Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 84 (Wednesday, June 24, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 84 (Wednesday, June 24, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6935-S6973]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of S. 2057, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2057) to authorize appropriations for the fiscal
year 1999 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Amendment No. 2975

(Purpose: To express the sense of Congress regarding continued
participation of United States forces in operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina)

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for
himself, Mr. Levin and Mr. Coats, proposes an amendment
numbered 2975.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the committee has worked very hard to
achieve consensus on an amendment----
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield just
briefly?
Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the clerk has not finished the reading of
the amendment and there has been no unanimous consent request to ask
that the reading of the amendment be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1064. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CONTINUED
PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN
OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The contributions of the people of the United States
and other nations have, in large measure, resulted in the
suspension of fighting and alleviated the suffering of the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1995.
(2) the people of the United States have expended
approximately $9,500,000,000 in tax dollars between 1992 and
mid-1998 just in support of the United States military
operations in Bosnia to achieve those results.
(3) Efforts to restore the economy and political structure
in Bosnia and Herzegovina have achieved some success in
accordance with the Dayton Agreement.
(4) In February 1998, the President certified to Congress
that the continued presence of United States forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina after June 30, 1998, was necessary in order
to meet national security interests of the United States.
(5) There is, however, no accurate estimate of the time
needed to accomplish the civilian implementation tasks
outlined in the Dayton Agreement.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States ground combat forces should not remain in
Bosnia and Herzegovina indefinitely in view of the world-wide
commitments of the Armed Forces of the United States;
(2) the President should work with NATO allies and the
other nations whose military forces are participating in the
NATO-led Stabilization Force to withdraw United States ground
combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina within a reasonable
period of time, consistent with the safety of those forces
and the accomplishment of the Stabilization Force's military
tasks;
(3) a NATO-led force without the participation of United
States ground combat forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina might
be suitable for a follow-on force for Bosnia and Herzegovina
if the European Security and Defense Identity is not
sufficiently developed or is otherwise considered
inappropriate for such a mission;
(4) the United States may decide to provide appropriate
support to a Western European Union-led or NATO-led follow-on
force for Bosnia and Herzegovina, including command and
control, intelligence, logistics, and, if necessary, a ready
reserve force in the region;
(5) the President should inform the European NATO allies of
this expression of the sense of Congress and should strongly
urge them to undertake preparations for establishing a
Western European Union-led or a NATO-led force as a follow-on
force to the NATO-led Stabilization Force if needed to
maintain peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
(6) the President should consult closely with the
congressional leadership and the congressional defense
committees with respect to the progress being made toward
achieving a sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the progress being made toward a reduction and ultimate
withdrawal of United States ground combat forces from Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
(c) Dayton Agreement Defined.--In this section, the term
``Dayton Agreement'' means the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with annexes
relating thereto, done at Dayton, November 10 through 16,
1995.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the committee has worked very hard to
achieve consensus on an amendment that would represent the majority
views of the committee. Since May 13, at the request of several
Members, the committee has met at least five times to discuss possible
amendments on Bosnia that would be offered to the defense bill. The
committee also conducted a hearing with Ambassador Robert Gelbard and
General Wesley Clark to discuss the status of progress in implementing
the Dayton Agreement.
Despite all meetings and discussions, the committee was not able to
reach

[[Page S6936]]

consensus on an amendment on Bosnia. However, following the committee's
meeting on June 19, Senator Coats and Senator Levin, met, and, using a
compromise amendment that I had proposed as a starting point, continued
the effort to craft an amendment, which I support and which I believe
the Senate can support.
While I am aware that there are Senators who would prefer to do more,
I believe that this amendment represents the view of most Senators.
I am pleased to join Senators Coats and Levin, and I urge the Senate
to adopt it. Let me emphasize, this amendment does not represent a
committee amendment, it merely represents the tireless efforts of
several Members.
This amendment would express the concerns of the Congress that U.S.
ground combat forces should not be deployed indefinitely in Bosnia, and
that efforts should be taken by the President to work with our Allies
in Europe so that U.S. ground combat forces could withdraw in a safe
and orderly fashion from Bosnia within a reasonable period of time.
Additionally, the amendment would express our views that the European
allies should take appropriate steps to develop forces to take on the
responsibilities of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, if necessary, to
continue to implement the Dayton Agreement.
Mr. President, by December 1998, U.S. ground forces will have been
deployed in Bosnia for three years, and the United States will have
spent almost $9 billion dollars for its share of the operations. That
is two years more than the President, Secretary Perry, Secretary
Christopher and General Shalikashvili told us in 1995 that our forces
would be in Bosnia, and $8.0 billion more than their original cost
estimate.
I believe it is imperative that the United States make strong efforts
to work with our NATO and European allies to provide a situation where
U.S. ground combat forces can leave Bosnia. The United States has
world-wide commitments, and the continued deployment of U.S. forces in
Bosnia is starting to take a toll on the readiness of our military
forces. The deployment in Bosnia along with our other commitments
produces an operational tempo which impacts heavily on the morale of
our forces and our ability to retain personnel.
I believe this amendment sends the message that we have been in
Bosnia too long, and that we should begin working our way out. I also
believe the amendment sends a message that our European allies should
assume a more equitable leadership role on their borders, while at the
same time ensuring some continued level of continued U.S. support.
I believe this is a good amendment, and urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I, along with the
chairman and others, have worked long and hard attempting to fashion a
way in which this Congress could express its dissatisfaction with the
prospect of an indefinite troop commitment in Bosnia.
We now are going on the third year of that commitment at a cost that
continues to escalate. I believe it is approaching, if it hasn't
exceeded, $9 billion--this is despite the assurances of the
administration that the troops would only be necessary to accomplish
the military portion of the Dayton accords for 1 year.
The then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Shalikashvili, in testimony before our committee on October 18, 1995,
said:

NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to
complete its mission in twelve months and to withdraw.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in testimony before the House
National Security Committee on October 18, 1995, said:

NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to
complete its mission in twelve months and to withdraw.

Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, said in a speech to the
National Press Club on November 9, 1995:

We believe that twelve months is a reasonable period of
time for the implementation force to have accomplished its
mission.

The President of the United States, President Clinton, in a letter to
Speaker Gingrich dated December 13, 1995, said:

NATO and U.S. military commanders believe and I expect that
the military mission can be accomplished in about a year.
Twelve months will allow IFOR time to complete the military
task assigned in the Dayton agreement and to establish a
secure environment. Within 1 year we expect that the military
provisions of the Dayton agreement will have been carried
out, implementation of the civil aspects and economic
reconstruction will have been firmly launched, free elections
will have been held under international supervision, and a
stable military balance will have been established.

Those words from the President of the United States. He was supported
by Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State, who
negotiated the Dayton agreement. Mr. Holbrooke said:

The President has given a very clear commitment on the
twelve months. That is our policy. It will remain our policy.

General Shalikashvili once again said, in an article, in an interview
with the Washington Post of April 3, 1996:

I'm absolutely convinced that America will not participate
with military forces in Bosnia after the conclusion of this
year.

On and on it goes. Yet it is now 1998. There is no indication of when
our military forces will be removed from Bosnia. Their continued
presence has come at considerable cost to the taxpayer--as I said, $9
billion-plus and counting--and no indications by the administration
that forces will be withdrawn at any time soon.
There is little disagreement on this floor about the concern over the
escalating costs and the indefinite commitment. The real question
before the Senate is how we accomplish the goal of withdrawing those
troops. It is clear that what was promised by the administration as a
consequence of the Dayton accords has not been accomplished on the
civil implementation.
Our armed forces have done a marvelous job in meeting the military
obligations. In fact, the military tasks were essentially accomplished
in that first year. A poitical decision was made, however, that forces
needed to remain in Bosnia to provide a secure environment so that the
civilian portion of Dayton could be accomplished.
I was one who voted against the use of our troops to enforce the
Dayton accord. I did not provide that support. Senator Levin I believe,
did provide that support. Yet today we are joining in attempting to
send a message from the Congress to the President and to our allies
that we do not want an indefinite commitment, that we believe the
military mission has been successfully achieved--that it is time to
begin the process of bringing our troops home. While there has been
some progress in civil implementation, when I traveled last December
with the President to Bosnia, I saw little evidence of successful
civilian implementation.
It has taken 2 years and an extraordinary amount of outside pressure
to get the three nations involved to agree on a common license plate
and a common foreign currency--what is seemingly the most easily
defined civilian implementation aspects of that accord. Yet, the
parties, over a 2-year period of time, could not even agree on what the
license plate would look like that each of them would put on their
vehicles, or what the currency would look like, in order to establish a
common currency for that one country.
So I stand here as one with grave concerns and deeply held doubts
about whether or not we are ever going to accomplish what Dayton
attempted and promised, and that is reunification of a country that
appears to not want to reunify. Key issues such as resettlement of
refugees; establishment of a civilian police force that, to date, has
not been deemed effective in providing any kind of stability;
establishment of judicial reforms that would provide a basis for
enforcement of the law on an equal and fair basis. Resolution of many
of these issues appear far down the road--if they are even achievable.
I come back to the central question, which is, now that our troops
are there, who makes the determination and what is our obligation as
Members of Congress relative to establishing the continued presence,
limiting that presence, or requiring that withdrawal? I happen to
believe strongly that our responsibility, as defined by the
Constitution, is to determine the funding, whether or not we will
financially support the commitment that has been made by our Commander
in Chief.

[[Page S6937]]

Now, Senator Levin and I have wrestled with this question in terms of
how we can best express a message to the President of the United States
that we do not support an indefinite commitment, that we do believe
that a transition should take place from an American presence to
European support for whatever military forces are necessary to provide
continued stability. But we do not believe that we are in a position;
nor do we have the right to define a timetable or a troop level. We
believe that is a decision that ought to be left to the military, ought
to be left to the Commander in Chief, and that is where the
responsibility lies. We do so because we don't believe we have the
expertise to define what that troop level should be.
When the discussion was undertaken relative to our placing troops in
Bosnia, virtually every individual who represented the military, from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to the Secretary of Defense, to the
commanders who were called forward to testify, said we need the
flexibility to determine what is necessary to accomplish our message
and to provide for the security for the forces that are deployed in
Bosnia. We need to make that decision based on our military expertise
and based on what we see as the threat and what is necessary to provide
for the security of those forces.
This is not a decision that ought to be made by Congress, regardless
of our own expertise or what expertise we think we might have, having
served on the Armed Services Committee or learned through our
association with the Department of Defense. We are not in a position to
define that troop level number. This decision has to be left to the
military commanders.
We learned, by tragic experience, how political intervention and
policy can sacrifice lives and place our troops in jeopardy. All of us
have freshly imprinted on our minds the tragedy in Somalia, as a
request by the commander of our forces in Mogadishu for armored forces
to provide the force protection was denied primarily for political
reasons, because they wanted to avoid the perception that the U.S. was
enlarging our presence in Somalia, but that we were drawing down. We
drew down too far and we lost some great Americans because we were not
able to provide them with sufficient protection. It is not our decision
as to what that level of protection should be.
Secondly, Senator Levin and I--and he will speak for himself--believe
that it is important that we not set an arbitrary timetable for
accomplishment of the mission or for withdrawal of troops. That simply
sends a signal to extremist forces and others who are intent on
destabilizing the situation. All they have to do is wait until a
certain date, pull back and give the appearance of stability, give the
appearance of cooperation, knowing that when a certain date is reached,
our troops will be withdrawn.
We want to keep that indefinite. It doesn't mean the decision can't
be made to remove the troops tomorrow, or the President can't sit down
with our allies and discuss what the future force should be. I believe
an amendment will be offered--if not to this bill, to the defense
appropriations bill--by the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator
from Texas to establish a certain level and a certain timetable. It may
be that that is what our military commanders decide is in the best
interests of accomplishing our military mission and protecting our
forces. But that ought to be their decision, not ours.
So those are the primary reasons--the protection of our forces, for a
limited success, in stabilizing the war and to protect against the
potential of extremist groups taking advantage of the knowledge they
have of our force size and to protect against the concept that if we
define a specific date through a statutory definition, that any hopes
of accomplishing a mission that has been agreed to--as I said not by
this Senator, but by the President and supported by a majority--can be
realized.
To conclude, our amendment essentially expresses the sense of
Congress that the U.S. ground combat forces should not remain in Bosnia
indefinitely, in view of the worldwide commitments that we have, the
impact on our forces, on our readiness, on our deployment, and on our
ability to address other needs; that the President should work with our
NATO allies, and other nations who have military forces participating
in the stabilization force, to withdraw ground combat forces from
Bosnia within a reasonable period of time. The difference here is
reasonable. We allow a reasonable period of time, leaving it again to
the discretion of our military, rather than the fixed time. Consistent
with the safety of those forces and the accomplishment of the
stabilization force's military task.
We think it is appropriate to define a way in which we can continue,
when we withdraw ground combat forces, to continue to provide support
for a follow-on European force, and to have a ready reaction or Ready
Reserve force in the region--not in Bosnia, but in the region,
available to help if necessary; that the President should inform our
European allies of the will of the Congress, should this amendment be
accepted; and that the President should consult very closely with
congressional leadership with respect to the progress he is making in
terms of achieving the goals of the Dayton accord.
That is the essence of our amendment. As Senator Thurmond said, this
is not a committee amendment that was voted out of committee, though it
is supported by a number of members on our committee. We think it is an
important amendment to lay down. We think this debate is important.
Following this, there is much about what is going to be said by those
who may not support this and who want something different than what I
am going to agree with.
Much of what they have put in their proposed amendment, which
apparently will not be offered to this amendment and to this bill but
at a later time, I am going to agree with.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. COATS. I would be happy to yield to the Senator.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have tried to carefully listen to the
Senator's remarks, and I think I have heard the implication that
Congress was somehow at fault in Somalia for the lack of supplying of
heavy equipment.
Mr. COATS. I don't believe that is what I said.
Mr. BYRD. I didn't say you said that. I thought that it was implied.
Mr. COATS. I can assure the Senator from West Virginia that was not
implied.
Mr. BYRD. It was not Congress' fault?
Mr. COATS. No; it was not. Congress had no role in that whatsoever.
This Senator believes there is subsequent evidence in the reports that
followed up on that tragedy which indicate that political decisions
were made by people within the administration relative to the
perception American people might have regarding our presence and
involvement in Somalia, and the decision that was then made, either
through the administration or at the Department of Defense, and to deny
the request for additional force support.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator. I incorrectly drew the
wrong inference from what the Senator said.
Mr. COATS. I thank the Senator. I apologize if I left that inference.
If I had, I am glad the Senator clarified that, because I didn't want
to leave that impression.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I will conclude, so that my colleague,
Senator Levin, may proceed, simply by saying that we asked for the
Department of Defense response to this amendment. They reported back.
The Department of Defense says:

The Department has no objection to the proposed amendment
in general.
The Department is concerned that paragraph (2) under Sense
of Congress could be misinterpreted as a weakening of US
resolve and commitment to the process initiated under the
Dayton Agreement. While the Department agrees that there
should not be a permanent US presence in Bosnia, the timing
and nature of discussions on withdrawal of the international
coalition should be driven by our continued progress on the
ground and not by artificial deadlines.

And The New York Times reported the following on June 13, 1996:

There has been no change in the President's view of the
current IFOR mission. It will last about a year.--Michael
McCurry, White House spokesman, New York Times, 6/13/96.
The Washington Post reported on July 25, 1996 the following:

[[Page S6938]]

There is no successor mission. . . . We're not anticipating
any such thing.--Vice President Albert Gore, Washington Post,
7/25/96.

I agree in terms of their discussion about ``artificial deadlines.''
But I want to point out that the Dayton agreement clearly stated that
the presence of the military was necessary to accomplish the military
task. And I believe that military task has been accomplished.
I think the debate on this floor, if there is to be a debate about
our troop presence, should not be defining what the size of that
presence should be and the timing of that presence. I think it should
be on whether or not there ought to be a presence.
There is going to be a legitimate debate, I believe, as to whether or
not we want to stay involved in Bosnia. And the will of the Congress
ought to be expressed on that, or the appropriations ought to be
defined in a way to support whatever is necessary, if we are going to
be there, determined by the military, or zero if we determine they
shouldn't be there.
That ought to be the debate, rather than defining what the mission
should be, what the size of the force should be, and putting deadlines
in terms of achieving those goals.
With that, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator take a question?
Momentarily, I will follow the distinguished ranking member.
Mr. COATS. I will be glad to take a question from the Senator.
Mr. WARNER. I want to make sure.
First, I think the thrust of the amendment is one with which I agree.
I was part of the deliberations over a period of time. I certainly want
to acknowledge the participation by the distinguished senior Senator
from West Virginia, and the Senator from Texas, and the work they have
done.
But I want to make certain--I have read through this carefully a
number of times--there is nothing in it that could be misinterpreted at
this particularly sensitive point in time in the Kosovo negotiations
with Ambassador Holbrooke--who is, I think, perhaps at this very moment
trying to work with Milosevic--that nothing in this amendment indicates
a lessened support of the United States, together with our principal
allies, to try our very best to preclude a repetition in Kosovo of the
tragedies that unfolded over the past years in Bosnia. It is my
understanding that nothing in this amendment should be interpreted by
Milosevic or anyone else that this is less than full support of the
effort on behalf of the President and his designated Secretary of State
and Ambassador to work on that problem.
Mr. COATS. The Senator, I believe, is correct. There is nothing in
this amendment that I believe could be interpreted contrary to what the
Senator has just stated.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. COATS. I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able Senator from
Indiana on his excellent remarks on this subject.
I now yield to the able ranking member of this committee, Senator
Levin.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, let me thank the chairman, Senator
Coats, and others who have worked on this amendment. It is a sense-of-
the-Congress amendment regarding the continuation of United States
forces and operations in Bosnia. We worked very hard on this amendment.
The committee did not reach a consensus or, indeed, ever take a final
vote on the various alternatives which were offered to us. I don't
think anything should be said which would suggest that this is a
committee amendment. Indeed, I believe that the chairman and Senator
Coats made it clear that it was not. But it is an amendment which has a
significant amount of bipartisan support. We offer it to the Senate on
that basis.

I am wondering if at this point, Mr. President, I could ask for the
yeas and nays on this amendment, so people know there will be a vote
forthcoming.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of the
Congress on a number of aspects of our presence in Bosnia.
First, it says that our forces should not remain in Bosnia
indefinitely. We do not simply want to authorize a significant amount
of funds without any statement as to the length of time that our forces
should remain in Bosnia.
As the Senator from Indiana very ably put it, we don't want to set a
deadline. We don't want to mandate a certain force structure as of a
certain time. We think that would diminish the safety of our forces. We
think that would pull the rug out from under our forces.
On the other hand, we don't want to write a blank check. We don't
want to simply say, here are billions of dollars for our presence in
Bosnia, and not continue to make a statement about the necessity within
a reasonable period of time to remove our combat forces from Bosnia. So
this sense-of-the-Congress amendment is an effort to avoid both the
blank check downside but also to avoid setting a mandated date for the
removal of those forces.
First, I would note, Mr. President, for our colleagues, that the
Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Shelton, in their letter of May 21 wrote to Senator
Thurmond and to me to express their concerns about some of the
proposals that were being offered relating to Bosnia.
In that letter, they said the following:

We write to express our concerns with any amendment that
would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or
reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia.
Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish
the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date.

Later on in that letter, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton said the
following:
We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and
progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we
expect further reductions will be possible, but that
determination is best based on the actual situation on the
ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field,
and the approval of the NATO military and political
authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction date
determined long in advance.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. BYRD. The first reference to the Secretary's letter, would he
read that again? He quoted the Secretary's letter.
Mr. LEVIN. Yes.

We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and
progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we
expect further reductions will be possible but----

Mr. BYRD. The first. I believe something came before that.
Mr. LEVIN. I apologize. I started too late in the quote, and I will
go back. The letter starts off with the quote that I gave before.

Mr. BYRD. At that point does the Secretary state what ``the mission''
is?
Mr. LEVIN. There is nothing stated beyond that relative to the
mission in this letter. Of course, we have other statements from them
as to what their mission is, but this letter does not restate what
their mission is.
Mr. BYRD. May I further interrupt the Senator? Mr. President, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. BYRD. That is one of the problems we have had with the
administration. They have a changing mission. At the beginning, the
mission was one thing. Then it changed. Then it changed, and it
continues to change. Now, the Secretary, in his letter, according to
the quotation by Senator Levin, references ``the mission.'' Well, it is
a moving target, that mission. That is one of the problems I have with
this whole situation.
I just wanted to make that point. I thank the Senator.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank our good friend from West Virginia.
General Clark appeared on June 4th before the Armed Services
Committee,

[[Page S6939]]

and, of course, General Clark commands our U.S. and NATO forces in
Europe, including Bosnia, and we asked him what effect the adoption of
a legislatively mandated reduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia would have.
And this was part of his response:

I would not favor as a military professional a mandated
limit because it would, I think, hinder our accomplishment of
the mission on the ground.

Then he went on:

In so doing, I think it could jeopardize force protection.
I mean, one of the things that has kept our troops safe, and
all of our NATO troops, it has been made very clear to those
who might seek to do us harm that it will not be tolerated,
that we will take action. We made that very clear personally
and in many different statements. So if such a commitment
were to be taken by those over there that this was some
change in policy, that we were somehow less committed,
that it somehow meant that we were not as firm in our
resolve, then I would say that could pose a force
protection threat.

And he went on a little later in his testimony as follows:

I hope that we could move through and live with the
benchmark approach that we were urged to adopt. We have some
pretty specific benchmarks. We will take a look at how long
it might take to achieve these. We will try to do all that we
can to encourage those who are responsible for them other
than SFOR to move as rapidly as possible on this. But they
are not, there cannot be deadlines. There are too many
intervening factors, and it will just have to be recognized
as such.

Now, these are the benchmarks that were referred to by General Clark.
This perhaps addresses the issue of our good friend from West Virginia.

The goal of the military presence--

And now I am quoting from these benchmarks--

is to establish the conditions under which the Dayton
implementation can continue without the support of a major
NATO-led military force.

And at this point the 10 specific benchmarks are set forth. And after
those benchmarks are set forth the following statement is made:

These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their
achievement will enable the international community to rely
largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil
personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence-
building measures and negotiation to continue implementing
the Dayton Accords over the longer term.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire document be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

1. The Dayton cease-fire remains in place, supported by
mechanisms for military-to-military transparency and
cooperation.
2. Police in both entities are restructured, re-integrated,
re-trained and equipped in accordance with democratic
standards.
3. An effective judicial reform program is in place.
4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions (e.g. Herceg Bosnia,
Strategic Reserve Office, Centreks and Selek Impeks) are
dissolved and revenue and disbursement mechanisms under
control of legitimately elected officials.
5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic
standards; independent/alternative media are available
throughout B-H.
6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic
standards, and results are implemented.
7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and
banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal
barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated.
8. A phased and orderly minority return process is
functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having
accepted significant returns.
9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning
and a secure environment for returns is established.
10. The Parties are cooperating with ICTY in the arrest and
prosecution of war criminals.

Mr. LEVIN. We on the committee pressed General Clark to give us some
kind of timeline for the accomplishment of those benchmarks, and it is
that timeline, for how long will it take to establish each of these
benchmarks--to achieve, excuse me, each of these benchmarks that
General Clark is referring to and he is going to be sending to the
Congress within the next few months.
This amendment builds on an amendment to the 1998 supplemental
appropriations bill that urged the President to seek concurrence among
the NATO members on the benchmarks detailed in that March 3, 1998,
report to Congress on estimated target dates for achieving the
benchmarks and a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving
the benchmarks. It required a report to be submitted, which was
submitted semiannually thereafter on such progress.
NATO has now adopted those benchmarks and will use those benchmarks
as it conducts its own 6-month reviews of the mission and the size of
the NATO led stabilization force in Bosnia. Our amendment is designed
to keep the pressure on our NATO allies, to continue the process where
the United States is able to withdraw our ground combat forces from
Bosnia, while our NATO allies and other nations maintain or increase
their share of the stabilization forces, total force strength in
Bosnia.
Again, the amendment does not mandate specific force levels. It does
not mandate a specific withdrawal or reduction timetable because we do
not believe it would be prudent to do so. Indeed, based on General
Clark's testimony and on the letter from General Shelton and Secretary
Cohen, we believe it could endanger our forces if we mandated a
specific date for withdrawal or reduction.
The people who do not want those forces there would then know what
our forces would be doing and when, when they would be leaving and in
what numbers. And it is not to their safety, it is not to our
advantage, it would jeopardize their well-being for us to state
legislatively in advance that a certain number of troops are going to
be leaving in a certain number of months or years, or to set forth a
timetable for the reduction or removal or withdrawal of those ground
combat forces.
Well, then, how do we keep the pressure on our European allies? How
do we let them know we are not there for an indefinite period of time?
How do we avoid writing that open-ended commitment or blank check? The
answer is set forth in this resolution which attempts to let our allies
know that we are not there indefinitely. At the same time, we do not in
any way undermine the morale or the safety of our forces.
Finally, Mr. President, the NATO-led mission in Bosnia has been very
successful. It has been able to carry out its military tasks without a
single combat death. The civilian implementation of the Dayton accords
has not proceeded as well as the military implementation, but some
progress has been made in the last 6 months. The upcoming September
election, which will involve virtually every elective office in Bosnia,
will be a major event. If things go well, it could lead to a major
reduction in the U.S. ground combat presence there.

I have been to Bosnia on a number of occasions, as have many of our
colleagues. On each of my visits I have been struck by the high morale
and the positive attitude of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces
there. They feel, and I surely concur, that they are making a
contribution to the maintenance of an enduring peace in Bosnia. Those
who work with the Russian forces on joint patrols in the United States
sector also feel that they are contributing to a better understanding
of, and a closer relationship with, Russia.
But we have worldwide commitments, and our forces are stretched thin.
We cannot remain in Bosnia indefinitely. This amendment--it is a
bipartisan amendment with strong support--serves to pressure our
European allies to redouble their efforts to bear more of the burden in
Bosnia so that United States ground combat forces can be withdrawn
within a reasonable period of time.
Finally, I will read from the mission statement that guides our
forces, and then I will put the entire statement in the Record.
The mission and objectives of the U.S. military forces deployed in
and around Bosnia are as follow:

SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will
continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide
support for civil implementation in a manner similar to the
previous approach of SFOR.

So that is the very narrow mission of the military forces--to deter a
resumption of hostilities and to provide support for civil
implementation in the manner that was adopted by the previous force.
The objective of the current mission will be:

. . . to consolidate the gains achieved to date while
sustaining the current pace of

[[Page S6940]]

civil implementation. This approach will encourage the
implementation process to become progressively more self-
sustaining without exceeding SFOR's current level of
intensity and involvement.

The key military tasks to create that mission have been set forth as
follows:

Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities.
Preventing removal of heavy or air defense weapons from
cantonments.
Maintaining the operation of the joint military
commissions.
Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and
continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of
Separation.
Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords
and, if required, enforcing compliance.
Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovinia.
Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner
similar to the SFOR previous approach, to a secure
environment within which civil implementation can continue.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that document setting
forth the mission, setting forth the key military tasks, and then
setting forth the key supporting tasks be printed in the Record at this
time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Mission

SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will
continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide
support for civil implementation in a manner similar to the
current approach of SFOR. The objective of the follow-on
mission will be consolidate the gains achieved to date while
sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. This
approach will encourage the implementation process to become
progressively more self-sustaining without exceeding SFOR's
current level of intensity and involvement. To this end, NATO
has established the following tasks:
Key military tasks:
Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities.
Preventing removal of heavy or air defense weapons from
cantonments.
Maintaining the operation of the Joint Military
Commissions.
Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and
continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of
Separation.
Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords
and, if required, enforcing compliance.
Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner
similar to SFOR's current approach, to a secure environment
within which civil implementation can continue.
Key supporting tasks, within means and capabilities and in
a manner similar to SFOR's current approach:
Supporting the High Representative.
Supporting phased and orderly returns of refugees and
displaced persons by contributing to a safe and secure
environment, but not forcibly returning refugees or displaced
persons or undertake to guard individual locations.
Supporting OHR and OSCE in the conduct of elections and the
installation of elected officials.
Supporting the OHR and International Police Task Force
(IPTF) in assisting local police by providing back-up support
and a secure operating environment towards the creation of a
restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking
civil police tasks.
Supporting OHR and OSCE in media reform efforts.
Supporting ICTY and efforts against war criminals.
Supporting the OSCE, on a case-by-case basis, in
implementing Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Supporting the Supervisor in the implementation of the
Brcko decisions presently in effect.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator referred earlier to certain
benchmarks. What are we to understand with regard to the benchmarks,
and what are they? The Senator put them in the Record. What are they?
Mr. LEVIN. There are 10 benchmarks that were referred to.
Mr. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. Perhaps I will just read them:

Mr. BYRD. What does that mean? What does that mean, ``democratic
standards''?
Mr. LEVIN. That means--what it means is, the civilian control over
the police, and that the police will operate within the standards which
are followed in democratic countries, which means a semblance,
presumably, of process for its citizens, avoidance of physical violence
against its citizens, and the kind of implementation of the law which
democratic countries seek to achieve.
I may say to my good friend from West Virginia that it was because
these benchmarks, in the judgment of many of us, including me, are not
achievable within a reasonable period of time--that this involves too
long a period, that this would require some significant restructuring--
that we pressed General Clark, when he was here, for what would be the
estimated timeline to achieve those kinds of goals.
This is not the military mission, by the way. This is the civil
restructuring that mission seeks to support. That was what I just
previously read from. The military mission is what I just read from a
moment ago. These are the benchmarks which the Dayton implementation,
hopefully, will follow and achieve.
But I must say, I agree with the Senator from West Virginia--at least
as to what I believe he is driving at--that these benchmarks will take
a significant period of time. That was the point that I made to General
Clark. That is why I pressed him very hard to give us the timeline
within which he believes these individual benchmarks could be achieved,
because I expressed then, and I will express again: I do not believe
these benchmarks can be achieved--that these goals, these civilian
goals, can be achieved within years. I think this will take decades, in
some instances, to achieve these.
So if I could just conclude, and I will be happy to yield further.
Mr. BYRD. I just wanted to say, Mr. President, I think the Senator
has contributed an invaluable service in so questioning General Clark.
I did interrupt the Senator. Please proceed.
Mr. LEVIN. What I simply was saying was, for instance, benchmark No.
3, ``An effective judicial reform program is in place.'' I said to the
general, ``My heavens, we are not going to be doing that in a matter of
years. If it is highly successful, that could take a decade to achieve.
But we cannot be there that long. We have to let the Europeans know in
some way that we can only be there for a reasonable period of time, and
then our ground forces must be removed, because we are stretched thin.
We are all over the place, all over the world in many different ways,
and our readiness is going to be jeopardized if we continue to have our
forces in Bosnia for an unlimited period of time.''

So what General Clark committed to do is to give us, within a matter
of months, estimated time lines for achieving these benchmarks. That is
what we are awaiting. I think it will be very helpful. I think all of
us look forward to his estimates, as to how long would it take for an
effective judicial program to be in place.
He said he is not going to give us a specific year. Then I said,
``Can you give us a range as to how long it might take?'' He said he
will go through this, benchmark by benchmark, in order to give us that
range.
So I think we are kind of after the same goal here, both making sure
our mission is clear--and I just put that in the Record, making sure
that our particular military tasks are clear, and I just put those in
the Record. But as far as these benchmarks being accomplished, the best
we are going to do, I think, is to get the time lines, the estimates on
it, and then make the best judgment as to how long the forces can be
there while these processes, hopefully, continue.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. BYRD. The Senator did not complete his reading of the benchmarks.
Mr. LEVIN. I will do that, and then I will be happy to yield the
floor. There are 10 benchmarks. The third benchmark I just referred to:
An effective judicial reform program being in place.
The fourth benchmark--again, this is for civil implementation, now,
of Dayton. This is not our military mission. I want to be real clear, I
read our military mission before. I read our military tasks before.
This is the civil implementation side of Dayton.

4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions . . . are dissolved . .
.

And they specify which ones they are talking about. And I would be
happy to

[[Page S6941]]

give you a list. There are four of them: and revenue and disbursement
mechanisms under control of legitimately elected
officials.
5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic
standards; independent/alternative media are available
throughout [Bosnia].
6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic
standards, and results are implemented.
7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and
banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal
barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated.
8. A phased and orderly minority return process is
functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having
accepted significant returns.
9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning
and a secure environment for returns is established.
10. The Parties are cooperating with [the International
Criminal Tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war
criminals.

Those are the 10.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator to yield for a
question?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I just want to make sure that it is
understood by all concerned--and I am asking the Senator this
question--that the benchmarks that were read are not a necessary
precondition to our accomplishing the military mission; that the
amendment that we are offering is an amendment that says our troops
should not stay there indefinitely; that we should transition to a
European-only-led force, supported by us but not with the use of U.S.
ground combat troops.
I wouldn't want to leave the impression here that the request by the
Senator from West Virginia, if I can have his attention, the
establishment of those benchmarks are not necessary for the
accomplishment of the military mission. I think where the Senator is
going is the fact that some of those benchmarks may never be
established. If that was a precondition to our troops staying on the
ground in Bosnia, they might be there for another millennium.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. COATS. And I want to make sure that everyone understands that the
amendment that is before the Senate, the sense of the Congress, does
not address that question, is not meant to address that question.
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to respond to the comment. That is exactly
what my point was. It is because it will take such a long time, in our
judgment, for those kinds of civilian goals to be achieved that we must
send a clear signal we cannot be there--
Mr. COATS. Exactly.
Mr. LEVIN. As long as it takes for those goals to be accomplished. It
is because those goals, as important as they are--those are important
goals; they could take decades, as I just said to the good Senator from
West Virginia, they could take decades--may never be achieved. Those
civilian goals may never be achieved. We hope they are, but we cannot
be there militarily until those civilian goals are achieved, or
benchmarks, and that is why this resolution is the signal, the
statement that we must have our ground forces out of there within a
reasonable period of time.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Michigan
yield on that point? Did not the President in his explanation for
keeping our troops in Bosnia beyond December list these benchmarks in a
report to the Congress? Did he not--I don't have them before me now,
but it seems to me that I recall he sent a report to Congress.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield for 1
second? I do have the report, and I know exactly what he is trying to
say. I would like to read him exactly what it says.
Mr. LEVIN. If I can respond first, I will be happy to yield in a
moment. I just read the President's report.
Mr. BYRD. Wasn't the President saying, in essence, that our troops
should stay there until these benchmarks have been achieved? In
essence, wasn't he saying that?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator from West Virginia yield?
Mr. BYRD. He has the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy just to yield for a question for the
moment, but--we are going to get the exact wording--but it is my
recollection that the President did not say until these benchmarks are
achieved.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, reading from the report that the
distinguished Senator from West Virginia refers to, in the report the
President says:

The exit strategy for U.S. troops engaged in such
deployment--

And then he notes:

The goal of the military presence is to establish the
conditions under which Dayton implementation can
continue without the support of a major NATO-led military
force.

And begins to list the concrete benchmarks that the Senator from
Michigan has just read. I don't exactly know how you can refer to them
as concrete, because I think that they are not concrete. I think the
police re-integration, the effective judicial reform, and media
regulation is a giant leap, and I think the Senator from Michigan
probably has already said that he also sees that these could be
limitless. But, in fact, that is the exit strategy that has been put
forward by the President, and that is exactly why I think the Senator
from West Virginia is on point to question what is the exit strategy.
If these are clear benchmarks--the State of Texas doesn't have
effective judicial reform yet--there are countries in the European
Union that can't meet the economic test that is set out in this exit
strategy for Bosnia.
I think the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from West Virginia
and the Senator from Michigan are all beginning to agree that we are
looking at an exit strategy from which there is not an exit in the
foreseeable future, and I hope that we will be able to clarify this as
we go down the road. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I can reclaim the floor for a final
moment. Our resolution, it seems to me, clearly speaks for itself.
People can try to interpret the President's statement in different
ways, and I will read one line from it in a moment, but our resolution
is very clear: Our forces cannot be there indefinitely. We want our
forces out within a reasonable period of time.
It is our belief that it will take a long time for these kinds of
civilian reforms to occur. If you want to read the President's report
as saying that the forces cannot leave, in his judgment, until these
are achieved, I think that is really stretching what the President has
said, but I will read it, and then one can interpret it the way one
wants:

The goal of the military presence is to establish the
conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue
without the support of a major NATO-led military force.

That is what the President reports. He wants to establish the
conditions under which progress can continue--``Dayton implementation
can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force.''
The way I read that is that these do not need to be reality before
the President intends to remove combat forces from Bosnia. If one wants
to read that differently, one is free to do so. But however one reads
the President's report, what our resolution makes clear is we are not
going to be there. We don't believe we should be there for as long as
it takes to achieve this. That is the point of our resolution.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I agree with the distinguished Senator from
Michigan as to his resolution. I agree with him on that. But from his
reading of the benchmark items and the language that was in the
President's report, it seems pretty clear to me that conditions that
need to exist in order that we no longer keep our troops there are
conditions that the President expects to be achieved before we remove
our troops. And those conditions, as the distinguished Senator has
pointed out, many of them are impossible within my lifetime, if I live
to be as old as Abraham, that was 175 years; and if I live to be as old
as Isaac, that is 180; if I live to be as old as Jacob, that is 147
years; if I live to be as old as Joseph, that is 110 years. So I have a
pretty long while to go to make that. But sincerely, and seriously, I
thank the distinguished Senator for his comments.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to just respond to that, because the
words in the President's language is not ``these need to be achieved.''
In fairness--and I do not consider this to be

[[Page S6942]]

an abundantly clear document. That is the reason why I think we should
speak as to what our own beliefs are, and that is why this resolution
is introduced. But the document says, ``conditions under which Dayton
implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led
military force.''
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. LEVIN. In a moment.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Since we are on this point, I would like to add that
the sentence above that, ``The exit strategy for U.S. forces engaged in
such deployment,'' that is the question that was asked by Congress for
the President to respond to. In response to the question, What is the
exit strategy? he lists these 10 benchmarks that we have been
discussing. So----
Mr. LEVIN. But I think the Senator would need to then read what it is
in entirety, which is to establish conditions under which
implementation can continue without the support of major NATO-led
military forces. But that could be argued to read as that
implementation of this can continue--not that it has to be achieved
before the force can leave--but that it could continue after a major--
major; a qualification--NATO-led force can continue.
But I will simply repeat and then yield the floor. It is because we
have our responsibility to state what we believe our policy should be
in Bosnia that this bipartisan resolution has been introduced. We are
trying to state we are not there indefinitely, in our judgment. And we
want to let the Europeans know we will not be there indefinitely. We
are not writing a blank check. We are not making an open-ended
commitment. We are putting you on notice, we are there for a reasonable
period of time.
Now, why don't we set a specific date? Why don't we then say how many
troops, by what date? The answer is, because our top military leaders
say that would undermine the safety of our troops. That will jeopardize
the well-being of our troops. That will play into the hands of those
that want us out of there by one means or another and that will use
force if necessary to get us out of there. That is because we want to
support our troops as long as they are there and not harm them.
Setting a specific date or setting a specific reduction timetable
would, in the judgment of General Clark and General Shelton and
Secretary Cohen, jeopardize the well-being of our troops.
So what our resolution does is say we want to express ourselves, put
everybody on notice that we are not there for an indefinite period of
time. And by the way, we surely are not there until these goals are
achieved. There is no way--no way --we are going to be there until
these goals are achieved. But that is the expression of our opinion.
I would be happy to yield for a question or yield the floor.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Well, I would like to ask the question, if the
Senator will yield, and that is, I appreciate your interpretation of
this because I certainly agree with you that these benchmarks are not
achievable in a reasonable length of time. But I would just like to ask
you the question, What is the next step? The President has said this is
an exit strategy, that these 10 benchmarks could be--would be reached
without the necessity of major support from the United States. That is
what is on this page.
The Senator from Michigan has asked General Clark, What would be the
timetable to achieve these 10 benchmarks, which I think we all now have
a consensus are going to be very difficult to quantify? What is the
next step? If General Clark comes back and says, well, effective
judicial reform would be maybe 50 years, or 30 years, the civil Dayton
goals, the reestablishment of minority homeowners in each area of
Bosnia, the media regulation, these will take 60 years or 40 years or
25 years, what then is the next step?
If we have the benchmarks in a report from the President, which we
are now asking, ``OK, you, Mr. President, have said the exit strategy
is that these will be achieved without the requirement of a major U.S.
presence,'' we get the timetable back, we think it is unrealistic to
have a major U.S. presence for 50 years, and do all of the other
responsibilities of the U.S. military, what is the next step?
Mr. LEVIN. First, I think I want to just restate what the President's
statement here is. It is not that these will be achieved before. That
is not what this states. It is that ``implementation can continue.'' I
just want to again reiterate what this document says.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Without the support of a major U.S. force.
Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely, without the support of a major NATO-led
military force.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is the exit strategy for the United States.
Mr. LEVIN. That is the strategy, that implementation can continue
without the support of a major military force. And what the next step
is is for General Clark to submit to us, as he said he would, within 2
months of our hearing, which was early June, June 4--so that,
hopefully, by the end of July we will then have his timelines for the
achievement of the benchmarks. At that point we will take whatever
action we think is appropriate.
This resolution is aimed at stating what our position is, again,
relative to not having an unlimited commitment from ground combat
forces in Bosnia. That is what this resolution says. We are not going
to do that. We are going to say they are there for a reasonable time
period. That is what this resolution does, which is what we think is
the responsible thing to do at this time, without having more
information as to what those estimated timelines are. But I would not
want to tell you what action, if any, Congress would appropriately take
after it receives estimates of timelines, perhaps ranges, from General
Clark before we actually see his response. I don't think it would be
responsible for us to project in advance what action, if any, we would
think would be appropriate beyond adopting this resolution which states
quite clearly that we intend that our ground forces only be there for a
reasonable period of time.
Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. I thank my colleague.
I just want to make sure that I understand that what he is trying to
say is that it is important, a discussion over what the benchmarks
should be or could be or ought to be, or how it ought to be modified,
and should not be confused with what we are attempting to do in this
resolution.
Discussing benchmarks, I say to the Senator from Texas, is perfectly
legitimate, but not as an objection to the resolution that is before
us. It is partly, maybe even primarily, I would ask the Senator,
because of the benchmarks, because we agree that they are indefinite,
because we agree they are not achievable that we want this resolution.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. COATS. If I could finish my statement.
The only thing we do not want is for those of us in Congress to tell
the military how to protect itself. But we want to send a message that
we do not care what the President's interpretation is; we are dealing
with what Congress wants to say.
What Congress wants to say is, Mr. President, I do not care what your
exit strategy is, whether I agree with it or disagree with it. We
believe that our troops should not be there indefinitely. We believe
you should talk to our NATO allies and European allies and tell them
that Congress does not support an indefinite troop commitment. We want
our combat forces out of there. We want a European force--if you think
it is necessary to stay there, you better tell the Europeans to put a
European force together. If you want our support, logistics support,
intelligence support, communications support, rapid reaction that might
help you in a crisis, yes, we can consider that.
But we want those combat troops out of there. I just don't want to
confuse the President's policies--exit strategy, benchmarks, General
Clark's interpretation. That is not what we are about here. We are
talking about Congress' resolution.
I ask the Senator if that is what we are up to?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Indiana is the prime sponsor of this
resolution and is exactly correct.
Further, in response to his question, I again state that this is our
expression of what Congress intends, that we intend for Europeans to
understand, and

[[Page S6943]]

what we intend, of course, for the President to understand.
Part of this, paragraph 5, is that the President should inform the
European NATO allies of this expression of the sense of the Congress,
should strongly urge them to undertake preparations for establishing a
Western/European Union-led or a NATO-led force as a follow-on force to
the NATO-led stabilization force, if needed, to maintain peace. In
other words, there may be a need--in my judgment there will be, by the
way--for a long period of time for there to be an outside force in
Bosnia.
But what this resolution is saying, it cannot have American combat
forces as part of that force beyond a reasonable period of time and we
are putting you on notice. Whether we understand your exit strategy,
whether we agree with your exit strategy, Mr. President, whatever
differences there are as to the interpretation of it, that is not the
point. The point is this is what Congress is telling you and telling
the Europeans. This is not an unlimited commitment. We are sending you
a very clear statement that we are only going to support the presence
of American combat forces there for a reasonable period of time. Plus,
as long as they are there, we will support them. We are not going to
harm them by setting a specific exit date or a specific reduction
schedule. We are not going to jeopardize the well-being of our forces
with a specific date for an exit, because our top military leaders have
told us that is what the effect would be. We are not going to do that
in this resolution, at least.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. I simply wanted to say to the Senator from Indiana and the
Senator from Michigan, I think I was the first to raise questions about
benchmarks. In so doing, I did not mean to imply that I was against the
amendment that Senator Thurmond has offered. I don't mean that at all.
I just picked up on Senator Levin's reference to benchmarks and asked
some questions about them. I intend to support the amendment.
As to the distinguished Senator's reference to the military leaders,
our military leaders, in part, helped to get us right where we are now.
We were misled by some of our military leaders at the very beginning of
the discussions concerning Bosnia. I have great respect for our
military leaders, but I don't accept their word as having come down
from Mount Sinai, as being engraved in stone. They listen to the
President. They say whatever the President thinks. They all do. And
very seldom will they venture to say something that isn't in accordance
with the administration's viewpoint.
I intend to say something about this subject matter later, but I
wanted to wait to listen to what the distinguished Senator from Texas
has to say first.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have had a lot of talk here. It is
about time for action now.
At this time, I yield to the able Senator from Virginia, Senator
Warner.
Incidentally, for the record, Senator Warner served as a sailor in
World War II. In his career he served in the Marines; he served as
Secretary of the Navy. He is the ranking Republican on this committee.
He has had vast military experience.
I am very pleased at this time to yield him such time as he desires.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. That was unexpected.
I assure you that my very modest record of military service pales in
comparison to yours, having been the only Member of the Senate to have
landed on June 6, 1944, D-day.
Moving on, this is a very important debate, if for only the reason
here we have some of the most intelligent persons debating documents
which read with clear English language, yet we can't seem to come to an
agreement. That signifies the desperate need for clarity to our policy.
That clarity has to come from the President of the United States.
This debate was really fostered some months ago by the efforts of our
distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia, and the
Senator from Texas, when they, consulting with members of the Armed
Services Committee, and others, showed various proposals. Those
proposals manifested, in my judgment, the unrest, certainly within the
Senate and I think largely within the Congress, that we could not keep
going on and going on as we have been, and that it was inflicting a
very severe penalty upon research and development budgets, readiness
budgets, procurement budgets, and that we must bring this debate to the
floor of the Senate so that Senators can have expressions and perhaps
pass a resolution and/or an amendment or, in whatever form, to manifest
our great concern.

I wish to compliment the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator
from Texas for their efforts. The Armed Services Committee took into
consideration their views. As a result, we have this amendment today by
the distinguished ranking member and the Senator from Indiana, which I
intend to support.
My concern is that as I listen to this debate it is clear to this
Senator that our American troops, particularly the combat troops, are
simply hostage, I repeat hostage, to the uncertainty of what these
goals are and what the time is within which they are achievable. As a
consequence of this amendment, I am concerned that the President and
others will take it into consideration and come back to the Congress
with specificity and clarity.
It will be, in my judgment, impossible for this Congress in the few
weeks remaining, to make a decision on this subject. My concern is that
we really not make a definitive decision other than this amendment, for
the following reasons: No. 1, as the Senator from Michigan said, in the
course of General Clark's appearance before the Armed Services
Committee, which was a hearing dedicated to the subject of Bosnia and
at which we received one of the most profound and eloquent
dissertations by the Senator from West Virginia, expressing the
responsibilities of the Congress of the United States as being parallel
and equal in every precedent to those of the President--an excellent
statement.
But General Clark, when pressed--this Senator was particular in
urging him to assess these goals, for General Clark to go back to the
various individuals, government entities and the like, and to establish
a timetable within which they could be achieved. Now, my understanding
of his reply and my recollection was that he felt he could not provide
the Congress, particularly the Senate, with that reply much before
September. That was my recollection.
Now, also in September are a very important series of elections that
will take place in Bosnia. Step one is the Clark report. Step two are
the elections in Bosnia. Hopefully, those elections will again point in
the direction towards greater achievement of the overall Dayton
accords. Then we have to recognize that this Congress ends and a new
Congress will come in the January-February timeframe, and that they--
possibly new Members, possibly different views--they will then have
their opportunity to express their views.
I think decisions by the Congress as to the future level of funding,
which is pointed out by the Senator from Indiana, is our explicit
authority here, will probably have to await until early next year. In
that interim, we have called upon the President, subsequent to General
Clark's announcement, to come forward no later than, I believe,
December 31, of this calendar year and give us a detailed report.
We are beginning to lay the foundation now, expressing to the
President, and indeed to our allies, the unrest that exists in the
Congress, which unrest is reflective of the people across the United
States. And that time is running out. We have made a significant
contribution in terms of our men and women of the Armed Services
Committee working with our allies. We have made a very significant
financial commitment of $9.5 billion.
My concern at this particular moment is that we are walking something
of a high wire, because as we are discussing, I think in a very
responsible way, these issues, at the same time we have to take notice
of the fact of the unrest in Kosovo. With all due respect for my
colleague from Texas, I see there is a direct correlation between the
actions we take in Bosnia and the possible consequences in Kosovo. I

[[Page S6944]]

readily admit, as my colleague from Texas points out, the legalities--
namely, that Kosovo is a sovereign part of the Serbian State and, as
such, it is a civil war. But I say to my colleagues that if the
continued criminal hardships being inflicted upon innocent people in
Kosovo become portrayed in greater detail, and we experience greater
and greater levels of suffering of those people, all those legalities
go to the side. Once the pictures of the horror begin to emanate --and
I hope they will not--in further amounts from Kosovo, everybody will
recognize that there is a conflict that responsible nations of the
world must participate in, in trying to bring about a cessation.
I urge my colleague from Indiana--and I am certain my colleague from
Michigan heard--I hope nothing we do here today can in any way be
utilized by those forces trying to continue the criminal acts being
perpetrated in Kosovo to give them any encouragement to continue those
acts. What we are doing today is an important debate, but it is not to
be construed in any other way but that the United States will assume
its responsible role, along with our allies, in trying to stem the
crisis that is developing in Kosovo.
As we speak, the President has dispatched Mr. Holbrooke--soon, I
hope, to be confirmed as our U.S. Representative to the United
Nations--a man who had a great deal to do with reaching the accords in
Dayton and who has had extensive experience in this area. It is our
hope that he can bring about a strong message that will eventually
bring stability in the Kosovo region. What we do today will have
consequences, and it is walking the high wire that nothing be
interpreted as lessening our intent to stop the killing, the rape, and
so on taking place in Kosovo.
I will return to the debate. It is clear that these Dayton accords,
as pointed out by the Senator from West Virginia, the Senator from
Texas, and others, are holding hostage the need for troops. I agree
with the Senator. He said they are not achievable unless there is a
military force in place, and the part that we play or do not play
remains to be seen, be it combat or support in that continuing military
force, because I am sure that the Dayton accords--no matter what time
within which we will require their ultimate achievement--would require
a security force, and that security force must perform only military
missions. They cannot perform the missions to directly achieve the
accords. But only by their presence and the infrastructure that they
maintain in place--namely, some semblance of law and order--can we hope
to achieve any of the Dayton accords. So I commend my colleagues.
I intend to support this amendment. But I see a direct linkage
between the problems in Bosnia and the developing problems in Kosovo. I
hope that nothing as a consequence of this debate today will ever be
construed by anyone as undermining the efforts of our Government,
because I remember so well in the early debates--and this Senator was
never in favor of sending in combat troops; the record is clear on
that. But once that decision was made and once we have become a party
and a partner--and I underline ``partner''--with our allies and
achieved the Dayton accords, then I feel we are there and we should not
jeopardize the $9.5 billion and the personal sacrifices of our troops
by doing something precipitous now that would undo the progress in
Bosnia.

But there is a direct correlation between Bosnia and Kosovo. We used
to argue that we have to contain Bosnia so it doesn't spill over into
Kosovo. The opposite could happen now. The problems in Kosovo could
spill over into Bosnia and begin to undermine the progress we made in
Dayton. We have to proceed with great caution.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question of the
Senator from West Virginia. I did not intend to speak before the
distinguished Senator from West Virginia. If it is his desire to speak
first, I am happy to wait.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I certainly do
not wish to speak in advance of the Senator from Texas. I very much
appreciate the courtesy, but I am very content to wait and listen to
the Senator.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you.
Mr. President, first, let me say I thank the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia, because he and I have worked together. We have
introduced a bill--the Byrd-Hutchison bill--which would produce a
downsizing of our commitment in Bosnia in, I think, a reasonable
timeframe, taking into account the safety of our troops. I will talk
about that in a few minutes. He has been a leader in this effort, and
he is a member of the Armed Services Committee. He has provided a lot
of input into this debate and certainly a background that none of us
can match because of his years in the Senate and his scholarly pursuits
in Senate history.
I also want to thank Senator Thurmond, Senator Levin, and Senator
Coats for putting forward this amendment. I think this sense of the
Senate is a good start. It certainly sends the signal to the President
and the administration from Congress that Congress is very concerned
about the policy. I think it is very clear from the recent debate that
many of us do not consider that the exit strategy put forward, in
response to our question, from the President is a serious exit
strategy. It cannot be considered a serious exit strategy, because I
think when General Clark comes back with a timetable, it is going to be
totally unacceptable, and I think everybody on this floor agrees that
it is too nebulous to be in any way dubbed a concrete and clear
benchmark.
I want to respond because Senator Byrd and I have spoken on this
subject and we feel, I think, very strongly about the role of Congress
and the importance that Congress exercise its responsibility under the
Constitution. That is why we have been active in this area and why I
think it is important that we take this first step with the Thurmond-
Levin-Coats amendment, and that we eventually go further in making sure
that Congress is a part of any effort by the President to have a long-
term commitment of our troops in a foreign land.
In fact, that is what the Constitution envisioned. It is very clear
if you read the Federalist Papers, if you study the Constitution, if
you read the debate, that our founders had an example. The example was
a king, a monarchy--a monarchy in which the king not only declared war
for his country, Great Britain, but the king also paid for it,
implemented it, did the strategy. It was all a power of the monarch. As
the founders of our country were debating what they wanted, they said
they wanted it to be hard to declare war. In fact, in the debate, I
will quote from James Wilson, the delegate from Pennsylvania, who said:

We must have a system of checks and balances in this area
that will not hurry us into war. It is calculated to guard
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man or a
single body of men to involve us in such distress, for the
important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature
at large.

Mr. President, we have a situation here in which there is no
declaration of war. So we have a shift of power toward the President,
putting our troops into combat positions, or into peacekeeping
positions, certainly into harm's way--however you would like to
describe it--unilaterally.
Congress has since World War II, I think it can be fairly said,
continued to allow the President to encroach more and more on the
responsibility that was clearly given in the Constitution to Congress,
because, in fact, it should be hard to declare war. It should be hard
to put our troops into harm's way except in an emergency, which I think
all of us would agree is within the power of the President to address.
So now we have a situation where more and more the President is going
forward on his own and Congress is stepping back and allowing the
President to take the power without our input, and even when we
disagree with the President, unfortunately, I think we have been timid
about standing up.
I believe it was this timidity that caused the extended Vietnam war.
I think we extended it by not exercising the responsibility of
Congress, which clearly knew that this was not a war in which we should
be, and most certainly not one in which so much American blood should
have been shed.
Mr. President, here we are now with an exit strategy given to
Congress by

[[Page S6945]]

the President that is not realizable--an exit strategy that many States
of the United States couldn't meet as benchmarks.
On the effect of the judicial reform program, police in both entities
are restructured, retrained, and equipped in accordance with democratic
standards; media-regulated in accordance with democratic standards;
independent alternative media available; free market reforms;
functioning privatization; banking laws; an IMF program in place.
Mr. President, these are worthy goals. They are worthy benchmarks,
and I hope we work toward them. But this is not an exit strategy for
U.S. forces.
I am pleased that so many Members of Congress agree with that, and
are beginning to take first steps that would say to the President you
don't have carte blanche to watch our military move into a dangerously
hollow force while you are spending $10 billion of taxpayer money on
this kind of effort with no exit strategy. That is what is happening.
I am pleased that we are going to begin to take the first steps to
say to the President we want an exit strategy; we want an exit strategy
that is reasonable, and we want an exit strategy that is responsible as
an ally.
Everything that Senator Byrd and I have done has been to try to work
with our allies as a responsible ally, not to exit totally from Bosnia
as a requirement, but to say we want to do our fair share, and we want
our allies to work with us to allow us to continue to have a military
that is capable of responding in the only way that America can respond,
and that is with our unique capabilities, our unique technology, our
unique modernized equipment, and our uniquely trained forces, which are
the best in the world. We don't need our best fighting forces to do the
police-keeping mission that we are doing in Bosnia, which can ably be
done by many other of our allies.
So my goal is going to be to support this very good beginning, but to
say that we must be willing to stand up and force this issue because we
are going in the wrong direction. We are allowing our military to
become hollow because we are in unending missions. Our troop morale is
suffering. We are losing experienced people, because they are gone from
home so much on missions that they do not see as essential. If you talk
to military people, as I have, that is what you will hear. They will be
there when they see that it is a U.S. security interest. They have
always been. But they do not understand continuous deployments when
there is no emergency, as they see it, and when they see no exit
strategy.

I am very pleased that the Senator from West Virginia made the
specific point of trying to determine what the mission is. Is it a
clear mission? He asked what the benchmarks for the exit strategy were.
I think it became very clear to anyone who listened that the benchmarks
are no exit strategy at all. They are worthy goals. But they will not
be met in our lifetime. And, indeed, many countries of Europe do not
meet them today.
I hope the Senate will take the first step. But I hope the Senate
will not be timid about its responsibility under the Constitution, and
take further steps along the way.
We are going to continue to have other amendments to other bills that
will provide the United States an opportunity to speak to our allies to
determine how we can work together to downsize the U.S. commitment, to
help our allies in every possible way within the bounds of reason,
because we do have other commitments. We must respond, if there is a
real security threat to our country, or to any of our forces in the
field, and we are losing our edge.
Mr. President, I hope that this is a first step, not a last step. I
hope the President will hear what the Senate is saying with this sense-
of-the-Senate resolution. It is a good resolution. The President should
work with NATO allies to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from Bosnia
within a reasonable period of time.
That is the resolution. I agree with that--that a NATO-led force
without the participation of the U.S. ground combat forces in Bosnia
might be suitable for a follow-on; that we, the taxpayers of the United
States, have spent $9.5 billion over the last 6 years at a time when
our military is telling us that we are dropping in modernization; that
we are dropping in our recruitment. We are losing experienced people.
We must as responsible Members of the Senate question the priorities in
spending for an operation that has no exit strategy.
We want to take this first step. I certainly do. But I want the U.S.
Senate to remember our part of the Constitution. If we fail to keep our
part of the Constitution working, we are failing in our duty and our
responsibility to the people of our country, and most certainly to
those combat forces who are putting their lives on the line every day.
We would never jeopardize troop safety in anything we do.
I want to say that Senator Byrd's and my two bills that have been put
forward both exempt totally the troops that are necessary for the
safety of the troops that are on the ground.
We want a responsible exit. We want to be responsible allies. We are
not walking away from our responsibility to our allies. But we do not
think it is fair for the United States to continue to bear the lion's
share of the burden in Bosnia. We are now twice as many troops as our
nearest ally, and I do not think that is a fair allocation.
So, Mr. President, I think this is a good first step. I think the
United States is taking a necessary first step. I hope the President
will listen to the concerns that have been raised in this very good
resolution, and I hope the Senate will be willing to continue to work
on legitimate, responsible parameters around this Bosnia mission.
And just one more response to the Senator from Virginia. I think that
this must be separated from Kosovo for many reasons. One is Kosovo is
an independent country and requires a different set of references. We
have been in Bosnia for 6 years, really more. We have been working on
the Bosnia issue. Kosovo, we have yet to take the definitive action,
and I do support the President for getting his emissaries in and trying
to bring these people to the peace table. I want to be shown to support
that effort, and I hope that it works.
I think the Bosnia issue is much different, and I think we have
worked toward coming to some sort of clear mission and clear exit
strategy in Bosnia for many years, since I have been in Congress, and I
think now is the time for us to exercise our responsibility under the
Constitution and become more firm in how long we will be in a mission
in which our troops will be engaged, will be in harm's way, and for
which there is no congressional approval as I think is required by the
Constitution in spirit if not in actual terms.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator yield?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will yield for a question.
Mr. McCAIN. Did the Senator just yield the floor? Parliamentary
inquiry.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I did not yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has yielded for a question.
Mr. WARNER. Let's clarify the question of the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. I thought I heard the Senator from Texas yield the floor.
I was asking if that was the case.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator was asked if she will yield for a
question, and she did yield for a question.
Mr. WARNER. My question would be, we have our differences on the
legal--clearly, the Senator is correct about Kosovo--independent and
the like. But it just has been my experience that once the television
pictures and stories come back across the ocean as to the horror and
pillage, and so forth, that could take place in greater porportion than
now, then this whole thing blends together, and I do see a direct
linkage between the turmoil in one geographic area and turmoil in
another just a bare few miles away.
But my concern, and it goes to both my distinguished colleagues from
West Virginia and Texas; I have followed and respect greatly their
efforts here, but we are about to get a report from General Clark which
will throw, I think,

[[Page S6946]]

some very clear light on this otherwise unclear situation as the time
within which the goals for Dayton can be achieved. We are about to
experience the results of elections in Bosnia which we all hope, again,
will move towards a more rapid resolution of the remaining problems in
Bosnia.

The distinguished Senator from Arizona--and I have read through his
amendment, which I support--is going to list, I think, some very
important analysis from the President, Secretaries of Defense and
State, and then we have the fact that a new Congress is coming in. So
my concern is what can we hope to achieve now were we to move along the
lines of the amendment which I have seen from the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia and the Senator from Texas, given that so much
remains to be done, and those actions--the Clark report, the elections,
the fact that we are going to have a new Congress--in my judgment, all
have a direct bearing on what we can achieve by way of reductions in
the specific numbers of troops over this period. So I thank the
Senator. If the Senator cares to reply, I would appreciate it.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator.
I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that we
have had benchmarks that are clearly not achievable in any lifetime
that we are going to have. We have had deadlines that have failed to be
met. I think it is time that Congress stand up and say we are looking
at the facts. The facts are we are having a harder time recruiting for
the military. We are having a harder time funding the modernization and
the technology. We haven't even addressed missile defense systems. And
yet we know now that two more countries have joined the nuclear club;
that we are talking to troops--at least I am--who are very low in
morale, and people who not only are not coming into the service, but
our experienced people are leaving, and I think it is time that
Congress take the responsibility to address these concerns. One of them
is a mission with no exit strategy, which is, I think, an ill-defined
mission, and no clear policy that shows our enemies or our allies where
we would go in the future.
Kosovo is another issue. There are problems erupting in India and
Pakistan. Certainly, Iraq is still on the horizon, not to mention
Korea. The United States has the unique responsibility in the world to
provide a security umbrella in a lot of places, and I want to make sure
that we are going to be strong enough to respond when there is a threat
to U.S. security. And if we continue to sit back and let deadline after
deadline and benchmarks that do not hold water go forward, I think we
are abdicating our responsibility.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator, and I certainly
associate myself with her concerns as to the overall posture of our own
Armed Forces, which have been degraded, and I so stated in my opening
comments, by the heavy expenditures associated with Bosnia. And you are
quite correct; the India-Pakistan series of regrettable events has, I
think, spurred other nations to look more and more to biological and
chemical missilery and other weapons in the area of mass destruction
and, indeed, we are all, I think, deeply concerned when we read the
reports that, indeed, Iraq was preparing its weaponry to incorporate
the biological material in its missile heads, and all the more reason
to proceed with this missile defense program which for years the
Senator from Texas, myself and others have been urging be adopted.
I yield floor.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Senator from Virginia. I think when you
look at these other potential necessary points of U.S. defense
callings, we have to look at our budget, our defense dollars, our
modernization, our technology and our will along with the morale of our
troops, and we have got to say that there is a red flag out there, and
if we do not do something about the priorities, we are going to have a
hollow force at a time when we really need it. And I think that is the
responsibility of this Senate to address and to make sure that it does
not happen on our watch. I appreciate what the Senator from Virginia
has said. I appreciate the leadership he has shown, along with Senator
Thurmond and all of those. I think we all have the same goal. I just
hope that we can all as a group of 100 independent operators come
together and realize that because we are so diverse, we cannot allow
ourselves to be inept in action, in doing the right thing that all of
us, I think, are seeking to do. That is what happens in a legislative
body. It is not an easy, clear direction that you can point a
legislative body to. But nevertheless, I hope we can overcome the
inherent problems in dealing in a legislative body and do something
strong and courageous and decisive and fulfill our responsibility under
the Constitution for our country, for those who are serving our country
in the military, and for our future generations.

Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I
believe, has an amendment. Does he wish to call that amendment up at
this time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. BYRD. No, no, I am recognized. I am not yielding the floor. I am
merely asking the Senator from Arizona if he would like to call his
amendment up.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to
respond to the Senator from West Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Without his losing the right of the floor.
Yes, I have a second-degree amendment, I say to the Senator from West
Virginia, concerning this issue that is before us. I believe it is not
controversial. The Senator from Virginia supports it, and others. It is
concerning reports that are required about progress in our mission in
Bosnia and certain benchmarks for us being able to determine how long
we have to remain there.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator is pressed for
time right at the moment, I will be glad to yield to him for that
purpose.
Let me say, before I do so, I congratulate the distinguished Senator
from Texas on her statement and on the work that she has done in
preparing legislation on this very issue that has been discussed. I
also congratulate the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his work
on the committee and I commend those who have prepared the Amendment
that has been offered by Mr. Thurmond, which I intend to support, and I
hope it will be unanimously agreed to. I think it goes in our
direction, but I don't think it goes far enough. But I think it is
moving in the direction that Senator Hutchison and I favor.
Mr. President, I have waited 3 hours to address the Senate. I want to
speak on the same subject. I have had my share of entries into the
colloquy by interrupting others and asking questions. I am perfectly
content to desist and await just a few minutes longer, if the
distinguished Senator from Arizona wishes to call up his amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge the distinguished Senator from West
Virginia to do that, and I thank him. I think it would be important
because this amendment is germane to this debate and should be before
the Senate. And then, of course, immediately after it is sent to the
desk, the Senator from West Virginia would give us his important
analysis of the debate.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time would the distinguished
Senator from Arizona need?
Mr. President, I yield the floor for not to exceed 5 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from Arizona, and I ask unanimous consent that I
may regain the floor at that time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.

Amendment No. 2977 to Amendment No. 2975

(Purpose: To require the President to submit to Congress certain
reports on the missions of United States forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina)

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment at the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment
numbered 2977 to amendment No. 2974.

[[Page S6947]]

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

After subsection (b) of the amendment insert the following:
(c) One-Time Reports.--The President shall submit to
Congress the following reports:
(1) Not later than September 30, 1998, a report containing
a discussion of the likely impact on the security situation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the prospects for
establishing self-sustaining peace and stable local
government there that would result from a phased reduction in
the number of United States military personnel stationed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the following alternatives:
(A) A phased reduction to 5,000 by February 2, 1999, to
3,500 by June 30, 1999, and to 2,500 by February 2, 2000.
(B) A phased reduction by February 2, 2000, to the number
of personnel that is approximately equal to the mean average
of--
(i) the number of military personnel of the United Kingdom
that are stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina on that date;
(ii) the number of military personnel of Germany that are
stationed there on that date;
(iii) the number of military personnel of France that are
stationed there on that date; and
(iv) the number of military personnel of Italy that are
stationed there on that date.
(2) Not later than October 1, 1998, a report on the status
of the NATO force of gendarmes or paramilitary police
referred to in subsection (a)(1), including the mission of
the force, the composition of the force, and the extent, if
any, to which members of the Armed Forces of the United
States are participating (or are to participate) in the
force.
(d) Report To Accompany Each Request for Funding.--(1) Each
time that the President submits to Congress a proposal for
funding continued operations of United States forces in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President shall submit to
Congress a report on the missions of United States forces
there. The first report shall be submitted at the same time
that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 2000 to
Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States
Code.
(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) The performance objectives and schedule for the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement, including--
(i) the specific objectives for the reestablishment of a
self-sustaining peace and a stable local government in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, taking into account (I) each of the areas of
implementation required by the Dayton Agreement, as well as
other areas that are not covered specifically in the Dayton
Agreement but are essential for reestablishing such a peace
and local government and to permitting an orderly withdrawal
of the international peace implementation force from Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and (II) the benchmarks reported in the
latest semiannual report submitted under section 7(b)(2) of
the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act
(revised as necessary to be current as of the date of the
report submitted under this subsection); and
(ii) the schedule, specified by fiscal year, for achieving
the objectives.
(B) The military and non-military missions that the
President has directed for United States forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in support of the objectives identified pursuant
to paragraph (1), including a specific discussion of--
(i) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in
connection with the pursuit and apprehension of war
criminals;
(ii) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in
connection with civilian police functions;
(iii) the mission of the United States forces, if any, in
connection with the resettlement of refugees; and
(iv) the missions undertaken by the United States forces,
if any, in support of international and local civilian
authorities.
(C) An assessment of the risk for the United States forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including, for each mission
identified pursuant to subparagraph (B), the assessment of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the
nature and level of risk of the mission for the safety and
well-being of United States military personnel.
(D) An assessment of the cost to the United States, by
fiscal year, of carrying out the missions identified pursuant
to subparagraph (B) for the period indicated in the schedule
provided pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(E) A joint assessment by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State of the status of planning for--
(i) the assumption of all remaining military missions
inside Bosnia and Herzegovina by European military and
paramilitary forces; and
(ii) the establishment and support of forward-based United
States rapid response force outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that would be capable of deploying rapidly to defeat military
threats to a European follow-on force inside Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and of providing whatever logistical,
intelligence, and air support is needed to ensure that a
European follow-on force is fully capable of accomplishing
its missions under the Dayton Agreement.
Redesignate subsection (c) of the amendment as subsection
(e).

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I understand I have 5 minutes. I thank the
Senator from West Virginia for his courtesy.
Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment concerning the continuing
U.S. military presence in Bosnia. This is a second degree amendment to
amendment No. 2975.
Mr. President, I believe everyone in this body knows that I have long
had serious concerns about our mission in Bosnia. From the time the
IFOR mission was first briefed to the Congress, I knew the job could
not be completed in one year--nor against any arbitrary deadline.
Instead, I urged the Administration to set concrete objectives and
benchmarks for measuring success.
Now, as many members have pointed out, we are in an open-ended and
ill-defined military commitment. The Administration has scrapped all
the artificial deadlines. But no clear set of objectives and well-
defined military missions has taken its place. We seem to drift in and
out of going after war criminals, of using the military to resettle
refugees, and of taking on a direct political role in parts of Bosnia
in the name of supporting international civilian authorities. The role
of our military has expanded, and there is no end in sight.
The answer to this problem, however, is not to go back and set new
artificial deadlines. Bosnia is a long-term, complicated problem. It
involves not only the warring factions, but has direct effects on
Croatia and Serbia, including Kosovo, and threatens to spillover to the
wider Balkan region. The credibility of NATO and especially the United
States is tied up with finding a solution for the Bosnia crisis. It
would be sheer irresponsibility, probably leading to renewed warfare,
if we were to precipitously pull out of Bosnia after investing so much.
It would be a betrayal of our commitment to cooperating with our
Allies. And it could well lead to an even more costly and dangerous re-
introduction of American forces to stop the renewed fighting.
Dealing with the Bosnia crisis--even if though our objective is to
get American troops out of there--requires treating Bosnia as a serious
long-term challenge. It is not an issue that lends itself to artificial
deadlines for withdrawal. Nor is there any rationale to forcing the
Congress to vote by some artificial deadline. Worse still would be a
funding cut-off, which would only punish our troops for the failure of
policymakers in Washington to craft a viable long-term policy.
Handling the Bosnia crisis requires us to look beyond just this
fiscal year. It requires the United States to develop a multi-year
strategy that sets out our objectives, the means for achieving these
objectives, and a target timetable for getting us there--but no phony
deadlines. For the sake of our troops, we need to set out clearly the
military and non-military missions they are being asked to perform.
``Creative ambiguity'' may be useful in politics, but it is dangerous
for soldiers. We need to be honest with ourselves about the risks we
are asking our troops to face, and the costs to the taxpayers of
continuing the mission.
I am convinced that the direction we should be taking is to move
toward a force made up of European nations inside Bosnia, with U.S.
forces just ``over-the-horizon'' outside of Bosnia--providing a rapid
response capability to deter or defeat security threats, and providing
logistical, intelligence, and air support to the European forces inside
Bosnia. This step would free up U.S. forces to prepare for other
contingencies.
But it is not possible to achieve this goal simply by setting
arbitrary numbers and deadlines for troop withdrawals. Doing so could
provoke a crisis with our Allies and could have the effect of simply
setting a timetable for restoring violence to Bosnia. Instead,
achieving this goal requires working together with our Allies and
realistically taking account of the situation inside Bosnia.
Mr. President, my amendment seeks to do exactly these things. It
expresses the sense of the Senate that we need to have a clearer
picture of our objectives, timetable, missions assigned to our
military, risks, and costs. It expresses the sense of the Senate that
we should be moving toward a European force inside Bosnia, and a U.S.
``over-

[[Page S6948]]

the-horizon'' capability outside Bosnia. It also says it is time to
stop treating Bosnia as an unplanned emergency and include funding for
operations there as an addition to the defense budget.
My amendment also imposes a number of reporting requirements. Each
time the Administration submits a budget request for funding military
operations in Bosnia, the Administration must clearly state its best
assessment of six items:
(1) Our overall objectives and multi-year timetable for achieving
these objectives--taking account of the benchmarks already required
under the supplemental appropriation passed earlier this year; (2) the
military and non-military missions the President has directed U.S.
forces to carry out--including specific language on our policy on war
criminals, returning refugees, police functions, and support for civil
implementation; (3) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
assessment of the risks these missions present to U.S. military
personnel; (4) the cost of carrying out our strategy over several
fiscal years. (5) the status of plans to move toward a European force
inside Bosnia with a U.S. force outside Bosnia that would deter threats
and provide support to the European force; and (6) an assessment of the
impact of reducing our forces according to the timetable proposed in
the original Byrd-Hutchison amendment.

This may seem like a detailed and onerous reporting requirement, but
it is nothing more than the kind of long-term planning the
Administration should be doing anyway. And by requiring it in a report
to Congress, we ensure that the Congress is operating off the same set
of assumptions and plans as the Administration. This will give us an
opportunity to look more thoughtfully at the real challenges in Bosnia
and structure our decisions more appropriately. Instead of broad swipes
through artificial deadlines or prohibitions on certain missions, we
will be able to target our policy choices more effectively.
Finally, Mr. President, my amendment requires that if the Senate
votes to discontinue funding for continued operations in Bosnia, the
Administration must submit a withdrawal plan within 120 days. This
language does not impose any artificial procedure or deadline on the
Senate. Rather, it acknowledges that the Senate already has the right
at any time to vote to discontinue funding for Bosnia operations. The
question is whether the Senate chooses to exercise this right. If it
does, and the vote is to pull out, then the Administration must present
a withdrawal plan within 120 days.
Mr. President, no one is more frustrated than this Member; all of us
are. The administration came over and said our troops would be out in a
year. We knew that wasn't true at the time. Then they came over and
said they would be out in a year and a half. We knew that wasn't true
at the time. And the frustration that many of us felt as members of the
Armed Services Committee during that period was enormous because we
knew that there was no way that we could possibly have our troops exit
on a date certain which was not an exit strategy. The purpose of this
amendment is to try to force an exit strategy from the administration
so we have expectations as to, No. 1, what our goals are and, No. 2,
how they can be achieved.
I also am a student of the Constitution. I also understand the role
of the U.S. Senate to advise and consent, and if the U.S. Senate wants
the troops withdrawn from Bosnia, all we have to do is, on the
Department of Defense appropriations bill, cut off all funding. That is
all we have to do. We have that right --and that responsibility, in the
view of some.
What we don't have the right to do, because we don't have the
commensurate responsibility, is to devise a strategy for Bosnia. How in
the world do we know what troop levels can be dictated so we will know
that those young men and women are secure? That is why we have
generals. That is why we have a Pentagon. That is why we have a
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is why we have a National
Security Adviser and a Secretary of Defense.
Mr. President, we give them that responsibility that is not a
legislative function, to set troop levels. If the Senator from Texas
wants them out, get them out. I will be glad to debate and discuss an
amendment that says no further funding as of whatever date she wants.
But to say at some date there should be a certain level of troops--from
whence does this information come? From whence does this judgment that
5,000 or 10,000 or 50,000 is the right number of troops?
Mr. President, occasionally I put myself in the role of a military
commander, a position that I aspired to but never achieved. I cannot
imagine--I cannot imagine, as a military commander, trying to meet a
national security threat saying, ``Wait a minute, I've got to be down
to 5,000''--or 10,000 or 20,000 or whatever it is. I am the one who is
supposed to decide that, along with the Commander in Chief. Then we
come to the Congress for approval or disapproval. That is the way the
system should work. We cannot have the Senate, the U.S. Senate, decide
what number of troops are there.
So, I believe that this administration has failed in devising a
strategy. They have failed in giving us an exit strategy. They have
deceived, really, the Congress and the American people, when they first
came over and said that they would be out by a certain date.
But at the same time, to set troop levels, I think, is very, very
dangerous, not only for our troops and the men and women who are there,
but is a dangerous precedent.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I appreciate
his courtesy, as always, that he extends to every Member in this body
in allowing me to propose this amendment and make it part of the
debate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might, just for purposes of
management, seek recognition for a moment. Can the Senator from Arizona
advise us with regard to the yeas and nays?
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator withhold the yeas and nays, because the
yeas and nays have been ordered on the underlying amendment. I wonder
whether or not the Senator might accept a voice vote on the second-
degree amendment. I think it has strong support.
Mr. McCAIN. I withdraw my request for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
West Virginia has the floor.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the original amendment by Senator Hutchison
and myself does not set troop levels.
The original amendment offered by Senator Hutchison and myself does
not cut off money for the troops.
The original amendment by Senator Hutchison and myself does not
withdraw troops from Bosnia.
The original amendment by Senator Hutchison and myself sets no
termination date for withdrawal of American troops from Bosnia. It does
not jerk the rug out from under our troops.
The amendment which the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs.
Hutchison, and I would have offered and may offer at another time on
some bill provides that the President--the Commander in Chief, if you
will--submit to Congress a report, a plan, no later than February 2,
1999, for reducing the military personnel of the United States in
Bosnia to an average of the numbers of troops that Great Britain,
France, Italy and Germany have in Bosnia, the other members of the
contact group--an average--and that that reduction occur by February 2
of the year 2000.
That is not setting troop levels. That is not withdrawing American
troops. We are saying, ``We'll stay there with you; we'll stay there,
but it's about time that the other members of NATO take on a greater
part of the burden.'' After all, this situation has developed in their
own backyard, not in ours.
We are not saying we are going to withdraw. We are not suggesting
that the money be terminated. We are not suggesting that American
troops get out lock, stock, and barrel. We are simply saying that we
should at least be able to reduce our troops, now that there is
stability in Bosnia, we should be able to reduce our troop level to an
average, we would say, of the troop numbers that are involved from the
other members of the contact group.
I think Great Britain has 5,000 involved. France has something like

[[Page S6949]]

2,500. Germany has something like 2,500. Italy has fewer. And we are
saying to the President, ``Now you submit us your plan--your plan.
Submit us your plan, and you don't need to submit it tomorrow or the
day after tomorrow or next month. Submit it by February 2 of next year,
just the plan. Tell us how you, Mr. Commander in Chief''--that magic
term, that all-encompassing, worshipful term, ``Commander in Chief''--
``you tell us how you can get our troop levels down to an average of
those of Great Britain and Germany and France and Italy, and by
February 2 of the year 2000.''
What is wrong with that? Is there someone here who would say to me
that the Congress under the Constitution doesn't have a right or
doesn't have a duty even to submit such an amendment calling on the
Commander in Chief to do that? ``Just let us have your plan, Mr.
President. You have lots of time now. We're putting our allies on
notice that we want our troop levels to be down to an average of what
theirs are. It doesn't have to be an exact average. Certainly, instead
of 7,000, it could be 3,500 by then, but we'll still be there with
you.''

What got us into this situation, Mr. President, I have heard it said
that our military leaders, our generals, our Commander in Chief, have
to make these decisions as to troop levels. I don't quarrel with that,
but these are the same people, these are the same individuals--there
may have been some changes since 1995 and 1996, perhaps some changes in
the identity of the personnel in those respective positions, but it is
the same administration that got us where we are, the same
administration that misled the Congress, misled us into the belief that
our troops would be there no longer than 1 year, roughly a year.
We were told that. We were told that on the Armed Services Committee.
The distinguished Senator from Indiana and the distinguished Senator
from Michigan were there when the committee discussed this matter. That
is what the administration told us, and the distinguished Senator from
Indiana has set forth a litany of the dates and the things that were
said in keeping with the idea that the United States would be involved
there roughly only a year. He has done that for the record, and I
consider that to be a service. That is what was there.
They are the very people who misled us in the beginning. That is why
some of us feel that we haven't been dealt with fairly from the
beginning, and that it is about time that the administration come
forward and give us some reliable statements, give us some reliable
data upon which we can depend and the American people can depend. I
don't think I have voted at any point against the funding or any
authorization of troops in Bosnia. I don't think I have. I am going to
check to make sure, but I was misled along with everybody else.
I doubted, at the time, that the administration would have us out in
a year. I was listening to the Commander in Chief through his Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through his Secretary of Defense, in
their appearances before the Armed Services Committee. I listened.
We took them at their word. You see where we are today. That was
1995, and now this is 1998. I just want to shed a little history for
the record--for the record--not necessarily for all Senators. Some
Senators probably know more about the record than I do. Certainly
several of them are in a good position to remember as much about it as
I can. But for the record, I want to state a little of the history of
this situation.

To begin with, in a nationally televised address on November 27,
1995, President Clinton justified dispatching U.S. troops to Bosnia as
part of IFOR by saying U.S. engagement was needed to stop the great
suffering caused by the war, to bring stability in Europe, a region
vital to U.S. interests, and to maintain U.S. leadership in NATO.
President Clinton said that the deployment would last--and I quote--
``about one year.''
In subsequent statements, administration officials asserted that U.S.
forces would be out of Bosnia by the end of 1996. President Clinton
decided on April 30, 1996, to keep U.S. forces in IFOR at full strength
through the Bosnian election on September 14 in order to support the
election process. He said the United States would maintain a robust
force in Bosnia until IFOR's 1-year mandate expired on December 20,
1996. However, administration officials continued to insist that U.S.
forces planned to leave Bosnia within a few weeks after December 20,
1996.
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton said that the administration
had agreed in principle to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a new
NATO-led peacekeeping force for Bosnia. President Clinton said the
force would remain there until June 1998.
Now, let me read that again. On November 15, 1996, President Clinton
said the administration had agreed--the administration had agreed; did
not say that Congress had agreed; the administration had agreed--in
principle to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a new NATO-led
peacekeeping force for Bosnia. President Clinton said the force would
remain there until June 1998.
So there the administration had already changed their position. No
longer was it said that we would be there about a year. Then it was
said by the President that we would remain there until June 1998.
On December 18, 1997, President Clinton announced that he had agreed
in principle that U.S. forces should participate in a Bosnian
peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expires in
June 1998. He did not set a new departure deadline, but said the force
would leave only when key peace implementation milestones have been
achieved. This follow-on force has been unofficially dubbed ``deterrent
force'' or DFOR by some observers. So it went from IFOR, which was
``intervention force''; to SFOR, which was ``stabilization force''; to
DFOR, which was ``deterrent force.''
Mr. President, this is the administration. It was they who said, in
the beginning, that American forces would be in Bosnia for about 1
year. We took them at their word. But then, as time went on, the
administration, the President, the Commander in Chief, set new dates.
After all, Congress sometimes is faced with a very difficult situation.
And that is what we are faced with. Things are more complicated than
they were in 1787 at the time the Constitution was written. Things are
very complicated.
Here is what Congress is faced with. The administration uses the
cloak ``Commander in Chief'' to put our men and women in foreign areas,
in foreign countries where they are in danger; takes them away from
their families, away from their loved ones, away from their
hearthstones, away from their homes--puts them in foreign countries
where they are in danger. They may never come back. They go, and they
are there because the Commander in Chief sent them, whoever he is--it
may be a Democrat or it may be a Republican.

I respect the Commander in Chief, whoever he is, be it Mr. Reagan, be
it Mr. Bush, be it Mr. Clinton. I respect that office. But our troops
are sent overseas. Congress did not vote to send them overseas. We are
told they will be there about a year. The year comes and the year goes;
they are still there. Then we are told they will be there until June
1998. It is now June 1998, and June is about gone.
Then we are faced, we in the Senate, we in the Congress are faced
with the choice of providing money for the military that has been sent
abroad. They did not ask to go abroad--these soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines. They have been sent by the Commander in Chief. Then we are
faced with the dilemma.
The administration knew that when it told the Congress that our men
and women would be there about a year. The administration knew that
once they were there, Congress would be faced with a dilemma. And, of
course, Congress--we are going to support our military people wherever
they are. The administration knows that. They knew that back in 1995.
We had our doubts on whether we were deliberately misled, the
administration knowing that they could not do this within a year. How
am I to know?
Some of us are becoming aware of the fact that we have been dealt
that hand more than once. We had the same hand dealt to us in Somalia--
the same hand. And there have been other places as well.

[[Page S6950]]

But I think this is why the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, and
I, and others, are just becoming a little distrustful of what the
administration says about these matters. And we want to have a hand at
the end of the leash. We want that constitutional leash to be there.
The power of the purse, of course, is the most fundamental, the most
basic, the greatest power in Government--the power of the purse.
We want a hand at the end of the leash. We are not saying, you have
to take the troops out. We are not saying, you have to set certain
levels. We are just saying, as I indicated earlier, let us know by
February 2, 1999, Mr. President, how you would suggest that we reduce
those to a certain level that is more in keeping with what the other
major parties are doing in Bosnia. And you reach that level by February
2, 2000.
Now let me lay the predicate by reading into the Record what the
Constitution says. Now, how much responsibility, how much power, how
much authority does the Commander in Chief have? After all, the framers
had in mind making doubly sure that the Commander in Chief was a
civilian, not a military officer; and that this civilian, the
President, would have the authority over the military. The framers were
determined that a civilian would have supreme authority over the
military. They placed that authority in the President. He would be the
Commander in Chief. He would be superior to the military. It would not
be a military officer who would be Commander in Chief. It had to be a
civilian officer, selected by the people through electors who, in turn,
would elect a President. A civilian would be the Commander in Chief.
The framers were very jealous of that power. They knew the history of
England. They knew that the King was the Commander in Chief and the
admiral in chief and that the King in England raised armies and
maintained navies, that the King in England declared war and declared
peace, and that the King in England made the regulations for the
governance of the Armed Forces. They were determined that no King would
do that in this country. They were determined that no President would
sit as a King in this country.
The President, a civilian, was to be the Commander in Chief.
Now, I want to read for the Record everything that is in this
Constitution with respect to the powers of the President--the Commander
in Chief--when it comes to the military.
So I look to Article II of the United States. Here it is, Article II
of the Constitution of the United States. ``The executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America.''
That sentence vests the executive power in one person, the President
of the United States. It is just that simple. There is your separation
of powers.
Now, I want to read everything that is in this Constitution that has
to do with the Commander in Chief and his power. Here we go. Section 2,
Article II:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States;

Now, who provides for the calling of the militia into the actual
service of the United States? The Congress. I will read that a little
later. The Congress provides for the actual calling of the militia into
the service of the United States.
Then in the second paragraph of section 2:

He [meaning the President, the Commander in Chief] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur;

In England, the king could make treaties, but the framers decided
that that power in this country, under this Republic--it is not a
democracy, it is a republic--under this Republic, would be shared
between the President and the Senate.
Continuing to read:

and he [the President, the Commander in Chief] shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . [and other public
officers].

So, there again, the King in the motherland from whom most of the
Members came either directly or by their ancestors, the King appointed
the officers. But in this Republic, the President can appoint them by
and with the consent of the Senate.
So that is a power that the framers decided to share.
Now, there is one more phrase.
Section 3, the President, the Commander in Chief, ``shall Commission
all the Officers of the United States.''
Now, there it is, lock, stock, and barrel, every bit of it, all of
it. There is the Commander in Chief's powers with respect to war. There
it is. I have read all that the Constitution says regarding the
Commander in Chief.
He shall be Commander and Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States and of the militia of the several States when called into the
full service of the United States; he shall have power by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with
the advice of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors; and, finally, he
shall commission all the officers of the United States.
That is it. So the President is Commander in Chief. The Constitution
doesn't say what his powers are as Commander in Chief. He is Commander
in Chief of the Army and the Navy if Congress provides an Army and Navy
for him to command.
So much for the Commander in Chief. Now, let's read what the war
powers of the Congress are, according to the Constitution. Here they
are with regard to warmaking:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect Taxes . .
. to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense . . .

Section 8, the very first sentence. I will go ahead:

The Congress shall have Power To . . . borrow money . . .

The President doesn't have that power.

The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce
with foreign nations . . .

That is a very important power in peace and in war.
Continuing, still, in section 8 of Article I of the Constitution:

The Congress shall have Power To . . . define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations . . .

Continuing:

The Congress shall have Power To . . . declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water . . .
The Congress shall have Power To . . . raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years . . .
The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide and maintain
a Navy.
The Congress shall have Power To . . . make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . .
The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for calling
forth the Militia . . .
The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress . . .

Continuing in Article I, section 8;

The Congress shall have Power To . . . exercise like
Authority over all Places . . . for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards . . .
The Congress shall have Power To . . . make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.

Including the Department of Defense, or officers thereof, which
includes the Secretary of Defense.
So there you are. Then in Article I, section 9:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . .

Congress makes the law. So I have taken the time of the Senate--and
Senators have been very kind to listen--to read into the record that
which any Member of the Congress, or any individual, can at any time he
or she wishes to read for himself or herself from the Constitution of
the United States. All of the authority of the Commander in Chief is
there in the Constitution. That is all. And all of the authority is
there in that Constitution for the Congress, when it comes to
warmaking.

From my reading of those portions of the Constitution, it appears to
me that

[[Page S6951]]

Congress has the authority and the duty, on behalf of the people from
whom all power comes, in whom all power resides, under this
Constitution--Congress has the responsibility and the duty to ask
questions and to make laws, and to make appropriations, and to draw
lines in the sand. Yes; Congress has the authority there to decide
overall troop levels. One will find that most of the lawmaking powers,
most of the authority and the powers that deal with the military forces
and with military actions, rest in the Congress of the United States.
Don't blame me for that. You are not arguing with me, you are arguing
with the Constitution. I have read the pertinent parts of the
Constitution into the Record.
Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?
Mr. BYRD. Yes, I will.
Mr. COATS. The Senator certainly understands that the Senator from
West Virginia has a much greater grasp of the Constitution than this
Senator from Indiana. But I am having difficulty understanding how the
power of Congress to regulate troop levels--and I understand that we
set force levels. The Congress, through our committee, authorizes
certain force levels for the Army, for the Navy, and the branches. But
I don't understand how that would apply to the deployment of those
forces or the utilization of those forces within a specific military
exercise. I don't know that that is a power that is granted to the
Congress. I don't see that here in the Constitution.
Mr. BYRD. I don't think that I said that.
Mr. COATS. Perhaps I misunderstood the Senator.
Mr. BYRD. Perhaps I didn't speak clearly. There are those who say
that the Congress doesn't have authority to do this, Congress doesn't
have authority to do that. If the Congress wanted to limit the troop
levels in the war to 5,000 men, is the Senator telling me that Congress
doesn't have the authority under the Constitution to say there will be
5,000 and no more in this theater or that?
Mr. COATS. I don't see what grants the Congress the power to do that.
Mr. BYRD. The Senator doesn't?
Mr. COATS. I don't. I wonder if the Senator could point out that
portion of the constitutional powers that grants Congress that
authority.
Mr. BYRD. Well----
Mr. COATS. I understand how Congress has the power to establish the
level of the militia, the level of the Army, the number of individuals.
I suppose if Congress said there shall be no more than 5,000 members in
the U.S. Navy, that would impose a limit to how many troops could be
deployed, and the maximum number you could deploy would be 5,000. But I
don't see where once the level is established, and we have established
a level of nearly 500,000 Active Army, for instance, I don't see how
that would translate to Congress having the power to dictate how that
500,000 force level would be assigned.
Mr. BYRD. I don't, either. I don't think Congress would attempt to do
that. But I think Congress has the power and has the authority to say
there will be no more than 5,000.

Mr. COATS. Total.
Mr. BYRD. Total.
Is that the troop level?
Mr. COATS. Yes.
Perhaps I was extrapolating wrongly. I thought the Senator was
indicating that power would be vested with the Congress relative to the
Byrd-Hutchison amendment which sets a level--attempts to set, to
dictate a process which would set a level for total number of troops
that would be engaged. Perhaps this Senator--
Mr. BYRD. No. The Senator heard me. The Senator was in here earlier
and heard me say that the Hutchison-Byrd amendment did not do that, did
not dictate troop levels.
Mr. COATS. Would that amendment not lead to Congress making the
decision on that?
Mr. BYRD. No. It states specifically that the President, the
Commander in Chief, shall submit to the Congress the plan by February
2, 1999, which will bring the force levels of the United States in
Bosnia down to a certain number which is more in keeping with the
numbers that are provided by Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain.
Is there anything unfair about that?
We don't say it has to be 2,000, or 2,500, or anything like that.
Mr. COATS. But as a condition, that level is required; a level is
required to be reached on the basis of an average of ground force
levels of other NATO troops, specified troops from Great Britain,
Germany, France, and Italy that arrives at a specific number.
Mr. BYRD. What is wrong with that? We are saying to the President,
``You tell us how you would get it down to something which, in the eyes
of the American people, who are paying the taxes to keep our forces
over there, would be a fair level in view of the fact that we have
carried most of the burden thus far. We have helped stabilize the
situation. Why isn't it fair?'' But let the President tell us how he
would go about doing it and bring it down more in keeping with what the
other leading countries of NATO are providing.
Mr. COATS. I would respectfully say to the Senator, my reading of the
amendment indicates that it would do more than that. It doesn't just
ask the President as Commander in Chief to tell us what the numbers
shall be. It tells the President of the United States that he has to
submit to us a number which is the average of four other countries'
participation. That requires the President to tell us a specific number
dictated by the decisions made by the King.
Mr. BYRD. Right.
Mr. COATS. Made by Great Britain, made by France, made by Italy.
Mr. BYRD. What is wrong with that?
Mr. COATS. I think there is a great distinction between asking the
President, ``What do you think the force should be? What, in your
judgment as Commander in Chief, with the advice and consent and
assistance of your military commanders, should the number be to perform
a certain mission?''--there is a great distinction between that and a
direction to the President of the United States saying, ``You must give
us a number based on an average of troops that are committed by nations
outside Congress' control,'' and it cannot exceed that.

The President here couldn't have the discretion to say, ``Well, we
need whatever troops are necessary to protect, or complete our mission,
or carry out our mission in this part of the world, or to protect our
forces.'' The President is being dictated to arrive at a number, which
the President may disagree with, or the Commander in Chief, or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagrees with in terms of
ability to carry out that mission.
That is my concern with the Byrd-Hutchison amendment.
Mr. BYRD. What is the Senator's question? Is he saying that, under
the Constitution, Congress cannot ask the President to do this?
Mr. COATS. I do not understand where in the Constitution the power is
vested in Congress to specify not the total force level but to specify
military strategy.
Mr. BYRD. Where in the Constitution does it say that the Commander in
Chief can do that? Where in the Constitution can the Senator point to
me that the Constitution says the Commander in Chief can do that?
Mr. COATS. This Senator interprets the power given to the President
to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
``Commander in Chief'' implies that person is in charge. That person
makes the decision.
Mr. BYRD. The Senator interprets that.
Suppose Congress doesn't raise and support any Army. Suppose Congress
does not provide and maintain a Navy. Then what does the Commander in
Chief command?
Mr. COATS. Nothing.
Mr. BYRD. He is Commander in Chief. But he has no Navy, and he has no
Army to command.
Mr. COATS. I agree with the Senator. If the Congress does not choose
to give the President the military force, he has nothing with which to
command. But if the Congress does give him forces and raises an Army
and a Navy, this Constitution designates that the President of the
United States is commander of that Army.
Mr. BYRD. And that is all. Just that he is Commander in Chief.
Mr. COATS. The duties of Commander in Chief are to direct that Army,
to deploy that Army when necessary to defend the United States.

[[Page S6952]]

Mr. BYRD. This doesn't say that. This Constitution doesn't say that.
Mr. COATS. Is the Senator saying those are the decisions to be made
by this Congress?
Mr. BYRD. I am reading the Constitution.
Mr. COATS. So am I.
Mr. BYRD. Let me read it.

The Congress shall have Powers . . . To make Rules for the
Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces.

And:

The Congress shall have . . . Power to provide for calling
forth the Militia . . ..

It doesn't say the President has the power to call forth the militia.
It doesn't say the President has the power to make rules for government
and regulation of land and naval forces.
I am reading the Constitution, Senator. I am not interpreting it. I
am reading it word for word.

Mr. COATS. I ask the Senator, what does the Senator believe the
founders intended to be the powers of the President as Commander in
Chief? What would be his duties as Commander? What does the word
``commander'' imply, or state, or mean?
Mr. BYRD. They saw the benefit in having one individual lead the
military forces of this country.
Mr. COATS. How does that individual do that?
Mr. BYRD. If Congress declares war.
Mr. COATS. It only applies if Congress declares war.
Mr. BYRD. I see. The Senator wants to play games.
Mr. COATS. No. The Senator wants to understand the Constitution.
Mr. BYRD. This Senator cannot teach the Senator from Indiana how to
understand the Constitution. I can only read the Constitution. And it
is pretty clear.
Mr. COATS. This Senator is reading the Constitution. It says the
President shall be Commander in Chief.
Mr. BYRD. Period. That is it. That is all.
Mr. COATS. If I am in charge of my office, I make decisions about how
that office performs its duties. If the President is Commander in Chief
of the military, he makes decisions about how the military performs its
duties.
That is my understanding of the word ``commander.''
Mr. BYRD. The Constitution doesn't say anything about how the Senator
would operate his office.
Mr. COATS. The Senator was using an analogy to try to illustrate the
role of Commander.
Mr. BYRD. It is not a good analogy, if I may say so most
respectfully.
Mr. COATS. Then I will go back to my first question, respectfully.
Mr. BYRD. Then I will go back to my first answer.
Mr. COATS. How are we to interpret the role and the meaning of the
word ``Commander in Chief''?
Mr. BYRD. In the first place, the courts might do the interpreting at
some point.
Second place: Read the Constitution. Congress has power over the
purse strings.
I hope the Court will decide that the Line Item Veto Act is
unconstitutional. I hope it will do that before it goes out for its
recess.
Congress having the power over the purse, Congress having the power
to declare war, Congress having the power to raise and support armies,
having the power to provide and maintain a navy, having the power to
make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, having the power to provide for calling forth the militia.
It would seem to me that a reading of the Constitution would indicate
that the basic power, the power of the purse, is the basic,
fundamental, rock bottom power in this Government. There is no greater
power. There is no power as great as the power of the purse. That is
vested here.
It would seem to me that a reading of this Constitution would
indicate that Congress has more power and authority under the
Constitution than many Senators are willing to admit.
Mr. COATS. I am not disagreeing with the Senator on that point
whatsoever.
Mr. BYRD. All too many Senators appear to be thinking that the
Commander in Chief can do this, the Commander in Chief can do that, and
that we ought to follow along like the tail on a kite and do whatever
the Commander in Chief decides should be done.
I am just saying that Congress has these powers in this Constitution
and Congress should raise some questions. And Congress certainly has
the authority to rein in the Commander in Chief if it sees fit.
Mr. COATS. I do not disagree with the Senator a bit on anything he
has just said.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. COATS. But the question I asked the Senator is whether that power
extends to once that force is raised, once Congress determines to raise
an army, once Congress appropriates funds for that army, once Congress
establishes force levels and sets the rules, at what point does
Congress, does that extend--I should add, does that extend to the
actual utilization by the Commander in Chief of the power--does the
Congress have the power to determine how those forces then should be
deployed to protect and defend the interests of the United States?
Mr. BYRD. The distinguished Senator appears bent upon splitting
hairs.
Mr. COATS. But that is the essential question.
Mr. BYRD. I am not interested in splitting hairs.
Mr. COATS. That is the essential question.
Mr. BYRD. The Senator says at what point does Congress have that.
Congress before, before it provides for calling forth the militia,
before it creates an army, before it creates a Navy, it certainly has
the power and authority not to do those things; it has the power to
issue regulations. I am not suggesting that the Congress ought to try
to get into the nitty-gritty, teensy-weensy little details of this and
that. Of course, there has to be one person who can command the
military forces of this country.
Mr. COATS. That is the Senator's question.
Mr. BYRD. I am saying the Congress has not done its duty, and I am
taking my responsibility along with others. We have not done our duty.
Congress has the responsibility not to follow along after the President
like my little dog Billy follows after me. The Commander in Chief is
just a man like I am. I respect the Presidency. I respect the President
of the United States. I have never served under any President--that is
the way I look at being a Senator--but he puts his britches on just
like I do, one leg at a time. No more. And he is there for 4 years,
unless the House impeaches him. He can't impeach us, but the House can
impeach and we can convict him and take him out of that office, and we
can also provide that he can never again hold an office.
I am not one who bows down to the President, who bows down to any
Commander in Chief. I am not one who believes we have to do what the
Commander in Chief says, but I respect the Commander in Chief. I
haven't cast a vote, I don't think, against our having personnel in
Bosnia. I haven't done that. But I am certainly not one who says that
Congress has to follow the Commander in Chief.
Now, if the Commander in Chief is ever a Republican again, I daresay
there won't be as many people on that side who will stand up and
challenge his powers as I stand up and challenge the powers of a
Democratic President. As far as I am concerned, under this Constitution
there is no Democrat; there is no Republican. He is the President of
the United States. He is in there for 4 years, and that is it, unless
he is reelected.
I have been here for 40 years. I hope to be here 40 years more, if
the Good Lord lets me live that long. But don't look at this Senator
and say I am picking on the President. I am not picking on the
Commander in Chief. I am simply saying that we here in the Congress
have not stood up to our duties under this Constitution. And I do not
read under this Constitution where we have to follow any President
lock, stock, and barrel, line, hook and sinker. We do not have to do
that. We can set a line, and we can say ``this far and no farther. If
you want to keep our troops in Bosnia longer, come back, Mr. Commander
in Chief, come back and we will decide whether or not we want to open
the purse strings and provide more appropriations.''

Mr. COATS. Well, in response--perhaps I should let the Senator finish
and then I will respond on my own time.

[[Page S6953]]

Mr. BYRD. I hope the Senator doesn't think he has to respond.
Mr. COATS. The Senator feels that he should respond because----
Mr. BYRD. I am not challenging the Senator.
Mr. COATS. I am not challenging the Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. I am talking about the Commander in Chief, in the abstract.
I haven't said anything about the Senator from Indiana. He shouldn't
feel he has to respond to me. He has a right to if he wishes, but I
hope the Senator will know I haven't challenged him.
Mr. COATS. No, the Senator didn't take it that way at all. The
Senator is simply trying to get an answer to his question as it applied
to the language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment which has been talked
about today, and trying to understand the role of the Commander in
Chief vis-a-vis the role of Congress in that specific, requiring that
specific requirement of the President as Commander in Chief relative to
that language in the Byrd-Hutchison amendment. I was just trying to
clarify it.
Mr. BYRD. The Senator apparently doesn't believe the Congress has the
authority to do what the Hutchison-Byrd amendment would require. I hope
he does. I think it does.
Congress can limit troops by limiting funds for missions. No one
questions that. There is great reluctance to placing limits on
missions. But when we come to a place where an administration doesn't
level with the Congress, then it is about time that the Congress
thought about putting some limits on missions, and Congress has the
constitutional authority to do it. Don't think it doesn't. I have been
around here for 40 years in this Senate and 6 years in the other body,
and as far as I am concerned I am getting a little tired of Presidents
and Commanders in Chief and their administrations misleading
Congresses. This isn't the first time it has been done. It has been
done before.
Madam President, I think I have said about everything already that I
have in my prepared remarks. I have read the pertinent parts of the
Constitution that deal with the Commander in Chief's war powers and the
war power and authority that rests with Congress. I do not say this
disrespectfully towards our Commander in Chief. I would say the same if
he were Republican. The Constitution is not partisan. I hope that we
can be able to agree on some legislation--and it is extremely difficult
under the circumstances--particularly in regard to the situation we
have in the Balkans. And I agree with the distinguished Senator from
Texas, Mrs. Hutchison. In my own mind, I can keep separate the
circumstances and conditions that we face in regard to Bosnia from
those which we might have to face in Kosovo.
I don't understand what our security interests are in relation to
Bosnia. But I do understand what our security interests can be when it
comes to Kosovo. I think Congress has to recognize it has a duty here,
not just to let the administration do whatever it alone thinks best.
And I think we owe the President that kind of consideration. I would
hope that we could come out with some kind of proposal, certainly in
the long run, that would clearly state what the exit strategy is or
what the limitations are, what is the deadline, what are the phases by
which we reduce our forces.
I do not have the magic bullet. I don't claim that the Hutchison-Byrd
amendment has the magic bullet. I have taken the time at this point to
quote the pertinent provisions of the Constitution for the Record,
Madam President. I don't claim to add to them or to subtract from them.
Here they are.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. COATS. Madam President, first of all, I have great respect for
the Senator from West Virginia. His knowledge of the Constitution
certainly is far deeper than mine is, or perhaps will ever be. And I
also share his deep concern about the duplicity of this administration
in terms of its dealings with Congress on the issue of Bosnia. What was
assured to the Congress by the President and his designees prior to
deployment in order to secure congressional support and appropriations
for that deployment is far from the picture that exists today. Many of
us knew that, once in, it would be tough to get out, and that a year,
probably, would be far insufficient to accomplish the mission that was
there, that was outlined for us. This is the reason I voted against it
in the first place.
As well-intended, as humanitarian, as compassionate as the decision
was to try to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia, there was no realistic
means by which that nation could be reborn into a nation of multi-
ethnic harmony that would at least be accomplished within that 1-year
period of time, or perhaps even a decade or more. So, many of us feared
that, once in, we would have trouble getting out.
I certainly agree with the Senator from West Virginia when he says
that the Constitution clearly gives Congress the responsibility for
providing the funds for the first person in uniform, the first ship
ever built, setting limits on how many ships we build or the size of
our force. The question that the Senator from Indiana was trying to
raise, and still doesn't feel he has the answer to, is whether or not
the power extended to the Congress extends to defining how that force,
once raised, is used in defense of the Nation, in defense of our vital
interests. Which is the entity, the Congress or the President as
Commander in Chief, that makes the decision establishing a process by
which decisions are made, through his military commanders, about
utilization of the forces that are raised after the Congress
appropriates the funds to raise those forces? And it goes to the
specific question of whether or not we have the authority, in Congress,
to set specific limits to how those troops, once raised, within that
category of troops--who has the power to do that.
But let's set that aside. Let's assume that the power given to the
President as Commander in Chief is nothing more than titular. It is
just simply a title. It is a phrase that means nothing. It grants no
power. It just simply says the President of the United States is the
titular head of the Army, but there are no powers that go with the
title of ``Commander,'' or the role of ``Commander''--that all powers
are vested in the Congress.
Let's say that the courts interpret the Constitution to clearly mean
that Congress makes decisions on how troops are deployed, where they
fight, whom they fight, how they fight, how many infantry are needed,
how many tanks are needed--make the military strategy decisions. It is
inconceivable to this Senator that our Founding Fathers thought that
would be a power delegated to the Congress, but let's assume that it
was. Would we want to do that? Would we want to put ourselves in the
place of a military commander, with his training and years of
experience, honed through hard experience in many cases, to make a
decision about how we protect those forces and how we deploy those
forces? It just seems it would be perhaps the most unwise thing
Congress could ever do. Who would ever want to take on that
responsibility? Which one of us would want to say that, for the
protection of our forces deployed overseas in a hostile environment, we
should be the ones to make the determination about how many troops are
necessary to protect those forces, what weapons are necessary to
protect those forces, what enablers are necessary to protect those
forces? I am not sure any of us would want to do that, even if we did
have the power.

But that is a debate that I think we will have again. The amendment
before us is not the Byrd-Hutchison amendment, which this Senator
supports parts of but not all of, because I think it dictates a
specific force level inappropriately and I don't think that is
something that we ought to do.
But the amendment that is before us is one that I think is supported
by most Members. It simply says that we want to advise the President
that we don't think an indefinite troop deployment in Bosnia. We want
the President to understand, the Congress is not going to continue to
support that policy. But the decision that vests with us is whether or
not to pay for it. That is the power given to us under the
Constitution. And, to echo the words of Senator McCain from Arizona, if
you want the troops out of Bosnia, cut off the funds. That is our
responsibility. But if you are going to appropriate the

[[Page S6954]]

funds, let's let the Commander in Chief and the people he designates as
leaders of those troops make decisions as to how those troops are
deployed and at what levels they are deployed, and not have the
Congress dictate force levels.
So, I agree with the Senator from West Virginia. We ought to follow
our constitutional responsibility. That constitutional responsibility
is to vote on the appropriations, yea or nay. That is the honest,
straight-up vote. That is the debate we ought to be having. In the
meantime, we would like to send a message to the President of the
United States. That is what a sense of the Congress is. The message
that we would like to send to the President of the United States is:
Mr. President, we are concerned that we are looking at an indefinite
troop deployment at considerable cost to the taxpayer in Bosnia, and we
don't see the light at the end of the tunnel. Because of that, we are
just giving you a warning flag.
We are not going to continue to appropriate funds for this unless we
have some idea of how we are going to get out of this morass and
whether or not this is achieving the goals that have been set out.
So, therefore, we would like you, understanding that message, to
begin consultations with our NATO allies and European friends and begin
the process of telling them, ``You can't count on us indefinitely. We
need to move toward a European force. Now, we will provide support for
you, but we are not going to provide combat troops on the ground much
longer. So let's move forward with this process.''
That is the amendment that is before us. I think it is a message that
needs to be sent. We can have debate on whether or not Congress has the
power or whether or not it is even wise for Congress to get into the
specifics of how troops are used once they are there. We will have that
debate at another time.
Madam President, I don't know that there is any further debate on
this particular amendment. It does not mean we can't further debate on
Bosnia or another amendment, but if there is no further debate on this
particular amendment, we need to voice vote the McCain second-degree
amendment and then have a recorded vote on the underlying amendment. I
do, however, see the Senator from New Hampshire on his feet, as well as
the Senator from South Carolina.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Reed from Rhode Island be added as a cosponsor to the Thurmond-Levin-
Coats amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, just as an inquiry to
the managers, I have an amendment that I would like to offer which will
probably take 15 or 20 minutes for me to present at the most. I don't
want to delay a vote, but it seems that we might be able to put the two
votes together. We would have the voice vote on McCain, and then if I
offer my amendment, we can have two votes together. Will that work for
the Senator? I would at least like to debate and offer this amendment
prior to the vote on your amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, will the able Senator allow the other
amendments to go forward before we take up his amendment?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. My preference, I say to the Senator, is
that I be allowed to debate this amendment, present it and allow----
Mr. THURMOND. After we finish this amendment.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. No, I prefer to do it prior to this
amendment, because it is on the same subject. It is Bosnia, and once
you vote and that amendment is gone--my preference is to do it now if I
can do it.
Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I will be glad to yield.
Mr. COATS. I say to the Senator, our vote will not preclude the
Senator from offering an amendment on Bosnia. If the Senator's
amendment is not a second-degree amendment to the underlying amendment,
we strongly prefer to deal with our amendment as it stands and then
have the Senator be recognized to offer an amendment on Bosnia.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. All I am trying to do is to make it a
little more convenient for Members. I was saying if I had 15 or 20
minutes to present my amendment, we can have both votes on the
underlying amendment and my amendment at the same time. That is my
point.
Mr. COATS. As I understand it--parliamentary inquiry--if the
Senator's amendment is not a second degree, does it not require
unanimous consent to set aside the underlying amendment before going to
his amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, unanimous consent is
required.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent that the
underlying amendment be set aside in order for me to offer my amendment
and subsequently have a vote on both amendments.
Mr. COATS. Reserving the right to object, Madam President, and I am
going to object. I don't think that is the procedure we ought to be
following. I understand the Senator's desire to speak on his Bosnia
amendment, and we will do that, but if an amendment is not being
offered as a second degree to perfect or change or modify the
underlying amendment--we have been working on this since noon. We would
very much like to get to a vote. It is second degreed. We have an
amendment. And on that basis, I object.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Further parliamentary inquiry. It is my
understanding the tree is full with the McCain second degree; is that
correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The understanding of the Senator from New
Hampshire is correct.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Madam President.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, we have been on this amendment now for
hours. It is time to vote and take some action. I urge adoption of the
amendment.
Mr. CLELAND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CLELAND. Madam President, I have remarks I would like to make in
general on the subject of the amendments to the defense authorization
bill regarding Bosnia. It will take about 5 minutes. I ask the
tolerance of the distinguished chairman, if that is permissible.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I yield to the Senator to speak for 5
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, the debate on Bosnia has raised some fundamental
questions regarding the conduct of our foreign policy particularly with
respect to the deployment of U.S. military forces around the world. I
will point out just a few of the questions that members have raised:
What is the mission of U.S. forces in Bosnia?
When can we expect to bring them home?
What should the role of the Congress be in the fulfillment of this
mission?
How can we manage the cost of the Bosnia commitment in terms of
dollars and the overall strain to our forces?
It is good that we debate these important issues here in the Senate
today. But I feel it is important to say that I believe we should ask
only one question:

Should we continue to support a U.S. troop presence in Bosnia?

That is a simple question. If the answer is yes, then I do not see
anything we can do but to support the troops and insure that their
mission is achievable.
If the answer is no, then we should bring them home today.
I support the mission. Let me take a few moments to explain why. I
was very skeptical of the Bosnia mission before I was elected to the
Senate. That is part of the reason why I made Bosnia one of the first
places I visited on my first trip abroad as a U.S. Senator. On my
journey in Bosnia, I had the opportunity to visit with our troops at
Eagle Base and then at Camp Bedrock. I found them surprisingly cheerful
and confident in their mission

[[Page S6955]]

of peace-keeping in that war-weary countryside. I'm very proud of our
forces. They are paying a personal price every day in risking their
lives on our behalf. They are working in a tasking and demanding
environment filled with diplomatic and military minefields. All of the
men and women involved in this effort are a credit to the United States
and the cause of human dignity and freedom in the Balkans. I am proud
of them all.
The effort in Bosnia involves the largest alliance of nations ever to
coalesce against a common enemy on the continent of Europe. I applaud
all the members of the alliance for their contributions to peace and
stability in Bosnia, particularly the NATO members, and especially the
Russians, for coming together in a unified effort to prevent further
bloodshed, enhance stability and pave a pathway for peace. I hope it is
a harbinger of good things to come in the next century in terms of
enhanced cooperation and communications among our countries for the
betterment of mankind.
It was raining during the afternoon we were in Bosnia. By the time we
were preparing to leave, the rain had ceased and the sun was coming
out. As we boarded our airplane, I noticed a large rainbow forming in
the sky. It was impossible to avoid the symbolism and be reminded of
the covenant between God and mankind after the great flood. It was a
symbol of hope, I think.
Today we are in a new era. No one has quite coined the term for it.
Some call it the ``New World Order,'' but I prefer to call it The Age
of Democracy. What I find different and indeed magical about this new
era is the fact that while it brings with it the spread of democracy
and democratic principles around the world to places that have been
burdened by tyranny, it is doing so not through the threat of force,
but through the promise of peace. U.S. forces in Bosnia bring with them
the promise of peace.
A few days after I visited Camp Bedrock, I was in Brussels. An
American businessman approached me and asked me if I had ``hope'' about
Bosnia. I had to reply, ``Yes.'' I have hope because I believe Europe
has learned some painful lessons over the last two centuries. One of
those lessons is that alliances--whether against Napoleon, Hitler or
Stalin--can win. Secondly, I have hope because Americans have learned
some lessons about European history as well. Particularly, I think
we've learned one of the lessons about American involvement on the
European continent. The lesson is this: ``Pay me now, or pay me
later.'' In other words, we as a nation are involved in Europe--
militarily, economically, culturally. Better to work through the
European Alliance, in particular through NATO, to prevent a conflict
than to risk that conflict turning into a greater confrontation or,
even worse, war itself.
I do not know whether the Bosnia mission will ultimately prove to be
successful, but I do believe we should try. We should not tie the hands
of our troops.
In spite of my support for the Bosnia mission, however, I do not like
the fact that it appears to be open-ended. I do not like the fact that
it is placing a tremendous strain on our Armed Forces. I do not like
the fact that we do not know when the mission will be completed. But we
should have addressed these issues years ago before we ever sent our
troops there. We have violated a fundamental principle about the
deployment of military forces.
Clauswitz stated that in military matters you should not take the
first step unless you know what your last step is going to be. Four
years ago, we had no idea what our last step would be. That has led us
to where we are today. Today we are deciding by amendment what our
policy in Bosnia should be. You can't manage a military deployment that
way.
It seems to me that we are in for a dime, in for a dollar. The
question is should we stay in Bosnia, or should we leave? Once we
decide to go in, we need to give our military commanders the resources
and support they need to get the job done. We cannot change our mind
every year with new amendments and new resolutions and new laws.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has debated this matter numerous
times. We could not arrive at a consensus on the matter. The more we
debated the issue, the more I became convinced that we should not do
anything that would undermine the mission in Bosnia. I fear that all of
the amendments that have been offered sent the wrong message to both
our troops and our allies.
I was inclined to support a proposal by Senator Levin which would
have established expedited voting procedures on the question of whether
to continue authorization of funds for the Bosnia mission. I believe of
all of the amendments, his is one of the better approaches. Many
members of the Senate want to have a straight up or down vote on the
Bosnia mission--in or out. Senator Levin's amendment would have
provided a mechanism for that.
However, I would point that over the past 4 years, the Congress has
given its consent and approval for the Bosnia mission dozens of times.
The Congress has appropriated over $9.4 billion for this mission. The
bottom line is that we have had the opportunity to weigh in on this
matter. Enough is enough.
Now is the time to focus on ensuring that we do not allow a situation
like the current situation with Bosnia to occur again. Before we get to
the point of committing our service men and women, we must certainly
determine if we have an appropriate military mission which can only be
accomplished by military means. Once such a determination is made, we
must provide our forces with sufficient resources, and clear and
concise rules of engagement to get the job done.
In this day and age we must pick and choose our battles carefully. As
we have learned so painfully in Vietnam, Somalia and now Bosnia,
American troops cannot stay there forever. We have learned valuable
lessons from these engagements and now realize that before approving
funding for such missions, Congress must have a defined game plan and
exit strategy. Senator Snowe and I have offered an amendment to the
defense authorization bill which would require the President to submit,
along with a request for appropriations to support a military
contingency involving 500 or more personnel, a strategic plan regarding
the goals and objectives of the contingency and the conditions that
define the success of that contingency. We needed this amendment 4
years ago when we first sent American troops into Bosnia, but we have
learned from these important lessons. Congress, by approving such a
plan would be in on the takeoff, as well as the landing.
Frankly, I think this is the most important amendment related to the
deployment of forces in the entire bill. I am pleased that the Senate
has approved it. I would only urge that we think twice before doing
anything that would undermine U.S. forces after they have already been
committed.
Madam President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, let me just thank the Senator from
Georgia not just for his statement but also for the amendment which he
and Senator Snowe had offered in committee, which was adopted in
committee. It is a very important amendment. It is based on his
experience, the experience of so many others relative to the use of
military force, and the importance of exercising exceeding care when
that military force is utilized. And I think the Nation, again, is in
his debt and Senator Snowe's debt. I just thank him for it.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Amendment No. 2977

Mr. THURMOND. I urge adoption of the McCain amendment No. 2977, which
would amend the amendment offered by myself, Senator Coats, and Senator
Levin that would require two reports on matters related to U.S. forces
in Bosnia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I understand that Senator Biden might be
on his way over. I suggest the absence of a quorum for just one brief
moment until we can ascertain that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S6956]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Is there further debate on the McCain amendment?
Mr. THURMOND. I urge adoption of the McCain amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2977) was agreed to.

Vote on Amendment No. 2975, as Amended

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask that we proceed to vote on the
Thurmond, Levin, Coats amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on agreeing to the
Thurmond amendment, as amended.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr.
Domenici) is necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter) is
absent because of illness.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from Montana (Mr. Baucus), and the Senator from West Virginia
(Mr. Rockefeller) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 5, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 170 Leg.]

YEAS--90

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--5

Biden
Cleland
Dodd
Lieberman
Robb

NOT VOTING--5

Akaka
Baucus
Domenici
Rockefeller
Specter
The amendment (No. 2975), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Amendment No. 2912

(Purpose: To limit the use of funds to support the continued deployment
of ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in
Bosnia and Herzegovina pending a vote of Congress on the continuation
of the deployment, and to require the President to submit to Congress a
plan for withdrawing United States forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina
if Congress does not so act by March 31, 1999)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask that my amendment
No. 2912, which is at the desk, be called up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Smith) proposes an
amendment numbered 2912.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1064. POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

(a) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated under this Act may be expended after March 31,
1999, to support the continued deployment of ground combat
forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in Bosnia and
Herzegovina unless, on or before such date, each House of
Congress votes on passage of legislation that, if adopted,
would specifically authorize the continued deployment of
ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(b) Plan for Withdrawal of Forces.--If legislation referred
to in subsection (a) is not presented to the President on or
before March 31, 1999, the President shall submit to
Congress, not later than September 30, 1999, a plan that
provides for the ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of
the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be withdrawn
from Bosnia and Herzegovina in an orderly and safe manner.
(c) Prohibition.--
(1) Use of funds after march 31, 1999.--After March 31,
1999, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this
or any other Act may be obligated or expended to support the
continued deployment of United States ground combat forces in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for the purpose of
implementing the withdrawal plan.
(2) Condition.--The prohibition on use of funds in
paragraph (1) shall not take effect if a joint resolution
described in subsection (d)(1) is enacted on or before March
31, 1999.
(d) Procedures for Joint Resolution of Approval.--
(1) Content of joint resolution.--For the purposes of
subsection (c)(2), ``joint resolution'' means only a joint
resolution that sets forth as the matter after the resolving
clause only the following: ``That the continued deployment of
ground combat forces of the Armed Forces of the United States
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is authorized.''.
(2) Referral to committee.--A resolution described in
paragraph (1) that is introduced in the Senate shall be
referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. A
resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in
the House of Representatives shall be referred to the
Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is
referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not
reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the
end of 7 calendar days after its introduction, the committee
shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration
of the resolution and the resolution shall be placed on the
appropriate calendar of the House involved.
(4) Floor consideration.--
(A) In general.--When the committee to which a resolution
is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged
(under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a
resolution described in paragraph (1), it is at any time
thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the
same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the
respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of
the resolution, and all points of order against the
resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are
waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of
Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not
debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a
motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the
consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the
vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall
not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration
of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain
the unfinished business of the respective House until
disposed of.
(B) Debate.--Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable
motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited
to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally
between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A
motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable.
An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion
to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or
disagreed to is not in order.
(C) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the
conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in
paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of
the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the
appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the
resolution shall occur.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution
described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.
(5) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before
the passage by one House of a resolution of that House
described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the
other House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the
following procedures shall apply:
(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred
to a committee.
(B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1)
of the House receiving the resolution--

[[Page S6957]]

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no
resolution had been received from the other House; but
(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution
of the other House.
(6) Consideration of veto.--
(A) Action upon receipt of message.--Upon receipt of a
message from the President returning the joint resolution
unsigned to the House of origin and setting forth his
objections to the joint resolution, the House receiving the
message shall immediately enter the objections at large on
the journal of that House and the House shall proceed to the
immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding
or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of
the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections
shall lie on the table. Upon receipt of a message of a House
transmitting the joint resolution and the objections of the
President, the House receiving the message shall proceed to
the immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding
or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of
the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections
shall lie on the table. A motion to refer the joint
resolution to a committee shall not be in order in either
House.
(B) Motion to proceed.--After the receipt of a message by a
House as described in subparagraph (A), it is at any time in
order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has
been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to
move to proceed to the reconsideration of the joint
resolution the objections of the President to the contrary
notwithstanding. The motion is highly privileged in the House
of Representatives and is a question of highest privilege in
the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to
amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to
the reconsideration of the resolution is agreed to, the
resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the
respective House until disposed of.
(C) Debate.--Debate on reconsideration of the joint
resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10
hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring
and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion further to
limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to,
or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the
consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed
to notwithstanding the objections of the President or
disagreed to is not in order.
(D) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the
conclusion of the debate on reconsideration of the
resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the
debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the
appropriate House, the vote on the question of passage, the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall occur.
(7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This
subsection is enacted by Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but
applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed
in that House in the case of a resolution described in
paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the
extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the able Senator allow me to get
two people on the floor?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I am happy to yield.

Privilege of the Floor

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a military
fellow on assignment to my staff, Major Joann Eberle, be permitted
access to the Senate Chamber during the consideration of S. 2057, the
FY-1999 defense authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Vaughn
Ward, a fellow in Senator Kempthorne's office, be permitted floor
privileges during the consideration of the pending bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, it is not my intention to
delay the Senate. I have a very serious amendment, and I have a few
moments of time and would like to outline what it is. If there is not a
lot of argument on the other side, I say to my colleagues, we could
have a vote in a very few minutes.
The amendment is very simple. It just limits the use of funds to
support the continued deployment of ground forces of the United States
in Bosnia pending a vote of Congress on the continuation of deployment,
and to require the President to submit a plan for withdrawal, if the
Congress does not do so by March 31.
Very simply put, Mr. President--Mr. President, may I have order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will Members of the Senate who are having
discussions please retire to the Cloakroom.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, this amendment is very
simple. It simply says that we will have a vote, that the Congress will
go on record one way or the other. It doesn't say we have to vote yes.
It doesn't say we have to vote no. It just simply says that we exercise
our opinion so that the Congress can speak, so that we will be on
record one way or the other. Leaving forces in Bosnia, taking them out,
whatever that vote turns out to be, that is all this amendment does. If
the President decides to keep them there after that, then so be it. But
we go on record as making a statement. This does not get into some of
the other issues that have been gotten into.
I would just like to briefly go back a little bit to remind Senators,
because we hear a lot of talk of frustration about the Bosnia
operation, about why our troops are there, how long are they going to
be there, people complaining about being misled by the President or not
being told the truth by the President and all this. I am hearing all of
these comments and here is our chance with this amendment to be heard.
It just seems to me if we vote against this amendment, I don't see any
reason why we should be complaining about the operation.
I remind my colleagues of some testimony. Secretary of Defense Perry
on December 1, 1995, said the following:

We believe the mission in Bosnia can be accomplished in 1
year. So we built our plan based on that time line. And this
schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in
the agreement can be completed in the first 6 months and
thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of
stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We
expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated
in 1 year, but even if some of them are not, we must not be
drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

Further, on December 6, 1995, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke
said:

The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't
any question. The deeper question is whether the nonmilitary
functions can be done in 12 months. That is the real
question. But it is not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility
to do that. It is us on the civilian side working with the
Europeans. It is going to be tough. Should the military stick
around until every refugee has gone home, until everything
else in the civilian annex has been done?

No, that is not their mission. That is what Secretary Holbrooke said.
So, Mr. President, the mission to Bosnia has very strong advocates
and strong detractors. We have heard that in the debate in these past
few hours. My amendment does not seek to open that discussion nor to
close it. It really has nothing to do with that. It simply asks that
Members of Congress at some point between now and March 31 of next
year, 1999, cast a vote on the wisdom of the United States-Bosnia
policy. That is all it does.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I will be happy to yield to the Senator
from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. I would like to make a comment as to the genesis of this.
I think there might be some misunderstanding. First of all, we did have
a vote back in 1995. That was the resolution of disapproval. And I
suggest that we only lost that by three votes. And at that time there
was a guarantee it was going to be a 12-month operation, it would not
exceed $1.2 billion, all of these things. So predicated on that, the
vote took place.
Now we are over there, and, quite frankly, I would have preferred to
have an amendment that would require a vote periodically, every 3
months or every 6 months, on approval of leaving them there, because I
think that would

[[Page S6958]]

be much stronger. I think we need to be on record.
But all the Senator is doing is just--he is not saying this is going
to be a resolution of disapproval or approval that we are voting on; it
is just a vote.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is correct. And I would just say to
the Senator, I agree with him. I would like to vote for and see passed
a resolution of disapproval.
Mr. INHOFE. The only thing that the Senator would accomplish, if he
will yield for one last question, is the fact that would give us all an
opportunity to be on record.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. On record.
Mr. INHOFE. So the people would have no doubt as to who wants to
ultimately get out of there.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The Senator is exactly correct. It gives
us the opportunity to go on record as saying, one, let's just keep
going, doing what we are doing. If you vote against the resolution, you
can do that, or if you want to get out. But the point is we vote. This
says that we have to have a vote by March 31 before we spend the rest
of the money for the 6 months of the fiscal year 1999.
That is all it says. Now, however we vote is another issue. Then
Senators go on record one way or the other--get out, stay in, either
one, but they will be on record instead of all the complaining that we
hear around here about the Bosnia policy. Why would anybody object?
This is not asking us to vote yes. It is not asking us to vote no. It
is asking us to vote, have a vote.
Mr. INHOFE. One last comment. One last question. The reason I bring
this up, there are still some Senators who may be thinking this was the
stronger version in which I joined the Senator. I would have preferred
to have this as the stronger version, but this is not that version.
This is simply that vote to which the Senator is referring.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The Senator is correct. I would have
preferred the stronger version myself, but given the fact that we
didn't have the votes, I decided to step back and just say, look, let's
go on record. Let's have the opportunity to go on record. It doesn't
require that the vote be affirmative for the money to be released, only
that a vote takes place.
So to require that a vote take place and to have that vote taken
seriously, my amendment uses the constitutional power that Senator Byrd
spoke so eloquently of an hour or so ago of Congress to restrict funds.
The amendment holds back half the money authorized for Bosnia
operations next year until a vote is held--not a vote to leave them
there, not a vote to take them out--a vote on a resolution authorizing
continued deployment of U.S. ground combat forces to Bosnia. If it
fails, the only result is that the President is required to tell us how
and when he intends to withdraw. The money is still released.

The purpose is simple and straightforward. It is to use a small
amount of leverage, half of next year's money, to force Congress to
express itself--that is all, to express itself--clearly on the Bosnia
mission. The resolution may pass, it may fail, but at least Congress
will have expressed itself.
As the Senator from West Virginia has said so eloquently a while ago,
why would Congress want to step away from its constitutional
responsibilities if it doesn't tell the President what to do? It
doesn't restrict the President. It doesn't get into troop strength. It
doesn't get into deployment. It doesn't get into any of that. It just
simply says Congress will have a vote.
Let me just say this. Before we have a vote on this amendment, I
would say to my colleagues that our constituents elected us to
represent them. How can we represent them if we are afraid to just
express ourselves on the Senate floor one way or the other? They expect
us to stand and be counted on major foreign policy issues, and I can't
think of any excuse that we would give our constituents that would
justify refusing to even have a vote on the resolution on Bosnia.
So I would urge my colleagues to accept some responsibility for
United States-Bosnia policy, stand up and be counted and to pass the
amendment.
Let me be a little more specific, in summary, as to what the
amendment does. It is going to withhold half of next year's funding for
Bosnia until Congress votes on the issue. It doesn't require that the
mission be approved, just that the vote is one way or the other. The
purpose is to honor the very strong arguments and strong feelings on
both sides of the issue--both sides of the issue--by requiring the
debate and a vote. I hope my colleagues understand this amendment
because I think there have been some expressions of misunderstanding.
As the Senator from West Virginia so eloquently said awhile back, the
only leverage that Congress has is funding. That is our leverage. I
think to use it in this manner is to use it responsibly. Unless we
place some restriction on it, there will be no pressure to debate
anything and no pressure to vote on anything, and the debate itself
will not, in my view, ever be taken seriously. You know: sense of the
Senate, sense of the House--these resolutions, they don't mean
anything.
So, to try to get in the middle here so we can get some common
ground, just to have a vote rather than go one way or the other, is my
goal. I do not think that is asking that much, that the American
people, through their elected representatives, declare either their
support for or opposition to this.
Don't you think your constituents are entitled to know how you feel,
on the record, not in some speech where it is easy to say something and
then walk it back a little later, but on the record with a vote? I
don't think that is unreasonable. I think it is in everyone's interests
to have this vote. I have been trying to offer this amendment for a
long, long time. I have been put off on certain other vehicles because
it was not the appropriate place to do it, they said. I don't know what
the appropriate place is.
I remember, as some of my colleagues will who are here on the floor
with me, I remember similar debates on the floor of the Senate and the
House of Representatives while people were dying every day in Vietnam.
While those men and women were honorably serving their country, the
debate raged on and nobody had the guts to do one thing or the other,
either win the war or get out. I am not saying this is Vietnam, yet.
But we do have a situation here where I believe Congress should go on
record.
I happen to be a critic of the mission. I agree with Senator Inhofe
and I supported Senator Inhofe in his mission here, if you will, to end
the deployment. But that is not what I am trying to do here. If the
Senators on both sides cannot force themselves to vote, take a public
position, then I don't understand how they can continue to talk about
it and complain about it and attack the President and say: ``Oh, the
President's going to do this,'' or, ``We might get stuck in Bosnia,''
or, ``We ought to do this,'' or, ``We ought to do that.'' Here is your
chance to say, one way or the other. I want to have a vote. That is all
it says. No more complaining about costs. No more second-guessing the
President. Just stand up and be counted. Yes, we will have a vote, and
when we take that vote, we can decide one way or the other what we want
to do.
I think I have made the case on this amendment. It uses funding
leverage. It is an appropriate congressional tool. It does not
micromanage the executive branch, as some people have expressed a lot
of concern about. It does not do that. It doesn't tell the President
how to conduct his operations. But it does say that we ought to have a
vote, and I think it calls for a future vote. Don't wait until next
year or the year after; let's have the vote. Let's let the American
people know how we feel.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered
by my friend and colleague from New Hampshire. If I may respond in one
sense directly to what the proponent of the amendment said about going
on record, I want to make very clear that I oppose the amendment
because I feel that America's involvement in the implementation force
and in the stabilization force has been critically important to the
return of peace to that region, has been critically important to
American prestige and credibility militarily in the world, and has been

[[Page S6959]]

critically important to the stature and force of NATO. That is about as
unambivalently as I can express it.

I think American involvement in Bosnia has been a remarkably
successful involvement at a time when it was very important to draw a
line in Europe against aggression, against genocide, and to indicate--
more than indicate, to make very clear at the end of the cold war that
we were not going to stand idly by, that NATO was not going to stand
back, idly by, and allow the disintegration of sections of Europe that
could have led to a wider war.
So I am unambivalently proud of the involvement that has occurred
there, am supportive of it, and do not want to send any mixed messages.
I want to oppose the Senate sending any mixed messages to our allies,
to those who were previous combatants in the war in Bosnia--indeed, and
most important, to our own troops there--not to send any mixed messages
to any of them about the support of the Congress of the United States
for the mission that our troops are performing there.
Looking back to the early 1990s when this conflict broke out, it was
my honor to work alongside the former majority leader, Senator Dole,
first trying to urge an end to the arms embargo on the Bosnians who
were being slaughtered and were the victims of genocide, and then to
urge the United States to lead NATO into doing something to stop this
conflict.
We have been involved in three wars in Europe in this century, two
world wars and one long, costly, dangerous cold war. It seemed to many
of us that the lessons from those conflicts were to act as early as
possible to contain just the kind of conflict that was occurring in
Bosnia from spreading. And we battled, Senator Dole and I and others in
both parties--battled the administration, first the Bush administration
and then more directly, as the conflict in Bosnia became more
desperate, the Clinton administration, to get involved, to exercise
leadership, to be at least fair with the Bosnians and give them arms.
Finally, the resolution to lift the arms embargo did pass in the
early part of 1995, here, with bipartisan support. There was a
significant Croatian offensive on the ground, which was making headway,
which contributed to a changing strategic situation on the ground. And
Srebrenica fell, with a disastrous loss of life which was exposed to
the world. And then there were airstrikes on Serbian positions. The
fear that we had was that this was an indomitable force, one that we
could not stop. There were recollections of the futile attempts by the
Nazis to suppress the Serbs. In this case, the power of NATO from the
air had the effect of bringing the combatants to the peace table in
Dayton, the State of the Presiding Officer, where a historic peace
agreement was signed.
This implementation force, followed by the stabilization force, in
which the United States contributed troops, has been critical to
implementing that Dayton agreement. Our presence there has always been
less than half. The majority of the effort has been provided by our
European allies and others. And, as success has been attained, the
number of troops has been scaled down again. And yet it goes down
again--now, I believe, below 7,000, I think maybe closer to 6,500. As a
result of the effort of these troops in IFOR and then followed on by
SFOR, the conflict has ended, hostilities have ended, and there is a
slow, steady implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, the military
and the civilian components of that. IFOR and SFOR have been charged
with carrying out that agreement.
The economy is up and beginning to flourish again. Elections have
been held; common institutions are beginning to be developed. In the
Serbian Republic, Srspka, an extraordinary turn of events has occurred
as a result of, first and most important, I think, the desire of the
Bosnian Serbs to have new leadership, not the leadership of indicted
war criminals like Karadzic and Mladic, but to see new leadership. But
that was assisted by some very aggressive, determined involvement by
the SFOR, particularly by American leadership leading up right to the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, who has
performed, in my opinion, with extraordinary skill and effectiveness in
this arena of, first combat, and now peacemaking, followed by some very
effective involvement by Ambassador Bob Gelbard in the political
situation in Srspka, resulting in new leadership: President Plavsic
now, Prime Minister Dodik, proud Serbian nationalists, but committed to
the Dayton peace accord.

The progress goes on. Benchmarks have been provided, civilian
benchmarks have been provided to us by the administration to determine
progress as we go along, all of it leading to a hopeful withdrawal and
an end date.
Mr. President, along the way, some mistakes have been made. The
Senator from New Hampshire mentioned them; others have as well. As part
of the earlier involvement, there were those in the administration who
offered deadlines for withdrawal of American forces. I presume that
some measure of the motivation for doing that was to reassure Congress
that this involvement would be limited. But those deadlines were
always, in my opinion, a mistake. They were a mistake because why would
one want to state a date by which one would withdraw from an uncertain
situation?
Traditional policy would be in a conflict or in a peacemaking
situation, one withdraws when one achieves the goals of the
involvement. So the deadline was always a mistake.
It was a mistake in another sense because it would send a message to
those hostile to our involvement there in the first place, who want to
reignite the conflict, that there is a date on which we are getting
out. They could lay back and wait until NATO forces, IFOR and SFOR,
including the U.S. leadership, left.
I feel that the proposal here for a vote and the more indirect
references in the amendment that was just voted on for withdrawal, head
back in the direction of the setting of deadlines, and they have some
of the same deficiencies that I think were part of the deadline which
the administration set, which most all of us in the Senate condemned
and see now as a mistake.
My own feeling is that we are on the right course in Bosnia; that
this is all moving in the right direction, both in terms of
implementation of the Dayton accords and scaling back the number of
American personnel who are there on the ground. I think if we now enter
and say we are going to have a vote on whether to go forward, and if we
don't vote to do so, in the middle of the next fiscal year, March 31,
1999, that we will withdraw, that puts a cloud over our involvement.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I will be glad to yield to my colleague.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. With all due respect, the Senator
misunderstands my amendment, because that is not what my amendment
does. You just articulated the policy that you supported. Even if your
side would lose in the debate that we would have in Congress--let's say
we have the debate. If your side lost, the money would still be
released. If my side loses --I happen to favor withdrawal--if I lost,
the money would still be released.
All my amendment calls for is a vote. It doesn't say that if we vote
to get out on March 31 that the money is not released. The money is
still released.
This is on the Senator's time. He has been very generous. The only
conclusion I can draw is the Senator just doesn't want a vote in the
Congress at all.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, are we under any time limits?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no limitations.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield to me. Is it not true,
I ask the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from New Hampshire,
obviously, as well, that the amendment says the following in paragraph
(c)(1) that ``after March 31, 1999, none of the funds''--none of the
funds appropriated or authorized here or anywhere else can be used ``to
support the continued deployment of United States ground combat forces
in Bosnia * * * except for'' withdrawal. Is that not your amendment?
I guess since the Senator from Connecticut has the floor, let me ask
the Senator from Connecticut, is that not the amendment before you.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. If I may say to the Senator from Michigan, that is
exactly

[[Page S6960]]

the understanding of the impact of the amendment offered by the Senator
from New Hampshire, which is that if there was a negative vote by March
31 of next year on our American involvement in Bosnia, that the only
thing funds would be available for would be to withdraw our personnel.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If I can respond to the Senator, I need
to see if we are looking at the same draft, because that is not my
intention, and if that is in the draft, I will amend that to change
that because that is not the intention of the Senator's amendment. I
yield back to the Senator his time and let me take a look at the draft.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Fine, Mr. President. The statement Senator Levin made
was exactly my understanding and was what I saw in the draft. The
direct effect of a negative vote next March would be to terminate
funding of our operations except to withdraw. I await clarification on
that, but I must say again, because I support this involvement, I
support the command overseeing it, and I support the soldiers in the
field, I don't want to set a date down for this kind of vote on our
involvement in Bosnia.
For those who are against it, they always have the option to try to
eliminate funding for it through the appropriations process. I think to
state a date by which we are going to vote next year on whether to
remain involved in Bosnia or not hangs a sword of uncertainty in this
case over the entire operation, over the American troops that are
there, over our NATO allies who have said they will leave when we
leave: ``We went in together, we are going out together.'' That is what
I have heard them say over and over again. Again, it raises the
prospect in the minds and hearts of those who are waiting to resume
this conflict that they may well have the opportunity come next spring,
because the U.S. Senate may vote to terminate this involvement.
I do want to say about our troops there, I have had the occasion to
be there now three times in the last year, as it happens: once last
July in a delegation headed by Senator Lott, and the distinguished
occupant of the Chair was with us; once in December, right before
Christmas, when we went over with President Clinton to visit the
troops; and then again in February when I went with a delegation headed
by Senator McCain.
One thing that struck me was the very high morale of American troops
that are part of this peacemaking mission in Bosnia. I have had the
opportunity as a member of the Armed Services Committee--the honor,
really--to visit American soldiers in the field around the world. I
must tell you that I have never met a group of American soldiers who
had a better, clearer, more positive feeling about why they were
somewhere around the world.
It struck me as particularly interesting and encouraging, because
right now they are not involved, certainly not involved in active
combat. They are active, they are peacemaking, they are patrolling, but
they are involved in a lot of civilian activity. They understand why
they are there.
One of them said to me that once a month, he went into an orphanage,
somewhere around Sarajevo, as some of the troops there do, and visited
some children who were orphans as a result of the war in Bosnia. He
said, ``You know, when I go there, I understand why we are here. We are
here to stop more children on all sides from becoming orphans; to keep
people alive and to help this country to rebuild itself.''

And I fear that any of these amendments we pass here that incline
toward withdrawal or state the necessity for a vote on withdrawal by a
date certain puts a cloud over the mission of our personnel in Bosnia
and runs the risk of diminishing the morale, understandably, of our
troops there as well as those who have led them so ably.
I do want to take just a moment, Mr. President, to explain,
consistent with what I have said here, why I voted against the previous
amendment offered by Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin, a worthy
attempt to achieve consensus, and in fact it did achieve consensus
since the vote was 90-5 on it. It was not an easy vote to vote against,
to be one of the five.
But I was concerned about it because on page 3, beginning in
paragraph (2), it does say that:

The President should work with NATO allies and other
nations * * * participating in the NATO-led Stabilization
Force to withdraw United States ground combat forces from
Bosnia and Herzegovina within a reasonable period of time,
consistent with the safety of those forces and the
accomplishment of the Stabilization Force's military tasks.

Well, it is not a direct withdrawal. It does condition it on the
accomplishment of the stabilization force's military tasks, but, to me,
it inclines toward withdrawal as a matter of policy. Because I am so
proud of what has been accomplished as a result of the stabilization
force that we have led, and because I am so committed to a withdrawal
that occurs consistent with the achievement of the goals, the
benchmarks that the administration and NATO have set down for this
mission, I was troubled by that paragraph as well as the succeeding
paragraphs which suggest the possibility that there might be a need for
continued military presence there but that we should consider that it
be a NATO-led force without the participation of U.S. ground combat
forces.
I think once we begin to do that, once we begin to separate ourselves
from NATO, we begin to diminish the unity of that greatest military
alliance in history and we begin to diminish our leadership of NATO.
And I do not think any one of those is in our national security
interest. The fact also is, as I mentioned briefly a moment ago, our
NATO allies--the Brits, the French, Germans--all of them have said,
``We went in together. We're going out together. So when the United
States departs from Bosnia, we're all leaving.''
So on a practical ground, I do not think we have that option. I think
the option is to hang in there together, continue what has been a
remarkably successful mission, and we can see the end in sight. But let
us not force it. Let us let it come naturally as we achieve the
benchmarks.
So that is why I voted against the previous amendment No. 2975, and
all the more so for the current amendment, because it puts us on a
course to vote on withdrawal and sends a mixed signal.
One of my favorite expressions from the Bible in cases such as this
is--I am not going to quote exactly--``If the sound of the trumpet be
uncertain, who will follow into battle?'' ``If the sound of the trumpet
be uncertain, who will follow into battle?'' And I fear here that the
sound from these amendments is uncertain and the effect will be to
diminish the morale, the effectiveness, of the remarkably effective
high-morale mission that American troops have carried out as part of
IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. If there is no further debate at this time, I was going to
note the absence of a quorum because I do have some things I want to
say about the amendment, but I want to get the amendment straightened
out.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleague, I have a
modification, and I will have it ready in a moment. So I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in light of the fact that the managers
are working out an agreement on the amendment, I am wondering if I
could simply address the bill itself for just a few moments.
Mr. President, I come to the floor today to register my opposition to
the fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense Authorization Act. I have
numerous concerns with the bill, especially the continued spending of
billions of dollars on wasteful and unnecessary programs.
In a time when we are cutting programs and fighting for a truly
balanced budget, we cannot really afford to insulate any department of
our Government from scrutiny as we seek to reduce the Federal debt.

[[Page S6961]]

I think it is very ironic that programs like health care for veterans
and social services were put on the chopping block to offset increased
funding for our highways and transit systems but we did not have an
attempt to use defense spending for transportation. It was not even
considered.
The message we are clearly sending is that roads and overpriced
weapons systems are more important than the people who are actually
living in this country: We will give you roads and planes, but we will
have to take away your health care and programs that serve ordinary
human needs.
Mr. President, there are a number of provisions in the DOD bill that
I oppose and I will continue to oppose. One is the subject of some of
the discussion we have been having this afternoon. And that is the $1.9
billion ``emergency'' supplemental appropriations recently passed by
the Congress.
The Congress has never developed firm rules on how we should define
an emergency. Everybody assumes, I guess, that we will use common sense
when deciding when to grant special emergency treatment to certain
expenditures. And of course common sense tells us that things like
floods and tornadoes clearly are unanticipated emergencies.
In my view, however, the mission in Bosnia is not. It is a
substantial, long-term commitment. It is something the United States
has, for better or worse, decided to do for quite a long term. If
events there take an unexpected turn for the worse, of course, we could
have some kind of emergency on our hands, but as we stand here today
and debate this bill, the Bosnia situation is not really something you
can call an emergency.

The line items in the law--military personnel, operations and
maintenance, and contingency funds--are really standard military costs
that would be part of any military mission. United States troops have
been on the ground in Bosnia for more than 2 years. The change in
designation from IFOR to SFOR was made more than a year ago and is
scheduled to continue through June of this year. Then, last December,
the President announced he would forgo imposing a deadline altogether
and opted instead for a policy of benchmarks whose definitions remain
open to interpretation.
Mr. President, how can Congress and the President possibly profess to
the American people that the additional costs for the Bosnia mission
constitute an emergency? On the contrary, it has been quite clear for a
while now that the cost of this mission would rise continuously and
substantially. And I would say, to me at least, that was really clear
from the start. This was never going to be a temporary emergency
situation.
Ironically, congressional appropriators and our military leaders have
planned for many months, Mr. President, on obtaining these funds in
this emergency spending bill. So that invites my next question: What
are these funds doing in the bill? I just do not think you can equate
the long-anticipated needs of the operation in Bosnia with the urgent,
unexpected needs of the farmers in California or homeowners in Florida
who have been devastated by natural disaster.
Another matter, Mr. President, in the bill, that concerns me is that
$3.3 billion authorized for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program.
It is no secret that I have some questions about this program. But I am
also troubled by the activities of the Pentagon and the Navy in moving
the Super Hornet airplane forward. And my concerns are not addressed in
the least in this bill.
The current Hornet program has proven reliable and cost effective.
Why do we want to replace the Hornet with a bloated, cost-prohibitive
aircraft that offers only marginally greater benefits over the current
reliable fighter?
Third, I am concerned that the DOD authorization bill shortchanges
our National Guard by at least $594 million. The National Guard is an
immense source of pride throughout the country, and especially in my
State of Wisconsin. As I travel across the State, I frequently have the
privilege of meeting the men and women who compose the Wisconsin Guard,
and I have been very impressed with the tremendous degree of
professionalism and proficiency with which they complete a wide range
of missions.
They are well-trained, dedicated, professional soldiers who earn rave
reviews from the Governor's office, down to the villages and
municipalities who often are the principal beneficiaries in regard to
assistance.
Since I arrived in the U.S. Senate more than 5 years ago, my driving
objective has been to reduce the Federal deficit and achieve a balanced
budget. We have made great progress in that regard. While we continue
to run a deficit while using the Social Security trust fund to mask the
deficit, we have almost overcome the hangover of our 1980 spending
binge.
A large part of that success has been due to the willingness of both
the Congress and the President to do more with less, to trim excessive
spending wherever possible, and maintain important services but with
fewer resources. And we have succeeded in almost every area of
government to do this--in education, in health care, in veterans' care,
in welfare benefits, and in environmental programs. We have succeeded
virtually everywhere, except defense spending, where we continue to
build destroyers the Navy does not ask for and we continue to build
bombers the Air Force does not want.
Balancing the budget, as you well know, is about making difficult
choices. Sure, the Navy would rather have a Super Hornet, and if we
were in a radically different budgetary position I could possibly
support giving them 300 of those airplanes instead of the 30 they are
receiving in this legislation. But can we afford 30 of these new
tactical fighters when a more affordable and equally effective
alternative aircraft is readily available? How that question is
answered is the difference, that is the difference between fiscal
excess and fiscal responsibility.
So we have to make smart choices. A truly balanced Federal budget is
almost, unbelievably, in sight for the first time in three decades. But
we are not going to be able to get the balanced budget or maintain a
balanced budget, let alone starting to bring down the Federal debt and
protect Social Security, so long as we continue to commit to programs
and force structures that are so blatantly unaffordable. We must
continue to fight for further spending reductions until we achieve the
most effective and cost-efficient military which serves our national
security interests.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Mr. Smith of New Hampshire.

Amendment No. 2912, as Modified

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent it
be in order for me to modify my amendment with the text that I now send
to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 2912), as modified, is as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1064. POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

[[Page S6962]]

forth as the matter after the resolving clause only the
following: ``That the continued deployment of ground combat
forces of the Armed Forces of the United States in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is authorized.''.
(2) Referral to committee.--A resolution described in
paragraph (1) that is introduced in the Senate shall be
referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. A
resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in
the House of Representatives shall be referred to the
Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is
referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not
reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the
end of 7 calendar days after its introduction, the committee
shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration
of the resolution and the resolution shall be placed on the
appropriate calendar of the House involved.
(4) Floor consideration.--
(A) In general.--When the committee to which a resolution
is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged
(under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a
resolution described in paragraph (1), it is at any time
thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the
same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the
respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of
the resolution, and all points of order against the
resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are
waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of
Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not
debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a
motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the
consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the
vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall
not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration
of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain
the unfinished business of the respective House until
disposed of.
(B) Debate.--Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable
motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited
to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally
between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A
motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable.
An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion
to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or
disagreed to is not in order.
(C) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the
conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in
paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of
the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the
appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the
resolution shall occur.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution
described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.
(5) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before
the passage by one House of a resolution of that House
described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the
other House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the
following procedures shall apply:
(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred
to a committee.
(B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1)
of the House receiving the resolution--
(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no
resolution had been received from the other House; but
(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution
of the other House.
(6) Consideration of veto.--
(A) Action upon receipt of message.--Upon receipt of a
message from the President returning the joint resolution
unsigned to the House of origin and setting forth his
objections to the joint resolution, the House receiving the
message shall immediately enter the objections at large on
the journal of that House and the House shall proceed to the
immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding
or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of
the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections
shall lie on the table. Upon receipt of a message of a House
transmitting the joint resolution and the objections of the
President, the House receiving the message shall proceed to
the immediate reconsideration of the joint resolution the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding
or of a motion to proceed to the immediate reconsideration of
the joint resolution, or the joint resolution and objections
shall lie on the table. A motion to refer the joint
resolution to a committee shall not be in order in either
House.
(B) Motion to proceed.--After the receipt of a message by a
House as described in subparagraph (A), it is at any time in
order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has
been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to
move to proceed to the reconsideration of the joint
resolution the objections of the President to the contrary
notwithstanding. The motion is highly privileged in the House
of Representatives and is a question of highest privilege in
the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to
amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to
the reconsideration of the resolution is agreed to, the
resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the
respective House until disposed of.
(C) Debate.--Debate on reconsideration of the joint
resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10
hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring
and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion further to
limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to,
or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the
consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed
to notwithstanding the objections of the President or
disagreed to is not in order.
(D) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the
conclusion of the debate on reconsideration of the
resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the
debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the
appropriate House, the vote on the question of passage, the
objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall occur.
(7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This
subsection is enacted by Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but
applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed
in that House in the case of a resolution described in
paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the
extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I take 1 minute because I understand the
Senator from Arizona now is here to move to table.
This amendment, I believe, is seriously flawed. What it will do is
keep our troops nervous and our commanders nervous, because if there is
not a vote that occurs on March 31 next year, then no funds can be
spent to support our troops.
So it really is the worst of all worlds. It attempts to guarantee
there will be a vote. Of course, you never can tell what efforts will
be made to thwart that. What this amendment says, if there is no vote
by a certain date, the funding is cut, the troops must be withdrawn,
the troops will not be supported--if there is no vote.
That is a ``keep the troops and commanders nervous'' approach. I
think it is a terrible mistake. I hope our last vote, which was
overwhelming in this body, will be considered the view of this Senate.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I make one remark before I move to table.
We will be taking up the Department of Defense appropriations bill
after this. I recommended that the Senator from New Hampshire propose a
simple amendment which would cut off funding for further operations in
Bosnia. That is a right, as part of our role as advice and consent--
keeping with an earlier debate that we had--to somehow draw down and
set troop levels in Bosnia.
Therefore, since among other things I am opposed to the amendment in
principle, but also there is a parliamentary standpoint, I think it
would be much more appropriate to propose an amendment on the
Department of Defense appropriations bill that would give us all a
chance to be on record as to whether we support funding or not.
I now move to table the Smith amendment, and I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). The question is on agreeing to the
motion to table the amendment offered by the Senator from New
Hampshire, Senator Smith.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Specter), is absent because of illness.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from Montana (Mr. Baucus), and

[[Page S6963]]

the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller), are necessarily
absent.
The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 31, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 171 Leg.]

YEAS--65

Abraham
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Enzi
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Hagel
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roth
Sarbanes
Shelby
Stevens
Thurmond
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--31

Allard
Ashcroft
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Craig
Durbin
Faircloth
Feingold
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Lott
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Thomas
Thompson
Warner

NOT VOTING--4

Akaka
Baucus
Rockefeller
Specter
The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2912), as modified,
was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Amendment No. 2892

(Purpose: To provide a substitute for title XXIX, relating to the
Juniper Butte Range, Idaho)

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I would call up amendment No. 2892
and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. Kempthorne] proposes an
amendment numbered 2892.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Amendments
Submitted.''
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, in the defense bill we have language
dealing with land withdrawal. This is a project that the Air Force has
been working on for some years. The language that I have now proposed
to the Senate is the perfecting language which has been provided to us.
Madam President, this concerns the 366th Composite Wing which is
bedded down at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho. This is a
composite wing that consists of F-15s, F-16s, B-1 bombers, and C-135
tankers. This allows them to train as they fight. This is one of our
rapid deployment Air Force units that would be called to respond
anywhere in the world where we may have a terrible situation.
The current range that we have in place, there is only one
direction--that is from the south--from which you can access that
range. That worked when this was not a composite wing, but now that you
have all of these different aircraft there, they need to have much
greater ability for training purposes. This would allow us to maximize
training for this situation.
After many, many months of a process, I will tell you that this is
something that has been a high priority for the White House, for the
Air Force, for the Department of the Interior, for BLM, for the
Governor of the State of Idaho, and for the Idaho delegation.
With regard to the process, Madam President, this is a process that
has taken 2\1/2\ years to get us to this point-- 2\1/2\ years. During
those 2\1/2\ years, 16 different public hearings were held in three
different States. Over 400 witnesses testified as to their thoughts,
either pro or con, mitigations they would suggest. Over 1,000 different
comments were recorded.
This is the Environmental Impact Statement that is the result of 2\1/
2\ years of effort, three volumes. Included in the first volume is the
reference that ``The final EIS has been prepared in accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act,'' or NEPA. So, again, this is a
process that has been in place, that has followed all of the
guidelines. And really I think the Air Force and the Department of the
Interior are to be commended for the process which they have utilized,
and really the mitigations that have been put into place are some of
the most significant the Air Force has ever had. Also, the Air Force
had no less than 25 meetings with tribal representatives of the
Shoshone-Paiute tribe. Their reservation is Duck Valley.
The particular site that was chosen, Madam President, 12,000 acres,
is currently under ownership by the Bureau of Land Management. When we
talk about land withdrawal, who are we withdrawing it from and who
becomes its new landlord? Well, currently, because it is BLM, it is
Federal land. It will remain Federal land. It is being withdrawn from
the BLM to be put under the stewardship of the U.S. Air Force.
I would like to give you a sense of what this issue is about. In this
particular area of the State, these are what are called the Owyhee
Canyonlands. As you see, they are beautiful. You can see the streams
going through there.
Currently, in this area, we have the Mountain Home Air Force Base,
and under existing regulation those aircraft can fly at 100 feet above
the canyon rim or 100 feet above ground level 365 days out of the year.
With this proposal that is before the Senate, in this legislation that
changes. For 3 months out of the year--April, May and June--those
aircraft, instead of flying at 100 feet above the canyon rim, if they
fly parallel to the canyon, would be at 5,000 feet, and that is 1 mile
from the canyon either side. If they fly perpendicular, across the
canyon, they would be at 1,000 feet--significant improvements. Also,
during those months they would only fly Tuesday, Wednesday and
Thursday--not 7 days a week. So for recreationalists, this is a real
advantage that is gained by them.
Now, when we talk about 12,000 acres, is it this same sort of
beautiful landscape as we see here? Let me show you.
This is a picture of the 12,000 acres. As you can see, it is sparse.
It is flat. This is where for 100 years they have been grazing cattle.
Folks out there work hard to make a living on this land. But this is
the picture of the 12,000 acres that are out there now.
Also, when I mentioned the Shoshone-Paiute tribes, one of the things
that was asked of our Native Americans--and this is the Duck Valley
Reservation, which is in this southwest corner of the State of Idaho,
and also in Nevada--but we asked them what areas of concern they would
have, what geographic areas of concern that they would have for some of
their sacred areas. They drew this line and said, anything in here we
would certainly prefer that you not have this training facility in.
And, therefore, Juniper Butte, which is the land in question, is right
here. As you can see, it is a great deal outside the area of concern of
the Native Americans.

The funds for the improvements and for land acquisition for this
project have been provided by President Clinton in his defense bill
that is before us. It is included in the Department of Defense
authorization bill, so it is very logical and consistent for us to deal
with this project in the same legislation that has the funding for this
project. That is what is before us at this point.
The result of this is that there will be: A new, no-live-ordnance,
12,000-acre training range using land that has been grazed for over 100
years; the most extensive mitigation program in the history of the Air
Force; new seasonal overflight restrictions of the canyons for
recreationalists and sheep; an Air Force commitment to provide $430,000
over 4 years to monitor impacts on bighorn sheep and sage grouse;
avoidance of the entire sacred site area identified by the Shoshone-
Paiute Tribes at the start of the process and protection of

[[Page S6964]]

existing sacred sites; Air Force agreement with ranching operation
impacted by land withdrawal. The Juniper Butte Range is supported by
letters from Defense Secretary Bill Cohen, Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt, and Air Force Secretary--Acting Secretary Whitten Peters, and
Idaho Governor Batt.
The Air Force, from the outset, said if, in the area that they
ultimately chose as the approved site for this training range, there
were people who might be adversely impacted, that the Air Force would
compensate. This agreement would allow for compensation to be a result
of the agreement negotiated between the Air Force and, in this case, a
ranching family. We have a rancher who, for years, has been grazing his
cattle on these 12,000 acres and has made a great many improvements
with regard to the water lines and fencing. So as he moved those water
lines and the fencing to a different location, again, he would be
compensated for this and he would have those grazing areas realigned in
a different location. So, again he would be leaving that area.
The language that we have before the Senate is language that was
given to us by the Department of the Interior, by BLM, and by the U.S.
Air Force.
I will tell you, Madam President, that there are a couple of items
which have been added to the Kempthorne-Craig amendment which are a
substitute for the language in the bill. Again, the language comes from
the Department of the Interior and the Air Force, and there are four
additional changes.
No. 1, the impacted rancher may continue to graze the withdrawn land
until his agreement with the Air Force is fully implemented; that is,
until rights-of-way are granted and new fences and water pipes are
built.
We cleared this with Katie McGinty, who is the President's counsel on
environmental quality. The White House is very comfortable with this
language.
No. 2, to the maximum extent possible, Interior should use maps
already bought and paid for in development of the EIS, just trying to
avoid further costs of the project.
No. 3, we add Owyhee County to the development of the resource
management plan for withdrawn lands and monitoring activities.
No. 4, we change water right language from the Air Force ``may'' not
seek water rights to the Air Force ``shall'' not seek water rights.
The substitute amendment will result in development of the Juniper
Butte Range. I think this is an important distinction. That is, that
particular site was recommended by the Bureau of Land Management after
a lengthy process, which I have outlined; the Air Force then concluded
that was the best site. It was not a situation where the rancher came
forward and said, is there any way that the Federal Government could
somehow come and utilize this land? This was something that was driven
by, No. 1, the Air Force wanting to have this enhanced training for the
Composite Wing at the Air Force base, the Bureau of Land Management
choosing the Juniper Butte site, the Air Force ultimately agreeing to
it, and then a whole series of mitigations have been put in place.
The amendment sets no precedent on grazing rights, as is acknowledged
by the Bureau of Land Management. I think that is an important
distinction.
So this is perfecting language. It, again, is a process that has
taken 2\1/2\ years, three volumes that are contained in the
environmental impact statement following NEPA. It has the strong
support of the President of the United States, the Acting Secretary of
the Air Force, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the
Director of the Bureau of Land Management, the Governor of the State of
Idaho, the Idaho delegation.
Again, I appreciate all the cooperation we have had and the strong
support from the administration on bringing this project, finally, to
closure.
With that, I know the senior Senator from Idaho, Senator Craig, has
some comments he would like to make on this amendment as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, first of all, I thank my colleague,
Senator Kempthorne, for the tremendous diligence with which he has
approached this issue for national defense and for the citizens of the
State of Idaho. What we are talking about this evening in the amendment
that we bring before you is an issue of national defense and the
appropriate allocation of natural resources, natural public resources
in our country.
There is no question that it has been determined by the Air Force
that Mountain Home Air Force Base needs additional capacity to train,
to train the 366th Wing, the Composite Wing that my colleague has just
spoken about--not only current training but future training. And of
course out West, where the skies are blue and the horizons seem to be
endless, you would think this would be an easy process. There is all of
this public land. In fact, 63 percent of the State of Idaho is owned by
the Federal Government. And you can just go anywhere and fly anywhere
and train anywhere. That is not the case. We know that is not the case.
And it should not be the case, because that public land is a valuable
natural resources allocated for a variety of uses.
It is most important that where the Air Force should train, that
training should be specific, well defined, and that is exactly what we
are attempting to do. The Senator has outlined the process--well over
2\1/2\ years, 16 public hearings, thousands of inputs from the citizens
of our State and from around the country for and against the expansion
or the development of a new training range. We are now here, doing the
necessary thing, and that is to reallocate public land, to take land
which was once grazing land and wildlife habitat, but primarily used
for grazing--it had been for well over 100 years --and saying no longer
will this land be used for grazing, it will be used for training
overflights.
But for the person who grazed that land, the family who has had the
right to graze that land under BLM permit for nearly 100 years, we are
saying, ``You will no longer be able to graze there. We are going to
take that land away from your use. We are going to allocate a new area,
and you are going to be able to gain a permit to graze in the new area
under the standard prescriptions of the BLM and the range management
set forth by the Secretary of the Interior and the appropriate rules
and regulations of the National Environmental Policy Act.'' As the
Senator has just spoken, ``You will be able to graze on your own range
until such time as this agreement is worked out.''

There is no special treatment. There is a recognition that in this
process, we have two demands, and we ought to be able to meet both of
them. We have the demand for expanded training range capability of the
366th, and we have what I think is a reasonable approach toward land
use, and that is grazing. If we did not grant this rancher an
opportunity to graze in other areas, we would destroy a 100-year-old
family business and put them out of business. It is that plain, and it
is that simple.
The Air Force understood that, BLM understood that, the President
understands that, and through this give-and-take and negotiations, we
have arrived at a settlement. Not everybody agrees with that
settlement, but everybody has been treated fairly.
The Duck Valley Indian Reservation, Shoshone Paiute Tribe, Native
Americans with substantial rights in that area have been treated
fairly, have been allowed to be at the table to negotiate, as we should
have treated them, and all considerations have been made--overflight
levels not to disturb their solitude and the character of their lands,
all the corridors of flight, all of those have been considered, because
those pictures that the Senator just showed us show huge expanses of
public lands and no fences and no lines and no roads. You would think,
well, my goodness, fly anywhere. Not the case. There are land rights
out there. There is private land, there is Indian land, and that is
private by character of a separate nation, and there are private
inholdings of citizens, and then, of course, there is the public land.
There is a criticism launched that somehow this particular rancher
that we are dislodging from an area where he and his father and his
grandfather grazed for over 100 years is getting special treatment.
That is not the case. What we are saying to him as we take away from
him the land under which

[[Page S6965]]

he grazed, therefore, if we didn't offer new land to graze, under the
standards of the current law, somehow we would be denying him his
livelihood. We are saying there will be costs involved in bringing the
new range into quality--quality grazing, availability of water, fences
for rest rotation grazing, and that rancher should not have to sustain
those costs. So there are costs in transition.
There are mitigating costs, and that is why we have worked hard; that
is why Senator Kempthorne has worked especially hard on his committee
to make all of these things happen.
He twice--at least twice, maybe three times--has hosted meetings in
his office that I have attended with all of the parties at the table to
assure that everybody was talking and the fullest public process was
met; that every ``i'' was dotted and every ``t'' was crossed under the
National Environmental Policy Act to make sure that no stakeholder was
left out.
There are some California sheep, wild sheep in the area of concern.
There is money in here for the Idaho Department of Fish and Game to
monitor the character of that herd so that in no way do we damage the
environment or the wildlife at hand.
I think as a country, I hope that we as a Congress, have the ability
to allocate resource and balance natural resource use and environmental
needs along with our national defense. That is what this amendment
does. It not only expands training range capability for Mountain Home
Air Force Base and this new concept we call ``composite wing,'' but it
assures long-term ability to do that kind of training.

I say to my colleagues, you have just received a ``Dear Colleague''
letter from Senator Kempthorne and myself outlining the pros and cons
of this. I must tell you that this is not without opposition. There are
some who still prefer that nothing be done. But a majority of Idahoans
believe something should be done, and certainly as those who are
caretakers of the national defense--and that is what we as Senators
are--it is important that we assure the long-term capability for our
national defense and optimum training conditions for the men and women
who fly the aircraft of our country. That is what we believe we are
doing here. At the same time, we are assuring that the traditional and
legally prescribed uses of our public lands for grazing purposes can
continue to go on.
I believe, Madam President, that what Senator Kempthorne and I offer
tonight is a win-win proposition. The Air Force wins; American citizens
win because of enhanced capability for national defense training; and
our public land users and the environment win, because we are now
expanding the capability of grazing by improving its conditions, and
those grazing conditions also improve the conditions for wildlife
because of additional water in areas where there may not currently be
water and will be in the future.
That is what we bring before you tonight. We appreciate your
consideration of it. We hope you can agree with us, because, as Senator
Kempthorne has said, the Idaho delegation stands united, along with the
Governor of our State and our State legislature. We appreciate having a
military presence in our State. We appreciate Mountain Home Air Force
Base for what it does for the country, but also what it does for the
State of Idaho. We also appreciate the beauty of the great expanse of
our Federal lands.
We also understand the importance of balanced and multiple uses. We
think we bring all of those to the table in the amendment that we have
offered, that the Senator has authored, and we hope that the Senate
will concur with us in that amendment. I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, the land withdrawal for enhanced
military training in Idaho is a necessary element for varied, realistic
training that is essential to enable the 366th Wing at Mountain Home
Air Force Base to sustain combat readiness to meet the complex threats
expected in the 21st century. The proponents of this provision have
worked long and hard to resolve all of the stakeholders' interest
related to this military land withdrawal and have put together a good
provision.
I strongly support Senator Kempthorne's substitute amendment to title
XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999 and
the continued efforts to secure enhanced military training in Idaho.
Madam President, we have both Senators from Idaho in accord on this
matter. The Governor of Idaho is in accord on this matter. It appears
to be highly desirable that the Senate adopt this amendment and
accommodate the two Senators, the Governor and the people of Idaho.
Thank you. I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the Senator from Idaho, Senator
Kempthorne, has done what he indicated in committee that he intended to
do, which was to offer a modification of his previous language when
this bill got to the floor. That is being carried out with the support
of his good colleague from Idaho.
We have no objection to the modification in the language. My
understanding is there is further discussion or debate relative to this
subject which will be forthcoming at a later time, but I have no
objection to this amendment.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I thank the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, for his comments and his strong
support. I also thank Senator Levin for his comments. I enjoy greatly
working with the ranking member.
We have fulfilled what we said we would do. Also, I point out to our
ranking member that this language is the language provided to us by the
administration.
And so I feel very comfortable with this.
I also, Madam President, would like to make part of the Record the
letter from the Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen; the letter from the
Secretary of the Air Force, Acting Secretary Whitten Peters; and the
letter is also signed by Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, in
support of the project with the language, the news release by the
Bureau of Land Management, which goes into details, and also the letter
from Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, where he
affirms that the Air Force will provide $430,000 to monitor the impact
on bighorn sheep and sage grouse over 4 years. I ask unanimous consent
that those be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Secretary of Defense,

1000 Defense Pentagon,

Washington, DC, October 21, 1997.
Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Dirk: Thank you for your letter of September 8, 1997.
I want to assure you nothing has changed regarding my
enthusiasm for the Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI)
initiative.
The 366th Wing as Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB) is an
important component of our military capability. As one of the
first units to deploy to a problem area, it has the
responsibility to neutralize enemy forces. It must maintain
peak readiness to respond rapidly and effectively to diverse
situation and conflicts.
ETI balances realistic local training with careful
consideration of environmental, cultural, and economic
concerns. The elements of the ETI proposal, though designed
to minimize environmental impacts, will simulate real world
scenarios and allow the aircrews to plan and practice complex
missions. In addition to providing realistic training, ETI's
close proximity to Mountain Home AFB also will enable the Air
Force to convert time currently spent in transit into actual
training time. Thus, the ETI proposal allows Air Force crews
to use limited flight training hours more efficiently.
I continue to give the ETI process my full support. It will
provide our commanders with realistic training opportunities
locally, while ensuring potential impacts to natural,
cultural, social, and economic resources are identified, and
where possible, cooperatively resolved. Your strong support
for the ETI initiative is very important to us, and you may
rely upon my continued interest and commitment.
I trust this information is useful.
Sincerely,
William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense.

[[Page S6966]]

____
Secretary of the Air Force,

Washington, DC, June 19, 1998.
Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Kempthorne: We are pleased to provide you with
the attached legislation for the withdrawal of lands for the
Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI) project. As you know, this
legislation represents three years of extensive work by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Air Force, you and other
representatives of the people of Idaho, and many others who
care about the welfare of Idaho's environment and the
effectiveness of the 366th Wing at Mountain Home Air Force
Base.
ETI will increase the realism, flexibility, and quality of
the Air Force's training. It permits the 366th Wing to train
more efficiently and effectively for its important missions,
thereby improving the aircrews' safety and mission
performance. Implementation of ETI will substantially
strengthen the 366th Wing's ability to ensure readiness to
perform its assigned missions.
Importantly, however, the Air Force and BLM also worked
very hard so that ETI would balance training needs with the
concerns of the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, the environment, and
other public land uses. The Air Force and BLM actively
solicited public and agency involvement throughout the
development of the project. Participants in the process
included the State of Idaho, environmental organizations, the
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, ranchers, recreational organizations,
and other users of the public lands in Idaho.
The Air Force incorporated numerous mitigations in the
design of the project to address public concerns and
relocated facility sites during preparation of the
environmental impact statement (EIS) to avoid various
environmental concerns expressed by the Shoshone-Paiute
Tribes and others. Following completion of the EIS and
consideration of public comment the Air Force adopted further
mitigation measures, including altitude and seasonal
overflight restrictions that further address concerns of
recreational users and protect the habitat of bighorn sheep.
The NEPA process was a valuable tool in helping to identify
these mitigations and resolve concerns.
We believe the attached legislation accommodates many
issues that you and other representatives of the people of
Idaho have raised throughout the process and is an important
step forward for national security, for the environment, and
for significant tribal interests.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the
standpoint of the Administration's program there is no
objection to the presentation of this report to Congress.
Sincerely,
Bruce Babbit,
Secretary of the Interior.
F. Whitten Peters,
Acting Secretary of the Air Force.
____

Agreement on Enhanced Training in Idaho

* * * * *

Bruneau-Jarbidge River System

In general, for all major canyons in the Bruneau-Jarbidge
River System, low-altitude training flights would be limited
to 1,000 feet above ground level and would cross only
perpendicular to the canyons. Additionally, parallel flights
within one mile of the canyon rims would be limited to 5,000
feet above ground level (AGL).
Along the Bruneau River from the Bruneau-Jarbidge
confluence to Clover Creek, no low-level overflights will
occur within one mile of the canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL
from April 1 through June 30.
Along the Bruneau River from Clover Creek to Miller Water,
no low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the
canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30
on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays.
To support composite wing exercises (includes fighters and
bombers) from April 1 through June 30, the low-level flight
restrictions over the Bruneau River will be relaxed during
two days each month to allow exercises as low as 500 feet
AGL. The Air Force will provide advance public notification
of when these composite wing exercises will occur.

owyhee river system

In general, for all major canyons in the Owyhee River
System, low-altitude training flights would be limited to
1,000 feet AGL and would cross only perpendicular to the
canyons. Additionally, parallel flights within one mile of
the canyon rims would be limited to 5,000 feet AGL.
Along the South Fork of the Owyhee River from the 45 Ranch
to the confluence with the East Fork of the Owyhee River, no
low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the
canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30,
subject to two composite wing training exercises per month.
Along the East Fork of the Owyhee River from the confluence
of Dickshooter Creek to the confluence of the South Fork, no
low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the
canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30,
subject to two composite wing training exercises per month.
Along the East Fork of the Owyhee River from the confluence
of Battle Creek to the confluence of Dickshooter Creek, no
low-level overflights will occur within one mile of the
canyon rim below 5,000 feet AGL from April 1 through June 30
on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays.

airspace expansion over little jacks creek

There will be no military training overflights below 5,000
feet AGL in the airspace over the Little Jacks Creek area
during April, May, and June.

recreation study

The BLM and Air Force will jointly fund a study on
recreation use in the Little Jacks Creek area and the
canyonlands of the Bruneau-Jarbidge and Owyhee River Systems.
____

Bureau of Land Management,

Office of Public Affairs,

Washington, DC, May 15, 1998.

BLM, Air Force Reach Agreement on Idaho Training Range Expansion

The Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Air Force have
reached an agreement that would accommodate military flights
over public land in southwest Idaho while subjecting those
flights to altitude and seasonal restrictions over key
portions of the Owyhee and Bruneau river canyons, BLM
Director Pat Shea announced today.
Under the agreement, which would withdraw 12,000 acres of
BLM-managed public land for expanded military training, the
Air Force would extend its airspace training over Little
Jacks Creek, but its additional flights would be subject to
altitude and seasonal restrictions. Under the agreement, the
Air Force would continue its current use of about 7.5 million
acres of airspace over BLM-managed land.
``This agreement reflects extensive public input on issues
surrounding Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI), and protects
public land resources while accommodating vital U.S. military
training,'' said Shea. ``the agreement ensures that military
flights would be limited to 5,000 feet above ground level in
the airspace above Little Jacks Creek during April, May, and
June, which addresses concerns raised by recreationists who
hike in the area and raft down the Owyhee and Bruneau rivers.
The altitude restriction is also aimed at protecting the
habitat of bighorn sheep.''
Shea said the agreement took into account public input from
eight ``scoping'' meetings held by the Air Force and BLM in
1996 and seven public hearings held last year on the Air
Force's Draft Environmental Impact Statement relating to
expanded airspace training.
Below are the particulars of the BLM-Air Force agreement:

seasonal low-level flight restrictions

The Air Force will institute seasonal low-level flight
restrictions for all military users in the Jarbidge and
Owyhee military operating areas to minimize conflicts with
public land resources and uses.
____

Secretary of the Air Force,

Washington, DC, June 11, 1998.
Hon. Dirk Kempthorne,
U.S. Senate,
Washington DC.
Dear Senator Kempthorne: Thank you for your recent inquiry
concerning Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI). You have asked
if the Air Force intends to monitor bighorn sheep and sage
grouse populations further in conjunction with the ETI
proposal.
The Air Force provided $100K in FY 1998 to determine the
baseline populations of the two species in areas where ETI
would cause surface and airspace changes with the
implementation of ETI. Headquarters Air Combat Command has
indicated that it intends to fully fund monitoring activities
in subsequent years, assuming ETI is approved. They would
then provide the State of Idaho $110K per year for the next
three years for monitoring activities.
ETI will be a great asset for the composite wing based at
Mountain Home AFB and will reflect our commitment to
environmental stewardship. We appreciate your commitment to
this important project.
Sincerely,
F. Whitten Peters,
Acting Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I want to report that there are some
members who believe the proposed substitute amendment #2892 sets a new
standard for environmental remediation before the Air Force can
relinquish the withdrawn lands back to the Bureau of Land Management.
Like I did with the Department of Interior, the BLM and the Air Force
regarding the new overflight restrictions of the canyons, I will
convene a meeting with all of the interested parties and committees to
try to reach a consensus on this issue before completion of the
conference on this bill.
Madam President, I would just like to say, after months and months of
due process, I think we are doing what is right by the environment,
what is good for recreation, and certainly what is right for the
pilots.
When we think of those pilots who have to climb into those aircraft,
if we do have to send them into harm's way, let us make sure we provide
them with not only the best aircraft in the world but the best training
opportunities, so that when they go into harm's way,

[[Page S6967]]

they can come back to their loved ones in good shape.
So I want to thank Senator Craig for his partnership. He has been a
tremendous partner, as has Congresswoman Chenoweth, Congressman Crapo,
Governor Batt. And, again, there are folks who do not like this--didn't
like it from the outset, don't like the conclusion, don't like the
answer. But the process has been fulfilled, and the conclusion, I
believe, is right.
I just want to say to the family of the Bracketts, the ranchers who
have been working with us on this, I appreciate their willingness to go
through this process. Again, they did not come forward; they did not
step up and say, ``Boy, why don't you use this land.'' I think out of
their belief in Idaho and their belief in the country, they are willing
to go along with this. But in this very public process, unfortunately,
some people lodge charges that bring into question the integrity of
some individuals. I think that is just very unfortunate. That happens
in the political process. Perhaps we get used to it a little more, but
I hate to see it when it is leveled at a good family like this. So I
appreciate the Brackett family.
Again, I appreciate the chairman and the ranking member's comments.
And I believe, unless there is further debate, we are ready for a vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on agreeing to the
amendment offered by the Senator from Idaho.
The amendment (No. 2892) was agreed to.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Privilege Of The Floor

Mr. BROWNBACK. I ask unanimous consent that a fellow in my office,
Terry Bare, be able to sit in on the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 2978

(Purpose: To require separate housing for male and female basic
trainees, and to ensure after-hours privacy for basic trainees)

Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] proposes an
amendment numbered 2978.

Mr. BROWNBACK. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment
be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

Strike out section 527, and insert in lieu thereof the
following:

SEC. 527. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO RECRUIT BASIC TRAINING.

(a) Army.--(1) Chapter 401 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``Sec. 4319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and
privacy for male and female recruits

``(a) Separate Housing Facilities.--The Secretary of the
Army shall require that during basic training male and female
recruits be housed in separate barracks or other troop
housing facilities.
``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Army shall
require that access by drill sergeants and other training
personnel to a barracks floor on which recruits are housed
during basic training shall be limited after the end of the
training day, other than in the case of an emergency or other
exigent circumstance, to drill sergeants and other training
personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits housed on
that floor.
``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term
`basic training' means the initial entry training program of
the Army that constitutes the basic training of new
recruits.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``4319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male
and female recruits.''.

(b) Navy and Marine Corps.--(1) Part III of subtitle C of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
chapter 601 the following new chapter:

``CHAPTER 602--TRAINING GENERALLY

``Sec.
``6931. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male
and female recruits.

``Sec. 6931. Recruit basic training: separate housing and
privacy for male and female recruits

``(a) Separate Housing.--The Secretary of the Navy shall
require that during basic training male and female recruits
be housed in separate barracks or other troop housing
facilities.
``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Navy shall
require that access by recruit division commanders and other
training personnel to a barracks floor on which Navy recruits
are housed during basic training shall be limited after the
end of the training day, other than in the case of an
emergency or other exigent circumstance, to recruit division
commanders and other training personnel who are of the same
sex as the recruits housed on that floor.
``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term
`basic training' means the initial entry training programs of
the Navy and Marine Corps that constitute the basic training
of new recruits.''.
(2) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle C,
and at the beginning of part III of subtitle C, of such title
are amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter
601 the following new item:

``602. Training Generally...................................6931''.....

(c) Air Force.--(1) Chapter 901 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:

``Sec. 9319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and
privacy for male and female recruits

``(a) Separate Housing.--The Secretary of the Air Force
shall require that during basic training male and female
recruits be housed in separate dormitories or other troop
housing facilities.
``(b) Housing Privacy.--The Secretary of the Air Force
shall require that access by drill sergeants and other
training personnel to a dormitory floor on which recruits are
housed during basic training shall be limited after the end
of the training day, other than in the case of an emergency
or other exigent circumstance, to drill sergeants and other
training personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits
housed on that floor.
``(c) Basic Training Defined.--In this section, the term
`basic training' means the initial entry training program of
the Air Force that constitutes the basic training of new
recruits.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``9319. Recruit basic training: separate housing and privacy for male
and female recruits.''.

(d) Implementation.--(1) The Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force
shall implement section 4319, 6931, or 9319, respectively, of
title 10, United States Code (as added by this section), as
rapidly as feasible and shall ensure that the provisions of
that section are applied to all recruit basic training
classes beginning not later than the first such class that
enters basic training on or after April 15, 1999.
(2)(A) If the Secretary of the military department
concerned determines that it is not feasible, during some or
all of the period beginning on April 15, 1999, and ending on
October 1, 2001, to comply with the requirement for separate
housing at any particular installation at which basic
training is conducted because facilities at that installation
are insufficient for such purpose, the Secretary may grant a
waiver of the requirement with respect to that installation.
Any such waiver may not be in effect after October 1, 2001,
and may only be in effect while the facilities at that
installation are insufficient for the purposes of compliance
with the requirement for separate housing.
(B) If the Secretary of a military department grants a
waiver under subparagraph (A) with respect to an
installation, the Secretary shall require that male and
female recruits in basic training at that installation during
any period that the waiver is in effect not be housed on the
same floor of a barracks or other troop housing facility.
(3) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``requirement for separate housing'' means--
(i) with respect to the Army, the requirement set forth in
section 4319(a) of title 10, United States Code, as added by
subsection (a);
(ii) with respect to the Navy and the Marine Corps, the
requirement set forth in section 6931(a) of such title, as
added by subsection (b); and
(iii) with respect to the Air Force, the requirement set
forth in section 9319(a) of such title, as added by
subsection (c).
(B) The term ``basic training'' means the initial entry
training program of an armed force that constitutes the basic
training of new recruits.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds are authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal
year 1999 for actions necessary to carry out this section and
the amendments made by this section, including military
construction projects (which projects are hereby authorized),
in the total amount of $166,000,000.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Amendment No. 2979 To Amendment No. 2978

(Purpose: To require a moratorium on changes to gender-related policies
and practices)

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf
of Senators Snowe and Cleland and ask for its immediate consideration.

[[Page S6968]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for Ms. Snowe, for
herself and Mr. Cleland, proposes an amendment numbered 2979
to amendment No. 2978.

Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President--
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for two unanimous consent requests
relative to staffs' presence on the floor?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Could I ask a parliamentary question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk is still reading the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk continued to read as follows:

Beginning on the first page, strike out all after SEC. and
insert in lieu thereof the following:

. MORATORIUM ON CHANGES OF GENDER-RELATED POLICIES AND
PRACTICES PENDING COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE
COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-
RELATED ISSUES.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, officials of
the Department of Defense are prohibited from implementing
any change of policy or official practice in the department
regarding separation or integration of members of the Armed
Forces on the basis of gender that is within the
responsibility of the Commission on Military Training and
Gender-Related Issues to review under subtitle F of title V
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1750), before the date on
which the commission terminates under section 654 of such
Act.

Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, if I could make a parliamentary
inquiry. As I understood, I was putting forward an amendment to be
considered and had the floor to speak concerning that amendment. Is
that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator lost the floor when he offered the
amendment.
Mr. BROWNBACK. I would note that we would like to have and will get a
debate on this issue at some point in time about separate barracks for
the genders. And I had that as my understanding, that that was the
debate that we were going to at the present time.
Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, he can go ahead and debate on
his amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is entitled to go ahead with his amendment.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much.
Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield for a unanimous consent for two
staffs' presence on the floor?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Only for that, and I am not yielding the floor. The
understanding is, I am not yielding the floor. Yes, I will, if I
receive it back to consider my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Privilege Of The Floor

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues, Senator
Bingaman, and Senator Domenici, I ask unanimous consent that the
privileges of the floor be granted to Peter Lyons of his office during
the pendency of S. 2057 and any votes thereon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, for the
period of time the Department of Defense authorization bill is under
consideration, Mark Tauber, a State Department Pearson Fellow on the
Foreign Relations Committee staff, be granted floor access.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise to discuss today the amendment I
have offered that I put forward at the desk and will, at the
appropriate time, be calling for the yeas and nays on that.
I have discussed my amendment with the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Personnel of the Armed Services Committee, the
distinguished Senator from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne. And after my
staff had briefings with the Pentagon, I decided the privacy of our new
recruits, by mandating separate barracks, was extremely important and
that this debate was necessary and needed at this point in time.
Mr. President, my amendment is common sense. It simply requires
separate barracks for male and female recruits during basic training.
Further, the amendment protects the privacy of recruits by limiting
access to barracks after hours to those of the same gender.
I might note for the Senators that the House has considered much
stronger language, and actually enacted in their bill, in the DOD
authorization, the separation of genders during basic training. But we
fall far short of that. This is just about barracks and housing during
basic training.
I believe this is a sensible step in restoring privacy and dignity to
the military basic training experience and will allow our young
recruits to focus on the serious tasks before them.
This amendment helps to uphold the military standards of behavior and
improves the quality of life for military members and spouses left at
home while a loved one completes basic training.
The amendment will help train instructors to instill the basic core
values of discipline, teamwork, unit cohesion, and values that will
ultimately benefit the individual, the family, and the military. By
adopting this amendment, we codify a unanimous recommendation of the
bipartisan Kassebaum-Baker commission.
The Kassebaum-Baker Commission interviewed 2,000 recruits, 2,000
recruits, and their supervisors and found serious problems. Let me just
articulate a few of them. The commission recognized that sexual
relations take place inside of barracks where young men and women live
together. Moral and unit cohesion were negatively affected. Thus, the
commission recommended that male and female recruits sleep in separate
barracks. Talk about common sense, that seems to be it.
To avoid cries that the cost is prohibitive, the Kassebaum Commission
completed an analysis of the current structures at training
installations which showed that the cost of this amendment is marginal.
Mr. President, I will read the section of the Kassebaum Commission that
says just that, quoting from page 15 of the study of the Kassebaum
Commission:

The committee has reviewed the layout and surge numbers of
the training installation and believes this change can be
accomplished at marginal cost, if any.

Available barracks exist and have already been converted to
accommodate both male recruits. Thus, there are no physical constraints
to having men and women recruits housed separately during basic
training. Existing structures can be used. The Kassebaum panel was
stunned to discover--and this is a direct quote--``high frequency'' of
sexual relations during basic training between male and female recruits
in all branches of the services. High frequency.
Now, if you think about this, if you put young male and female
recruits around the age of 18 in close proximity, in the same quarters,
I think there is a possibility that a high frequency of this may
happen. The amendment that I put forward simply says we should have
separate barracks. It doesn't even go to wanting separate training. It
says separate ``barracks,'' to maybe reduce some of these incidents.
The same report said ``some drill sergeants complained to the panel
about the large amount of time they were spending investigating or
disciplining male and female misconduct. It was found that the problem
is exacerbated in mixed-gender barracks. This is after interviewing
2,000 recruits and sergeants. It is exacerbated in mixed-gender
barracks, especially where men and women live on the same floor.
Just think about it again, in common-sense terms. Doesn't this just
make sense that you will have more problems if you have mixed genders
on same floor in the same barracks, and that you will then have to deal
with that in basic training?

[[Page S6969]]

Listen to this. At one location at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, the panel
was told that male and female fraternization was so frequent that drill
instructors had to take the doors off of the barracks rooms so they
could maintain order inside. It was that frequent. They had to take the
doors off.
Secretary Cohen gave the services an opportunity to respond to the
Kassebaum recommendations. Other than the marines, God bless 'em, they
all came back and disagreed with the recommendation to establish
separate living barracks. Despite this, I believe that there is no
reason why male and female recruits should be sleeping on the same
floors. This makes no sense.
I put it in personal terms, if I could, for my colleagues. Think
about their daughters, if they are going into the military. I have two
young daughters. What if they were going in. Would you feel safer and
better about their security and about this issue of fraternization if,
during basic training, they are in separate facilities, or would you
feel better and safer about it if they are on the same floor with
different genders? Just think about that for half a second. Wouldn't
you feel a lot better about it if they are in separate barracks so that
people can watch a little closer than if they are on the same floor
with other recruits and you already have these instances taking place?

This is a common-sense proposal with minimal, if any, cost. This is
about national security and ensuring our recruits make up the best,
most disciplined force in the world. Just last month, we learned that
five instructors at the Navy's boot camp have been accused of sexual
misconduct and improper relations with women recruits. This is the
Navy, not the Army; this is the Navy. One of the instructors at the
Great Lakes Naval Training Center, a 30-year-old, was arrested on April
30 on charges of having an improper sexual relationship with an 18-
year-old female recruit.
I want to read some of the press account that is out of this, from
the Chicago Sun Times, June 6, 1998.

A Navy petty officer was found guilty of sexual misconduct
with female recruits and making false statements to Navy
officers in a court-martial Friday at the Great Lakes Naval
Base.
After deliberating about 90 minutes, [90 minutes, not
long.] a three-member jury made up of two male Navy officers
and one female enlisted sailor found Machinists Mate 1st
Class Gregg Peterson guilty of eight of nine charges against
him.

They quoted in this article several of the sailors, some of the women
sailors. One--and I will not give her name because I don't think that
is appropriate--said she cried as the jury presided and read its
decision of guilty. She said ``I feel like I can breathe again now.''
She walked out of the Navy headquarters building where the court-
marital was held. She stated-- this is sad--``I didn't join the Navy to
be laughed at.'' She had stated that this particular officer that was
found guilty had stated lewd things towards her. Another recruit had
said this person that was found guilty intimated to her he wanted to
have sex with her, and she stated, ``I'll feel better when he is
punished. He was in charge of the way he made us feel.''
Two other recruits testified they had sex with the same person that
was found guilty after he threw a mattress on the floor in the barracks
and told them to undress. This is a superior position telling these
recruits to do this. This is one of the recruits who said, ``The Navy
is trying to cover up the fact that they let this guy wander through
the barracks, intimidating recruits into having sex with them.'' That
is a horror story for them. And another who had sex with this
particular person found guilty said she couldn't have fought him off if
she tried.
What is that about? This is terrible. This is disgusting that this
took place at the Navy basic training facility, and you have several
recruits testifying of what this person in a senior position forced
them to do.
Our amendment is aimed at trying to get just at that, separate
barracks. You cannot have a person of the other gender in the facility
where the people of the opposite gender are except on emergency cases.
What are we letting them do, just parade around and throw mattresses on
the floor? He was court-martialled for this and found guilty of eight
of nine charges. This is the press account from June 6th after the
court-martial report came back. My goodness.

Now, what sort of solace, if you are an 18-year-old and your family
is considering letting you go into the military service and you want to
go into the military service and you are a female, and you are reading
these sort of stories, what goes through your mind at that time? Do you
want to go into the military then? Is this going to be an inhibition if
you think you want to be a part of the Navy, of the proud tradition of
the Navy, of the Army? You want to be part of that unit, but then you
read this stuff about guys parading around in barracks and throwing
mattresses on the floor. What does that do? And what does it do to the
family? What does the family think about in that case?
A study of female recruits out last November found them particularly
susceptible to unwanted pregnancies and assaults. The study found that
``to many young female recruits, the basic training experience can be
uniquely stressful with individuals often experiencing feelings of
loneliness and isolation and the possibility that some individuals
would turn to sexual relationships as a means of coping with the stress
is great.''
Let's go to another case we are all familiar with. We all remember
what went on at the Aberdeen Proving Ground between instructor and
trainee last year--rape and sex between drill instructors and trainees.
Aberdeen is an example of what can happen in the pressurized training
environment without proper supervision. Remember, basic trainees are
even more susceptible, even more susceptible.
We must do what we can to remove these pressures. Again, I plead with
my colleagues, think of your own 18-year-old daughters going into the
military, or others that would be considering this. Is this really the
sort of situation we want to put them in, that we are forcing them to
go into, that we force them, if they want to be a part of the military.
That is what they have to do; this is where they have to sleep.
I recognize that the services are already taking steps to ensure
security and privacy of the current male and female living arrangements
and I applaud the services for taking these steps. My amendment allows
time for the services to accomplish the transition to separate
barracks, which is where they have to get. It really is where they have
to get. It sets October 1, 2001, as the effective date. If an
installation has insufficient facilities, the amendment allows recruits
to be housed in separate barrack floors with the proper access
restrictions until 2001.
We are giving the military some lead time to build into this, to deal
with this situation, and they are trying to deal with it. The bottom
line is this: The primary function of the basic training is to properly
induce young trainees into the Armed Forces, with minimal
distractions. They are there to learn the skills that spell success or
failure on the battlefield. I urge you to support Secretary Cohen's
goal of ``a basic training system which provides gender privacy and
dignity and safe, secure living conditions.'' Safe, secure, and
separate barracks is the best way to ensure a well-trained and
disciplined force. At a minimum, I believe that we owe that to these
recruits and their families.

Mr. President, I just ask you to think about this for a little while,
because this really makes sense. I know the military is trying to get
accomplish what we have mandated them to do on the mixed-gender
training, and they are trying to do it in the close quarters that we
have, and these have been the ways they have received pressure.
My goodness, I say to Senators, we have to look at the facts and what
is taking place, ask ourselves a bit of common sense. These young 18-
year-old men and women are in close quarters, in a pressurized
situation at basic training. What do you think is going to happen in
this situation if you provide a situation where they are in the same
barracks and you have a common area for them to go into, or you have
instructors that are superior in age and position and they are able to
go into the same facilities?
The military is saying, ``Look, we are trying to divide and partition
the buildings, so that on the same floor

[[Page S6970]]

you are going to have a plywood petition, and hopefully we will get to
a permanent petition between the two genders on the floor.'' But you
are still going to have common areas where the two can mix. Plus, you
can still have and will still have your instructors going into the area
of the opposite sex and being there. You are going to have,
unfortunately, that situation like just happened up in the Navy basic
training facility, if that occurs. If we leave the situation the way it
is today, that is going to occur. Plus, you are still mixing a
situation that just doesn't apply to us in common sense, if we think
about it. This is going to lead to the problems we have.
I also want to add a personal Kansas story into this. My office in
Kansas--I have not been a Senator a long time, but we regularly get
requests from female recruits who get pregnant while in basic training,
and they ask for discharges. One lady who contacted my office had a
nervous breakdown. She has since separated from the Navy. I will not
say her name; that would be inappropriate. But my note to colleagues is
that everybody loses in this deal. Everybody loses in this deal. The
Navy loses a highly qualified, motivated recruit, who falls into a
pressurized environment and then gets demoralized and has a nervous
breakdown.
This is a Kansas example I have, and only one. I have multiple ones
that come into my office in Kansas. I am sure others have them, too.
Check your records, check your services, and what you are being
contacted about in your State. How many of you have the same
situation--being contacted by female recruits who want out of the
military because they have unwarranted sexual advances? My goodness,
the Navy loses, we lose, and this particular recruit was demoralized
and loses as well. This makes no sense.
I want to go through the report, if I may, of the Kassebaum
commission. This is something I respect, coming from Nancy Kassebaum
Baker from my home State of Kansas, who is as level-headed a person as
you will ever find anywhere in the world. She is a wonderful lady. She
is very thoughtful, and she doesn't go around tilting at different
things and doesn't follow wildly different philosophies. She looks at
things and applies a good Kansas common sense to it. I think she
epitomizes that sense of common sense. A lot of my colleagues will
remember her, and they know what I am saying is true. This is her
commission's report:

The committee observed that integrated housing is
contributing to a higher rate of disciplinary problems. Both
recruits and trainers, consequently, are distracted from
their training objectives . . ..

What is our objective in basic training but to train? They are being
distracted because of disciplinary problems they are having. This is a
quote from the commission report on December 16, 1997. I want to show
you a chart of this commission in a little bit. It was appointed by the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, and from the President, and they
came out with these unanimous recommendations. It was bipartisan, and
there were a number of people in this commission who served in the
military themselves. This is a group that has considered it. Here is
another quote from congressional testimony:

We have reviewed the barracks structure at the training
installations and believe that this can be achieved at
minimal cost.

I am sensitive to the cost issue because we are not funding the
military sufficiently. I have military bases in my State that are
important and are not being funded sufficiently. They have studied this
thoroughly. They said we can do this at minimal, if any, cost.
In my amendment, we do authorize money to be able to be used to do
this. I think even if you are talking about recruits coming in, you
have to provide some solace to the families that we are going to
separate and do everything we can--and right now we are not--to prevent
this sort of situation from happening. We still provide an
authorization in the amendment that I have, and we can deal with the
appropriation on another day.
This is the Army inspector general's special inspection from July 22,
1997:

Many of the first sergeants interviewed indicated that
trainee-trainee consensual sex occurred quite often, but felt
the chain of command was reluctant to enforce the
installation regulation.

To back up this even with my staff's investigation, the military
requested--and they want to try to make this situation work--and they
have been pushing our office and saying, ``Don't do this.'' They said,
``Send a couple of your staff members to Fort Jackson to look at the
situation.'' We did. I had two staff members go there. They went and
talked with some of the recruits, who told them about instances of
sexual activity happening in the telephone booth and in the same
barracks where you have mixed genders involved, and they told them how
this was done, how the pressure is and the environment and how this
occurs.
So rather than allaying my fears, which is what I hoped would happen,
it just heightened them. Here we had my staff members being told by
recruits, ``Well, yes, this goes on. Here is how it happens in separate
facilities.'' And we were shown how the barrier is built between the
male and female genders on the same floor, with a piece of plywood put
up and a Radio Shack alarm. Well, you are still putting males and
females in close proximity, in common areas. My staff was supposed to
be there being assured this was not going on, but we got just the
opposite report of what was taking place.
This is the CRS issue brief of May 14, 1998. It is the third
different study looking at this particular issue:

At a number of Army facilities, investigations and court
marshals are underway, or have been completed, concerning
harassment, fraternization, assault and rape.

So I have the Kassebaum commission, the Army inspector general, and
now the CRS issue brief. This isn't just one study; this is the third
one. It is the same point that it makes.
Some of the people who have supported the military for a long time,
the American Legion, submitted a report to the House Subcommittee on
Military Personnel on March 17. It said:

The American Legion advocates separate barracks for male
and female recruits at basic training facilities.

This is also an American Legion statement:

The mission in combat is to close with and destroy the
enemy by fire and maneuver and/or close combat. Separate
gender living conditions will better prepare the Armed Forces
to fulfill this mission.

That is what the military is about, Mr. President. This is the
overall commission's unanimous recommendation for separate barracks.
Mr. President, I hope we can have a direct vote on this. I think we
should have separate training for male and female, like what the House
passed. I know a number of my colleagues actually support that as
well--separate training altogether. We decided, let's take a narrower
approach. Let's go on this narrower issue here, because this one I
don't see how you disagree with.

Some of my colleagues will argue, and say, ``Well, let's wait for
another commission report. We have a congressional commission.'' Yes;
we have a congressional commission. It has been appointed. It has a
much broader requirement than just the issue of separate gender
relations. Plus, I would point out again to you, now we are another
year into the future. We are going to be on a second commission. We
already have one conducted and led by a Member of this body, a highly
respected Member of this body, who unanimously reported back. Now we
are going to wait another year.
How many more of these situations like we had take place in the Navy
are we going to have in the interim? How many more letters or contacts
am I going to get by constituents in Kansas saying they had nervous
breakdowns because of this situation? How many more of these will it
take when we will not respond to common sense? This is just common
sense.
I have deep respect for my colleagues who view this differently.
Senator Kempthorne and his committee has looked at this. But I don't
think this makes any sense of where we are. I think this is a very
narrow approach. It isn't about basic training; it is just about
barracks. We can do it at minimal cost. If not, we have the
authorization here to deal with this.
I plead with my colleagues that we do it. I hope we take a different
tack on this.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I ask the Senator a question? I
listened very carefully. I am supportive of his amendment.

[[Page S6971]]

Did the Senator from Kansas mention the Marine Corps?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Only briefly.
Mr. WARNER. Their experience has been considerably freer of the
problems that the other two services have incurred as a consequence of
that. Am I correct?
Mr. BROWNBACK. The Senator is absolutely correct. They, as a service,
agree with what the Kassebaum Commission put forth. The other services
have not.
Mr. WARNER. For those who may be following this debate outside of the
Senate, so to speak, basic training is just 9 weeks in each of the
services. So it is a relatively short period of time. It is a brief
period from when they leave the home environment, school environment,
and other structured environments in their communities across America
to come and undertake this important first phase of their training of a
military career.
It seems to me that what the Senator is asking is just the
opportunity for the different sectors to go into this very intense
period where the objective is to really transform them in many ways, as
the Senator pointed out. First of all, it is a patriotic duty to be a
member of the team. And all of the other important goals are in the
first 9 weeks. To simply, at the end of the training, give them a
little respite from all of the pressures which they are being
subjected, give them a chance to kick back and rest on their own, among
themselves, and then as soon as reveille the following morning,
beginning with the mess facility, beginning the fallout, the grinder
formation, as they march off to the rifle range, they are together, and
it is joint in every respect. Am I not correct?
Mr. BROWNBACK. That is correct. The Senator from Virginia is correct.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator very much.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I want to address further the issue of
cost on this, because some will allege that is the reason we should
block this, because it puts a cost figure of $166 million, $190
million. I am very sensitive to the cost issue, so I provide for the
authorization.
But I also challenge my colleagues on this very point to think about
this. Basic training for 9 weeks, pressurized environment. It is where
you teach, train, build, and mold--9 weeks of a focused, intense time
period that is taking place. You are putting somebody 18 years old,
male and female, into that pressurized environment. Is this a place for
us to cut costs in the military, saying because of that cost we have to
force them onto the same floor and the same common area because we
cannot afford the $166 million?
Mind you, the Kassebaum Commission says we can do this at zero to
minimal cost. We can do this with minimal, if any, cost.
Let's say it does have some cost with it. I don't think it does. I
don't support that notion. Anyway, if you are 18 years old looking at
going into the military, isn't this a pretty minimal amount of cost? If
you are the family of that 18-year-old considering going into the
military, is that a cost that you want the Government to be putting
forth and being a part of? My goodness, we have to make some sense out
of this.
This is a very narrow amendment that we are asking for. I hope we
have a direct vote on this. I hope we will be able to get to it. I will
learn my lessons quickly. So I hope we can get to a vote on this
particular issue.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Yes; I yield to the Senator.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I support the Senator and commend him on his
fine statement. I support the recommendations of the Kassebaum
Commission. I think it is the right recommendation. I wonder if the
Senator would add my name as a cosponsor of his amendment.
Mr. BROWNBACK. I am pleased to do so.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor of the
Brownback amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I will be asking for the yeas and nays
at the appropriate time on this. I plead with my colleagues to really
consider this.
I ask them really just one small, simple favor: Will they call their
constituent services' offices to see how many recruits they have been
contacted by back home during this past year asking for relief from
military duty because they were sexually assaulted, got pregnant at
basic training or at training, and see what the numbers are in their
particular office? One is too many. But I would be interested to see
how many of them have had multiple contacts in their office.
We shouldn't ignore this anymore. We should deal with it. This is a
minor request we should be making.
With that, Mr. President, I will ask for the yeas and nays at the
proper time.
I yield the floor.
Ms. SNOWE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. President.
I appreciate this opportunity to address this body on the subject of
an important issue and what it means, I believe, to the future of our
Armed Forces.
The participation of women in the armed services today is very
important. As the Secretary of Defense said recently in reaffirming his
support for gender-integrated training, and the recommendations of the
services with respect to gender-integrated training, he said clearly
that the military depends upon women.
Women now represent 14 percent of our armed services. So their role
and their well-being is an essential ingredient to upholding the
importance of certain standards with respect to our national security
and performance of our Armed Forces and personnel.
I offered a second-degree amendment to the amendment offered by the
Senator from Kansas, because it will reaffirm the judgment that was
made first in the Armed Services Committee last year to the DOD 1998
authorization. The amendment that was offered created a congressional
commission to examine many of the issues that were raised by the
Senator from Kansas. Obviously, they are not new issues. They are ones
in which we have been wrestling with time and time again, not only here
in Congress but, of course, within the Defense Department.
There are no simple solutions. But what I find amazing in hearing the
discussion with respect to women in the military and the gender-
integrated training and the problems that have resulted from gender-
integrated training, no one seems to raise the issue as to what about
the responsibilities and the moral authority of those people who are in
positions of leadership within our military?
I have had the opportunity to visit many installations, including
Fort Jackson, the one which the Senator from Kansas referred to and
that his staff visited. I also visited that facility. I well remember
the facilities that are there that separate men and women. Men and
women are separated within the Army, within the Air Force, within the
Navy. They have separate entrances. They have separate wings, separate
bays, separate bathrooms, separate alarms. They have security guards,
security cameras. So there are certain security measures that are
already in place. Now the question has arisen as to whether or not we
should have separate barracks.
With all the misconduct and sexual harassment that has occurred that
we have heard so much about over the last few years, much of it,
interestingly enough, has occurred in advanced integrated training
programs, not with basic training. But nevertheless, one of the
critical areas that we must focus on is developing standards and
upholding and enforcing those standards that are consistent with the
well-being of both men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, the
basic rights of all human beings, whether they are in the military or
in the private sector.
And these questions have to be considered as proposed by the Senator
from Kansas through a simple disposition of an amendment? We in the
committee last year said no, and, frankly, I was prepared to debate and
fight this issue in the Chamber with respect to gender-integrated
training, whether or not to have separate barracks, and so

[[Page S6972]]

on and so forth. But in the good judgment and the wisdom of the
committee, we decided to create a consensus-based amendment that was
offered by the chairman of the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senator
Kempthorne, Senator Byrd from West Virginia, and myself. We knew that
the Department of Defense had already created its own commission to
evaluate these questions and many more. We decided that it was also
important to create a commission that was independent to evaluate these
issues as well.
Now we have to decide in this Chamber whether or not we should
subjugate the recommendations of the commission that will be coming
forward next spring to the amendment that is offered by the Senator
from Kansas. I say not. This is a major and fundamental issue. How we
proceed is important, and that is why the Committee on Armed Services
approved an amendment that was included in the 1998 authorization to
create this commission that is now part of law, and it was approved in
the Senate and approved by Congress. So now we have to decide whether
or not we are going to allow the Senator from Kansas to override the
judgment of the members of this commission that will come forward with
recommendations next spring. There will be 10 members of this
commission that are appointed by the chairman and ranking member of the
House National Security Committee and the ranking member and the
chairman of this Committee on Armed Services in the Senate with
consultation with the majority and minority leaders in both bodies.
They represent a cross-section of experience, expertise on some of
these critical issues--that is what we are welcoming--that is
independent of the kind of decision that we can make here in an
amendment that is offered by the Senator from Kansas without the
examination and the evaluation of these issues.
We have represented on the commission a Marine Corps general who
commanded a division during Operation Desert Storm; we have a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management; a former Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower; a board member of the Virginia
Military Institute; the Provost of the University of Michigan, two
military sociologists, a former Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs and a retired sergeant major from the
Training and Doctrine Command. The men and women in our commission have
held these positions or are currently holding them. We should give them
the opportunity to meet their responsibilities under law.
The proponents of the amendment that is offered by the Senator from
Kansas would require by the year 2001 the construction of separate
barracks. It basically will not allow any flexibility by the service
chiefs with respect to the construction of those facilities; that, yes,
will cost more than $167 million to construct. It will not permit
trainees, instructors, commanders, to offer their own assessments of
whether the way the recruits live supports the process for developing a
soldier.

They should be in a position of making those decisions--in fact, have
had the ability to accept the decision that was recommended by the
Kassebaum-Baker Commission. In fact, the Secretary of Defense gave the
service chiefs the opportunity to respond within 90 days to that
recommendation as to how they wanted to proceed and to develop criteria
on the basis on which they decide they would advance or implement those
recommendations. The service chiefs responded. They all upheld their
current status because they have made adjustments in the living
quarters. They are separate. They are not in separate facilities, but
they are in separate wings and bays, as I mentioned earlier, and they
believe that the current process is working. They support gender-
integrated training because they feel that this is the way in which you
build a cohesive unit.
We have thousands and thousands of women who are currently serving in
Bosnia without complaint. We have had thousands and thousands of women
serving in the Persian Gulf without complaint. We have had more than
1,000 women who participated in our operations in Somalia, and we have
had no complaints.
Are we now not saying that it is possible for men and women, on the
day in which they begin their basic training, cannot work and train
together as they will be required to do after their basic training, as
they are required to do right now in Bosnia? We have over 5,000 women
currently serving in Bosnia. In fact, the Washington Post had an in-
depth story last year that described the circumstances under which both
men and women were serving, and they were doing an extraordinary job
without hindrance, without barriers, without complications under some
most arduous of conditions. We had 41,000 women in the Persian Gulf.
Did we hear of complaints? No. It is because they trained together.
They understood the professionalism of their responsibilities, and they
carried them out as we could expect them to do. They upheld the highest
moral standards.
The amendment that I offer here today reinforces the recommendation
that was made by the Armed Services Committee last year by the creation
of this commission to examine many of the questions that have been
raised. Frankly, I had my doubts as to whether or not it was necessary
to create another commission, but I also personally had to recognize
that, in fact, many here in this Chamber and elsewhere had concerns
about basic training and about gender-integrated training, and that
perhaps the best way to proceed was to create another commission that
would represent a breadth of experience and professionalism and
qualifications and skills that are necessary to make the kinds of
decisions that we would expect of them.
Their mandate is substantial. We have more than 10 different areas
with respect to gender-integrated training and all of the other
dimensions to the question--the living conditions, the impact on
readiness, on morale, on fitness standards, the rationale for the
establishment or the disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-
segregated basic training, the rationale that was used at the time in
which these decisions were made by the services to integrate training
or to segregate in the case of the Marines, or assess whether or not
the concept of training as you will fight is a valid rationale for
gender-integrated basic training; identify the requirements that are
unique to each of the services that could affect a decision by the
Secretary considering adopting a gender-integrated or gender-segregated
format for basic training; to examine all the facilities for
feasibility or the implications of requiring drill inspectors to be of
the same sex.

There are a number of issues that are embodied in this statute that
was approved by the Congress last year to the authorization that will
be examined by the men and women who are serving on this commission. So
the question is, Should we adopt the amendment by the Senator from
Kansas or should we adopt the amendment that I have offered as a
second-degree to the amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas that
will give this commission the opportunity to evaluate these questions
so that we can make a reasoned, informed decision as to what approach
should be taken by the military?
This amendment that I have offered is supported by the civilian, the
officer, and the enlisted leadership of the Pentagon to retain the
current training programs at each of the armed services until this
Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues files its
final report in March of 1999. It reaffirms this decision. It reaffirms
the bipartisanship and the consensus that was produced last year in the
Senate Armed Services Committee and in the Congress on these difficult
issues of obtaining the most comprehensive use of professionals and
military leaders outside of Congress. And the charter stipulates very
clearly the aspects that will be examined of the training practices and
the policy directives and the regulations that enumerate the
professional relationships between men and women in uniform. It also
assigns the commission the obligation and responsibility to evaluate
the findings of the Kassebaum-Baker panel on gender-integrated training
and the Pentagon's rules regarding fraternization as well as adultery.
So we have to decide here whether we are going to approve my
amendment that is supported by the Secretary of Defense and the service
chiefs and many of the Members here in this

[[Page S6973]]

body, or are we going to support the amendment offered by the Senator
from Kansas that presumes to answer this in three pages this afternoon
with a new regulation imposing a $167 million military construction
cost on the Defense Department. I think we have an obligation to give
the commission the opportunity to work its will as we have asked them
to do.
I would like to read to you, Mr. President, some excerpts from the
various letters and statements that have been made by the service
chiefs and by the Secretary of Defense about the issues concerning
gender-integrated training and separate barracks. The Secretary of
Defense wrote to the chairman of our committee, Senator Thurmond:

Training in the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps is a
complex matter given each Service's unique mission,
traditions and conditions of service. Each Service has their
own approach in how they conduct basic training. This
training must not be characterized by any one issue such as
billeting or any one policy such as the extent of gender
integrated training. We must, however, identify the right set
of standards to produce a safe and secure environment for the
rigorous training our young men and women need for military
service.
This is exactly what the Department is doing. We are making
sure that we have the very best personnel to staff our
training establishments and to serve as role models for our
new recruits. . . .

____________________