[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 77 (Monday, June 15, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6311-S6313]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, given the fact that the managers of the 
tobacco legislation are not here even though the Senate was to begin 
reconsideration of that proposal at 2 o'clock, I would like to continue 
to speak in morning business for about 5 minutes to put an article in 
the Record and ask unanimous consent at this time to include that 
article at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is an article from the Washington Post 
by Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal. Victor Gilinsky is an energy 
consultant, and Paul Leventhal is president of the Nuclear Control 
Institute. At the time of the 1974 nuclear test by India, they were, 
respectively, a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
U.S. Senate staff.
  They write about the history of the nuclear program conducted by 
India, illustrating the complicity that the United States has had in 
the Indian program and, more importantly, the misplaced reliance that 
the United States has put in arms control agreements, which in the end 
never quite seem to bear the fruit that we had hoped for.
  In this case, it was part of the Atoms for Peace Program that the 
United States participated in as a result of a previous treaty, and it 
was part of the Atoms for Peace Program whereby the United States and 
Canada and other nuclear powers would provide some material for India 
for peaceful purposes. They had a reactor built by Canada. It was made 
essentially operable, according to this article, by the United States 
providing 21 tons of heavy water. This, of course, was all under a 
promise that the Indians made to the United States that the reactor 
would be used only for peaceful purposes. But apparently India used 
plutonium from this reactor in its 1974 nuclear explosion. What the 
authors said--I will quote: ``. . .neither capital''--meaning the 
capital of Canada or the United States--``has uttered a peep about this 
matter is symptomatic of Western complicity in the South Asian nuclear 
crisis and of the present paralysis in dealing with it.''
  What they are pointing out is that when we negotiate a peace treaty 
with countries which says, ``You won't develop nuclear weapons--if you 
will promise not to do that, then we will provide you peaceful nuclear 
technology,'' it is almost impossible for that peaceful technology to 
end up in a nuclear weapons program if that is the country's ultimate 
desire. And, in the case of India, for whatever reasons it decided it 
was in its national interest to produce a nuclear weapon, apparently it 
used the product of this Atoms for Peace peaceful nuclear program as 
part of its weapon program in violation of the treaty.
  But for the United States, or Canada, or the other nuclear powers of 
the world to complain about this would require us to have to admit to 
something that we are not about to admit; namely, that these treaties 
don't work; that there is no way to enforce them; and that, in point of 
fact, a program that we had every hope would be a success--the Atoms 
for Peace Program--has in fact helped to contribute to the development 
of a nuclear weapon by the country of India.
  The article goes on to make some other points that I think are 
important; that is, that the country of India has broken several 
promises here in the development of its nuclear weaponry; that it had 
always complained about the charter of the new International Atomic 
Energy Agency in the 1950s.
  The article points out:

       It was duplicity in carrying out the Atoms for Peace 
     agreements in the 1960's. It undermined the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty with its ``peaceful'' bomb of 1974.

  That is referring to the fact that the Indians got around the 
violation by claiming that the bomb they exploded was for peaceful 
purposes. And apparently the United States looked the other way.
  But the article goes on to note, ``Despite this history, each new 
generation of American policymakers thinks that by being a little more 
accommodating''--for countries like India--we will then gain their 
restraint and their acceptance of the nuclear controls that we would 
like to place upon them. Of course, India is not alone in this. I am 
not being any more critical of India than I would be of other countries 
that would be engaged in the same kind of conduct.
  But what this article concludes is ``. . .American self-deception 
that stems from a mix of idealism and commercial greed.'' is the reason 
these countries have been able to get away with this for so long--
again, ``. . .American self-deception that stems from a mix of idealism 
and commercial greed.''
  Mr. President, that is exactly what we have seen with the desire to 
sell virtually anything to nobody, the argument always being, if we 
will not sell it to them, then someone else will, which is always an 
excuse for transferring technology. That we have come to learn with 
some sadness recently. That should not have been transferred to China, 
for example.
  We also find this concept of idealism--that if they will just sign 
one more treaty, if we will just get one more commitment from a country 
that it won't engage in conduct that we believe inimical to world 
peace, that just maybe, therefore, we will have the peace that we so 
earnestly desire.
  The fact of the matter is that when it comes to a nation's self-
defense, it is going to do what it deems in its best interest 
irrespective of a piece of paper, of a treaty, of a commitment, or of a 
promise to the rest of the world, and it is not going to be swayed by 
world opinion or even by the punishment that nations or organizations 
may mete out.
  Thus, India and Pakistan were all too willing to suffer the 
opprobrium of the world community. They were very--I shouldn't say 
``happy''--but they were willing to suffer the constraints of the 
economic sanctions that are automatically imposed upon them as a result 
of their nuclear programs and their testing, because, first of all, it 
is domestic politics for them, but, even more importantly, they deem it 
to be in their national self-interest for the preservation of their 
countries.

[[Page S6312]]

  You cannot expect a treaty that has been signed to prevent a country 
from doing what it believes is in its national self-interest. To think 
that the United States could, therefore, dissuade a country like North 
Korea or Iran or Iraq or one of the other so-called rogue nations of 
the world to forego the development or testing of nuclear weapons if 
only we could get everybody in the world to sign the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty is, I think, a ludicrous, self-deceptive, naive thought.
  That is why I thought the article these two gentlemen wrote and was 
published in the Washington Post today is so interesting, because it 
gives a little bit of perspective. It reminds us of how, with the best 
intentions, we signed treaties in the past. Part of the terms of those 
treaties was that we would supply atoms for peace, but when a country 
deemed it to be in their self-interest to use that largesse to develop 
their nuclear program, they did it. And after having developed their 
nuclear program, and this having been a violation of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, we should not find it as a surprise that they are 
then going to test those nuclear weapons which would, if these 
countries were to sign the CTBT, be a violation of that treaty as well.
  Mr. President, I conclude with this point. There has been some talk 
lately that the explosions of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear devices 
suggest it is now time for the Senate to take up the CTBT, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Exactly the opposite is true, as the distinguished majority leader of 
the Senate pointed out in a television interview a week ago last 
Sunday. He said it is 180 degrees wrong. He said the fact is that these 
two tests demonstrate that a test ban treaty will not have any effect 
on a country that deems it in its national self-interest to test these 
weapons; that a piece of paper is not going to stop them.
  It is interesting that in the last 2\1/2\ years, during the time that 
the United States has had a moratorium on testing, and that we have 
supposedly led world opinion in encouraging other nations not to test, 
five nations have tested nuclear devices--probably five. We know about 
France and China and now India and Pakistan, and perhaps Russia. But, 
you see, as to verifying whether Russia actually tested at its test 
site in the Novaya Zemlya, we don't know for sure whether that 
happened, or at least we can't discuss it publicly because the means 
that we have for detecting those explosions is not adequate for the 
verification that would be called for under the CTBT.
  But we know that at least four, if not five, nations have tested, and 
this is all during the time that the United States has been leading the 
way by not testing, by having a unilateral moratorium here. The only 
other, of course, Great Britain, has acknowledged having nuclear 
weapons that it hasn't tested.
  So world opinion, leading by example, sanctions, none of these is 
sufficient to prevent a country from doing what it believes is in its 
national self-interest. As this article points out, you just cannot 
rely upon a treaty or a piece of paper to prevent a country from doing 
what it believes it has to do to protect its national security. To do 
so is to fall back on that great American practice of hoping against 
hope and of putting our reliance in idealism and in treaties when, in 
fact, the answer is to always be prepared with an adequate military 
defense. In this case, of course, the defense is the establishment of a 
missile defense, which we have got to get on with building.
  That is a subject for another day, but the bottom line is we can 
always do what we can do to defend ourselves, such as building a 
missile defense as opposed to putting our reliance on something over 
which we have no control, and that is another country's behavior, even 
in the face of moral condemnation by world opinion and the significant 
economic sanctions that might be imposed by other countries as well as 
the United States.
  As I said, I will put this article in the Record. I urge my 
colleagues who are interested in the subject to further explore it as 
we debate the question of whether or not the Senate should take up the 
CTBT. As I said, I agree with the distinguished majority leader that 
these tests demonstrate that putting any reliance on that agreement 
would be folly and therefore far from suggesting this is the time to 
take it up, I suggest it is time to forget about it.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Post, June 15, 1998]

                             India Cheated

                (By Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal)

       You wouldn't know it from news reports, but most of the 
     military plutonium stocks India dipped into for its recent 
     nuclear tests came from a research project provided years ago 
     by the United States and Canada. India had promised both 
     countries it would not use this plutonium for bombs.
       If Washington and Ottawa were now to keep India to its 
     promise, and verify this, India would lose more than half the 
     weapons-grade plutonium for its nuclear bombs and missiles. 
     The United States and Canada should make this an essential 
     condition for the lifting of economic sanctions.
       The plutonium in question is the approximately 600 pounds--
     enough for about 50 bombs--produced in India's CIRUS research 
     reactor since it began operating in 1960. This was an ``Atoms 
     for Peace'' reactor built by Canada and made operable by an 
     essential 21 tons of heavy water supplied by the United 
     States. In return for this assistance, India promised both 
     suppliers in writing that the reactor would be reserved for 
     ``peaceful purposes.''
       India used plutonium from this reactor for its 1974 nuclear 
     explosion. When the facts emerged, Prime Minister Indira 
     Gandhi insisted there had been no violation of the peaceful-
     use commitments because India had set off a ``peaceful 
     nuclear explosion.'' The Indian scientist then in charge, 
     Raja Ramanna, now has admitted it was a bomb all along. And 
     India now has declared itself a nuclear-weapons state on the 
     basis of its current tests. With the decades-old ``peaceful'' 
     pretense stripped away, the United States and Canada should 
     make unambiguously clear that India may not use CIRUS 
     plutonium for warheads or related research.
       The fact that neither capital has uttered a peep about this 
     matter is symptomatic of Western complicity in the South 
     Asian nuclear crisis and of the present paralysis in dealing 
     with it. There is also the matter of a 1963 agreement 
     covering two U.S.-supplied nuclear power reactors at Tarapur 
     and their fuel. The radioactive used fuel from these reactors 
     is in storage and contains most of India's ``reactor-grade'' 
     plutonium. India has said it will reprocess the used fuel to 
     extract the plutonium for use as civilian power-reactor fuel. 
     But reactor-grade plutonium also is explosive and once 
     separated, it could be used by India's scientists for rapid 
     deployment in warheads. There is enough Tarapur plutonium for 
     hundreds of them.
       Under the 1963 agreement, India must get U.S. approval to 
     reprocess. India disputes this and insists it is free to 
     reprocess the used fuel at any time. The State Department, 
     historically reluctant to tangle with India, rationalized 
     Tarapur as an unnecessary irritant in U.S.-India relations 
     and put this disagreement in the sleeping-dogs category.
       In the history of U.S.-India nuclear relations, nothing 
     stands out so much as India's constancy in pursuing nuclear 
     bomb-making and America's nearsightedness about Indian 
     intentions. India fought to weaken the charter of the new 
     International Atomic Energy Agency in the 1950s. It was 
     duplicitous in carrying out Atoms for Peace agreements in the 
     1960s. It undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     with its ``peaceful'' bomb of 1974.
       Despite this history, each new generation of American 
     policymakers thinks that by being a little more accommodating 
     it will gain Indian restraint and acceptance of nuclear 
     controls. The Indians (they are not alone in this) have for a 
     long time played on that characteristically American self-
     deception that stems from a mix of idealism and commercial 
     greed. It is not surprising that the Indians expect the game 
     to continue.
       The angry congressional reaction to discovering America's 
     role in the 1974 test was the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Act. This barred nuclear reactor and fuel exports to 
     countries such as India that refuse to accept full 
     international inspections. But the State Department helped 
     India get around the law by arranging for France and later 
     China to continue the Tarapur fuel supply. Is it any wonder 
     the Indians do not take us seriously?
       Like India's 1974 test, the 1998 tests present a defining 
     event in U.S. nonproliferation policy. We have failed to 
     react sharply enough to head off Pakistani tests. But we 
     still can be taken seriously in this region and by other 
     aspiring nuclear states such as Iran. At a minimum we should 
     insist that Indian plutonium covered by ``peaceful purposes'' 
     agreements be unavailable for warheads, and that Tarapur fuel 
     is not reprocessed to extract plutonium. This is by no means 
     the whole answer, but there is no point in trying to 
     ``engage'' India is new nuclear limitations if we do not 
     enforce existing agreements.

  Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S6313]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may 
speak as in morning business for 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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