[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 84 (Wednesday, June 24, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H5071-H5072]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1998--VETO MESSAGE FROM THE 
          PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 105-276)

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following veto 
message from the President of the United States:

To the House of Representatives:
  I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the ``Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''
  H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign 
individuals and companies if there is ``credible information indicating 
that'' they transferred certain items or provided certain types of 
assistance that contributed to Iran's missile program, or attempted 
more than once to transfer such items or provide such assistance. These 
sanctions would last at least 2 years and would prohibit sales of 
defense articles and services; exports of certain dual-use items; and 
United States Government assistance.
  My Administration unequivocally supports the critical objectives of 
fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the transfer of missile 
technology to nations whose foreign policy practices and 
nonproliferation policies violate international norms. This 
legislation, however, is indiscriminate, inflexible, and prejudicial to 
these efforts, and would in fact undermine the national security 
objectives of the United States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 
risk a proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.
  Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the credibility of 
U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering U.S. nonproliferation 
objectives. Indeed, the sweeping application of sanctions likely would 
cause serious friction with many governments, diminishing vital 
international cooperation across the range of policy areas--military, 
political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global leadership 
depend.
  Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of sanctions 
based on an unworkably low standard of evidence: ``credible information 
indicating that'' certain transfers or attempted transfers had 
occurred. Such a low standard of evidence could result in the erroneous 
imposition of sanctions on individuals and business entities 
worldwide--even in certain instances when they did not know the true 
end user of the items. The bill would also hinder U.S. efforts to 
enlist the support of other countries to halt the objectionable 
activities by imposing an unreasonable standard for waiving the bill's 
sanctions. In addition, the sanctions proposed by the legislation are 
disproportionate. A minor violation (e.g., the transfer of a few grams 
of aluminum powder) would carry the same penalty as a transfer of major 
proliferation significance. This, too, undermines U.S. credibility and 
increases foreign opposition to U.S. policy.

  H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it will affect 
that country. The legislation does not allow flexibility sufficient to 
reflect the progress made by the Russian government in formulating 
policies and processes whose goal is to sever links between Russian 
entities and Iran's ballistic missile program. At the urging of the 
United States, President Yeltsin, the Prime Minister, Russian security 
services Chief Kovalev, and Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev have all 
made clear that proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction is a serious threat to Russia's security. They have called 
for strict control of sensitive technologies and stressed the strict 
penalties that will be imposed for violations of Russian law. On 
January 22 of this year, the Russian government issued a ``catch all'' 
executive order providing authority to stop all transfers of dual-use 
goods and services for missiles and weapons of mass destruction 
programs, and on May 15 published detailed regulations to implement 
that order. They have recently developed and circulated a list of end 
users of concern in Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. In the 
course of regular and active discussion of this issue with the Russian 
government, the United States has raised problem cases involving 
cooperation between Russian entities and the Iranian missile program. 
We have seen progress in this area, and a number of these cases are no 
longer active concerns.

  Precisely because Russia needs to take effective enforcement steps to 
control the flow of technology, the United States needs to be able to 
work cooperatively with the Russian government to assure further 
progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut the cooperation we have worked to 
achieve with the Russian government without helping us solve the 
problem of technology transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature 
could also hurt our increasing cooperation with Russian government 
agencies in other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-
narcotics, and combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would 
interpret this law as an infringement of its sovereignty, affecting our 
ability to work with Russia on broader U.S. policy goals and on 
regional and global issues.
  Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law, such as 
the missile technology control provisions of the Arms Export Control 
Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing sanctions to prevent 
missile proliferation to Iran and elsewhere.
  I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress attached Title 
II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997,'' to 
this problematic and counterproductive bill. Because Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) implementation legislation has not been enacted, the 
United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations under the 
CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong bipartisan support, 
and should be passed by the Congress as a free-standing bill without 
further delay. I note, however, that sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii), 
213(e)(3)(B)(v), and 213(f) of Title II could interfere with certain of 
my exclusive constitutional powers, and I urge the Congress to correct 
these constitutional deficiencies.
  For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709 without my 
approval.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, June 23, 1998.

[[Page H5072]]

                              {time}  1030

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The objections of the 
President will be spread at large upon the Journal and, without 
objection, the message and bill will be printed as a House document.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the message of 
the President, together with the accompanying bill, H.R. 2709, be 
referred to the Committee on International Relations.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Missouri?
  There was no objection.

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