[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 80 (Thursday, June 18, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1160-E1161]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       GOOD ADVICE ON NORTH KOREA

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 18, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, managing our relations with North Korea is 
one of the toughest challenges confronting American diplomats today.
  Until a few years ago, North Korea seemed determined to move forward 
with a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In October 1994, the 
Clinton administration negotiated a landmark agreement with North Korea 
that has frozen North Korea's weapons program and holds out the promise 
of eliminating this threat to regional security and to our global 
nonproliferation goals.
  A few days ago, the Los Angeles Times published an article written by 
James Laney, who was the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea until last 
year, and Jason Shaplen, an expert on North Korea, which lays out other 
steps the United States might take to manage our relationship with 
North Korea.
  Given the importance of this issue, I insert this article for 
printing in the Congressional Record so that Members might have an 
opportunity to read the advice offered by two of our country's foremost 
Korean experts.

  Engaging Pyongyang Is Route to Stability--Korea: The U.S. Needs To 
  Reassure the North That It Isn't Seeking Its Demise and to Increase 
                                Contacts

                 (By James Laney and Jason T. Shaplen)

       South Korean president Kim Dae Jung's visit to the U.S. has 
     put the focus on how to manage an increasingly desperate 
     North Korea. Since assuming office in February, Kim has 
     indicated that he intends to break the Cold War mentality 
     that has stymied progress on the Korean peninsula for the 
     past 45 years and implement a bold new policy toward the 
     North--a policy based on engagement. The U.S. should support 
     his initiative and take steps of its own to promote 
     engagement that moves the peninsula, home to 37,000 U.S. 
     troops, toward greater stability. There are three ways the 
     U.S. can do this.
       Issue a statement that Washington does not seek the North's 
     collapse. In his inaugural address, Kim stated that his 
     government, which sits only 30 miles from the

[[Page E1161]]

     DMZ, neither seeks to absorb the North nor actively promote 
     its collapse. Washington, 7,000 miles farther away, should do 
     the same.
       Kim's call for reconciliation was not a rash statement made 
     for political effect. It was based on the reality that 
     pursuing a policy of collapse is futile. Barring unforeseen 
     events, neither Kim Jong IL, the North's reclusive leader, 
     nor his regime is likely to disappear in the near future. 
     Even if the situation in the North should change, neighboring 
     China is likely to offer aid that ensures its survival.
       Stating clearly that the U.S. does not actively seek the 
     North's collapse (while also recognizing that there is no 
     moral equivalency between the North and South) represents 
     the most sensible approach toward promoting stability. 
     Confronted with a positive statement of this nature, it 
     would be more difficult for North Korea's military to 
     assume an aggressive posture.
       Greater engagement with the North. Issuing a statement that 
     the U.S. does not seek the North's collapse will only bring 
     meaningful change if it is followed with a series of 
     initiatives that seek to promote greater engagement, 
     particularly in the economic arena.
       To this end, the U.S., on a case-by-case basis, should lift 
     economic sanctions imposed on North Korea as a result of the 
     Trading With the Enemy Act. Allowing investment will force 
     the North to learn more about our economic system and its 
     benefits. One requirement that could be placed on lifting 
     sanctions is that investment in the North must be in the form 
     of U.S.-South Korean joint ventures.
       The case for lifting sanctions has some strong proponents. 
     Since his election, Kim Dae Jung has boldly increased the 
     amount and type of investments South Korean firms can make in 
     the North and has suggested that Washington lift sanctions.
       Support for existing initiatives. Policy toward North Korea 
     in the pre-Kim Dae Jung era was not without success. Four-
     party peace talks to replace the truce that stopped the 
     Korean War with a formal peace treaty began last year. The 
     talks include North and South Korea, the U.S. and China. 
     shortly after these talks began, Pyongyang and Seoul resumed 
     direct, bilateral dialogue in Beijing.
       Similarly, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
     Organization has been a success. Founded by the U.S., South 
     Korea and Japan to implement portions of the landmark 1994 
     U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework (in which Pyongyang agreed 
     to scrap its suspect nuclear program in exchange for two 
     proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors), KEDO has formed a 
     professional relationship with the North. Working on the 
     ground in North Korea and across the table from in New York, 
     KEDO and North Korea have signed scores of internationally 
     binding agreements that have allowed hundreds of South 
     Koreans to travel to the North for the nuclear project. 
     KEDO's prime contractor for the nuclear project. KEDO's prime 
     contractor for the project is a South Korean firm. This means 
     that at the height of construction, thousands of South 
     Koreans will work side by side with thousands of North 
     Koreans, building not only safer nuclear reactors, but 
     greater understanding and, it is hoped, mutual confidence.
       These and other initiatives signal an acknowledgment of 
     necessity, if not desire by the North to engage. As such, 
     they deserve the continued political and, in the case of 
     KEDO, financial support of the administration and Congress.
       Managing North Korea is a very difficult task. The 
     situation remains precarious and deterrence must remain the 
     foundation of the U.S.-South Korean approach to the North. 
     That said, the combination of Pyongyang's increasing 
     desperation and Kim Dae Jung's refreshing vision presents an 
     opportunity that Washington and Seoul must not let pass.

     

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