[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 77 (Monday, June 15, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6311-S6313]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, given the fact that the managers of the
tobacco legislation are not here even though the Senate was to begin
reconsideration of that proposal at 2 o'clock, I would like to continue
to speak in morning business for about 5 minutes to put an article in
the Record and ask unanimous consent at this time to include that
article at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is an article from the Washington Post
by Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal. Victor Gilinsky is an energy
consultant, and Paul Leventhal is president of the Nuclear Control
Institute. At the time of the 1974 nuclear test by India, they were,
respectively, a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
U.S. Senate staff.
They write about the history of the nuclear program conducted by
India, illustrating the complicity that the United States has had in
the Indian program and, more importantly, the misplaced reliance that
the United States has put in arms control agreements, which in the end
never quite seem to bear the fruit that we had hoped for.
In this case, it was part of the Atoms for Peace Program that the
United States participated in as a result of a previous treaty, and it
was part of the Atoms for Peace Program whereby the United States and
Canada and other nuclear powers would provide some material for India
for peaceful purposes. They had a reactor built by Canada. It was made
essentially operable, according to this article, by the United States
providing 21 tons of heavy water. This, of course, was all under a
promise that the Indians made to the United States that the reactor
would be used only for peaceful purposes. But apparently India used
plutonium from this reactor in its 1974 nuclear explosion. What the
authors said--I will quote: ``. . .neither capital''--meaning the
capital of Canada or the United States--``has uttered a peep about this
matter is symptomatic of Western complicity in the South Asian nuclear
crisis and of the present paralysis in dealing with it.''
What they are pointing out is that when we negotiate a peace treaty
with countries which says, ``You won't develop nuclear weapons--if you
will promise not to do that, then we will provide you peaceful nuclear
technology,'' it is almost impossible for that peaceful technology to
end up in a nuclear weapons program if that is the country's ultimate
desire. And, in the case of India, for whatever reasons it decided it
was in its national interest to produce a nuclear weapon, apparently it
used the product of this Atoms for Peace peaceful nuclear program as
part of its weapon program in violation of the treaty.
But for the United States, or Canada, or the other nuclear powers of
the world to complain about this would require us to have to admit to
something that we are not about to admit; namely, that these treaties
don't work; that there is no way to enforce them; and that, in point of
fact, a program that we had every hope would be a success--the Atoms
for Peace Program--has in fact helped to contribute to the development
of a nuclear weapon by the country of India.
The article goes on to make some other points that I think are
important; that is, that the country of India has broken several
promises here in the development of its nuclear weaponry; that it had
always complained about the charter of the new International Atomic
Energy Agency in the 1950s.
The article points out:
It was duplicity in carrying out the Atoms for Peace
agreements in the 1960's. It undermined the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty with its ``peaceful'' bomb of 1974.
That is referring to the fact that the Indians got around the
violation by claiming that the bomb they exploded was for peaceful
purposes. And apparently the United States looked the other way.
But the article goes on to note, ``Despite this history, each new
generation of American policymakers thinks that by being a little more
accommodating''--for countries like India--we will then gain their
restraint and their acceptance of the nuclear controls that we would
like to place upon them. Of course, India is not alone in this. I am
not being any more critical of India than I would be of other countries
that would be engaged in the same kind of conduct.
But what this article concludes is ``. . .American self-deception
that stems from a mix of idealism and commercial greed.'' is the reason
these countries have been able to get away with this for so long--
again, ``. . .American self-deception that stems from a mix of idealism
and commercial greed.''
Mr. President, that is exactly what we have seen with the desire to
sell virtually anything to nobody, the argument always being, if we
will not sell it to them, then someone else will, which is always an
excuse for transferring technology. That we have come to learn with
some sadness recently. That should not have been transferred to China,
for example.
We also find this concept of idealism--that if they will just sign
one more treaty, if we will just get one more commitment from a country
that it won't engage in conduct that we believe inimical to world
peace, that just maybe, therefore, we will have the peace that we so
earnestly desire.
The fact of the matter is that when it comes to a nation's self-
defense, it is going to do what it deems in its best interest
irrespective of a piece of paper, of a treaty, of a commitment, or of a
promise to the rest of the world, and it is not going to be swayed by
world opinion or even by the punishment that nations or organizations
may mete out.
Thus, India and Pakistan were all too willing to suffer the
opprobrium of the world community. They were very--I shouldn't say
``happy''--but they were willing to suffer the constraints of the
economic sanctions that are automatically imposed upon them as a result
of their nuclear programs and their testing, because, first of all, it
is domestic politics for them, but, even more importantly, they deem it
to be in their national self-interest for the preservation of their
countries.
[[Page S6312]]
You cannot expect a treaty that has been signed to prevent a country
from doing what it believes is in its national self-interest. To think
that the United States could, therefore, dissuade a country like North
Korea or Iran or Iraq or one of the other so-called rogue nations of
the world to forego the development or testing of nuclear weapons if
only we could get everybody in the world to sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty is, I think, a ludicrous, self-deceptive, naive thought.
That is why I thought the article these two gentlemen wrote and was
published in the Washington Post today is so interesting, because it
gives a little bit of perspective. It reminds us of how, with the best
intentions, we signed treaties in the past. Part of the terms of those
treaties was that we would supply atoms for peace, but when a country
deemed it to be in their self-interest to use that largesse to develop
their nuclear program, they did it. And after having developed their
nuclear program, and this having been a violation of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, we should not find it as a surprise that they are
then going to test those nuclear weapons which would, if these
countries were to sign the CTBT, be a violation of that treaty as well.
Mr. President, I conclude with this point. There has been some talk
lately that the explosions of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear devices
suggest it is now time for the Senate to take up the CTBT, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Exactly the opposite is true, as the distinguished majority leader of
the Senate pointed out in a television interview a week ago last
Sunday. He said it is 180 degrees wrong. He said the fact is that these
two tests demonstrate that a test ban treaty will not have any effect
on a country that deems it in its national self-interest to test these
weapons; that a piece of paper is not going to stop them.
It is interesting that in the last 2\1/2\ years, during the time that
the United States has had a moratorium on testing, and that we have
supposedly led world opinion in encouraging other nations not to test,
five nations have tested nuclear devices--probably five. We know about
France and China and now India and Pakistan, and perhaps Russia. But,
you see, as to verifying whether Russia actually tested at its test
site in the Novaya Zemlya, we don't know for sure whether that
happened, or at least we can't discuss it publicly because the means
that we have for detecting those explosions is not adequate for the
verification that would be called for under the CTBT.
But we know that at least four, if not five, nations have tested, and
this is all during the time that the United States has been leading the
way by not testing, by having a unilateral moratorium here. The only
other, of course, Great Britain, has acknowledged having nuclear
weapons that it hasn't tested.
So world opinion, leading by example, sanctions, none of these is
sufficient to prevent a country from doing what it believes is in its
national self-interest. As this article points out, you just cannot
rely upon a treaty or a piece of paper to prevent a country from doing
what it believes it has to do to protect its national security. To do
so is to fall back on that great American practice of hoping against
hope and of putting our reliance in idealism and in treaties when, in
fact, the answer is to always be prepared with an adequate military
defense. In this case, of course, the defense is the establishment of a
missile defense, which we have got to get on with building.
That is a subject for another day, but the bottom line is we can
always do what we can do to defend ourselves, such as building a
missile defense as opposed to putting our reliance on something over
which we have no control, and that is another country's behavior, even
in the face of moral condemnation by world opinion and the significant
economic sanctions that might be imposed by other countries as well as
the United States.
As I said, I will put this article in the Record. I urge my
colleagues who are interested in the subject to further explore it as
we debate the question of whether or not the Senate should take up the
CTBT. As I said, I agree with the distinguished majority leader that
these tests demonstrate that putting any reliance on that agreement
would be folly and therefore far from suggesting this is the time to
take it up, I suggest it is time to forget about it.
Exhibit 1
[From the Washington Post, June 15, 1998]
India Cheated
(By Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal)
You wouldn't know it from news reports, but most of the
military plutonium stocks India dipped into for its recent
nuclear tests came from a research project provided years ago
by the United States and Canada. India had promised both
countries it would not use this plutonium for bombs.
If Washington and Ottawa were now to keep India to its
promise, and verify this, India would lose more than half the
weapons-grade plutonium for its nuclear bombs and missiles.
The United States and Canada should make this an essential
condition for the lifting of economic sanctions.
The plutonium in question is the approximately 600 pounds--
enough for about 50 bombs--produced in India's CIRUS research
reactor since it began operating in 1960. This was an ``Atoms
for Peace'' reactor built by Canada and made operable by an
essential 21 tons of heavy water supplied by the United
States. In return for this assistance, India promised both
suppliers in writing that the reactor would be reserved for
``peaceful purposes.''
India used plutonium from this reactor for its 1974 nuclear
explosion. When the facts emerged, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi insisted there had been no violation of the peaceful-
use commitments because India had set off a ``peaceful
nuclear explosion.'' The Indian scientist then in charge,
Raja Ramanna, now has admitted it was a bomb all along. And
India now has declared itself a nuclear-weapons state on the
basis of its current tests. With the decades-old ``peaceful''
pretense stripped away, the United States and Canada should
make unambiguously clear that India may not use CIRUS
plutonium for warheads or related research.
The fact that neither capital has uttered a peep about this
matter is symptomatic of Western complicity in the South
Asian nuclear crisis and of the present paralysis in dealing
with it. There is also the matter of a 1963 agreement
covering two U.S.-supplied nuclear power reactors at Tarapur
and their fuel. The radioactive used fuel from these reactors
is in storage and contains most of India's ``reactor-grade''
plutonium. India has said it will reprocess the used fuel to
extract the plutonium for use as civilian power-reactor fuel.
But reactor-grade plutonium also is explosive and once
separated, it could be used by India's scientists for rapid
deployment in warheads. There is enough Tarapur plutonium for
hundreds of them.
Under the 1963 agreement, India must get U.S. approval to
reprocess. India disputes this and insists it is free to
reprocess the used fuel at any time. The State Department,
historically reluctant to tangle with India, rationalized
Tarapur as an unnecessary irritant in U.S.-India relations
and put this disagreement in the sleeping-dogs category.
In the history of U.S.-India nuclear relations, nothing
stands out so much as India's constancy in pursuing nuclear
bomb-making and America's nearsightedness about Indian
intentions. India fought to weaken the charter of the new
International Atomic Energy Agency in the 1950s. It was
duplicitous in carrying out Atoms for Peace agreements in the
1960s. It undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
with its ``peaceful'' bomb of 1974.
Despite this history, each new generation of American
policymakers thinks that by being a little more accommodating
it will gain Indian restraint and acceptance of nuclear
controls. The Indians (they are not alone in this) have for a
long time played on that characteristically American self-
deception that stems from a mix of idealism and commercial
greed. It is not surprising that the Indians expect the game
to continue.
The angry congressional reaction to discovering America's
role in the 1974 test was the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act. This barred nuclear reactor and fuel exports to
countries such as India that refuse to accept full
international inspections. But the State Department helped
India get around the law by arranging for France and later
China to continue the Tarapur fuel supply. Is it any wonder
the Indians do not take us seriously?
Like India's 1974 test, the 1998 tests present a defining
event in U.S. nonproliferation policy. We have failed to
react sharply enough to head off Pakistani tests. But we
still can be taken seriously in this region and by other
aspiring nuclear states such as Iran. At a minimum we should
insist that Indian plutonium covered by ``peaceful purposes''
agreements be unavailable for warheads, and that Tarapur fuel
is not reprocessed to extract plutonium. This is by no means
the whole answer, but there is no point in trying to
``engage'' India is new nuclear limitations if we do not
enforce existing agreements.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may
speak as in morning business for 7 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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