[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 79 (Wednesday, June 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6462-S6465]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO PROBLEM

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise at this moment to deplore the 
ongoing, brutal Serbian repression of the people of Kosovo and to lay 
out principles for American policy to deal with the crisis.
  Analysts have known for years that the Serbian province of Kosovo is 
a potential tinderbox for the entire southern Balkans. Approximately 
ninety percent of Kosovo's population is ethnic Albanian, known as 
Kosovars. Because of emigration to--not from--to other parts of Serbia 
and because of a

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low birth rate, ethnic Serbs now constitutute only about 7 percent of 
the province's population, down from a quarter of the population in the 
early 1970's.
  Kosovo is revered, as you know, Madam President, by Serbs as the 
cradle of their culture. Near the provincial capital Pristina lies 
Kosovo Plain, the site of the epic battle of June 28, 1389 in which 
medieval Serb knights and other Europeans were defeated by the Ottoman 
Turks, who remained in control of much of the Balkans into this 
century. Many of the holiest monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
lie within Kosovo's borders.
  The ethnic Albanians also have long historical ties to Kosovo, 
tracing, in fact, their origins to the Illyrians who inhabited the area 
in ancient times. Senator Byrd often talks of this heritage when he 
recites, as he does better than anyone, the history of Rome and its 
impact on the region.
  In 1974, Yugoslav President Tito made Kosovo, along with Vojvodina in 
the north, an autonomous region within Serbia.
  After Tito's death as the old Yugoslav Federation was beginning to 
disintegrate, an ambitious, demagogic Serbian politician named Slobodan 
Milosevic used Serbian nationalism and resentment of the Kosovo 
Albanians as a springboard to national power.
  In 1989, Milosevic abrogated Kosovo's constitutional autonomy, 
concurrently launching a purge of ethnic Albanians from the province's 
civil service and curtailing government funding for public 
institutions, including the schools.
  In response, the Kosovars, led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a Sorbonne-
educated intellectual, set up a shadow government and began a campaign 
of non-violent resistance to the Serbian oppression. The Kosovars set 
up and ran a system of public schools and maintained other public 
services. Rugova advocated attaining independence for Kosovo through 
Gandhian tactics. For most of this decade he was able to keep the lid 
on popular resentment and prevent violence.
  Rugova's position began to be undermined when the Kosovo Question was 
left off the agenda at the Dayton Peace talks in November 1995. Younger 
Kosovars increasingly began to ask why they should hold fast to 
nonviolence when the Bosnian Serbs were rewarded for their violence and 
brutality with their own quasi-state within Bosnia.
  In 1996 the beginnings of armed resistance to the Serbs appeared. A 
clandestine group calling itself the Kosova Liberation Army--KLA in 
English acronym or UCK in the Albanian acronym--carried out isolated 
attacks on Serbian police.
  By this past winter the frequency of KLA attacks increased, and 
Milosevic decided to respond. In late February his special police 
units, backed up by the Yugoslav Army, stormed into the Drenica area, 
killing and mutilating civilians who they said were harboring KLA 
militants.
  Some of you will remember, some of the people listening will 
remember, that's the circumstance in which the Yugoslav authorities 
would not allow the international community to examine the bodies. They 
rapidly buried them in mass graves and would not let outsiders come in 
and see what they had done.
  But, Madam President, it is essential not to fall into the trap that 
some have done by making false parallels to Milosevic's vicious 
military repression.
  These people, either for want of logic or perhaps as Serbian 
apologists, assert that Milosevic's storm troopers were only doing what 
any state would do against rebels.
  But, Madam President, if Milosevic had not robbed Kosovo of its legal 
autonomy, had not closed its schools and other institutions, and had 
not summarily brutalized and fired thousands of Kosovars, the armed 
resistance never would have materialized.
  Just yesterday in Moscow, Milosevic refused to deal with the KLA 
saying, ``I see no reason to conduct negotiations with terrorists.'' I 
will return to these prospects for negotiations in a minute, but let me 
just respond to Milosevic's comment by saying that acting just as he 
did in Croatia and Bosnia, as he is acting in Kosovo, I ask the 
rhetorical question: Who is the terrorist? Milosevic is a terrorist and 
a war criminal. He has demonstrated that over the past 5 to 6 years in 
Bosnia, and he is revealing it again in Kosovo.
  Since the February and early March massacres by his troops, Milosevic 
has diddled the Western world, utilizing his classic ``bait-and-
switch'' tactics.
  First, he agreed to negotiate with Dr. Rugova and, thereby, earned 
from the United States an ill-advised postponement of a ban on foreign 
investments in Serbia.
  While talking, but not seriously negotiating with Rugova, Milosevic 
was busy setting in motion the next step in his state of terrorism. 
Late last month, his notorious special police sealed off western Kosovo 
and began a murderous campaign of ethnic cleansing, driving some 65,000 
refugees into neighboring Albania and others into Montenegro. After 
killing hundreds and burning entire towns to the ground, Milosevic's 
forces have reportedly even resorted to strafing fleeing refugees from 
Yugoslav helicopters.
  One would hope that the West has learned something from its pathetic 
temporizing in Bosnia earlier in this decade. Perhaps we have, but 
maybe we have not. The so-called Contact Group, made up of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, has met 
regularly to try to hammer out a unified policy on Kosovo before it 
spins out of control. In spite of the fact that it operates by 
consensus, which means the ``lowest common denominator,'' the Contact 
Group has agreed upon economic sanctions which, given time, will worsen 
the already catastrophic conditions of the Serbian economy.
  But, Madam President, time is of the essence. Not only are thousands 
of innocent civilians--most of them Kosovars, but also some ethnic 
Serbs--being killed or driven from their homes, but the continuing 
fighting threatens the stability of neighboring Albania and also of the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which itself has restive ethnic 
Albanians who constitute between one-quarter and one-third of its 
population.
  Maintaining the integrity of Macedonia--a fragile democracy with a 
Slavic leadership genuinely committed to interethnic reconciliation--
must be the cornerstone of U.S. policy. Above all, however, is the 
stark obvious fact that everyone should have learned from Bosnia, and 
that is, Slobodan Milosevic will only react to superior force being 
employed against him. He will not react otherwise.
  Lest anyone forget, while economic sanctions against Yugoslavia may 
have modified Milosevic's position in Bosnia, it was only the use of 
American airpower for 3 weeks in the fall of 1995 that brought 
Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb puppets to the bargaining table in 
Dayton. So now, Madam President, we, once again, are faced with an 
unpalatable fact that force may have to be employed in order to prevent 
the need for even greater force later. But there is no decision more 
difficult than considering whether to send American troops into action.
  I have been a Senator for 25 years. I started here when the Vietnam 
war was still underway, and I am here today. I find the single most 
intimidating decision that need be made by any of us is when we vote, 
as we have in the past, to put American forces in harm's way, and 
Kosovo is no exception.
  Let me outline some of the basic principles that have to be part of 
that decision, outline whether or not that the decision, although 
difficult, will have to be made.
  First, I believe that, except for those who prefer to withdraw to a 
``Fortress America'' posture, no one doubts the strategic importance of 
the south Balkans to the United States.
  Second, before we embark upon any military or political action, we 
must have our goals firmly established.

  Third, I also believe that most of my colleagues will agree that NATO 
remains the cornerstone of American policy in Europe and should be the 
vehicle by which we act in Kosovo.
  Fourth, it goes without saying that a primary concern in any military 
planning is to minimize the risk of American lives while ensuring the 
success of the mission.
  With these principles in mind, let me examine our options in the 
Kosovo crisis now.
  The United States has declared itself against independence for 
Kosovo,

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thereby putting itself at odds with the Kosovar leadership and people, 
the very ones who are currently being brutalized.
  Madam President, I agree with the position our nation is taking. 
Whatever one may think of a broader decision made at the beginning of 
the 20th century as the Turks were pushed out of most of the Balkans, 
the ethnographic mix of the area simply precludes homogenous states, 
except through ethnic cleansing, which we must oppose. To put it 
bluntly, I would use force to stop massacres of innocent civilians. I 
would use force to prevent cross-border invasions. I would use 
peacekeepers backed up by force to guarantee the rights of minorities. 
But I would not risk American lives in a cause of a ``greater Albania'' 
which would probably destroy the Macedonian state and set off a chain 
reaction of incalculable proportions in the south Balkans.
  On the other hand, I cannot imagine asking the Kosovars to accept a 
return to the pre-1989 autonomy with Serbia. If Milosevic could 
summarily revoke the autonomy one time, he can do it again.
  Therefore, my own preference as a political goal would be giving 
Kosovo full republic status within the Yugoslav federation, on an equal 
footing with Serbia and Montenegro. Perhaps we would also have to have 
republic status for other parts of Serbia.
  I recognize there are problems with such a solution. Milosevic will 
be dead set against it, since a Kosovo Republic would ipso facto 
consign Serbia to a minority role in the upper house of the Yugoslav 
Parliament and probably mean the end of Milosevic's quasi-dictatorial 
rule.
  My response is that we and the Kosovars and the democratic leadership 
of Montenegro and the remaining democrats in Serbia should look at the 
probable outcome as an opportunity, not a problem.
  Both Dr. Rugova and the KLA have insisted upon independence for 
Kosovo, but if they keep in mind the scenario I just outlined, they 
might, in the course of negotiations, agree to a ``third republic'' or 
``fourth republic'' compromise.
  But how about Milosevic? It is clear to me that only one principle 
continues to guide his policy, and that is clinging to power. In fact, 
since he took power in Serbia, Milosevic has been a dismal failure at 
everything, except staying in power.
  His wars of aggression in pursuit of a goal of a ``greater Serbia'' 
have resulted in the extinguishing of hundreds of years of Serbian 
culture in the Krajina and in Slavonia, and hundreds of thousands of 
Serbian refugees, and in the impoverishment of most Bosnian Serbs, and 
all this at a cost of over 300,000 persons killed.
  Meanwhile, under Milosevic's stewardship Serbia itself has plummeted 
from having been one of the wealthiest countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe to a near basket-case.
  But Milosevic clings to power. And it is, I regret to have to repeat, 
only the use of countervailing policy and force, power, that will 
remove Milosevic.
  And this is the central point. While there is no panacea for the 
Balkan ills, the necessary precondition for restoration of peace is a 
democratic government in Belgrade that is prepared to coexist with the 
non-Serb peoples of the area.
  In order to move events in that direction the Clinton administration 
has wisely supported the democratic reformist regime in Montenegro--of 
which Milo Djukanovic is the president--which is already posing a 
serious challenge to Milosevic within the Yugoslav parliament.
  We must now apply all necessary pressure on Milosevic in Kosovo.
  The Contact Group has issued four demands: a cessation of fighting; 
the unconditional withdrawal of Serbian special police forces and 
Yugoslav Army forces from Kosovo; a return of refugees; and unlimited 
access for international monitors.
  Milosevic's statement on Tuesday in Moscow after his talks with 
Russian President Yeltsin did not go far enough. He refused to withdraw 
his troops or to talk with the KLA--two conditions the Contact Group is 
asking for.
  Milosevic's usual half-way tactics must not dilute the West's resolve 
to force him to meet all the demands.
  NATO has already tasked its military experts to come up with military 
options for moving against the Serbs and Milosevic.
  Reportedly, nine preliminary options have been submitted. They range 
from stationing troops along Kosovo's borders, to imposing a new ``no-
fly zone'' and a ``weapons-exclusion zone'' over part of Yugoslavia, to 
air strikes, and even ground invasions.
  In this planning, the possible political ramifications of any 
military action are, I am sure, being factored in by this 
administration.
  In the immediate future, though, the NATO military planners will 
flesh out the details of these options. So, I think it would be 
imprudent for me or for any other Senator to second-guess the NATO 
military planners who have the relevant expertise and are in possession 
of the vital intelligence data needed to make a judgment.
  What I can say is that the use of force must remain on the table, and 
that, if at all possible, it must be exercised through NATO.
  Within NATO, however, there exists a serious problem. It does not 
revolve so much around whether or not to use force; for most of our 
European allies seem to have learned from our Bosnian experience that 
the use of force in Kosovo may well be necessary.
  The dispute is rather over the question of whether approval by the 
U.N. Security Council is necessary before NATO acts outside the 
territory of its members. The United States has always maintained that 
it is not. As recently as our expansion vote on NATO we insisted that 
that is not a neessary precondition. A U.N. Security Council mandate is 
not a necessary precondition to use NATO forces.
  This is a position reinforced, as I said, by the U.S. Senate in the 
Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement overwhelmingly passed on 
April 30 of this year.
  Most--perhaps all--of our European NATO allies, including the 
British, assert that U.N. approval is necessary.
  Madam President, this difference of opinion strikes at the heart of 
the Alliance, for if the European allies' position wins out, the 
Russians--and even the Chinese--will have a veto power over NATO action 
in Central and Eastern Europe. This is precisely where Bosnia and 
Kosovo-like ethnic conflicts are likely to pose the biggest threats to 
regional security in the coming decades. As much as I support the U.N., 
I, for one, am not about to yield to the Security Council, the 
Russians, and the Chinese the decision of whether or not we are able to 
protect the interests of Europe--requiring their approval ahead of 
time.
  We must make clear to our European allies, and to the Russians, that 
while we prefer to act within NATO, we see Kosovo as a vital national 
security interest of the United States and, hence, are prepared to act 
alone if necessary.
  This is an unpleasant exercise, but it is preferable to face it now, 
rather than to postpone the issue. In fact, it would be good to resolve 
this intra-alliance dispute in the newest revision of NATO's Strategic 
Concept, which is now being discussed.
  Finally, Madam President, I believe it is absolutely essential for 
the United States immediately to make contact with the Kosovo 
Liberation Army.
  A withdrawal of Serbian special forces and Yugoslav Army troops, or a 
NATO bombing campaign, must not be done unless the KLA first agrees to 
a ceasefire. For I must repeat--the object of U.S. policy is not only 
to stop the movement toward a greater Serbia on the part of Mr. 
Milosevic, but it is also not to become a tool for a greater Albania in 
the South Balkans. It is to halt the fighting and then to start serious 
negotiations involving all the parties. I have already made clear my 
preferred political solution, but the outcome is for the parties to 
thrash out.
  We are approaching the moment of truth in Kosovo. As usual, the 
indispensible element in solving the crisis is the active involvement 
of the United States, just as it was in Bosnia.
  As the U.S. Government continues its negotiations with its allies and 
its Contact Group partners, and as NATO military planners continue to 
refine possible military options, I urge my colleagues to recognize the 
gravity of the situation and to make clear their support for resolute 
American leadership.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.

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  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

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