Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 82 (Monday, June 22, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 82 (Monday, June 22, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6740-S6751]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have advised the distinguished ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee of what I am about to do.
Hopefully, this announcement will lend some clarity to the procedural
situation we are now in.

Amendment No. 2737, as modified

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Hutchinson, I modify
the pending amendment with the additional text now at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
At the end of the amendment, add the following:
TITLE ____

SEC. ____. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Forced Abortion
Condemnation Act''.

SEC. ____. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime
against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
(2) For over 15 years there have been frequent and credible
reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization in
connection with the population control policies of the
People's Republic of China. These reports indicate the
following:
(A) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of
the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced
sterilization have no role in the population control program,
in fact the Communist Chinese Government encourages both
forced abortion and forced sterilization through a
combination of strictly enforced birth quotas and immunity
for local population control officials who engage in
coercion. Officials acknowledge that there have been
instances of forced abortions and sterilization, and no
evidence has been made available to suggest that the
perpetrators have been punished.
(B) People's Republic of China population control
officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit
officials, routinely monitor women's menstrual cycles and
subject women who conceive without government authorization
to extreme psychological pressure, to harsh economic
sanctions, including unpayable fines and loss of employment,
and often to physical force.
(C) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized
children include fines in amounts several times larger than
the per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's
Republic of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine
is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual income.
Families which cannot pay the fine may be subject to
confiscation and destruction of their homes and personal
property.
(D) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on
those whose resistance is motivated by religion. For example,
according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the
Catholic inhabitants of 2 villages in Hebei Province were
subjected to population control under the slogan ``better to
have more graves than one more child''. Enforcement measures
included torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of
resisters' relatives as hostages.
(E) Forced abortions in Communist China often have taken
place in the very late stages of pregnancy.
(F) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization have been
used in Communist China not only to regulate the number of
children, but also to eliminate those who are regarded as
defective in accordance with the official eugenic policy
known as the ``Natal and Health Care Law''.

SEC. ____. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES OF PERSONS
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ENGAGED IN
ENFORCEMENT OF FORCED ABORTION POLICY.

The Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the
Attorney General may not admit to the United States, any
national of the People's Republic of China, including any
official of the Communist Party or the Government of the
People's Republic of China and its regional, local, and
village authorities (except the head of state, the head of
government, and cabinet level ministers) who the Secretary
finds, based on credible information, has been involved in
the establishment or enforcement of population control
policies resulting in a woman being forced to undergo an
abortion against her free choice, or resulting in a man or
woman being forced to undergo sterilization against his or
her free choice.

SEC. ____. WAIVER.

The President may waive the requirement contained in
section ____ with respect to a national of the People's
Republic of China if the President--
(1) determines that it is in the national interest of the
United States to do so; and
(2) provides written notification to Congress containing a
justification for the waiver.
This title may be cited as the ``Communist China Subsidy
Reduction Act of 1998''.

SEC. ____. FINDINGS.

Congress finds that--
(1) the People's Republic of China has enjoyed ready access
to international capital through commercial loans, direct
investment, sales of securities, bond sales, and foreign aid;
(2) regarding international commercial lending, the
People's Republic of China had $48,000,000,000 in loans
outstanding from private creditors in 1995;
(3) regarding international direct investment,
international direct investment in the People's Republic of
China from 1993 through 1995 totaled $97,151,000,000, and in
1996 alone totaled $47,000,000,000;
(4) regarding investment in Chinese securities, the
aggregate value of outstanding Chinese securities currently
held by Chinese nationals and foreign persons is
$175,000,000,000, and from 1993 through 1995 foreign persons
invested $10,540,000,000 in Chinese stocks;
(5) regarding investment in Chinese bonds, entities
controlled by the Government of the People's Republic of
China have issued 75 bonds since 1988, including 36 dollar-
denominated bond offerings valued at more than
$6,700,000,000, and the total value of long-term Chinese
bonds outstanding as of January 1, 1996, was $11,709,000,000;
(6) regarding international assistance, the People's
Republic of China received almost $1,000,000,000 in foreign
aid grants and an additional $1,566,000,000 in technical
assistance grants from 1993 through 1995, and in 1995
received $5,540,000,000 in bilateral assistance loans,
including concessional aid, export credits, and related
assistance; and
(7) regarding international financial institutions--
(A) despite the People's Republic of China's access to
international capital and world financial markets,
international financial institutions have annually provided
it with more than $4,000,000,000 in loans in recent years,
amounting to almost a third of the loan commitments of the
Asian Development Bank and 17.1 percent of the loan approvals
by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
in 1995; and
(B) the People's Republic of China borrows more from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
Asian Development Bank than any other country, and loan
commitments from those institutions to the People's Republic
of China quadrupled from $1,100,000,000 in 1985 to
$4,300,000,000 by 1995.

[[Page S6741]]

SEC. ____. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO CONCESSIONAL LOANS
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Title XV of the International Financial Institutions Act
(22 U.S.C. 262o-262o-1) is amended by adding at the end the
following:

``SEC. 1503. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO CONCESSIONAL
LOANS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
instruct the United States Executive Directors at each
international financial institution (as defined in section
1702(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act)
to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the
provision by the institution of concessional loans to the
People's Republic of China, any citizen or national of the
People's Republic of China, or any entity established in the
People's Republic of China.
``(b) Concessional Loans Defined.--As used in subsection
(a), the term `concessional loans' means loans with highly
subsidized interest rates, grace periods for repayment of 5
years or more, and maturities of 20 years or more.''.

SEC. ____. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD BE ADHERED TO BY ANY UNITED
STATES NATIONAL CONDUCTING AN INDUSTRIAL
COOPERATION PROJECT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.

(a) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this section to create
principles governing the conduct of industrial cooperation
projects of United States nationals in the People's Republic
of China.
(b) Statement of Principles.--It is the sense of Congress
that any United States national conducting an industrial
cooperation project in the People's Republic of China should:
(1) Suspend the use of any goods, wares, articles, or
merchandise that the United States national has reason to
believe were mined, produced, or manufactured, in whole or in
part, by convict labor or forced labor, and refuse to use
forced labor in the industrial cooperation project.
(2) Seek to ensure that political or religious views, sex,
ethnic or national background, involvement in political
activities or nonviolent demonstrations, or association with
suspected or known dissidents will not prohibit hiring, lead
to harassment, demotion, or dismissal, or in any way affect
the status or terms of employment in the industrial
cooperation project. The United States national should not
discriminate in terms or conditions of employment in the
industrial cooperation project against persons with past
records of arrest or internal exile for nonviolent protest or
membership in unofficial organizations committed to
nonviolence.
(3) Ensure that methods of production used in the
industrial cooperation project do not pose an unnecessary
physical danger to workers and neighboring populations or
property, and that the industrial cooperation project does
not unnecessarily risk harm to the surrounding environment;
and consult with community leaders regarding environmental
protection with respect to the industrial cooperation
project.
(4) Strive to establish a private business enterprise when
involved in an industrial cooperation project with the
Government of the People's Republic of China or other state
entity.
(5) Discourage any Chinese military presence on the
premises of any industrial cooperation projects which involve
dual-use technologies.
(6) Undertake to promote freedom of association and
assembly among the employees of the United States national.
The United States national should protest any infringement by
the Government of the People's Republic of China of these
freedoms to the International Labor Organization's office in
Beijing.
(7) Provide the Department of State with information
relevant to the Department's efforts to collect information
on prisoners for the purposes of the Prisoner Information
Registry, and for other purposes.
(8) Discourage or undertake to prevent compulsory political
indoctrination programs from taking place on the premises of
the industrial cooperation project.
(9) Promote freedom of expression, including the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any media. To this end,
the United States national should raise with appropriate
authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of
China concerns about restrictions on the free flow of
information.
(10) Undertake to prevent harassment of workers who,
consistent with the United Nations World Population Plan of
Action, decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing
of their children; and prohibit compulsory population control
activities on the premises of the industrial cooperation
project.
(c) Promotion of Principles by Other Nations.--The
Secretary of State shall forward a copy of the principles set
forth in subsection (b) to the member nations of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
encourage them to promote principles similar to these
principles.
(d) Registration Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Each United States national conducting an
industrial cooperation project in the People's Republic of
China shall register with the Secretary of State and indicate
that the United States national agrees to implement the
principles set forth in subsection (b). No fee shall be
required for registration under this subsection.
(2) Preference for participation in trade missions.--The
Secretary of Commerce shall consult the register prior to the
selection of private sector participants in any form of trade
mission to China, and undertake to involve those United
States nationals that have registered their adoption of the
principles set forth above.
(e) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``industrial cooperation project'' refers to a
for-profit activity the business operations of which employ
more than 25 individuals or have assets greater than $25,000;
and
(2) the term ``United States national'' means--
(A) a citizen or national of the United States or a
permanent resident of the United States; and
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other business
association organized under the laws of the United States,
any State or territory thereof, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.

SEC. ____. PROMOTION OF EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC,
AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY, LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND
ARTISTIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA.

(a) Exchanges Between the United States and China.--
Agencies of the United States Government which engage in
educational, cultural, scientific, agricultural, military,
legal, political, and artistic exchanges shall endeavor to
initiate or expand such exchange programs with regard to
China.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a
federally chartered not-for-profit organization should be
established to fund exchanges between the United States and
China through private donations.

SEC. ____. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should make
freedom of religion one of the major objectives of United
States foreign policy with respect to China. As part of this
policy, the Department of State should raise in every
relevant bilateral and multilateral forum the issue of
individuals imprisoned, detained, confined, or otherwise
harassed by the Chinese Government on religious grounds. In
its communications with the Chinese Government, the
Department of State should provide specific names of
individuals of concern and request a complete and timely
response from the Chinese Government regarding the
individuals' whereabouts and condition, the charges against
them, and sentence imposed. The goal of these official
communications should be the expeditious release of all
religious prisoners in China and Tibet and the end of the
Chinese Government's policy and practice of harassing and
repressing religious believers.

SEC. ____. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE PARTICIPATION
OF CERTAIN CHINESE OFFICIALS IN CONFERENCES,
EXCHANGES, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES.

(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, for fiscal years after fiscal year 1997, no funds
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department
of State, the United States Information Agency, and the
United States Agency for International Development may be
used for the purpose of providing travel expenses and per
diem for the participation of nationals of the People's
Republic of China described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in
conferences, exchanges, programs, and activities:
(1) The head or political secretary of any of the following
Chinese Government-created or approved organizations:
(A) The Chinese Buddhist Association.
(B) The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.
(C) The National Congress of Catholic Representatives.
(D) The Chinese Catholic Bishops' Conference.
(E) The Chinese Protestant ``Three Self'' Patriotic
Movement.
(F) The China Christian Council.
(G) The Chinese Taoist Association.
(H) The Chinese Islamic Association.
(2) Any military or civilian official or employee of the
Government of the People's Republic of China who carried out
or directed the carrying out of any of the following policies
or practices:
(A) Formulating, drafting, or implementing repressive
religious policies.
(B) Imprisoning, detaining, or harassing individuals on
religious grounds.
(C) Promoting or participating in policies or practices
which hinder religious activities or the free expression of
religious beliefs.
(b) Certification.--
(1) Each Federal agency subject to the prohibition of
subsection (a) shall certify in writing to the appropriate
congressional committees no later than 120 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter,
that it did not pay, either directly or through a contractor
or grantee, for travel expenses or per diem of any national
of the People's Republic of China described in subsection
(a).
(2) Each certification under paragraph (1) shall be
supported by the following information:
(A) The name of each employee of any agency of the
Government of the People's Republic of China whose travel
expenses or

[[Page S6742]]

per diem were paid by funds of the reporting agency of the
United States Government.
(B) The procedures employed by the reporting agency of the
United States Government to ascertain whether each individual
under subparagraph (A) did or did not participate in
activities described in subsection (a)(2).
(C) The reporting agency's basis for concluding that each
individual under subparagraph (A) did not participate in such
activities.
(c) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
For purposes of this section the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. ____. CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE VISAS AND EXCLUDED
FROM ADMISSION.

(a) Requirement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, any national of the People's Republic of China described
in section ____(a)(2) (except the head of state, the head of
government, and cabinet level ministers) shall be ineligible
to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into
the United States.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement in
subsection (a) with respect to an individual described in
such subsection if the President--
(1) determines that it is vital to the national interest to
do so; and
(2) provides written notification to the appropriate
congressional committees (as defined in section ____(c))
containing a justification for the waiver.

SEC. ____. SUNSET PROVISION.

Sections ____ and ____ shall cease to have effect 4 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. ____. SATELLITE CONTROLS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
MUNITIONS LIST.

(a) Control of Satellites on the United States Munitions
List.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the export
control of satellites and related items on the Commerce
Control List of dual-use items in the Export Administration
Regulations (15 C.F.R. Part 730 et seq.) on the day before
the effective date of this section shall be considered, on or
after such date, to be transferred to the United States
Munitions List under section 38 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
(b) Report.--Each report to Congress submitted pursuant to
section 902(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246) to waive the
restrictions contained in that Act on the export to the
People's Republic of China of United States-origin satellites
and defense articles on the United States Munitions List
shall be accompanied by a detailed justification setting
forth--
(1) a detailed description of all militarily sensitive
characteristics integrated within, or associated with, the
satellite;
(2) an estimate of the number of United States civilian
contract personnel expected to be needed in country to carry
out the proposed satellite launch;
(3) a detailed description of--
(A) the United States Government's plan to monitor the
proposed satellite launch to ensure that no unauthorized
transfer of technology occurs, together with an estimate of
the number of officers and employees of the United States
Government expected to be needed in country to carry out
monitoring of the proposed satellite launch; and
(B) the manner in which the costs of such monitoring shall
be borne; and
(4) the reasons why the proposed satellite launch is in the
national security interest of the United States, including--
(A) the impact of the proposed export on employment in the
United States, including the number of new jobs created in
the United States, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct
result of the proposed export;
(B) the number of existing jobs in the United States that
would be lost, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result
of the proposed export not being licensed;
(C) the impact of the proposed export on the balance of
trade between the United States and China and a reduction in
the current United States trade deficit with China;
(D) the impact of the proposed export on China's transition
from a nonmarket to a market economy and the long-term
economic benefit to the United States;
(E) the impact of the proposed export on opening new
markets to American-made products through China's purchase of
United States-made goods and services not directly related to
the proposed export;
(F) the impact of the proposed export on reducing acts,
policies, and practices that constitute significant trade
barriers to United States exports or foreign direct
investment in China by United States nationals;
(G) the increase in the United States overall market share
for goods and services in comparison to Japan, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia;
(H) the impact of the proposed export on China's
willingness to modify its commercial and trade laws,
practices, and regulations to make American-made goods and
services more accessible to that market; and
(I) the impact of the proposed export on China's
willingness to reduce formal and informal trade barriers and
tariffs, duties, and other fees on American-made goods and
services entering China.
(c) National Security Waiver for the Export of Satellites
to China.--Section 902(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law
101-246; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note) is amended by inserting before
the period at the end the following: ``, except that, in the
case of a proposed export of a satellite under subsection
(a)(5), on a case-by-case basis, that it is in the national
security interests of the United States to do so''.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Militarily sensitive characteristics.--The term
``militarily sensitive characteristics'' includes, but is not
limited to, antijamming capability, antennas, crosslinks,
baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation-hardened
devices, propulsion systems, pointing accuracy, or kick
motors.
(2) Related items.--The term ``related items'' means the
satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equipment,
payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and
non-embedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines
described in the report submitted to Congress by the
Department of State on February 6, 1998, pursuant to section
38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)).
(e) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect 15 days
after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC.____. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY POLICY.

(a) Establishment of Position.--Section 134 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(d)(1) There is a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Technology Security Policy in the Office of the Under
Secretary. The Deputy Under Secretary serves as the Director
of the Defense Technology Security Administration.
``(2) The Deputy Under Secretary has only the following
duties:
``(A) To supervise activities of the Department of Defense
relating to export controls.
``(B) To develop for the Department of Defense policies and
positions regarding the appropriate export control policies
and procedures that are necessary to protect the national
security interests of the United States.
``(3) The Deputy Under Secretary may report directly to the
Secretary of Defense on the matters that are within the
duties of the Deputy Under Secretary.''.
(b) Implementation.--The Secretary of Defense shall
complete the actions necessary to implement section 134(d) of
title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)),
not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives a report on the plans of the Secretary for
implementing section 134(d) of title 10, United States Code,
as added by subsection (a). The report shall include the
following:
(1) A description of any organizational changes that are to
be made within the Department of Defense to implement the
provision.
(2) A description of the role of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the export control activities of the
Department of Defense after the provision is implemented,
together with a discussion of how that role compares to the
Chairman's role in those activities before the implementation
of the provision.
(d) Limitation.--Unless specifically authorized and
appropriated for such purpose, no funds may be obligated to
relocate office space or personnel of the Defense Technology
Security Administration.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it will be my intention to move to table
this amendment at approximately 11 a.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, June 23. I
will be working with Senator Levin to reach an agreement as to the
exact time. Members will be notified as soon as that time agreement has
been reached. In addition, other votes could occur prior to the
scheduled weekly recess for our party conferences, which begins at
12:30 p.m. on Tuesday. I thank all colleagues for their attention to
this matter.
Mr. President, I hope that while we only have another 50 minutes on
the bill prior to business, according to the pending order, that there
will be statements and other matters relating to this bill so that we
can make as productive use of the time as possible. I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Virginia for
the statement he has made. I know all Members of the Senate will be on
notice accordingly.
I take this moment to speak generally to the amendment that is before
the Senate regarding China policy and the overall question before the
country about China policy, as President Clinton prepares to leave for
China later this week.

[[Page S6743]]

Mr. President, this debate is nothing new. Nonetheless, it takes on a
special meaning and intensity, because it happens in the week in which
the President will go to China. I understand the Senator from Arkansas,
who is the proponent of most of the amendments, has stated over and
over again that it was not his intention that these amendments be
brought up in the week in which the President was going to China, and I
know that is absolutely the fact. These amendments were filed earlier.
He had discussed them earlier. It just happens that here we are on this
bill, and they are coming up.
I hope that we will proceed, may I say, with an appropriate sense of
respect for the mission that the President will carry out on all our
behalf, because, though we may have different sides of this American
policy towards China that we speak to on the floor, I know that we all
hope and pray that the President's trip will be successful, in the
sense that it will not only strengthen our bilateral relationship with
China, but will do so based on honest exchange and principle, including
the very principles that are the subject of some of the amendments that
are before us, most particularly human rights, proliferation, which is
to say security, and trade policy, and the others as well.
Mr. President, this question of our relationship with China is, in
some ways, the most difficult, complicated and yet the most important
of our foreign and defense policies because of the size of China, the
enormous changes that are occurring in China, and the significant role
that China will play in the next century as a true military, economic
superpower. The question of our policy is often described as a choice
between engagement or nonengagement, which is to say engagement, on the
one hand, or isolation and containment on the other.
Well, I favor engagement. I think that the truth is when you come
down to it, there are very few people here that I have heard in the
Senate who really want to isolate China, or that is the stated
intention of their policy. The question then becomes, I believe, not
whether or not to engage; China is too big for us not to engage with;
we are too sensible for us to try to isolate or contain this great
country with such a long and proud history. The question then becomes,
How do we engage? And do we engage in a way that works together in an
honest, principled fashion to not only improve our relations--military,
economic, ideological, philosophical--but to improve the lot, the
plight, the lives of people in China consistent with our own
principles.
My fear is that some of the amendments that are offered here on this
bill, and some of the statements of intention that have been made
regarding American policy toward China, while they may want a form of
engagement or they may acknowledge the inevitability of engagement with
China, they do so in a way that is confrontational, in some sense is
punitive, perhaps without justification for all the punitive qualities,
and in the end will put us in a course of conflict with China which
many of us feel is not necessary. That, I think, is the issue drawn by
these amendments. Yes, engagement, but what kind of engagement will it
be?
On the other side there is an engagement that would be so devoid of
honesty and principle that it would sacrifice America's national
interests and our traditional values, human rights being at the top of
them, which is to say it would be engagement for the sake of
engagement, to yield, if you will, to the People's Republic of China in
any point of conflict between us. That is as unacceptable as the policy
on the other side of isolation and attempted containment.
I think we have to see if we can work together here to find a common
ground on which we engage honestly and consistent with our principles
and interests, which is to say we have an interest--military, economic,
philosophical--in engaging China in the world community, in building
peaceful relationships and prosperous relationships with her, but that
engagement must be honest in the sense that we do not conceal our
differences, and principled in the sense that we do not yield on the
principles that make us uniquely American.
I hope out of the kind of debate that--though it is awkward to have
it the week that the President is going to China--but I hope that out
of the debate that is occurring here on these amendments, and the
debate that I am sure will follow on MFN as the days and weeks go by,
that we will be able to find a common ground.
It is not surprising that this debate is occurring. China is not only
a big country and an important country, but it is a country with a
different culture and history from ours. It is a country that lived
under a remarkably rigid, ideological, Communist dictatorship for a
long period of time that has seen outbursts, spasmodic alterations in
the political status quo, and it is different from us. So these
differences about how to engage China, what to expect of China, are not
surprising. And we express those in the debate that is occurring on
this bill.

My own strong support for the policy of engagement--honest,
principled, direct engagement; one that I think is in our national
interest--is premised on a conclusion which is that that policy of
engagement, begun 26 years ago by President Nixon, followed by every
President since of both political parties, has worked. We have had
tough times, crises in the relationship--cultural revolution two
decades ago; and very fresh, still stinging for us, the tragedy on
Tiananmen Square a little less than a decade ago.
But overall, if you look at the changes, the revolutionary changes
within this country, China, I believe the facts indicate that the
policy of engagement has produced a China today that is significantly
different than the China of two decades ago of the cultural revolution,
and one decade ago of the Tiananmen Square tragedy--an atrocity--that
it is a country today that is moving in exactly the direction we would
want it to, remarkably toward a market economy--and I will speak in a
moment more to that--and also more in the direction of human rights
than before, though, God knows, not enough.
But remember, again, we are dealing with a culture and a country very
different from ours, a culture and a country during communism and
before so large that it lived with the constant fear of the leadership,
of the disintegration of this enormous national entity, a country in
which leaders have traditionally portrayed themselves as riding on the
back of a tiger. But the changes have most assuredly occurred.
It has been fascinating in the last month or so just to pay a little
bit of extra attention to the newspaper reports from China, not so much
the political reports, but what might be called feature stories in the
press. And they showed a China that is dramatically different, much
more like us than it was before.
There was a story a while back in one of the papers about the fact
that half of the villages in China have held elections. It was a
concerted effort by the leadership--not unlimited; that is for sure--
but a concerted effort by the leadership of China to introduce some
form of participatory electoral system in half of the villages in
China, almost 500,000 villages.
There was another story about a professor at a university in Beijing,
a brilliant man, from the article, who had an idea for a new
technology; this kind of thing that happens around America,
particularly in places like Silicon Valley. It did not happen in
Communist China. But he found his way to some capital, started a
company, and is doing brilliantly. He is excited about his stock
options. Wow. That is not one of Mao's--I do not remember stock options
being in Mao's little red book.
There was a different kind of story about a change in the use of the
media. Remember, under Mao the television or the propaganda instruments
only had one--it was all straight ahead. It was all: ``Support Mao.
Support the State.'' There was a story about a gentleman who is
producing the most popular sitcom on television in China. He had been,
I am proud to say, in my own State of Connecticut, in Waterford at the
Eugene O'Neill Theater for a period of months studying and saw ``The
Cosby Show'' and was inspired by it. I take some license here, but he
went back and created the Chinese version of ``Cosby,'' the most
popular show in China at this point.
There was an announcement of the sale of 3 million state-owned
residences

[[Page S6744]]

to people, to citizens of China, property ownership fundamental to our
view of the world, not theirs; tens of thousands of State-owned
enterprises about to be privatized or closed down because they are
inefficient.

Under the leadership I would describe as revolutionary, of the new
Premier, Zhu Rongji, one of the ways in which the Communist State
controls the lives and political behavior of all of its citizens is by
employing all of its citizens. Once you take these tens of thousands,
hundreds of thousands, of State-owned enterprises, privatize them, and
people are not working for the State any more but working for private
owners, you have the conditions for a whole new expression and
experience of freedom--remarkable, remarkable changes.
Let me talk about religion, because it is of real interest to me. I
worked with colleagues and cosponsored one of the two bills before this
body that try to put religious freedom and protection from religious
persecution and discrimination at the center of our foreign policy and
impose penalties on countries or at least alter our relationship with
countries that don't respect the bedrock American principle of freedom
of religion.
Last March, Senator Mack, a colleague and dear friend from Florida,
and I went to China. It happened to be Holy Week, the week before
Easter. Senator Mack went to mass each day. The churches were more or
less full.
Let me read from a New York Times article of just less than a week
ago, June 17, so you can get a flavor of the changes that are
occurring, and yet the enormous changes that have not yet occurred that
we need to have occurring. I will read briefly from the New York Times
of June 17, an article by Eric Eckholm, from Nanjing. The article
begins with a report that:

New Bibles stream forth from a computerized printing press
in this onetime southern capital at a rate of two and a half
million a year for sale to Christians all over China. [Bibles
in Chinese, of course.]

* * * * *

Critics in the West point to the restrictions and
repression as evidence of systematic persecution, while the
Government's defenders here point, instead, to the relative
freedom most Christians now enjoy.
Paradoxically, the rising outcry abroad comes as
Christianity in China, especially evangelical Protestantism,
is growing explosively. The Rev. Don Argue [many of us are
privileged to know in this Chamber], recent president of the
National Association of Evangelicals in the United States,
says China may be experiencing ``the single greatest Revival
in the history of Christianity.''
Much of that growth has occurred with official
acquiescence, and though they remain a small minority in a
giant country, millions of Chinese people like Zhang Linmei,
a 32-year-old worshiper at St. Paul's [in Nanjing], find the
same comfort in religion that Christians do anywhere, without
worrying much about politics.
``I feel life is meaningless in society at large,'' Zhang
said after services as she picked up her 5-year-old daughter,
dressed in her finest, from Sunday school.
``This is the only reliable place in my life,'' Zhang
added.
``The situation for religion is in many ways the best it's
been since 1949,'' [the year of the Communist revolution]
said Richard Madsen, an expert on Chinese religion at the
University of California at San Diego. Though the
Government still controls their growth and closely
monitors their activities, he said, the official churches
enjoy more autonomy [today] than [ever] in the past.
Even the illegal churches--[of course, here we get to the
problem] unregistered Protestant churches and openly pro-
Vatican Catholic groups--function without serious trouble in
many places, Dr. Madsen and others say. But those who refuse
to pledge support to the Government and its apparatus of
religious control, and those with unorthodox or ecstatic
styles of worship, can face harsh repression. The situation
is similar for other major religions here, including
Buddhists and Muslims. Many believers now enjoy relative
freedom, but Tibetan Buddhists who consider the Dalai Lama
their leader face repression.

Finally, a few more paragraphs which I think express the explosion in
belief and freedom to believe, and yet the repression that still exists
for those who trouble and offend particularly provincial
administrators, administrators of the various Chinese provinces, or
touch a vulnerable cord in the Chinese experience, which is the fear of
a loyalty to a force outside of China and beyond the Government.
I read again from the New York Times article of June 17 last week:

Officials say Catholics now number four million, while
outside researchers say the true total may be closer to 10
million, with many secretly accepting the Pope as the true
head of their church.
The peculiar hybrid state of Christianity here reflects the
obsession of the Communist party with control: virtually any
organization, whether political or social or religious, must
gain party approval.
The party is an officially atheist organization that
asserts that religion will eventually wither away. But in a
policy spelled out in the early 1980's, the Government
officially guarantees freedom of religion--within prescribed
boundaries including a required allegiance to the state,
adherence to certain styles of worship and limits on church
construction, evangelizing and the baptism of children, among
other rules.

Of course, those are all unacceptable to us.

For those willing to accommodate, the 1990's seem a golden
time.
``From our perspective, now is the best time ever for
implementing the policy of religious freedom,'' said Han
Wenzao, who as president of the China Christian Council is
the national leader of the official Protestant church and a
prime link to the Communist Government. ``The criterion
should be, is the word of God being propagated or not? [And
Mr. Han Wenzao says] It is and it's good.''

Well, that is a rational report, sobering and disappointing in the
continuation of official sanctions, repression, anxiety about religion;
and yet, clearly, the momentum is all in favor of faith. That, too,
represents a maturing, a changing and development within the mind and
outlook of the leadership of China. I think it is at least in part a
reaction to the centrality that we have placed on religious freedom,
absent persecution, in our relations with the People's Republic of
China.
So, I hope we will pass one of these bills that set up a system in
our Government to rank and report on the state of religious freedom in
all the countries of the world. Of course, I don't favor a specific
action regarding the People's Republic of China, because that tends to
scapegoat them and it tends to create a confrontation between us
separately that is not necessary. They ought to be part of the overall
policy that I hope this Senate will adopt, that Congress will adopt,
before this session ends and, most particularly, to the events of this
week.
I hope and believe that when the President meets with Jiang Zemin,
when he speaks with the people of China publicly, he will raise this
question of religious persecution in a way that he couldn't do if he
were not engaged and wouldn't do if we were not honestly and
principally engaged; he will speak directly to why it is so important
to us in America that countries with which we have normal, bilateral
relations respect the right of their citizens to worship God as they
choose. That was the initial, primal motivation for those who founded
this country. It is right there in the first or second paragraph--first
substantive paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, in the first
amendment to our Constitution, the beginning of the Bill of Rights. It
is what we are about. If we are not directly and principally engaged
with that, if our President of the United States does not go to China,
the kind of progress that I have described in which I say the glass is
certainly half full and getting fuller, the opportunities for that will
be lost.
I want to say just a word more about national security, because these
amendments, after all, are attached to the Department of Defense
authorization bill, S. 2057.
In a literal sense, a parliamentary sense, it seems to me personally
that these amendments are not germane. That is a matter of
parliamentary conclusion, which I will leave to others. But I want to
say that the question of our relations with the People's Republic of
China, the question of how we engage and whether we engage with the
People's Republic of China is at the center of our national security
policy, of our defense policy today and, even more so, in the next
century.
We have many important security relationships in the world, beginning
with our allies in Europe, and in Japan. Our ability to manage our
relationship with the People's Republic of China will, in my opinion,
as much as any other relation we have, determine whether or not we will
live in a world that remains secure in our time, but whether our
children, and whether the pages here, as they grow to be adults, will
live in a world that is secure. That is the destiny of China--with 1.2
billion people who are building a military, it is strategically
located, an enormous country.
Look at the situations in the world which worry us now--most
recently,

[[Page S6745]]

the explosions of atomic weapons by India and Pakistan on the Asian
subcontinent. Our ability to work with them, as we have been doing
since those explosions, greatly strengthens our capacity to limit the
possibility that the conflict on the subcontinent will break into a
worse conflict, and a nightmare would be a nuclear war.
Consider where we would be today in implementing the policy on the
Asian subcontinent if we were not engaged with China, if we could not
work with the permanent five members of the Security Council and with
China on a problem such as that. Take the Korean peninsula. We have in
excess of 30,000 American soldiers there. It is probably the most
heavily armed border in the world. Our ability to keep the peace there
and, in fact, to begin to move beyond, in the absence of conflict, to
better relations between the parties there is very important to us. It
is materially helped by our engagement with China--our ability to work
with the two Koreas, China, and the United States to try to create more
stability and ultimately, perhaps, a reunification of the two parts of
Korea.
Take our interest in the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East--an
interest so clearly vital to our national security that we sent a half
million troops there about 7 years ago in the Persian Gulf war. China
and United States will begin to have shared interests--and perhaps even
if we are not engaged, a shared competition, as China grows
economically--for the energy resources in the Persian Gulf area, for
the oil. We have to have a good relationship with China to be able to
manage that competition for energy in a way that doesn't break into
conflict.
More immediately, the Middle East, Persian Gulf--always a tinderbox
in our time--we deeply fear the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, of ballistic missiles, particularly in Iran. My sense is
that the engagement with China has assisted us materially in cutting
down the flow of component parts to the Iranians for the development of
nuclear weapons, which is not so with missile proliferation, as far as
I can tell. I hope and trust that the President will discuss that
directly with the leadership of China in the summit that is to come
later this week.
But, again, an engagement with China offers us the prospect, in
return for what China seeks in our bilateral relationship, including
not only economic gain but recognition, stature, involvement in world
organizations--in return for that, hopefully, we will be in a position
to convince the leadership in China to cut back on any of the component
parts of ballistic missiles, which they are selling to Iran, or any
other countries that threaten our security, because that is part of
what it means to be engaged.

Incidentally, Mr. President, in this regard--and I know there are
some amendments that maybe have been put forth that deal with
proliferation--this Chamber, a short while ago, passed the Iran Missile
Sanctions Act, also passed by the House, on its way to the President.
The concern expressed about that bill had mostly to do with its impact
on Russia as a major supply of component parts for missile construction
in Iran. But Russia is not mentioned in that bill. That is a generic
bill. That is the way we ought to deal with problems like
proliferation--not to single out the Chinese, but, you know, the PRC,
People's Republic of China, will be affected by that legislation, and
entities within it will be deprived of doing business with the United
States if there is evidence that they are contributing to the ballistic
missile capacity of the Iranians. We would not have those opportunities
if we were not engaged honestly and in a principled way.
So I draw the conclusion that though these amendments may, in one
sense, parliamentary, be ill placed on this bill, that they touch a
larger issue. It is the right issue and the right point, which is that
our ability to manage our relations with China in our time, and
particularly as we head into the next century, will substantially
affect the national security of the United States.
Let us say we stopped engaging and we attempted to isolate or contain
China. Think of the turmoil that would cause to our allies in Taiwan,
our great, dear friends and allies in Taiwan. Think about the prospect
of an independent--disengaged from the United States--People's Republic
of China, growing stronger in the next century. Could our allies in
that region--even our best ally, Japan--maintain as close a
relationship with us when China was an emerging strength and was
hostile to the United States because we attempted to contain them? I
think not.
So, Mr. President, I hope we can find a more constructive course to
go forward with than being unnecessarily punitive about everything that
happens in the People's Republic of China that doesn't please us. A lot
will happen there that doesn't please us. But it is in our overriding
national interest, militarily, economically, and ideologically, to
continue to be engaged in an honest and direct way.
In my opinion, there is ultimately no choice. And I hope we can find
ways--short of some of the amendments that have been put onto this
bill--to reason together and come up with common approaches because, as
I said at the outset, as much as I support engagement, engagement
cannot allow us to become spineless. I don't think it has been in our
time. Since President Nixon, and since Tiananmen, and President Bush,
and on into President Clinton, I think we have been strong and
demanding. It is an appropriate role for Congress to continue to work
with the administration to make sure that is the case.
Finally, I will offer for the review of my colleagues, at some point,
a bill I was privileged to introduce last fall, in October, with three
colleagues, which constituted two Republicans and two Democrats,
including myself; Senators Bob Kerrey of Nebraska; Chuck Hagel of
Nebraska, and Frank Murkowski. I believe it is Senate bill 1303. It is
an attempt to create a legislative expression of support for a policy
of honest, direct, tough principled engagement with China, that is in
our interest, and to create some bilateral entities, commissions, and
working groups to work through in a demanding way--and some of them
including Members of Congress --these points of conflict that we have
with China to see if we cannot build on them instead of striking down
and undercutting the relationship as a result of those areas in which
we disagree.

I hope at some point to be able to bring this bill to the floor and
to either in whole or in part as an amendment ask my colleagues to
consider it as an expression of a policy, but also as evidence of a
particular way to express that policy to establish a United States-
China trade and investment commission, to establish a bilateral energy
committee, to establish a bilateral food committee, to establish a U.S.
human rights commission to not only create a bilateral dialog on human
rights, but for us to have an opportunity directly to speak to the
Chinese about how important it is to us, but also to create an
opportunity to review the Chinese, province by province, in these areas
of concern to us--human rights, proliferation, trade, environment--and
to use a carrot instead of a stick, and to offer to those provinces
that measure up closer to our standards and ideals: OPIC insurance
financing backing, clear access to Eximbank financing that is not
available now but only through a Presidential waiver to move
constructively, honestly, forward; an understanding that both peoples
and both countries have to gain from this involvement, and particularly
understanding that the people of China for whose freedom we work and
pray and from whose increasing freedom we take great joy.
They are the ones that I think will ultimately suffer as much as we
will from a policy of isolation and containment, and will gain from a
policy of direct and principled engagement.
I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak.
It would be my intention on the motion to table that the Senator from
Virginia has said he will put in tomorrow to vote to table, because
while I think this has been a constructive debate, I don't think this
is the week to be taking action in the way that some of these
amendments would, and I don't favor most of the amendments as
expressing the kind of policy of engagement that I think is so much in
our American national interests.
I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor.
Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

[[Page S6746]]

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that current
business be set aside for the purpose of immediate consideration of my
amendment No. 2405.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with respect, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I had the intention, and still have the
intention at some later time, of reintroducing the amendment that is at
the desk.
What it effectively does is address the potential problem and
influence that a company called COSCO, the Chinese Ocean Shipping
Company, will have on the United States.
Mr. President, the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company is Communist
China's largest shipping group. It has more than doubled the number of
ships that our entire U.S. Navy has. This group has been given
preferential treatment by this country and other countries for some
period of time. It wasn't long ago that they were given the opportunity
to have ports at both ends of the Panama Canal, the Ports of Colon and
Cristobal, and our country was supportive of that.
This 25-year lease gives them an abundance of control in the Panama
Canal and was to cost $22 million a year. But the deal that was made
would be to waive that amount of money, and to waive the labor laws and
veto rights over a period of approximately 2 years.
Other areas where we have given preferential treatment to COSCO fall
in the area of taxpayer-guaranteed loans.
COSCO was the first shipping company owned by Beijing government to
receive a U.S. Federal loan guarantee under a 40-year-old
Transportation Department program designed to help American shipyards
win business. This was a $138 million loan, which constituted 87.5
percent of the cost of the projects to build four container ships in
Alabama. The ships were never built. They did not go through.
Nonetheless, the permission was given.
There are many other areas where they have received preferential
treatment. Since the 1950s, ships from Communist nations have been
forced to give 4 day's notice before they could dock near U.S. military
establishments. This was to give the U.S. officials early warning about
possible spying and this type of thing. The restriction still applies
to countries like Cambodia, Vietnam, Russia, and some of the other
former Soviet Republics. But in a deal that was worked out in December
of 1996, the United States cut China's wait at a dozen sensitive ports
from 4 days to 1 day.

Make sure we understand what we have done here. We have allowed this
company to only have to wait 1 day, and all the rest of the Communist
nations have to wait 4 days. Cambodia still has to wait 4 days. Vietnam
still has to wait 4 days. Russia still has to wait 4 days, but China
only 1 day.
U.S. firms still can't get sole-tenancy leases at Chinese ports, yet
COSCO got just such rights last year from Long Beach, CA. What a
lease--a vacant U.S. Naval Station with no security check. What they
are attempting to do now is to get the rest of that closed operation.
We are talking about several hundred acres very strategically
located.
It is kind of interesting, since we have been giving such
preferential treatment to the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company. Why are
we doing this?
I think it is important to understand that this shipping company is
not a part of the private sector. This is owned by the Chinese
Government. It is owned specifically by the People's Liberation Army of
Communist China. So their interests are not just in mercantile--not
just in ships--but also they have military interests. COSCO reports to
the Chinese Ministry of Communications, which falls under the State
Council, which in turn is led by the Communist Party Politburo member
and Premier Li Peng.
If we are looking at the problems that have come up and surfaced and
have caused many of us to be concerned, we might want to remember that
back in March of 1996 a COSCO ship, the Empress Phoenix, transported
2,000 illegal AK-47 automatic weapons to be used in street gangs in Los
Angeles. It was intended to be sold to the California street gangs, and
this has been verified. The corporation was the Norinco Corporation,
which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army. Fortunately, the
guns were confiscated as a part of an FBI sting operation.
Mr. President, it is certainly no coincidence that the firm is also
the employer of record of Wang Jun, which is the well-known Chinese
arms dealer who attended a recent radio address in this country.
Mr. President, only last week the Washington Times reported that a
COSCO ship was on its way to Pakistan.
Now we are talking about shipping, carrying, nuclear technology and
equipment in violation of an international nonproliferation agreement.
We are talking about carrying this information, carrying this
technology, carrying this nuclear technology to Pakistan from China, a
clear violation.
The COSCO ships have previously been used to transport military and
strategic cargoes, including components for ballistic missiles from
China and North Korea to such countries as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and just most recently, we learned last week, Libya.
So I think that we have a great deal of our Nation's security at risk
by allowing them--continuing to allow them to have this lease.
With that in mind, I would again renew my unanimous consent request.
I will wait and give adequate time for someone to come in, if there is
an objection, but my unanimous consent request would be to set aside
the pending business for the immediate consideration of my amendment
No. 2405.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BUMPERS. I respectfully object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears an objection.
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair.
Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, in the few minutes we have, I would
like to respond to my good friend and colleague from Connecticut, to
some of the comments he made about the pending business and the
amendments I have offered regarding China.
He spoke of engagement and the necessity of the engagement policy,
and as has so often been the case with administration defenders and the
defenders of the engagement policy, they would present a false
dichotomy in that if you are not for the current administration's
policy, then you are an isolationist. I would suggest it is not
engagement or isolation; it is how we are going to engage China.
I would further suggest that the policy this administration has
pursued has failed in engaging China adequately. That is evident in a
whole host of areas, not the least of which are the abuses addressed by
these amendments.
So when my good friend from Connecticut said that he is opposed to
these amendments, I was tempted to ask specifically what amendment is
it--denying visas to those who perform forced abortions, or is it
denying visas to government individuals involved in religious
persecution? What is it precisely that is objectionable about these? I
would think, rather than undermining the President's hand as he goes to
China, this in fact strengthens his hand, strengthens his ability to
deal in a more forthright way with those issues of concern to all
Americans.
My good friend from Connecticut also spoke in glowing terms of the
``changed China.'' It is becoming more common to hear of the ``changed
China.''
In the edition of Newsweek magazine which just came out is a cover
article, a beautiful cover article, entitled ``The New China.'' ``The
New China.''
Well, I wish that as we looked at the experience of the Chinese
people today and what has happened since 9 years ago and the Tiananmen
massacre, we could be reassured that there were students to gather on
the Tiananmen plaza during the President's visit next week, in fact
they would receive a different greeting than they did 9 years ago when
they were mowed down with gunfire.
Well, is China different? Is it a new China? These are just reports
in the

[[Page S6747]]

last 3 weeks. New York Times, June 6: A bishop in the underground
Catholic Church has been arrested, was detained on May 31 while
traveling to his village.
This is the changed China.
June 14, the Portland Oregonian reports that Chinese police
interrogated and threatened three dissidents who urged President
Clinton to press Chinese leaders on human rights during the summit.
Police ransacked the homes, confiscated their computers, took two to
local precincts. June 14.
June 15, South China Morning Post: Dissidents in several areas
including Shanghai and Weifang in Shangdong Province, the first stop
for Mr. Clinton, have complained of harassment. Incidents have included
home raids, detention, telephone tapping and confiscation of computers.
June 16, Japan Economic News Wire. In the runup to President Bill
Clinton's visit to China, a veteran Chinese dissident has been indicted
for helping another activist escape to Hong Kong.
June 18, Far Eastern Economic Review reports that Beijing warned the
Vatican, ``Don't use the Internet or other media channels to interfere
with Chinese religious affairs policies.'' And we could go on and on.
That is the last 3 weeks, Mr. President, of news accounts of what is
going on in China. That is the ``new China.'' We want to present China
today in some kind of rose-colored glasses, that everything is fine,
when in fact it is not.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield? Will the Senator yield for a
question?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would love to yield to my good friend from
Oklahoma, but I have 5 minutes left. Unfortunately, the Presiding
Officer has assured me he is going to gavel me quiet at 3 o'clock, so I
am going to have to talk very quickly.
The issue of religious freedom was raised, and my friend from
Connecticut spoke once again in glowing terms of improved conditions in
China on the issue of religious freedom. While my friend quoted from
the New York Times--my good friend and distinguished colleague, whom I
admire greatly--I would like to quote from the State Department's
Report on Religious Freedom in China just issued in the last--it is a
1997 report just issued recently on China, and I will quote just a
portion of this.

Some religious groups have registered while others were
refused registration and others have not applied. Many groups
have been reluctant to comply due to principled opposition to
state control of religion, unwillingness to limit their
activities or refusal to compromise their position on matters
such as abortion. They fear adverse consequences if they
reveal as required the names and addresses of members and
details about leadership activities, finances and contacts in
China or abroad.
Guided by a central policy directive of October 1996 that
launched a national campaign to suppress unauthorized
religious groups and social organizations, Chinese
authorities in some areas made strong efforts to crack down
on the activities of unregistered Catholic and Protestant
movements. They raided and closed several hundred house
church groups, many with significant memberships, properties
and financial resources.

And it goes on and gives many examples of that. So, in fact, our
State Department--whatever else the New York Times may say, our State
Department says that conditions in China are deplorable and that in
fact there has been a crackdown on those who would defy the Government
by not registering because of principled opposition to the Government's
policy.
Now, we say--and I have heard it argued even today--that the church
and religious organizations in China are flourishing. Well, they are
growing, but I would just suggest that they are growing in spite of
Government policy, in spite of the persecution, not because there has
somehow been a blossoming of religious freedom in China.
As I think back to the early days of Christianity and how the Roman
empire cracked down with great intensity upon the infant Christian
faith, the Christian faith mushroomed and spread all across the known
world at that time. But they did so in spite of intense persecution,
and actually Christianity began to demise when suddenly it was made the
``official religion.'' So to say somehow growth equates with freedom in
China today, I simply reject that.
I have much, much more that I would like to say. I do want to say a
word about the President's plans to be received in Tiananmen Square.
Mrs. Ding Zilin, mother of a 17-year-old student who was killed in 1989
in the Tiananmen protest, said that she hoped President Clinton would
make a strong gesture. Her husband is associate professor of philosophy
at the People's University in Beijing. They said this. They objected to
the pomp and ceremony in Tiananmen Square as the red carpet ``is dyed
with the blood of our relatives who have fallen.''
I wonder, with the emphasis upon property control, if the President
would feel the same about following protocol if those hundreds of
students who were slain had included some American students, perhaps
there as foreign exchange students.
One thing is certain. When the President goes to Tiananmen, it will
be peaceful. It will be quiet. All dissidents will have been rounded
up, and there will be no embarrassing protesters. When President Jiang
Zemin came to the United States, there were protesters. When Jiang was
asked about it, he mocked the protesters, saying with a smile that
periodically he heard little voices and noises in his ear. There will
be no such embarrassing little noises in his ear when President Clinton
goes to Tiananmen Square.
How do we turn what I think is an unfortunate decision to go to
Tiananmen Square into something positive? Perhaps the President could
give a Reagan-like speech, when President Reagan went to the Berlin
Wall in 1987 and he said, ``Tear down this wall.''
It was Jiang who said that all of the protest in 1989 was ``much ado
about nothing.'' That was the President's attitude--much ado about
nothing. Perhaps President Clinton could ask for an official apology.
Perhaps he could ask for the release of the dissidents. They have never
investigated; they have never apologized; they have never released the
dissidents. Perhaps he could take a lead from the Italian President,
who last week, after the official reception, returned to Tiananmen
Square, where he prayed and where he meditated and where he remembered
those who fell. Perhaps the President, in going to Tiananmen, could
bring a wreath in memory of those.
And then I would suggest this as well, that when the President raises
the issue of human rights, he does so not before a press briefing but
that he does so on his broadcast to the Chinese people. And if he will
do so, it will be at least a small step in turning what I think is an
unfortunate image for the world to see, into something that can be
positive in this trip to China.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I come to the floor briefly today to
address the China-related amendments to the S. 2057, the DOD
Authorization bill, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations--the
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the subject matter of these
amendments.
Unfortunately, the proponents of these amendments chose a day to
debate these provisions when it was clear that many of the amendments'
detractors would be out of town. As a result, many of the latter are
not here today to participate in this important discussion. While I
strongly oppose these amendments, as I believe do a majority of the
members of the full Foreign Relations Committee, I myself have
commitments preventing me from spending any significant time today on
the floor.
So in order to express the thrust of my position on these amendments,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at
this point a copy of a ``Dear Colleague'' letter dated June 15, 1998,
of which I am the primary signatory; a copy of my opening statement
from a hearing before my subcommittee dated June 18, 1998; and finally
pages 1, 2 and 6 through 9 of a statement by Assistant Secretary
Stanley Roth.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC, June 15, 1998.
Dear Colleague: When the Senate returns to consideration of
the DOD Authorization bill, S. 2057, we expect a series of
amendments to be offered concerning the People's Republic of
China. These amendments, if accepted, would do serious damage
to our bilateral relationship and halt a decade of U.S.
efforts to encourage greater Chinese adherence

[[Page S6748]]

to international norms in such areas of nonproliferation,
human rights, and trade.
In relative terms, in the last year China has shown
improvement in several areas which the U.S. has specifically
indicated are important to us. Relations with Taiwan have
stabilized, several prominent dissidents have been released
from prison, enforcement of our agreements on intellectual
property rights has been stepped up, the reversion of Hong
Kong has gone smoothly, and China's agreement not to devalue
its currency helped to stabilize Asia's economic crisis.
Has this been enough change: Clearly not. But the question
is: how do we best encourage more change in China? Do we do
so by isolating one fourth of the world's population, by
denying visas to most members of its government, by denying
it access to any international concessional loans, and by
backing it into a corner and declaring it a pariah as these
amendments would do?
Or, rather, is the better course to engage China, to expand
dialogue, to invite China to live up to its aspirations as a
world power, to expose the country to the norms of democracy
and human rights and thereby draw it further into the family
of nations?
We are all for human rights; there's no dispute about that.
But the question is, how do we best achieve human rights? We
think it's through engagement.
We urge you to look beyond the artfully-crafted titles of
these amendments to their actual content and effect. One
would require the United States to oppose the provision of
any international concessional loan to China, its citizens,
or businesses, even if the loan were to be used in a manner
which would promote democracy or human rights. This same
amendment would require every U.S. national involved in
conducting any significant business in China to register with
the Commerce Department and to agree to abide by a set of
government-imposed ``business principles'' mandated in the
amendment. On the eve of President Clinton's trip to China,
the raft of radical China-related amendments threatens to
undermine our relationship just when it is most crucial to
advance vital U.S. interests.
Several of the amendments contain provisions which are
sufficiently vague so as to effectively bar the grant of any
entrance visa to the United States to every member of the
Chinese government. Those provisions not only countervene
many of our international treaty commitments, but are
completely at odds with one of the amendments which would
prohibit the United States from funding the participation of
a great proportion of Chinese officials in any State
Department, USIA, or USAID conference, exchange program,
or activity; and with another amendment which urges
agencies of the U.S. Government to increase exchange
programs between our two countries.
Finally, many of the amendments are drawn from bills which
have yet to be considered by the committee of jurisdiction,
the Foreign Relations Committee. That committee will review
the bills at a June 18 hearing, and they are scheduled to be
marked-up in committee on June 23. Legislation such as this
that would have such a profound effect on US-China relations
warrants careful committee consideration. They should not be
the subject of an attempt to circumvent the committee
process.
In the short twenty years since we first officially engaged
China, that country has opened up to the outside world,
rejected Maoism, initiated extensive market reforms,
witnessed a growing grass-roots movement towards increased
democratization, agreed to be bound by major international
nonproliferation and human rights agreements, and is on the
verge of dismantling its state-run enterprises. We can
continue to nurture that transformation through further
engagement, or we can capitulate to the voices of isolation
and containment that these amendments represent and negate
all the advances made so far.
We hope that you will agree with us and choose engagement.
We strongly urge you to vote against these amendments.
Sincerely,
Craig Thomas, Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations; Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign
Relations; Frank H. Murkowski, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources; John F. Kerry; Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations; Chuck Hagel, Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations; Gordon Smith, Chairman,
Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign
Relations; Rod Grams, Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Operations, Committee on Foreign
Relations; Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on
Foreign Relations; Charles S. Robb, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Near East/South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations; Joseph I. Lieberman,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Acquisition and
Technology, Committee on Armed Services.
____

Opening Statement of Senator Craig Thomas, Chairman, Subcommittee on
East Asian & Pacific Affairs, June 18, 1998

Good Morning. Today the Subcommittee meets to consider
current Congressional views of the U.S.-China relationship.
If we had had this hearing just six months ago, I believe
that we'd be examining an entirely different climate. But due
to a variety of circumstances--the timing of the President's
visit to Beijing, a growing effort to emphasize human rights,
both the Loral and campaign finance allegations, a question
of foreign policy leadership in general and Asia policy in
particular on the part of the Administration, to name a few--
the Congressional spotlight is focused brightly on China, and
the light is harsh.
As of today, in this Congress there have been 25 pieces of
legislation introduced in the Senate and 51 in the House
dealing solely with China. That's excluding authorization and
appropriations bills, or amendments and riders to other non-
China specific legislation and is more than in the last three
Congresses. A majority of them involve sanctioning or
otherwise castigating China for its behavior in a variety of
fields, good examples being five bills presently pending
before this Committee: HR 967, 2358, 2386, 2570, and 2605.
One would require the United States to oppose the provision
of any international concessional loan to China, its
citizens, or businesses, even if the loan were to be used in
a manner which would promote democracy or human rights. This
same amendment would require every U.S. national involved in
conducting any significant business in China to register with
the Commerce Department and to agree to abide by a set of
government-imposed ``business principles'' mandated in the
amendment. On the eve of President Clinton's trip to China,
the raft of strident China-related bills and amendments
threatens to challenge our relationship just at a time in its
development when it is most crucial to advance vital U.S.
interests.
Several of the bills contain provisions which are
sufficiently vague so as to effectively bar the grant of any
entrance visa to the United States to every member of the
Chinese government. Those provisions not only contravene many
of our international treaty commitments, but are completely
at odds with one of the bills which would prohibit the United
States from funding the participation of a great proportion
of Chinese officials in any State Department, USIA, or SAID
conference, exchange program, or activity; and with another
amendment which urges agencies of the U.S. Government to
increase exchange programs between our two countries.
Finally, many of the provisions in the bills are redundant,
reflecting legislation which has either already passed out of
the Committee or out of the Senate.
Targeting China at this time strikes me as somewhat ironic.
In relative terms, during the last year China has shown
improvement in several areas which the U.S. has specifically
indicated are important to us. Relations with Taiwan have
stabilized and intergovernmental contacts have increased.
Several prominent dissidents have been released from prison.
Enforcement of our trade agreements on intellectual property
rights has been stepped up. Despite predictions to the
contrary, the reversion of Hong Kong has gone smoothly and
Beijing has maintained its distance. And at the height of the
Asian financial crisis, China agreed not to devalue its
currency thereby helping to stabilize the crisis.
Has this been enough change? Clearly not. But the question
is: how do we best encourage more change in China? Do we do
so by isolating one fourth of the world's population, by
denying visas to most members of its government, by denying
it access to any international concessional loans, and by
backing it into a corner and declaring it a pariah as these
bills would do?
Or, rather is the better course to engage China, to expand
dialogue, to invite China to live up to its aspirations as a
world player, to expose the country to the norms of democracy
and human rights and thereby draw it further into the family
of nations?
We're all for human rights--there's no dispute about that.
We agree on the message we want the Chinese to hear--stop the
human rights abuses, stop facilitating the proliferation of
dangerous weapons, stop the trade inequities. As the Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
I have been extremely active in making clear to the Chinese
our disappointment with their actions in these and other
related areas. But the question is, how do we best achieve
human rights? I think it's through engagement.
In the short twenty years since we first officially engaged
China, that country has opened up to the outside world,
rejected Maoism, initiated extensive market reforms,
witnessed a growing grass-roots movement towards increased
democratization, agreed to be bound by major international
nonproliferation and human rights agreements, and is on the
verge of dismantling its state-run enterprises. We can
continue to nurture that transformation through further
engagement, or we can capitulate to the voices of isolation
and containment that these five House bills in particular
represent and negate all the advances made so far.
The purpose of this hearing is to explore the current
climate in Congress, to examine these bills, and to explore
alternatives to them that will continue to advance both our
interests and China's transformation.

[[Page S6749]]

____
Testimony of Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Asia
Pacific Subcommittee, June 18, 1998

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to address the
Subcommittee on the important issue of pending China
legislation in the Senate. This is, of course, a timely
hearing, with the President's historic trip to China only a
week away. I therefore welcome this opportunity to lay out
the Administration's position on the bills before the Senate
and look forward to engaging Committee members in a
productive dialogue on this matter.
My testimony will be divided into three parts. First, I
will review the reasons why a stronger, more constructive
relationship with China is in the U.S. interest. Second, I
will outline the Clinton Administration's strategy of
engagement, highlighting what we have accomplished while
noting the obstacles we still face. Finally I will explain
the Administration's position on each of the five China-
related bills currently before the Senate, examining the
impact such legislation would have on our ability to engage
the Chinese.

china affects u.s. interests

Mr. Chairman, peace and stability in East Asia and the
Pacific is a fundamental prerequisite for U.S. security and
prosperity. Nearly one half the world's people live in
countries bordering the Asia Pacific region and over half of
all economic activity in the world is conducted there. Four
of the world's major powers rub shoulders in Northeast Asia
while some of the most strategically important waterways on
the globe flow through Southeast Asia. The US. itself is as
much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic one, with the states of
Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington bordering on the
Pacific Ocean and Hawaii surrounded by it. American citizens
in Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Marianas live closer to Asian capitals than to our own, vast
numbers of Americans work in the Asia-Pacific region, and an
increasingly large number of Americans trace their ancestry
back to the Pacific Rim.
For these and many other reasons, the U.S. has remained
committed to the Asia-Pacific region and has spent its
resources and blood defending and strengthening our stake in
the region. Since coming to office, President Clinton has
repeatedly made clear that America will remain an Asia-
Pacific power. We maintain a sizable military presence in
Asia; enjoy a vibrant network of mutual security alliances
with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea
and Thailand; and have significant economic ties with most
countries in the region. . . .

pending legislation

The sponsors of the China-related legislation before the
Senate clearly share our goal of positively influencing
China's development. The bills in question seek to bring an
end to human rights violations, religious persecution, forced
prison labor and coercive family planning policies in China
and thus are very much in line with the Administration's own
objectives.
The question, once again, is one of approach. How do we
best effect those changes in the PRC?
H.R. 967 and H.R. 2570 both mandate a denial of visas to
Chinese officials alleged to be involved in religious
persecution (in the case of the former) or forced abortions
(in the case of the latter). While the Administration opposes
such repugnant practices and wholeheartedly agrees they must
be addressed, these bills would restrict our ability to
engage influential individuals in the very dialogue that has
begun to produce tangible results.
For example, the heads of the Religious Affairs and Family
Planning Bureaus are people we want to invite to the United
States again and again. The more Chinese leaders see of the
U.S., the more they are exposed to our point of view and our
way of life. We would be doing a disservice to the very
people we endeavor to help if we cut off dialogue with those
officials who shape the very policies we want to change. Such
unilateral action on our part, moreover, could prompt Beijing
to impose its own visa restrictions, further limiting the
ability of U.S. officials and religious figures to advocate
their views in China.
In addition, these bills impinge upon the President's
constitutional prerogatives regarding the conduct of foreign
relations of the United States. Decisions whether and when to
issue visas to foreign government officials necessarily
implicate the most sensitive foreign policy considerations,
concerning which the Executive requires maximum flexibility.
H.R. 2605, which requires U.S. directors at International
Financial Institutions to oppose the provision of
concessional loans to China, would have the effect of
punishing the Chinese people most in need of international
assistance. The United States, as a matter of policy, has not
since the Tiananmen Square crackdown supported development
bank lending to China except for projects designed to help
meet basic human needs. Concessional loans to China from the
World Bank, for example, are only granted for the purposes of
poverty alleviation. These loans support agricultural, rural
health, educational and rural water supply programs in
some of the poorest areas of the country. A vote against
such lending would thus be a vote against the Chinese
people.
Moreover, World Bank member donors agreed in 1996 that
China, owing to its improved creditworthiness, would cease
concessional borrowing. The Bank's concessional loans to
China are thus to be terminated at the end of FY1999.
H.R. 2358 is fundamentally different than the first three
bills in that it seeks to expand rather than limit U.S.
engagement in China. The bill allocates new monies for
additional human rights monitors at U.S. Embassies/Consulates
in China; authorizes funds to the NED for democracy, civil
society, and rule of law programming; and requires the
Secretary of State to use funds from the East Asia/Pacific
Regional democracy fund to provide grants to NGOs for similar
programs. Human rights reporting and the promotion of
democracy, civil society and rule of law have long been among
this Administration's highest priorities in China, and thus
we do not oppose, in principle, any of the above provisions.
We would note, however, that the East Asia/Pacific democracy
fund is a limited fund with competing demands. There is much
work to be done to promote democracy at this time of great
change in the Asia-Pacific, and thus we ask that Congress
give Secretary Albright maximum flexibility in allocating
these scarce resources.
The bill further requires the Secretary of State to
establish a Prisoner Information Registry for China. We are
sympathetic to the idea of establishing a prisoner registry
and recognize the importance of such a registry to our human
rights work. We caution, however, that the U.S. government is
not the right institution for the task. Aside from the
logistical difficulties of gaining access to the families and
friends of Chinese dissidents, U.S. Government contact with
such individuals could actually place them in further
jeopardy. We believe that NGOs are far better equipped to
carry out these kinds of contacts. Several groups and
individual activists, including Human Rights Watch, Human
Rights in Asia, and John Kamm, already maintain such lists.
Thus rather than undertake to compile and maintain an
accurate registry, the State Department might play a more
useful role in coordinating those groups already actively
engaged in this issue.
Finally, H.R. 2358 requires the Secretary of State to
submit a separate, annual human rights in China report to the
HIRC and the SFRC. Documenting and making public the human
rights situation in China is indeed of critical importance.
We have accordingly given a great deal of attention to China
in our annual ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.''
The Department and our missions abroad expend enormous energy
and resources preparing this report, and the final product
routinely receives high marks for its thoroughness and
integrity.
An additional study on China would be redundant and thus
wasteful of taxpayer dollars. We already make extensive
efforts to cover those topics earmarked for attention in H.R.
2358: religious persecution, development of democratic
institutions and the rule of law. That said, we welcome
suggestions on how to improve the reports and would gladly
open a dialogue with the Congress on this important issue.
The last bill I want to address today, H.R. 2386, requires
the Secretary of Defense to produce a study of the
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation
of a theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan. Let
me state up front and emphatically that the Clinton
Administration remains firmly committed to fulfilling the
security and arms transfer provisions of the Taiwan Relations
Act. We have demonstrated this commitment through the
transfer of F-16s, Knox class frigates, helicopters and tanks
as well as a variety of air to air, surface to air, and anti-
ship defensive missiles and will continue to assist Taiwan in
meeting its defense needs.
Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we regularly
consult with Taiwan as to how it can best address a broad
range of security threats, including the threat posed by
ballistic missiles. We have briefed Taiwan, as we have many
other friends, on the concept of theater missile defense
(TMD). Officials in Taiwan are currently assessing their own
capabilities and needs, an have not, to date, indicated
interest in acquiring TMD. Requiring a study of this kind
thus gets ahead of the situation on the ground in Taiwan and
may not even be consistent with the approach Taiwan officials
will ultimately want to take. We are accordingly opposed to
the legislation.
Again, let me restate that we are steadfast in our
commitment to meet Taiwan's defense needs. But while making
it possible for Taiwan to acquire the wherewithal to defend
itself, we must recognize that security over the long term
depends upon more than military factors. In the end,
stability in the Strait will be contingent upon the ability
of the two sides to come to terms with each other. For this
reason the Administration has encouraged Taipei an Beijing to
reopen dialogue, making it clear to both sides that dialogue
is the most promising way to defuse tensions and build
confidence. In that regard, we are encouraged by recent signs
of a willingness on both sides of the Strait to resume talks.
Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Albright has often said, there
is no greater opportunity--or challenge--in U.S. foreign
policy today than to encourage China's integration into the
world community. While the Administration shares fully the
concerns which inform

[[Page S6750]]

the bills before the Senate today, we do not believe that
proscribing engagement with broad categories of Chinese
people and mandating U.S. rejection of aid intended to meet
basic human needs will help to change those policies and
practices with which we disagree.
These concerns can be best addressed by continuing to
engage Chinese leaders on the full range of security,
economic and political issues. President Clinton's upcoming
trip to China is intended to do just that, and thus is an
opportunity to make progress on the very human rights issues
addressed in today's legislation. Our strategy of engagement
has met with considerable success thus far, and I am
confident that with the support of the Congress we will
continue to make progress in the lead up to the summit and
beyond.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I know my friend from Arkansas has been waiting. I
just want to say very briefly in response to my other friend from
Arkansas, the question, I think, and we will debate this more tomorrow,
is whether things are better today for the people of China than they
were at the time of Tiananmen. I say much better. Are they where they
ought to be? No. Absolutely not. Is it moving in the right direction as
a result of our engagement? Yes.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I know my good friend Senator Inouye is
here because he has a judgeship nomination he feels very strongly
about. I have waited here for over an hour now, and I ask unanimous
consent I be permitted to speak for 10 minutes on the Hutchinson
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing no objection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me say it is with some regret I rise
in opposition to an amendment by my distinguished colleague and good
friend from Arkansas, Senator Hutchinson. It is never pleasant to take
an opposite viewpoint from your colleague, but I feel very strongly
about this, as does he.
Let me say, first of all, I have no quarrel or suggestion that any of
the information that Senator Hutchinson has just given us about
conditions in China are incorrect. I do not know that they are correct,
but I am sure he has checked out the facts he just gave the Senate.
What I want to say is, if you had been in China with me in 1978 at the
end of the Cultural Revolution, and it was at the end of the Cultural
Revolution, and if you had heard the stories or if you had read the
documentation since the end of the Cultural Revolution about what went
on in China, I suggest this debate ought to be not about where China
is, but how far she has come since 1978.
On the issue of religion in China, according to the New York Times,
in 1979 there were three active churches in China. Today there are
12,000. In addition to the 12,000 temples and churches in China, it is
estimated that over 25,000 religious groups meet in the homes of
members every week, and nobody has tried to stop that. On the contrary,
when you think of the growth from 3 to 12,000, China should receive
some recognition for what they have done and the improvements they have
made.
Nobody in the U.S. Senate will take issue with some of the
accusations here that have been made about China's opposition to
religions of all kinds. Nobody will argue that China has a good human
rights record. Nobody will argue with very much of what has been said
here. What we are arguing here is a simple philosophical point that I
feel strongly about, and that is that China is 10 times more likely to
allow the kind of progress that is going on there today, which has been
absolutely phenomenal, when they are engaged in dialog with nations
like the United States with whom they would like to have good
relations, than it would be if we try to tell a great nation of between
1 billion and 2 billion people--25 percent of the Earth's population
resides in China--they are much more likely to behave themselves when
they are dealing with people who constructively engage them than they
are with people who ignore them and try to impose sanctions.
What if China said, ``We are not going to do business with the United
States anymore until they pay the United Nations dues? We are paid up.
It is the United States that is the deadbeat. They owe the United
Nations $900 million.''
You would hear a hue and outcry in this country that would drown out
every rock band in America.
Mr. President, China has a long way to go. Nobody argues that. But I
can tell you that by the President constructively engaging China,
presumably he will talk to them forcefully about human rights, inquire
and talk to them forcefully about the issue of forced abortion, talk to
them about religion, talk to them about political freedoms and how much
better off they would be, talk to them about nuclear weaponry and how
we are relying on China to temper one of the most volatile dangerous
regions in the world, between India and Pakistan.
If you read the Washington Post yesterday, read the interview with
President Jiang, you heard him say that he was shocked to hear India
use, as one of its excuses for exploding a nuclear weapon--a weapon--he
was shocked that they used China as a threat to India as one of the
reasons. China and India have not been big bosom buddies. I am not
suggesting that. As a matter of fact, it hasn't been too long since
they had a border war. But, in my opinion, China is not the reason they
exploded a nuclear bomb. The reason they exploded a nuclear weapon is
because the Indians and Pakistanis mistrust each other, and one of the
main reasons they distrust each other is because of their religious
differences. If you look around the world, you will find most of the
wars, most of the dissent going on in the world today is because of
religion--in Ireland, in Bosnia, in China, in India and Pakistan.

Mr. President, I think we ought to utilize China as a possible broker
in the fight on the Korean peninsula, as well as between India and
Pakistan--that whole region of the world.
I heard something the other day. I don't know whether it is true or
not. I heard some guy on NPR talking about the criminal justice of the
United States. There are 70,000 people in the United States in prison
who are innocent. That is not the best record in the world, if that is
true. I expect it is probably close to true. Every day you read about
somebody who gets out of prison who has been there 10 years because he
was found, finally, to be innocent. Nobody's criminal justice system is
perfect. I am not saying there are not a lot more people imprisoned in
China who are innocent. All I am saying is for any nation to hold
itself out as perfect and to castigate other nations for being
imperfect is the height of hypocrisy.
Mr. President, nobody disagrees with the issues that are being raised
in this amendment, nor is anybody suggesting the President not engage
the Chinese very forcefully on those issues. We have a trade imbalance
with China. They sell us a lot more than we sell them. But I can tell
you, if you took away the $5 billion in goods we sell to China every
year, there would be a lot of jobs lost in this country, and the people
who sell in China, and other people who buy from China, are opposed,
very strongly opposed to this amendment.
Two final points. A lot of people have a very difficult time since
the Soviet Union disappeared. They have a very difficult time accepting
the idea that we don't have anybody to hate. We had the Soviet Union
for 70 years. It was so much fun. We didn't have to debate about who
the enemy was; we knew it was the Soviet Union. We built weapons
galore, trillions of dollars' worth, because of the threat of the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is not around anymore, and we have been searching
frantically for somebody with which to replace the Soviet Union,
somebody we could hate with a great deal of gusto and vigor.
I have watched for the past 2 years. I have watched the anti-China
decibel level rise to unprecedented rates. China has been elected. I am
not suggesting this amendment is offered because of the hatred for
China. I am telling you, you cannot keep 270 billion dollars' worth of
defense going a year unless you have an enemy. The military industrial
complex has decided that is China, so we are going to continue to build
weapons, and we are going to continue to make China the bad guy.
As I say, when you say these things, it looks as if you are being
apologetic

[[Page S6751]]

or defensive. I am not, not for a moment. I am simply saying that is a
fact, and I can tell you, since those bombs exploded in India and
Pakistan, it is a very ominous sign, and I can tell you the threat to
civilization has gone up exponentially.
When the President is going to visit a country which has signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has signed the Conventional
Weapons Treaty, Conventional Weapons Convention, and which has agreed
to quit shipping any information of any nuclear value to Iran, those
are things that would never have happened if the Hutchinson amendment
was in place. I feel quite sure the Hutchinson amendment will be
defeated. I hope so.
He is my colleague, and I regret taking a position opposite him on
any issue, but on this one, I can tell you, in my opinion, common sense
dictates that the President do exactly what he is doing. I wish him
well. I yield the floor.

____________________