military task.
  We think it is appropriate to define a way in which we can continue, 
when we withdraw ground combat forces, to continue to provide support 
for a follow-on European force, and to have a ready reaction or Ready 
Reserve force in the region--not in Bosnia, but in the region, 
available to help if necessary; that the President should inform our 
European allies of the will of the Congress, should this amendment be 
accepted; and that the President should consult very closely with 
congressional leadership with respect to the progress he is making in 
terms of achieving the goals of the Dayton accord.
  That is the essence of our amendment. As Senator Thurmond said, this 
is not a committee amendment that was voted out of committee, though it 
is supported by a number of members on our committee. We think it is an 
important amendment to lay down. We think this debate is important. 
Following this, there is much about what is going to be said by those 
who may not support this and who want something different than what I 
am going to agree with.
  Much of what they have put in their proposed amendment, which 
apparently will not be offered to this amendment and to this bill but 
at a later time, I am going to agree with.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. COATS. I would be happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have tried to carefully listen to the 
Senator's remarks, and I think I have heard the implication that 
Congress was somehow at fault in Somalia for the lack of supplying of 
heavy equipment.
  Mr. COATS. I don't believe that is what I said.
  Mr. BYRD. I didn't say you said that. I thought that it was implied.
  Mr. COATS. I can assure the Senator from West Virginia that was not 
implied.
  Mr. BYRD. It was not Congress' fault?
  Mr. COATS. No; it was not. Congress had no role in that whatsoever. 
This Senator believes there is subsequent evidence in the reports that 
followed up on that tragedy which indicate that political decisions 
were made by people within the administration relative to the 
perception American people might have regarding our presence and 
involvement in Somalia, and the decision that was then made, either 
through the administration or at the Department of Defense, and to deny 
the request for additional force support.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator. I incorrectly drew the 
wrong inference from what the Senator said.
  Mr. COATS. I thank the Senator. I apologize if I left that inference. 
If I had, I am glad the Senator clarified that, because I didn't want 
to leave that impression.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will conclude, so that my colleague, 
Senator Levin, may proceed, simply by saying that we asked for the 
Department of Defense response to this amendment. They reported back. 
The Department of Defense says:

       The Department has no objection to the proposed amendment 
     in general.
       The Department is concerned that paragraph (2) under Sense 
     of Congress could be misinterpreted as a weakening of US 
     resolve and commitment to the process initiated under the 
     Dayton Agreement. While the Department agrees that there 
     should not be a permanent US presence in Bosnia, the timing 
     and nature of discussions on withdrawal of the international 
     coalition should be driven by our continued progress on the 
     ground and not by artificial deadlines.

  And The New York Times reported the following on June 13, 1996:

       There has been no change in the President's view of the 
     current IFOR mission. It will last about a year.--Michael 
     McCurry, White House spokesman, New York Times, 6/13/96.
  The Washington Post reported on July 25, 1996 the following:


[[Page S6938]]


       There is no successor mission. . . . We're not anticipating 
     any such thing.--Vice President Albert Gore, Washington Post, 
     7/25/96.

  I agree in terms of their discussion about ``artificial deadlines.'' 
But I want to point out that the Dayton agreement clearly stated that 
the presence of the military was necessary to accomplish the military 
task. And I believe that military task has been accomplished.
  I think the debate on this floor, if there is to be a debate about 
our troop presence, should not be defining what the size of that 
presence should be and the timing of that presence. I think it should 
be on whether or not there ought to be a presence.
  There is going to be a legitimate debate, I believe, as to whether or 
not we want to stay involved in Bosnia. And the will of the Congress 
ought to be expressed on that, or the appropriations ought to be 
defined in a way to support whatever is necessary, if we are going to 
be there, determined by the military, or zero if we determine they 
shouldn't be there.
  That ought to be the debate, rather than defining what the mission 
should be, what the size of the force should be, and putting deadlines 
in terms of achieving those goals.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator take a question? 
Momentarily, I will follow the distinguished ranking member.
  Mr. COATS. I will be glad to take a question from the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. I want to make sure.
  First, I think the thrust of the amendment is one with which I agree. 
I was part of the deliberations over a period of time. I certainly want 
to acknowledge the participation by the distinguished senior Senator 
from West Virginia, and the Senator from Texas, and the work they have 
done.
  But I want to make certain--I have read through this carefully a 
number of times--there is nothing in it that could be misinterpreted at 
this particularly sensitive point in time in the Kosovo negotiations 
with Ambassador Holbrooke--who is, I think, perhaps at this very moment 
trying to work with Milosevic--that nothing in this amendment indicates 
a lessened support of the United States, together with our principal 
allies, to try our very best to preclude a repetition in Kosovo of the 
tragedies that unfolded over the past years in Bosnia. It is my 
understanding that nothing in this amendment should be interpreted by 
Milosevic or anyone else that this is less than full support of the 
effort on behalf of the President and his designated Secretary of State 
and Ambassador to work on that problem.
  Mr. COATS. The Senator, I believe, is correct. There is nothing in 
this amendment that I believe could be interpreted contrary to what the 
Senator has just stated.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. COATS. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from 
Indiana on his excellent remarks on this subject.
  I now yield to the able ranking member of this committee, Senator 
Levin.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, let me thank the chairman, Senator 
Coats, and others who have worked on this amendment. It is a sense-of-
the-Congress amendment regarding the continuation of United States 
forces and operations in Bosnia. We worked very hard on this amendment. 
The committee did not reach a consensus or, indeed, ever take a final 
vote on the various alternatives which were offered to us. I don't 
think anything should be said which would suggest that this is a 
committee amendment. Indeed, I believe that the chairman and Senator 
Coats made it clear that it was not. But it is an amendment which has a 
significant amount of bipartisan support. We offer it to the Senate on 
that basis.

  I am wondering if at this point, Mr. President, I could ask for the 
yeas and nays on this amendment, so people know there will be a vote 
forthcoming.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of the 
Congress on a number of aspects of our presence in Bosnia.
  First, it says that our forces should not remain in Bosnia 
indefinitely. We do not simply want to authorize a significant amount 
of funds without any statement as to the length of time that our forces 
should remain in Bosnia.
  As the Senator from Indiana very ably put it, we don't want to set a 
deadline. We don't want to mandate a certain force structure as of a 
certain time. We think that would diminish the safety of our forces. We 
think that would pull the rug out from under our forces.
  On the other hand, we don't want to write a blank check. We don't 
want to simply say, here are billions of dollars for our presence in 
Bosnia, and not continue to make a statement about the necessity within 
a reasonable period of time to remove our combat forces from Bosnia. So 
this sense-of-the-Congress amendment is an effort to avoid both the 
blank check downside but also to avoid setting a mandated date for the 
removal of those forces.
  First, I would note, Mr. President, for our colleagues, that the 
Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Shelton, in their letter of May 21 wrote to Senator 
Thurmond and to me to express their concerns about some of the 
proposals that were being offered relating to Bosnia.
  In that letter, they said the following:

       We write to express our concerns with any amendment that 
     would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or 
     reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. 
     Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish 
     the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date.

  Later on in that letter, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton said the 
following:
       We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and 
     progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we 
     expect further reductions will be possible, but that 
     determination is best based on the actual situation on the 
     ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field, 
     and the approval of the NATO military and political 
     authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction date 
     determined long in advance.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. The first reference to the Secretary's letter, would he 
read that again? He quoted the Secretary's letter.
  Mr. LEVIN. Yes.

       We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and 
     progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we 
     expect further reductions will be possible but----

  Mr. BYRD. The first. I believe something came before that.
  Mr. LEVIN. I apologize. I started too late in the quote, and I will 
go back. The letter starts off with the quote that I gave before.

       We write to express our concerns with any amendment that 
     would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or 
     reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. 
     Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish 
     the mission which has been remarkably successful to date.

  Mr. BYRD. At that point does the Secretary state what ``the mission'' 
is?
  Mr. LEVIN. There is nothing stated beyond that relative to the 
mission in this letter. Of course, we have other statements from them 
as to what their mission is, but this letter does not restate what 
their mission is.
  Mr. BYRD. May I further interrupt the Senator? Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield further?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. That is one of the problems we have had with the 
administration. They have a changing mission. At the beginning, the 
mission was one thing. Then it changed. Then it changed, and it 
continues to change. Now, the Secretary, in his letter, according to 
the quotation by Senator Levin, references ``the mission.'' Well, it is 
a moving target, that mission. That is one of the problems I have with 
this whole situation.
  I just wanted to make that point. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank our good friend from West Virginia.
  General Clark appeared on June 4th before the Armed Services 
Committee,

[[Page S6939]]

and, of course, General Clark commands our U.S. and NATO forces in 
Europe, including Bosnia, and we asked him what effect the adoption of 
a legislatively mandated reduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia would have. 
And this was part of his response:

       I would not favor as a military professional a mandated 
     limit because it would, I think, hinder our accomplishment of 
     the mission on the ground.

  Then he went on:

       In so doing, I think it could jeopardize force protection. 
     I mean, one of the things that has kept our troops safe, and 
     all of our NATO troops, it has been made very clear to those 
     who might seek to do us harm that it will not be tolerated, 
     that we will take action. We made that very clear personally 
     and in many different statements. So if such a commitment 
     were to be taken by those over there that this was some 
     change in policy, that we were somehow less committed, 
     that it somehow meant that we were not as firm in our 
     resolve, then I would say that could pose a force 
     protection threat.

  And he went on a little later in his testimony as follows:

       I hope that we could move through and live with the 
     benchmark approach that we were urged to adopt. We have some 
     pretty specific benchmarks. We will take a look at how long 
     it might take to achieve these. We will try to do all that we 
     can to encourage those who are responsible for them other 
     than SFOR to move as rapidly as possible on this. But they 
     are not, there cannot be deadlines. There are too many 
     intervening factors, and it will just have to be recognized 
     as such.

  Now, these are the benchmarks that were referred to by General Clark. 
This perhaps addresses the issue of our good friend from West Virginia.

       The goal of the military presence--

  And now I am quoting from these benchmarks--

       is to establish the conditions under which the Dayton 
     implementation can continue without the support of a major 
     NATO-led military force.

  And at this point the 10 specific benchmarks are set forth. And after 
those benchmarks are set forth the following statement is made:

       These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their 
     achievement will enable the international community to rely 
     largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil 
     personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence-
     building measures and negotiation to continue implementing 
     the Dayton Accords over the longer term.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire document be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       1. The Dayton cease-fire remains in place, supported by 
     mechanisms for military-to-military transparency and 
     cooperation.
       2. Police in both entities are restructured, re-integrated, 
     re-trained and equipped in accordance with democratic 
     standards.
       3. An effective judicial reform program is in place.
       4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions (e.g. Herceg Bosnia, 
     Strategic Reserve Office, Centreks and Selek Impeks) are 
     dissolved and revenue and disbursement mechanisms under 
     control of legitimately elected officials.
       5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic 
     standards; independent/alternative media are available 
     throughout B-H.
       6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic 
     standards, and results are implemented.
       7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and 
     banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal 
     barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated.
       8. A phased and orderly minority return process is 
     functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having 
     accepted significant returns.
       9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning 
     and a secure environment for returns is established.
       10. The Parties are cooperating with ICTY in the arrest and 
     prosecution of war criminals.

  Mr. LEVIN. We on the committee pressed General Clark to give us some 
kind of timeline for the accomplishment of those benchmarks, and it is 
that timeline, for how long will it take to establish each of these 
benchmarks--to achieve, excuse me, each of these benchmarks that 
General Clark is referring to and he is going to be sending to the 
Congress within the next few months.
  This amendment builds on an amendment to the 1998 supplemental 
appropriations bill that urged the President to seek concurrence among 
the NATO members on the benchmarks detailed in that March 3, 1998, 
report to Congress on estimated target dates for achieving the 
benchmarks and a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving 
the benchmarks. It required a report to be submitted, which was 
submitted semiannually thereafter on such progress.
  NATO has now adopted those benchmarks and will use those benchmarks 
as it conducts its own 6-month reviews of the mission and the size of 
the NATO led stabilization force in Bosnia. Our amendment is designed 
to keep the pressure on our NATO allies, to continue the process where 
the United States is able to withdraw our ground combat forces from 
Bosnia, while our NATO allies and other nations maintain or increase 
their share of the stabilization forces, total force strength in 
Bosnia.
  Again, the amendment does not mandate specific force levels. It does 
not mandate a specific withdrawal or reduction timetable because we do 
not believe it would be prudent to do so. Indeed, based on General 
Clark's testimony and on the letter from General Shelton and Secretary 
Cohen, we believe it could endanger our forces if we mandated a 
specific date for withdrawal or reduction.
  The people who do not want those forces there would then know what 
our forces would be doing and when, when they would be leaving and in 
what numbers. And it is not to their safety, it is not to our 
advantage, it would jeopardize their well-being for us to state 
legislatively in advance that a certain number of troops are going to 
be leaving in a certain number of months or years, or to set forth a 
timetable for the reduction or removal or withdrawal of those ground 
combat forces.
  Well, then, how do we keep the pressure on our European allies? How 
do we let them know we are not there for an indefinite period of time? 
How do we avoid writing that open-ended commitment or blank check? The 
answer is set forth in this resolution which attempts to let our allies 
know that we are not there indefinitely. At the same time, we do not in 
any way undermine the morale or the safety of our forces.
  Finally, Mr. President, the NATO-led mission in Bosnia has been very 
successful. It has been able to carry out its military tasks without a 
single combat death. The civilian implementation of the Dayton accords 
has not proceeded as well as the military implementation, but some 
progress has been made in the last 6 months. The upcoming September 
election, which will involve virtually every elective office in Bosnia, 
will be a major event. If things go well, it could lead to a major 
reduction in the U.S. ground combat presence there.

  I have been to Bosnia on a number of occasions, as have many of our 
colleagues. On each of my visits I have been struck by the high morale 
and the positive attitude of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces 
there. They feel, and I surely concur, that they are making a 
contribution to the maintenance of an enduring peace in Bosnia. Those 
who work with the Russian forces on joint patrols in the United States 
sector also feel that they are contributing to a better understanding 
of, and a closer relationship with, Russia.
  But we have worldwide commitments, and our forces are stretched thin. 
We cannot remain in Bosnia indefinitely. This amendment--it is a 
bipartisan amendment with strong support--serves to pressure our 
European allies to redouble their efforts to bear more of the burden in 
Bosnia so that United States ground combat forces can be withdrawn 
within a reasonable period of time.
  Finally, I will read from the mission statement that guides our 
forces, and then I will put the entire statement in the Record.
  The mission and objectives of the U.S. military forces deployed in 
and around Bosnia are as follow:

       SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will 
     continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide 
     support for civil implementation in a manner similar to the 
     previous approach of SFOR.

  So that is the very narrow mission of the military forces--to deter a 
resumption of hostilities and to provide support for civil 
implementation in the manner that was adopted by the previous force.
  The objective of the current mission will be:

       . . . to consolidate the gains achieved to date while 
     sustaining the current pace of

[[Page S6940]]

     civil implementation. This approach will encourage the 
     implementation process to become progressively more self-
     sustaining without exceeding SFOR's current level of 
     intensity and involvement.

  The key military tasks to create that mission have been set forth as 
follows:

       Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities.
       Preventing removal of heavy or air defense weapons from 
     cantonments.
       Maintaining the operation of the joint military 
     commissions.
       Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and 
     continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of 
     Separation.
       Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords 
     and, if required, enforcing compliance.
       Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovinia.
       Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner 
     similar to the SFOR previous approach, to a secure 
     environment within which civil implementation can continue.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that document setting 
forth the mission, setting forth the key military tasks, and then 
setting forth the key supporting tasks be printed in the Record at this 
time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                Mission

       SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will 
     continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide 
     support for civil implementation in a manner similar to the 
     current approach of SFOR. The objective of the follow-on 
     mission will be consolidate the gains achieved to date while 
     sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. This 
     approach will encourage the implementation process to become 
     progressively more self-sustaining without exceeding SFOR's 
     current level of intensity and involvement. To this end, NATO 
     has established the following tasks:
       Key military tasks:
       Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities.
       Preventing removal of heavy or air defense weapons from 
     cantonments.
       Maintaining the operation of the Joint Military 
     Commissions.
       Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and 
     continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of 
     Separation.
       Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords 
     and, if required, enforcing compliance.
       Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner 
     similar to SFOR's current approach, to a secure environment 
     within which civil implementation can continue.
       Key supporting tasks, within means and capabilities and in 
     a manner similar to SFOR's current approach:
       Supporting the High Representative.
       Supporting phased and orderly returns of refugees and 
     displaced persons by contributing to a safe and secure 
     environment, but not forcibly returning refugees or displaced 
     persons or undertake to guard individual locations.
       Supporting OHR and OSCE in the conduct of elections and the 
     installation of elected officials.
       Supporting the OHR and International Police Task Force 
     (IPTF) in assisting local police by providing back-up support 
     and a secure operating environment towards the creation of a 
     restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking 
     civil police tasks.
       Supporting OHR and OSCE in media reform efforts.
       Supporting ICTY and efforts against war criminals.
       Supporting the OSCE, on a case-by-case basis, in 
     implementing Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
       Supporting the Supervisor in the implementation of the 
     Brcko decisions presently in effect.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator referred earlier to certain 
benchmarks. What are we to understand with regard to the benchmarks, 
and what are they? The Senator put them in the Record. What are they?
  Mr. LEVIN. There are 10 benchmarks that were referred to.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Perhaps I will just read them:

       1. The Dayton cease-fire remains in place, supported by 
     mechanisms for military-to-military transparency and 
     cooperation.
       2. Police in both entities are restructured, re-integrated, 
     re-trained and equipped in accordance with democratic 
     standards.

  Mr. BYRD. What does that mean? What does that mean, ``democratic 
standards''?
  Mr. LEVIN. That means--what it means is, the civilian control over 
the police, and that the police will operate within the standards which 
are followed in democratic countries, which means a semblance, 
presumably, of process for its citizens, avoidance of physical violence 
against its citizens, and the kind of implementation of the law which 
democratic countries seek to achieve.
  I may say to my good friend from West Virginia that it was because 
these benchmarks, in the judgment of many of us, including me, are not 
achievable within a reasonable period of time--that this involves too 
long a period, that this would require some significant restructuring--
that we pressed General Clark, when he was here, for what would be the 
estimated timeline to achieve those kinds of goals.
  This is not the military mission, by the way. This is the civil 
restructuring that mission seeks to support. That was what I just 
previously read from. The military mission is what I just read from a 
moment ago. These are the benchmarks which the Dayton implementation, 
hopefully, will follow and achieve.
  But I must say, I agree with the Senator from West Virginia--at least 
as to what I believe he is driving at--that these benchmarks will take 
a significant period of time. That was the point that I made to General 
Clark. That is why I pressed him very hard to give us the timeline 
within which he believes these individual benchmarks could be achieved, 
because I expressed then, and I will express again: I do not believe 
these benchmarks can be achieved--that these goals, these civilian 
goals, can be achieved within years. I think this will take decades, in 
some instances, to achieve these.
  So if I could just conclude, and I will be happy to yield further.
  Mr. BYRD. I just wanted to say, Mr. President, I think the Senator 
has contributed an invaluable service in so questioning General Clark.
  I did interrupt the Senator. Please proceed.
  Mr. LEVIN. What I simply was saying was, for instance, benchmark No. 
3, ``An effective judicial reform program is in place.'' I said to the 
general, ``My heavens, we are not going to be doing that in a matter of 
years. If it is highly successful, that could take a decade to achieve. 
But we cannot be there that long. We have to let the Europeans know in 
some way that we can only be there for a reasonable period of time, and 
then our ground forces must be removed, because we are stretched thin. 
We are all over the place, all over the world in many different ways, 
and our readiness is going to be jeopardized if we continue to have our 
forces in Bosnia for an unlimited period of time.''

  So what General Clark committed to do is to give us, within a matter 
of months, estimated time lines for achieving these benchmarks. That is 
what we are awaiting. I think it will be very helpful. I think all of 
us look forward to his estimates, as to how long would it take for an 
effective judicial program to be in place.
  He said he is not going to give us a specific year. Then I said, 
``Can you give us a range as to how long it might take?'' He said he 
will go through this, benchmark by benchmark, in order to give us that 
range.
  So I think we are kind of after the same goal here, both making sure 
our mission is clear--and I just put that in the Record, making sure 
that our particular military tasks are clear, and I just put those in 
the Record. But as far as these benchmarks being accomplished, the best 
we are going to do, I think, is to get the time lines, the estimates on 
it, and then make the best judgment as to how long the forces can be 
there while these processes, hopefully, continue.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator did not complete his reading of the benchmarks.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will do that, and then I will be happy to yield the 
floor. There are 10 benchmarks. The third benchmark I just referred to: 
An effective judicial reform program being in place.
  The fourth benchmark--again, this is for civil implementation, now, 
of Dayton. This is not our military mission. I want to be real clear, I 
read our military mission before. I read our military tasks before. 
This is the civil implementation side of Dayton.

       4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions . . . are dissolved . . 
     .

  And they specify which ones they are talking about. And I would be 
happy to

[[Page S6941]]

give you a list. There are four of them: and revenue and disbursement 
     mechanisms under control of legitimately elected 
     officials.
       5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic 
     standards; independent/alternative media are available 
     throughout [Bosnia].
       6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic 
     standards, and results are implemented.
       7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and 
     banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal 
     barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated.
       8. A phased and orderly minority return process is 
     functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having 
     accepted significant returns.
       9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning 
     and a secure environment for returns is established.
       10. The Parties are cooperating with [the International 
     Criminal Tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war 
     criminals.

  Those are the 10.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator to yield for a 
question?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I just want to make sure that it is 
understood by all concerned--and I am asking the Senator this 
question--that the benchmarks that were read are not a necessary 
precondition to our accomplishing the military mission; that the 
amendment that we are offering is an amendment that says our troops 
should not stay there indefinitely; that we should transition to a 
European-only-led force, supported by us but not with the use of U.S. 
ground combat troops.
  I wouldn't want to leave the impression here that the request by the 
Senator from West Virginia, if I can have his attention, the 
establishment of those benchmarks are not necessary for the 
accomplishment of the military mission. I think where the Senator is 
going is the fact that some of those benchmarks may never be 
established. If that was a precondition to our troops staying on the 
ground in Bosnia, they might be there for another millennium.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. COATS. And I want to make sure that everyone understands that the 
amendment that is before the Senate, the sense of the Congress, does 
not address that question, is not meant to address that question.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to respond to the comment. That is exactly 
what my point was. It is because it will take such a long time, in our 
judgment, for those kinds of civilian goals to be achieved that we must 
send a clear signal we cannot be there--
  Mr. COATS. Exactly.
  Mr. LEVIN. As long as it takes for those goals to be accomplished. It 
is because those goals, as important as they are--those are important 
goals; they could take decades, as I just said to the good Senator from 
West Virginia, they could take decades--may never be achieved. Those 
civilian goals may never be achieved. We hope they are, but we cannot 
be there militarily until those civilian goals are achieved, or 
benchmarks, and that is why this resolution is the signal, the 
statement that we must have our ground forces out of there within a 
reasonable period of time.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Michigan 
yield on that point? Did not the President in his explanation for 
keeping our troops in Bosnia beyond December list these benchmarks in a 
report to the Congress? Did he not--I don't have them before me now, 
but it seems to me that I recall he sent a report to Congress.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield for 1 
second? I do have the report, and I know exactly what he is trying to 
say. I would like to read him exactly what it says.
  Mr. LEVIN. If I can respond first, I will be happy to yield in a 
moment. I just read the President's report.
  Mr. BYRD. Wasn't the President saying, in essence, that our troops 
should stay there until these benchmarks have been achieved? In 
essence, wasn't he saying that?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield?
  Mr. BYRD. He has the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy just to yield for a question for the 
moment, but--we are going to get the exact wording--but it is my 
recollection that the President did not say until these benchmarks are 
achieved.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, reading from the report that the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia refers to, in the report the 
President says:

       The exit strategy for U.S. troops engaged in such 
     deployment--

  And then he notes:

       The goal of the military presence is to establish the 
     conditions under which Dayton implementation can 
     continue without the support of a major NATO-led military 
     force.

  And begins to list the concrete benchmarks that the Senator from 
Michigan has just read. I don't exactly know how you can refer to them 
as concrete, because I think that they are not concrete. I think the 
police re-integration, the effective judicial reform, and media 
regulation is a giant leap, and I think the Senator from Michigan 
probably has already said that he also sees that these could be 
limitless. But, in fact, that is the exit strategy that has been put 
forward by the President, and that is exactly why I think the Senator 
from West Virginia is on point to question what is the exit strategy.
  If these are clear benchmarks--the State of Texas doesn't have 
effective judicial reform yet--there are countries in the European 
Union that can't meet the economic test that is set out in this exit 
strategy for Bosnia.
  I think the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from West Virginia 
and the Senator from Michigan are all beginning to agree that we are 
looking at an exit strategy from which there is not an exit in the 
foreseeable future, and I hope that we will be able to clarify this as 
we go down the road. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I can reclaim the floor for a final 
moment. Our resolution, it seems to me, clearly speaks for itself. 
People can try to interpret the President's statement in different 
ways, and I will read one line from it in a moment, but our resolution 
is very clear: Our forces cannot be there indefinitely. We want our 
forces out within a reasonable period of time.
  It is our belief that it will take a long time for these kinds of 
civilian reforms to occur. If you want to read the President's report 
as saying that the forces cannot leave, in his judgment, until these 
are achieved, I think that is really stretching what the President has 
said, but I will read it, and then one can interpret it the way one 
wants:

       The goal of the military presence is to establish the 
     conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue 
     without the support of a major NATO-led military force.

  That is what the President reports. He wants to establish the 
conditions under which progress can continue--``Dayton implementation 
can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force.''
  The way I read that is that these do not need to be reality before 
the President intends to remove combat forces from Bosnia. If one wants 
to read that differently, one is free to do so. But however one reads 
the President's report, what our resolution makes clear is we are not 
going to be there. We don't believe we should be there for as long as 
it takes to achieve this. That is the point of our resolution.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I agree with the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan as to his resolution. I agree with him on that. But from his 
reading of the benchmark items and the language that was in the 
President's report, it seems pretty clear to me that conditions that 
need to exist in order that we no longer keep our troops there are 
conditions that the President expects to be achieved before we remove 
our troops. And those conditions, as the distinguished Senator has 
pointed out, many of them are impossible within my lifetime, if I live 
to be as old as Abraham, that was 175 years; and if I live to be as old 
as Isaac, that is 180; if I live to be as old as Jacob, that is 147 
years; if I live to be as old as Joseph, that is 110 years. So I have a 
pretty long while to go to make that. But sincerely, and seriously, I 
thank the distinguished Senator for his comments.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to just respond to that, because the 
words in the President's language is not ``these need to be achieved.'' 
In fairness--and I do not consider this to be

[[Page S6942]]

an abundantly clear document. That is the reason why I think we should 
speak as to what our own beliefs are, and that is why this resolution 
is introduced. But the document says, ``conditions under which Dayton 
implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led 
military force.''
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. In a moment.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Since we are on this point, I would like to add that 
the sentence above that, ``The exit strategy for U.S. forces engaged in 
such deployment,'' that is the question that was asked by Congress for 
the President to respond to. In response to the question, What is the 
exit strategy? he lists these 10 benchmarks that we have been 
discussing. So----
  Mr. LEVIN. But I think the Senator would need to then read what it is 
in entirety, which is to establish conditions under which 
implementation can continue without the support of major NATO-led 
military forces. But that could be argued to read as that 
implementation of this can continue--not that it has to be achieved 
before the force can leave--but that it could continue after a major--
major; a qualification--NATO-led force can continue.
  But I will simply repeat and then yield the floor. It is because we 
have our responsibility to state what we believe our policy should be 
in Bosnia that this bipartisan resolution has been introduced. We are 
trying to state we are not there indefinitely, in our judgment. And we 
want to let the Europeans know we will not be there indefinitely. We 
are not writing a blank check. We are not making an open-ended 
commitment. We are putting you on notice, we are there for a reasonable 
period of time.
  Now, why don't we set a specific date? Why don't we then say how many 
troops, by what date? The answer is, because our top military leaders 
say that would undermine the safety of our troops. That will jeopardize 
the well-being of our troops. That will play into the hands of those 
that want us out of there by one means or another and that will use 
force if necessary to get us out of there. That is because we want to 
support our troops as long as they are there and not harm them.
  Setting a specific date or setting a specific reduction timetable 
would, in the judgment of General Clark and General Shelton and 
Secretary Cohen, jeopardize the well-being of our troops.
  So what our resolution does is say we want to express ourselves, put 
everybody on notice that we are not there for an indefinite period of 
time. And by the way, we surely are not there until these goals are 
achieved. There is no way--no way --we are going to be there until 
these goals are achieved. But that is the expression of our opinion.
  I would be happy to yield for a question or yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Well, I would like to ask the question, if the 
Senator will yield, and that is, I appreciate your interpretation of 
this because I certainly agree with you that these benchmarks are not 
achievable in a reasonable length of time. But I would just like to ask 
you the question, What is the next step? The President has said this is 
an exit strategy, that these 10 benchmarks could be--would be reached 
without the necessity of major support from the United States. That is 
what is on this page.
  The Senator from Michigan has asked General Clark, What would be the 
timetable to achieve these 10 benchmarks, which I think we all now have 
a consensus are going to be very difficult to quantify? What is the 
next step? If General Clark comes back and says, well, effective 
judicial reform would be maybe 50 years, or 30 years, the civil Dayton 
goals, the reestablishment of minority homeowners in each area of 
Bosnia, the media regulation, these will take 60 years or 40 years or 
25 years, what then is the next step?
  If we have the benchmarks in a report from the President, which we 
are now asking, ``OK, you, Mr. President, have said the exit strategy 
is that these will be achieved without the requirement of a major U.S. 
presence,'' we get the timetable back, we think it is unrealistic to 
have a major U.S. presence for 50 years, and do all of the other 
responsibilities of the U.S. military, what is the next step?
  Mr. LEVIN. First, I think I want to just restate what the President's 
statement here is. It is not that these will be achieved before. That 
is not what this states. It is that ``implementation can continue.'' I 
just want to again reiterate what this document says.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Without the support of a major U.S. force.
  Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely, without the support of a major NATO-led 
military force.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is the exit strategy for the United States.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is the strategy, that implementation can continue 
without the support of a major military force. And what the next step 
is is for General Clark to submit to us, as he said he would, within 2 
months of our hearing, which was early June, June 4--so that, 
hopefully, by the end of July we will then have his timelines for the 
achievement of the benchmarks. At that point we will take whatever 
action we think is appropriate.
  This resolution is aimed at stating what our position is, again, 
relative to not having an unlimited commitment from ground combat 
forces in Bosnia. That is what this resolution says. We are not going 
to do that. We are going to say they are there for a reasonable time 
period. That is what this resolution does, which is what we think is 
the responsible thing to do at this time, without having more 
information as to what those estimated timelines are. But I would not 
want to tell you what action, if any, Congress would appropriately take 
after it receives estimates of timelines, perhaps ranges, from General 
Clark before we actually see his response. I don't think it would be 
responsible for us to project in advance what action, if any, we would 
think would be appropriate beyond adopting this resolution which states 
quite clearly that we intend that our ground forces only be there for a 
reasonable period of time.
  Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. I thank my colleague.
  I just want to make sure that I understand that what he is trying to 
say is that it is important, a discussion over what the benchmarks 
should be or could be or ought to be, or how it ought to be modified, 
and should not be confused with what we are attempting to do in this 
resolution.
  Discussing benchmarks, I say to the Senator from Texas, is perfectly 
legitimate, but not as an objection to the resolution that is before 
us. It is partly, maybe even primarily, I would ask the Senator, 
because of the benchmarks, because we agree that they are indefinite, 
because we agree they are not achievable that we want this resolution.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. COATS. If I could finish my statement.
  The only thing we do not want is for those of us in Congress to tell 
the military how to protect itself. But we want to send a message that 
we do not care what the President's interpretation is; we are dealing 
with what Congress wants to say.
  What Congress wants to say is, Mr. President, I do not care what your 
exit strategy is, whether I agree with it or disagree with it. We 
believe that our troops should not be there indefinitely. We believe 
you should talk to our NATO allies and European allies and tell them 
that Congress does not support an indefinite troop commitment. We want 
our combat forces out of there. We want a European force--if you think 
it is necessary to stay there, you better tell the Europeans to put a 
European force together. If you want our support, logistics support, 
intelligence support, communications support, rapid reaction that might 
help you in a crisis, yes, we can consider that.
  But we want those combat troops out of there. I just don't want to 
confuse the President's policies--exit strategy, benchmarks, General 
Clark's interpretation. That is not what we are about here. We are 
talking about Congress' resolution.
  I ask the Senator if that is what we are up to?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Indiana is the prime sponsor of this 
resolution and is exactly correct.
  Further, in response to his question, I again state that this is our 
expression of what Congress intends, that we intend for Europeans to 
understand, and

[[Page S6943]]

what we intend, of course, for the President to understand.
  Part of this, paragraph 5, is that the President should inform the 
European NATO allies of this expression of the sense of the Congress, 
should strongly urge them to undertake preparations for establishing a 
Western/European Union-led or a NATO-led force as a follow-on force to 
the NATO-led stabilization force, if needed, to maintain peace. In 
other words, there may be a need--in my judgment there will be, by the 
way--for a long period of time for there to be an outside force in 
Bosnia.
  But what this resolution is saying, it cannot have American combat 
forces as part of that force beyond a reasonable period of time and we 
are putting you on notice. Whether we understand your exit strategy, 
whether we agree with your exit strategy, Mr. President, whatever 
differences there are as to the interpretation of it, that is not the 
point. The point is this is what Congress is telling you and telling 
the Europeans. This is not an unlimited commitment. We are sending you 
a very clear statement that we are only going to support the presence 
of American combat forces there for a reasonable period of time. Plus, 
as long as they are there, we will support them. We are not going to 
harm them by setting a specific exit date or a specific reduction 
schedule. We are not going to jeopardize the well-being of our forces 
with a specific date for an exit, because our top military leaders have 
told us that is what the effect would be. We are not going to do that 
in this resolution, at least.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. I simply wanted to say to the Senator from Indiana and the 
Senator from Michigan, I think I was the first to raise questions about 
benchmarks. In so doing, I did not mean to imply that I was against the 
amendment that Senator Thurmond has offered. I don't mean that at all. 
I just picked up on Senator Levin's reference to benchmarks and asked 
some questions about them. I intend to support the amendment.
  As to the distinguished Senator's reference to the military leaders, 
our military leaders, in part, helped to get us right where we are now. 
We were misled by some of our military leaders at the very beginning of 
the discussions concerning Bosnia. I have great respect for our 
military leaders, but I don't accept their word as having come down 
from Mount Sinai, as being engraved in stone. They listen to the 
President. They say whatever the President thinks. They all do. And 
very seldom will they venture to say something that isn't in accordance 
with the administration's viewpoint.
  I intend to say something about this subject matter later, but I 
wanted to wait to listen to what the distinguished Senator from Texas 
has to say first.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have had a lot of talk here. It is 
about time for action now.
  At this time, I yield to the able Senator from Virginia, Senator 
Warner.
  Incidentally, for the record, Senator Warner served as a sailor in 
World War II. In his career he served in the Marines; he served as 
Secretary of the Navy. He is the ranking Republican on this committee. 
He has had vast military experience.
  I am very pleased at this time to yield him such time as he desires.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. That was unexpected. 
I assure you that my very modest record of military service pales in 
comparison to yours, having been the only Member of the Senate to have 
landed on June 6, 1944, D-day.
  Moving on, this is a very important debate, if for only the reason 
here we have some of the most intelligent persons debating documents 
which read with clear English language, yet we can't seem to come to an 
agreement. That signifies the desperate need for clarity to our policy. 
That clarity has to come from the President of the United States.
  This debate was really fostered some months ago by the efforts of our 
distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia, and the 
Senator from Texas, when they, consulting with members of the Armed 
Services Committee, and others, showed various proposals. Those 
proposals manifested, in my judgment, the unrest, certainly within the 
Senate and I think largely within the Congress, that we could not keep 
going on and going on as we have been, and that it was inflicting a 
very severe penalty upon research and development budgets, readiness 
budgets, procurement budgets, and that we must bring this debate to the 
floor of the Senate so that Senators can have expressions and perhaps 
pass a resolution and/or an amendment or, in whatever form, to manifest 
our great concern.

  I wish to compliment the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator 
from Texas for their efforts. The Armed Services Committee took into 
consideration their views. As a result, we have this amendment today by 
the distinguished ranking member and the Senator from Indiana, which I 
intend to support.
  My concern is that as I listen to this debate it is clear to this 
Senator that our American troops, particularly the combat troops, are 
simply hostage, I repeat hostage, to the uncertainty of what these 
goals are and what the time is within which they are achievable. As a 
consequence of this amendment, I am concerned that the President and 
others will take it into consideration and come back to the Congress 
with specificity and clarity.
  It will be, in my judgment, impossible for this Congress in the few 
weeks remaining, to make a decision on this subject. My concern is that 
we really not make a definitive decision other than this amendment, for 
the following reasons: No. 1, as the Senator from Michigan said, in the 
course of General Clark's appearance before the Armed Services 
Committee, which was a hearing dedicated to the subject of Bosnia and 
at which we received one of the most profound and eloquent 
dissertations by the Senator from West Virginia, expressing the 
responsibilities of the Congress of the United States as being parallel 
and equal in every precedent to those of the President--an excellent 
statement.
  But General Clark, when pressed--this Senator was particular in 
urging him to assess these goals, for General Clark to go back to the 
various individuals, government entities and the like, and to establish 
a timetable within which they could be achieved. Now, my understanding 
of his reply and my recollection was that he felt he could not provide 
the Congress, particularly the Senate, with that reply much before 
September. That was my recollection.
  Now, also in September are a very important series of elections that 
will take place in Bosnia. Step one is the Clark report. Step two are 
the elections in Bosnia. Hopefully, those elections will again point in 
the direction towards greater achievement of the overall Dayton 
accords. Then we have to recognize that this Congress ends and a new 
Congress will come in the January-February timeframe, and that they--
possibly new Members, possibly different views--they will then have 
their opportunity to express their views.
  I think decisions by the Congress as to the future level of funding, 
which is pointed out by the Senator from Indiana, is our explicit 
authority here, will probably have to await until early next year. In 
that interim, we have called upon the President, subsequent to General 
Clark's announcement, to come forward no later than, I believe, 
December 31, of this calendar year and give us a detailed report.
  We are beginning to lay the foundation now, expressing to the 
President, and indeed to our allies, the unrest that exists in the 
Congress, which unrest is reflective of the people across the United 
States. And that time is running out. We have made a significant 
contribution in terms of our men and women of the Armed Services 
Committee working with our allies. We have made a very significant 
financial commitment of $9.5 billion.
  My concern at this particular moment is that we are walking something 
of a high wire, because as we are discussing, I think in a very 
responsible way, these issues, at the same time we have to take notice 
of the fact of the unrest in Kosovo. With all due respect for my 
colleague from Texas, I see there is a direct correlation between the 
actions we take in Bosnia and the possible consequences in Kosovo. I

[[Page S6944]]

readily admit, as my colleague from Texas points out, the legalities--
namely, that Kosovo is a sovereign part of the Serbian State and, as 
such, it is a civil war. But I say to my colleagues that if the 
continued criminal hardships being inflicted upon innocent people in 
Kosovo become portrayed in greater detail, and we experience greater 
and greater levels of suffering of those people, all those legalities 
go to the side. Once the pictures of the horror begin to emanate --and 
I hope they will not--in further amounts from Kosovo, everybody will 
recognize that there is a conflict that responsible nations of the 
world must participate in, in trying to bring about a cessation.
  I urge my colleague from Indiana--and I am certain my colleague from 
Michigan heard--I hope nothing we do here today can in any way be 
utilized by those forces trying to continue the criminal acts being 
perpetrated in Kosovo to give them any encouragement to continue those 
acts. What we are doing today is an important debate, but it is not to 
be construed in any other way but that the United States will assume 
its responsible role, along with our allies, in trying to stem the 
crisis that is developing in Kosovo.
  As we speak, the President has dispatched Mr. Holbrooke--soon, I 
hope, to be confirmed as our U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations--a man who had a great deal to do with reaching the accords in 
Dayton and who has had extensive experience in this area. It is our 
hope that he can bring about a strong message that will eventually 
bring stability in the Kosovo region. What we do today will have 
consequences, and it is walking the high wire that nothing be 
interpreted as lessening our intent to stop the killing, the rape, and 
so on taking place in Kosovo.
  I will return to the debate. It is clear that these Dayton accords, 
as pointed out by the Senator from West Virginia, the Senator from 
Texas, and others, are holding hostage the need for troops. I agree 
with the Senator. He said they are not achievable unless there is a 
military force in place, and the part that we play or do not play 
remains to be seen, be it combat or support in that continuing military 
force, because I am sure that the Dayton accords--no matter what time 
within which we will require their ultimate achievement--would require 
a security force, and that security force must perform only military 
missions. They cannot perform the missions to directly achieve the 
accords. But only by their presence and the infrastructure that they 
maintain in place--namely, some semblance of law and order--can we hope 
to achieve any of the Dayton accords. So I commend my colleagues.
  I intend to support this amendment. But I see a direct linkage 
between the problems in Bosnia and the developing problems in Kosovo. I 
hope that nothing as a consequence of this debate today will ever be 
construed by anyone as undermining the efforts of our Government, 
because I remember so well in the early debates--and this Senator was 
never in favor of sending in combat troops; the record is clear on 
that. But once that decision was made and once we have become a party 
and a partner--and I underline ``partner''--with our allies and 
achieved the Dayton accords, then I feel we are there and we should not 
jeopardize the $9.5 billion and the personal sacrifices of our troops 
by doing something precipitous now that would undo the progress in 
Bosnia.

  But there is a direct correlation between Bosnia and Kosovo. We used 
to argue that we have to contain Bosnia so it doesn't spill over into 
Kosovo. The opposite could happen now. The problems in Kosovo could 
spill over into Bosnia and begin to undermine the progress we made in 
Dayton. We have to proceed with great caution.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question of the 
Senator from West Virginia. I did not intend to speak before the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia. If it is his desire to speak 
first, I am happy to wait.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I certainly do 
not wish to speak in advance of the Senator from Texas. I very much 
appreciate the courtesy, but I am very content to wait and listen to 
the Senator.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you.
  Mr. President, first, let me say I thank the distinguished Senator 
from West Virginia, because he and I have worked together. We have 
introduced a bill--the Byrd-Hutchison bill--which would produce a 
downsizing of our commitment in Bosnia in, I think, a reasonable 
timeframe, taking into account the safety of our troops. I will talk 
about that in a few minutes. He has been a leader in this effort, and 
he is a member of the Armed Services Committee. He has provided a lot 
of input into this debate and certainly a background that none of us 
can match because of his years in the Senate and his scholarly pursuits 
in Senate history.
  I also want to thank Senator Thurmond, Senator Levin, and Senator 
Coats for putting forward this amendment. I think this sense of the 
Senate is a good start. It certainly sends the signal to the President 
and the administration from Congress that Congress is very concerned 
about the policy. I think it is very clear from the recent debate that 
many of us do not consider that the exit strategy put forward, in 
response to our question, from the President is a serious exit 
strategy. It cannot be considered a serious exit strategy, because I 
think when General Clark comes back with a timetable, it is going to be 
totally unacceptable, and I think everybody on this floor agrees that 
it is too nebulous to be in any way dubbed a concrete and clear 
benchmark.
  I want to respond because Senator Byrd and I have spoken on this 
subject and we feel, I think, very strongly about the role of Congress 
and the importance that Congress exercise its responsibility under the 
Constitution. That is why we have been active in this area and why I 
think it is important that we take this first step with the Thurmond-
Levin-Coats amendment, and that we eventually go further in making sure 
that Congress is a part of any effort by the President to have a long-
term commitment of our troops in a foreign land.
  In fact, that is what the Constitution envisioned. It is very clear 
if you read the Federalist Papers, if you study the Constitution, if 
you read the debate, that our founders had an example. The example was 
a king, a monarchy--a monarchy in which the king not only declared war 
for his country, Great Britain, but the king also paid for it, 
implemented it, did the strategy. It was all a power of the monarch. As 
the founders of our country were debating what they wanted, they said 
they wanted it to be hard to declare war. In fact, in the debate, I 
will quote from James Wilson, the delegate from Pennsylvania, who said:

       We must have a system of checks and balances in this area 
     that will not hurry us into war. It is calculated to guard 
     against it. It will not be in the power of a single man or a 
     single body of men to involve us in such distress, for the 
     important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature 
     at large.

  Mr. President, we have a situation here in which there is no 
declaration of war. So we have a shift of power toward the President, 
putting our troops into combat positions, or into peacekeeping 
positions, certainly into harm's way--however you would like to 
describe it--unilaterally.
  Congress has since World War II, I think it can be fairly said, 
continued to allow the President to encroach more and more on the 
responsibility that was clearly given in the Constitution to Congress, 
because, in fact, it should be hard to declare war. It should be hard 
to put our troops into harm's way except in an emergency, which I think 
all of us would agree is within the power of the President to address.
  So now we have a situation where more and more the President is going 
forward on his own and Congress is stepping back and allowing the 
President to take the power without our input, and even when we 
disagree with the President, unfortunately, I think we have been timid 
about standing up.
  I believe it was this timidity that caused the extended Vietnam war. 
I think we extended it by not exercising the responsibility of 
Congress, which clearly knew that this was not a war in which we should 
be, and most certainly not one in which so much American blood should 
have been shed.
  Mr. President, here we are now with an exit strategy given to 
Congress by

[[Page S6945]]

the President that is not realizable--an exit strategy that many States 
of the United States couldn't meet as benchmarks.
  On the effect of the judicial reform program, police in both entities 
are restructured, retrained, and equipped in accordance with democratic 
standards; media-regulated in accordance with democratic standards; 
independent alternative media available; free market reforms; 
functioning privatization; banking laws; an IMF program in place.
  Mr. President, these are worthy goals. They are worthy benchmarks, 
and I hope we work toward them. But this is not an exit strategy for 
U.S. forces.
  I am pleased that so many Members of Congress agree with that, and 
are beginning to take first steps that would say to the President you 
don't have carte blanche to watch our military move into a dangerously 
hollow force while you are spending $10 billion of taxpayer money on 
this kind of effort with no exit strategy. That is what is happening.
  I am pleased that we are going to begin to take the first steps to 
say to the President we want an exit strategy; we want an exit strategy 
that is reasonable, and we want an exit strategy that is responsible as 
an ally.
  Everything that Senator Byrd and I have done has been to try to work 
with our allies as a responsible ally, not to exit totally from Bosnia 
as a requirement, but to say we want to do our fair share, and we want 
our allies to work with us to allow us to continue to have a military 
that is capable of responding in the only way that America can respond, 
and that is with our unique capabilities, our unique technology, our 
unique modernized equipment, and our uniquely trained forces, which are 
the best in the world. We don't need our best fighting forces to do the 
police-keeping mission that we are doing in Bosnia, which can ably be 
done by many other of our allies.
  So my goal is going to be to support this very good beginning, but to 
say that we must be willing to stand up and force this issue because we 
are going in the wrong direction. We are allowing our military to 
become hollow because we are in unending missions. Our troop morale is 
suffering. We are losing experienced people, because they are gone from 
home so much on missions that they do not see as essential. If you talk 
to military people, as I have, that is what you will hear. They will be 
there when they see that it is a U.S. security interest. They have 
always been. But they do not understand continuous deployments when 
there is no emergency, as they see it, and when they see no exit 
strategy.

  I am very pleased that the Senator from West Virginia made the 
specific point of trying to determine what the mission is. Is it a 
clear mission? He asked what the benchmarks for the exit strategy were. 
I think it became very clear to anyone who listened that the benchmarks 
are no exit strategy at all. They are worthy goals. But they will not 
be met in our lifetime. And, indeed, many countries of Europe do not 
meet them today.
  I hope the Senate will take the first step. But I hope the Senate 
will not be timid about its responsibility under the Constitution, and 
take further steps along the way.
  We are going to continue to have other amendments to other bills that 
will provide the United States an opportunity to speak to our allies to 
determine how we can work together to downsize the U.S. commitment, to 
help our allies in every possible way within the bounds of reason, 
because we do have other commitments. We must respond, if there is a 
real security threat to our country, or to any of our forces in the 
field, and we are losing our edge.
  Mr. President, I hope that this is a first step, not a last step. I 
hope the President will hear what the Senate is saying with this sense-
of-the-Senate resolution. It is a good resolution. The President should 
work with NATO allies to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from Bosnia 
within a reasonable period of time.
  That is the resolution. I agree with that--that a NATO-led force 
without the participation of the U.S. ground combat forces in Bosnia 
might be suitable for a follow-on; that we, the taxpayers of the United 
States, have spent $9.5 billion over the last 6 years at a time when 
our military is telling us that we are dropping in modernization; that 
we are dropping in our recruitment. We are losing experienced people. 
We must as responsible Members of the Senate question the priorities in 
spending for an operation that has no exit strategy.
  We want to take this first step. I certainly do. But I want the U.S. 
Senate to remember our part of the Constitution. If we fail to keep our 
part of the Constitution working, we are failing in our duty and our 
responsibility to the people of our country, and most certainly to 
those combat forces who are putting their lives on the line every day.
  We would never jeopardize troop safety in anything we do.
  I want to say that Senator Byrd's and my two bills that have been put 
forward both exempt totally the troops that are necessary for the 
safety of the troops that are on the ground.
  We want a responsible exit. We want to be responsible allies. We are 
not walking away from our responsibility to our allies. But we do not 
think it is fair for the United States to continue to bear the lion's 
share of the burden in Bosnia. We are now twice as many troops as our 
nearest ally, and I do not think that is a fair allocation.
  So, Mr. President, I think this is a good first step. I think the 
United States is taking a necessary first step. I hope the President 
will listen to the concerns that have been raised in this very good 
resolution, and I hope the Senate will be willing to continue to work 
on legitimate, responsible parameters around this Bosnia mission.
  And just one more response to the Senator from Virginia. I think that 
this must be separated from Kosovo for many reasons. One is Kosovo is 
an independent country and requires a different set of references. We 
have been in Bosnia for 6 years, really more. We have been working on 
the Bosnia issue. Kosovo, we have yet to take the definitive action, 
and I do support the President for getting his emissaries in and trying 
to bring these people to the peace table. I want to be shown to support 
that effort, and I hope that it works.
  I think the Bosnia issue is much different, and I think we have 
worked toward coming to some sort of clear mission and clear exit 
strategy in Bosnia for many years, since I have been in Congress, and I 
think now is the time for us to exercise our responsibility under the 
Constitution and become more firm in how long we will be in a mission 
in which our troops will be engaged, will be in harm's way, and for 
which there is no congressional approval as I think is required by the 
Constitution in spirit if not in actual terms.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will yield for a question.
  Mr. McCAIN. Did the Senator just yield the floor? Parliamentary 
inquiry.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I did not yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has yielded for a question.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's clarify the question of the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thought I heard the Senator from Texas yield the floor. 
I was asking if that was the case.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator was asked if she will yield for a 
question, and she did yield for a question.
  Mr. WARNER. My question would be, we have our differences on the 
legal--clearly, the Senator is correct about Kosovo--independent and 
the like. But it just has been my experience that once the television 
pictures and stories come back across the ocean as to the horror and 
pillage, and so forth, that could take place in greater porportion than 
now, then this whole thing blends together, and I do see a direct 
linkage between the turmoil in one geographic area and turmoil in 
another just a bare few miles away.
  But my concern, and it goes to both my distinguished colleagues from 
West Virginia and Texas; I have followed and respect greatly their 
efforts here, but we are about to get a report from General Clark which 
will throw, I think,

[[Page S6946]]

some very clear light on this otherwise unclear situation as the time 
within which the goals for Dayton can be achieved. We are about to 
experience the results of elections in Bosnia which we all hope, again, 
will move towards a more rapid resolution of the remaining problems in 
Bosnia.

  The distinguished Senator from Arizona--and I have read through his 
amendment, which I support--is going to list, I think, some very 
important analysis from the President, Secretaries of Defense and 
State, and then we have the fact that a new Congress is coming in. So 
my concern is what can we hope to achieve now were we to move along the 
lines of the amendment which I have seen from the distinguished Senator 
from West Virginia and the Senator from Texas, given that so much 
remains to be done, and those actions--the Clark report, the elections, 
the fact that we are going to have a new Congress--in my judgment, all 
have a direct bearing on what we can achieve by way of reductions in 
the specific numbers of troops over this period. So I thank the 
Senator. If the Senator cares to reply, I would appreciate it.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator.
  I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that we 
have had benchmarks that are clearly not achievable in any lifetime 
that we are going to have. We have had deadlines that have failed to be 
met. I think it is time that Congress stand up and say we are looking 
at the facts. The facts are we are having a harder time recruiting for 
the military. We are having a harder time funding the modernization and 
the technology. We haven't even addressed missile defense systems. And 
yet we know now that two more countries have joined the nuclear club; 
that we are talking to troops--at least I am--who are very low in 
morale, and people who not only are not coming into the service, but 
our experienced people are leaving, and I think it is time that 
Congress take the responsibility to address these concerns. One of them 
is a mission with no exit strategy, which is, I think, an ill-defined 
mission, and no clear policy that shows our enemies or our allies where 
we would go in the future.
  Kosovo is another issue. There are problems erupting in India and 
Pakistan. Certainly, Iraq is still on the horizon, not to mention 
Korea. The United States has the unique responsibility in the world to 
provide a security umbrella in a lot of places, and I want to make sure 
that we are going to be strong enough to respond when there is a threat 
to U.S. security. And if we continue to sit back and let deadline after 
deadline and benchmarks that do not hold water go forward, I think we 
are abdicating our responsibility.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator, and I certainly 
associate myself with her concerns as to the overall posture of our own 
Armed Forces, which have been degraded, and I so stated in my opening 
comments, by the heavy expenditures associated with Bosnia. And you are 
quite correct; the India-Pakistan series of regrettable events has, I 
think, spurred other nations to look more and more to biological and 
chemical missilery and other weapons in the area of mass destruction 
and, indeed, we are all, I think, deeply concerned when we read the 
reports that, indeed, Iraq was preparing its weaponry to incorporate 
the biological material in its missile heads, and all the more reason 
to proceed with this missile defense program which for years the 
Senator from Texas, myself and others have been urging be adopted.
  I yield floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator from Virginia. I think when you 
look at these other potential necessary points of U.S. defense 
callings, we have to look at our budget, our defense dollars, our 
modernization, our technology and our will along with the morale of our 
troops, and we have got to say that there is a red flag out there, and 
if we do not do something about the priorities, we are going to have a 
hollow force at a time when we really need it. And I think that is the 
responsibility of this Senate to address and to make sure that it does 
not happen on our watch. I appreciate what the Senator from Virginia 
has said. I appreciate the leadership he has shown, along with Senator 
Thurmond and all of those. I think we all have the same goal. I just 
hope that we can all as a group of 100 independent operators come 
together and realize that because we are so diverse, we cannot allow 
ourselves to be inept in action, in doing the right thing that all of 
us, I think, are seeking to do. That is what happens in a legislative 
body. It is not an easy, clear direction that you can point a 
legislative body to. But nevertheless, I hope we can overcome the 
inherent problems in dealing in a legislative body and do something 
strong and courageous and decisive and fulfill our responsibility under 
the Constitution for our country, for those who are serving our country 
in the military, and for our future generations.

  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I 
believe, has an amendment. Does he wish to call that amendment up at 
this time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. BYRD. No, no, I am recognized. I am not yielding the floor. I am 
merely asking the Senator from Arizona if he would like to call his 
amendment up.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to 
respond to the Senator from West Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Without his losing the right of the floor.
  Yes, I have a second-degree amendment, I say to the Senator from West 
Virginia, concerning this issue that is before us. I believe it is not 
controversial. The Senator from Virginia supports it, and others. It is 
concerning reports that are required about progress in our mission in 
Bosnia and certain benchmarks for us being able to determine how long 
we have to remain there.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator is pressed for 
time right at the moment, I will be glad to yield to him for that 
purpose.
  Let me say, before I do so, I congratulate the distinguished Senator 
from Texas on her statement and on the work that she has done in 
preparing legislation on this very issue that has been discussed. I 
also congratulate the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his work 
on the committee and I commend those who have prepared the Amendment 
that has been offered by Mr. Thurmond, which I intend to support, and I 
hope it will be unanimously agreed to. I think it goes in our 
direction, but I don't think it goes far enough. But I think it is 
moving in the direction that Senator Hutchison and I favor.
  Mr. President, I have waited 3 hours to address the Senate. I want to 
speak on the same subject. I have had my share of entries into the 
colloquy by interrupting others and asking questions. I am perfectly 
content to desist and await just a few minutes longer, if the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona wishes to call up his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia to do that, and I thank him. I think it would be important 
because this amendment is germane to this debate and should be before 
the Senate. And then, of course, immediately after it is sent to the 
desk, the Senator from West Virginia would give us his important 
analysis of the debate.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time would the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona need?
  Mr. President, I yield the floor for not to exceed 5 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona, and I ask unanimous consent that I 
may regain the floor at that time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.


                Amendment No. 2977 to Amendment No. 2975

   (Purpose: To require the President to submit to Congress certain 
     reports on the missions of United States forces in Bosnia and 
                              Herzegovina)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment at the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2977 to amendment No. 2974.


[[Page S6947]]


  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       After subsection (b) of the amendment insert the following:
       (c) One-Time Reports.--The President shall submit to 
     Congress the following reports:
       (1) Not later than September 30, 1998, a report containing 
     a discussion of the likely impact on the security situation 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the prospects for 
     establishing self-sustaining peace and stable local 
     government there that would result from a phased reduction in 
     the number of United States military personnel stationed in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina under the following alternatives:
       (A) A phased reduction to 5,000 by February 2, 1999, to 
     3,500 by June 30, 1999, and to 2,500 by February 2, 2000.
       (B) A phased reduction by February 2, 2000, to the number 
     of personnel that is approximately equal to the mean average 
     of--
       (i) the number of military personnel of the United Kingdom 
     that are stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina on that date;
       (ii) the number of military personnel of Germany that are 
     stationed there on that date;
       (iii) the number of military personnel of France that are 
     stationed there on that date; and
       (iv) the number of military personnel of Italy that are 
     stationed there on that date.
       (2) Not later than October 1, 1998, a report on the status 
     of the NATO force of gendarmes or paramilitary police 
     referred to in subsection (a)(1), including the mission of 
     the force, the composition of the force, and the extent, if 
     any, to which members of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States are participating (or are to participate) in the 
     force.
       (d) Report To Accompany Each Request for Funding.--(1) Each 
     time that the President submits to Congress a proposal for 
     funding continued operations of United States forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the missions of United States forces 
     there. The first report shall be submitted at the same time 
     that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 2000 to 
     Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
     Code.
       (2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the 
     following:
       (A) The performance objectives and schedule for the 
     implementation of the Dayton Agreement, including--
       (i) the specific objectives for the reestablishment of a 
     self-sustaining peace and a stable local government in Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina, taking into account (I) each of the areas of 
     implementation required by the Dayton Agreement, as well as 
     other areas that are not covered specifically in the Dayton 
     Agreement but are essential for reestablishing such a peace 
     and local government and to permitting an orderly withdrawal 
     of the international peace implementation force from Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina, and (II) the benchmarks reported in the 
     latest semiannual report submitted under section 7(b)(2) of 
     the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act 
     (revised as necessary to be current as of the date of the 
     report submitted under this subsection); and
       (ii) the schedule, specified by fiscal year, for achieving 
     the objectives.
       (B) The military and non-military missions that the 
     President has directed for United States forces in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina in support of the objectives identified pursuant 
     to paragraph (1), including a specific discussion of--
       (i) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in 
     connection with the pursuit and apprehension of war 
     criminals;
       (ii) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in 
     connection with civilian police functions;
       (iii) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in 
     connection with the resettlement of refugees; and
       (iv) the missions undertaken by the United States forces, 
     if any, in support of international and local civilian 
     authorities.
       (C) An assessment of the risk for the United States forces 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including, for each mission 
     identified pursuant to subparagraph (B), the assessment of 
     the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the 
     nature and level of risk of the mission for the safety and 
     well-being of United States military personnel.
       (D) An assessment of the cost to the United States, by 
     fiscal year, of carrying out the missions identified pursuant 
     to subparagraph (B) for the period indicated in the schedule 
     provided pursuant to subparagraph (A).
       (E) A joint assessment by the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of State of the status of planning for--
       (i) the assumption of all remaining military missions 
     inside Bosnia and Herzegovina by European military and 
     paramilitary forces; and
       (ii) the establishment and support of forward-based United 
     States rapid response force outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     that would be capable of deploying rapidly to defeat military 
     threats to a European follow-on force inside Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, and of providing whatever logistical, 
     intelligence, and air support is needed to ensure that a 
     European follow-on force is fully capable of accomplishing 
     its missions under the Dayton Agreement.
       Redesignate subsection (c) of the amendment as subsection 
     (e).

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I understand I have 5 minutes. I thank the 
Senator from West Virginia for his courtesy.
  Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment concerning the continuing 
U.S. military presence in Bosnia. This is a second degree amendment to 
amendment No. 2975.
  Mr. President, I believe everyone in this body knows that I have long 
had serious concerns about our mission in Bosnia. From the time the 
IFOR mission was first briefed to the Congress, I knew the job could 
not be completed in one year--nor against any arbitrary deadline. 
Instead, I urged the Administration to set concrete objectives and 
benchmarks for measuring success.
  Now, as many members have pointed out, we are in an open-ended and 
ill-defined military commitment. The Administration has scrapped all 
the artificial deadlines. But no clear set of objectives and well-
defined military missions has taken its place. We seem to drift in and 
out of going after war criminals, of using the military to resettle 
refugees, and of taking on a direct political role in parts of Bosnia 
in the name of supporting international civilian authorities. The role 
of our military has expanded, and there is no end in sight.
  The answer to this problem, however, is not to go back and set new 
artificial deadlines. Bosnia is a long-term, complicated problem. It 
involves not only the warring factions, but has direct effects on 
Croatia and Serbia, including Kosovo, and threatens to spillover to the 
wider Balkan region. The credibility of NATO and especially the United 
States is tied up with finding a solution for the Bosnia crisis. It 
would be sheer irresponsibility, probably leading to renewed warfare, 
if we were to precipitously pull out of Bosnia after investing so much. 
It would be a betrayal of our commitment to cooperating with our 
Allies. And it could well lead to an even more costly and dangerous re-
introduction of American forces to stop the renewed fighting.
  Dealing with the Bosnia crisis--even if though our objective is to 
get American troops out of there--requires treating Bosnia as a serious 
long-term challenge. It is not an issue that lends itself to artificial 
deadlines for withdrawal. Nor is there any rationale to forcing the 
Congress to vote by some artificial deadline. Worse still would be a 
funding cut-off, which would only punish our troops for the failure of 
policymakers in Washington to craft a viable long-term policy.
  Handling the Bosnia crisis requires us to look beyond just this 
fiscal year. It requires the United States to develop a multi-year 
strategy that sets out our objectives, the means for achieving these 
objectives, and a target timetable for getting us there--but no phony 
deadlines. For the sake of our troops, we need to set out clearly the 
military and non-military missions they are being asked to perform. 
``Creative ambiguity'' may be useful in politics, but it is dangerous 
for soldiers. We need to be honest with ourselves about the risks we 
are asking our troops to face, and the costs to the taxpayers of 
continuing the mission.
  I am convinced that the direction we should be taking is to move 
toward a force made up of European nations inside Bosnia, with U.S. 
forces just ``over-the-horizon'' outside of Bosnia--providing a rapid 
response capability to deter or defeat security threats, and providing 
logistical, intelligence, and air support to the European forces inside 
Bosnia. This step would free up U.S. forces to prepare for other 
contingencies.
  But it is not possible to achieve this goal simply by setting 
arbitrary numbers and deadlines for troop withdrawals. Doing so could 
provoke a crisis with our Allies and could have the effect of simply 
setting a timetable for restoring violence to Bosnia. Instead, 
achieving this goal requires working together with our Allies and 
realistically taking account of the situation inside Bosnia.
  Mr. President, my amendment seeks to do exactly these things. It 
expresses the sense of the Senate that we need to have a clearer 
picture of our objectives, timetable, missions assigned to our 
military, risks, and costs. It expresses the sense of the Senate that 
we should be moving toward a European force inside Bosnia, and a U.S. 
``over-

[[Page S6948]]

the-horizon'' capability outside Bosnia. It also says it is time to 
stop treating Bosnia as an unplanned emergency and include funding for 
operations there as an addition to the defense budget.
  My amendment also imposes a number of reporting requirements. Each 
time the Administration submits a budget request for funding military 
operations in Bosnia, the Administration must clearly state its best 
assessment of six items:
  (1) Our overall objectives and multi-year timetable for achieving 
these objectives--taking account of the benchmarks already required 
under the supplemental appropriation passed earlier this year; (2) the 
military and non-military missions the President has directed U.S. 
forces to carry out--including specific language on our policy on war 
criminals, returning refugees, police functions, and support for civil 
implementation; (3) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 
assessment of the risks these missions present to U.S. military 
personnel; (4) the cost of carrying out our strategy over several 
fiscal years. (5) the status of plans to move toward a European force 
inside Bosnia with a U.S. force outside Bosnia that would deter threats 
and provide support to the European force; and (6) an assessment of the 
impact of reducing our forces according to the timetable proposed in 
the original Byrd-Hutchison amendment.

  This may seem like a detailed and onerous reporting requirement, but 
it is nothing more than the kind of long-term planning the 
Administration should be doing anyway. And by requiring it in a report 
to Congress, we ensure that the Congress is operating off the same set 
of assumptions and plans as the Administration. This will give us an 
opportunity to look more thoughtfully at the real challenges in Bosnia 
and structure our decisions more appropriately. Instead of broad swipes 
through artificial deadlines or prohibitions on certain missions, we 
will be able to target our policy choices more effectively.
  Finally, Mr. President, my amendment requires that if the Senate 
votes to discontinue funding for continued operations in Bosnia, the 
Administration must submit a withdrawal plan within 120 days. This 
language does not impose any artificial procedure or deadline on the 
Senate. Rather, it acknowledges that the Senate already has the right 
at any time to vote to discontinue funding for Bosnia operations. The 
question is whether the Senate chooses to exercise this right. If it 
does, and the vote is to pull out, then the Administration must present 
a withdrawal plan within 120 days.
  Mr. President, no one is more frustrated than this Member; all of us 
are. The administration came over and said our troops would be out in a 
year. We knew that wasn't true at the time. Then they came over and 
said they would be out in a year and a half. We knew that wasn't true 
at the time. And the frustration that many of us felt as members of the 
Armed Services Committee during that period was enormous because we 
knew that there was no way that we could possibly have our troops exit 
on a date certain which was not an exit strategy. The purpose of this 
amendment is to try to force an exit strategy from the administration 
so we have expectations as to, No. 1, what our goals are and, No. 2, 
how they can be achieved.
  I also am a student of the Constitution. I also understand the role 
of the U.S. Senate to advise and consent, and if the U.S. Senate wants 
the troops withdrawn from Bosnia, all we have to do is, on the 
Department of Defense appropriations bill, cut off all funding. That is 
all we have to do. We have that right --and that responsibility, in the 
view of some.
  What we don't have the right to do, because we don't have the 
commensurate responsibility, is to devise a strategy for Bosnia. How in 
the world do we know what troop levels can be dictated so we will know 
that those young men and women are secure? That is why we have 
generals. That is why we have a Pentagon. That is why we have a 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is why we have a National 
Security Adviser and a Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. President, we give them that responsibility that is not a 
legislative function, to set troop levels. If the Senator from Texas 
wants them out, get them out. I will be glad to debate and discuss an 
amendment that says no further funding as of whatever date she wants. 
But to say at some date there should be a certain level of troops--from 
whence does this information come? From whence does this judgment that 
5,000 or 10,000 or 50,000 is the right number of troops?
  Mr. President, occasionally I put myself in the role of a military 
commander, a position that I aspired to but never achieved. I cannot 
imagine--I cannot imagine, as a military commander, trying to meet a 
national security threat saying, ``Wait a minute, I've got to be down 
to 5,000''--or 10,000 or 20,000 or whatever it is. I am the one who is 
supposed to decide that, along with the Commander in Chief. Then we 
come to the Congress for approval or disapproval. That is the way the 
system should work. We cannot have the Senate, the U.S. Senate, decide 
what number of troops are there.
  So, I believe that this administration has failed in devising a 
strategy. They have failed in giving us an exit strategy. They have 
deceived, really, the Congress and the American people, when they first 
came over and said that they would be out by a certain date.
  But at the same time, to set troop levels, I think, is very, very 
dangerous, not only for our troops and the men and women who are there, 
but is a dangerous precedent.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I appreciate 
his courtesy, as always, that he extends to every Member in this body 
in allowing me to propose this amendment and make it part of the 
debate.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might, just for purposes of 
management, seek recognition for a moment. Can the Senator from Arizona 
advise us with regard to the yeas and nays?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator withhold the yeas and nays, because the 
yeas and nays have been ordered on the underlying amendment. I wonder 
whether or not the Senator might accept a voice vote on the second-
degree amendment. I think it has strong support.
  Mr. McCAIN. I withdraw my request for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
West Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the original amendment by Senator Hutchison 
and myself does not set troop levels.
  The original amendment offered by Senator Hutchison and myself does 
not cut off money for the troops.
  The original amendment by Senator Hutchison and myself does not 
withdraw troops from Bosnia.
  The original amendment by Senator Hutchison and myself sets no 
termination date for withdrawal of American troops from Bosnia. It does 
not jerk the rug out from under our troops.
  The amendment which the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs. 
Hutchison, and I would have offered and may offer at another time on 
some bill provides that the President--the Commander in Chief, if you 
will--submit to Congress a report, a plan, no later than February 2, 
1999, for reducing the military personnel of the United States in 
Bosnia to an average of the numbers of troops that Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Germany have in Bosnia, the other members of the 
contact group--an average--and that that reduction occur by February 2 
of the year 2000.
  That is not setting troop levels. That is not withdrawing American 
troops. We are saying, ``We'll stay there with you; we'll stay there, 
but it's about time that the other members of NATO take on a greater 
part of the burden.'' After all, this situation has developed in their 
own backyard, not in ours.
  We are not saying we are going to withdraw. We are not suggesting 
that the money be terminated. We are not suggesting that American 
troops get out lock, stock, and barrel. We are simply saying that we 
should at least be able to reduce our troops, now that there is 
stability in Bosnia, we should be able to reduce our troop level to an 
average, we would say, of the troop numbers that are involved from the 
other members of the contact group.
  I think Great Britain has 5,000 involved. France has something like

[[Page S6949]]

2,500. Germany has something like 2,500. Italy has fewer. And we are 
saying to the President, ``Now you submit us your plan--your plan. 
Submit us your plan, and you don't need to submit it tomorrow or the 
day after tomorrow or next month. Submit it by February 2 of next year, 
just the plan. Tell us how you, Mr. Commander in Chief''--that magic 
term, that all-encompassing, worshipful term, ``Commander in Chief''--
``you tell us how you can get our troop levels down to an average of 
those of Great Britain and Germany and France and Italy, and by 
February 2 of the year 2000.''
  What is wrong with that? Is there someone here who would say to me 
that the Congress under the Constitution doesn't have a right or 
doesn't have a duty even to submit such an amendment calling on the 
Commander in Chief to do that? ``Just let us have your plan, Mr. 
President. You have lots of time now. We're putting our allies on 
notice that we want our troop levels to be down to an average of what 
theirs are. It doesn't have to be an exact average. Certainly, instead 
of 7,000, it could be 3,500 by then, but we'll still be there with 
you.''

  What got us into this situation, Mr. President, I have heard it said 
that our military leaders, our generals, our Commander in Chief, have 
to make these decisions as to troop levels. I don't quarrel with that, 
but these are the same people, these are the same individuals--there 
may have been some changes since 1995 and 1996, perhaps some changes in 
the identity of the personnel in those respective positions, but it is 
the same administration that got us where we are, the same 
administration that misled the Congress, misled us into the belief that 
our troops would be there no longer than 1 year, roughly a year.
  We were told that. We were told that on the Armed Services Committee. 
The distinguished Senator from Indiana and the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan were there when the committee discussed this matter. That 
is what the administration told us, and the distinguished Senator from 
Indiana has set forth a litany of the dates and the things that were 
said in keeping with the idea that the United States would be involved 
there roughly only a year. He has done that for the record, and I 
consider that to be a service. That is what was there.
  They are the very people who misled us in the beginning. That is why 
some of us feel that we haven't been dealt with fairly from the 
beginning, and that it is about time that the administration come 
forward and give us some reliable statements, give us some reliable 
data upon which we can depend and the American people can depend. I 
don't think I have voted at any point against the funding or any 
authorization of troops in Bosnia. I don't think I have. I am going to 
check to make sure, but I was misled along with everybody else.
  I doubted, at the time, that the administration would have us out in 
a year. I was listening to the Commander in Chief through his Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through his Secretary of Defense, in 
their appearances before the Armed Services Committee. I listened.
  We took them at their word. You see where we are today. That was 
1995, and now this is 1998. I just want to shed a little history for 
the record--for the record--not necessarily for all Senators. Some 
Senators probably know more about the record than I do. Certainly 
several of them are in a good position to remember as much about it as 
I can. But for the record, I want to state a little of the history of 
this situation.

  To begin with, in a nationally televised address on November 27, 
1995, President Clinton justified dispatching U.S. troops to Bosnia as 
part of IFOR by saying U.S. engagement was needed to stop the great 
suffering caused by the war, to bring stability in Europe, a region 
vital to U.S. interests, and to maintain U.S. leadership in NATO. 
President Clinton said that the deployment would last--and I quote--
``about one year.''
  In subsequent statements, administration officials asserted that U.S. 
forces would be out of Bosnia by the end of 1996. President Clinton 
decided on April 30, 1996, to keep U.S. forces in IFOR at full strength 
through the Bosnian election on September 14 in order to support the 
election process. He said the United States would maintain a robust 
force in Bosnia until IFOR's 1-year mandate expired on December 20, 
1996. However, administration officials continued to insist that U.S. 
forces planned to leave Bosnia within a few weeks after December 20, 
1996.
  On November 15, 1996, President Clinton said that the administration 
had agreed in principle to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a new 
NATO-led peacekeeping force for Bosnia. President Clinton said the 
force would remain there until June 1998.
  Now, let me read that again. On November 15, 1996, President Clinton 
said the administration had agreed--the administration had agreed; did 
not say that Congress had agreed; the administration had agreed--in 
principle to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a new NATO-led 
peacekeeping force for Bosnia. President Clinton said the force would 
remain there until June 1998.
  So there the administration had already changed their position. No 
longer was it said that we would be there about a year. Then it was 
said by the President that we would remain there until June 1998.
  On December 18, 1997, President Clinton announced that he had agreed 
in principle that U.S. forces should participate in a Bosnian 
peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expires in 
June 1998. He did not set a new departure deadline, but said the force 
would leave only when key peace implementation milestones have been 
achieved. This follow-on force has been unofficially dubbed ``deterrent 
force'' or DFOR by some observers. So it went from IFOR, which was 
``intervention force''; to SFOR, which was ``stabilization force''; to 
DFOR, which was ``deterrent force.''
  Mr. President, this is the administration. It was they who said, in 
the beginning, that American forces would be in Bosnia for about 1 
year. We took them at their word. But then, as time went on, the 
administration, the President, the Commander in Chief, set new dates. 
After all, Congress sometimes is faced with a very difficult situation. 
And that is what we are faced with. Things are more complicated than 
they were in 1787 at the time the Constitution was written. Things are 
very complicated.
  Here is what Congress is faced with. The administration uses the 
cloak ``Commander in Chief'' to put our men and women in foreign areas, 
in foreign countries where they are in danger; takes them away from 
their families, away from their loved ones, away from their 
hearthstones, away from their homes--puts them in foreign countries 
where they are in danger. They may never come back. They go, and they 
are there because the Commander in Chief sent them, whoever he is--it 
may be a Democrat or it may be a Republican.

  I respect the Commander in Chief, whoever he is, be it Mr. Reagan, be 
it Mr. Bush, be it Mr. Clinton. I respect that office. But our troops 
are sent overseas. Congress did not vote to send them overseas. We are 
told they will be there about a year. The year comes and the year goes; 
they are still there. Then we are told they will be there until June 
1998. It is now June 1998, and June is about gone.
  Then we are faced, we in the Senate, we in the Congress are faced 
with the choice of providing money for the military that has been sent 
abroad. They did not ask to go abroad--these soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and marines. They have been sent by the Commander in Chief. Then we are 
faced with the dilemma.
  The administration knew that when it told the Congress that our men 
and women would be there about a year. The administration knew that 
once they were there, Congress would be faced with a dilemma. And, of 
course, Congress--we are going to support our military people wherever 
they are. The administration knows that. They knew that back in 1995. 
We had our doubts on whether we were deliberately misled, the 
administration knowing that they could not do this within a year. How 
am I to know?
  Some of us are becoming aware of the fact that we have been dealt 
that hand more than once. We had the same hand dealt to us in Somalia--
the same hand. And there have been other places as well.

[[Page S6950]]

  But I think this is why the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, and 
I, and others, are just becoming a little distrustful of what the 
administration says about these matters. And we want to have a hand at 
the end of the leash. We want that constitutional leash to be there. 
The power of the purse, of course, is the most fundamental, the most 
basic, the greatest power in Government--the power of the purse.
  We want a hand at the end of the leash. We are not saying, you have 
to take the troops out. We are not saying, you have to set certain 
levels. We are just saying, as I indicated earlier, let us know by 
February 2, 1999, Mr. President, how you would suggest that we reduce 
those to a certain level that is more in keeping with what the other 
major parties are doing in Bosnia. And you reach that level by February 
2, 2000.
  Now let me lay the predicate by reading into the Record what the 
Constitution says. Now, how much responsibility, how much power, how 
much authority does the Commander in Chief have? After all, the framers 
had in mind making doubly sure that the Commander in Chief was a 
civilian, not a military officer; and that this civilian, the 
President, would have the authority over the military. The framers were 
determined that a civilian would have supreme authority over the 
military. They placed that authority in the President. He would be the 
Commander in Chief. He would be superior to the military. It would not 
be a military officer who would be Commander in Chief. It had to be a 
civilian officer, selected by the people through electors who, in turn, 
would elect a President. A civilian would be the Commander in Chief.
  The framers were very jealous of that power. They knew the history of 
England. They knew that the King was the Commander in Chief and the 
admiral in chief and that the King in England raised armies and 
maintained navies, that the King in England declared war and declared 
peace, and that the King in England made the regulations for the 
governance of the Armed Forces. They were determined that no King would 
do that in this country. They were determined that no President would 
sit as a King in this country.
  The President, a civilian, was to be the Commander in Chief.
  Now, I want to read for the Record everything that is in this 
Constitution with respect to the powers of the President--the Commander 
in Chief--when it comes to the military.
  So I look to Article II of the United States. Here it is, Article II 
of the Constitution of the United States. ``The executive power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States of America.''
  That sentence vests the executive power in one person, the President 
of the United States. It is just that simple. There is your separation 
of powers.
  Now, I want to read everything that is in this Constitution that has 
to do with the Commander in Chief and his power. Here we go. Section 2, 
Article II:

       The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
     Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
     States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
     States;

  Now, who provides for the calling of the militia into the actual 
service of the United States? The Congress. I will read that a little 
later. The Congress provides for the actual calling of the militia into 
the service of the United States.
  Then in the second paragraph of section 2:

       He [meaning the President, the Commander in Chief] shall 
     have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
     to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present 
     concur;

  In England, the king could make treaties, but the framers decided 
that that power in this country, under this Republic--it is not a 
democracy, it is a republic--under this Republic, would be shared 
between the President and the Senate.
  Continuing to read:

       and he [the President, the Commander in Chief] shall 
     nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
     Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . [and other public 
     officers].

  So, there again, the King in the motherland from whom most of the 
Members came either directly or by their ancestors, the King appointed 
the officers. But in this Republic, the President can appoint them by 
and with the consent of the Senate.
  So that is a power that the framers decided to share.
  Now, there is one more phrase.
  Section 3, the President, the Commander in Chief, ``shall Commission 
all the Officers of the United States.''
  Now, there it is, lock, stock, and barrel, every bit of it, all of 
it. There is the Commander in Chief's powers with respect to war. There 
it is. I have read all that the Constitution says regarding the 
Commander in Chief.
  He shall be Commander and Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States and of the militia of the several States when called into the 
full service of the United States; he shall have power by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds 
of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with 
the advice of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors; and, finally, he 
shall commission all the officers of the United States.
  That is it. So the President is Commander in Chief. The Constitution 
doesn't say what his powers are as Commander in Chief. He is Commander 
in Chief of the Army and the Navy if Congress provides an Army and Navy 
for him to command.
  So much for the Commander in Chief. Now, let's read what the war 
powers of the Congress are, according to the Constitution. Here they 
are with regard to warmaking:

       The Congress shall have power to lay and collect Taxes . . 
     . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense . . .

  Section 8, the very first sentence. I will go ahead:

       The Congress shall have Power To . . . borrow money . . .

  The President doesn't have that power.

       The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce 
     with foreign nations . . .

  That is a very important power in peace and in war.
  Continuing, still, in section 8 of Article I of the Constitution:

       The Congress shall have Power To . . . define and punish 
     Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
     Offenses against the Law of Nations . . .

  Continuing:

       The Congress shall have Power To . . . declare War, grant 
     Letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning 
     Captures on Land and Water . . .
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . raise and support 
     Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be 
     for a longer Term than two Years . . .
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide and maintain 
     a Navy.
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . make Rules for the 
     Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . .
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for calling 
     forth the Militia . . .
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for 
     organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for 
     governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service 
     of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, 
     the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
     training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed 
     by Congress . . .

  Continuing in Article I, section 8;

       The Congress shall have Power To . . . exercise like 
     Authority over all Places . . . for the Erection of Forts, 
     Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards . . .
       The Congress shall have Power To . . . make all Laws which 
     shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
     foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
     Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
     any Department or Officer thereof.

  Including the Department of Defense, or officers thereof, which 
includes the Secretary of Defense.
  So there you are. Then in Article I, section 9:

       No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . .

  Congress makes the law. So I have taken the time of the Senate--and 
Senators have been very kind to listen--to read into the record that 
which any Member of the Congress, or any individual, can at any time he 
or she wishes to read for himself or herself from the Constitution of 
the United States. All of the authority of the Commander in Chief is 
there in the Constitution. That is all. And all of the authority is 
there in that Constitution for the Congress, when it comes to 
warmaking.

  From my reading of those portions of the Constitution, it appears to 
me that

[[Page S6951]]

Congress has the authority and the duty, on behalf of the people from 
whom all power comes, in whom all power resides, under this 
Constitution--Congress has the responsibility and the duty to ask 
questions and to make laws, and to make appropriations, and to draw 
lines in the sand. Yes; Congress has the authority there to decide 
overall troop levels. One will find that most of the lawmaking powers, 
most of the authority and the powers that deal with the military forces 
and with military actions, rest in the Congress of the United States. 
Don't blame me for that. You are not arguing with me, you are arguing 
with the Constitution. I have read the pertinent parts of the 
Constitution into the Record.
  Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes, I will.
  Mr. COATS. The Senator certainly understands that the Senator from 
West Virginia has a much greater grasp of the Constitution than this 
Senator from Indiana. But I am having difficulty understanding how the 
power of Congress to regulate troop levels--and I understand that we 
set force levels. The Congress, through our committee, authorizes 
certain force levels for the Army, for the Navy, and the branches. But 
I don't understand how that would apply to the deployment of those 
forces or the utilization of those forces within a specific military 
exercise. I don't know that that is a power that is granted to the 
Congress. I don't see that here in the Constitution.
  Mr. BYRD. I don't think that I said that.
  Mr. COATS. Perhaps I misunderstood the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. Perhaps I didn't speak clearly. There are those who say 
that the Congress doesn't have authority to do this, Congress doesn't 
have authority to do that. If the Congress wanted to limit the troop 
levels in the war to 5,000 men, is the Senator telling me that Congress 
doesn't have the authority under the Constitution to say there will be 
5,000 and no more in this theater or that?
  Mr. COATS. I don't see what grants the Congress the power to do that.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator doesn't?
  Mr. COATS. I don't. I wonder if the Senator could point out that 
portion of the constitutional powers that grants Congress that 
authority.
  Mr. BYRD. Well----
  Mr. COATS. I understand how Congress has the power to establish the 
level of the militia, the level of the Army, the number of individuals. 
I suppose if Congress said there shall be no more than 5,000 members in 
the U.S. Navy, that would impose a limit to how many troops could be 
deployed, and the maximum number you could deploy would be 5,000. But I 
don't see where once the level is established, and we have established 
a level of nearly 500,000 Active Army, for instance, I don't see how 
that would translate to Congress having the power to dictate how that 
500,000 force level would be assigned.
  Mr. BYRD. I don't, either. I don't think Congress would attempt to do 
that. But I think Congress has the power and has the authority to say 
there will be no more than 5,000.

  Mr. COATS. Total.
  Mr. BYRD. Total.
  Is that the troop level?
  Mr. COATS. Yes.
  Perhaps I was extrapolating wrongly. I thought the Senator was 
indicating that power would be vested with the Congress relative to the 
Byrd-Hutchison amendment which sets a level--attempts to set, to 
dictate a process which would set a level for total number of troops 
that would be engaged. Perhaps this Senator--
  Mr. BYRD. No. The Senator heard me. The Senator was in here earlier 
and heard me say that the Hutchison-Byrd amendment did not do that, did 
not dictate troop levels.
  Mr. COATS. Would that amendment not lead to Congress making the 
decision on that?
  Mr. BYRD. No. It states specifically that the President, the 
Commander in Chief, shall submit to the Congress the plan by February 
2, 1999, which will bring the force levels of the United States in 
Bosnia down to a certain number which is more in keeping with the 
numbers that are provided by Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain.
  Is there anything unfair about that?
  We don't say it has to be 2,000, or 2,500, or anything like that.
  Mr. COATS. But as a condition, that level is required; a level is 
required to be reached on the basis of an average of ground force 
levels of other NATO troops, specified troops from Great Britain, 
Germany, France, and Italy that arrives at a specific number.
  Mr. BYRD. What is wrong with that? We are saying to the President, 
``You tell us how you would get it down to something which, in the eyes 
of the American people, who are paying the taxes to keep our forces 
over there, would be a fair level in view of the fact that we have 
carried most of the burden thus far. We have helped stabilize the 
situation. Why isn't it fair?'' But let the President tell us how he 
would go about doing it and bring it down more in keeping with what the 
other leading countries of NATO are providing.
  Mr. COATS. I would respectfully say to the Senator, my reading of the 
amendment indicates that it would do more than that. It doesn't just 
ask the President as Commander in Chief to tell us what the numbers 
shall be. It tells the President of the United States that he has to 
submit to us a number which is the average of four other countries' 
participation. That requires the President to tell us a specific number 
dictated by the decisions made by the King.
  Mr. BYRD. Right.
  Mr. COATS. Made by Great Britain, made by France, made by Italy.
  Mr. BYRD. What is wrong with that?
  Mr. COATS. I think there is a great distinction between asking the 
President, ``What do you think the force should be? What, in your 
judgment as Commander in Chief, with the advice and consent and 
assistance of your military commanders, should the number be to perform 
a certain mission?''--there is a great distinction between that and a 
direction to the President of the United States saying, ``You must give 
us a number based on an average of troops that are committed by nations 
outside Congress' control,'' and it cannot exceed that.

  The President here couldn't have the discretion to say, ``Well, we 
need whatever troops are necessary to protect, or complete our mission, 
or carry out our mission in this part of the world, or to protect our 
forces.'' The President is being dictated to arrive at a number, which 
the President may disagree with, or the Commander in Chief, or the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagrees with in terms of 
ability to carry out that mission.
  That is my concern with the Byrd-Hutchison amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. What is the Senator's question? Is he saying that, under 
the Constitution, Congress cannot ask the President to do this?
  Mr. COATS. I do not understand where in the Constitution the power is 
vested in Congress to specify not the total force level but to specify 
military strategy.
  Mr. BYRD. Where in the Constitution does it say that the Commander in 
Chief can do that? Where in the Constitution can the Senator point to 
me that the Constitution says the Commander in Chief can do that?
  Mr. COATS. This Senator interprets the power given to the President 
to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. 
``Commander in Chief'' implies that person is in charge. That person 
makes the decision.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator interprets that.
  Suppose Congress doesn't raise and support any Army. Suppose Congress 
does not provide and maintain a Navy. Then what does the Commander in 
Chief command?
  Mr. COATS. Nothing.
  Mr. BYRD. He is Commander in Chief. But he has no Navy, and he has no 
Army to command.
  Mr. COATS. I agree with the Senator. If the Congress does not choose 
to give the President the military force, he has nothing with which to 
command. But if the Congress does give him forces and raises an Army 
and a Navy, this Constitution designates that the President of the 
United States is commander of that Army.
  Mr. BYRD. And that is all. Just that he is Commander in Chief.
  Mr. COATS. The duties of Commander in Chief are to direct that Army, 
to deploy that Army when necessary to defend the United States.

[[Page S6952]]

  Mr. BYRD. This doesn't say that. This Constitution doesn't say that.
  Mr. COATS. Is the Senator saying those are the decisions to be made 
by this Congress?
  Mr. BYRD. I am reading the Constitution.
  Mr. COATS. So am I.
  Mr. BYRD. Let me read it.

       The Congress shall have Powers . . . To make Rules for the 
     Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces.

  And:

       The Congress shall have . . . Power to provide for calling 
     forth the Militia . . ..

  It doesn't say the President has the power to call forth the militia. 
It doesn't say the President has the power to make rules for government 
and regulation of land and naval forces.
  I am reading the Constitution, Senator. I am not interpreting it. I 
am reading it word for word.

  Mr. COATS. I ask the Senator, what does the Senator believe the 
founders intended to be the powers of the President as Commander in 
Chief? What would be his duties as Commander? What does the word 
``commander'' imply, or state, or mean?
  Mr. BYRD. They saw the benefit in having one individual lead the 
military forces of this country.
  Mr. COATS. How does that individual do that?
  Mr. BYRD. If Congress declares war.
  Mr. COATS. It only applies if Congress declares war.
  Mr. BYRD. I see. The Senator wants to play games.
  Mr. COATS. No. The Senator wants to understand the Constitution.
  Mr. BYRD. This Senator cannot teach the Senator from Indiana how to 
understand the Constitution. I can only read the Constitution. And it 
is pretty clear.
  Mr. COATS. This Senator is reading the Constitution. It says the 
President shall be Commander in Chief.
  Mr. BYRD. Period. That is it. That is all.
  Mr. COATS. If I am in charge of my office, I make decisions about how 
that office performs its duties. If the President is Commander in Chief 
of the military, he makes decisions about how the military performs its 
duties.
  That is my understanding of the word ``commander.''
  Mr. BYRD. The Constitution doesn't say anything about how the Senator 
would operate his office.
  Mr. COATS. The Senator was using an analogy to try to illustrate the 
role of Commander.
  Mr. BYRD. It is not a good analogy, if I may say so most 
respectfully.
  Mr. COATS. Then I will go back to my first question, respectfully.
  Mr. BYRD. Then I will go back to my first answer.
  Mr. COATS. How are we to interpret the role and the meaning of the 
word ``Commander in Chief''?
  Mr. BYRD. In the first place, the courts might do the interpreting at 
some point.
  Second place: Read the Constitution. Congress has power over the 
purse strings.
  I hope the Court will decide that the Line Item Veto Act is 
unconstitutional. I hope it will do that before it goes out for its 
recess.
  Congress having the power over the purse, Congress having the power 
to declare war, Congress having the power to raise and support armies, 
having the power to provide and maintain a navy, having the power to 
make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces, having the power to provide for calling forth the militia.
  It would seem to me that a reading of the Constitution would indicate 
that the basic power, the power of the purse, is the basic, 
fundamental, rock bottom power in this Government. There is no greater 
power. There is no power as great as the power of the purse. That is 
vested here.
  It would seem to me that a reading of this Constitution would 
indicate that Congress has more power and authority under the 
Constitution than many Senators are willing to admit.
  Mr. COATS. I am not disagreeing with the Senator on that point 
whatsoever.
  Mr. BYRD. All too many Senators appear to be thinking that the 
Commander in Chief can do this, the Commander in Chief can do that, and 
that we ought to follow along like the tail on a kite and do whatever 
the Commander in Chief decides should be done.
  I am just saying that Congress has these powers in this Constitution 
and Congress should raise some questions. And Congress certainly has 
the authority to rein in the Commander in Chief if it sees fit.
  Mr. COATS. I do not disagree with the Senator a bit on anything he 
has just said.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. COATS. But the question I asked the Senator is whether that power 
extends to once that force is raised, once Congress determines to raise 
an army, once Congress appropriates funds for that army, once Congress 
establishes force levels and sets the rules, at what point does 
Congress, does that extend--I should add, does that extend to the 
actual utilization by the Commander in Chief of the power--does the 
Congress have the power to determine how those forces then should be 
deployed to protect and defend the interests of the United States?
  Mr. BYRD. The distinguished Senator appears bent upon splitting 
hairs.
  Mr. COATS. But that is the essential question.
  Mr. BYRD. I am not interested in splitting hairs.
  Mr. COATS. That is the essential question.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator says at what point does Congress have that. 
Congress before, before it provides for calling forth the militia, 
before it creates an army, before it creates a Navy, it certainly has 
the power and authority not to do those things; it has the power to 
issue regulations. I am not suggesting that the Congress ought to try 
to get into the nitty-gritty, teensy-weensy little details of this and 
that. Of course, there has to be one person who can command the 
military forces of this country.
  Mr. COATS. That is the Senator's question.
  Mr. BYRD. I am saying the Congress has not done its duty, and I am 
taking my responsibility along with others. We have not done our duty. 
Congress has the responsibility not to follow along after the President 
like my little dog Billy follows after me. The Commander in Chief is 
just a man like I am. I respect the Presidency. I respect the President 
of the United States. I have never served under any President--that is 
the way I look at being a Senator--but he puts his britches on just 
like I do, one leg at a time. No more. And he is there for 4 years, 
unless the House impeaches him. He can't impeach us, but the House can 
impeach and we can convict him and take him out of that office, and we 
can also provide that he can never again hold an office.
  I am not one who bows down to the President, who bows down to any 
Commander in Chief. I am not one who believes we have to do what the 
Commander in Chief says, but I respect the Commander in Chief. I 
haven't cast a vote, I don't think, against our having personnel in 
Bosnia. I haven't done that. But I am certainly not one who says that 
Congress has to follow the Commander in Chief.
  Now, if the Commander in Chief is ever a Republican again, I daresay 
there won't be as many people on that side who will stand up and 
challenge his powers as I stand up and challenge the powers of a 
Democratic President. As far as I am concerned, under this Constitution 
there is no Democrat; there is no Republican. He is the President of 
the United States. He is in there for 4 years, and that is it, unless 
he is reelected.
  I have been here for 40 years. I hope to be here 40 years more, if 
the Good Lord lets me live that long. But don't look at this Senator 
and say I am picking on the President. I am not picking on the 
Commander in Chief. I am simply saying that we here in the Congress 
have not stood up to our duties under this Constitution. And I do not 
read under this Constitution where we have to follow any President 
lock, stock, and barrel, line, hook and sinker. We do not have to do 
that. We can set a line, and we can say ``this far and no farther. If 
you want to keep our troops in Bosnia longer, come back, Mr. Commander 
in Chief, come back and we will decide whether or not we want to open 
the purse strings and provide more appropriations.''

  Mr. COATS. Well, in response--perhaps I should let the Senator finish 
and then I will respond on my own time.

[[Page S6953]]

  Mr. BYRD. I hope the Senator doesn't think he has to respond.
  Mr. COATS. The Senator feels that he should respond because----
  Mr. BYRD. I am not challenging the Senator.
  Mr. COATS. I am not challenging the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. I am talking about the Commander in Chief, in the abstract. 
I haven't said anything about the Senator from Indiana. He shouldn't 
feel he has to respond to me. He has a right to if he wishes, but I 
hope the Senator will know I haven't challenged him.
  Mr. COATS. No, the Senator didn't take it that way at all. The 
Senator is simply trying to get an answer to his question as it applied 
to the language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment which has been talked 
about today, and trying to understand the role of the Commander in 
Chief vis-a-vis the role of Congress in that specific, requiring that 
specific requirement of the President as Commander in Chief relative to 
that language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment. I was just trying to 
clarify it.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator apparently doesn't believe the Congress has the 
authority to do what the Hutchison-Byrd amendment would require. I hope 
he does. I think it does.
  Congress can limit troops by limiting funds for missions. No one 
questions that. There is great reluctance to placing limits on 
missions. But when we come to a place where an administration doesn't 
level with the Congress, then it is about time that the Congress 
thought about putting some limits on missions, and Congress has the 
constitutional authority to do it. Don't think it doesn't. I have been 
around here for 40 years in this Senate and 6 years in the other body, 
and as far as I am concerned I am getting a little tired of Presidents 
and Commanders in Chief and their administrations misleading 
Congresses. This isn't the first time it has been done. It has been 
done before.
  Madam President, I think I have said about everything already that I 
have in my prepared remarks. I have read the pertinent parts of the 
Constitution that deal with the Commander in Chief's war powers and the 
war power and authority that rests with Congress. I do not say this 
disrespectfully towards our Commander in Chief. I would say the same if 
he were Republican. The Constitution is not partisan. I hope that we 
can be able to agree on some legislation--and it is extremely difficult 
under the circumstances--particularly in regard to the situation we 
have in the Balkans. And I agree with the distinguished Senator from 
Texas, Mrs. Hutchison. In my own mind, I can keep separate the 
circumstances and conditions that we face in regard to Bosnia from 
those which we might have to face in Kosovo.
  I don't understand what our security interests are in relation to 
Bosnia. But I do understand what our security interests can be when it 
comes to Kosovo. I think Congress has to recognize it has a duty here, 
not just to let the administration do whatever it alone thinks best. 
And I think we owe the President that kind of consideration. I would 
hope that we could come out with some kind of proposal, certainly in 
the long run, that would clearly state what the exit strategy is or 
what the limitations are, what is the deadline, what are the phases by 
which we reduce our forces.
  I do not have the magic bullet. I don't claim that the Hutchison-Byrd 
amendment has the magic bullet. I have taken the time at this point to 
quote the pertinent provisions of the Constitution for the Record, 
Madam President. I don't claim to add to them or to subtract from them. 
Here they are.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, first of all, I have great respect for 
the Senator from West Virginia. His knowledge of the Constitution 
certainly is far deeper than mine is, or perhaps will ever be. And I 
also share his deep concern about the duplicity of this administration 
in terms of its dealings with Congress on the issue of Bosnia. What was 
assured to the Congress by the President and his designees prior to 
deployment in order to secure congressional support and appropriations 
for that deployment is far from the picture that exists today. Many of 
us knew that, once in, it would be tough to get out, and that a year, 
probably, would be far insufficient to accomplish the mission that was 
there, that was outlined for us. This is the reason I voted against it 
in the first place.
  As well-intended, as humanitarian, as compassionate as the decision 
was to try to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia, there was no realistic 
means by which that nation could be reborn into a nation of multi-
ethnic harmony that would at least be accomplished within that 1-year 
period of time, or perhaps even a decade or more. So, many of us feared 
that, once in, we would have trouble getting out.
  I certainly agree with the Senator from West Virginia when he says 
that the Constitution clearly gives Congress the responsibility for 
providing the funds for the first person in uniform, the first ship 
ever built, setting limits on how many ships we build or the size of 
our force. The question that the Senator from Indiana was trying to 
raise, and still doesn't feel he has the answer to, is whether or not 
the power extended to the Congress extends to defining how that force, 
once raised, is used in defense of the Nation, in defense of our vital 
interests. Which is the entity, the Congress or the President as 
Commander in Chief, that makes the decision establishing a process by 
which decisions are made, through his military commanders, about 
utilization of the forces that are raised after the Congress 
appropriates the funds to raise those forces? And it goes to the 
specific question of whether or not we have the authority, in Congress, 
to set specific limits to how those troops, once raised, within that 
category of troops--who has the power to do that.
  But let's set that aside. Let's assume that the power given to the 
President as Commander in Chief is nothing more than titular. It is 
just simply a title. It is a phrase that means nothing. It grants no 
power. It just simply says the President of the United States is the 
titular head of the Army, but there are no powers that go with the 
title of ``Commander,'' or the role of ``Commander''--that all powers 
are vested in the Congress.
  Let's say that the courts interpret the Constitution to clearly mean 
that Congress makes decisions on how troops are deployed, where they 
fight, whom they fight, how they fight, how many infantry are needed, 
how many tanks are needed--make the military strategy decisions. It is 
inconceivable to this Senator that our Founding Fathers thought that 
would be a power delegated to the Congress, but let's assume that it 
was. Would we want to do that? Would we want to put ourselves in the 
place of a military commander, with his training and years of 
experience, honed through hard experience in many cases, to make a 
decision about how we protect those forces and how we deploy those 
forces? It just seems it would be perhaps the most unwise thing 
Congress could ever do. Who would ever want to take on that 
responsibility? Which one of us would want to say that, for the 
protection of our forces deployed overseas in a hostile environment, we 
should be the ones to make the determination about how many troops are 
necessary to protect those forces, what weapons are necessary to 
protect those forces, what enablers are necessary to protect those 
forces? I am not sure any of us would want to do that, even if we did 
have the power.

  But that is a debate that I think we will have again. The amendment 
before us is not the Byrd-Hutchison amendment, which this Senator 
supports parts of but not all of, because I think it dictates a 
specific force level inappropriately and I don't think that is 
something that we ought to do.
  But the amendment that is before us is one that I think is supported 
by most Members. It simply says that we want to advise the President 
that we don't think an indefinite troop deployment in Bosnia. We want 
the President to understand, the Congress is not going to continue to 
support that policy. But the decision that vests with us is whether or 
not to pay for it. That is the power given to us under the 
Constitution. And, to echo the words of Senator McCain from Arizona, if 
you want the troops out of Bosnia, cut off the funds. That is our 
responsibility. But if you are going to appropriate the

[[Page S6954]]

funds, let's let the Commander in Chief and the people he designates as 
leaders of those troops make decisions as to how those troops are 
deployed and at what levels they are deployed, and not have the 
Congress dictate force levels.
  So, I agree with the Senator from West Virginia. We ought to follow 
our constitutional responsibility. That constitutional responsibility 
is to vote on the appropriations, yea or nay. That is the honest, 
straight-up vote. That is the debate we ought to be having. In the 
meantime, we would like to send a message to the President of the 
United States. That is what a sense of the Congress is. The message 
that we would like to send to the President of the United States is: 
Mr. President, we are concerned that we are looking at an indefinite 
troop deployment at considerable cost to the taxpayer in Bosnia, and we 
don't see the light at the end of the tunnel. Because of that, we are 
just giving you a warning flag.
  We are not going to continue to appropriate funds for this unless we 
have some idea of how we are going to get out of this morass and 
whether or not this is achieving the goals that have been set out.
  So, therefore, we would like you, understanding that message, to 
begin consultations with our NATO allies and European friends and begin 
the process of telling them, ``You can't count on us indefinitely. We 
need to move toward a European force. Now, we will provide support for 
you, but we are not going to provide combat troops on the ground much 
longer. So let's move forward with this process.''
  That is the amendment that is before us. I think it is a message that 
needs to be sent. We can have debate on whether or not Congress has the 
power or whether or not it is even wise for Congress to get into the 
specifics of how troops are used once they are there. We will have that 
debate at another time.
  Madam President, I don't know that there is any further debate on 
this particular amendment. It does not mean we can't further debate on 
Bosnia or another amendment, but if there is no further debate on this 
particular amendment, we need to voice vote the McCain second-degree 
amendment and then have a recorded vote on the underlying amendment. I 
do, however, see the Senator from New Hampshire on his feet, as well as 
the Senator from South Carolina.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Reed from Rhode Island be added as a cosponsor to the Thurmond-Levin-
Coats amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, just as an inquiry to 
the managers, I have an amendment that I would like to offer which will 
probably take 15 or 20 minutes for me to present at the most. I don't 
want to delay a vote, but it seems that we might be able to put the two 
votes together. We would have the voice vote on McCain, and then if I 
offer my amendment, we can have two votes together. Will that work for 
the Senator? I would at least like to debate and offer this amendment 
prior to the vote on your amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, will the able Senator allow the other 
amendments to go forward before we take up his amendment?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. My preference, I say to the Senator, is 
that I be allowed to debate this amendment, present it and allow----
  Mr. THURMOND. After we finish this amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. No, I prefer to do it prior to this 
amendment, because it is on the same subject. It is Bosnia, and once 
you vote and that amendment is gone--my preference is to do it now if I 
can do it.
  Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. THURMOND. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. COATS. I say to the Senator, our vote will not preclude the 
Senator from offering an amendment on Bosnia. If the Senator's 
amendment is not a second-degree amendment to the underlying amendment, 
we strongly prefer to deal with our amendment as it stands and then 
have the Senator be recognized to offer an amendment on Bosnia.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. All I am trying to do is to make it a 
little more convenient for Members. I was saying if I had 15 or 20 
minutes to present my amendment, we can have both votes on the 
underlying amendment and my amendment at the same time. That is my 
point.
  Mr. COATS. As I understand it--parliamentary inquiry--if the 
Senator's amendment is not a second degree, does it not require 
unanimous consent to set aside the underlying amendment before going to 
his amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, unanimous consent is 
required.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent that the 
underlying amendment be set aside in order for me to offer my amendment 
and subsequently have a vote on both amendments.
  Mr. COATS. Reserving the right to object, Madam President, and I am 
going to object. I don't think that is the procedure we ought to be 
following. I understand the Senator's desire to speak on his Bosnia 
amendment, and we will do that, but if an amendment is not being 
offered as a second degree to perfect or change or modify the 
underlying amendment--we have been working on this since noon. We would 
very much like to get to a vote. It is second degreed. We have an 
amendment. And on that basis, I object.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Further parliamentary inquiry. It is my 
understanding the tree is full with the McCain second degree; is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The understanding of the Senator from New 
Hampshire is correct.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Madam President.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, we have been on this amendment now for 
hours. It is time to vote and take some action. I urge adoption of the 
amendment.
  Mr. CLELAND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Madam President, I have remarks I would like to make in 
general on the subject of the amendments to the defense authorization 
bill regarding Bosnia. It will take about 5 minutes. I ask the 
tolerance of the distinguished chairman, if that is permissible.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I yield to the Senator to speak for 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, the debate on Bosnia has raised some fundamental 
questions regarding the conduct of our foreign policy particularly with 
respect to the deployment of U.S. military forces around the world. I 
will point out just a few of the questions that members have raised:
  What is the mission of U.S. forces in Bosnia?
  When can we expect to bring them home?
  What should the role of the Congress be in the fulfillment of this 
mission?
  How can we manage the cost of the Bosnia commitment in terms of 
dollars and the overall strain to our forces?
  It is good that we debate these important issues here in the Senate 
today. But I feel it is important to say that I believe we should ask 
only one question:


     Should we continue to support a U.S. troop presence in Bosnia?

  That is a simple question. If the answer is yes, then I do not see 
anything we can do but to support the troops and insure that their 
mission is achievable.
  If the answer is no, then we should bring them home today.
  I support the mission. Let me take a few moments to explain why. I 
was very skeptical of the Bosnia mission before I was elected to the 
Senate. That is part of the reason why I made Bosnia one of the first 
places I visited on my first trip abroad as a U.S. Senator. On my 
journey in Bosnia, I had the opportunity to visit with our troops at 
Eagle Base and then at Camp Bedrock. I found them surprisingly cheerful 
and confident in their mission

[[Page S6955]]

of peace-keeping in that war-weary countryside. I'm very proud of our 
forces. They are paying a personal price every day in risking their 
lives on our behalf. They are working in a tasking and demanding 
environment filled with diplomatic and military minefields. All of the 
men and women involved in this effort are a credit to the United States 
and the cause of human dignity and freedom in the Balkans. I am proud 
of them all.
  The effort in Bosnia involves the largest alliance of nations ever to 
coalesce against a common enemy on the continent of Europe. I applaud 
all the members of the alliance for their contributions to peace and 
stability in Bosnia, particularly the NATO members, and especially the 
Russians, for coming together in a unified effort to prevent further 
bloodshed, enhance stability and pave a pathway for peace. I hope it is 
a harbinger of good things to come in the next century in terms of 
enhanced cooperation and communications among our countries for the 
betterment of mankind.
  It was raining during the afternoon we were in Bosnia. By the time we 
were preparing to leave, the rain had ceased and the sun was coming 
out. As we boarded our airplane, I noticed a large rainbow forming in 
the sky. It was impossible to avoid the symbolism and be reminded of 
the covenant between God and mankind after the great flood. It was a 
symbol of hope, I think.
  Today we are in a new era. No one has quite coined the term for it. 
Some call it the ``New World Order,'' but I prefer to call it The Age 
of Democracy. What I find different and indeed magical about this new 
era is the fact that while it brings with it the spread of democracy 
and democratic principles around the world to places that have been 
burdened by tyranny, it is doing so not through the threat of force, 
but through the promise of peace. U.S. forces in Bosnia bring with them 
the promise of peace.
  A few days after I visited Camp Bedrock, I was in Brussels. An 
American businessman approached me and asked me if I had ``hope'' about 
Bosnia. I had to reply, ``Yes.'' I have hope because I believe Europe 
has learned some painful lessons over the last two centuries. One of 
those lessons is that alliances--whether against Napoleon, Hitler or 
Stalin--can win. Secondly, I have hope because Americans have learned 
some lessons about European history as well. Particularly, I think 
we've learned one of the lessons about American involvement on the 
European continent. The lesson is this: ``Pay me now, or pay me 
later.'' In other words, we as a nation are involved in Europe--
militarily, economically, culturally. Better to work through the 
European Alliance, in particular through NATO, to prevent a conflict 
than to risk that conflict turning into a greater confrontation or, 
even worse, war itself.
  I do not know whether the Bosnia mission will ultimately prove to be 
successful, but I do believe we should try. We should not tie the hands 
of our troops.
  In spite of my support for the Bosnia mission, however, I do not like 
the fact that it appears to be open-ended. I do not like the fact that 
it is placing a tremendous strain on our Armed Forces. I do not like 
the fact that we do not know when the mission will be completed. But we 
should have addressed these issues years ago before we ever sent our 
troops there. We have violated a fundamental principle about the 
deployment of military forces.
  Clauswitz stated that in military matters you should not take the 
first step unless you know what your last step is going to be. Four 
years ago, we had no idea what our last step would be. That has led us 
to where we are today. Today we are deciding by amendment what our 
policy in Bosnia should be. You can't manage a military deployment that 
way.
  It seems to me that we are in for a dime, in for a dollar. The 
question is should we stay in Bosnia, or should we leave? Once we 
decide to go in, we need to give our military commanders the resources 
and support they need to get the job done. We cannot change our mind 
every year with new amendments and new resolutions and new laws.

  The Senate Armed Services Committee has debated this matter numerous 
times. We could not arrive at a consensus on the matter. The more we 
debated the issue, the more I became convinced that we should not do 
anything that would undermine the mission in Bosnia. I fear that all of 
the amendments that have been offered sent the wrong message to both 
our troops and our allies.
  I was inclined to support a proposal by Senator Levin which would 
have established expedited voting procedures on the question of whether 
to continue authorization of funds for the Bosnia mission. I believe of 
all of the amendments, his is one of the better approaches. Many 
members of the Senate want to have a straight up or down vote on the 
Bosnia mission--in or out. Senator Levin's amendment would have 
provided a mechanism for that.
  However, I would point that over the past 4 years, the Congress has 
given its consent and approval for the Bosnia mission dozens of times. 
The Congress has appropriated over $9.4 billion for this mission. The 
bottom line is that we have had the opportunity to weigh in on this 
matter. Enough is enough.
  Now is the time to focus on ensuring that we do not allow a situation 
like the current situation with Bosnia to occur again. Before we get to 
the point of committing our service men and women, we must certainly 
determine if we have an appropriate military mission which can only be 
accomplished by military means. Once such a determination is made, we 
must provide our forces with sufficient resources, and clear and 
concise rules of engagement to get the job done.
  In this day and age we must pick and choose our battles carefully. As 
we have learned so painfully in Vietnam, Somalia and now Bosnia, 
American troops cannot stay there forever. We have learned valuable 
lessons from these engagements and now realize that before approving 
funding for such missions, Congress must have a defined game plan and 
exit strategy. Senator Snowe and I have offered an amendment to the 
defense authorization bill which would require the President to submit, 
along with a request for appropriations to support a military 
contingency involving 500 or more personnel, a strategic plan regarding 
the goals and objectives of the contingency and the conditions that 
define the success of that contingency. We needed this amendment 4 
years ago when we first sent American troops into Bosnia, but we have 
learned from these important lessons. Congress, by approving such a 
plan would be in on the takeoff, as well as the landing.
  Frankly, I think this is the most important amendment related to the 
deployment of forces in the entire bill. I am pleased that the Senate 
has approved it. I would only urge that we think twice before doing 
anything that would undermine U.S. forces after they have already been 
committed.
  Madam President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, let me just thank the Senator from 
Georgia not just for his statement but also for the amendment which he 
and Senator Snowe had offered in committee, which was adopted in 
committee. It is a very important amendment. It is based on his 
experience, the experience of so many others relative to the use of 
military force, and the importance of exercising exceeding care when 
that military force is utilized. And I think the Nation, again, is in 
his debt and Senator Snowe's debt. I just thank him for it.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                           Amendment No. 2977

  Mr. THURMOND. I urge adoption of the McCain amendment No. 2977, which 
would amend the amendment offered by myself, Senator Coats, and Senator 
Levin that would require two reports on matters related to U.S. forces 
in Bosnia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I understand that Senator Biden might be 
on his way over. I suggest the absence of a quorum for just one brief 
moment until we can ascertain that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S6956]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Is there further debate on the McCain amendment?
  Mr. THURMOND. I urge adoption of the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2977) was agreed to.


                 Vote on Amendment No. 2975, as Amended

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask that we proceed to vote on the 
Thurmond, Levin, Coats amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on agreeing to the 
Thurmond amendment, as amended.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. 
Domenici) is necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter) is 
absent because of illness.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from Montana (Mr. Baucus), and the Senator from West Virginia 
(Mr. Rockefeller) are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 5, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 170 Leg.]

                                YEAS--90

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--5

     Biden
     Cleland
     Dodd
     Lieberman
     Robb

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Domenici
     Rockefeller
     Specter
  The amendment (No. 2975), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                           Amendment No. 2912

(Purpose: To limit the use of funds to support the continued deployment 
  of ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina pending a vote of Congress on the continuation 
of the deployment, and to require the President to submit to Congress a 
 plan for withdrawing United States forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
             if Congress does not so act by March 31, 1999)

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask that my amendment 
No. 2912, which is at the desk, be called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Smith) proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2912.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1064. POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN 
                   BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

       (a) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated under this Act may be expended after March 31, 
     1999, to support the continued deployment of ground combat 
     forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina unless, on or before such date, each House of 
     Congress votes on passage of legislation that, if adopted, 
     would specifically authorize the continued deployment of 
     ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (b) Plan for Withdrawal of Forces.--If legislation referred 
     to in subsection (a) is not presented to the President on or 
     before March 31, 1999, the President shall submit to 
     Congress, not later than September 30, 1999, a plan that 
     provides for the ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be withdrawn 
     from Bosnia and Herzegovina in an orderly and safe manner.
       (c) Prohibition.--
       (1) Use of funds after march 31, 1999.--After March 31, 
     1999, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
     or any other Act may be obligated or expended to support the 
     continued deployment of United States ground combat forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for the purpose of 
     implementing the withdrawal plan.
       (2) Condition.--The prohibition on use of funds in 
     paragraph (1) shall not take effect if a joint resolution 
     described in subsection (d)(1) is enacted on or before March 
     31, 1999.
       (d) Procedures for Joint Resolution of Approval.--
       (1) Content of joint resolution.--For the purposes of 
     subsection (c)(2), ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
     resolution that sets forth as the matter after the resolving 
     clause only the following: ``That the continued deployment of 
     ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina is authorized.''.
       (2) Referral to committee.--A resolution described in 
     paragraph (1) that is introduced in the Senate shall be 
     referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. A 
     resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in 
     the House of Representatives shall be referred to the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is 
     referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not 
     reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the 
     end of 7 calendar days after its introduction, the committee 
     shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration 
     of the resolution and the resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate calendar of the House involved.
       (4) Floor consideration.--
       (A) In general.--When the committee to which a resolution 
     is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged 
     (under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a 
     resolution described in paragraph (1), it is at any time 
     thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the 
     same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the 
     respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of 
     the resolution, and all points of order against the 
     resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are 
     waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of 
     Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not 
     debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a 
     motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the 
     vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall 
     not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration 
     of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain 
     the unfinished business of the respective House until 
     disposed of.
       (B) Debate.--Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited 
     to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally 
     between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A 
     motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. 
     An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion 
     to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or 
     disagreed to is not in order.
       (C) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the 
     conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in 
     paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of 
     the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the 
     appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the 
     resolution shall occur.
       (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the 
     case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution 
     described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.
       (5) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before 
     the passage by one House of a resolution of that House 
     described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the 
     other House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the 
     following procedures shall apply:
       (A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred 
     to a committee.
       (B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) 
     of the House receiving the resolution--

[[Page S6957]]

       (i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no 
     resolution had been received from the other House; but
       (ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution 
     of the other House.
       (6) Consideration of veto.--
       (A) Action upon receipt of message.--Upon receipt of a 
     message from the President returning the joint resolution 
     unsigned to the House of origin and setting forth his 
     objections to the joint resolution, the House receiving the 
     message shall immediately enter the objections at large on 
     the journal of that House and the House shall proceed to the 
     immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding 
     or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of 
     the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections 
     shall lie on the table. Upon receipt of a message of a House 
     transmitting the joint resolution and the objections of the 
     President, the House receiving the message shall proceed to 
     the immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding 
     or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of 
     the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections 
     shall lie on the table. A motion to refer the joint 
     resolution to a committee shall not be in order in either 
     House.
       (B) Motion to proceed.--After the receipt of a message by a 
     House as described in subparagraph (A), it is at any time in 
     order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has 
     been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to 
     move to proceed to the reconsideration of the joint 
     resolution the objections of the President to the contrary 
     notwithstanding. The motion is highly privileged in the House 
     of Representatives and is a question of highest privilege in 
     the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to 
     amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
     disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to 
     the reconsideration of the resolution is agreed to, the 
     resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the 
     respective House until disposed of.
       (C) Debate.--Debate on reconsideration of the joint 
     resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 
     hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring 
     and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion further to 
     limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, 
     or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed 
     to notwithstanding the objections of the President or 
     disagreed to is not in order.
       (D) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the 
     conclusion of the debate on reconsideration of the 
     resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the 
     debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the 
     appropriate House, the vote on the question of passage, the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding, 
     shall occur.
       (7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
     subsection is enacted by Congress--
       (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but 
     applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed 
     in that House in the case of a resolution described in 
     paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the 
     extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
       (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the able Senator allow me to get 
two people on the floor?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I am happy to yield.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a military 
fellow on assignment to my staff, Major Joann Eberle, be permitted 
access to the Senate Chamber during the consideration of S. 2057, the 
FY-1999 defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Vaughn 
Ward, a fellow in Senator Kempthorne's office, be permitted floor 
privileges during the consideration of the pending bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, it is not my intention to 
delay the Senate. I have a very serious amendment, and I have a few 
moments of time and would like to outline what it is. If there is not a 
lot of argument on the other side, I say to my colleagues, we could 
have a vote in a very few minutes.
  The amendment is very simple. It just limits the use of funds to 
support the continued deployment of ground forces of the United States 
in Bosnia pending a vote of Congress on the continuation of deployment, 
and to require the President to submit a plan for withdrawal, if the 
Congress does not do so by March 31.
  Very simply put, Mr. President--Mr. President, may I have order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will Members of the Senate who are having 
discussions please retire to the Cloakroom.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, this amendment is very 
simple. It simply says that we will have a vote, that the Congress will 
go on record one way or the other. It doesn't say we have to vote yes. 
It doesn't say we have to vote no. It just simply says that we exercise 
our opinion so that the Congress can speak, so that we will be on 
record one way or the other. Leaving forces in Bosnia, taking them out, 
whatever that vote turns out to be, that is all this amendment does. If 
the President decides to keep them there after that, then so be it. But 
we go on record as making a statement. This does not get into some of 
the other issues that have been gotten into.
  I would just like to briefly go back a little bit to remind Senators, 
because we hear a lot of talk of frustration about the Bosnia 
operation, about why our troops are there, how long are they going to 
be there, people complaining about being misled by the President or not 
being told the truth by the President and all this. I am hearing all of 
these comments and here is our chance with this amendment to be heard. 
It just seems to me if we vote against this amendment, I don't see any 
reason why we should be complaining about the operation.
  I remind my colleagues of some testimony. Secretary of Defense Perry 
on December 1, 1995, said the following:

       We believe the mission in Bosnia can be accomplished in 1 
     year. So we built our plan based on that time line. And this 
     schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in 
     the agreement can be completed in the first 6 months and 
     thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of 
     stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We 
     expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated 
     in 1 year, but even if some of them are not, we must not be 
     drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

  Further, on December 6, 1995, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke 
said:

       The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't 
     any question. The deeper question is whether the nonmilitary 
     functions can be done in 12 months. That is the real 
     question. But it is not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility 
     to do that. It is us on the civilian side working with the 
     Europeans. It is going to be tough. Should the military stick 
     around until every refugee has gone home, until everything 
     else in the civilian annex has been done?

  No, that is not their mission. That is what Secretary Holbrooke said.
  So, Mr. President, the mission to Bosnia has very strong advocates 
and strong detractors. We have heard that in the debate in these past 
few hours. My amendment does not seek to open that discussion nor to 
close it. It really has nothing to do with that. It simply asks that 
Members of Congress at some point between now and March 31 of next 
year, 1999, cast a vote on the wisdom of the United States-Bosnia 
policy. That is all it does.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I will be happy to yield to the Senator 
from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I would like to make a comment as to the genesis of this. 
I think there might be some misunderstanding. First of all, we did have 
a vote back in 1995. That was the resolution of disapproval. And I 
suggest that we only lost that by three votes. And at that time there 
was a guarantee it was going to be a 12-month operation, it would not 
exceed $1.2 billion, all of these things. So predicated on that, the 
vote took place.
  Now we are over there, and, quite frankly, I would have preferred to 
have an amendment that would require a vote periodically, every 3 
months or every 6 months, on approval of leaving them there, because I 
think that would

[[Page S6958]]

be much stronger. I think we need to be on record.
  But all the Senator is doing is just--he is not saying this is going 
to be a resolution of disapproval or approval that we are voting on; it 
is just a vote.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is correct. And I would just say to 
the Senator, I agree with him. I would like to vote for and see passed 
a resolution of disapproval.
  Mr. INHOFE. The only thing that the Senator would accomplish, if he 
will yield for one last question, is the fact that would give us all an 
opportunity to be on record.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. On record.
  Mr. INHOFE. So the people would have no doubt as to who wants to 
ultimately get out of there.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The Senator is exactly correct. It gives 
us the opportunity to go on record as saying, one, let's just keep 
going, doing what we are doing. If you vote against the resolution, you 
can do that, or if you want to get out. But the point is we vote. This 
says that we have to have a vote by March 31 before we spend the rest 
of the money for the 6 months of the fiscal year 1999.
  That is all it says. Now, however we vote is another issue. Then 
Senators go on record one way or the other--get out, stay in, either 
one, but they will be on record instead of all the complaining that we 
hear around here about the Bosnia policy. Why would anybody object? 
This is not asking us to vote yes. It is not asking us to vote no. It 
is asking us to vote, have a vote.
  Mr. INHOFE. One last comment. One last question. The reason I bring 
this up, there are still some Senators who may be thinking this was the 
stronger version in which I joined the Senator. I would have preferred 
to have this as the stronger version, but this is not that version. 
This is simply that vote to which the Senator is referring.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The Senator is correct. I would have 
preferred the stronger version myself, but given the fact that we 
didn't have the votes, I decided to step back and just say, look, let's 
go on record. Let's have the opportunity to go on record. It doesn't 
require that the vote be affirmative for the money to be released, only 
that a vote takes place.
  So to require that a vote take place and to have that vote taken 
seriously, my amendment uses the constitutional power that Senator Byrd 
spoke so eloquently of an hour or so ago of Congress to restrict funds. 
The amendment holds back half the money authorized for Bosnia 
operations next year until a vote is held--not a vote to leave them 
there, not a vote to take them out--a vote on a resolution authorizing 
continued deployment of U.S. ground combat forces to Bosnia. If it 
fails, the only result is that the President is required to tell us how 
and when he intends to withdraw. The money is still released.

  The purpose is simple and straightforward. It is to use a small 
amount of leverage, half of next year's money, to force Congress to 
express itself--that is all, to express itself--clearly on the Bosnia 
mission. The resolution may pass, it may fail, but at least Congress 
will have expressed itself.
  As the Senator from West Virginia has said so eloquently a while ago, 
why would Congress want to step away from its constitutional 
responsibilities if it doesn't tell the President what to do? It 
doesn't restrict the President. It doesn't get into troop strength. It 
doesn't get into deployment. It doesn't get into any of that. It just 
simply says Congress will have a vote.
  Let me just say this. Before we have a vote on this amendment, I 
would say to my colleagues that our constituents elected us to 
represent them. How can we represent them if we are afraid to just 
express ourselves on the Senate floor one way or the other? They expect 
us to stand and be counted on major foreign policy issues, and I can't 
think of any excuse that we would give our constituents that would 
justify refusing to even have a vote on the resolution on Bosnia.
  So I would urge my colleagues to accept some responsibility for 
United States-Bosnia policy, stand up and be counted and to pass the 
amendment.
  Let me be a little more specific, in summary, as to what the 
amendment does. It is going to withhold half of next year's funding for 
Bosnia until Congress votes on the issue. It doesn't require that the 
mission be approved, just that the vote is one way or the other. The 
purpose is to honor the very strong arguments and strong feelings on 
both sides of the issue--both sides of the issue--by requiring the 
debate and a vote. I hope my colleagues understand this amendment 
because I think there have been some expressions of misunderstanding.
  As the Senator from West Virginia so eloquently said awhile back, the 
only leverage that Congress has is funding. That is our leverage. I 
think to use it in this manner is to use it responsibly. Unless we 
place some restriction on it, there will be no pressure to debate 
anything and no pressure to vote on anything, and the debate itself 
will not, in my view, ever be taken seriously. You know: sense of the 
Senate, sense of the House--these resolutions, they don't mean 
anything.
  So, to try to get in the middle here so we can get some common 
ground, just to have a vote rather than go one way or the other, is my 
goal. I do not think that is asking that much, that the American 
people, through their elected representatives, declare either their 
support for or opposition to this.
  Don't you think your constituents are entitled to know how you feel, 
on the record, not in some speech where it is easy to say something and 
then walk it back a little later, but on the record with a vote? I 
don't think that is unreasonable. I think it is in everyone's interests 
to have this vote. I have been trying to offer this amendment for a 
long, long time. I have been put off on certain other vehicles because 
it was not the appropriate place to do it, they said. I don't know what 
the appropriate place is.
  I remember, as some of my colleagues will who are here on the floor 
with me, I remember similar debates on the floor of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives while people were dying every day in Vietnam. 
While those men and women were honorably serving their country, the 
debate raged on and nobody had the guts to do one thing or the other, 
either win the war or get out. I am not saying this is Vietnam, yet. 
But we do have a situation here where I believe Congress should go on 
record.
  I happen to be a critic of the mission. I agree with Senator Inhofe 
and I supported Senator Inhofe in his mission here, if you will, to end 
the deployment. But that is not what I am trying to do here. If the 
Senators on both sides cannot force themselves to vote, take a public 
position, then I don't understand how they can continue to talk about 
it and complain about it and attack the President and say: ``Oh, the 
President's going to do this,'' or, ``We might get stuck in Bosnia,'' 
or, ``We ought to do this,'' or, ``We ought to do that.'' Here is your 
chance to say, one way or the other. I want to have a vote. That is all 
it says. No more complaining about costs. No more second-guessing the 
President. Just stand up and be counted. Yes, we will have a vote, and 
when we take that vote, we can decide one way or the other what we want 
to do.
  I think I have made the case on this amendment. It uses funding 
leverage. It is an appropriate congressional tool. It does not 
micromanage the executive branch, as some people have expressed a lot 
of concern about. It does not do that. It doesn't tell the President 
how to conduct his operations. But it does say that we ought to have a 
vote, and I think it calls for a future vote. Don't wait until next 
year or the year after; let's have the vote. Let's let the American 
people know how we feel.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered 
by my friend and colleague from New Hampshire. If I may respond in one 
sense directly to what the proponent of the amendment said about going 
on record, I want to make very clear that I oppose the amendment 
because I feel that America's involvement in the implementation force 
and in the stabilization force has been critically important to the 
return of peace to that region, has been critically important to 
American prestige and credibility militarily in the world, and has been

[[Page S6959]]

critically important to the stature and force of NATO. That is about as 
unambivalently as I can express it.

  I think American involvement in Bosnia has been a remarkably 
successful involvement at a time when it was very important to draw a 
line in Europe against aggression, against genocide, and to indicate--
more than indicate, to make very clear at the end of the cold war that 
we were not going to stand idly by, that NATO was not going to stand 
back, idly by, and allow the disintegration of sections of Europe that 
could have led to a wider war.
  So I am unambivalently proud of the involvement that has occurred 
there, am supportive of it, and do not want to send any mixed messages. 
I want to oppose the Senate sending any mixed messages to our allies, 
to those who were previous combatants in the war in Bosnia--indeed, and 
most important, to our own troops there--not to send any mixed messages 
to any of them about the support of the Congress of the United States 
for the mission that our troops are performing there.
  Looking back to the early 1990s when this conflict broke out, it was 
my honor to work alongside the former majority leader, Senator Dole, 
first trying to urge an end to the arms embargo on the Bosnians who 
were being slaughtered and were the victims of genocide, and then to 
urge the United States to lead NATO into doing something to stop this 
conflict.
  We have been involved in three wars in Europe in this century, two 
world wars and one long, costly, dangerous cold war. It seemed to many 
of us that the lessons from those conflicts were to act as early as 
possible to contain just the kind of conflict that was occurring in 
Bosnia from spreading. And we battled, Senator Dole and I and others in 
both parties--battled the administration, first the Bush administration 
and then more directly, as the conflict in Bosnia became more 
desperate, the Clinton administration, to get involved, to exercise 
leadership, to be at least fair with the Bosnians and give them arms.
  Finally, the resolution to lift the arms embargo did pass in the 
early part of 1995, here, with bipartisan support. There was a 
significant Croatian offensive on the ground, which was making headway, 
which contributed to a changing strategic situation on the ground. And 
Srebrenica fell, with a disastrous loss of life which was exposed to 
the world. And then there were airstrikes on Serbian positions. The 
fear that we had was that this was an indomitable force, one that we 
could not stop. There were recollections of the futile attempts by the 
Nazis to suppress the Serbs. In this case, the power of NATO from the 
air had the effect of bringing the combatants to the peace table in 
Dayton, the State of the Presiding Officer, where a historic peace 
agreement was signed.
  This implementation force, followed by the stabilization force, in 
which the United States contributed troops, has been critical to 
implementing that Dayton agreement. Our presence there has always been 
less than half. The majority of the effort has been provided by our 
European allies and others. And, as success has been attained, the 
number of troops has been scaled down again. And yet it goes down 
again--now, I believe, below 7,000, I think maybe closer to 6,500. As a 
result of the effort of these troops in IFOR and then followed on by 
SFOR, the conflict has ended, hostilities have ended, and there is a 
slow, steady implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, the military 
and the civilian components of that. IFOR and SFOR have been charged 
with carrying out that agreement.
  The economy is up and beginning to flourish again. Elections have 
been held; common institutions are beginning to be developed. In the 
Serbian Republic, Srspka, an extraordinary turn of events has occurred 
as a result of, first and most important, I think, the desire of the 
Bosnian Serbs to have new leadership, not the leadership of indicted 
war criminals like Karadzic and Mladic, but to see new leadership. But 
that was assisted by some very aggressive, determined involvement by 
the SFOR, particularly by American leadership leading up right to the 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, who has 
performed, in my opinion, with extraordinary skill and effectiveness in 
this arena of, first combat, and now peacemaking, followed by some very 
effective involvement by Ambassador Bob Gelbard in the political 
situation in Srspka, resulting in new leadership: President Plavsic 
now, Prime Minister Dodik, proud Serbian nationalists, but committed to 
the Dayton peace accord.

  The progress goes on. Benchmarks have been provided, civilian 
benchmarks have been provided to us by the administration to determine 
progress as we go along, all of it leading to a hopeful withdrawal and 
an end date.
  Mr. President, along the way, some mistakes have been made. The 
Senator from New Hampshire mentioned them; others have as well. As part 
of the earlier involvement, there were those in the administration who 
offered deadlines for withdrawal of American forces. I presume that 
some measure of the motivation for doing that was to reassure Congress 
that this involvement would be limited. But those deadlines were 
always, in my opinion, a mistake. They were a mistake because why would 
one want to state a date by which one would withdraw from an uncertain 
situation?
  Traditional policy would be in a conflict or in a peacemaking 
situation, one withdraws when one achieves the goals of the 
involvement. So the deadline was always a mistake.
  It was a mistake in another sense because it would send a message to 
those hostile to our involvement there in the first place, who want to 
reignite the conflict, that there is a date on which we are getting 
out. They could lay back and wait until NATO forces, IFOR and SFOR, 
including the U.S. leadership, left.
  I feel that the proposal here for a vote and the more indirect 
references in the amendment that was just voted on for withdrawal, head 
back in the direction of the setting of deadlines, and they have some 
of the same deficiencies that I think were part of the deadline which 
the administration set, which most all of us in the Senate condemned 
and see now as a mistake.
  My own feeling is that we are on the right course in Bosnia; that 
this is all moving in the right direction, both in terms of 
implementation of the Dayton accords and scaling back the number of 
American personnel who are there on the ground. I think if we now enter 
and say we are going to have a vote on whether to go forward, and if we 
don't vote to do so, in the middle of the next fiscal year, March 31, 
1999, that we will withdraw, that puts a cloud over our involvement.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I will be glad to yield to my colleague.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. With all due respect, the Senator 
misunderstands my amendment, because that is not what my amendment 
does. You just articulated the policy that you supported. Even if your 
side would lose in the debate that we would have in Congress--let's say 
we have the debate. If your side lost, the money would still be 
released. If my side loses --I happen to favor withdrawal--if I lost, 
the money would still be released.
  All my amendment calls for is a vote. It doesn't say that if we vote 
to get out on March 31 that the money is not released. The money is 
still released.
  This is on the Senator's time. He has been very generous. The only 
conclusion I can draw is the Senator just doesn't want a vote in the 
Congress at all.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, are we under any time limits?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no limitations.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield to me. Is it not true, 
I ask the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from New Hampshire, 
obviously, as well, that the amendment says the following in paragraph 
(c)(1) that ``after March 31, 1999, none of the funds''--none of the 
funds appropriated or authorized here or anywhere else can be used ``to 
support the continued deployment of United States ground combat forces 
in Bosnia * * * except for'' withdrawal. Is that not your amendment?
  I guess since the Senator from Connecticut has the floor, let me ask 
the Senator from Connecticut, is that not the amendment before you.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. If I may say to the Senator from Michigan, that is 
exactly

[[Page S6960]]

the understanding of the impact of the amendment offered by the Senator 
from New Hampshire, which is that if there was a negative vote by March 
31 of next year on our American involvement in Bosnia, that the only 
thing funds would be available for would be to withdraw our personnel.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If I can respond to the Senator, I need 
to see if we are looking at the same draft, because that is not my 
intention, and if that is in the draft, I will amend that to change 
that because that is not the intention of the Senator's amendment. I 
yield back to the Senator his time and let me take a look at the draft.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Fine, Mr. President. The statement Senator Levin made 
was exactly my understanding and was what I saw in the draft. The 
direct effect of a negative vote next March would be to terminate 
funding of our operations except to withdraw. I await clarification on 
that, but I must say again, because I support this involvement, I 
support the command overseeing it, and I support the soldiers in the 
field, I don't want to set a date down for this kind of vote on our 
involvement in Bosnia.
  For those who are against it, they always have the option to try to 
eliminate funding for it through the appropriations process. I think to 
state a date by which we are going to vote next year on whether to 
remain involved in Bosnia or not hangs a sword of uncertainty in this 
case over the entire operation, over the American troops that are 
there, over our NATO allies who have said they will leave when we 
leave: ``We went in together, we are going out together.'' That is what 
I have heard them say over and over again. Again, it raises the 
prospect in the minds and hearts of those who are waiting to resume 
this conflict that they may well have the opportunity come next spring, 
because the U.S. Senate may vote to terminate this involvement.
  I do want to say about our troops there, I have had the occasion to 
be there now three times in the last year, as it happens: once last 
July in a delegation headed by Senator Lott, and the distinguished 
occupant of the Chair was with us; once in December, right before 
Christmas, when we went over with President Clinton to visit the 
troops; and then again in February when I went with a delegation headed 
by Senator McCain.
  One thing that struck me was the very high morale of American troops 
that are part of this peacemaking mission in Bosnia. I have had the 
opportunity as a member of the Armed Services Committee--the honor, 
really--to visit American soldiers in the field around the world. I 
must tell you that I have never met a group of American soldiers who 
had a better, clearer, more positive feeling about why they were 
somewhere around the world.
  It struck me as particularly interesting and encouraging, because 
right now they are not involved, certainly not involved in active 
combat. They are active, they are peacemaking, they are patrolling, but 
they are involved in a lot of civilian activity. They understand why 
they are there.
  One of them said to me that once a month, he went into an orphanage, 
somewhere around Sarajevo, as some of the troops there do, and visited 
some children who were orphans as a result of the war in Bosnia. He 
said, ``You know, when I go there, I understand why we are here. We are 
here to stop more children on all sides from becoming orphans; to keep 
people alive and to help this country to rebuild itself.''

  And I fear that any of these amendments we pass here that incline 
toward withdrawal or state the necessity for a vote on withdrawal by a 
date certain puts a cloud over the mission of our personnel in Bosnia 
and runs the risk of diminishing the morale, understandably, of our 
troops there as well as those who have led them so ably.
  I do want to take just a moment, Mr. President, to explain, 
consistent with what I have said here, why I voted against the previous 
amendment offered by Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin, a worthy 
attempt to achieve consensus, and in fact it did achieve consensus 
since the vote was 90-5 on it. It was not an easy vote to vote against, 
to be one of the five.
  But I was concerned about it because on page 3, beginning in 
paragraph (2), it does say that:

       The President should work with NATO allies and other 
     nations * * * participating in the NATO-led Stabilization 
     Force to withdraw United States ground combat forces from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina within a reasonable period of time, 
     consistent with the safety of those forces and the 
     accomplishment of the Stabilization Force's military tasks.

  Well, it is not a direct withdrawal. It does condition it on the 
accomplishment of the stabilization force's military tasks, but, to me, 
it inclines toward withdrawal as a matter of policy. Because I am so 
proud of what has been accomplished as a result of the stabilization 
force that we have led, and because I am so committed to a withdrawal 
that occurs consistent with the achievement of the goals, the 
benchmarks that the administration and NATO have set down for this 
mission, I was troubled by that paragraph as well as the succeeding 
paragraphs which suggest the possibility that there might be a need for 
continued military presence there but that we should consider that it 
be a NATO-led force without the participation of U.S. ground combat 
forces.
  I think once we begin to do that, once we begin to separate ourselves 
from NATO, we begin to diminish the unity of that greatest military 
alliance in history and we begin to diminish our leadership of NATO. 
And I do not think any one of those is in our national security 
interest. The fact also is, as I mentioned briefly a moment ago, our 
NATO allies--the Brits, the French, Germans--all of them have said, 
``We went in together. We're going out together. So when the United 
States departs from Bosnia, we're all leaving.''
  So on a practical ground, I do not think we have that option. I think 
the option is to hang in there together, continue what has been a 
remarkably successful mission, and we can see the end in sight. But let 
us not force it. Let us let it come naturally as we achieve the 
benchmarks.
  So that is why I voted against the previous amendment No. 2975, and 
all the more so for the current amendment, because it puts us on a 
course to vote on withdrawal and sends a mixed signal.
  One of my favorite expressions from the Bible in cases such as this 
is--I am not going to quote exactly--``If the sound of the trumpet be 
uncertain, who will follow into battle?'' ``If the sound of the trumpet 
be uncertain, who will follow into battle?'' And I fear here that the 
sound from these amendments is uncertain and the effect will be to 
diminish the morale, the effectiveness, of the remarkably effective 
high-morale mission that American troops have carried out as part of 
IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia.

  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. If there is no further debate at this time, I was going to 
note the absence of a quorum because I do have some things I want to 
say about the amendment, but I want to get the amendment straightened 
out.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleague, I have a 
modification, and I will have it ready in a moment. So I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in light of the fact that the managers 
are working out an agreement on the amendment, I am wondering if I 
could simply address the bill itself for just a few moments.
  Mr. President, I come to the floor today to register my opposition to 
the fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense Authorization Act. I have 
numerous concerns with the bill, especially the continued spending of 
billions of dollars on wasteful and unnecessary programs.
  In a time when we are cutting programs and fighting for a truly 
balanced budget, we cannot really afford to insulate any department of 
our Government from scrutiny as we seek to reduce the Federal debt.

[[Page S6961]]

  I think it is very ironic that programs like health care for veterans 
and social services were put on the chopping block to offset increased 
funding for our highways and transit systems but we did not have an 
attempt to use defense spending for transportation. It was not even 
considered.
  The message we are clearly sending is that roads and overpriced 
weapons systems are more important than the people who are actually 
living in this country: We will give you roads and planes, but we will 
have to take away your health care and programs that serve ordinary 
human needs.
  Mr. President, there are a number of provisions in the DOD bill that 
I oppose and I will continue to oppose. One is the subject of some of 
the discussion we have been having this afternoon. And that is the $1.9 
billion ``emergency'' supplemental appropriations recently passed by 
the Congress.
  The Congress has never developed firm rules on how we should define 
an emergency. Everybody assumes, I guess, that we will use common sense 
when deciding when to grant special emergency treatment to certain 
expenditures. And of course common sense tells us that things like 
floods and tornadoes clearly are unanticipated emergencies.
  In my view, however, the mission in Bosnia is not. It is a 
substantial, long-term commitment. It is something the United States 
has, for better or worse, decided to do for quite a long term. If 
events there take an unexpected turn for the worse, of course, we could 
have some kind of emergency on our hands, but as we stand here today 
and debate this bill, the Bosnia situation is not really something you 
can call an emergency.

  The line items in the law--military personnel, operations and 
maintenance, and contingency funds--are really standard military costs 
that would be part of any military mission. United States troops have 
been on the ground in Bosnia for more than 2 years. The change in 
designation from IFOR to SFOR was made more than a year ago and is 
scheduled to continue through June of this year. Then, last December, 
the President announced he would forgo imposing a deadline altogether 
and opted instead for a policy of benchmarks whose definitions remain 
open to interpretation.
  Mr. President, how can Congress and the President possibly profess to 
the American people that the additional costs for the Bosnia mission 
constitute an emergency? On the contrary, it has been quite clear for a 
while now that the cost of this mission would rise continuously and 
substantially. And I would say, to me at least, that was really clear 
from the start. This was never going to be a temporary emergency 
situation.
  Ironically, congressional appropriators and our military leaders have 
planned for many months, Mr. President, on obtaining these funds in 
this emergency spending bill. So that invites my next question: What 
are these funds doing in the bill? I just do not think you can equate 
the long-anticipated needs of the operation in Bosnia with the urgent, 
unexpected needs of the farmers in California or homeowners in Florida 
who have been devastated by natural disaster.
  Another matter, Mr. President, in the bill, that concerns me is that 
$3.3 billion authorized for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program. 
It is no secret that I have some questions about this program. But I am 
also troubled by the activities of the Pentagon and the Navy in moving 
the Super Hornet airplane forward. And my concerns are not addressed in 
the least in this bill.
  The current Hornet program has proven reliable and cost effective. 
Why do we want to replace the Hornet with a bloated, cost-prohibitive 
aircraft that offers only marginally greater benefits over the current 
reliable fighter?
  Third, I am concerned that the DOD authorization bill shortchanges 
our National Guard by at least $594 million. The National Guard is an 
immense source of pride throughout the country, and especially in my 
State of Wisconsin. As I travel across the State, I frequently have the 
privilege of meeting the men and women who compose the Wisconsin Guard, 
and I have been very impressed with the tremendous degree of 
professionalism and proficiency with which they complete a wide range 
of missions.
  They are well-trained, dedicated, professional soldiers who earn rave 
reviews from the Governor's office, down to the villages and 
municipalities who often are the principal beneficiaries in regard to 
assistance.
  Since I arrived in the U.S. Senate more than 5 years ago, my driving 
objective has been to reduce the Federal deficit and achieve a balanced 
budget. We have made great progress in that regard. While we continue 
to run a deficit while using the Social Security trust fund to mask the 
deficit, we have almost overcome the hangover of our 1980 spending 
binge.
  A large part of that success has been due to the willingness of both 
the Congress and the President to do more with less, to trim excessive 
spending wherever possible, and maintain important services but with 
fewer resources. And we have succeeded in almost every area of 
government to do this--in education, in health care, in veterans' care, 
in welfare benefits, and in environmental programs. We have succeeded 
virtually everywhere, except defense spending, where we continue to 
build destroyers the Navy does not ask for and we continue to build 
bombers the Air Force does not want.
  Balancing the budget, as you well know, is about making difficult 
choices. Sure, the Navy would rather have a Super Hornet, and if we 
were in a radically different budgetary position I could possibly 
support giving them 300 of those airplanes instead of the 30 they are 
receiving in this legislation. But can we afford 30 of these new 
tactical fighters when a more affordable and equally effective 
alternative aircraft is readily available? How that question is 
answered is the difference, that is the difference between fiscal 
excess and fiscal responsibility.
  So we have to make smart choices. A truly balanced Federal budget is 
almost, unbelievably, in sight for the first time in three decades. But 
we are not going to be able to get the balanced budget or maintain a 
balanced budget, let alone starting to bring down the Federal debt and 
protect Social Security, so long as we continue to commit to programs 
and force structures that are so blatantly unaffordable. We must 
continue to fight for further spending reductions until we achieve the 
most effective and cost-efficient military which serves our national 
security interests.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Mr. Smith of New Hampshire.


                    Amendment No. 2912, as Modified

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent it 
be in order for me to modify my amendment with the text that I now send 
to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 2912), as modified, is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1064. POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN 
                   BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

       (a) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated under this Act may be expended after March 31, 
     1999, to support the continued deployment of ground combat 
     forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina unless, on or before such date, each House of 
     Congress votes on passage of legislation that, if adopted, 
     would specifically authorize the continued deployment of 
     ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (b) Plan for Withdrawal of Forces.--If legislation referred 
     to in subsection (a) is not presented to the President on or 
     before March 31, 1999, the President shall submit to 
     Congress, not later than September 30, 1999, a plan that 
     provides for the ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be withdrawn 
     from Bosnia and Herzegovina in an orderly and safe manner.
       (c) Prohibition.--
       (1) Use of funds after march 31, 1999.--After March 31, 
     1999, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
     or any other Act may be obligated or expended to support the 
     continued deployment of United States ground combat forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for the purpose of 
     implementing the withdrawal plan.
       (2) Condition.--The prohibition on use of funds in 
     paragraph (1) shall not take effect if a joint resolution 
     described in subsection (d)(1) is acted upon on or before 
     March 31, 1999.
       (d) Procedures for Joint Resolution of Approval.--
       (1) Content of joint resolution.--For the purposes of 
     subsection (c)(2), ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
     resolution that sets

[[Page S6962]]

     forth as the matter after the resolving clause only the 
     following: ``That the continued deployment of ground combat 
     forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina is authorized.''.
       (2) Referral to committee.--A resolution described in 
     paragraph (1) that is introduced in the Senate shall be 
     referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. A 
     resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in 
     the House of Representatives shall be referred to the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is 
     referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not 
     reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the 
     end of 7 calendar days after its introduction, the committee 
     shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration 
     of the resolution and the resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate calendar of the House involved.
       (4) Floor consideration.--
       (A) In general.--When the committee to which a resolution 
     is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged 
     (under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a 
     resolution described in paragraph (1), it is at any time 
     thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the 
     same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the 
     respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of 
     the resolution, and all points of order against the 
     resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are 
     waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of 
     Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not 
     debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a 
     motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the 
     vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall 
     not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration 
     of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain 
     the unfinished business of the respective House until 
     disposed of.
       (B) Debate.--Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited 
     to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally 
     between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A 
     motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. 
     An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion 
     to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or 
     disagreed to is not in order.
       (C) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the 
     conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in 
     paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of 
     the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the 
     appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the 
     resolution shall occur.
       (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the 
     case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution 
     described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.
       (5) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before 
     the passage by one House of a resolution of that House 
     described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the 
     other House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the 
     following procedures shall apply:
       (A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred 
     to a committee.
       (B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) 
     of the House receiving the resolution--
       (i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no 
     resolution had been received from the other House; but
       (ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution 
     of the other House.
       (6) Consideration of veto.--
       (A) Action upon receipt of message.--Upon receipt of a 
     message from the President returning the joint resolution 
     unsigned to the House of origin and setting forth his 
     objections to the joint resolution, the House receiving the 
     message shall immediately enter the objections at large on 
     the journal of that House and the House shall proceed to the 
     immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding 
     or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of 
     the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections 
     shall lie on the table. Upon receipt of a message of a House 
     transmitting the joint resolution and the objections of the 
     President, the House receiving the message shall proceed to 
     the immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding 
     or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of 
     the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections 
     shall lie on the table. A motion to refer the joint 
     resolution to a committee shall not be in order in either 
     House.
       (B) Motion to proceed.--After the receipt of a message by a 
     House as described in subparagraph (A), it is at any time in 
     order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has 
     been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to 
     move to proceed to the reconsideration of the joint 
     resolution the objections of the President to the contrary 
     notwithstanding. The motion is highly privileged in the House 
     of Representatives and is a question of highest privilege in 
     the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to 
     amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
     disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to 
     the reconsideration of the resolution is agreed to, the 
     resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the 
     respective House until disposed of.
       (C) Debate.--Debate on reconsideration of the joint 
     resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 
     hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring 
     and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion further to 
     limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, 
     or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed 
     to notwithstanding the objections of the President or 
     disagreed to is not in order.
       (D) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the 
     conclusion of the debate on reconsideration of the 
     resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the 
     debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the 
     appropriate House, the vote on the question of passage, the 
     objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding, 
     shall occur.
       (7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
     subsection is enacted by Congress--
       (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but 
     applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed 
     in that House in the case of a resolution described in 
     paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the 
     extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
       (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I take 1 minute because I understand the 
Senator from Arizona now is here to move to table.
  This amendment, I believe, is seriously flawed. What it will do is 
keep our troops nervous and our commanders nervous, because if there is 
not a vote that occurs on March 31 next year, then no funds can be 
spent to support our troops.
  So it really is the worst of all worlds. It attempts to guarantee 
there will be a vote. Of course, you never can tell what efforts will 
be made to thwart that. What this amendment says, if there is no vote 
by a certain date, the funding is cut, the troops must be withdrawn, 
the troops will not be supported--if there is no vote.
  That is a ``keep the troops and commanders nervous'' approach. I 
think it is a terrible mistake. I hope our last vote, which was 
overwhelming in this body, will be considered the view of this Senate.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I make one remark before I move to table. 
We will be taking up the Department of Defense appropriations bill 
after this. I recommended that the Senator from New Hampshire propose a 
simple amendment which would cut off funding for further operations in 
Bosnia. That is a right, as part of our role as advice and consent--
keeping with an earlier debate that we had--to somehow draw down and 
set troop levels in Bosnia.
  Therefore, since among other things I am opposed to the amendment in 
principle, but also there is a parliamentary standpoint, I think it 
would be much more appropriate to propose an amendment on the 
Department of Defense appropriations bill that would give us all a 
chance to be on record as to whether we support funding or not.
  I now move to table the Smith amendment, and I ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). The question is on agreeing to the 
motion to table the amendment offered by the Senator from New 
Hampshire, Senator Smith.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Specter), is absent because of illness.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from Montana (Mr. Baucus), and

[[Page S6963]]

the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller), are necessarily 
absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 31, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 171 Leg.]

                                YEAS--65

     Abraham
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--31

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Craig
     Durbin
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Rockefeller
     Specter
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2912), as modified, 
was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.


                           Amendment No. 2892

   (Purpose: To provide a substitute for title XXIX, relating to the 
                      Juniper Butte Range, Idaho)

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I would call up amendment No. 2892 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Idaho [Mr. Kempthorne] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2892.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Amendments 
Submitted.''
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, in the defense bill we have language 
dealing with land withdrawal. This is a project that the Air Force has 
been working on for some years. The language that I have now proposed 
to the Senate is the perfecting language which has been provided to us.
  Madam President, this concerns the 366th Composite Wing which is 
bedded down at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho. This is a 
composite wing that consists of F-15s, F-16s, B-1 bombers, and C-135 
tankers. This allows them to train as they fight. This is one of our 
rapid deployment Air Force units that would be called to respond 
anywhere in the world where we may have a terrible situation.
  The current range that we have in place, there is only one 
direction--that is from the south--from which you can access that 
range. That worked when this was not a composite wing, but now that you 
have all of these different aircraft there, they need to have much 
greater ability for training purposes. This would allow us to maximize 
training for this situation.
  After many, many months of a process, I will tell you that this is 
something that has been a high priority for the White House, for the 
Air Force, for the Department of the Interior, for BLM, for the 
Governor of the State of Idaho, and for the Idaho delegation.
  With regard to the process, Madam President, this is a process that 
has taken 2\1/2\ years to get us to this point-- 2\1/2\ years. During 
those 2\1/2\ years, 16 different public hearings were held in three 
different States. Over 400 witnesses testified as to their thoughts, 
either pro or con, mitigations they would suggest. Over 1,000 different 
comments were recorded.
  This is the Environmental Impact Statement that is the result of 2\1/
2\ years of effort, three volumes. Included in the first volume is the 
reference that ``The final EIS has been prepared in accordance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act,'' or NEPA. So, again, this is a 
process that has been in place, that has followed all of the 
guidelines. And really I think the Air Force and the Department of the 
Interior are to be commended for the process which they have utilized, 
and really the mitigations that have been put into place are some of 
the most significant the Air Force has ever had. Also, the Air Force 
had no less than 25 meetings with tribal representatives of the 
Shoshone-Paiute tribe. Their reservation is Duck Valley.
  The particular site that was chosen, Madam President, 12,000 acres, 
is currently under ownership by the Bureau of Land Management. When we 
talk about land withdrawal, who are we withdrawing it from and who 
becomes its new landlord? Well, currently, because it is BLM, it is 
Federal land. It will remain Federal land. It is being withdrawn from 
the BLM to be put under the stewardship of the U.S. Air Force.
  I would like to give you a sense of what this issue is about. In this 
particular area of the State, these are what are called the Owyhee 
Canyonlands. As you see, they are beautiful. You can see the streams 
going through there.
  Currently, in this area, we have the Mountain Home Air Force Base, 
and under existing regulation those aircraft can fly at 100 feet above 
the canyon rim or 100 feet above ground level 365 days out of the year. 
With this proposal that is before the Senate, in this legislation that 
changes. For 3 months out of the year--April, May and June--those 
aircraft, instead of flying at 100 feet above the canyon rim, if they 
fly parallel to the canyon, would be at 5,000 feet, and that is 1 mile 
from the canyon either side. If they fly perpendicular, across the 
canyon, they would be at 1,000 feet--significant improvements. Also, 
during those months they would only fly Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday--not 7 days a week. So for recreationalists, this is a real 
advantage that is gained by them.
  Now, when we talk about 12,000 acres, is it this same sort of 
beautiful landscape as we see here? Let me show you.
  This is a picture of the 12,000 acres. As you can see, it is sparse. 
It is flat. This is where for 100 years they have been grazing cattle. 
Folks out there work hard to make a living on this land. But this is 
the picture of the 12,000 acres that are out there now.
  Also, when I mentioned the Shoshone-Paiute tribes, one of the things 
that was asked of our Native Americans--and this is the Duck Valley 
Reservation, which is in this southwest corner of the State of Idaho, 
and also in Nevada--but we asked them what areas of concern they would 
have, what geographic areas of concern that they would have for some of 
their sacred areas. They drew this line and said, anything in here we 
would certainly prefer that you not have this training facility in. 
And, therefore, Juniper Butte, which is the land in question, is right 
here. As you can see, it is a great deal outside the area of concern of 
the Native Americans.

  The funds for the improvements and for land acquisition for this 
project have been provided by President Clinton in his defense bill 
that is before us. It is included in the Department of Defense 
authorization bill, so it is very logical and consistent for us to deal 
with this project in the same legislation that has the funding for this 
project. That is what is before us at this point.
  The result of this is that there will be: A new, no-live-ordnance, 
12,000-acre training range using land that has been grazed for over 100 
years; the most extensive mitigation program in the history of the Air 
Force; new seasonal overflight restrictions of the canyons for 
recreationalists and sheep; an Air Force commitment to provide $430,000 
over 4 years to monitor impacts on bighorn sheep and sage grouse; 
avoidance of the entire sacred site area identified by the Shoshone-
Paiute Tribes at the start of the process and protection of

[[Page S6964]]

existing sacred sites; Air Force agreement with ranching operation 
impacted by land withdrawal. The Juniper Butte Range is supported by 
letters from Defense Secretary Bill Cohen, Interior Secretary Bruce 
Babbitt, and Air Force Secretary--Acting Secretary Whitten Peters, and 
Idaho Governor Batt.
  The Air Force, from the outset, said if, in the area that they 
ultimately chose as the approved site for this training range, there 
were people who might be adversely impacted, that the Air Force would 
compensate. This agreement would allow for compensation to be a result 
of the agreement negotiated between the Air Force and, in this case, a 
ranching family. We have a rancher who, for years, has been grazing his 
cattle on these 12,000 acres and has made a great many improvements 
with regard to the water lines and fencing. So as he moved those water 
lines and the fencing to a different location, again, he would be 
compensated for this and he would have those grazing areas realigned in 
a different location. So, again he would be leaving that area.
  The language that we have before the Senate is language that was 
given to us by the Department of the Interior, by BLM, and by the U.S. 
Air Force.
  I will tell you, Madam President, that there are a couple of items 
which have been added to the Kempthorne-Craig amendment which are a 
substitute for the language in the bill. Again, the language comes from 
the Department of the Interior and the Air Force, and there are four 
additional changes.
  No. 1, the impacted rancher may continue to graze the withdrawn land 
until his agreement with the Air Force is fully implemented; that is, 
until rights-of-way are granted and new fences and water pipes are 
built.
  We cleared this with Katie McGinty, who is the President's counsel on 
environmental quality. The White House is very comfortable with this 
language.
  No. 2, to the maximum extent possible, Interior should use maps 
already bought and paid for in development of the EIS, just trying to 
avoid further costs of the project.
  No. 3, we add Owyhee County to the development of the resource 
management plan for withdrawn lands and monitoring activities.
  No. 4, we change water right language from the Air Force ``may'' not 
seek water rights to the Air Force ``shall'' not seek water rights.
  The substitute amendment will result in development of the Juniper 
Butte Range. I think this is an important distinction. That is, that 
particular site was recommended by the Bureau of Land Management after 
a lengthy process, which I have outlined; the Air Force then concluded 
that was the best site. It was not a situation where the rancher came 
forward and said, is there any way that the Federal Government could 
somehow come and utilize this land? This was something that was driven 
by, No. 1, the Air Force wanting to have this enhanced training for the 
Composite Wing at the Air Force base, the Bureau of Land Management 
choosing the Juniper Butte site, the Air Force ultimately agreeing to 
it, and then a whole series of mitigations have been put in place.
  The amendment sets no precedent on grazing rights, as is acknowledged 
by the Bureau of Land Management. I think that is an important 
distinction.
  So this is perfecting language. It, again, is a process that has 
taken 2\1/2\ years, three volumes that are contained in the 
environmental impact statement following NEPA. It has the strong 
support of the President of the United States, the Acting Secretary of 
the Air Force, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the 
Director of the Bureau of Land Management, the Governor of the State of 
Idaho, the Idaho delegation.
  Again, I appreciate all the cooperation we have had and the strong 
support from the administration on bringing this project, finally, to 
closure.
  With that, I know the senior Senator from Idaho, Senator Craig, has 
some comments he would like to make on this amendment as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, first of all, I thank my colleague, 
Senator Kempthorne, for the tremendous diligence with which he has 
approached this issue for national defense and for the citizens of the 
State of Idaho. What we are talking about this evening in the amendment 
that we bring before you is an issue of national defense and the 
appropriate allocation of natural resources, natural public resources 
in our country.
  There is no question that it has been determined by the Air Force 
that Mountain Home Air Force Base needs additional capacity to train, 
to train the 366th Wing, the Composite Wing that my colleague has just 
spoken about--not only current training but future training. And of 
course out West, where the skies are blue and the horizons seem to be 
endless, you would think this would be an easy process. There is all of 
this public land. In fact, 63 percent of the State of Idaho is owned by 
the Federal Government. And you can just go anywhere and fly anywhere 
and train anywhere. That is not the case. We know that is not the case. 
And it should not be the case, because that public land is a valuable 
natural resources allocated for a variety of uses.
  It is most important that where the Air Force should train, that 
training should be specific, well defined, and that is exactly what we 
are attempting to do. The Senator has outlined the process--well over 
2\1/2\ years, 16 public hearings, thousands of inputs from the citizens 
of our State and from around the country for and against the expansion 
or the development of a new training range. We are now here, doing the 
necessary thing, and that is to reallocate public land, to take land 
which was once grazing land and wildlife habitat, but primarily used 
for grazing--it had been for well over 100 years --and saying no longer 
will this land be used for grazing, it will be used for training 
overflights.
  But for the person who grazed that land, the family who has had the 
right to graze that land under BLM permit for nearly 100 years, we are 
saying, ``You will no longer be able to graze there. We are going to 
take that land away from your use. We are going to allocate a new area, 
and you are going to be able to gain a permit to graze in the new area 
under the standard prescriptions of the BLM and the range management 
set forth by the Secretary of the Interior and the appropriate rules 
and regulations of the National Environmental Policy Act.'' As the 
Senator has just spoken, ``You will be able to graze on your own range 
until such time as this agreement is worked out.''

  There is no special treatment. There is a recognition that in this 
process, we have two demands, and we ought to be able to meet both of 
them. We have the demand for expanded training range capability of the 
366th, and we have what I think is a reasonable approach toward land 
use, and that is grazing. If we did not grant this rancher an 
opportunity to graze in other areas, we would destroy a 100-year-old 
family business and put them out of business. It is that plain, and it 
is that simple.
  The Air Force understood that, BLM understood that, the President 
understands that, and through this give-and-take and negotiations, we 
have arrived at a settlement. Not everybody agrees with that 
settlement, but everybody has been treated fairly.
  The Duck Valley Indian Reservation, Shoshone Paiute Tribe, Native 
Americans with substantial rights in that area have been treated 
fairly, have been allowed to be at the table to negotiate, as we should 
have treated them, and all considerations have been made--overflight 
levels not to disturb their solitude and the character of their lands, 
all the corridors of flight, all of those have been considered, because 
those pictures that the Senator just showed us show huge expanses of 
public lands and no fences and no lines and no roads. You would think, 
well, my goodness, fly anywhere. Not the case. There are land rights 
out there. There is private land, there is Indian land, and that is 
private by character of a separate nation, and there are private 
inholdings of citizens, and then, of course, there is the public land.
  There is a criticism launched that somehow this particular rancher 
that we are dislodging from an area where he and his father and his 
grandfather grazed for over 100 years is getting special treatment. 
That is not the case. What we are saying to him as we take away from 
him the land under which

[[Page S6965]]

he grazed, therefore, if we didn't offer new land to graze, under the 
standards of the current law, somehow we would be denying him his 
livelihood. We are saying there will be costs involved in bringing the 
new range into quality--quality grazing, availability of water, fences 
for rest rotation grazing, and that rancher should not have to sustain 
those costs. So there are costs in transition.
  There are mitigating costs, and that is why we have worked hard; that 
is why Senator Kempthorne has worked especially hard on his committee 
to make all of these things happen.
  He twice--at least twice, maybe three times--has hosted meetings in 
his office that I have attended with all of the parties at the table to 
assure that everybody was talking and the fullest public process was 
met; that every ``i'' was dotted and every ``t'' was crossed under the 
National Environmental Policy Act to make sure that no stakeholder was 
left out.
  There are some California sheep, wild sheep in the area of concern. 
There is money in here for the Idaho Department of Fish and Game to 
monitor the character of that herd so that in no way do we damage the 
environment or the wildlife at hand.
  I think as a country, I hope that we as a Congress, have the ability 
to allocate resource and balance natural resource use and environmental 
needs along with our national defense. That is what this amendment 
does. It not only expands training range capability for Mountain Home 
Air Force Base and this new concept we call ``composite wing,'' but it 
assures long-term ability to do that kind of training.

  I say to my colleagues, you have just received a ``Dear Colleague'' 
letter from Senator Kempthorne and myself outlining the pros and cons 
of this. I must tell you that this is not without opposition. There are 
some who still prefer that nothing be done. But a majority of Idahoans 
believe something should be done, and certainly as those who are 
caretakers of the national defense--and that is what we as Senators 
are--it is important that we assure the long-term capability for our 
national defense and optimum training conditions for the men and women 
who fly the aircraft of our country. That is what we believe we are 
doing here. At the same time, we are assuring that the traditional and 
legally prescribed uses of our public lands for grazing purposes can 
continue to go on.
  I believe, Madam President, that what Senator Kempthorne and I offer 
tonight is a win-win proposition. The Air Force wins; American citizens 
win because of enhanced capability for national defense training; and 
our public land users and the environment win, because we are now 
expanding the capability of grazing by improving its conditions, and 
those grazing conditions also improve the conditions for wildlife 
because of additional water in areas where there may not currently be 
water and will be in the future.
  That is what we bring before you tonight. We appreciate your 
consideration of it. We hope you can agree with us, because, as Senator 
Kempthorne has said, the Idaho delegation stands united, along with the 
Governor of our State and our State legislature. We appreciate having a 
military presence in our State. We appreciate Mountain Home Air Force 
Base for what it does for the country, but also what it does for the 
State of Idaho. We also appreciate the beauty of the great expanse of 
our Federal lands.
  We also understand the importance of balanced and multiple uses. We 
think we bring all of those to the table in the amendment that we have 
offered, that the Senator has authored, and we hope that the Senate 
will concur with us in that amendment. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, the land withdrawal for enhanced 
military training in Idaho is a necessary element for varied, realistic 
training that is essential to enable the 366th Wing at Mountain Home 
Air Force Base to sustain combat readiness to meet the complex threats 
expected in the 21st century. The proponents of this provision have 
worked long and hard to resolve all of the stakeholders' interest 
related to this military land withdrawal and have put together a good 
provision.
  I strongly support Senator Kempthorne's substitute amendment to title 
XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999 and 
the continued efforts to secure enhanced military training in Idaho.
  Madam President, we have both Senators from Idaho in accord on this 
matter. The Governor of Idaho is in accord on this matter. It appears 
to be highly desirable that the Senate adopt this amendment and 
accommodate the two Senators, the Governor and the people of Idaho. 
Thank you. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the Senator from Idaho, Senator 
Kempthorne, has done what he indicated in committee that he intended to 
do, which was to offer a modification of his previous language when 
this bill got to the floor. That is being carried out with the support 
of his good colleague from Idaho.
  We have no objection to the modification in the language. My 
understanding is there is further discussion or debate relative to this 
subject which will be forthcoming at a later time, but I have no 
objection to this amendment.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I thank the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, for his comments and his strong 
support. I also thank Senator Levin for his comments. I enjoy greatly 
working with the ranking member.
  We have fulfilled what we said we would do. Also, I point out to our 
ranking member that this language is the language provided to us by the 
administration.
  And so I feel very comfortable with this.
  I also, Madam President, would like to make part of the Record the 
letter from the Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen; the letter from the 
Secretary of the Air Force, Acting Secretary Whitten Peters; and the 
letter is also signed by Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, in 
support of the project with the language, the news release by the 
Bureau of Land Management, which goes into details, and also the letter 
from Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, where he 
affirms that the Air Force will provide $430,000 to monitor the impact 
on bighorn sheep and sage grouse over 4 years. I ask unanimous consent 
that those be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                             Secretary of Defense,


                                        1000 Defense Pentagon,

                                 Washington, DC, October 21, 1997.
     Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Dirk: Thank you for your letter of September 8, 1997. 
     I want to assure you nothing has changed regarding my 
     enthusiasm for the Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI) 
     initiative.
       The 366th Wing as Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB) is an 
     important component of our military capability. As one of the 
     first units to deploy to a problem area, it has the 
     responsibility to neutralize enemy forces. It must maintain 
     peak readiness to respond rapidly and effectively to diverse 
     situation and conflicts.
       ETI balances realistic local training with careful 
     consideration of environmental, cultural, and economic 
     concerns. The elements of the ETI proposal, though designed 
     to minimize environmental impacts, will simulate real world 
     scenarios and allow the aircrews to plan and practice complex 
     missions. In addition to providing realistic training, ETI's 
     close proximity to Mountain Home AFB also will enable the Air 
     Force to convert time currently spent in transit into actual 
     training time. Thus, the ETI proposal allows Air Force crews 
     to use limited flight training hours more efficiently.
       I continue to give the ETI process my full support. It will 
     provide our commanders with realistic training opportunities 
     locally, while ensuring potential impacts to natural, 
     cultural, social, and economic resources are identified, and 
     where possible, cooperatively resolved. Your strong support 
     for the ETI initiative is very important to us, and you may 
     rely upon my continued interest and commitment.
       I trust this information is useful.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William S. Cohen,
                                             Secretary of Defense.

[[Page S6966]]

     
                                  ____
                                   Secretary of the Air Force,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1998.
     Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Kempthorne: We are pleased to provide you with 
     the attached legislation for the withdrawal of lands for the 
     Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI) project. As you know, this 
     legislation represents three years of extensive work by the 
     Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Air Force, you and other 
     representatives of the people of Idaho, and many others who 
     care about the welfare of Idaho's environment and the 
     effectiveness of the 366th Wing at Mountain Home Air Force 
     Base.
       ETI will increase the realism, flexibility, and quality of 
     the Air Force's training. It permits the 366th Wing to train 
     more efficiently and effectively for its important missions, 
     thereby improving the aircrews' safety and mission 
     performance. Implementation of ETI will substantially 
     strengthen the 366th Wing's ability to ensure readiness to 
     perform its assigned missions.
       Importantly, however, the Air Force and BLM also worked 
     very hard so that ETI would balance training needs with the 
     concerns of the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, the environment, and 
     other public land uses. The Air Force and BLM actively 
     solicited public and agency involvement throughout the 
     development of the project. Participants in the process 
     included the State of Idaho, environmental organizations, the 
     Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, ranchers, recreational organizations, 
     and other users of the public lands in Idaho.
       The Air Force incorporated numerous mitigations in the 
     design of the project to address public concerns and 
     relocated facility sites during preparation of the 
     environmental impact statement (EIS) to avoid various 
     environmental concerns expressed by the Shoshone-Paiute 
     Tribes and others. Following completion of the EIS and 
     consideration of public comment the Air Force adopted further 
     mitigation measures, including altitude and seasonal 
     overflight restrictions that further address concerns of 
     recreational users and protect the habitat of bighorn sheep. 
     The NEPA process was a valuable tool in helping to identify 
     these mitigations and resolve concerns.
       We believe the attached legislation accommodates many 
     issues that you and other representatives of the people of 
     Idaho have raised throughout the process and is an important 
     step forward for national security, for the environment, and 
     for significant tribal interests.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the 
     standpoint of the Administration's program there is no 
     objection to the presentation of this report to Congress.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bruce Babbit,
                                        Secretary of the Interior.
                                                F. Whitten Peters,
     Acting Secretary of the Air Force.
                                  ____


Agreement on Enhanced Training in Idaho

                           *   *   *   *   *



                     Bruneau-Jarbidge River System

       In general, for all major canyons in the Bruneau-Jarbidge 
     River System, low-altitude training flights would be limited 
     to 1,000 feet above ground level and would cross only 
     perpendicular to the canyons. Additionally, parallel flights 
     within one mile of the canyon rims would be limited to 5,000 
     feet above ground level (AGL).
       Along the Bruneau River from the Bruneau-Jarbidge 
     confluence to Clover Creek, no low-level overflights will 
     occur within one mile of the canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL 
     from April 1 through June 30.
       Along the Bruneau River from Clover Creek to Miller Water, 
     no low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the 
     canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30 
     on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays.
       To support composite wing exercises (includes fighters and 
     bombers) from April 1 through June 30, the low-level flight 
     restrictions over the Bruneau River will be relaxed during 
     two days each month to allow exercises as low as 500 feet 
     AGL. The Air Force will provide advance public notification 
     of when these composite wing exercises will occur.


                          owyhee river system

       In general, for all major canyons in the Owyhee River 
     System, low-altitude training flights would be limited to 
     1,000 feet AGL and would cross only perpendicular to the 
     canyons. Additionally, parallel flights within one mile of 
     the canyon rims would be limited to 5,000 feet AGL.
       Along the South Fork of the Owyhee River from the 45 Ranch 
     to the confluence with the East Fork of the Owyhee River, no 
     low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the 
     canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30, 
     subject to two composite wing training exercises per month.
       Along the East Fork of the Owyhee River from the confluence 
     of Dickshooter Creek to the confluence of the South Fork, no 
     low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the 
     canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30, 
     subject to two composite wing training exercises per month.
       Along the East Fork of the Owyhee River from the confluence 
     of Battle Creek to the confluence of Dickshooter Creek, no 
     low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the 
     canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30 
     on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays.


               airspace expansion over little jacks creek

       There will be no military training overflights below 5,000 
     feet AGL in the airspace over the Little Jacks Creek area 
     during April, May, and June.


                            recreation study

       The BLM and Air Force will jointly fund a study on 
     recreation use in the Little Jacks Creek area and the 
     canyonlands of the Bruneau-Jarbidge and Owyhee River Systems.
                                  ____

                                        Bureau of Land Management,


                                     Office of Public Affairs,

                                     Washington, DC, May 15, 1998.

    BLM, Air Force Reach Agreement on Idaho Training Range Expansion

       The Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Air Force have 
     reached an agreement that would accommodate military flights 
     over public land in southwest Idaho while subjecting those 
     flights to altitude and seasonal restrictions over key 
     portions of the Owyhee and Bruneau river canyons, BLM 
     Director Pat Shea announced today.
       Under the agreement, which would withdraw 12,000 acres of 
     BLM-managed public land for expanded military training, the 
     Air Force would extend its airspace training over Little 
     Jacks Creek, but its additional flights would be subject to 
     altitude and seasonal restrictions. Under the agreement, the 
     Air Force would continue its current use of about 7.5 million 
     acres of airspace over BLM-managed land.
       ``This agreement reflects extensive public input on issues 
     surrounding Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI), and protects 
     public land resources while accommodating vital U.S. military 
     training,'' said Shea. ``the agreement ensures that military 
     flights would be limited to 5,000 feet above ground level in 
     the airspace above Little Jacks Creek during April, May, and 
     June, which addresses concerns raised by recreationists who 
     hike in the area and raft down the Owyhee and Bruneau rivers. 
     The altitude restriction is also aimed at protecting the 
     habitat of bighorn sheep.''
       Shea said the agreement took into account public input from 
     eight ``scoping'' meetings held by the Air Force and BLM in 
     1996 and seven public hearings held last year on the Air 
     Force's Draft Environmental Impact Statement relating to 
     expanded airspace training.
       Below are the particulars of the BLM-Air Force agreement:


                 seasonal low-level flight restrictions

       The Air Force will institute seasonal low-level flight 
     restrictions for all military users in the Jarbidge and 
     Owyhee military operating areas to minimize conflicts with 
     public land resources and uses.
                                  ____



                                   Secretary of the Air Force,

                                    Washington, DC, June 11, 1998.
     Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington DC.
       Dear Senator Kempthorne: Thank you for your recent inquiry 
     concerning Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI). You have asked 
     if the Air Force intends to monitor bighorn sheep and sage 
     grouse populations further in conjunction with the ETI 
     proposal.
       The Air Force provided $100K in FY 1998 to determine the 
     baseline populations of the two species in areas where ETI 
     would cause surface and airspace changes with the 
     implementation of ETI. Headquarters Air Combat Command has 
     indicated that it intends to fully fund monitoring activities 
     in subsequent years, assuming ETI is approved. They would 
     then provide the State of Idaho $110K per year for the next 
     three years for monitoring activities.
       ETI will be a great asset for the composite wing based at 
     Mountain Home AFB and will reflect our commitment to 
     environmental stewardship. We appreciate your commitment to 
     this important project.
           Sincerely,
                                                F. Whitten Peters,
                                Acting Secretary of the Air Force.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I want to report that there are some 
members who believe the proposed substitute amendment #2892 sets a new 
standard for environmental remediation before the Air Force can 
relinquish the withdrawn lands back to the Bureau of Land Management. 
Like I did with the Department of Interior, the BLM and the Air Force 
regarding the new overflight restrictions of the canyons, I will 
convene a meeting with all of the interested parties and committees to 
try to reach a consensus on this issue before completion of the 
conference on this bill.
  Madam President, I would just like to say, after months and months of 
due process, I think we are doing what is right by the environment, 
what is good for recreation, and certainly what is right for the 
pilots.
  When we think of those pilots who have to climb into those aircraft, 
if we do have to send them into harm's way, let us make sure we provide 
them with not only the best aircraft in the world but the best training 
opportunities, so that when they go into harm's way,

[[Page S6967]]

they can come back to their loved ones in good shape.
  So I want to thank Senator Craig for his partnership. He has been a 
tremendous partner, as has Congresswoman Chenoweth, Congressman Crapo, 
Governor Batt. And, again, there are folks who do not like this--didn't 
like it from the outset, don't like the conclusion, don't like the 
answer. But the process has been fulfilled, and the conclusion, I 
believe, is right.
  I just want to say to the family of the Bracketts, the ranchers who 
have been working with us on this, I appreciate their willingness to go 
through this process. Again, they did not come forward; they did not 
step up and say, ``Boy, why don't you use this land.'' I think out of 
their belief in Idaho and their belief in the country, they are willing 
to go along with this. But in this very public process, unfortunately, 
some people lodge charges that bring into question the integrity of 
some individuals. I think that is just very unfortunate. That happens 
in the political process. Perhaps we get used to it a little more, but 
I hate to see it when it is leveled at a good family like this. So I 
appreciate the Brackett family.
  Again, I appreciate the chairman and the ranking member's comments. 
And I believe, unless there is further debate, we are ready for a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Idaho.
  The amendment (No. 2892) was agreed to.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. BROWNBACK. I ask unanimous consent that a fellow in my office, 
Terry Bare, be able to sit in on the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2978

    (Purpose: To require separate housing for male and female basic 
    trainees, and to ensure after-hours privacy for basic trainees)

  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2978.

  Mr. BROWNBACK. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike out section 527, and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:

     SEC. 527. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO RECRUIT BASIC TRAINING.

       (a) Army.--(1) Chapter 401 of title 10, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 4319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and 
       privacy for male and female recruits

       ``(a) Separate Housing Facilities.--The Secretary of the 
     Army shall require that during basic training male and female 
     recruits be housed in separate barracks or other troop 
     housing facilities.
       ``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Army shall 
     require that access by drill sergeants and other training 
     personnel to a barracks floor on which recruits are housed 
     during basic training shall be limited after the end of the 
     training day, other than in the case of an emergency or other 
     exigent circumstance, to drill sergeants and other training 
     personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits housed on 
     that floor.
       ``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `basic training' means the initial entry training program of 
     the Army that constitutes the basic training of new 
     recruits.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``4319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male 
              and female recruits.''.

       (b) Navy and Marine Corps.--(1) Part III of subtitle C of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after 
     chapter 601 the following new chapter:

                   ``CHAPTER 602--TRAINING GENERALLY

``Sec.
``6931. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male 
              and female recruits.

     ``Sec. 6931. Recruit basic training: separate housing and 
       privacy for male and female recruits

       ``(a) Separate Housing.--The Secretary of the Navy shall 
     require that during basic training male and female recruits 
     be housed in separate barracks or other troop housing 
     facilities.
       ``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Navy shall 
     require that access by recruit division commanders and other 
     training personnel to a barracks floor on which Navy recruits 
     are housed during basic training shall be limited after the 
     end of the training day, other than in the case of an 
     emergency or other exigent circumstance, to recruit division 
     commanders and other training personnel who are of the same 
     sex as the recruits housed on that floor.
       ``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `basic training' means the initial entry training programs of 
     the Navy and Marine Corps that constitute the basic training 
     of new recruits.''.
       (2) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle C, 
     and at the beginning of part III of subtitle C, of such title 
     are amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 
     601 the following new item:

``602. Training Generally...................................6931''.....

       (c) Air Force.--(1) Chapter 901 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 9319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and 
       privacy for male and female recruits

       ``(a) Separate Housing.--The Secretary of the Air Force 
     shall require that during basic training male and female 
     recruits be housed in separate dormitories or other troop 
     housing facilities.
       ``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Air Force 
     shall require that access by drill sergeants and other 
     training personnel to a dormitory floor on which recruits are 
     housed during basic training shall be limited after the end 
     of the training day, other than in the case of an emergency 
     or other exigent circumstance, to drill sergeants and other 
     training personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits 
     housed on that floor.
       ``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `basic training' means the initial entry training program of 
     the Air Force that constitutes the basic training of new 
     recruits.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``9319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male 
              and female recruits.''.

       (d) Implementation.--(1) The Secretary of the Army, the 
     Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force 
     shall implement section 4319, 6931, or 9319, respectively, of 
     title 10, United States Code (as added by this section), as 
     rapidly as feasible and shall ensure that the provisions of 
     that section are applied to all recruit basic training 
     classes beginning not later than the first such class that 
     enters basic training on or after April 15, 1999.
       (2)(A) If the Secretary of the military department 
     concerned determines that it is not feasible, during some or 
     all of the period beginning on April 15, 1999, and ending on 
     October 1, 2001, to comply with the requirement for separate 
     housing at any particular installation at which basic 
     training is conducted because facilities at that installation 
     are insufficient for such purpose, the Secretary may grant a 
     waiver of the requirement with respect to that installation. 
     Any such waiver may not be in effect after October 1, 2001, 
     and may only be in effect while the facilities at that 
     installation are insufficient for the purposes of compliance 
     with the requirement for separate housing.
       (B) If the Secretary of a military department grants a 
     waiver under subparagraph (A) with respect to an 
     installation, the Secretary shall require that male and 
     female recruits in basic training at that installation during 
     any period that the waiver is in effect not be housed on the 
     same floor of a barracks or other troop housing facility.
       (3) In this subsection:
       (A) The term ``requirement for separate housing'' means--
       (i) with respect to the Army, the requirement set forth in 
     section 4319(a) of title 10, United States Code, as added by 
     subsection (a);
       (ii) with respect to the Navy and the Marine Corps, the 
     requirement set forth in section 6931(a) of such title, as 
     added by subsection (b); and
       (iii) with respect to the Air Force, the requirement set 
     forth in section 9319(a) of such title, as added by 
     subsection (c).
       (B) The term ``basic training'' means the initial entry 
     training program of an armed force that constitutes the basic 
     training of new recruits.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds are authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal 
     year 1999 for actions necessary to carry out this section and 
     the amendments made by this section, including military 
     construction projects (which projects are hereby authorized), 
     in the total amount of $166,000,000.

  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.


                Amendment No. 2979 To Amendment No. 2978

(Purpose: To require a moratorium on changes to gender-related policies 
                             and practices)

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf 
of Senators Snowe and Cleland and ask for its immediate consideration.

[[Page S6968]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for Ms. Snowe, for 
     herself and Mr. Cleland, proposes an amendment numbered 2979 
     to amendment No. 2978.

  Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President--
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for two unanimous consent requests 
relative to staffs' presence on the floor?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Could I ask a parliamentary question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk is still reading the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk continued to read as follows:

       Beginning on the first page, strike out all after SEC. and 
     insert in lieu thereof the following:

         . MORATORIUM ON CHANGES OF GENDER-RELATED POLICIES AND 
                   PRACTICES PENDING COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE 
                   COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-
                   RELATED ISSUES.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, officials of 
     the Department of Defense are prohibited from implementing 
     any change of policy or official practice in the department 
     regarding separation or integration of members of the Armed 
     Forces on the basis of gender that is within the 
     responsibility of the Commission on Military Training and 
     Gender-Related Issues to review under subtitle F of title V 
     of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1750), before the date on 
     which the commission terminates under section 654 of such 
     Act.

  Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, if I could make a parliamentary 
inquiry. As I understood, I was putting forward an amendment to be 
considered and had the floor to speak concerning that amendment. Is 
that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator lost the floor when he offered the 
amendment.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I would note that we would like to have and will get a 
debate on this issue at some point in time about separate barracks for 
the genders. And I had that as my understanding, that that was the 
debate that we were going to at the present time.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, he can go ahead and debate on 
his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is entitled to go ahead with his amendment.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much.
  Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield for a unanimous consent for two 
staffs' presence on the floor?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Only for that, and I am not yielding the floor. The 
understanding is, I am not yielding the floor. Yes, I will, if I 
receive it back to consider my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues, Senator 
Bingaman, and Senator Domenici, I ask unanimous consent that the 
privileges of the floor be granted to Peter Lyons of his office during 
the pendency of S. 2057 and any votes thereon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, for the 
period of time the Department of Defense authorization bill is under 
consideration, Mark Tauber, a State Department Pearson Fellow on the 
Foreign Relations Committee staff, be granted floor access.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise to discuss today the amendment I 
have offered that I put forward at the desk and will, at the 
appropriate time, be calling for the yeas and nays on that.
  I have discussed my amendment with the distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Personnel of the Armed Services Committee, the 
distinguished Senator from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne. And after my 
staff had briefings with the Pentagon, I decided the privacy of our new 
recruits, by mandating separate barracks, was extremely important and 
that this debate was necessary and needed at this point in time.
  Mr. President, my amendment is common sense. It simply requires 
separate barracks for male and female recruits during basic training. 
Further, the amendment protects the privacy of recruits by limiting 
access to barracks after hours to those of the same gender.
  I might note for the Senators that the House has considered much 
stronger language, and actually enacted in their bill, in the DOD 
authorization, the separation of genders during basic training. But we 
fall far short of that. This is just about barracks and housing during 
basic training.
  I believe this is a sensible step in restoring privacy and dignity to 
the military basic training experience and will allow our young 
recruits to focus on the serious tasks before them.
  This amendment helps to uphold the military standards of behavior and 
improves the quality of life for military members and spouses left at 
home while a loved one completes basic training.
  The amendment will help train instructors to instill the basic core 
values of discipline, teamwork, unit cohesion, and values that will 
ultimately benefit the individual, the family, and the military. By 
adopting this amendment, we codify a unanimous recommendation of the 
bipartisan Kassebaum-Baker commission.
  The Kassebaum-Baker Commission interviewed 2,000 recruits, 2,000 
recruits, and their supervisors and found serious problems. Let me just 
articulate a few of them. The commission recognized that sexual 
relations take place inside of barracks where young men and women live 
together. Moral and unit cohesion were negatively affected. Thus, the 
commission recommended that male and female recruits sleep in separate 
barracks. Talk about common sense, that seems to be it.
  To avoid cries that the cost is prohibitive, the Kassebaum Commission 
completed an analysis of the current structures at training 
installations which showed that the cost of this amendment is marginal. 
Mr. President, I will read the section of the Kassebaum Commission that 
says just that, quoting from page 15 of the study of the Kassebaum 
Commission:

       The committee has reviewed the layout and surge numbers of 
     the training installation and believes this change can be 
     accomplished at marginal cost, if any.

  Available barracks exist and have already been converted to 
accommodate both male recruits. Thus, there are no physical constraints 
to having men and women recruits housed separately during basic 
training. Existing structures can be used. The Kassebaum panel was 
stunned to discover--and this is a direct quote--``high frequency'' of 
sexual relations during basic training between male and female recruits 
in all branches of the services. High frequency.
  Now, if you think about this, if you put young male and female 
recruits around the age of 18 in close proximity, in the same quarters, 
I think there is a possibility that a high frequency of this may 
happen. The amendment that I put forward simply says we should have 
separate barracks. It doesn't even go to wanting separate training. It 
says separate ``barracks,'' to maybe reduce some of these incidents.
  The same report said ``some drill sergeants complained to the panel 
about the large amount of time they were spending investigating or 
disciplining male and female misconduct. It was found that the problem 
is exacerbated in mixed-gender barracks. This is after interviewing 
2,000 recruits and sergeants. It is exacerbated in mixed-gender 
barracks, especially where men and women live on the same floor.
  Just think about it again, in common-sense terms. Doesn't this just 
make sense that you will have more problems if you have mixed genders 
on same floor in the same barracks, and that you will then have to deal 
with that in basic training?

[[Page S6969]]

  Listen to this. At one location at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, the panel 
was told that male and female fraternization was so frequent that drill 
instructors had to take the doors off of the barracks rooms so they 
could maintain order inside. It was that frequent. They had to take the 
doors off.
  Secretary Cohen gave the services an opportunity to respond to the 
Kassebaum recommendations. Other than the marines, God bless 'em, they 
all came back and disagreed with the recommendation to establish 
separate living barracks. Despite this, I believe that there is no 
reason why male and female recruits should be sleeping on the same 
floors. This makes no sense.
  I put it in personal terms, if I could, for my colleagues. Think 
about their daughters, if they are going into the military. I have two 
young daughters. What if they were going in. Would you feel safer and 
better about their security and about this issue of fraternization if, 
during basic training, they are in separate facilities, or would you 
feel better and safer about it if they are on the same floor with 
different genders? Just think about that for half a second. Wouldn't 
you feel a lot better about it if they are in separate barracks so that 
people can watch a little closer than if they are on the same floor 
with other recruits and you already have these instances taking place?

  This is a common-sense proposal with minimal, if any, cost. This is 
about national security and ensuring our recruits make up the best, 
most disciplined force in the world. Just last month, we learned that 
five instructors at the Navy's boot camp have been accused of sexual 
misconduct and improper relations with women recruits. This is the 
Navy, not the Army; this is the Navy. One of the instructors at the 
Great Lakes Naval Training Center, a 30-year-old, was arrested on April 
30 on charges of having an improper sexual relationship with an 18-
year-old female recruit.
  I want to read some of the press account that is out of this, from 
the Chicago Sun Times, June 6, 1998.

       A Navy petty officer was found guilty of sexual misconduct 
     with female recruits and making false statements to Navy 
     officers in a court-martial Friday at the Great Lakes Naval 
     Base.
       After deliberating about 90 minutes, [90 minutes, not 
     long.] a three-member jury made up of two male Navy officers 
     and one female enlisted sailor found Machinists Mate 1st 
     Class Gregg Peterson guilty of eight of nine charges against 
     him.

  They quoted in this article several of the sailors, some of the women 
sailors. One--and I will not give her name because I don't think that 
is appropriate--said she cried as the jury presided and read its 
decision of guilty. She said ``I feel like I can breathe again now.'' 
She walked out of the Navy headquarters building where the court-
marital was held. She stated-- this is sad--``I didn't join the Navy to 
be laughed at.'' She had stated that this particular officer that was 
found guilty had stated lewd things towards her. Another recruit had 
said this person that was found guilty intimated to her he wanted to 
have sex with her, and she stated, ``I'll feel better when he is 
punished. He was in charge of the way he made us feel.''
  Two other recruits testified they had sex with the same person that 
was found guilty after he threw a mattress on the floor in the barracks 
and told them to undress. This is a superior position telling these 
recruits to do this. This is one of the recruits who said, ``The Navy 
is trying to cover up the fact that they let this guy wander through 
the barracks, intimidating recruits into having sex with them.'' That 
is a horror story for them. And another who had sex with this 
particular person found guilty said she couldn't have fought him off if 
she tried.
  What is that about? This is terrible. This is disgusting that this 
took place at the Navy basic training facility, and you have several 
recruits testifying of what this person in a senior position forced 
them to do.
  Our amendment is aimed at trying to get just at that, separate 
barracks. You cannot have a person of the other gender in the facility 
where the people of the opposite gender are except on emergency cases. 
What are we letting them do, just parade around and throw mattresses on 
the floor? He was court-martialled for this and found guilty of eight 
of nine charges. This is the press account from June 6th after the 
court-martial report came back. My goodness.

  Now, what sort of solace, if you are an 18-year-old and your family 
is considering letting you go into the military service and you want to 
go into the military service and you are a female, and you are reading 
these sort of stories, what goes through your mind at that time? Do you 
want to go into the military then? Is this going to be an inhibition if 
you think you want to be a part of the Navy, of the proud tradition of 
the Navy, of the Army? You want to be part of that unit, but then you 
read this stuff about guys parading around in barracks and throwing 
mattresses on the floor. What does that do? And what does it do to the 
family? What does the family think about in that case?
  A study of female recruits out last November found them particularly 
susceptible to unwanted pregnancies and assaults. The study found that 
``to many young female recruits, the basic training experience can be 
uniquely stressful with individuals often experiencing feelings of 
loneliness and isolation and the possibility that some individuals 
would turn to sexual relationships as a means of coping with the stress 
is great.''
  Let's go to another case we are all familiar with. We all remember 
what went on at the Aberdeen Proving Ground between instructor and 
trainee last year--rape and sex between drill instructors and trainees. 
Aberdeen is an example of what can happen in the pressurized training 
environment without proper supervision. Remember, basic trainees are 
even more susceptible, even more susceptible.
  We must do what we can to remove these pressures. Again, I plead with 
my colleagues, think of your own 18-year-old daughters going into the 
military, or others that would be considering this. Is this really the 
sort of situation we want to put them in, that we are forcing them to 
go into, that we force them, if they want to be a part of the military. 
That is what they have to do; this is where they have to sleep.
  I recognize that the services are already taking steps to ensure 
security and privacy of the current male and female living arrangements 
and I applaud the services for taking these steps. My amendment allows 
time for the services to accomplish the transition to separate 
barracks, which is where they have to get. It really is where they have 
to get. It sets October 1, 2001, as the effective date. If an 
installation has insufficient facilities, the amendment allows recruits 
to be housed in separate barrack floors with the proper access 
restrictions until 2001.
  We are giving the military some lead time to build into this, to deal 
with this situation, and they are trying to deal with it. The bottom 
line is this: The primary function of the basic training is to properly 
induce young trainees into the Armed Forces, with minimal 
distractions. They are there to learn the skills that spell success or 
failure on the battlefield. I urge you to support Secretary Cohen's 
goal of ``a basic training system which provides gender privacy and 
dignity and safe, secure living conditions.'' Safe, secure, and 
separate barracks is the best way to ensure a well-trained and 
disciplined force. At a minimum, I believe that we owe that to these 
recruits and their families.

  Mr. President, I just ask you to think about this for a little while, 
because this really makes sense. I know the military is trying to get 
accomplish what we have mandated them to do on the mixed-gender 
training, and they are trying to do it in the close quarters that we 
have, and these have been the ways they have received pressure.
  My goodness, I say to Senators, we have to look at the facts and what 
is taking place, ask ourselves a bit of common sense. These young 18-
year-old men and women are in close quarters, in a pressurized 
situation at basic training. What do you think is going to happen in 
this situation if you provide a situation where they are in the same 
barracks and you have a common area for them to go into, or you have 
instructors that are superior in age and position and they are able to 
go into the same facilities?
  The military is saying, ``Look, we are trying to divide and partition 
the buildings, so that on the same floor

[[Page S6970]]

you are going to have a plywood petition, and hopefully we will get to 
a permanent petition between the two genders on the floor.'' But you 
are still going to have common areas where the two can mix. Plus, you 
can still have and will still have your instructors going into the area 
of the opposite sex and being there. You are going to have, 
unfortunately, that situation like just happened up in the Navy basic 
training facility, if that occurs. If we leave the situation the way it 
is today, that is going to occur. Plus, you are still mixing a 
situation that just doesn't apply to us in common sense, if we think 
about it. This is going to lead to the problems we have.
  I also want to add a personal Kansas story into this. My office in 
Kansas--I have not been a Senator a long time, but we regularly get 
requests from female recruits who get pregnant while in basic training, 
and they ask for discharges. One lady who contacted my office had a 
nervous breakdown. She has since separated from the Navy. I will not 
say her name; that would be inappropriate. But my note to colleagues is 
that everybody loses in this deal. Everybody loses in this deal. The 
Navy loses a highly qualified, motivated recruit, who falls into a 
pressurized environment and then gets demoralized and has a nervous 
breakdown.
  This is a Kansas example I have, and only one. I have multiple ones 
that come into my office in Kansas. I am sure others have them, too. 
Check your records, check your services, and what you are being 
contacted about in your State. How many of you have the same 
situation--being contacted by female recruits who want out of the 
military because they have unwarranted sexual advances? My goodness, 
the Navy loses, we lose, and this particular recruit was demoralized 
and loses as well. This makes no sense.
  I want to go through the report, if I may, of the Kassebaum 
commission. This is something I respect, coming from Nancy Kassebaum 
Baker from my home State of Kansas, who is as level-headed a person as 
you will ever find anywhere in the world. She is a wonderful lady. She 
is very thoughtful, and she doesn't go around tilting at different 
things and doesn't follow wildly different philosophies. She looks at 
things and applies a good Kansas common sense to it. I think she 
epitomizes that sense of common sense. A lot of my colleagues will 
remember her, and they know what I am saying is true. This is her 
commission's report:

       The committee observed that integrated housing is 
     contributing to a higher rate of disciplinary problems. Both 
     recruits and trainers, consequently, are distracted from 
     their training objectives . . ..

  What is our objective in basic training but to train? They are being 
distracted because of disciplinary problems they are having. This is a 
quote from the commission report on December 16, 1997. I want to show 
you a chart of this commission in a little bit. It was appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, and from the President, and they 
came out with these unanimous recommendations. It was bipartisan, and 
there were a number of people in this commission who served in the 
military themselves. This is a group that has considered it. Here is 
another quote from congressional testimony:

       We have reviewed the barracks structure at the training 
     installations and believe that this can be achieved at 
     minimal cost.

  I am sensitive to the cost issue because we are not funding the 
military sufficiently. I have military bases in my State that are 
important and are not being funded sufficiently. They have studied this 
thoroughly. They said we can do this at minimal, if any, cost.
  In my amendment, we do authorize money to be able to be used to do 
this. I think even if you are talking about recruits coming in, you 
have to provide some solace to the families that we are going to 
separate and do everything we can--and right now we are not--to prevent 
this sort of situation from happening. We still provide an 
authorization in the amendment that I have, and we can deal with the 
appropriation on another day.
  This is the Army inspector general's special inspection from July 22, 
1997:

       Many of the first sergeants interviewed indicated that 
     trainee-trainee consensual sex occurred quite often, but felt 
     the chain of command was reluctant to enforce the 
     installation regulation.

  To back up this even with my staff's investigation, the military 
requested--and they want to try to make this situation work--and they 
have been pushing our office and saying, ``Don't do this.'' They said, 
``Send a couple of your staff members to Fort Jackson to look at the 
situation.'' We did. I had two staff members go there. They went and 
talked with some of the recruits, who told them about instances of 
sexual activity happening in the telephone booth and in the same 
barracks where you have mixed genders involved, and they told them how 
this was done, how the pressure is and the environment and how this 
occurs.
  So rather than allaying my fears, which is what I hoped would happen, 
it just heightened them. Here we had my staff members being told by 
recruits, ``Well, yes, this goes on. Here is how it happens in separate 
facilities.'' And we were shown how the barrier is built between the 
male and female genders on the same floor, with a piece of plywood put 
up and a Radio Shack alarm. Well, you are still putting males and 
females in close proximity, in common areas. My staff was supposed to 
be there being assured this was not going on, but we got just the 
opposite report of what was taking place.
  This is the CRS issue brief of May 14, 1998. It is the third 
different study looking at this particular issue:

       At a number of Army facilities, investigations and court 
     marshals are underway, or have been completed, concerning 
     harassment, fraternization, assault and rape.

  So I have the Kassebaum commission, the Army inspector general, and 
now the CRS issue brief. This isn't just one study; this is the third 
one. It is the same point that it makes.
  Some of the people who have supported the military for a long time, 
the American Legion, submitted a report to the House Subcommittee on 
Military Personnel on March 17. It said:

       The American Legion advocates separate barracks for male 
     and female recruits at basic training facilities.

  This is also an American Legion statement:

       The mission in combat is to close with and destroy the 
     enemy by fire and maneuver and/or close combat. Separate 
     gender living conditions will better prepare the Armed Forces 
     to fulfill this mission.

  That is what the military is about, Mr. President. This is the 
overall commission's unanimous recommendation for separate barracks. 
Mr. President, I hope we can have a direct vote on this. I think we 
should have separate training for male and female, like what the House 
passed. I know a number of my colleagues actually support that as 
well--separate training altogether. We decided, let's take a narrower 
approach. Let's go on this narrower issue here, because this one I 
don't see how you disagree with.

  Some of my colleagues will argue, and say, ``Well, let's wait for 
another commission report. We have a congressional commission.'' Yes; 
we have a congressional commission. It has been appointed. It has a 
much broader requirement than just the issue of separate gender 
relations. Plus, I would point out again to you, now we are another 
year into the future. We are going to be on a second commission. We 
already have one conducted and led by a Member of this body, a highly 
respected Member of this body, who unanimously reported back. Now we 
are going to wait another year.
  How many more of these situations like we had take place in the Navy 
are we going to have in the interim? How many more letters or contacts 
am I going to get by constituents in Kansas saying they had nervous 
breakdowns because of this situation? How many more of these will it 
take when we will not respond to common sense? This is just common 
sense.
  I have deep respect for my colleagues who view this differently. 
Senator Kempthorne and his committee has looked at this. But I don't 
think this makes any sense of where we are. I think this is a very 
narrow approach. It isn't about basic training; it is just about 
barracks. We can do it at minimal cost. If not, we have the 
authorization here to deal with this.
  I plead with my colleagues that we do it. I hope we take a different 
tack on this.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I ask the Senator a question? I 
listened very carefully. I am supportive of his amendment.

[[Page S6971]]

  Did the Senator from Kansas mention the Marine Corps?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Only briefly.
  Mr. WARNER. Their experience has been considerably freer of the 
problems that the other two services have incurred as a consequence of 
that. Am I correct?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. The Senator is absolutely correct. They, as a service, 
agree with what the Kassebaum Commission put forth. The other services 
have not.
  Mr. WARNER. For those who may be following this debate outside of the 
Senate, so to speak, basic training is just 9 weeks in each of the 
services. So it is a relatively short period of time. It is a brief 
period from when they leave the home environment, school environment, 
and other structured environments in their communities across America 
to come and undertake this important first phase of their training of a 
military career.
  It seems to me that what the Senator is asking is just the 
opportunity for the different sectors to go into this very intense 
period where the objective is to really transform them in many ways, as 
the Senator pointed out. First of all, it is a patriotic duty to be a 
member of the team. And all of the other important goals are in the 
first 9 weeks. To simply, at the end of the training, give them a 
little respite from all of the pressures which they are being 
subjected, give them a chance to kick back and rest on their own, among 
themselves, and then as soon as reveille the following morning, 
beginning with the mess facility, beginning the fallout, the grinder 
formation, as they march off to the rifle range, they are together, and 
it is joint in every respect. Am I not correct?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. That is correct. The Senator from Virginia is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator very much.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I want to address further the issue of 
cost on this, because some will allege that is the reason we should 
block this, because it puts a cost figure of $166 million, $190 
million. I am very sensitive to the cost issue, so I provide for the 
authorization.
  But I also challenge my colleagues on this very point to think about 
this. Basic training for 9 weeks, pressurized environment. It is where 
you teach, train, build, and mold--9 weeks of a focused, intense time 
period that is taking place. You are putting somebody 18 years old, 
male and female, into that pressurized environment. Is this a place for 
us to cut costs in the military, saying because of that cost we have to 
force them onto the same floor and the same common area because we 
cannot afford the $166 million?
  Mind you, the Kassebaum Commission says we can do this at zero to 
minimal cost. We can do this with minimal, if any, cost.
  Let's say it does have some cost with it. I don't think it does. I 
don't support that notion. Anyway, if you are 18 years old looking at 
going into the military, isn't this a pretty minimal amount of cost? If 
you are the family of that 18-year-old considering going into the 
military, is that a cost that you want the Government to be putting 
forth and being a part of? My goodness, we have to make some sense out 
of this.
  This is a very narrow amendment that we are asking for. I hope we 
have a direct vote on this. I hope we will be able to get to it. I will 
learn my lessons quickly. So I hope we can get to a vote on this 
particular issue.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Yes; I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I support the Senator and commend him on his 
fine statement. I support the recommendations of the Kassebaum 
Commission. I think it is the right recommendation. I wonder if the 
Senator would add my name as a cosponsor of his amendment.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I am pleased to do so.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor of the 
Brownback amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I will be asking for the yeas and nays 
at the appropriate time on this. I plead with my colleagues to really 
consider this.
  I ask them really just one small, simple favor: Will they call their 
constituent services' offices to see how many recruits they have been 
contacted by back home during this past year asking for relief from 
military duty because they were sexually assaulted, got pregnant at 
basic training or at training, and see what the numbers are in their 
particular office? One is too many. But I would be interested to see 
how many of them have had multiple contacts in their office.
  We shouldn't ignore this anymore. We should deal with it. This is a 
minor request we should be making.
  With that, Mr. President, I will ask for the yeas and nays at the 
proper time.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. SNOWE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I appreciate this opportunity to address this body on the subject of 
an important issue and what it means, I believe, to the future of our 
Armed Forces.
  The participation of women in the armed services today is very 
important. As the Secretary of Defense said recently in reaffirming his 
support for gender-integrated training, and the recommendations of the 
services with respect to gender-integrated training, he said clearly 
that the military depends upon women.
  Women now represent 14 percent of our armed services. So their role 
and their well-being is an essential ingredient to upholding the 
importance of certain standards with respect to our national security 
and performance of our Armed Forces and personnel.
  I offered a second-degree amendment to the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Kansas, because it will reaffirm the judgment that was 
made first in the Armed Services Committee last year to the DOD 1998 
authorization. The amendment that was offered created a congressional 
commission to examine many of the issues that were raised by the 
Senator from Kansas. Obviously, they are not new issues. They are ones 
in which we have been wrestling with time and time again, not only here 
in Congress but, of course, within the Defense Department.
  There are no simple solutions. But what I find amazing in hearing the 
discussion with respect to women in the military and the gender-
integrated training and the problems that have resulted from gender-
integrated training, no one seems to raise the issue as to what about 
the responsibilities and the moral authority of those people who are in 
positions of leadership within our military?
  I have had the opportunity to visit many installations, including 
Fort Jackson, the one which the Senator from Kansas referred to and 
that his staff visited. I also visited that facility. I well remember 
the facilities that are there that separate men and women. Men and 
women are separated within the Army, within the Air Force, within the 
Navy. They have separate entrances. They have separate wings, separate 
bays, separate bathrooms, separate alarms. They have security guards, 
security cameras. So there are certain security measures that are 
already in place. Now the question has arisen as to whether or not we 
should have separate barracks.
  With all the misconduct and sexual harassment that has occurred that 
we have heard so much about over the last few years, much of it, 
interestingly enough, has occurred in advanced integrated training 
programs, not with basic training. But nevertheless, one of the 
critical areas that we must focus on is developing standards and 
upholding and enforcing those standards that are consistent with the 
well-being of both men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, the 
basic rights of all human beings, whether they are in the military or 
in the private sector.
  And these questions have to be considered as proposed by the Senator 
from Kansas through a simple disposition of an amendment? We in the 
committee last year said no, and, frankly, I was prepared to debate and 
fight this issue in the Chamber with respect to gender-integrated 
training, whether or not to have separate barracks, and so

[[Page S6972]]

on and so forth. But in the good judgment and the wisdom of the 
committee, we decided to create a consensus-based amendment that was 
offered by the chairman of the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senator 
Kempthorne, Senator Byrd from West Virginia, and myself. We knew that 
the Department of Defense had already created its own commission to 
evaluate these questions and many more. We decided that it was also 
important to create a commission that was independent to evaluate these 
issues as well.
  Now we have to decide in this Chamber whether or not we should 
subjugate the recommendations of the commission that will be coming 
forward next spring to the amendment that is offered by the Senator 
from Kansas. I say not. This is a major and fundamental issue. How we 
proceed is important, and that is why the Committee on Armed Services 
approved an amendment that was included in the 1998 authorization to 
create this commission that is now part of law, and it was approved in 
the Senate and approved by Congress. So now we have to decide whether 
or not we are going to allow the Senator from Kansas to override the 
judgment of the members of this commission that will come forward with 
recommendations next spring. There will be 10 members of this 
commission that are appointed by the chairman and ranking member of the 
House National Security Committee and the ranking member and the 
chairman of this Committee on Armed Services in the Senate with 
consultation with the majority and minority leaders in both bodies.
  They represent a cross-section of experience, expertise on some of 
these critical issues--that is what we are welcoming--that is 
independent of the kind of decision that we can make here in an 
amendment that is offered by the Senator from Kansas without the 
examination and the evaluation of these issues.
  We have represented on the commission a Marine Corps general who 
commanded a division during Operation Desert Storm; we have a former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management; a former Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower; a board member of the Virginia 
Military Institute; the Provost of the University of Michigan, two 
military sociologists, a former Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs and a retired sergeant major from the 
Training and Doctrine Command. The men and women in our commission have 
held these positions or are currently holding them. We should give them 
the opportunity to meet their responsibilities under law.
  The proponents of the amendment that is offered by the Senator from 
Kansas would require by the year 2001 the construction of separate 
barracks. It basically will not allow any flexibility by the service 
chiefs with respect to the construction of those facilities; that, yes, 
will cost more than $167 million to construct. It will not permit 
trainees, instructors, commanders, to offer their own assessments of 
whether the way the recruits live supports the process for developing a 
soldier.

  They should be in a position of making those decisions--in fact, have 
had the ability to accept the decision that was recommended by the 
Kassebaum-Baker Commission. In fact, the Secretary of Defense gave the 
service chiefs the opportunity to respond within 90 days to that 
recommendation as to how they wanted to proceed and to develop criteria 
on the basis on which they decide they would advance or implement those 
recommendations. The service chiefs responded. They all upheld their 
current status because they have made adjustments in the living 
quarters. They are separate. They are not in separate facilities, but 
they are in separate wings and bays, as I mentioned earlier, and they 
believe that the current process is working. They support gender-
integrated training because they feel that this is the way in which you 
build a cohesive unit.
  We have thousands and thousands of women who are currently serving in 
Bosnia without complaint. We have had thousands and thousands of women 
serving in the Persian Gulf without complaint. We have had more than 
1,000 women who participated in our operations in Somalia, and we have 
had no complaints.
  Are we now not saying that it is possible for men and women, on the 
day in which they begin their basic training, cannot work and train 
together as they will be required to do after their basic training, as 
they are required to do right now in Bosnia? We have over 5,000 women 
currently serving in Bosnia. In fact, the Washington Post had an in-
depth story last year that described the circumstances under which both 
men and women were serving, and they were doing an extraordinary job 
without hindrance, without barriers, without complications under some 
most arduous of conditions. We had 41,000 women in the Persian Gulf. 
Did we hear of complaints? No. It is because they trained together. 
They understood the professionalism of their responsibilities, and they 
carried them out as we could expect them to do. They upheld the highest 
moral standards.
  The amendment that I offer here today reinforces the recommendation 
that was made by the Armed Services Committee last year by the creation 
of this commission to examine many of the questions that have been 
raised. Frankly, I had my doubts as to whether or not it was necessary 
to create another commission, but I also personally had to recognize 
that, in fact, many here in this Chamber and elsewhere had concerns 
about basic training and about gender-integrated training, and that 
perhaps the best way to proceed was to create another commission that 
would represent a breadth of experience and professionalism and 
qualifications and skills that are necessary to make the kinds of 
decisions that we would expect of them.
  Their mandate is substantial. We have more than 10 different areas 
with respect to gender-integrated training and all of the other 
dimensions to the question--the living conditions, the impact on 
readiness, on morale, on fitness standards, the rationale for the 
establishment or the disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-
segregated basic training, the rationale that was used at the time in 
which these decisions were made by the services to integrate training 
or to segregate in the case of the Marines, or assess whether or not 
the concept of training as you will fight is a valid rationale for 
gender-integrated basic training; identify the requirements that are 
unique to each of the services that could affect a decision by the 
Secretary considering adopting a gender-integrated or gender-segregated 
format for basic training; to examine all the facilities for 
feasibility or the implications of requiring drill inspectors to be of 
the same sex.

  There are a number of issues that are embodied in this statute that 
was approved by the Congress last year to the authorization that will 
be examined by the men and women who are serving on this commission. So 
the question is, Should we adopt the amendment by the Senator from 
Kansas or should we adopt the amendment that I have offered as a 
second-degree to the amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas that 
will give this commission the opportunity to evaluate these questions 
so that we can make a reasoned, informed decision as to what approach 
should be taken by the military?
  This amendment that I have offered is supported by the civilian, the 
officer, and the enlisted leadership of the Pentagon to retain the 
current training programs at each of the armed services until this 
Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues files its 
final report in March of 1999. It reaffirms this decision. It reaffirms 
the bipartisanship and the consensus that was produced last year in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and in the Congress on these difficult 
issues of obtaining the most comprehensive use of professionals and 
military leaders outside of Congress. And the charter stipulates very 
clearly the aspects that will be examined of the training practices and 
the policy directives and the regulations that enumerate the 
professional relationships between men and women in uniform. It also 
assigns the commission the obligation and responsibility to evaluate 
the findings of the Kassebaum-Baker panel on gender-integrated training 
and the Pentagon's rules regarding fraternization as well as adultery.
  So we have to decide here whether we are going to approve my 
amendment that is supported by the Secretary of Defense and the service 
chiefs and many of the Members here in this

[[Page S6973]]

body, or are we going to support the amendment offered by the Senator 
from Kansas that presumes to answer this in three pages this afternoon 
with a new regulation imposing a $167 million military construction 
cost on the Defense Department. I think we have an obligation to give 
the commission the opportunity to work its will as we have asked them 
to do.
  I would like to read to you, Mr. President, some excerpts from the 
various letters and statements that have been made by the service 
chiefs and by the Secretary of Defense about the issues concerning 
gender-integrated training and separate barracks. The Secretary of 
Defense wrote to the chairman of our committee, Senator Thurmond:

       Training in the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps is a 
     complex matter given each Service's unique mission, 
     traditions and conditions of service. Each Service has their 
     own approach in how they conduct basic training. This 
     training must not be characterized by any one issue such as 
     billeting or any one policy such as the extent of gender 
     integrated training. We must, however, identify the right set 
     of standards to produce a safe and secure environment for the 
     rigorous training our young men and women need for military 
     service.
       This is exactly what the Department is doing. We are making 
     sure that we have the very best personnel to staff our 
     training establishments and to serve as role models for our 
     new recruits. . . .

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