[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 80 (Thursday, June 18, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6557-S6559]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA: THE PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, President Clinton, as he prepares to depart 
for China, carries with him an obligation, which I am sure he will 
fulfill, to do his best to advance U.S. core interests with Beijing and 
to communicate the values of the American people directly to the 
Chinese people.
  But what is also at stake, I think, is that there is a concomitant 
responsibility on the part of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Congress to 
adhere to a practice that has been in place for the 25 years that I 
have been in the U.S. Senate; that is, when a President is abroad, for 
the Congress to refrain, if only temporarily, from acting on matters 
that would affect the country which the President is visiting.
  There were a number of times when President Reagan was President, 
when President Nixon was President, when President Ford was President, 
and when President Bush was President that I had sharp disagreements 
with their foreign policy initiatives. But never once did I, nor can I 
remember any of us in either the Republican or the Democratic Party, 
vote on legislation that would directly affect and impact upon the 
relationship of the United States and the country which the President 
was visiting.
  So I ask my Republican friends, in the spirit of bipartisanship in 
the conduct of American foreign policy, to refrain from offering 
amendments to the DOD bill, if it comes up, that are designed to 
sanction and/or publicly criticize China at the very moment the 
President of the United States will be in China. I hope that we could 
return to that period in our relationship when both parties adhered to 
that practice.
  There is a list of at least 12--maybe as many as 20--China sanction 
amendments, some of which may very well be justified, that would be 
attached to, or attempted to be attached to, the defense bill, which I 
am told is likely to come up on Tuesday of next week.
  I make a personal plea to my colleagues to return to the practice 
that has been honored here on the floor of the U.S. Senate of not 
engaging in legislative action that impacts upon, or can impact upon, 
the relationship with the country where the President of the United 
States, be he a Republican or Democrat, is presently in place. I will 
be sending a letter to all of my colleagues asking that they do that.
  But to continue, Mr. President, the President's mission is not going 
to be an easy one any more than the first time President Nixon went to 
China, or President Bush, or any other President who has engaged China.
  It comes amid a sometimes rancorous debate over China policy in this 
country, and the debate is totally appropriate, I might add. I am not 
suggesting there should not be a very serious debate, and I have no 
doubt, because of the consequences of the actions we will take as a 
Nation, it will likely get rancorous at some point.
  I have myself asked this Congress to move into special secret 
session, a rare occurrence, not so many years ago to debate the 
extension of most-favored-nation status to China. I did so because of 
my concerns about Chinese proliferation activities, proliferation of 
missile and/or nuclear technology. And so I am not suggesting the 
debate will not be heated, and I am not suggesting it should not be 
thorough. I am not suggesting that it will not have political 
ramifications. That is all appropriate, normal and reasonable. But the 
President's mission is going to be made more difficult as a consequence 
of the debate that is underway.
  There is no clear consensus in America, nor, in my view, no clear 
consensus in the Senate, on how to best advance American interests in 
the Far East. The Governments of China and the United States will not 
always see eye to eye, and while the people of the United States and 
the people of China have much in common--a love of family, a thirst for 
knowledge, and perhaps most importantly, a desire to see our children 
and grandchildren live in a world more peaceful and prosperous than our 
own--we also have profound differences that cannot be overlooked.
  In his incisive history, entitled, ``The Search for Modern China,'' 
Yale historian and prominent Chinese scholar Jonathan Spence writes 
that China is not yet truly a modern nation.''
  Spence defines a modern country as ``one that is both integrated and 
receptive, fairly sure of its own identity, yet able to join others on 
equal terms in a quest for new markets, new technologies and new 
ideas.'' He concludes that the ``search'' for modern China is an 
ongoing act.
  I think Spence is right, and the United States cannot afford to be a 
spectator in this drama. We need to be active on the world's stage, 
engaging China as it undergoes a period of extraordinary change.

[[Page S6558]]

  What do we want? What is in our national interest? Good China policy 
begins with a clear articulation of U.S. interests, beamed directly to 
the highest levels of the Chinese Government.
  There is virtually no debate in this country over our long-term 
objectives. Our interests are plain. We seek a more prosperous, open 
and democratic China, at peace with its neighbors, and respectful of 
international norms in the area of nonproliferation, human rights and 
trade.
  There is considerable debate, however, about how best to achieve 
those objectives and whether they can all be achieved simultaneously or 
whether we will put one ahead of the other during this transition 
period.
  There are some who are convinced that the best way to persuade 
China's leaders to bring their domestic and foreign policies in line 
with U.S. expectations is to punish them for each and every misdeed--as 
perceived by us. This punitive approach, one which I think occasionally 
is appropriate, is well represented by a raft of Chinese bills passed 
by the House of Representatives last fall, many of which have been 
introduced as amendments that I have referenced earlier to the Defense 
Authorization Act.
  Let me say that I share many of the concerns of my colleagues about 
the administration's handling of China policy. As I said on the Senate 
floor at this time last year, engagement is not a policy. Engagement is 
a means to an end. It is the substance of the engagement that matters.
  But a ``big stick'' approach to China can hardly be called engagement 
any more than yielding to China on every issue can be called 
engagement.
  This confrontational approach, or the ``big stick'' approach, flows 
from the absurd notion that China is unchanging and it will only behave 
responsibly when it is forced to do so.

  I respectfully suggest and favor a more balanced approach. Obviously, 
I am being subjective in characterizing my approach as more balanced. 
And it is not really my approach; many share the same view I am about 
to articulate--a balanced approach that relies upon spelling out the 
rules of the road to China, inviting them to abide by them, and then 
monitoring their compliance with their pledges to us and the rest of 
the international community.
  China aspires to be a great power. I welcome that aspiration because 
great powers live up to the great power obligation in the areas of 
nonproliferation, human rights and trade.
  China has undergone an extraordinary change over the past 25 years, 
opening to the outside world and dramatically transforming its economic 
institutions and the tenor of its political discourse. China has 
evidenced increasing accommodation to international norms.
  They have done so, for the most part, because they recognize their 
own interests dictate greater integration with the global economic 
markets and security regimes. We should encourage this trend, but we 
should not hesitate to communicate our concerns both publicly and 
privately when we think they deviate.
  For instance, we should not hesitate to criticize China for its human 
rights violations. We should publicly encourage China to sign the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to 
incorporate its spirit directly into Chinese law.
  I was very disappointed when the President decided not to condemn 
China for human rights violations before the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission in Geneva. If we are not going to criticize China's 
human rights violations in front of an international body specifically 
created to safeguard human rights standards, where are we willing to 
voice our concerns?
  I am also disappointed that China continues to jam Radio Free Asia. 
With the support of my colleagues in the Senate and the House, I 
introduced legislation several years ago which created Radio Free Asia. 
RFA broadcasts reliable news directly to the people of China and Tibet, 
empowering them to hold their government accountable for its actions. 
But RFA is being jammed by the Chinese Government. I hope that 
President Clinton, when he travels to China, will tune in RFA, and if 
he can't find it on the radio, he should explain to his Chinese hosts 
that great powers do not restrict access of their people to 
information.
  We can also do more to promote the rule of law in China, bringing the 
Chinese to this country to see how a truly independent judiciary 
functions and sending Americans to China to teach them how to create 
similar institutions there. The administration has requested $5 million 
for the Asia Foundation to launch a rule of law initiative in China. I 
support this initiative.
  When all else fails, the United States should not hesitate to punish 
China by using carefully targeted multilateral sanctions. But this 
should be a last resort, not a reflex.
  A wise man on the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from 
Indiana, has pointed out the dangers of an over reliance on ill-defined 
unilateral sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy.
  We have an important role to play in the search for modern China. We 
can help it to its destination of modernization, or we can throw 
obstacles in its path. The upcoming summit presents an opportunity for 
the United States and China to try to bridge some of our differences, a 
chance to transform the issues from points of contention to examples of 
cooperation.
  We should not expect the world from a single summit. But we can make 
some progress.
  Perhaps no issue at the summit will be more important than that of 
nonproliferation. I said at the outset that we know clearly what our 
objectives should be for our policy, where we want a modern China to 
go. We don't have any misunderstanding of what we would like to see: 
China at peace with its neighbors, respecting international norms in 
the areas of nonproliferation, open trade, and human rights.
  But at some point, as my dad would say, if everything is equally a 
high priority, then nothing is a priority. I believe that there is no 
more important issue at this moment in the history and our relationship 
with China than nonproliferation. The spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them represents a clear and 
present danger to the security of both the United States and China. We 
need Chinese cooperation if we are to find ways to promote stability in 
south Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the Middle East.
  China's historic track record in this area has been poor. Indeed, 
Pakistan probably would not possess the nuclear capacity it 
demonstrated late last month were it not for the Chinese assistance 
over the past decades. China cannot escape some responsibility for 
exacerbating south Asian tensions by engaging in policies that were 
seen as threatening to India's security.
  But more recently, China appears to have undergone a sea change in 
its attitude. China has joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Biological Weapons Convention. China has also agreed to be bound by 
some, but not all, of the terms of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime prior to it joining that regime. And, while China's export laws 
still fall short of international norms, particularly in the area of 
missile technology, China has been responsive to the administration's 
interests where we have clearly articulated them.
  Last fall, President Clinton secured a commitment from China not to 
extend any new cooperation to Iran's nuclear program. China has also 
pledged to halt all cruise missile exports to Iran in direct response 
to the urging of the U.S. Government. Moreover, China's initial 
response to nuclear tests on the subcontinent has been constructive 
thus far. China has avoided taking any steps which might exacerbate 
tensions or fuel a regional arms race.
  There is more, however, that China as a great power should do. As a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China should join in an 
international diplomatic effort designed to identify the source of 
tensions in south Asia and foster dialog between India and Pakistan and 
between India and China. China should lead by example, by promoting 
greater transparency in arms exports, defense expenditures, and 
military exercises.
  China, in my view, should join the Missile Technology Control Regime 
and agree to bring its export controls on dual-use items and missile-
related

[[Page S6559]]

technologies up to international standards. In addition, it should join 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and develop comprehensive controls on all 
nuclear-related technologies. Taken together, these steps would not 
only contribute significantly to peace and stability in south Asia, 
they would also serve the interests of global nonproliferation.
  The administration has accomplished much in the last 6 years: from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty to the Chemical Weapons Convention, et cetera. I asked, today, 
Assistant Secretary Roth, who testified before the Foreign Relations 
Committee, why that occurred. Was it merely the persuasiveness of the 
U.S. President? Was it because of the sticks as well as carrots that we 
have offered? Or, as this emerging modern power goes through a 
transformation, is it because they are finally determining on their own 
that it is in their own interest not to proliferate?
  I cannot fathom how, as a political leader sitting in Beijing, I 
could conclude that the ability of Pakistan to launch a nuclear weapon 
on the back of a missile that I had provided to them could possibly 
enhance my security. I cannot understand how anyone in Beijing could 
conclude that an arms race between India and Pakistan, and the prospect 
of what we would call theater nuclear weapons being engaged, could 
possibly do anything other than damage my security as a Chinese leader. 
I cannot imagine how they could reach that conclusion. But they have, 
in the past, reached similar conclusions.

  But I think what we are beginning to see, and it is presumptuous of 
me to say this about another country, but I think we are beginning to 
see the political maturation of a country. It is in its nascent stages, 
but they are coming to some of these conclusions, not merely because of 
what we do, not merely because of our urging, but because they begin to 
see it in their own naked self-interest. The only thing I have observed 
that causes China, in the recent past, to act against their own naked 
self-interest is if they are put in a position of being told they must 
do this or that.
  So, although sanctions are appropriate in some circumstances, and 
stating our view of what constitutes great power behavior is always 
appropriate, the idea that sanctions are always appropriate when we 
disagree with China is very mistaken and counterproductive.
  The stakes are high. Our success or failure in integrating China more 
fully into the community of nations, our success or failure at 
convincing China to live up to the international norms of behavior in 
the area of nonproliferation, our success or failure in helping to 
shape the emergence of modern China as a great power, will have 
profound effect, not only on the future of east Asia and south Asia, 
not only on the future of Europe, but on the entire world.
  Mr. President, about 25 years ago Fox Butterfield, the New York Times 
bureau chief in Beijing, published a book entitled ``China: Alive in 
the Bitter Sea.'' In it, Mr. Butterfield gave a moving account of the 
efforts of ordinary Chinese people to live under the often brutal 
authoritarian regime that existed at the time.
  Today there remains much injustice in China, and the struggle of 
ordinary people to exercise their universally acknowledged human rights 
is fought with peril. The outcome of that struggle will be central to 
the future of the ``middle kingdom.''
  But the changes over the past 25 years have been so profound that 
those returning to China today for the first time since Deng Xiaoping 
opened the doors--and I went with Senators Javits and Church and others 
back in those early years of engagement--those who have gone back 
barely recognize China to be the same country.
  Engagement, engagement with a purpose, can bring about changes we 
seek in China, including in areas of vital importance to our national 
security, but only if we are both patient and principled.
  If we are swayed from our course by those who believe conflict with 
China is inevitable, or if we are lulled into a false sense of security 
by those who stand on this floor and confidently predict that China 
will automatically transform itself into a Jeffersonian democracy as it 
modernizes, then we will miss out on an opportunity to fulfill our 
role, as small as it may be, in the search for a modern China.
  Mr. President, to conclude, the stakes are high. This is no time for 
the U.S. Senate--in this significant summer, at this moment when, if 
China concludes it wishes to devalue its currency, the situation in 
Asia could become much, much worse, when at the very moment when China 
is acting responsibly vis-a-vis Korea, we cause it to change its course 
of action; if at this moment we insist upon all of our agenda being 
met, we can do irreparable harm to our interests.

  I yield the floor, Mr. President, with a final plea to my colleagues: 
Please, please, on this critical matter of the security interest of the 
United States of America, please revert to the tradition that has been 
time honored in this body. While a President of the United States is 
meeting with a head of state of another country, do not engage in 
activities, justified or not, that will sanction the country with which 
the President is at that moment negotiating. That is inappropriate 
behavior, in my opinion. That is not only partisanship, but it is 
against the naked self-interest of the United States, and I think it is 
reprehensible conduct.
  I am confident my colleagues will ultimately do the right thing. We 
have plenty of time to act on, and I may even vote for, some of the 
proposals relating to the sanctioning of China that are contemplated in 
the upcoming bill. But, please look at America's interest first, look 
at the longstanding tradition of bipartisanship on this issue, and 
allow the President to conduct this major foreign policy foray on his 
own terms until he returns.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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