[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 82 (Monday, June 22, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6740-S6751]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have advised the distinguished ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee of what I am about to do. 
Hopefully, this announcement will lend some clarity to the procedural 
situation we are now in.


                    Amendment No. 2737, as modified

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Hutchinson, I modify 
the pending amendment with the additional text now at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       At the end of the amendment, add the following:
                               TITLE ____

     SEC. ____. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Forced Abortion 
     Condemnation Act''.

     SEC. ____. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime 
     against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
       (2) For over 15 years there have been frequent and credible 
     reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization in 
     connection with the population control policies of the 
     People's Republic of China. These reports indicate the 
     following:
       (A) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of 
     the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced 
     sterilization have no role in the population control program, 
     in fact the Communist Chinese Government encourages both 
     forced abortion and forced sterilization through a 
     combination of strictly enforced birth quotas and immunity 
     for local population control officials who engage in 
     coercion. Officials acknowledge that there have been 
     instances of forced abortions and sterilization, and no 
     evidence has been made available to suggest that the 
     perpetrators have been punished.
       (B) People's Republic of China population control 
     officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit 
     officials, routinely monitor women's menstrual cycles and 
     subject women who conceive without government authorization 
     to extreme psychological pressure, to harsh economic 
     sanctions, including unpayable fines and loss of employment, 
     and often to physical force.
       (C) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized 
     children include fines in amounts several times larger than 
     the per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's 
     Republic of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine 
     is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual income. 
     Families which cannot pay the fine may be subject to 
     confiscation and destruction of their homes and personal 
     property.
       (D) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on 
     those whose resistance is motivated by religion. For example, 
     according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the 
     Catholic inhabitants of 2 villages in Hebei Province were 
     subjected to population control under the slogan ``better to 
     have more graves than one more child''. Enforcement measures 
     included torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of 
     resisters' relatives as hostages.
       (E) Forced abortions in Communist China often have taken 
     place in the very late stages of pregnancy.
       (F) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization have been 
     used in Communist China not only to regulate the number of 
     children, but also to eliminate those who are regarded as 
     defective in accordance with the official eugenic policy 
     known as the ``Natal and Health Care Law''.

     SEC. ____. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES OF PERSONS 
                   IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ENGAGED IN 
                   ENFORCEMENT OF FORCED ABORTION POLICY.

       The Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the 
     Attorney General may not admit to the United States, any 
     national of the People's Republic of China, including any 
     official of the Communist Party or the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China and its regional, local, and 
     village authorities (except the head of state, the head of 
     government, and cabinet level ministers) who the Secretary 
     finds, based on credible information, has been involved in 
     the establishment or enforcement of population control 
     policies resulting in a woman being forced to undergo an 
     abortion against her free choice, or resulting in a man or 
     woman being forced to undergo sterilization against his or 
     her free choice.

     SEC. ____. WAIVER.

       The President may waive the requirement contained in 
     section ____ with respect to a national of the People's 
     Republic of China if the President--
       (1) determines that it is in the national interest of the 
     United States to do so; and
       (2) provides written notification to Congress containing a 
     justification for the waiver.
       This title may be cited as the ``Communist China Subsidy 
     Reduction Act of 1998''.

     SEC. ____. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) the People's Republic of China has enjoyed ready access 
     to international capital through commercial loans, direct 
     investment, sales of securities, bond sales, and foreign aid;
       (2) regarding international commercial lending, the 
     People's Republic of China had $48,000,000,000 in loans 
     outstanding from private creditors in 1995;
       (3) regarding international direct investment, 
     international direct investment in the People's Republic of 
     China from 1993 through 1995 totaled $97,151,000,000, and in 
     1996 alone totaled $47,000,000,000;
       (4) regarding investment in Chinese securities, the 
     aggregate value of outstanding Chinese securities currently 
     held by Chinese nationals and foreign persons is 
     $175,000,000,000, and from 1993 through 1995 foreign persons 
     invested $10,540,000,000 in Chinese stocks;
       (5) regarding investment in Chinese bonds, entities 
     controlled by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China have issued 75 bonds since 1988, including 36 dollar-
     denominated bond offerings valued at more than 
     $6,700,000,000, and the total value of long-term Chinese 
     bonds outstanding as of January 1, 1996, was $11,709,000,000;
       (6) regarding international assistance, the People's 
     Republic of China received almost $1,000,000,000 in foreign 
     aid grants and an additional $1,566,000,000 in technical 
     assistance grants from 1993 through 1995, and in 1995 
     received $5,540,000,000 in bilateral assistance loans, 
     including concessional aid, export credits, and related 
     assistance; and
       (7) regarding international financial institutions--
       (A) despite the People's Republic of China's access to 
     international capital and world financial markets, 
     international financial institutions have annually provided 
     it with more than $4,000,000,000 in loans in recent years, 
     amounting to almost a third of the loan commitments of the 
     Asian Development Bank and 17.1 percent of the loan approvals 
     by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
     in 1995; and
       (B) the People's Republic of China borrows more from the 
     International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
     Asian Development Bank than any other country, and loan 
     commitments from those institutions to the People's Republic 
     of China quadrupled from $1,100,000,000 in 1985 to 
     $4,300,000,000 by 1995.

[[Page S6741]]

     SEC. ____. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO CONCESSIONAL LOANS 
                   TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Title XV of the International Financial Institutions Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 262o-262o-1) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 1503. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO CONCESSIONAL 
                   LOANS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     instruct the United States Executive Directors at each 
     international financial institution (as defined in section 
     1702(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act) 
     to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the 
     provision by the institution of concessional loans to the 
     People's Republic of China, any citizen or national of the 
     People's Republic of China, or any entity established in the 
     People's Republic of China.
       ``(b) Concessional Loans Defined.--As used in subsection 
     (a), the term `concessional loans' means loans with highly 
     subsidized interest rates, grace periods for repayment of 5 
     years or more, and maturities of 20 years or more.''.

     SEC. ____. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD BE ADHERED TO BY ANY UNITED 
                   STATES NATIONAL CONDUCTING AN INDUSTRIAL 
                   COOPERATION PROJECT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                   CHINA.

       (a) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this section to create 
     principles governing the conduct of industrial cooperation 
     projects of United States nationals in the People's Republic 
     of China.
       (b) Statement of Principles.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that any United States national conducting an industrial 
     cooperation project in the People's Republic of China should:
       (1) Suspend the use of any goods, wares, articles, or 
     merchandise that the United States national has reason to 
     believe were mined, produced, or manufactured, in whole or in 
     part, by convict labor or forced labor, and refuse to use 
     forced labor in the industrial cooperation project.
       (2) Seek to ensure that political or religious views, sex, 
     ethnic or national background, involvement in political 
     activities or nonviolent demonstrations, or association with 
     suspected or known dissidents will not prohibit hiring, lead 
     to harassment, demotion, or dismissal, or in any way affect 
     the status or terms of employment in the industrial 
     cooperation project. The United States national should not 
     discriminate in terms or conditions of employment in the 
     industrial cooperation project against persons with past 
     records of arrest or internal exile for nonviolent protest or 
     membership in unofficial organizations committed to 
     nonviolence.
       (3) Ensure that methods of production used in the 
     industrial cooperation project do not pose an unnecessary 
     physical danger to workers and neighboring populations or 
     property, and that the industrial cooperation project does 
     not unnecessarily risk harm to the surrounding environment; 
     and consult with community leaders regarding environmental 
     protection with respect to the industrial cooperation 
     project.
       (4) Strive to establish a private business enterprise when 
     involved in an industrial cooperation project with the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China or other state 
     entity.
       (5) Discourage any Chinese military presence on the 
     premises of any industrial cooperation projects which involve 
     dual-use technologies.
       (6) Undertake to promote freedom of association and 
     assembly among the employees of the United States national. 
     The United States national should protest any infringement by 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China of these 
     freedoms to the International Labor Organization's office in 
     Beijing.
       (7) Provide the Department of State with information 
     relevant to the Department's efforts to collect information 
     on prisoners for the purposes of the Prisoner Information 
     Registry, and for other purposes.
       (8) Discourage or undertake to prevent compulsory political 
     indoctrination programs from taking place on the premises of 
     the industrial cooperation project.
       (9) Promote freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
     seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
     regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
     print, in the form of art, or through any media. To this end, 
     the United States national should raise with appropriate 
     authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China concerns about restrictions on the free flow of 
     information.
       (10) Undertake to prevent harassment of workers who, 
     consistent with the United Nations World Population Plan of 
     Action, decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing 
     of their children; and prohibit compulsory population control 
     activities on the premises of the industrial cooperation 
     project.
       (c) Promotion of Principles by Other Nations.--The 
     Secretary of State shall forward a copy of the principles set 
     forth in subsection (b) to the member nations of the 
     Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
     encourage them to promote principles similar to these 
     principles.
       (d) Registration Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--Each United States national conducting an 
     industrial cooperation project in the People's Republic of 
     China shall register with the Secretary of State and indicate 
     that the United States national agrees to implement the 
     principles set forth in subsection (b). No fee shall be 
     required for registration under this subsection.
       (2) Preference for participation in trade missions.--The 
     Secretary of Commerce shall consult the register prior to the 
     selection of private sector participants in any form of trade 
     mission to China, and undertake to involve those United 
     States nationals that have registered their adoption of the 
     principles set forth above.
       (e) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``industrial cooperation project'' refers to a 
     for-profit activity the business operations of which employ 
     more than 25 individuals or have assets greater than $25,000; 
     and
       (2) the term ``United States national'' means--
       (A) a citizen or national of the United States or a 
     permanent resident of the United States; and
       (B) a corporation, partnership, or other business 
     association organized under the laws of the United States, 
     any State or territory thereof, the District of Columbia, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the Commonwealth of the 
     Northern Mariana Islands.

     SEC. ____. PROMOTION OF EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, 
                   AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY, LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND 
                   ARTISTIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
                   AND CHINA.

       (a) Exchanges Between the United States and China.--
     Agencies of the United States Government which engage in 
     educational, cultural, scientific, agricultural, military, 
     legal, political, and artistic exchanges shall endeavor to 
     initiate or expand such exchange programs with regard to 
     China.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a 
     federally chartered not-for-profit organization should be 
     established to fund exchanges between the United States and 
     China through private donations.

     SEC. ____. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should make 
     freedom of religion one of the major objectives of United 
     States foreign policy with respect to China. As part of this 
     policy, the Department of State should raise in every 
     relevant bilateral and multilateral forum the issue of 
     individuals imprisoned, detained, confined, or otherwise 
     harassed by the Chinese Government on religious grounds. In 
     its communications with the Chinese Government, the 
     Department of State should provide specific names of 
     individuals of concern and request a complete and timely 
     response from the Chinese Government regarding the 
     individuals' whereabouts and condition, the charges against 
     them, and sentence imposed. The goal of these official 
     communications should be the expeditious release of all 
     religious prisoners in China and Tibet and the end of the 
     Chinese Government's policy and practice of harassing and 
     repressing religious believers.

     SEC. ____. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE PARTICIPATION 
                   OF CERTAIN CHINESE OFFICIALS IN CONFERENCES, 
                   EXCHANGES, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, for fiscal years after fiscal year 1997, no funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department 
     of State, the United States Information Agency, and the 
     United States Agency for International Development may be 
     used for the purpose of providing travel expenses and per 
     diem for the participation of nationals of the People's 
     Republic of China described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in 
     conferences, exchanges, programs, and activities:
       (1) The head or political secretary of any of the following 
     Chinese Government-created or approved organizations:
       (A) The Chinese Buddhist Association.
       (B) The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.
       (C) The National Congress of Catholic Representatives.
       (D) The Chinese Catholic Bishops' Conference.
       (E) The Chinese Protestant ``Three Self'' Patriotic 
     Movement.
       (F) The China Christian Council.
       (G) The Chinese Taoist Association.
       (H) The Chinese Islamic Association.
       (2) Any military or civilian official or employee of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China who carried out 
     or directed the carrying out of any of the following policies 
     or practices:
       (A) Formulating, drafting, or implementing repressive 
     religious policies.
       (B) Imprisoning, detaining, or harassing individuals on 
     religious grounds.
       (C) Promoting or participating in policies or practices 
     which hinder religious activities or the free expression of 
     religious beliefs.
       (b) Certification.--
       (1) Each Federal agency subject to the prohibition of 
     subsection (a) shall certify in writing to the appropriate 
     congressional committees no later than 120 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, 
     that it did not pay, either directly or through a contractor 
     or grantee, for travel expenses or per diem of any national 
     of the People's Republic of China described in subsection 
     (a).
       (2) Each certification under paragraph (1) shall be 
     supported by the following information:
       (A) The name of each employee of any agency of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China whose travel 
     expenses or

[[Page S6742]]

     per diem were paid by funds of the reporting agency of the 
     United States Government.
       (B) The procedures employed by the reporting agency of the 
     United States Government to ascertain whether each individual 
     under subparagraph (A) did or did not participate in 
     activities described in subsection (a)(2).
       (C) The reporting agency's basis for concluding that each 
     individual under subparagraph (A) did not participate in such 
     activities.
       (c) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
     For purposes of this section the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. ____. CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                   CHINA INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE VISAS AND EXCLUDED 
                   FROM ADMISSION.

       (a) Requirement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, any national of the People's Republic of China described 
     in section ____(a)(2) (except the head of state, the head of 
     government, and cabinet level ministers) shall be ineligible 
     to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into 
     the United States.
       (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement in 
     subsection (a) with respect to an individual described in 
     such subsection if the President--
       (1) determines that it is vital to the national interest to 
     do so; and
       (2) provides written notification to the appropriate 
     congressional committees (as defined in section ____(c)) 
     containing a justification for the waiver.

     SEC. ____. SUNSET PROVISION.

       Sections ____ and ____ shall cease to have effect 4 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. ____. SATELLITE CONTROLS UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
                   MUNITIONS LIST.

       (a) Control of Satellites on the United States Munitions 
     List.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the export 
     control of satellites and related items on the Commerce 
     Control List of dual-use items in the Export Administration 
     Regulations (15 C.F.R. Part 730 et seq.) on the day before 
     the effective date of this section shall be considered, on or 
     after such date, to be transferred to the United States 
     Munitions List under section 38 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
       (b) Report.--Each report to Congress submitted pursuant to 
     section 902(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
     Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246) to waive the 
     restrictions contained in that Act on the export to the 
     People's Republic of China of United States-origin satellites 
     and defense articles on the United States Munitions List 
     shall be accompanied by a detailed justification setting 
     forth--
       (1) a detailed description of all militarily sensitive 
     characteristics integrated within, or associated with, the 
     satellite;
       (2) an estimate of the number of United States civilian 
     contract personnel expected to be needed in country to carry 
     out the proposed satellite launch;
       (3) a detailed description of--
       (A) the United States Government's plan to monitor the 
     proposed satellite launch to ensure that no unauthorized 
     transfer of technology occurs, together with an estimate of 
     the number of officers and employees of the United States 
     Government expected to be needed in country to carry out 
     monitoring of the proposed satellite launch; and
       (B) the manner in which the costs of such monitoring shall 
     be borne; and
       (4) the reasons why the proposed satellite launch is in the 
     national security interest of the United States, including--
       (A) the impact of the proposed export on employment in the 
     United States, including the number of new jobs created in 
     the United States, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct 
     result of the proposed export;
       (B) the number of existing jobs in the United States that 
     would be lost, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result 
     of the proposed export not being licensed;
       (C) the impact of the proposed export on the balance of 
     trade between the United States and China and a reduction in 
     the current United States trade deficit with China;
       (D) the impact of the proposed export on China's transition 
     from a nonmarket to a market economy and the long-term 
     economic benefit to the United States;
       (E) the impact of the proposed export on opening new 
     markets to American-made products through China's purchase of 
     United States-made goods and services not directly related to 
     the proposed export;
       (F) the impact of the proposed export on reducing acts, 
     policies, and practices that constitute significant trade 
     barriers to United States exports or foreign direct 
     investment in China by United States nationals;
       (G) the increase in the United States overall market share 
     for goods and services in comparison to Japan, France, 
     Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia;
       (H) the impact of the proposed export on China's 
     willingness to modify its commercial and trade laws, 
     practices, and regulations to make American-made goods and 
     services more accessible to that market; and
       (I) the impact of the proposed export on China's 
     willingness to reduce formal and informal trade barriers and 
     tariffs, duties, and other fees on American-made goods and 
     services entering China.
       (c) National Security Waiver for the Export of Satellites 
     to China.--Section 902(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 
     101-246; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note) is amended by inserting before 
     the period at the end the following: ``, except that, in the 
     case of a proposed export of a satellite under subsection 
     (a)(5), on a case-by-case basis, that it is in the national 
     security interests of the United States to do so''.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Militarily sensitive characteristics.--The term 
     ``militarily sensitive characteristics'' includes, but is not 
     limited to, antijamming capability, antennas, crosslinks, 
     baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation-hardened 
     devices, propulsion systems, pointing accuracy, or kick 
     motors.
       (2) Related items.--The term ``related items'' means the 
     satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equipment, 
     payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and 
     non-embedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines 
     described in the report submitted to Congress by the 
     Department of State on February 6, 1998, pursuant to section 
     38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)).
       (e) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect 15 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC.____. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR TECHNOLOGY 
                   SECURITY POLICY.

       (a) Establishment of Position.--Section 134 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(d)(1) There is a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
     Technology Security Policy in the Office of the Under 
     Secretary. The Deputy Under Secretary serves as the Director 
     of the Defense Technology Security Administration.
       ``(2) The Deputy Under Secretary has only the following 
     duties:
       ``(A) To supervise activities of the Department of Defense 
     relating to export controls.
       ``(B) To develop for the Department of Defense policies and 
     positions regarding the appropriate export control policies 
     and procedures that are necessary to protect the national 
     security interests of the United States.
       ``(3) The Deputy Under Secretary may report directly to the 
     Secretary of Defense on the matters that are within the 
     duties of the Deputy Under Secretary.''.
       (b) Implementation.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     complete the actions necessary to implement section 134(d) of 
     title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), 
     not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the plans of the Secretary for 
     implementing section 134(d) of title 10, United States Code, 
     as added by subsection (a). The report shall include the 
     following:
       (1) A description of any organizational changes that are to 
     be made within the Department of Defense to implement the 
     provision.
       (2) A description of the role of the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff in the export control activities of the 
     Department of Defense after the provision is implemented, 
     together with a discussion of how that role compares to the 
     Chairman's role in those activities before the implementation 
     of the provision.
       (d) Limitation.--Unless specifically authorized and 
     appropriated for such purpose, no funds may be obligated to 
     relocate office space or personnel of the Defense Technology 
     Security Administration.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it will be my intention to move to table 
this amendment at approximately 11 a.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, June 23. I 
will be working with Senator Levin to reach an agreement as to the 
exact time. Members will be notified as soon as that time agreement has 
been reached. In addition, other votes could occur prior to the 
scheduled weekly recess for our party conferences, which begins at 
12:30 p.m. on Tuesday. I thank all colleagues for their attention to 
this matter.
  Mr. President, I hope that while we only have another 50 minutes on 
the bill prior to business, according to the pending order, that there 
will be statements and other matters relating to this bill so that we 
can make as productive use of the time as possible. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Virginia for 
the statement he has made. I know all Members of the Senate will be on 
notice accordingly.
  I take this moment to speak generally to the amendment that is before 
the Senate regarding China policy and the overall question before the 
country about China policy, as President Clinton prepares to leave for 
China later this week.

[[Page S6743]]

  Mr. President, this debate is nothing new. Nonetheless, it takes on a 
special meaning and intensity, because it happens in the week in which 
the President will go to China. I understand the Senator from Arkansas, 
who is the proponent of most of the amendments, has stated over and 
over again that it was not his intention that these amendments be 
brought up in the week in which the President was going to China, and I 
know that is absolutely the fact. These amendments were filed earlier. 
He had discussed them earlier. It just happens that here we are on this 
bill, and they are coming up.
  I hope that we will proceed, may I say, with an appropriate sense of 
respect for the mission that the President will carry out on all our 
behalf, because, though we may have different sides of this American 
policy towards China that we speak to on the floor, I know that we all 
hope and pray that the President's trip will be successful, in the 
sense that it will not only strengthen our bilateral relationship with 
China, but will do so based on honest exchange and principle, including 
the very principles that are the subject of some of the amendments that 
are before us, most particularly human rights, proliferation, which is 
to say security, and trade policy, and the others as well.
  Mr. President, this question of our relationship with China is, in 
some ways, the most difficult, complicated and yet the most important 
of our foreign and defense policies because of the size of China, the 
enormous changes that are occurring in China, and the significant role 
that China will play in the next century as a true military, economic 
superpower. The question of our policy is often described as a choice 
between engagement or nonengagement, which is to say engagement, on the 
one hand, or isolation and containment on the other.
  Well, I favor engagement. I think that the truth is when you come 
down to it, there are very few people here that I have heard in the 
Senate who really want to isolate China, or that is the stated 
intention of their policy. The question then becomes, I believe, not 
whether or not to engage; China is too big for us not to engage with; 
we are too sensible for us to try to isolate or contain this great 
country with such a long and proud history. The question then becomes, 
How do we engage? And do we engage in a way that works together in an 
honest, principled fashion to not only improve our relations--military, 
economic, ideological, philosophical--but to improve the lot, the 
plight, the lives of people in China consistent with our own 
principles.
  My fear is that some of the amendments that are offered here on this 
bill, and some of the statements of intention that have been made 
regarding American policy toward China, while they may want a form of 
engagement or they may acknowledge the inevitability of engagement with 
China, they do so in a way that is confrontational, in some sense is 
punitive, perhaps without justification for all the punitive qualities, 
and in the end will put us in a course of conflict with China which 
many of us feel is not necessary. That, I think, is the issue drawn by 
these amendments. Yes, engagement, but what kind of engagement will it 
be?
  On the other side there is an engagement that would be so devoid of 
honesty and principle that it would sacrifice America's national 
interests and our traditional values, human rights being at the top of 
them, which is to say it would be engagement for the sake of 
engagement, to yield, if you will, to the People's Republic of China in 
any point of conflict between us. That is as unacceptable as the policy 
on the other side of isolation and attempted containment.
  I think we have to see if we can work together here to find a common 
ground on which we engage honestly and consistent with our principles 
and interests, which is to say we have an interest--military, economic, 
philosophical--in engaging China in the world community, in building 
peaceful relationships and prosperous relationships with her, but that 
engagement must be honest in the sense that we do not conceal our 
differences, and principled in the sense that we do not yield on the 
principles that make us uniquely American.
  I hope out of the kind of debate that--though it is awkward to have 
it the week that the President is going to China--but I hope that out 
of the debate that is occurring here on these amendments, and the 
debate that I am sure will follow on MFN as the days and weeks go by, 
that we will be able to find a common ground.
  It is not surprising that this debate is occurring. China is not only 
a big country and an important country, but it is a country with a 
different culture and history from ours. It is a country that lived 
under a remarkably rigid, ideological, Communist dictatorship for a 
long period of time that has seen outbursts, spasmodic alterations in 
the political status quo, and it is different from us. So these 
differences about how to engage China, what to expect of China, are not 
surprising. And we express those in the debate that is occurring on 
this bill.

  My own strong support for the policy of engagement--honest, 
principled, direct engagement; one that I think is in our national 
interest--is premised on a conclusion which is that that policy of 
engagement, begun 26 years ago by President Nixon, followed by every 
President since of both political parties, has worked. We have had 
tough times, crises in the relationship--cultural revolution two 
decades ago; and very fresh, still stinging for us, the tragedy on 
Tiananmen Square a little less than a decade ago.
  But overall, if you look at the changes, the revolutionary changes 
within this country, China, I believe the facts indicate that the 
policy of engagement has produced a China today that is significantly 
different than the China of two decades ago of the cultural revolution, 
and one decade ago of the Tiananmen Square tragedy--an atrocity--that 
it is a country today that is moving in exactly the direction we would 
want it to, remarkably toward a market economy--and I will speak in a 
moment more to that--and also more in the direction of human rights 
than before, though, God knows, not enough.
  But remember, again, we are dealing with a culture and a country very 
different from ours, a culture and a country during communism and 
before so large that it lived with the constant fear of the leadership, 
of the disintegration of this enormous national entity, a country in 
which leaders have traditionally portrayed themselves as riding on the 
back of a tiger. But the changes have most assuredly occurred.
  It has been fascinating in the last month or so just to pay a little 
bit of extra attention to the newspaper reports from China, not so much 
the political reports, but what might be called feature stories in the 
press. And they showed a China that is dramatically different, much 
more like us than it was before.
  There was a story a while back in one of the papers about the fact 
that half of the villages in China have held elections. It was a 
concerted effort by the leadership--not unlimited; that is for sure--
but a concerted effort by the leadership of China to introduce some 
form of participatory electoral system in half of the villages in 
China, almost 500,000 villages.
  There was another story about a professor at a university in Beijing, 
a brilliant man, from the article, who had an idea for a new 
technology; this kind of thing that happens around America, 
particularly in places like Silicon Valley. It did not happen in 
Communist China. But he found his way to some capital, started a 
company, and is doing brilliantly. He is excited about his stock 
options. Wow. That is not one of Mao's--I do not remember stock options 
being in Mao's little red book.
  There was a different kind of story about a change in the use of the 
media. Remember, under Mao the television or the propaganda instruments 
only had one--it was all straight ahead. It was all: ``Support Mao. 
Support the State.'' There was a story about a gentleman who is 
producing the most popular sitcom on television in China. He had been, 
I am proud to say, in my own State of Connecticut, in Waterford at the 
Eugene O'Neill Theater for a period of months studying and saw ``The 
Cosby Show'' and was inspired by it. I take some license here, but he 
went back and created the Chinese version of ``Cosby,'' the most 
popular show in China at this point.
  There was an announcement of the sale of 3 million state-owned 
residences

[[Page S6744]]

to people, to citizens of China, property ownership fundamental to our 
view of the world, not theirs; tens of thousands of State-owned 
enterprises about to be privatized or closed down because they are 
inefficient.

  Under the leadership I would describe as revolutionary, of the new 
Premier, Zhu Rongji, one of the ways in which the Communist State 
controls the lives and political behavior of all of its citizens is by 
employing all of its citizens. Once you take these tens of thousands, 
hundreds of thousands, of State-owned enterprises, privatize them, and 
people are not working for the State any more but working for private 
owners, you have the conditions for a whole new expression and 
experience of freedom--remarkable, remarkable changes.
  Let me talk about religion, because it is of real interest to me. I 
worked with colleagues and cosponsored one of the two bills before this 
body that try to put religious freedom and protection from religious 
persecution and discrimination at the center of our foreign policy and 
impose penalties on countries or at least alter our relationship with 
countries that don't respect the bedrock American principle of freedom 
of religion.
  Last March, Senator Mack, a colleague and dear friend from Florida, 
and I went to China. It happened to be Holy Week, the week before 
Easter. Senator Mack went to mass each day. The churches were more or 
less full.
  Let me read from a New York Times article of just less than a week 
ago, June 17, so you can get a flavor of the changes that are 
occurring, and yet the enormous changes that have not yet occurred that 
we need to have occurring. I will read briefly from the New York Times 
of June 17, an article by Eric Eckholm, from Nanjing. The article 
begins with a report that:

       New Bibles stream forth from a computerized printing press 
     in this onetime southern capital at a rate of two and a half 
     million a year for sale to Christians all over China. [Bibles 
     in Chinese, of course.]

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Critics in the West point to the restrictions and 
     repression as evidence of systematic persecution, while the 
     Government's defenders here point, instead, to the relative 
     freedom most Christians now enjoy.
       Paradoxically, the rising outcry abroad comes as 
     Christianity in China, especially evangelical Protestantism, 
     is growing explosively. The Rev. Don Argue [many of us are 
     privileged to know in this Chamber], recent president of the 
     National Association of Evangelicals in the United States, 
     says China may be experiencing ``the single greatest Revival 
     in the history of Christianity.''
       Much of that growth has occurred with official 
     acquiescence, and though they remain a small minority in a 
     giant country, millions of Chinese people like Zhang Linmei, 
     a 32-year-old worshiper at St. Paul's [in Nanjing], find the 
     same comfort in religion that Christians do anywhere, without 
     worrying much about politics.
       ``I feel life is meaningless in society at large,'' Zhang 
     said after services as she picked up her 5-year-old daughter, 
     dressed in her finest, from Sunday school.
       ``This is the only reliable place in my life,'' Zhang 
     added.
       ``The situation for religion is in many ways the best it's 
     been since 1949,'' [the year of the Communist revolution] 
     said Richard Madsen, an expert on Chinese religion at the 
     University of California at San Diego. Though the 
     Government still controls their growth and closely 
     monitors their activities, he said, the official churches 
     enjoy more autonomy [today] than [ever] in the past.
       Even the illegal churches--[of course, here we get to the 
     problem] unregistered Protestant churches and openly pro-
     Vatican Catholic groups--function without serious trouble in 
     many places, Dr. Madsen and others say. But those who refuse 
     to pledge support to the Government and its apparatus of 
     religious control, and those with unorthodox or ecstatic 
     styles of worship, can face harsh repression. The situation 
     is similar for other major religions here, including 
     Buddhists and Muslims. Many believers now enjoy relative 
     freedom, but Tibetan Buddhists who consider the Dalai Lama 
     their leader face repression.

  Finally, a few more paragraphs which I think express the explosion in 
belief and freedom to believe, and yet the repression that still exists 
for those who trouble and offend particularly provincial 
administrators, administrators of the various Chinese provinces, or 
touch a vulnerable cord in the Chinese experience, which is the fear of 
a loyalty to a force outside of China and beyond the Government.
  I read again from the New York Times article of June 17 last week:

       Officials say Catholics now number four million, while 
     outside researchers say the true total may be closer to 10 
     million, with many secretly accepting the Pope as the true 
     head of their church.
       The peculiar hybrid state of Christianity here reflects the 
     obsession of the Communist party with control: virtually any 
     organization, whether political or social or religious, must 
     gain party approval.
       The party is an officially atheist organization that 
     asserts that religion will eventually wither away. But in a 
     policy spelled out in the early 1980's, the Government 
     officially guarantees freedom of religion--within prescribed 
     boundaries including a required allegiance to the state, 
     adherence to certain styles of worship and limits on church 
     construction, evangelizing and the baptism of children, among 
     other rules.

  Of course, those are all unacceptable to us.

       For those willing to accommodate, the 1990's seem a golden 
     time.
       ``From our perspective, now is the best time ever for 
     implementing the policy of religious freedom,'' said Han 
     Wenzao, who as president of the China Christian Council is 
     the national leader of the official Protestant church and a 
     prime link to the Communist Government. ``The criterion 
     should be, is the word of God being propagated or not? [And 
     Mr. Han Wenzao says] It is and it's good.''

  Well, that is a rational report, sobering and disappointing in the 
continuation of official sanctions, repression, anxiety about religion; 
and yet, clearly, the momentum is all in favor of faith. That, too, 
represents a maturing, a changing and development within the mind and 
outlook of the leadership of China. I think it is at least in part a 
reaction to the centrality that we have placed on religious freedom, 
absent persecution, in our relations with the People's Republic of 
China.
  So, I hope we will pass one of these bills that set up a system in 
our Government to rank and report on the state of religious freedom in 
all the countries of the world. Of course, I don't favor a specific 
action regarding the People's Republic of China, because that tends to 
scapegoat them and it tends to create a confrontation between us 
separately that is not necessary. They ought to be part of the overall 
policy that I hope this Senate will adopt, that Congress will adopt, 
before this session ends and, most particularly, to the events of this 
week.
  I hope and believe that when the President meets with Jiang Zemin, 
when he speaks with the people of China publicly, he will raise this 
question of religious persecution in a way that he couldn't do if he 
were not engaged and wouldn't do if we were not honestly and 
principally engaged; he will speak directly to why it is so important 
to us in America that countries with which we have normal, bilateral 
relations respect the right of their citizens to worship God as they 
choose. That was the initial, primal motivation for those who founded 
this country. It is right there in the first or second paragraph--first 
substantive paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, in the first 
amendment to our Constitution, the beginning of the Bill of Rights. It 
is what we are about. If we are not directly and principally engaged 
with that, if our President of the United States does not go to China, 
the kind of progress that I have described in which I say the glass is 
certainly half full and getting fuller, the opportunities for that will 
be lost.
  I want to say just a word more about national security, because these 
amendments, after all, are attached to the Department of Defense 
authorization bill, S. 2057.
  In a literal sense, a parliamentary sense, it seems to me personally 
that these amendments are not germane. That is a matter of 
parliamentary conclusion, which I will leave to others. But I want to 
say that the question of our relations with the People's Republic of 
China, the question of how we engage and whether we engage with the 
People's Republic of China is at the center of our national security 
policy, of our defense policy today and, even more so, in the next 
century.
  We have many important security relationships in the world, beginning 
with our allies in Europe, and in Japan. Our ability to manage our 
relationship with the People's Republic of China will, in my opinion, 
as much as any other relation we have, determine whether or not we will 
live in a world that remains secure in our time, but whether our 
children, and whether the pages here, as they grow to be adults, will 
live in a world that is secure. That is the destiny of China--with 1.2 
billion people who are building a military, it is strategically 
located, an enormous country.
  Look at the situations in the world which worry us now--most 
recently,

[[Page S6745]]

the explosions of atomic weapons by India and Pakistan on the Asian 
subcontinent. Our ability to work with them, as we have been doing 
since those explosions, greatly strengthens our capacity to limit the 
possibility that the conflict on the subcontinent will break into a 
worse conflict, and a nightmare would be a nuclear war.
  Consider where we would be today in implementing the policy on the 
Asian subcontinent if we were not engaged with China, if we could not 
work with the permanent five members of the Security Council and with 
China on a problem such as that. Take the Korean peninsula. We have in 
excess of 30,000 American soldiers there. It is probably the most 
heavily armed border in the world. Our ability to keep the peace there 
and, in fact, to begin to move beyond, in the absence of conflict, to 
better relations between the parties there is very important to us. It 
is materially helped by our engagement with China--our ability to work 
with the two Koreas, China, and the United States to try to create more 
stability and ultimately, perhaps, a reunification of the two parts of 
Korea.
  Take our interest in the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East--an 
interest so clearly vital to our national security that we sent a half 
million troops there about 7 years ago in the Persian Gulf war. China 
and United States will begin to have shared interests--and perhaps even 
if we are not engaged, a shared competition, as China grows 
economically--for the energy resources in the Persian Gulf area, for 
the oil. We have to have a good relationship with China to be able to 
manage that competition for energy in a way that doesn't break into 
conflict.
  More immediately, the Middle East, Persian Gulf--always a tinderbox 
in our time--we deeply fear the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, of ballistic missiles, particularly in Iran. My sense is 
that the engagement with China has assisted us materially in cutting 
down the flow of component parts to the Iranians for the development of 
nuclear weapons, which is not so with missile proliferation, as far as 
I can tell. I hope and trust that the President will discuss that 
directly with the leadership of China in the summit that is to come 
later this week.
  But, again, an engagement with China offers us the prospect, in 
return for what China seeks in our bilateral relationship, including 
not only economic gain but recognition, stature, involvement in world 
organizations--in return for that, hopefully, we will be in a position 
to convince the leadership in China to cut back on any of the component 
parts of ballistic missiles, which they are selling to Iran, or any 
other countries that threaten our security, because that is part of 
what it means to be engaged.

  Incidentally, Mr. President, in this regard--and I know there are 
some amendments that maybe have been put forth that deal with 
proliferation--this Chamber, a short while ago, passed the Iran Missile 
Sanctions Act, also passed by the House, on its way to the President. 
The concern expressed about that bill had mostly to do with its impact 
on Russia as a major supply of component parts for missile construction 
in Iran. But Russia is not mentioned in that bill. That is a generic 
bill. That is the way we ought to deal with problems like 
proliferation--not to single out the Chinese, but, you know, the PRC, 
People's Republic of China, will be affected by that legislation, and 
entities within it will be deprived of doing business with the United 
States if there is evidence that they are contributing to the ballistic 
missile capacity of the Iranians. We would not have those opportunities 
if we were not engaged honestly and in a principled way.
  So I draw the conclusion that though these amendments may, in one 
sense, parliamentary, be ill placed on this bill, that they touch a 
larger issue. It is the right issue and the right point, which is that 
our ability to manage our relations with China in our time, and 
particularly as we head into the next century, will substantially 
affect the national security of the United States.
  Let us say we stopped engaging and we attempted to isolate or contain 
China. Think of the turmoil that would cause to our allies in Taiwan, 
our great, dear friends and allies in Taiwan. Think about the prospect 
of an independent--disengaged from the United States--People's Republic 
of China, growing stronger in the next century. Could our allies in 
that region--even our best ally, Japan--maintain as close a 
relationship with us when China was an emerging strength and was 
hostile to the United States because we attempted to contain them? I 
think not.
  So, Mr. President, I hope we can find a more constructive course to 
go forward with than being unnecessarily punitive about everything that 
happens in the People's Republic of China that doesn't please us. A lot 
will happen there that doesn't please us. But it is in our overriding 
national interest, militarily, economically, and ideologically, to 
continue to be engaged in an honest and direct way.
  In my opinion, there is ultimately no choice. And I hope we can find 
ways--short of some of the amendments that have been put onto this 
bill--to reason together and come up with common approaches because, as 
I said at the outset, as much as I support engagement, engagement 
cannot allow us to become spineless. I don't think it has been in our 
time. Since President Nixon, and since Tiananmen, and President Bush, 
and on into President Clinton, I think we have been strong and 
demanding. It is an appropriate role for Congress to continue to work 
with the administration to make sure that is the case.
  Finally, I will offer for the review of my colleagues, at some point, 
a bill I was privileged to introduce last fall, in October, with three 
colleagues, which constituted two Republicans and two Democrats, 
including myself; Senators Bob Kerrey of Nebraska; Chuck Hagel of 
Nebraska, and Frank Murkowski. I believe it is Senate bill 1303. It is 
an attempt to create a legislative expression of support for a policy 
of honest, direct, tough principled engagement with China, that is in 
our interest, and to create some bilateral entities, commissions, and 
working groups to work through in a demanding way--and some of them 
including Members of Congress --these points of conflict that we have 
with China to see if we cannot build on them instead of striking down 
and undercutting the relationship as a result of those areas in which 
we disagree.

  I hope at some point to be able to bring this bill to the floor and 
to either in whole or in part as an amendment ask my colleagues to 
consider it as an expression of a policy, but also as evidence of a 
particular way to express that policy to establish a United States-
China trade and investment commission, to establish a bilateral energy 
committee, to establish a bilateral food committee, to establish a U.S. 
human rights commission to not only create a bilateral dialog on human 
rights, but for us to have an opportunity directly to speak to the 
Chinese about how important it is to us, but also to create an 
opportunity to review the Chinese, province by province, in these areas 
of concern to us--human rights, proliferation, trade, environment--and 
to use a carrot instead of a stick, and to offer to those provinces 
that measure up closer to our standards and ideals: OPIC insurance 
financing backing, clear access to Eximbank financing that is not 
available now but only through a Presidential waiver to move 
constructively, honestly, forward; an understanding that both peoples 
and both countries have to gain from this involvement, and particularly 
understanding that the people of China for whose freedom we work and 
pray and from whose increasing freedom we take great joy.
  They are the ones that I think will ultimately suffer as much as we 
will from a policy of isolation and containment, and will gain from a 
policy of direct and principled engagement.
  I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak.
  It would be my intention on the motion to table that the Senator from 
Virginia has said he will put in tomorrow to vote to table, because 
while I think this has been a constructive debate, I don't think this 
is the week to be taking action in the way that some of these 
amendments would, and I don't favor most of the amendments as 
expressing the kind of policy of engagement that I think is so much in 
our American national interests.
  I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

[[Page S6746]]

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that current 
business be set aside for the purpose of immediate consideration of my 
amendment No. 2405.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with respect, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I had the intention, and still have the 
intention at some later time, of reintroducing the amendment that is at 
the desk.
  What it effectively does is address the potential problem and 
influence that a company called COSCO, the Chinese Ocean Shipping 
Company, will have on the United States.
  Mr. President, the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company is Communist 
China's largest shipping group. It has more than doubled the number of 
ships that our entire U.S. Navy has. This group has been given 
preferential treatment by this country and other countries for some 
period of time. It wasn't long ago that they were given the opportunity 
to have ports at both ends of the Panama Canal, the Ports of Colon and 
Cristobal, and our country was supportive of that.
  This 25-year lease gives them an abundance of control in the Panama 
Canal and was to cost $22 million a year. But the deal that was made 
would be to waive that amount of money, and to waive the labor laws and 
veto rights over a period of approximately 2 years.
  Other areas where we have given preferential treatment to COSCO fall 
in the area of taxpayer-guaranteed loans.
  COSCO was the first shipping company owned by Beijing government to 
receive a U.S. Federal loan guarantee under a 40-year-old 
Transportation Department program designed to help American shipyards 
win business. This was a $138 million loan, which constituted 87.5 
percent of the cost of the projects to build four container ships in 
Alabama. The ships were never built. They did not go through. 
Nonetheless, the permission was given.
  There are many other areas where they have received preferential 
treatment. Since the 1950s, ships from Communist nations have been 
forced to give 4 day's notice before they could dock near U.S. military 
establishments. This was to give the U.S. officials early warning about 
possible spying and this type of thing. The restriction still applies 
to countries like Cambodia, Vietnam, Russia, and some of the other 
former Soviet Republics. But in a deal that was worked out in December 
of 1996, the United States cut China's wait at a dozen sensitive ports 
from 4 days to 1 day.

  Make sure we understand what we have done here. We have allowed this 
company to only have to wait 1 day, and all the rest of the Communist 
nations have to wait 4 days. Cambodia still has to wait 4 days. Vietnam 
still has to wait 4 days. Russia still has to wait 4 days, but China 
only 1 day.
  U.S. firms still can't get sole-tenancy leases at Chinese ports, yet 
COSCO got just such rights last year from Long Beach, CA. What a 
lease--a vacant U.S. Naval Station with no security check. What they 
are attempting to do now is to get the rest of that closed operation.
  We are talking about several hundred acres very strategically 
located.
  It is kind of interesting, since we have been giving such 
preferential treatment to the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company. Why are 
we doing this?
  I think it is important to understand that this shipping company is 
not a part of the private sector. This is owned by the Chinese 
Government. It is owned specifically by the People's Liberation Army of 
Communist China. So their interests are not just in mercantile--not 
just in ships--but also they have military interests. COSCO reports to 
the Chinese Ministry of Communications, which falls under the State 
Council, which in turn is led by the Communist Party Politburo member 
and Premier Li Peng.
  If we are looking at the problems that have come up and surfaced and 
have caused many of us to be concerned, we might want to remember that 
back in March of 1996 a COSCO ship, the Empress Phoenix, transported 
2,000 illegal AK-47 automatic weapons to be used in street gangs in Los 
Angeles. It was intended to be sold to the California street gangs, and 
this has been verified. The corporation was the Norinco Corporation, 
which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army. Fortunately, the 
guns were confiscated as a part of an FBI sting operation.
  Mr. President, it is certainly no coincidence that the firm is also 
the employer of record of Wang Jun, which is the well-known Chinese 
arms dealer who attended a recent radio address in this country.
  Mr. President, only last week the Washington Times reported that a 
COSCO ship was on its way to Pakistan.
  Now we are talking about shipping, carrying, nuclear technology and 
equipment in violation of an international nonproliferation agreement. 
We are talking about carrying this information, carrying this 
technology, carrying this nuclear technology to Pakistan from China, a 
clear violation.
  The COSCO ships have previously been used to transport military and 
strategic cargoes, including components for ballistic missiles from 
China and North Korea to such countries as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and just most recently, we learned last week, Libya.
  So I think that we have a great deal of our Nation's security at risk 
by allowing them--continuing to allow them to have this lease.
  With that in mind, I would again renew my unanimous consent request. 
I will wait and give adequate time for someone to come in, if there is 
an objection, but my unanimous consent request would be to set aside 
the pending business for the immediate consideration of my amendment 
No. 2405.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I respectfully object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears an objection.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, in the few minutes we have, I would 
like to respond to my good friend and colleague from Connecticut, to 
some of the comments he made about the pending business and the 
amendments I have offered regarding China.
  He spoke of engagement and the necessity of the engagement policy, 
and as has so often been the case with administration defenders and the 
defenders of the engagement policy, they would present a false 
dichotomy in that if you are not for the current administration's 
policy, then you are an isolationist. I would suggest it is not 
engagement or isolation; it is how we are going to engage China.
  I would further suggest that the policy this administration has 
pursued has failed in engaging China adequately. That is evident in a 
whole host of areas, not the least of which are the abuses addressed by 
these amendments.
  So when my good friend from Connecticut said that he is opposed to 
these amendments, I was tempted to ask specifically what amendment is 
it--denying visas to those who perform forced abortions, or is it 
denying visas to government individuals involved in religious 
persecution? What is it precisely that is objectionable about these? I 
would think, rather than undermining the President's hand as he goes to 
China, this in fact strengthens his hand, strengthens his ability to 
deal in a more forthright way with those issues of concern to all 
Americans.
  My good friend from Connecticut also spoke in glowing terms of the 
``changed China.'' It is becoming more common to hear of the ``changed 
China.''
  In the edition of Newsweek magazine which just came out is a cover 
article, a beautiful cover article, entitled ``The New China.'' ``The 
New China.''
  Well, I wish that as we looked at the experience of the Chinese 
people today and what has happened since 9 years ago and the Tiananmen 
massacre, we could be reassured that there were students to gather on 
the Tiananmen plaza during the President's visit next week, in fact 
they would receive a different greeting than they did 9 years ago when 
they were mowed down with gunfire.
  Well, is China different? Is it a new China? These are just reports 
in the

[[Page S6747]]

last 3 weeks. New York Times, June 6: A bishop in the underground 
Catholic Church has been arrested, was detained on May 31 while 
traveling to his village.
  This is the changed China.
  June 14, the Portland Oregonian reports that Chinese police 
interrogated and threatened three dissidents who urged President 
Clinton to press Chinese leaders on human rights during the summit. 
Police ransacked the homes, confiscated their computers, took two to 
local precincts. June 14.
  June 15, South China Morning Post: Dissidents in several areas 
including Shanghai and Weifang in Shangdong Province, the first stop 
for Mr. Clinton, have complained of harassment. Incidents have included 
home raids, detention, telephone tapping and confiscation of computers.
  June 16, Japan Economic News Wire. In the runup to President Bill 
Clinton's visit to China, a veteran Chinese dissident has been indicted 
for helping another activist escape to Hong Kong.
  June 18, Far Eastern Economic Review reports that Beijing warned the 
Vatican, ``Don't use the Internet or other media channels to interfere 
with Chinese religious affairs policies.'' And we could go on and on.
  That is the last 3 weeks, Mr. President, of news accounts of what is 
going on in China. That is the ``new China.'' We want to present China 
today in some kind of rose-colored glasses, that everything is fine, 
when in fact it is not.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield? Will the Senator yield for a 
question?
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would love to yield to my good friend from 
Oklahoma, but I have 5 minutes left. Unfortunately, the Presiding 
Officer has assured me he is going to gavel me quiet at 3 o'clock, so I 
am going to have to talk very quickly.
  The issue of religious freedom was raised, and my friend from 
Connecticut spoke once again in glowing terms of improved conditions in 
China on the issue of religious freedom. While my friend quoted from 
the New York Times--my good friend and distinguished colleague, whom I 
admire greatly--I would like to quote from the State Department's 
Report on Religious Freedom in China just issued in the last--it is a 
1997 report just issued recently on China, and I will quote just a 
portion of this.

       Some religious groups have registered while others were 
     refused registration and others have not applied. Many groups 
     have been reluctant to comply due to principled opposition to 
     state control of religion, unwillingness to limit their 
     activities or refusal to compromise their position on matters 
     such as abortion. They fear adverse consequences if they 
     reveal as required the names and addresses of members and 
     details about leadership activities, finances and contacts in 
     China or abroad.
       Guided by a central policy directive of October 1996 that 
     launched a national campaign to suppress unauthorized 
     religious groups and social organizations, Chinese 
     authorities in some areas made strong efforts to crack down 
     on the activities of unregistered Catholic and Protestant 
     movements. They raided and closed several hundred house 
     church groups, many with significant memberships, properties 
     and financial resources.

  And it goes on and gives many examples of that. So, in fact, our 
State Department--whatever else the New York Times may say, our State 
Department says that conditions in China are deplorable and that in 
fact there has been a crackdown on those who would defy the Government 
by not registering because of principled opposition to the Government's 
policy.
  Now, we say--and I have heard it argued even today--that the church 
and religious organizations in China are flourishing. Well, they are 
growing, but I would just suggest that they are growing in spite of 
Government policy, in spite of the persecution, not because there has 
somehow been a blossoming of religious freedom in China.
  As I think back to the early days of Christianity and how the Roman 
empire cracked down with great intensity upon the infant Christian 
faith, the Christian faith mushroomed and spread all across the known 
world at that time. But they did so in spite of intense persecution, 
and actually Christianity began to demise when suddenly it was made the 
``official religion.'' So to say somehow growth equates with freedom in 
China today, I simply reject that.
  I have much, much more that I would like to say. I do want to say a 
word about the President's plans to be received in Tiananmen Square. 
Mrs. Ding Zilin, mother of a 17-year-old student who was killed in 1989 
in the Tiananmen protest, said that she hoped President Clinton would 
make a strong gesture. Her husband is associate professor of philosophy 
at the People's University in Beijing. They said this. They objected to 
the pomp and ceremony in Tiananmen Square as the red carpet ``is dyed 
with the blood of our relatives who have fallen.''
  I wonder, with the emphasis upon property control, if the President 
would feel the same about following protocol if those hundreds of 
students who were slain had included some American students, perhaps 
there as foreign exchange students.
  One thing is certain. When the President goes to Tiananmen, it will 
be peaceful. It will be quiet. All dissidents will have been rounded 
up, and there will be no embarrassing protesters. When President Jiang 
Zemin came to the United States, there were protesters. When Jiang was 
asked about it, he mocked the protesters, saying with a smile that 
periodically he heard little voices and noises in his ear. There will 
be no such embarrassing little noises in his ear when President Clinton 
goes to Tiananmen Square.
  How do we turn what I think is an unfortunate decision to go to 
Tiananmen Square into something positive? Perhaps the President could 
give a Reagan-like speech, when President Reagan went to the Berlin 
Wall in 1987 and he said, ``Tear down this wall.''
  It was Jiang who said that all of the protest in 1989 was ``much ado 
about nothing.'' That was the President's attitude--much ado about 
nothing. Perhaps President Clinton could ask for an official apology. 
Perhaps he could ask for the release of the dissidents. They have never 
investigated; they have never apologized; they have never released the 
dissidents. Perhaps he could take a lead from the Italian President, 
who last week, after the official reception, returned to Tiananmen 
Square, where he prayed and where he meditated and where he remembered 
those who fell. Perhaps the President, in going to Tiananmen, could 
bring a wreath in memory of those.
  And then I would suggest this as well, that when the President raises 
the issue of human rights, he does so not before a press briefing but 
that he does so on his broadcast to the Chinese people. And if he will 
do so, it will be at least a small step in turning what I think is an 
unfortunate image for the world to see, into something that can be 
positive in this trip to China.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I come to the floor briefly today to 
address the China-related amendments to the S. 2057, the DOD 
Authorization bill, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations--the 
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the subject matter of these 
amendments.
  Unfortunately, the proponents of these amendments chose a day to 
debate these provisions when it was clear that many of the amendments' 
detractors would be out of town. As a result, many of the latter are 
not here today to participate in this important discussion. While I 
strongly oppose these amendments, as I believe do a majority of the 
members of the full Foreign Relations Committee, I myself have 
commitments preventing me from spending any significant time today on 
the floor.
  So in order to express the thrust of my position on these amendments, 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at 
this point a copy of a ``Dear Colleague'' letter dated June 15, 1998, 
of which I am the primary signatory; a copy of my opening statement 
from a hearing before my subcommittee dated June 18, 1998; and finally 
pages 1, 2 and 6 through 9 of a statement by Assistant Secretary 
Stanley Roth.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, June 15, 1998.
       Dear Colleague: When the Senate returns to consideration of 
     the DOD Authorization bill, S. 2057, we expect a series of 
     amendments to be offered concerning the People's Republic of 
     China. These amendments, if accepted, would do serious damage 
     to our bilateral relationship and halt a decade of U.S. 
     efforts to encourage greater Chinese adherence

[[Page S6748]]

     to international norms in such areas of nonproliferation, 
     human rights, and trade.
       In relative terms, in the last year China has shown 
     improvement in several areas which the U.S. has specifically 
     indicated are important to us. Relations with Taiwan have 
     stabilized, several prominent dissidents have been released 
     from prison, enforcement of our agreements on intellectual 
     property rights has been stepped up, the reversion of Hong 
     Kong has gone smoothly, and China's agreement not to devalue 
     its currency helped to stabilize Asia's economic crisis.
       Has this been enough change: Clearly not. But the question 
     is: how do we best encourage more change in China? Do we do 
     so by isolating one fourth of the world's population, by 
     denying visas to most members of its government, by denying 
     it access to any international concessional loans, and by 
     backing it into a corner and declaring it a pariah as these 
     amendments would do?
       Or, rather, is the better course to engage China, to expand 
     dialogue, to invite China to live up to its aspirations as a 
     world power, to expose the country to the norms of democracy 
     and human rights and thereby draw it further into the family 
     of nations?
       We are all for human rights; there's no dispute about that. 
     But the question is, how do we best achieve human rights? We 
     think it's through engagement.
       We urge you to look beyond the artfully-crafted titles of 
     these amendments to their actual content and effect. One 
     would require the United States to oppose the provision of 
     any international concessional loan to China, its citizens, 
     or businesses, even if the loan were to be used in a manner 
     which would promote democracy or human rights. This same 
     amendment would require every U.S. national involved in 
     conducting any significant business in China to register with 
     the Commerce Department and to agree to abide by a set of 
     government-imposed ``business principles'' mandated in the 
     amendment. On the eve of President Clinton's trip to China, 
     the raft of radical China-related amendments threatens to 
     undermine our relationship just when it is most crucial to 
     advance vital U.S. interests.
       Several of the amendments contain provisions which are 
     sufficiently vague so as to effectively bar the grant of any 
     entrance visa to the United States to every member of the 
     Chinese government. Those provisions not only countervene 
     many of our international treaty commitments, but are 
     completely at odds with one of the amendments which would 
     prohibit the United States from funding the participation of 
     a great proportion of Chinese officials in any State 
     Department, USIA, or USAID conference, exchange program, 
     or activity; and with another amendment which urges 
     agencies of the U.S. Government to increase exchange 
     programs between our two countries.
       Finally, many of the amendments are drawn from bills which 
     have yet to be considered by the committee of jurisdiction, 
     the Foreign Relations Committee. That committee will review 
     the bills at a June 18 hearing, and they are scheduled to be 
     marked-up in committee on June 23. Legislation such as this 
     that would have such a profound effect on US-China relations 
     warrants careful committee consideration. They should not be 
     the subject of an attempt to circumvent the committee 
     process.
       In the short twenty years since we first officially engaged 
     China, that country has opened up to the outside world, 
     rejected Maoism, initiated extensive market reforms, 
     witnessed a growing grass-roots movement towards increased 
     democratization, agreed to be bound by major international 
     nonproliferation and human rights agreements, and is on the 
     verge of dismantling its state-run enterprises. We can 
     continue to nurture that transformation through further 
     engagement, or we can capitulate to the voices of isolation 
     and containment that these amendments represent and negate 
     all the advances made so far.
       We hope that you will agree with us and choose engagement. 
     We strongly urge you to vote against these amendments.
           Sincerely,
         Craig Thomas, Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asian and 
           Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations; Joseph 
           R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign 
           Relations; Frank H. Murkowski, Chairman, Committee on 
           Energy and Natural Resources; John F. Kerry; Ranking 
           Member, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
           Committee on Foreign Relations; Chuck Hagel, Chairman, 
           Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, 
           Committee on Foreign Relations; Gordon Smith, Chairman, 
           Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign 
           Relations; Rod Grams, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
           International Operations, Committee on Foreign 
           Relations; Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, 
           Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on 
           Foreign Relations; Charles S. Robb, Ranking Member, 
           Subcommittee on Near East/South Asian Affairs, 
           Committee on Foreign Relations; Joseph I. Lieberman, 
           Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
           Technology, Committee on Armed Services.
                                  ____


 Opening Statement of Senator Craig Thomas, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
              East Asian & Pacific Affairs, June 18, 1998

       Good Morning. Today the Subcommittee meets to consider 
     current Congressional views of the U.S.-China relationship. 
     If we had had this hearing just six months ago, I believe 
     that we'd be examining an entirely different climate. But due 
     to a variety of circumstances--the timing of the President's 
     visit to Beijing, a growing effort to emphasize human rights, 
     both the Loral and campaign finance allegations, a question 
     of foreign policy leadership in general and Asia policy in 
     particular on the part of the Administration, to name a few--
     the Congressional spotlight is focused brightly on China, and 
     the light is harsh.
       As of today, in this Congress there have been 25 pieces of 
     legislation introduced in the Senate and 51 in the House 
     dealing solely with China. That's excluding authorization and 
     appropriations bills, or amendments and riders to other non-
     China specific legislation and is more than in the last three 
     Congresses. A majority of them involve sanctioning or 
     otherwise castigating China for its behavior in a variety of 
     fields, good examples being five bills presently pending 
     before this Committee: HR 967, 2358, 2386, 2570, and 2605.
       One would require the United States to oppose the provision 
     of any international concessional loan to China, its 
     citizens, or businesses, even if the loan were to be used in 
     a manner which would promote democracy or human rights. This 
     same amendment would require every U.S. national involved in 
     conducting any significant business in China to register with 
     the Commerce Department and to agree to abide by a set of 
     government-imposed ``business principles'' mandated in the 
     amendment. On the eve of President Clinton's trip to China, 
     the raft of strident China-related bills and amendments 
     threatens to challenge our relationship just at a time in its 
     development when it is most crucial to advance vital U.S. 
     interests.
       Several of the bills contain provisions which are 
     sufficiently vague so as to effectively bar the grant of any 
     entrance visa to the United States to every member of the 
     Chinese government. Those provisions not only contravene many 
     of our international treaty commitments, but are completely 
     at odds with one of the bills which would prohibit the United 
     States from funding the participation of a great proportion 
     of Chinese officials in any State Department, USIA, or SAID 
     conference, exchange program, or activity; and with another 
     amendment which urges agencies of the U.S. Government to 
     increase exchange programs between our two countries. 
     Finally, many of the provisions in the bills are redundant, 
     reflecting legislation which has either already passed out of 
     the Committee or out of the Senate.
       Targeting China at this time strikes me as somewhat ironic. 
     In relative terms, during the last year China has shown 
     improvement in several areas which the U.S. has specifically 
     indicated are important to us. Relations with Taiwan have 
     stabilized and intergovernmental contacts have increased. 
     Several prominent dissidents have been released from prison. 
     Enforcement of our trade agreements on intellectual property 
     rights has been stepped up. Despite predictions to the 
     contrary, the reversion of Hong Kong has gone smoothly and 
     Beijing has maintained its distance. And at the height of the 
     Asian financial crisis, China agreed not to devalue its 
     currency thereby helping to stabilize the crisis.
       Has this been enough change? Clearly not. But the question 
     is: how do we best encourage more change in China? Do we do 
     so by isolating one fourth of the world's population, by 
     denying visas to most members of its government, by denying 
     it access to any international concessional loans, and by 
     backing it into a corner and declaring it a pariah as these 
     bills would do?
       Or, rather is the better course to engage China, to expand 
     dialogue, to invite China to live up to its aspirations as a 
     world player, to expose the country to the norms of democracy 
     and human rights and thereby draw it further into the family 
     of nations?
       We're all for human rights--there's no dispute about that. 
     We agree on the message we want the Chinese to hear--stop the 
     human rights abuses, stop facilitating the proliferation of 
     dangerous weapons, stop the trade inequities. As the Chairman 
     of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
     I have been extremely active in making clear to the Chinese 
     our disappointment with their actions in these and other 
     related areas. But the question is, how do we best achieve 
     human rights? I think it's through engagement.
       In the short twenty years since we first officially engaged 
     China, that country has opened up to the outside world, 
     rejected Maoism, initiated extensive market reforms, 
     witnessed a growing grass-roots movement towards increased 
     democratization, agreed to be bound by major international 
     nonproliferation and human rights agreements, and is on the 
     verge of dismantling its state-run enterprises. We can 
     continue to nurture that transformation through further 
     engagement, or we can capitulate to the voices of isolation 
     and containment that these five House bills in particular 
     represent and negate all the advances made so far.
       The purpose of this hearing is to explore the current 
     climate in Congress, to examine these bills, and to explore 
     alternatives to them that will continue to advance both our 
     interests and China's transformation.

[[Page S6749]]

     
                                  ____
  Testimony of Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
  Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Asia 
                  Pacific Subcommittee, June 18, 1998

       Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to address the 
     Subcommittee on the important issue of pending China 
     legislation in the Senate. This is, of course, a timely 
     hearing, with the President's historic trip to China only a 
     week away. I therefore welcome this opportunity to lay out 
     the Administration's position on the bills before the Senate 
     and look forward to engaging Committee members in a 
     productive dialogue on this matter.
       My testimony will be divided into three parts. First, I 
     will review the reasons why a stronger, more constructive 
     relationship with China is in the U.S. interest. Second, I 
     will outline the Clinton Administration's strategy of 
     engagement, highlighting what we have accomplished while 
     noting the obstacles we still face. Finally I will explain 
     the Administration's position on each of the five China-
     related bills currently before the Senate, examining the 
     impact such legislation would have on our ability to engage 
     the Chinese.


                      china affects u.s. interests

       Mr. Chairman, peace and stability in East Asia and the 
     Pacific is a fundamental prerequisite for U.S. security and 
     prosperity. Nearly one half the world's people live in 
     countries bordering the Asia Pacific region and over half of 
     all economic activity in the world is conducted there. Four 
     of the world's major powers rub shoulders in Northeast Asia 
     while some of the most strategically important waterways on 
     the globe flow through Southeast Asia. The US. itself is as 
     much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic one, with the states of 
     Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington bordering on the 
     Pacific Ocean and Hawaii surrounded by it. American citizens 
     in Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
     Marianas live closer to Asian capitals than to our own, vast 
     numbers of Americans work in the Asia-Pacific region, and an 
     increasingly large number of Americans trace their ancestry 
     back to the Pacific Rim.
       For these and many other reasons, the U.S. has remained 
     committed to the Asia-Pacific region and has spent its 
     resources and blood defending and strengthening our stake in 
     the region. Since coming to office, President Clinton has 
     repeatedly made clear that America will remain an Asia-
     Pacific power. We maintain a sizable military presence in 
     Asia; enjoy a vibrant network of mutual security alliances 
     with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea 
     and Thailand; and have significant economic ties with most 
     countries in the region. . . .


                          pending legislation

       The sponsors of the China-related legislation before the 
     Senate clearly share our goal of positively influencing 
     China's development. The bills in question seek to bring an 
     end to human rights violations, religious persecution, forced 
     prison labor and coercive family planning policies in China 
     and thus are very much in line with the Administration's own 
     objectives.
       The question, once again, is one of approach. How do we 
     best effect those changes in the PRC?
       H.R. 967 and H.R. 2570 both mandate a denial of visas to 
     Chinese officials alleged to be involved in religious 
     persecution (in the case of the former) or forced abortions 
     (in the case of the latter). While the Administration opposes 
     such repugnant practices and wholeheartedly agrees they must 
     be addressed, these bills would restrict our ability to 
     engage influential individuals in the very dialogue that has 
     begun to produce tangible results.
       For example, the heads of the Religious Affairs and Family 
     Planning Bureaus are people we want to invite to the United 
     States again and again. The more Chinese leaders see of the 
     U.S., the more they are exposed to our point of view and our 
     way of life. We would be doing a disservice to the very 
     people we endeavor to help if we cut off dialogue with those 
     officials who shape the very policies we want to change. Such 
     unilateral action on our part, moreover, could prompt Beijing 
     to impose its own visa restrictions, further limiting the 
     ability of U.S. officials and religious figures to advocate 
     their views in China.
       In addition, these bills impinge upon the President's 
     constitutional prerogatives regarding the conduct of foreign 
     relations of the United States. Decisions whether and when to 
     issue visas to foreign government officials necessarily 
     implicate the most sensitive foreign policy considerations, 
     concerning which the Executive requires maximum flexibility.
       H.R. 2605, which requires U.S. directors at International 
     Financial Institutions to oppose the provision of 
     concessional loans to China, would have the effect of 
     punishing the Chinese people most in need of international 
     assistance. The United States, as a matter of policy, has not 
     since the Tiananmen Square crackdown supported development 
     bank lending to China except for projects designed to help 
     meet basic human needs. Concessional loans to China from the 
     World Bank, for example, are only granted for the purposes of 
     poverty alleviation. These loans support agricultural, rural 
     health, educational and rural water supply programs in 
     some of the poorest areas of the country. A vote against 
     such lending would thus be a vote against the Chinese 
     people.
       Moreover, World Bank member donors agreed in 1996 that 
     China, owing to its improved creditworthiness, would cease 
     concessional borrowing. The Bank's concessional loans to 
     China are thus to be terminated at the end of FY1999.
       H.R. 2358 is fundamentally different than the first three 
     bills in that it seeks to expand rather than limit U.S. 
     engagement in China. The bill allocates new monies for 
     additional human rights monitors at U.S. Embassies/Consulates 
     in China; authorizes funds to the NED for democracy, civil 
     society, and rule of law programming; and requires the 
     Secretary of State to use funds from the East Asia/Pacific 
     Regional democracy fund to provide grants to NGOs for similar 
     programs. Human rights reporting and the promotion of 
     democracy, civil society and rule of law have long been among 
     this Administration's highest priorities in China, and thus 
     we do not oppose, in principle, any of the above provisions. 
     We would note, however, that the East Asia/Pacific democracy 
     fund is a limited fund with competing demands. There is much 
     work to be done to promote democracy at this time of great 
     change in the Asia-Pacific, and thus we ask that Congress 
     give Secretary Albright maximum flexibility in allocating 
     these scarce resources.
       The bill further requires the Secretary of State to 
     establish a Prisoner Information Registry for China. We are 
     sympathetic to the idea of establishing a prisoner registry 
     and recognize the importance of such a registry to our human 
     rights work. We caution, however, that the U.S. government is 
     not the right institution for the task. Aside from the 
     logistical difficulties of gaining access to the families and 
     friends of Chinese dissidents, U.S. Government contact with 
     such individuals could actually place them in further 
     jeopardy. We believe that NGOs are far better equipped to 
     carry out these kinds of contacts. Several groups and 
     individual activists, including Human Rights Watch, Human 
     Rights in Asia, and John Kamm, already maintain such lists. 
     Thus rather than undertake to compile and maintain an 
     accurate registry, the State Department might play a more 
     useful role in coordinating those groups already actively 
     engaged in this issue.
       Finally, H.R. 2358 requires the Secretary of State to 
     submit a separate, annual human rights in China report to the 
     HIRC and the SFRC. Documenting and making public the human 
     rights situation in China is indeed of critical importance. 
     We have accordingly given a great deal of attention to China 
     in our annual ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.'' 
     The Department and our missions abroad expend enormous energy 
     and resources preparing this report, and the final product 
     routinely receives high marks for its thoroughness and 
     integrity.
       An additional study on China would be redundant and thus 
     wasteful of taxpayer dollars. We already make extensive 
     efforts to cover those topics earmarked for attention in H.R. 
     2358: religious persecution, development of democratic 
     institutions and the rule of law. That said, we welcome 
     suggestions on how to improve the reports and would gladly 
     open a dialogue with the Congress on this important issue.
       The last bill I want to address today, H.R. 2386, requires 
     the Secretary of Defense to produce a study of the 
     architecture requirements for the establishment and operation 
     of a theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan. Let 
     me state up front and emphatically that the Clinton 
     Administration remains firmly committed to fulfilling the 
     security and arms transfer provisions of the Taiwan Relations 
     Act. We have demonstrated this commitment through the 
     transfer of F-16s, Knox class frigates, helicopters and tanks 
     as well as a variety of air to air, surface to air, and anti-
     ship defensive missiles and will continue to assist Taiwan in 
     meeting its defense needs.
       Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we regularly 
     consult with Taiwan as to how it can best address a broad 
     range of security threats, including the threat posed by 
     ballistic missiles. We have briefed Taiwan, as we have many 
     other friends, on the concept of theater missile defense 
     (TMD). Officials in Taiwan are currently assessing their own 
     capabilities and needs, an have not, to date, indicated 
     interest in acquiring TMD. Requiring a study of this kind 
     thus gets ahead of the situation on the ground in Taiwan and 
     may not even be consistent with the approach Taiwan officials 
     will ultimately want to take. We are accordingly opposed to 
     the legislation.
       Again, let me restate that we are steadfast in our 
     commitment to meet Taiwan's defense needs. But while making 
     it possible for Taiwan to acquire the wherewithal to defend 
     itself, we must recognize that security over the long term 
     depends upon more than military factors. In the end, 
     stability in the Strait will be contingent upon the ability 
     of the two sides to come to terms with each other. For this 
     reason the Administration has encouraged Taipei an Beijing to 
     reopen dialogue, making it clear to both sides that dialogue 
     is the most promising way to defuse tensions and build 
     confidence. In that regard, we are encouraged by recent signs 
     of a willingness on both sides of the Strait to resume talks.
       Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Albright has often said, there 
     is no greater opportunity--or challenge--in U.S. foreign 
     policy today than to encourage China's integration into the 
     world community. While the Administration shares fully the 
     concerns which inform

[[Page S6750]]

     the bills before the Senate today, we do not believe that 
     proscribing engagement with broad categories of Chinese 
     people and mandating U.S. rejection of aid intended to meet 
     basic human needs will help to change those policies and 
     practices with which we disagree.
       These concerns can be best addressed by continuing to 
     engage Chinese leaders on the full range of security, 
     economic and political issues. President Clinton's upcoming 
     trip to China is intended to do just that, and thus is an 
     opportunity to make progress on the very human rights issues 
     addressed in today's legislation. Our strategy of engagement 
     has met with considerable success thus far, and I am 
     confident that with the support of the Congress we will 
     continue to make progress in the lead up to the summit and 
     beyond.

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I know my friend from Arkansas has been waiting. I 
just want to say very briefly in response to my other friend from 
Arkansas, the question, I think, and we will debate this more tomorrow, 
is whether things are better today for the people of China than they 
were at the time of Tiananmen. I say much better. Are they where they 
ought to be? No. Absolutely not. Is it moving in the right direction as 
a result of our engagement? Yes.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I know my good friend Senator Inouye is 
here because he has a judgeship nomination he feels very strongly 
about. I have waited here for over an hour now, and I ask unanimous 
consent I be permitted to speak for 10 minutes on the Hutchinson 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing no objection, it 
is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me say it is with some regret I rise 
in opposition to an amendment by my distinguished colleague and good 
friend from Arkansas, Senator Hutchinson. It is never pleasant to take 
an opposite viewpoint from your colleague, but I feel very strongly 
about this, as does he.
  Let me say, first of all, I have no quarrel or suggestion that any of 
the information that Senator Hutchinson has just given us about 
conditions in China are incorrect. I do not know that they are correct, 
but I am sure he has checked out the facts he just gave the Senate. 
What I want to say is, if you had been in China with me in 1978 at the 
end of the Cultural Revolution, and it was at the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, and if you had heard the stories or if you had read the 
documentation since the end of the Cultural Revolution about what went 
on in China, I suggest this debate ought to be not about where China 
is, but how far she has come since 1978.
  On the issue of religion in China, according to the New York Times, 
in 1979 there were three active churches in China. Today there are 
12,000. In addition to the 12,000 temples and churches in China, it is 
estimated that over 25,000 religious groups meet in the homes of 
members every week, and nobody has tried to stop that. On the contrary, 
when you think of the growth from 3 to 12,000, China should receive 
some recognition for what they have done and the improvements they have 
made.
  Nobody in the U.S. Senate will take issue with some of the 
accusations here that have been made about China's opposition to 
religions of all kinds. Nobody will argue that China has a good human 
rights record. Nobody will argue with very much of what has been said 
here. What we are arguing here is a simple philosophical point that I 
feel strongly about, and that is that China is 10 times more likely to 
allow the kind of progress that is going on there today, which has been 
absolutely phenomenal, when they are engaged in dialog with nations 
like the United States with whom they would like to have good 
relations, than it would be if we try to tell a great nation of between 
1 billion and 2 billion people--25 percent of the Earth's population 
resides in China--they are much more likely to behave themselves when 
they are dealing with people who constructively engage them than they 
are with people who ignore them and try to impose sanctions.
  What if China said, ``We are not going to do business with the United 
States anymore until they pay the United Nations dues? We are paid up. 
It is the United States that is the deadbeat. They owe the United 
Nations $900 million.''
  You would hear a hue and outcry in this country that would drown out 
every rock band in America.
  Mr. President, China has a long way to go. Nobody argues that. But I 
can tell you that by the President constructively engaging China, 
presumably he will talk to them forcefully about human rights, inquire 
and talk to them forcefully about the issue of forced abortion, talk to 
them about religion, talk to them about political freedoms and how much 
better off they would be, talk to them about nuclear weaponry and how 
we are relying on China to temper one of the most volatile dangerous 
regions in the world, between India and Pakistan.
  If you read the Washington Post yesterday, read the interview with 
President Jiang, you heard him say that he was shocked to hear India 
use, as one of its excuses for exploding a nuclear weapon--a weapon--he 
was shocked that they used China as a threat to India as one of the 
reasons. China and India have not been big bosom buddies. I am not 
suggesting that. As a matter of fact, it hasn't been too long since 
they had a border war. But, in my opinion, China is not the reason they 
exploded a nuclear bomb. The reason they exploded a nuclear weapon is 
because the Indians and Pakistanis mistrust each other, and one of the 
main reasons they distrust each other is because of their religious 
differences. If you look around the world, you will find most of the 
wars, most of the dissent going on in the world today is because of 
religion--in Ireland, in Bosnia, in China, in India and Pakistan.

  Mr. President, I think we ought to utilize China as a possible broker 
in the fight on the Korean peninsula, as well as between India and 
Pakistan--that whole region of the world.
  I heard something the other day. I don't know whether it is true or 
not. I heard some guy on NPR talking about the criminal justice of the 
United States. There are 70,000 people in the United States in prison 
who are innocent. That is not the best record in the world, if that is 
true. I expect it is probably close to true. Every day you read about 
somebody who gets out of prison who has been there 10 years because he 
was found, finally, to be innocent. Nobody's criminal justice system is 
perfect. I am not saying there are not a lot more people imprisoned in 
China who are innocent. All I am saying is for any nation to hold 
itself out as perfect and to castigate other nations for being 
imperfect is the height of hypocrisy.
  Mr. President, nobody disagrees with the issues that are being raised 
in this amendment, nor is anybody suggesting the President not engage 
the Chinese very forcefully on those issues. We have a trade imbalance 
with China. They sell us a lot more than we sell them. But I can tell 
you, if you took away the $5 billion in goods we sell to China every 
year, there would be a lot of jobs lost in this country, and the people 
who sell in China, and other people who buy from China, are opposed, 
very strongly opposed to this amendment.
  Two final points. A lot of people have a very difficult time since 
the Soviet Union disappeared. They have a very difficult time accepting 
the idea that we don't have anybody to hate. We had the Soviet Union 
for 70 years. It was so much fun. We didn't have to debate about who 
the enemy was; we knew it was the Soviet Union. We built weapons 
galore, trillions of dollars' worth, because of the threat of the 
Soviet Union.

  The Soviet Union is not around anymore, and we have been searching 
frantically for somebody with which to replace the Soviet Union, 
somebody we could hate with a great deal of gusto and vigor.
  I have watched for the past 2 years. I have watched the anti-China 
decibel level rise to unprecedented rates. China has been elected. I am 
not suggesting this amendment is offered because of the hatred for 
China. I am telling you, you cannot keep 270 billion dollars' worth of 
defense going a year unless you have an enemy. The military industrial 
complex has decided that is China, so we are going to continue to build 
weapons, and we are going to continue to make China the bad guy.
  As I say, when you say these things, it looks as if you are being 
apologetic

[[Page S6751]]

or defensive. I am not, not for a moment. I am simply saying that is a 
fact, and I can tell you, since those bombs exploded in India and 
Pakistan, it is a very ominous sign, and I can tell you the threat to 
civilization has gone up exponentially.
  When the President is going to visit a country which has signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has signed the Conventional 
Weapons Treaty, Conventional Weapons Convention, and which has agreed 
to quit shipping any information of any nuclear value to Iran, those 
are things that would never have happened if the Hutchinson amendment 
was in place. I feel quite sure the Hutchinson amendment will be 
defeated. I hope so.
  He is my colleague, and I regret taking a position opposite him on 
any issue, but on this one, I can tell you, in my opinion, common sense 
dictates that the President do exactly what he is doing. I wish him 
well. I yield the floor.

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