[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 82 (Monday, June 22, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H4949-H4950]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    DO NOT VETO THE IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am taking out this special order here 
today in conjunction with my friend and colleague from Texas (Mr. 
Frost) to discuss H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions 
Act of 1997. The President must decide tomorrow whether or not to veto 
H.R. 2709, which was sent to him on June 10.
  This is legislation which Congress and the administration have 
discussed and debated again and again. It was first introduced in 
October 1997, followed by hearings and briefings with the 
administration, including at least two lengthy meetings between Vice 
President Gore and congressional sponsors of the legislation. In June 
it was sent to the President after a 392 to 22 vote.
  The Senate passed this legislation 90 TO 4. It has such great support 
in the Congress because it is aimed at halting one of the major threats 
to international stability, Iran's program of developing missile 
delivery systems for its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
program.
  There is no doubt about the Iranian program. Iran's Shihab-3 and 
Shihab-4 missiles are being designed with external help, reportedly 
primarily but not

[[Page H4950]]

exclusively Russian, to a range of 930 to 1,250 miles. There have been 
additional reports that the Iranian objective is to develop a 
multistage, intercontinental missile with a range of 3,500 miles.
  I agree with the Secretary of State that we should engage Iran. We 
should not let the memory of the taking of American hostages in our 
Embassy in Tehran almost 20 years ago forever determine our 
relationships with Iran. We should seek to expand our person-to-person 
contacts and work to resolve differences that separate us.
  However, it is important to note that while President Khatami is 
pursuing more moderate domestic policies, it is not clear how much 
control he exercises or what his real intentions are with respect to 
foreign and defense policy. We cannot ignore the threat Iran's weapons 
programs and support for terrorism pose to regional peace and American 
interests in people. We should not change our policy toward Iran 
without seeing significant changes in Iran's behavior.
  Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs continue to be of grave 
concern. U.S. officials have said publicly that Iran has a large and 
increasingly self-sufficient chemical weapons program and probably has 
produced biological warfare agents as well. Administration officials 
have publicly confirmed that Iran is trying to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability.
  And while Iranian President Khatami has categorically rejected 
terrorist attacks against civilians, he has yet to back his words with 
action. According to State Department's most recent report on 
terrorism, Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. 
Last fall Iran hosted representatives of numerous terrorist groups at a 
conference of liberation movements where they discussed greater 
coordination and support for some of the groups.
  When the administration waived the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996, sanctions on European companies and Malaysia, it said that it did 
so because it wanted to focus on preventing proliferation rather than 
preventing investments in the Iranian oil industry. While I do not 
endorse the administration's rationale for the ILSA sanctions waiver, I 
cannot help but note that the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act 
does what the administration says it wants. It focuses on 
proliferation.
  It would be incongruous for the administration to veto this bill, 
because we can already see the consequence of the administration's 
waivers of the ILSA sanctions. The President should welcome this 
legislation, not decry it.

                              {time}  2100

  On too many occasions in the past 3\1/2\ years, the leadership in 
this House has tried to tie the President's hand in foreign policy and 
overrule his prerogative to lead on national security matters. This is 
not such an effort.
  Although the President must make a classified report to Congress of 
``credible information on foreign entities which have transferred 
missile technology to Iran,'' it is the President who determines what 
is credible. Thirty days later he must impose sanctions on those 
entities. These sanctions are not targeted against any country or 
government, but are narrowly targeted against the companies themselves, 
and the President may waive the imposition of sanctions, either because 
he is persuaded that the information contained in the report to 
Congress is incorrect or if he determines that the waiver is essential 
to the national security. And what are the sanctions that we are 
talking about? Simply that the entity or company that has proliferated 
this missile technology to Iran faces the loss of exports.
  The bill has been significantly improved since it was first 
introduced. First, it is no longer retroactive beyond January 1998. 
Second, it allows for a classified report to be submitted to the 
Congress and permits the President to suspend sanctions. Third, it is 
limited to the transfer of items already contained on the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) list--goods which are widely 
considered as benefiting a missile system--or additional items which 
the President determines to be of concern.
  When this bill was debated last November in the House, the 
Administration suggested that the standard of evidence was so low that 
the US would be forced to impose ``erroneously'' sanctions on 
foreigners. I find this to be a difficult argument to accept. The 
concept of this or any Administration ``rushing to an erroneous 
judgment'' on any issue subject to the availability and evaluation of 
intelligence data is hard to imagine. Is ``credible information'' so 
weak a standard that it would result in the erroneous imposition of 
sanctions when the President has the discretion to determine whether or 
not the information is credible? If the President has evidence that 
seemingly credible information is not accurate, then by definition the 
information is no longer credible.
  With a great deal of evidence accumulated since 1994, the 
Administration still has not determined whether or not to sanction 
China for transferring entire M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
  Yes, there are existing sanctions laws which attempt to restrict 
weapons proliferation. This bill is different from some existing laws 
because, unlike the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, and 
unlike existing law, the President must report to the Congress credible 
information about a violation and then he has thirty days to impose a 
sanction unless he uses the waiver procedure. There is no doubt that 
this legislation makes it more difficult for the President to evade 
responsibility for imposing sanctions. Some may think it best to make 
it easier for the President to evade the intent of the Congress. That 
is not my view.
  This bill should not be construed as anti-Russian--it applies to 
companies anywhere that aid Iran. Administration officials say that 
this legislation will damage our relationship with Russia at a time 
when Moscow is tightening controls over sensitive exports. If, indeed, 
the Russians are taking steps that comply with the Act's provisions, 
they will not be sanctioned. Even if Russian companies are sanctioned, 
U.S.-Russian relations will survive because our two countries have many 
shared interests and concerns. We cannot afford to stop working with 
each other. And the United States remains committed to strengthening 
Russia's democratic transition. The bill now comports with Russian law 
and should be construed as a cooperative tool in our joint struggle to 
stop the dangerous flow of illegal technology to Iran.
  The Russian Government has taken many positive steps to restrict 
sensitive exports. On May 5th the Deputy Head of Administration of the 
Russian President stated that ``Military and dual purpose technologies 
constitute the national treasure of Russia, which has been created by 
successive generations of our people. Therefore the export control 
shall completely exclude any possibility of squandering unique domestic 
technologies, materials, parts, intellectual property, and prevent 
leaks of classified state and military data.'' This is a very helpful 
statement and the additional measures that the Russians have taken to 
control exports are also praiseworthy. They are a tribute to the 
seriousness with which the Russians take this issue and a tribute to 
the Administration, especially Vice President Gore, who has worked 
extraordinarily hard with the Russians to come to a common 
understanding of the seriousness of the Iranian threat and to a common 
approach to confronting that threat.
  Vetoing this bill would be a mistake, sending instead a signal that 
the Administration is not as committed as it claims to be in preventing 
Iran from threatening its neighbors and the world.
  The strong support that this legislation has received indicates that 
should the President veto this bill, his veto will be over-ridden. This 
legislation makes a substantial contribution to the fight against 
proliferation and has the overwhelming support of the U.S. Congress.

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