[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 75 (Thursday, June 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6181-S6205]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. CLELAND (for himself, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr. 
        Lieberman):
  S. 2157. A bill to amend the Small Business Act to increase the 
authorized funding level for women's business centers; to the Committee 
on Small Business.


small business administration women's business center authorization act

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am delighted to join the Senator from 
Georgia, Senator Cleland, in introducing legislation with him to expand 
the authorized level of the Small Business Administration's Women's 
Business Centers. I appreciate the leadership of the Senator from 
Georgia on this issue.
  We must provide and over the last few years have provided strong 
support to help women business owners meet their greatest potential. I 
am happy to say this bill does just that. The additional funding that 
would be authorized in the bill will ensure that the SBA is going to 
achieve the goal of establishing the Women's Business Center in every 
single State by the year 1999. It will also be used to expand the 
existing very successful Women's Business Centers in the currently 
underserved areas of their States.
  Just 10 years ago Congress established a demonstration program to 
help women-owned businesses gain access to capital and assistance, 
technical assistance, in business development. This program has proven 
to be a really remarkable success. It has served nearly 50,000 American 
women, business owners, through 54 sites in 28 States and the District 
of Columbia.
  Women-owned businesses have made extraordinary gains over the past 
decade, and everyone in America is sharing the economic advantage that 
has resulted from their endeavors. Current calculations by the Small 
Business Administration indicate that women now own one-third of all 
U.S. firms--more than 8 million businesses. Women-owned businesses 
employ one out of every five U.S. workers, a total of 18.5 million 
employees, and more people than the Fortune 500 companies. Each year, 
women-owned businesses now

[[Page S6182]]

contribute more than $2.38 trillion into the national economy.
  In Massachusetts, where 147,000 women-owned businesses account for 
over one-third of all our companies, the Center for Women and Business 
Enterprise has worked to empower women in becoming economically self-
sufficient through entrepreneurship. The center provides in-depth 
courses, workshops, one-on-one counseling, and access to financing for 
women.
  Unfortunately, notwithstanding this extraordinary record of women-
owned business, credit has always been something that has been more 
difficult for women because of credit standards, and frankly some 
stereotyping that historically has taken place.
  Since its inception in 1995, my State's Women's Business Center has 
served more than 1,000 women business owners, 40 percent of whom are 
minorities. One hundred cities and towns in eastern Massachusetts are 
benefiting from the programs and the activities that are available at 
the center.
  I will share a couple of real stories of how this has worked and what 
it has done. Renata Matsson came to the Center for Women and Enterprise 
in October 1995 after she had developed a medical device to assist 
people suffering from chronic eye problems. But Renata didn't know how 
to transform her invention to a product in a small business. After 
completing an 11-week class which taught her ``the language of 
business,'' she developed a detailed business plan and applied for a 
grant from the Small Business Administration's Small Business 
Innovation Research Program through the National Institutes of Health. 
She was recently awarded a grant of $100,000. Today she is using that 
grant to commercialize her technology and start her own small business.
  Another example: 16 years ago, Nancy Engel was a young mother on 
welfare dreaming of giving her daughter the things that she never had--
a home, financial security, and a college education. Nancy took $30 
from her last welfare check and bought spices, which she then 
repackaged and sold at a flea market. She earned $200 from that 
investment of her $30 from her check. She then used those proceeds to 
develop a small business called the Sunny Window. In 1996, she enrolled 
in the Center for Women and Enterprise's business planning course. 
Since she completed the course, Sunny Window has grown and now 
generates $250,000 in annual revenues selling spices, dried flower 
arrangements and soaps throughout the world. It now employs seven women 
with what Nancy calls ``part-time mothers' hours.'' Nancy was recently 
named the U.S. Small Business Administration's first Welfare-to-Work 
Entrepreneur of the Year for Massachusetts. Soon she will be 
volunteering for the Center for Women and Enterprise, assisting other 
women entrepreneurs who are trying to make the very difficult 
transition from public assistance to running their own small business.
  These are just two of a myriad of stories, wonderful stories, of 
success as a result of our efforts at the Federal level to assist 
women-owned businesses. These success stories are, however, juxtaposed 
to the reality that far too many women still face unnecessary obstacles 
to developing their own businesses, ranging from the lack of access to 
capital to a lack of access to government contracts, to a lack of 
access to business education or even to training opportunities, not to 
mention some of the fundamental resistance that has, unfortunately, 
existed with respect to women's efforts to try to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities.
  We need to expand on the policies and programs that allow women 
entrepreneurs to grow and to thrive. In turn, it is clear their 
successes will benefit our country and all of our communities. We know 
that women entrepreneurs are now breaking records. Women-owned business 
have a startup rate twice that of male-owned counterparts. Between 1987 
and 1992, the number of women-owned businesses increased by 43 percent 
while business overall grew only 26 percent.
  Particularly notable, women-owned companies with 100 or more workers 
increased employment by 158 percent, more than double the rate for all 
U.S. firms of similar size. These accomplishments illustrate the 
importance of women-owned businesses to our economy, and they 
underscore why we in Congress should support their growth and 
development.
  Last year, I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Women's 
Business Centers Act of 1997, which doubled the authorization of 
funding for women business center programs to $8 million for each of 
the next 3 years. I was extremely pleased that the major provision of 
that bill, as well as a mandate for the SBA to conduct studies on how 
women businesses fare in the contracting and finance areas, was 
included in the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 and was 
enacted into law with President Clinton's signature.
  The legislation that I join Senator Cleland in introducing today 
takes the next step in developing the women's business center program 
by increasing the authorization to $9 million in fiscal year 1999, 
$10.5 million in the year 2000, and $12 million in 2001. I underscore 
that that is a remarkably small amount of money that we are seeking to 
do a large job, a job which obviously is returning extraordinary 
results to the Nation.
  This increased funding will ensure that the SBA achieves the goal of 
establishing at least one women's business center in each State by the 
end of the year in 1999 and will strengthen and expand the existing 
centers. I also continue to support the development of the women's on-
line center, which is a very useful tool for women businessowners--
especially those located in rural areas--who want to avail themselves 
of the women's business center technical expertise.
  The legislation that Senator Cleland and I introduce today is the 
beginning of a new advancement for women-owned businesses, and I am 
very proud to be a part of it. I hope that all of our colleagues will 
join in this important effort. I would like to take the opportunity to 
thank Senator Cleland and his staff, particularly John Johnson, for the 
work they have done in the preparation of this legislation.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts, 
Senator Kerry, for his work on behalf of small businesses. We are both 
members of the Small Business Committee here in the Senate.
  Mr. President, I speak this morning to introduce legislation with my 
colleague, the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, and fellow 
cosponsors, including Senators Daschle, Lautenberg, Mikulski, Abraham, 
D'Amato, Breaux, Dodd, Bingaman, Kohl, Landrieu, Torricelli, Leahy, 
Grassley, Snowe, Harkin, Bumpers, and Feinstein. That is an impressive 
bipartisan list of Senators.
  This legislation, simply stated, recognizes the outstanding 
contributions that women's business centers have made to women 
entrepreneurs across the Nation. In light of this outstanding 
achievement in the President's budget request, I am proud to offer this 
measure expressing the findings of Congress that funding for these 
centers, these women's business centers, should be increased. I note 
that the centers are the only organization, nationally, that focus 
exclusively on entrepreneurial training for women. Increased funding 
would allow for new centers and subcenters to be established and for 
continued funding for existing centers, including the on-line women's 
business center. Increased funding would achieve the goal of expanding 
centers to all 50 States. Our legislation would increase funding for 
women's business centers under the SBA in steps, from the current level 
of $8 million to $9 million for fiscal year 1999, $10.5 million for 
fiscal year 2000, and $12 million for fiscal year 2001.
  Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to talk about four focal 
points of women's business centers. The first and most important focus 
is the customer. These centers have responded to women's needs by 
offering training, and during accessible hours at nights and on 
weekends. In addition to regular training courses, special instructions 
on starting at-home child care businesses have also been offered. As 
the SBA Administrator Aida Alvarez points out, the number of clients 
served in the second year of the program increased by 40 percent. 
Approximately 44 percent of clients served were actually socially 
disadvantaged. More than 33 percent of the clients were economically 
disadvantaged,

[[Page S6183]]

nearly 40 percent were minorities, and 18 percent were actually on 
public assistance at the time.

  Then there is the community focus. Women's business centers are a 
network of more than 60 community-based women's business centers 
operating in 36 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each 
center offers long-term training, networking, and mentoring to 
potential and existing entrepreneurs, most of whom could not or would 
not start businesses without substantial help, and each center tailors 
its programs to the needs of the individual community it serves.
  Next is the economic focus. In terms of job growth, significantly 
high numbers of full- and part-time jobs were created at average hourly 
wages at least double the minimum wage. In the area of loan growth, the 
number of small loans received by clients has more than doubled since 
the first year of the program. In terms of small business growth, 78 
percent of all center clients were startup businessowners or aspiring 
entrepreneurs. The centers taught them business basics and provided 
practical support and realistic encouragement.
  The last focus is that of technology. The on-line women's business 
center, at www.onlinewbc.org, is an interactive state-of-the-art web 
site that offers virtually everything an entrepreneur needs to start 
and build a successful business, including on-line training, mentoring, 
individual counseling, topic forums and news groups, market research, a 
comprehensive State-by-State resource and information guide, and 
information on all of the SBA's programs and services, plus links to 
countless other resources. This site was developed by the North Texas 
Women's Business Development Center in cooperation with more than 60 
women's business centers and several corporate sponsors. This summer, 
information will be available in nine different languages.
  Mr. President, I want to conclude my statement by thanking the 
Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry. I think this legislation 
offers small businesses and entrepreneurs in America hope, particularly 
women businessowners and potential women businessowners. It is the hope 
of a better life for oneself, one's family and community, which 
actually drives entrepreneurs and also drives the economic engine in 
this country, which is so vital to our well-being as a Nation. Women's 
business centers are a distributor of that hope. We in Congress need to 
recognize that this program works. It makes a positive difference in 
the lives of so many women and the countless citizens they employ.
  I hope all of my colleagues will join me in cosponsoring our 
bipartisan legislation. I look forward to its future and timely 
consideration in the Senate Committee on Small Business. I thank my 
colleagues for the opportunity to be here this morning to present this 
legislation, which I think will serve the needs of so many.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of 
legislation increasing the authorization for the Small Business 
Administration's Women's Business Center program from $9 million in 
1999 to $12 million in 2001. These centers provide management, 
marketing, and financial advice to women-owned small businesses.
  Mr. President, the Small Business Administration's Women's Business 
Center program finances a number of very important initiatives at the 
state and local levels; initiatives that have proven crucial to women 
struggling to enter the job world and to start their own businesses. 
These initiatives have changed the lives of a significant number of 
women in Michigan and throughout the United States.
  For example, Mr. President, Ann Arbor's Women's Initiative for Self-
Employment or WISE program was started in 1987 as a means by which to 
provide low-income women with the tools and resources they need to 
begin and expand businesses. The WISE program provides a comprehensive 
package of business training, personal development workshops, credit 
counseling, start-up and expansion financing, business counseling, and 
mentoring. In addition to helping create and expand businesses, WISE 
fights poverty, increases incomes, stabilizes families, develops skills 
and sparks community renewal.
  In addition, Mr. President, Grand Rapids' Opportunities for Women or 
GROW provides career counseling and training for women in western 
Michigan. This nonprofit group serves about 250 women per year. GROW 
helps women get jobs by providing them with basic training and helping 
them get funds for more specialized training. In addition, they help 
women obtain appropriate clothing so that they can start work in a 
professional manner.
  I salute the good people at WISE and GROW for their hard work helping 
the women of Michigan. They provide the kind of services we need to 
revitalize troubled areas and empower women to build productive lives 
for themselves and their families.
  Because the Small Business Administration's Women's Business Centers 
program makes these kinds of efforts possible, I believe it deserves 
our full support, and merits the increase in funding called for in this 
legislation. I urge my colleagues to support this important bill.
 Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased today to join with my 
colleagues, Senators Cleland and Kerry, in introducing legislation that 
will bring the resources of SBA's Women's Business Center program much 
closer to those seeking this help as they work to start their own 
businesses. This bill does more than recognize the contributions that 
women make as business owners. This bill tangibly supports and 
encourages more women to become entrepreneurs.
  The Office of Women's Business Ownership recently released a report 
to Congress on the success of Women's Business Centers. This report 
officially confirms what we already informally know: Women are 
interested in owning their own businesses, and women appreciate the 
targeted help the Centers offer that relates directly to the unique 
opportunities and challenges that women face in creating a business. 
While existing Small Business Administration offices and Small Business 
Development Centers help women entrepreneurs, this report found that 
more than three-fourths of the women who have turned to a Women's 
Business Center appreciate its special focus. SBA offices and SBDCs do 
not have the resources available to offer the same kind of help.
  Our legislation will supply resources needed to establish a Women's 
Business Center in each of the fifty states, including in my home state 
of Vermont. Passage of this bill would give women in Vermont and in 
other states direct access to information on financing, marketing and 
managing their own business ventures. Under the provisions of this 
bill, Vermonters would have access to the wide range of resources that 
already are available to citizens in 36 other states.
  The bill will also extend additional resources for the online Women's 
Business Center. This resource, located at www.onlinewbc.org, provides 
assistance to women who are unable to travel long distances to Centers. 
With this online resource, women have access to much of the same 
information that is available at the Centers, and they can ask 
questions of specialists, all with the click of a mouse. Our bill would 
enable the Center to expand its online services to women in business.
  Even without the resources of a Women's Business Center, Vermont is a 
leader in women-owned businesses. The number of women entrepreneurs in 
Vermont has almost doubled over the last ten years. Women now own more 
than thirty-eight percent of all businesses in Vermont, which is above 
the national average of thirty-six percent. Women also employ thirty 
percent of Vermont's workers, which also exceeds the national average.
  Women have faced unique obstacles and challenges in starting and 
growing businesses. Some obstacles have been lowered in recent years, 
and we can all hope that this progress will continue. One step we can 
take to promote continued progress is by bringing the resources of 
Women's Business Centers to more women entrepreneurs. We must encourage 
more Vermont women to tap into this incredible growth. An SBA Women's 
Business Center in Vermont will do just that by providing women with 
the framework and support necessary to thrive and excel as business 
owners.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. THOMPSON (for himself and Mr. Breaux):

[[Page S6184]]

  S. 2161. A bill to provide Government-wide accounting of regulatory 
costs and benefits, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs.


                  regulatory right-to-know act of 1998

 Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I am introducing the 
``Regulatory Right-to-Know Act'' of 1998. I believe that this 
legislation will serve as an important tool to promote the public's 
right to know about the benefits and burdens of regulation; to increase 
the accountability of government to the people it serves; and, 
ultimately, to improve the quality of our government.
  This continues the effort begun by Senator Stevens, then the Chairman 
of the Governmental Affairs Committee, when he passed the Stevens 
Regulatory Accounting Amendment in 1996. This legislation would not 
change any statutory or regulatory standard; it simply would provide 
information to help the public, Congress and the President to 
understand the scope and performance of our regulatory system. As OMB 
stated in its first report under the Stevens Amendment, ``Over time, 
regulation . . . has become increasingly prevalent in our society, and 
the importance of our regulatory activities cannot be overstated.'' It 
is my hope that more information on the benefits and costs of 
regulation will help us make smarter decisions to get more of the good 
things that sensible regulation can deliver, and reduce needless waste 
and redtape at the same time. That's plain common sense.
  Regulations have played an important role in improving our quality of 
life--cleaner air, quality products, safer workplaces, and reliable 
economic markets--to name a few of the good things that sensible 
regulation can produce. Achieving these benefits does not come without 
cost. In its first regulatory accounting report, OMB estimated that the 
annual cost of regulation of the environment, health, safety and the 
economy is about $300 billion. Other studies, which include the full 
costs of paperwork and economic transfers, estimate that regulation 
costs about $700 billion annually. Those costs are passed on to 
American consumers and taxpayers through higher prices, diminished 
wages, increased taxes, or reduced government services. The tab for the 
average American household is thousands of dollars each year--$7,000 
per year by some estimates. At the same time, the public wants and 
deserves better results from our regulatory system. As the costs of 
regulation rise with public expectations of better results, the need is 
greater than ever to get a handle on how regulatory programs are 
performing, so we can find ways for our government to perform better.
  It's no surprise that the seriousness of this need is not widely 
appreciated, because the costs of regulation are not as obvious as many 
other costs of government, such as the taxes we pay each year; and the 
benefits of regulation often are diffuse. But there is substantial 
evidence that the current regulatory system often misses opportunities 
for greater benefits and lower costs. As noted by the President's chief 
spokesperson on regulatory policy, Sally Katzen:

       Regrettably, the regulatory system that has been built up 
     over the past five decades . . . is subject to serious 
     criticism . . . [on the grounds] that there are too many 
     regulations, that many are excessively burdensome, [and] that 
     many do not ultimately provide the intended benefits.

Our regulatory goals are too important, and our resources are too 
precious, to miss out on opportunities to do better.
  It's time to move toward a more open and accountable regulatory 
system. I am pleased to be introducing this bill with Senator Breaux. 
It's important that members from both sides of the aisle work together 
to solve these problems. I appreciate that Chairman Tom Bliley 
introduced a similar bill in the House last fall, and I look forward to 
working with him. Finally, I appreciate the effort that a few dedicated 
professionals put into OMB's first regulatory accounting report. While 
this report is certainly not perfect, it shows that regulatory 
accounting is doable and can help us better understand the benefits and 
burdens of regulation. Now let's do better. This bill will promote some 
important improvements, including:
  Making regulatory accounting a permanent requirement.
  Adding requirements for a more complete picture, including, to the 
extent feasible, the costs and benefits of particular programs, not 
just an aggregate picture, as well as an analysis of regulation's 
impacts on the State and local government, the private sector, and the 
federal government.
  Ensuring higher quality of information. Requirements for OMB 
guidelines and peer review should improve future reports.
  Ensuring better compliance with basic legislative requirements which 
the first report neglected. These deficiencies include failing to 
recommend improvements to current programs; failing to assess the 
indirect effects of regulation; failing to provide information on 
specific programs where feasible; and failing to provide a full 
accounting of all mandates. This bill will help address these problems.
  As OMB said in their first regulatory accounting report, 
``regulations (like other instruments of government policy) have 
enormous potential for both good and harm.'' I believe that better 
information will help us to increase the benefits of regulation and 
decrease unnecessary waste and red tape. I think we need to work 
together to contribute to the success of government programs the public 
values, while enhancing the economic security and well-being of our 
families and communities.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the ``Regulatory Right-
to-Know Act'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2161

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Regulatory Right-to-Know Act 
     of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are to--
       (1) promote the public right-to-know about the costs and 
     benefits of Federal regulatory programs and rules;
       (2) improve the quality of Federal regulatory programs and 
     rules;
       (3) increase Government accountability; and
       (4) encourage open communication among Federal agencies, 
     the public, the President, and Congress regarding regulatory 
     priorities.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any executive 
     department, military department, Government corporation, 
     Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in 
     the executive branch of the Government (including the 
     Executive Office of the President), or any independent 
     regulatory agency, but shall not include--
       (A) the General Accounting Office;
       (B) the Federal Election Commission;
       (C) the governments of the District of Columbia and of the 
     territories and possessions of the United States, and their 
     various subdivisions; or
       (D) Government-owned contractor-operated facilities, 
     including laboratories engaged in national defense research 
     and production activities.
       (2) Benefit.--The term ``benefit'' means the reasonably 
     identifiable significant favorable effects, quantifiable and 
     nonquantifiable, including social, health, safety, 
     environmental, economic, and distributional effects, that are 
     expected to result from implementation of, or compliance 
     with, a rule.
       (3) Cost.--The term ``cost'' means the reasonably 
     identifiable significant adverse effects, quantifiable and 
     nonquantifiable, including social, health, safety, 
     environmental, economic, and distributional effects, that are 
     expected to result from implementation of, or compliance 
     with, a rule.
       (4) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     the Office of Management and Budget, acting through the 
     Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
     Affairs.
       (5) Major rule.--The term ``major rule'' means a rule 
     that--
       (A) the agency proposing the rule or the Director 
     reasonably determines is likely to have an annual effect on 
     the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably 
     quantifiable costs; or
       (B) is otherwise designated a major rule by the Director on 
     the ground that the rule is likely to adversely affect, in a 
     material way, the economy, a sector of the economy, including 
     small business, productivity, competition, jobs, the 
     environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or 
     tribal governments, or communities.
       (6) Program element.--The term ``program element'' means a 
     rule or related set of rules.
       (7) Rule.--The term ``rule'' has the same meaning given 
     such term in section 551(4) of title 5, United States Code, 
     except that such term shall not include--
       (A) administrative actions governed by sections 556 and 557 
     of title 5, United States Code;

[[Page S6185]]

       (B) rules issued with respect to a military or foreign 
     affairs function of the United States; or
       (C) rules related to agency organization, management, or 
     personnel.

     SEC. 4. ACCOUNTING STATEMENT.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Administration.--The President, acting through the 
     Director, shall be responsible for implementing and 
     administering the requirements of this Act.
       (2) Accounting statement.--Not later than January 2000, and 
     each January every 2 years thereafter, the President shall 
     prepare and submit to Congress an accounting statement that 
     estimates the costs and corresponding benefits of Federal 
     regulatory programs and program elements in accordance with 
     this section.
       (b) Years Covered by Accounting Statement.--Each accounting 
     statement (other than the initial accounting statement) 
     submitted under this Act shall cover, at a minimum, the costs 
     and corresponding benefits for each of the 5 fiscal years 
     preceding October 1 of the year in which the report is 
     submitted. Each statement shall also contain, at a minimum, a 
     projection of the costs and corresponding benefits for each 
     of the next 10 fiscal years, based on rules in effect or 
     projected to take effect. The statement may cover any fiscal 
     year preceding such fiscal years for the purpose of revising 
     previous estimates.
       (c) Timing and Procedures.--
       (1) Notice and comment.--The President shall provide notice 
     and opportunity for comment, including consultation with the 
     Comptroller General of the United States, for each accounting 
     statement.
       (2) Timing.--The President shall propose the first 
     accounting statement under this section no later than 1 year 
     after the date of enactment of this Act. Such statement shall 
     cover, at a minimum, each of the preceding fiscal years 
     beginning with fiscal year 1997.
       (d) Contents of Accounting Statement.--
       (1) Estimates of costs.--An accounting statement shall 
     estimate the costs of all Federal regulatory programs and 
     program elements, including paperwork costs, by setting 
     forth, for each year covered by the statement--
       (A) the annual expenditure of national economic resources 
     for each regulatory program and program elements; and
       (B) such other quantitative and qualitative measures of 
     costs as the President considers appropriate.
       (2) Estimates of benefits.--An accounting statement shall 
     estimate the corresponding benefits of Federal regulatory 
     programs and program elements by setting forth, for each year 
     covered by the statement, such quantitative and qualitative 
     measures of benefits as the President considers appropriate. 
     Any estimates of benefits concerning reduction in health, 
     safety, or environmental risks shall be based on sound and 
     objective scientific practices and shall present the most 
     plausible level of risk practical, along with a statement of 
     the reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
       (3) Presentation of results.--
       (A) Costs and benefits categories.--To the extent feasible, 
     the costs and benefits under this subsection shall be listed 
     under the following categories:
       (i) In the aggregate.
       (ii) By agency, agency program, and program element.
       (iii) By major rule.
       (B) Quantification.--To the extent feasible, the Director 
     shall quantify the net benefits or net costs under 
     subparagraph (A).
       (C) Cost estimates.--In presenting estimates of costs in 
     the accounting statement, the Director shall provide 
     estimates for the following sectors:
       (i) Private sector costs.
       (ii) Federal sector administrative costs.
       (iii) Federal sector compliance costs.
       (iv) State and local government administrative costs.
       (v) State and local government compliance costs.

     SEC. 5. ASSOCIATED REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Submission.--In each year following the year in which 
     the President submits an accounting statement under section 
     4, the President, acting through the Director, shall, after 
     notice and opportunity for comment, submit to Congress a 
     report associated with the accounting statement (hereinafter 
     referred to as an ``associated report'').
       (2) Content.--The associated report shall contain, in 
     accordance with this section--
       (A) analyses of impacts;
       (B) identification and analysis of jurisdictional overlaps, 
     duplications, and potential inconsistencies among Federal 
     regulatory programs; and
       (C) recommendations for reform.
       (b) Analyses of Impacts.--The President shall include in 
     the associated report the following:
       (1) Analyses.--Analyses prepared by the president of the 
     cumulative impact of Federal regulatory programs covered in 
     the accounting statement. Factors to be considered in such 
     report shall include impacts on the following:
       (A) The ability of State and local governments to provide 
     essential services, including police, fire protection, and 
     education.
       (B) Small business.
       (C) Productivity.
       (D) Wages.
       (E) Economic growth.
       (F) Technological innovation.
       (G) Employment and income distribution.
       (H) Consumer prices for goods and services.
       (I) Such other factors considered appropriate by the 
     President.
       (2) Summary.--A summary of any independent analyses of 
     impacts prepared by persons commenting during the comment 
     period on the accounting statement.
       (c) Recommendations for Reform.--The President shall 
     include in the associated report the following:
       (1) Presidential recommendations.--A summary of 
     recommendations of the President for reform or elimination of 
     any Federal regulatory program or program element that does 
     not represent sound use of national economic resources or 
     otherwise is inefficient.
       (2) Recommendations from commenters.--A summary of any 
     recommendations for such reform or elimination of Federal 
     regulatory programs or program elements prepared by persons 
     commenting during the comment period on the accounting 
     statement.

     SEC. 6. GUIDANCE FROM OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in consultation 
     with the Council of Economic Advisers, issue guidelines to 
     agencies--
       (1) to standardize measures of costs and benefits in 
     accounting statements prepared pursuant to this Act, 
     including guidance on estimating the costs and corresponding 
     benefits of regulatory programs and program elements; and
       (2) to standardize the format of the accounting statements.
       (b) Review.--The Director shall review submissions from 
     agencies to assure consistency with the guidelines under this 
     section.

     SEC. 7. PEER REVIEW.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Scope.--The Director shall provide for independent and 
     external peer review of--
       (A) the guidelines issued under section 6; and
       (B) each accounting statement and associated report.
       (2) Use of comments.--The Director shall use the peer 
     review comments in preparing the final statement and report.
       (b) Review.--Peer review under subsection (a) shall--
       (1) involve participants who--
       (A) have expertise in the economic and technical issues 
     germane to regulatory accounting and economic and scientific 
     analysis; and
       (B) are independent of the Government;
       (2) be completed in a timely manner, consistent with 
     applicable deadlines;
       (3) provide written comments to the Director containing a 
     balanced presentation of all considerations; and
       (4) not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
     U.S.C. App.).
       (c) Response.--The Director shall provide a written 
     response to all significant peer review comments. Such 
     comments and responses shall be made available to the public.

     SEC. 8. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE.

       After each accounting statement and associated report is 
     submitted to Congress, the Director of the Congressional 
     Budget Office shall make recommendations to the President--
       (1) for improving agency compliance with this Act and the 
     guidelines under section 6; and
       (2) for improving accounting statements and associated 
     reports prepared under this Act, including recommendations on 
     level of detail, accuracy, and quality of analysis.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. MACK (for himself and Mr. Grams):
       S. 2162. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
     to more accurately codify the depreciable life of printed 
     wiring board and printed wiring assembly equipment; to the 
     Committee on Finance.


                 printed circuit investment act of 1998

 Mr. MACK. Mr. President, today Senator Grams and I introduce 
the Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1998. This bill would allow 
manufacturers of printed wiring boards and assemblies, known as the 
electronic interconnection industry, to depreciate their production 
equipment in 3 years rather than the 5 year period under current law.
  As we approach the 21st Century, our Nation's Tax Code should not 
stand in the way of technological progress. Printed wiring boards and 
assemblies are literally central to our economy, as they are the nerve 
centers of nearly every electronic device from camcorders and 
televisions to medical devices, computers and defense systems. But the 
Tax Code places U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage relative to their 
Asian competitors, because of different depreciation treatment. This 
disadvantage is particularly difficult for U.S. firms to bear, as the 
interconnection industry consists overwhelmingly of small firms that 
cannot easily absorb the costs inflicted by an irrationally-long 
depreciation schedule.

[[Page S6186]]

  As technology continues to advance at light speed, the exhilaration 
of competition in a dynamic market is dampened by the effects of a Tax 
Code that has not kept pace with these changes. Obsolete 
interconnection manufacturing equipment is kept on the books long after 
this equipment has gone out the door. Companies with the competitive 
fire to enter such a rapidly-evolving industry must constantly invest 
in new state-of-the-art equipment, replacing obsolete equipment every 
18 to 36 months just to remain competitive. U.S. investments in new 
printed wiring board and assembly manufacturing equipment have nearly 
tripled since 1991--growing from $847 million to an estimated $2.4 
billion.
  But this investment is taxed at an artificially-high rate, because 
deductions for the cost of the equipment are spread over a period that 
is several years longer than justified. The industry is at the mercy of 
tax laws passed in the 1980s, which were based on 1970s-era electronics 
technology. It is no wonder that the market share of U.S. 
interconnection companies has been cut in half over this period. Our 
Tax Code should not continue to undermine the competitiveness of 
American businesses. The opportunity is before us to correct the tax 
laws that dictate how rapidly board manufacturers and electronics 
assemblers can depreciate equipment needed to fabricate and assemble 
circuit boards.
  The Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1998 will provide modest tax 
relief to the electronics interconnection industry and the 250,000 
Americans, residing in every state of the Union, whose jobs rely on the 
success of this industry. This industry should get fair and accurate 
tax treatment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2162

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Printed Circuit Investment 
     Act of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. 3-YEAR DEPRECIBLE LIFE FOR PRINTED WIRING BOARD AND 
                   PRINTED WIRING ASSEMBLY EQUIPMENT.

       (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 168(e)(3) of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to classification 
     of property) is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of 
     clause (ii), by striking the period at the end of clause 
     (iii) and inserting ``, and'', and by adding at the end the 
     following new clause:
       ``(iv) any printed wiring board or printed wiring assembly 
     equipment.''
       (b) 3-Year Class Life.--Subparagraph (B) of section 
     168(g)(3) of such Code is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to subparagraph (A)(iii) the following new item:

  ``(A)(iv)....................................................3''.    

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to equipment placed in service after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 

By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. 
                        Sessions, and Mr. Kyl):

  S. 2163. A bill to modify the procedures of the Federal courts in 
certain matters, to reform prisoner litigation, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on the Judiciary.


                    judicial improvement act of 1998

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with 
Senators Thurmond, Abraham, and Ashcroft, the Judicial Improvement Act 
of 1998; legislation that will restore public confidence in our 
democratic process by strengthening the constitutional division of 
powers between the Federal government and the States and between 
Congress and the Courts. On the whole, our federal judges are 
respectful of their constitutional roles, yet a degree of overreaching 
by some dictates that Congress move to more clearly delineate the 
proper role of Federal judges in our constitutional system. 
Increasingly, judges forget that the Constitution has committed to them 
the power to interpret law, but reserved to Congress the power to 
legislate.
  This careful balancing of legislative and judicial functions is vital 
to our constitutional system. Regardless of how much we, as 
individuals, may approve of the results of a certain judge's decision, 
we must look beyond short-term political interests and remember the 
importance of preserving our Constitution.
  Attempts by certain jurists to encroach upon legislative authority 
deeply concern me. I have taken the floor in this chamber on numerous 
occasions to recite some of the more troubling examples of judicial 
overreaching. I will not revisit them today. Suffice it to say that 
activism, and by that I mean a judge who ignores the written text of 
the law, whether from the right or the left, threatens our 
constitutional structure.
  As an elected official, my votes for legislation are subject to voter 
approval. Federal judges, however, are unelected, hence they are, as a 
practical matter, unaccountable to the public. While tenure during good 
behavior, which amounts to life tenure, is important in that it frees 
judges to make unpopular, but constitutionally sound, decisions, it can 
become a threat to liberty when placed in the wrong hands. Alexander 
Hamilton, in the 78th Federalist, warned of the problem when judges 
``substitute their own pleasures to the constitutional intentions of 
the legislature.'' [Federalist No. 78, A. Hamilton]. Hamilton declared 
that ``The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should 
be disposed to exercise Will instead of Judgment, the consequence would 
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the 
legislative body.'' [Ibid.]. And substituting the will of life-tenured 
federal judges for the democratically elected representatives is not 
what our Constitution's framers had in mind.
  In an effort to avoid this long-contemplated problem, the proposed 
reform legislation we are introducing today will assist in ensuring 
that all three branches of the federal government work together in a 
fashion contemplated by, and consistent with, the Constitution. In 
addition, this legislation will ensure that federal judges are more 
respectful of the States.
  This bill is not, as some would claim, an assault on the Federal 
Judiciary. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of our Federal judges 
would find repugnant the idea of imposing their personal views on the 
people in lieu of Federal or State law. However, there are currently 
some activist Federal judges improperly expanding their roles to quash 
the will of the people. These individuals view themselves as so-called 
platonic guardians, and believe they know what is in the people's best 
interest. Judges, however, are simply not entitled to deviate from 
their roles as interpreters of the law to create new law from the 
bench. If they believe otherwise, they are derelict in their duties and 
should resign to run for public office--at least then they would be 
accountable for their actions. It is time that we pass legislation that 
precludes any Federal judge from blurring the lines separating the 
legislative and judicial functions.
  It is important to note that the effort to reign in judicial activism 
should not be limited simply to opposing potential activist nominees. 
While the careful scrutiny of judicial nominees is one important step 
in the process, a step reserved to the Senate alone, Congress itself 
has an obligation to the public to ensure that judges fulfill their 
constitutionally assigned roles and do not encroach upon those powers 
delegated to the legislature. Hence, the Congress performs an important 
role in bringing activist decisions to light and, where appropriate, 
publicly criticizing those decisions. Some view this as an assault upon 
judicial independence. That is untrue. It is merely a means of engaging 
in debate about a decision's merits or the process by which the 
decision was reached. Such criticism is a healthy part of our 
democratic system. While life tenure insulates judges from the 
political process, it should not, and must not, isolate them from the 
people.
  In addition, the Constitution grants Congress the authority, with a 
few notable limitations, to set federal courts' jurisdiction. This is 
an important tool that, while seldom used, sets forth the circumstances 
in which the judicial power may be exercised. A good example of this is 
the 104th Congress' effort to reform the statutory writ of habeas 
corpus in an attempt to curb the seemingly endless series of petitions 
filed by convicted criminals bent on thwarting the demands of justice. 
Legislation of this nature, actually called for by the Chief Justice 
and praised in his recent annual report, is an important means of 
curbing activism.

[[Page S6187]]

  To this end, I have chosen to introduce the Federal Judicial 
Improvement Act. It is a small, albeit meaningful, step in the right 
direction. Notably, this legislation will change the way federal courts 
review constitutional challenges to State and federal laws. The 
existing process allows a single federal judge to hear and grant 
applications regarding the constitutionality of State and federal laws 
as well as state ballot initiatives. In other words, a single federal 
judge can impede the will of a majority of the voters merely by issuing 
an order halting the implementation of a state referendum.
  This proposed reform will accomplish the twin goals of fighting 
judicial activism and preserving the democratic process. This bill 
modestly proposes to respond to the problem of judicial activism by:

       1. Requiring a three judge district court panel to hear 
     appeals and grant interlocutory or permanent injunctions 
     based on the constitutionality of the state law or 
     referendum.
       2. Placing time limitations on remedial authority in any 
     civil action in which prospective relief or a consent 
     judgment binds State or local officials.
       3. Prohibiting a Federal court from having the authority to 
     order State or local governments to increase taxes as part of 
     a judicial remedy.
       4. Preventing a Federal court from prohibiting State or 
     local officials from reprosecuting a defendant. AND
       5. Preventing a Federal court from ordering the release of 
     violent offenders under unwarranted circumstances.

  This reform bill is a long overdue effort to minimize the potential 
for judicial activism in the federal court system. Americans are 
understandably frustrated when they exercise their right to vote and 
the will of their elected representatives is thwarted by judges who 
enjoy life tenure. It's no wonder that millions of Americans don't 
think their vote matters when they enact a referendum only to have it 
enjoined by a single district court judge. By improving the way federal 
courts analyze constitutional challenges to laws and initiatives, 
Congress will protect the rights of parties to challenge 
unconstitutional laws while at the same time reduce the ability of 
activist judges to abuse their power and stifle the will of the people.

  I want to take a few moments to describe how this legislation will 
curb the ability of federal judges to engage in judicial activism. The 
first reform would require a three judge panel to hear and issue 
interlocutory and permanent injunctions regarding challenged laws at 
the district court level. The current system allows a single federal 
judge to restrain the enforcement, operation and execution of 
challenged federal or state laws, including initiatives. There have 
been many instances where an activist judge has used this power to 
overturn a ballot initiative only to have his or her order overturned 
by a higher court years later.
  For example, this change would have prevented U.S. District Court 
Judge Thelton Henderson from issuing an injunction barring enforcement 
of Proposition 209, a ballot initiative which prohibited affirmative 
action in California. Judge Henderson's order was subsequently 
overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the 
law was constitutional and that Judge Henderson thwarted the will of 
the people. A three judge panel would have prevented Henderson from 
acting on his own, and perhaps would have ruled correctly in the first 
place.
  Now, I have no problem with a court declaring a law unconstitutional 
when it violates the written text of the Constitution. It is, however, 
inappropriate when a judge, like Judge Henderson, attempts to act like 
a super-legislator and imposes his own policy preference on the 
citizens of a State. Such an action weakens respect for the federal 
judiciary, creates cynicism in the voting public, and costs the 
government millions of dollars in legal fees. By requiring a three 
judge panel, the proposed law would eliminate the ability of one 
activist judge to unilaterally bar enforcement of a law or ballot 
initiative through an interlocutory or permanent injunction.
  In addition, new time limits on injunctive relief would be imposed. A 
temporary restraining order would remain in force no more than 10 days, 
and an interlocutory injunction no more than 60 days. After the 
expiration of an interlocutory injunction, federal courts would lack 
the authority to grant any additional interlocutory relief but would 
still have the power to issue a permanent injunction. These limitations 
are designed to prevent the federal judiciary from indefinitely barring 
implementation of challenged laws by issuing endless injunctions, and 
facilitate the appeals process by motivating courts to speedily handle 
constitutional challenges.
  We need only to look at the legal wrangling over Proposition 187 to 
see the need for these time constraints. The California initiative was 
overwhelmingly approved in 1994 with almost 60 percent of the vote and 
was designed to end all social services and other benefits to illegal 
aliens. The referendum was supported by voters who felt that they as 
taxpayers didn't have the ability to provide those who break 
immigration laws with free health, education and welfare. Opponents who 
lost at the ballot box went to federal court the next day and obtained 
an injunction prohibiting enforcement of 187, and to this day it has 
never been the law of the state of California.
  U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer issued a preliminary injunction 
soon after the 1994 election and ruled way back in 1995 that part of 
187 was unconstitutional. The injunction stayed in effect and she 
finally ruled on the rest of the initiative in March of this year, when 
she found that an additional portion of the initiative was 
unconstitutional. The proposed time limitation on injunctions would 
have been an incentive for the judge to rule promptly on the issues at 
hand, and precluded her from indefinitely delaying enforcement of the 
proposition without ruling. What this reform essentially does is 
encourage the federal judiciary to rule on the merits of a case, and 
not use injunctions to keep a challenged law from going into effect or 
being heard by an appeals court through the use of delaying tactics.
  The bill also proposes to require that a notice of appeal must be 
filed not more than fourteen days after the date of an order granting 
an interlocutory injunction and the appeals court would lack 
jurisdiction over an untimely appeal of such an order. The court of 
appeals would apply a de novo standard of review before reconsidering 
the merits of granting relief, but not less than 100 days after the 
issuance of the original order granting interlocutory relief. If the 
interlocutory order is upheld on appeal, the order would remain in 
force no longer than 60 days after the date of the appellate decision 
or until replaced by a permanent injunction.
  The bill also proposes limitations on the remedial authority of 
federal courts. In any civil action where prospective relief or a 
consent judgment binds state and local officials, relief would be 
terminated upon the motion of any party or intervener:
  a) five years after the date the court granted or approved the 
prospective relief;
  b) two years after the date the court has entered an order denying 
termination of prospective relief; or
  c) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment 
of this act, two years after the date of enactment.
  Parties could agree to terminate or modify an injunction before 
relief is available if it otherwise would be legally permissible. 
Courts would promptly rule on motions to modify or terminate this 
relief and in the event that a motion is not ruled on within 60 days, 
the order or consent judgment binding State and local officials would 
automatically terminate.
  However, prospective relief would not terminate if the federal court 
makes written findings based on the record that relief remains 
necessary to correct an ongoing violation of a federal right, extends 
no further than necessary to correct the violation and is the least 
intrusive means available to correct the violation of a federal right.
  This measure would also prohibit a federal court from having the 
authority to order a unit of state or local government to increase 
taxes as part of a judicial remedy. When an unelected Federal judge has 
the power to order tax increases, this results in taxation without 
representation. Americans have fought against unfair taxation since the 
Revolutionary War, and this bill would prevent unfair judicial taxation 
and leave the power to tax to elected representatives of the people.

[[Page S6188]]

  The bill would not limit the authority of a Federal court to order a 
remedy which may lead a unit of local or State government to decide to 
increase taxes. A Federal court would still have the power to issue a 
money judgment against a State because the court would not 
be attempting to restructure local government entities or mandating a 
particular method or structure of State or local financing. This bill 
also doesn't limit the remedial authority of State courts in any case, 
including cases raising issues of federal law. All the bill does is 
prevent Federal courts from having the power to order elected 
representatives to raise taxes. This is moderate reform which prevents 
judicial activism and unfair taxation while preserving the Federal 
courts power to order remedial measures.

  Another important provision of the bill would prevent a federal court 
from prohibiting State or local officials from re-prosecuting a 
defendant. This legislation is designed to clarify that federal habeas 
courts lack the authority to bar retrial as a remedy.
  This part of the legislation was co-sponsored by Congressman Pitts 
and Senator Specter in response to a highly-publicized murder case in 
the Congressman's district. Sixteen year old Laurie Show was harassed, 
stalked and assaulted for six months by the defendant, who had a 
vendetta against Show for briefly dating the defendant's boyfriend. 
After luring Show's mother from their residence, the defendant and an 
accomplice forcefully entered the Show home, held the victim down, and 
slit her throat with a butcher knife, killing her. After the defendant 
was convicted in State court, she filed a habeas petition in which she 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct and averred her actual innocence. 
Federal district court judge Stewart Dalzell not only accepted this 
argument and released the defendant, but he also took the extraordinary 
step of barring state and local officials from reprosecuting the woman. 
Judge Dalzell stated that the defendant was the ``first and foremost 
victim of this affair.''
  Congress has long supported the ability of a Federal court to fashion 
creative remedies to preserve constitutional protections, but the 
additional step of barring state or local officials from reprosecution 
is without precedent and an unacceptable intrusion on the rights of 
states. This bill, if enacted, will prevent this type of judicial 
activism from ever occurring again.
  This bill also contains provisions for the termination of prospective 
relief when it is no longer warranted to cure a violation of a federal 
right. Once a violation that was the subject of a consent decree has 
been corrected, a consent decree must be terminated unless the court 
finds that an ongoing violation of a federal right exists, the specific 
relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and no 
other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right. The party 
opposing the termination of relief has the burden of demonstrating why 
the relief should not be terminated, and the court is required to grant 
the motion to terminate if the opposing party fails to meet its burden. 
These provisions prevent consent decrees from remaining in effect once 
a proper remedy has been implemented, thereby preventing judges from 
imposing consent decrees that go beyond the requirements of law.
  The proposed reform law also includes provisions designed to dissuade 
prisoners from filing frivolous and malicious motions by requiring that 
the complainant prisoner pay for the costs of the filings. These 
provisions will undoubtedly curb the number of frivolous motions filed 
by prisoners and thus, relieve the courts of the obligation to hear 
these vacuous motions designed to mock and frustrate the judicial 
system.
  Finally, the bill proposes to prevent federal judges from entering or 
carrying out any prisoner release order that would result in the 
release from or nonadmission to a prison on the basis of prison 
conditions. This provision will effectively preclude activist judges 
from circumventing mandatory minimum sentencing laws by stripping the 
federal judges of jurisdiction to enter such orders. This will ensure 
that the tough sentencing laws approved by voters to keep murderers, 
rapists, and drug dealers behind bars for lengthy terms will not be 
ignored by activist judges who improperly use complaints of prison 
conditions filed by convicts as a vehicle to release violent offenders 
back on our streets.
  For an example of this activism, I offer the rulings of a jurist whom 
I have mentioned before, Federal Judge Norma Shapiro, who sits on the 
Federal bench in Philadelphia. Judge Shapiro has a different view of 
what prison life should be: a view completely divergent from the view 
of the general public and, most importantly, the law.
  Judge Shapiro used complaints filed by inmates to impose her activist 
views and wrestle control of the prison system by setting a cap on the 
number of prisoners that can be incarcerated in Pennsylvania. When 
faced with the opportunity to extend her judicial powers and seize 
control of the prison system, Judge Shapiro jumped at the chance and 
the results have been disastrous.
  The cap imposed by Judge Shapiro forced the release of 500 prisoners 
a week. Because of this cap, in a time period of 18 months alone, 9,732 
arrestees were released on Philadelphia. Of course, many were re-
arrested on other charges, including 79 murders, 90 rapes, 701 
burglaries, 959 robberies, 1,113 assaults, 2,215 drug offenses and 
2,748 thefts. [Philadelphia Inquirer]. Releasing dangerous criminals on 
to the streets to reek havoc and violence is the ultimate slap in the 
faces of law enforcement and justice. How can we expect law enforcement 
to provide protection and safe streets if at every turn there is a 
Judge Shapiro waiting anxiously for the chance to release lawlessness 
on our communities? This reform bill will prevent Judge Shapiro and 
other like-minded judges from ever endangering families and children in 
our communities again by preventing these Judges from releasing 
prisoners based on prison conditions.
  Prison life is not supposed to be pleasant or comfortable; rather, it 
is supposed to serve as a deterrent to future crime. I would be worried 
if no prisoners were filing complaints because they actually found 
prison life to be acceptable. But it seems that some activist judges 
are willing to believe any prisoner complaint equates or rises to the 
level of a constitutional violation. It seems that in some courtrooms, 
if a prisoner simply files a complaint alleging prison conditions 
aren't laudable or praiseworthy, chances are good that that prisoner, 
and many others, will be released from custody early, sometimes 
immediately, thanks to the misguided activism of the judge hearing the 
complaint. This is absolutely unacceptable and this proposed law will 
put a stop to the agendas of some activist judges who believe every 
argument that the ACLU and guilty, but bored, convicts offer up.
  This overdue legislation is a measured effort to improve the way the 
federal judiciary works. It fights judicial activism and actually 
improves the way constitutional appeals are handled. This reform bill 
is a sensible, balanced attempt to promote judicial efficiency and to 
prevent egregious judicial activism. I encourage my colleagues to act 
swiftly on this needed reform.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this measure be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2163

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Judicial 
     Improvement Act of 1998''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Procedures for certain injunctions.
Sec. 3. Limitations on remedial authority.
Sec. 4. Interlocutory appeals of court orders relating to class 
              actions.
Sec. 5. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction of district courts.
Sec. 6. Appeals of Merit Systems Protection Board.
Sec. 7. Extension of Judiciary Information Technology Fund.
Sec. 8. Authorization for voluntary services.
Sec. 9. Offsetting receipts.
Sec. 10. Sunset of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans.
Sec. 11. Creation of certifying officers in the judicial branch.
Sec. 12. Limitation on collateral relief.
Sec. 13. Laurie Show victim protection.
Sec. 14. Rule of construction relating to retroactive application of 
              statutes.

[[Page S6189]]

Sec. 15. Appropriate remedies for prison conditions.
Sec. 16. Limitation on fees.
Sec. 17. Notice of malicious filings.
Sec. 18. Limitation on prisoner release orders.
Sec. 19. Repeal of section 140.
Sec. 20. Severability.

     SEC. 2. PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN INJUNCTIONS.

       (a) Requirement of 3-Judge Court.--
       (1) In general.--No interlocutory or permanent injunction 
     restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of a 
     State law adopted by referendum or an Act of Congress shall 
     be granted by a United States district court or judge thereof 
     upon the ground that the State law conflicts with the United 
     States Constitution, Federal law, or a treaty of the United 
     States unless the application for the injunction is heard and 
     determined by a court of 3 judges in accordance with section 
     2284 of title 28, United States Code.
       (2) Appeals.--Any appeal of a determination on such 
     application shall be to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
       (3) Designation of judges.--In any case to which this 
     section applies, the additional judges who will serve on the 
     3-judge court shall be designated under section 2284(b)(1) of 
     title 28, United States Code, as soon as practicable, and the 
     court shall expedite the consideration of the application for 
     an injunction.
       (4) Denial of request.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     prevent a district court judge from denying a request for 
     interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief.
       (b) Time Limits on Injunctive Relief.--
       (1) Temporary restraining order.--Section 2284(b)(3) of 
     title 28, United States Code, is amended in the second 
     sentence by inserting before the period, the following: ``, 
     but in no event shall the order remain in force for longer 
     than 10 days''.
       (2) Interlocutory injunction.--Any interlocutory injunction 
     restraining the enforcement or operation of a State law 
     adopted by referendum or an Act of Congress shall remain in 
     force for not longer than 60 days. The Federal courts shall 
     lack the authority to grant any additional interlocutory 
     relief after the expiration of an interlocutory injunction. 
     Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the court's authority 
     to issue a permanent injunction after an interlocutory 
     injunction has expired. If the order granting the 
     interlocutory injunction is appealed, the time limits of 
     paragraph (4) apply.
       (3) Filing of appeal.--A notice of appeal from an order 
     granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
     enforcement or operation, of a State law adopted by 
     referendum or an Act of Congress shall be filed not later 
     than 14 days after the date of the order. The Courts of 
     Appeals lack jurisdiction over an untimely appeal of such an 
     order.
       (4) Consideration of appeal.--If an appeal is filed from an 
     order granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
     enforcement or operation of a State law adopted by referendum 
     or an Act of Congress, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider 
     the merits of granting interlocutory relief applying a de 
     novo standard of review. The Court of Appeals shall dispose 
     of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, but in any event 
     within 100 days after the issuance of the original order 
     granting interlocutory relief. If the interlocutory order is 
     upheld on appeal, the interlocutory order shall remain in 
     force no longer than 60 days after the date of the appellate 
     decision or until replaced by a permanent injunction.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section--
       (1) the term ``State'' means each of the several States and 
     the District of Columbia;
       (2) the term ``State law'' means the constitution of a 
     State, or any statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or other 
     measure of a State that has the force of law, and any 
     amendment thereto; and
       (3) the term ``referendum'' means the submission to popular 
     vote of a measure passed upon or proposed by a legislative 
     body or by popular initiative.
       (d) Effective Date.--This section applies to any injunction 
     that is issued on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 3. LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIAL AUTHORITY.

       (a) Termination of Prospective Relief.--
       (1) In general.--In any civil action in which prospective 
     relief is issued which binds State or local officials or in 
     any civil action in which the parties entered a consent 
     judgment binding State or local officials, such relief shall 
     be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener--
       (A) 5 years after the date the court granted or approved 
     the prospective relief;
       (B) 2 years after the date the court has entered an order 
     denying termination of prospective relief under this 
     paragraph; or
       (C) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of 
     enactment of this Act, 2 years after the date of enactment.
       (2) Limitation.--Prospective relief shall not terminate if 
     the court makes written findings based on the record that 
     prospective relief--
       (A) remains necessary to correct current and ongoing 
     violation of a Federal right;
       (B) extends no further than necessary to correct the 
     violation of a Federal right; and
       (C) is the least intrusive means available to correct the 
     violation of a Federal right.
       (3) Termination and modification authority otherwise 
     unaffected.--Nothing in this section shall prevent any party 
     or intervener from seeking modification or termination before 
     relief is available under paragraph (1), to the extent that 
     modification or termination would otherwise be legally 
     permissible, and nothing in this section shall prevent the 
     parties from agreeing to terminate or modify an injunction 
     before such relief is available under paragraph (1).
       (4) Conformity with other laws.--Nothing in this section 
     shall affect the rules governing prospective relief in any 
     civil action with respect to prison conditions.
       (5) Procedure for motion to terminate.--
       (A) In general.--The court shall rule promptly on any 
     motion to modify or terminate relief.
       (B) Automatic termination.--In the event a court does not 
     rule on a motion to terminate filed under paragraph (1) 
     within 60 days, the order or consent judgment binding State 
     or local officials will automatically terminate and be of no 
     further legal force.
       (b) Special Masters.--
       (1) In general.--
       (A) Appointment.--In any civil action in a Federal court, 
     the Federal court may appoint a special master who shall be 
     disinterested and objective.
       (B) Remedial phase.--The court shall appoint a special 
     master under this subsection only during the remedial phase 
     of the action and only upon a finding that the remedial phase 
     will be sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment.
       (2) Appointment.--
       (A) Submission of list.--If the court determines that 
     appointment of a special master is necessary, the court shall 
     request that the defendant (or group of defendants) and the 
     plaintiff (or group of plaintiffs) each submit a list of not 
     more than 5 persons to serve as a special master.
       (B) Removal.--Each party shall have the opportunity to 
     remove up to 3 persons from the opposing party's list.
       (C) Selection.--The court shall select the special master 
     from the remaining names on the lists after the operation of 
     subparagraph (B).
       (3) Compensation.--The compensation to be paid to a special 
     master shall be based on an hourly rate not greater than the 
     hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, 
     United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel, 
     and costs reasonably incurred by the special master. Such 
     compensation and costs shall be paid with funds appropriated 
     to the Judiciary.
       (4) Regular review of appointment.--The court shall review 
     the appointment of the special master every 6 months to 
     determine whether the services of the special master 
     continued to be justified under the standards of paragraph 
     (1).
       (5) Limitations on powers and duties.--A special master 
     appointed under this subsection--
       (A) shall not make any finding or communication ex parte; 
     and
       (B) may be removed by the judge at any time, but shall be 
     relieved of the appointment upon termination of relief.
       (c) Judicial Taxation Prohibited.--
       (1) In general.--No Federal court shall have the authority 
     to order a unit of Federal, State, or local government to 
     increase taxes as part of a judicial remedy.
       (2) Remedial authority otherwise unaffected.--Nothing in 
     paragraph (1) shall be construed to limit the authority of a 
     Federal court to order a remedy that may lead a unit of local 
     or State government to decide to increase taxes.
       (d) State Court Remedies Unaffected.--Nothing in this 
     section shall limit the remedial authority of State courts in 
     any case, including cases raising issues of Federal law.

     SEC. 4. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF COURT ORDERS RELATING TO 
                   CLASS ACTIONS.

       (a) Interlocutory Appeals.--Section 1292(b) of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) The court of appeals which would have jurisdiction 
     over a final order in an action may, in its discretion, 
     permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting 
     or denying class action certification made to it within 10 
     days after the entry of the order. An appeal under this 
     paragraph shall not stay proceedings in the district court 
     unless the district judge or the court of appeals or a judge 
     thereof shall so order.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     applies to any action commenced on or after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 5. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT 
                   COURTS.

       (a) Basis of Jurisdiction.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction

       ``(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
     of any civil action involving minimal diversity between 
     adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where at 
     least 25 natural persons have either died or incurred injury 
     in the accident at a discrete location and, in the case of 
     injury, the injury has resulted in damages which exceed 
     $50,000 per person, exclusive of interest and costs, if--
       ``(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part 
     of the accident took place in another State or other 
     location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a 
     resident of the State where a substantial part of the 
     accident took place;

[[Page S6190]]

       ``(2) any 2 defendants reside in different States, 
     regardless of whether such defendants are also residents of 
     the same State or States; or
       ``(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in 
     different States.
       ``(b) For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) minimal diversity exists between adverse parties if 
     any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a 
     citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a foreign 
     state, or a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a);
       ``(2) a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State, 
     and a citizen or subject of any foreign state, in which it is 
     incorporated or has its principal place of business, and is 
     deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is 
     incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business;
       ``(3) the term `injury' means--
       ``(A) physical harm to a natural person; and
       ``(B) physical damage to or destruction of tangible 
     property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph 
     (A) exists;
       ``(4) the term `accident' means a sudden accident, or a 
     natural event culminating in an accident, that results in 
     death or injury incurred at a discrete location by at least 
     25 natural persons; and
       ``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia, 
     the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or 
     possession of the United States.
       ``(c) In any action in a district court which is or could 
     have been brought, in whole or in part, under this section, 
     any person with a claim arising from the accident described 
     in subsection (a) shall be permitted to intervene as a party 
     plaintiff in the action, even if that person could not have 
     brought an action in a district court as an original matter.
       ``(d) A district court in which an action under this 
     section is pending shall promptly notify the judicial panel 
     on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.''.

       (b) Venue.--Section 1391 of title 28, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district 
     court is based upon section 1369 may be brought in any 
     district in which any defendant resides or in which a 
     substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action 
     took place.''.
       (c) Multidistrict Litigation.--Section 1407 of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(i)(1) In actions transferred under this section when 
     jurisdiction is or could have been based, in whole or in 
     part, on section 1369, the transferee district court may 
     retain actions so transferred for the determination of 
     liability and punitive damages notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section. An action retained for the 
     determination of liability shall be remanded to the district 
     court from which the action was transferred, or to the State 
     court from which the action was removed, for the 
     determination of damages, other than punitive damages, unless 
     the court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses 
     and in the interest of justice, that the action should be 
     retained for the determination of damages.
       ``(2) Any remand under paragraph (1) shall not be effective 
     until 60 days after the transferee court has issued an order 
     determining liability and has certified its intention to 
     remand some or all of the transferred actions for the 
     determination of damages. An appeal with respect to the 
     liability determination and the choice of law determination 
     of the transferee court may be taken during that 60-day 
     period to the court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction 
     over the transferee court. In the event a party files such an 
     appeal, the remand shall not be effective until the appeal 
     has been finally disposed of. Once the remand has become 
     effective, the liability determination and the choice of law 
     determination shall not be subject to further review by 
     appeal or otherwise.
       ``(3) An appeal with respect to determination of punitive 
     damages by the transferee court may be taken, during the 60-
     day period beginning on the date the order making the 
     determination is issued, to the court of appeals with 
     jurisdiction over the transferee court.
       ``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand 
     for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by 
     appeal or otherwise.
       ``(5) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the 
     authority of the transferee court to transfer or dismiss an 
     action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
       (d) Removal of Actions.--Section 1441 of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (e) by striking ``(e) The court to which 
     such civil action is removed'' and inserting ``(f) The court 
     to which a civil action is removed under this section''; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e)(1)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 
     (b), a defendant in a civil action in a State court may 
     remove the action to the district court of the United States 
     for the district and division embracing the place where the 
     action is pending if--
       ``(i) the action could have been brought in a United States 
     district court under section 1369; or
       ``(ii) the defendant is a party to an action which is or 
     could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section 
     1369 in a United States district court and arises from the 
     same accident as the action in State court, even if the 
     action to be removed could not have been brought in a 
     district court as an original matter.
       ``(B) The removal of an action under this subsection shall 
     be made in accordance with section 1446, except that a notice 
     of removal may also be filed before trial of the action in 
     State court within 30 days after the date on which the 
     defendant first becomes a party to an action under section 
     1369 in a United States district court that arises from the 
     same accident as the action in State court, or at a later 
     time with leave of the district court.
       ``(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection 
     and the district court to which it is removed or transferred 
     under section 1407(i) has made a liability determination 
     requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district 
     court shall remand the action to the State court from which 
     it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless 
     the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and 
     witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should 
     be retained for the determination of damages.
       ``(3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective 
     until 60 days after the district court has issued an order 
     determining liability and has certified its intention to 
     remand the removed action for the determination of damages. 
     An appeal with respect to the liability determination and the 
     choice of law determination of the district court may be 
     taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with 
     appellate jurisdiction over the district court. In the event 
     a party files such an appeal, the remand shall not be 
     effective until the final disposition of the appeal. Once the 
     remand has become effective, the liability determination and 
     the choice of law determination shall not be subject to 
     further review by appeal or otherwise.
       ``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand 
     for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by 
     appeal or otherwise.
       ``(5) An action removed under this subsection shall be 
     deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in 
     which jurisdiction is based on section 1368 of this title for 
     purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1660, 1697, and 
     1785.
       ``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the 
     authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an 
     action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
       (e) Choice of Law.--
       (1) Determination by the court.--Chapter 111 of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 1660. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions

       ``(a)(1) In an action which is or could have been brought, 
     in whole or in part, under section 1369, the district court 
     in which the action is brought or to which it is removed 
     shall determine the source of the applicable substantive law, 
     except that if an action is transferred to another district 
     court, the transferee court shall determine the source of the 
     applicable substantive law. In making this determination, a 
     district court shall not be bound by the choice of law rules 
     of any State, and the factors that the court may consider in 
     choosing the applicable law include--
       ``(A) the place of the injury;
       ``(B) the place of the conduct causing the injury;
       ``(C) the principal places of business or domiciles of the 
     parties;
       ``(D) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for 
     forum shopping; and
       ``(E) whether the choice of law would be reasonably 
     foreseeable to the parties.
       ``(2) The factors set forth in paragraph (1) (A) through 
     (E) shall be evaluated according to their relative importance 
     with respect to the particular action. If good cause is shown 
     in exceptional cases, including constitutional reasons, the 
     court may allow the law of more than 1 State to be applied 
     with respect to a party, claim, or other element of an 
     action.
       ``(b) The district court making the determination under 
     subsection (a) shall enter an order designating the single 
     jurisdiction whose substantive law is to be applied in all 
     other actions under section 1369 arising from the same 
     accident as that giving rise to the action in which the 
     determination is made. The substantive law of the designated 
     jurisdiction shall be applied to the parties and claims in 
     all such actions before the court, and to all other elements 
     of each action, except where Federal law applies or the order 
     specifically provides for the application of the law of 
     another jurisdiction with respect to a party, claim, or other 
     element of an action.
       ``(c) In an action remanded to another district court or a 
     State court under section 1407(i)(1) or 1441(e)(2), the 
     district court's choice of law under subsection (b) shall 
     continue to apply.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``1660. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.

       (f) Service of Process.--
       (1) Other than subpoenas.--
       (A) In general.--Chapter 113 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page S6191]]

     ``Sec. 1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions

       ``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in 
     whole or in part upon section 1369, process, other than 
     subpoenas, may be served at any place within the United 
     States, or anywhere outside the United States if otherwise 
     permitted by law.''.
       (B) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 113 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.

       (2) Service of subpoenas.--
       (A) In general.--Chapter 117 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions

       ``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in 
     whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, a subpoena 
     for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if authorized by 
     the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such 
     terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at 
     any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the 
     United States if otherwise permitted by law.''.
       (B) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 117 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.

       (g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to 
     the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 6. APPEALS OF MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD.

       (a) Appeals.--Section 7703 of title 5, United States Code, 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``30'' and inserting 
     ``60''; and
       (2) in the first sentence of subsection (d), by inserting 
     after ``filing'' the following: ``, within 60 days after the 
     date the Director received notice of the final order or 
     decision of the Board,''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and apply to 
     any administrative or judicial proceeding pending on that 
     date or commenced on or after that date.

     SEC. 7. EXTENSION OF JUDICIARY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUND.

       Section 612 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``equipment'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``resources'';
       (2) by striking subsection (f) and redesignating subsequent 
     subsections accordingly;
       (3) in subsection (g), as so redesignated, by striking 
     paragraph (3); and
       (4) in subsection (i), as so redesignated--
       (A) by striking ``Judiciary'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``judiciary'';
       (B) by striking ``subparagraph (c)(1)(B)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (c)(1)(B)''; and
       (C) by striking ``under (c)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``under 
     subsection (c)(1)(B)''.

     SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICES.

       Section 677 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, the 
     Administrative Assistant, with the approval of the Chief 
     Justice, may accept voluntary personal services for the 
     purpose of providing tours of the Supreme Court building.
       ``(2) No person may volunteer personal services under this 
     subsection unless the person has first agreed, in writing, to 
     waive any claim against the United States arising out of or 
     in connection with such services, other than a claim under 
     chapter 81 of title 5.
       ``(3) No person volunteering personal services under this 
     subsection shall be considered an employee of the United 
     States for any purpose other than for purposes of--
       ``(A) chapter 81 of title 5; or
       ``(B) chapter 171 of this title.
       ``(4) In the administration of this subsection, the 
     Administrative Assistant shall ensure that the acceptance of 
     personal services shall not result in the reduction of pay or 
     displacement of any employee of the Supreme Court.''.

     SEC. 9. OFFSETTING RECEIPTS.

       For fiscal year 1999 and thereafter, any portion of 
     miscellaneous fees collected as prescribed by the Judicial 
     Conference of the United States pursuant to sections 1913, 
     1914(b), 1926(a), 1930(b), and 1932 of title 28, United 
     States Code, exceeding the amount of such fees in effect on 
     September 30, 1998, shall be deposited into the special fund 
     of the Treasury established under section 1931 of title 28, 
     United States Code.

     SEC. 10. SUNSET OF CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION 
                   PLANS.

       Section 103(b)(2)(A) of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
     1990 (Public Law 101-650; 104 Stat. 5096; 28 U.S.C. 471 
     note), as amended by Public Law 105-53 (111 Stat. 1173), is 
     amended by inserting ``471,'' after ``sections''.

     SEC. 11. CREATION OF CERTIFYING OFFICERS IN THE JUDICIAL 
                   BRANCH.

       (a) Appointment of Disbursing and Certifying Officers.--
     Chapter 41 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 613. Disbursing and certifying officers

       ``(a)(1) The Director may designate in writing officers and 
     employees of the judicial branch of the Government, including 
     the courts as defined in section 610 other than the Supreme 
     Court, to be disbursing officers in such numbers and 
     locations as the Director considers necessary.
       ``(2) Disbursing officers shall--
       ``(A) disburse moneys appropriated to the judicial branch 
     and other funds only in strict accordance with payment 
     requests certified by the Director or in accordance with 
     subsection (b);
       ``(B) examine payment requests as necessary to ascertain 
     whether such requests are in proper form, certified, and 
     approved; and
       ``(C) be held accountable for their actions as provided by 
     law, except that such a disbursing officer shall not be held 
     accountable or responsible for any illegal, improper, or 
     incorrect payment resulting from any false, inaccurate, or 
     misleading certificate for which a certifying officer is 
     responsible under subsection (b).
       ``(b)(1)(A) The Director may designate in writing officers 
     and employees of the judicial branch of the Government, 
     including the courts as defined in section 610 other than the 
     Supreme Court, to certify payment requests payable from 
     appropriations and funds.
       ``(B) Certifying officers shall be responsible and 
     accountable for--
       ``(i) the existence and correctness of the facts recited in 
     the certificate or other request for payment or its 
     supporting papers;
       ``(ii) the legality of the proposed payment under the 
     appropriation or fund involved; and
       ``(iii) the correctness of the computations of certified 
     payment requests.
       ``(2) The liability of a certifying officer shall be 
     enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as 
     provided by law with respect to the enforcement of the 
     liability of disbursing and other accountable officers. A 
     certifying officer shall be required to make restitution to 
     the United States for the amount of any illegal, improper, or 
     incorrect payment resulting from any false, inaccurate, or 
     misleading certificates made by the certifying officer, as 
     well as for any payment prohibited by law or which did not 
     represent a legal obligation under the appropriation or fund 
     involved.
       ``(c) A certifying or disbursing officer--
       ``(1) has the right to apply for and obtain a decision by 
     the Comptroller General on any question of law involved in a 
     payment request presented for certification; and
       ``(2) is entitled to relief from liability arising under 
     this section in accordance with title 31.
       ``(d) Nothing in this section affects the authority of the 
     courts with respect to moneys deposited with the courts under 
     chapter 129.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 41 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

``613. Disbursing and certifying officers.''.

       (c) Duties of Director.--Paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of 
     section 604 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(8) Disburse appropriations and other funds for the 
     maintenance and operation of the courts;''.

     SEC. 12. LIMITATION ON COLLATERAL RELIEF.

       (a) In General.--No writ of habeas corpus or other post-
     conviction remedy under section 2241, 2244, 2254, or 2255 of 
     title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of 
     Federal law, shall lie to challenge the custody or sentence 
     of a person on the ground that the custody or sentence of the 
     person is the result in whole or in part of the voluntarily 
     given confession of the person.
       (b) Determinations Regarding Post-Conviction Remedies.--For 
     purposes of subsection (a), in determining whether any post-
     conviction remedy lies under any provision of law described 
     in subsection (a), as well as in determining whether any such 
     remedy should be granted--
       (1) the court shall apply the standards set forth in 
     section 3501(b) of title 18, United States Code; and
       (2) in applying the standards described in paragraph (1) in 
     any case seeking a post-conviction remedy from a State court 
     conviction, the court shall apply the standards set forth in 
     section 2254(d) of title 28, United States Code.
       (c) Definition of Confession.--In this section, the term 
     ``confession'' has the same meaning as in section 3501(e) of 
     title 18, United States Code.
       (d) No Effect on Other Law.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to modify or otherwise affect any requirement 
     under Federal law relating to the obtaining or granting of 
     post-conviction relief.

     SEC. 13. LAURIE SHOW VICTIM PROTECTION.

       Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(j) No Federal court shall specifically bar the retrial 
     in State court of a person filing the writ of habeas 
     corpus.''.

     SEC. 14. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO RETROACTIVE 
                   APPLICATION OF STATUTES.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page S6192]]

     ``Sec. 8. Rules for determining the retroactive effect of 
       legislation

       ``(a) Any Act of Congress enacted after the effective date 
     of this section shall be prospective in application only 
     unless a provision included in the Act expressly specifies 
     otherwise.
       ``(b) In applying this section, a court shall determine the 
     relevant retroactivity event in an Act of Congress (if such 
     event is not specified in such Act) for purposes of 
     determining if the Act--
       ``(1) is prospective in application only; or
       ``(2) affects conduct that occurred before the effective 
     date of the Act.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 7 the 
     following:

``8. Rules for determining retroactive effect of legislation.''.

     SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES FOR PRISON CONDITIONS.

       (a) Transfer and Redesignation.--Section 3626 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is--
       (1) transferred to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
     Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq.);
       (2) redesignated as section 13 of that Act; and
       (3) inserted after section 12 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1997j).
       (b) Amendments.--Section 13 of the Civil Rights of 
     Institutionalized Persons Act, as redesignated by subsection 
     (a) of this section, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(3), by adding at the end the 
     following: ``Noncompliance with an order for prospective 
     relief by any party, including the party seeking termination 
     of that order, shall not constitute grounds for refusal to 
     terminate the prospective relief, if the party's 
     noncompliance does not constitute a current and ongoing 
     violation of a Federal right.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e) through (g) as 
     subsections (f) through (h), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Procedure for Entering Prospective Relief.--
       ``(1) In general.--In any civil action with respect to 
     prison conditions, a court entering an order for prospective 
     relief shall enter written findings specifying--
       ``(A) the Federal right the court finds to have been 
     violated;
       ``(B) the facts establishing that violation;
       ``(C) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who suffered 
     actual injury caused by that violation;
       ``(D) the actions of each defendant that warrant and 
     require the entry of prospective relief against that 
     defendant;
       ``(E) the reasons for which, in the absence of prospective 
     relief, each defendant as to whom the relief is being entered 
     will not take adequate measures to correct the violation of 
     the Federal right;
       ``(F) the reasons for which no more narrowly drawn or less 
     intrusive prospective relief would correct the current and 
     ongoing violation of the Federal right; and
       ``(G) the estimated impact of the prospective relief on 
     public safety and the operation of any affected criminal 
     justice system.
       ``(2) Conflict with state law.--If the prospective relief 
     ordered in any civil action with respect to prison conditions 
     requires or permits a government official to exceed his or 
     her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates 
     State law, the court shall, in addition to the findings 
     required under paragraph (1), enter findings regarding the 
     reasons for which--
       ``(A) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in 
     violation of State or local law;
       ``(B) the specific relief is necessary to correct the 
     violation of a Federal right; and
       ``(C) no other relief will correct the violation of the 
     Federal right.'';
       (4) in subsection (f), as redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (3), in the first sentence, by inserting 
     before the period at the end of the sentence the following: 
     ``, including that the case requires the determination of 
     complex or novel questions of law, or that the court plans to 
     order or has ordered a hearing under paragraph (5)(E) or 
     discovery under paragraph (5)(F)''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) Termination of prospective relief.--
       ``(A) Contents of answer to motion to terminate.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the answer to the motion to terminate 
     prospective relief, the plaintiff may oppose termination in 
     accordance with this subparagraph, on the ground that the 
     prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and 
     ongoing violation of a Federal right.
       ``(ii) Relief entered before enactment of prison litigation 
     reform act.--If the prospective relief sought to be 
     terminated was entered before the date of enactment of the 
     Prison Litigation Reform Act, the answer opposing termination 
     under clause (i) shall allege--

       ``(I) the specific Federal right alleged to be the object 
     of a current violation;
       ``(II) specific facts that, if true, would establish that 
     current violation;
       ``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are 
     currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation; 
       ``(IV) the actions of each named defendant that constitute 
     that violation of the particular plaintiff's or plaintiffs' 
     right;
       ``(V)(aa) the portion of the complaint or amended complaint 
     filed prior to the original entry of the prospective relief 
     sought to be retained that alleged the violation of that 
     Federal right;
       ``(bb) the portion of the court order originally ordering 
     the prospective relief that found the violation of that 
     Federal right; or
       ``(cc) both the materials specified in items (aa) and (bb), 
     if the violation of right was both alleged and established;
       ``(VI) the manner in which the current and ongoing 
     violation can be remedied by maintaining the existing 
     prospective relief; and
       ``(VII) the reasons for which, in the absence of 
     prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief 
     would be maintained would not take adequate measures to 
     correct the violation of the Federal right.

       ``(iii) Relief entered after enactment of prison litigation 
     reform act.--If the prospective relief was entered after the 
     date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the 
     answer opposing termination under clause (i) shall allege--

       ``(I) the specific Federal right alleged to be the object 
     of a current violation;
       ``(II) specific facts that, if true, would establish that 
     current violation;
       ``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are 
     currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation;
       ``(IV) the current actions of each named defendant that 
     constitute that violation of the particular plaintiff's or 
     plaintiffs' right;
       ``(V) the findings required by subsection (e) made by the 
     court at the time of the original entry of the prospective 
     relief that established that the right had been violated and 
     that the prospective relief was necessary to correct the 
     violation;
       ``(VI) the manner in which the current and ongoing 
     violation can be remedied by maintaining the existing 
     prospective relief; and
       ``(VII) the reasons for which, in the absence of 
     prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief 
     would be maintained would not take adequate measures to 
     correct the violation of the Federal right.

       ``(iv) The answer shall be accompanied by affidavits, 
     references to the record, and any other materials on which 
     the plaintiff relies to support the allegations required to 
     be contained in the answer under clause (ii) or (iii).
       ``(B) Contents of response to answer.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the defendant disputes plaintiff's 
     factual allegations, defendant shall file a response to the 
     answer setting forth the factual allegations the defendant 
     challenges.
       ``(ii) Additional requirements.--In any case where the 
     defendant seeks termination of the relief on the ground that 
     it is not narrowly tailored, overly intrusive, or poses too 
     great a burden on public safety or the operation of a 
     criminal justice system, or that it requires the defendant to 
     violate State or local law without meeting the requirements 
     of subsection (a)(1)(B)--

       ``(I) the defendant shall set forth the factual basis for 
     these claims in its response; and
       ``(II) the defendant shall also set forth alternative 
     relief that would correct the violation of the Federal right 
     and that is more narrowly tailored, less intrusive, less 
     burdensome to public safety or the operation of the affected 
     criminal justice system, or does not require a violation of 
     State or local law.

       ``(iii) Supporting documentation.--The defendant's response 
     shall be accompanied by affidavits, references to the record, 
     and any other materials on which the defendant relies to 
     support its challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations 
     or the factual basis for its claims regarding the propriety 
     or scope of the relief.
       ``(C) Burden of persuasion.--The plaintiff shall have the 
     burden of persuasion with respect to each point required to 
     be contained in the answer. The defendant shall have the 
     burden of persuasion with respect to whether the relief 
     extends further than necessary to correct the violation of 
     the Federal right, is not narrowly drawn nor the least 
     intrusive means to correct the violation of the Federal 
     right, excessively burdens public safety or the operation of 
     a prison system, or requires the defendant to violate State 
     or local law without meeting the requirements of subsection 
     (a)(1)(B).
       ``(D) Summary determination.--The court shall grant the 
     motion to terminate if the plaintiff's answer fails to 
     satisfy the requirements of subparagraph (A) or if the 
     materials accompanying the plaintiff's answer together with 
     the materials accompanying the defendant's response fail to 
     carry the plaintiff's burden of persuasion or fail to create 
     a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the relief 
     should be maintained.
       ``(E) Evidentiary hearing.--If the court determines that 
     there is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes it 
     from making a summary determination concerning the motion on 
     the basis of the materials filed by the parties, the court 
     may conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve any 
     disputed material facts identified by the court.
       ``(F) Discovery.--If the court determines that the 
     plaintiff's answer meets the requirements of paragraph 
     (5)(A), that there are genuine issues of material fact that 
     preclude it from making a summary determination concerning 
     the motion based on the material filed by the parties, and 
     that discovery would assist in resolving these issues, the 
     court may permit limited, narrowly tailored, and expeditious 
     discovery relating to the disputed material facts identified 
     by the court.
       ``(G) Findings.--

[[Page S6193]]

       ``(i) In general.--If the court denies the motion to 
     terminate prospective relief, the court shall enter written 
     findings specifying--

       ``(I) the Federal right the court finds to be currently 
     violated;
       ``(II) the facts establishing that the violation is 
     continuing to occur;
       ``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are 
     currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation;
       ``(IV) the actions of each defendant that warrant and 
     require the continuation of the prospective relief against 
     that defendant;
       ``(V) the reasons for which, in the absence of continued 
     prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief is 
     continued will not take adequate measures to correct the 
     violation of the Federal right;
       ``(VI) the reasons for which no more narrowly drawn on less 
     intrusive prospective relief would correct the current and 
     ongoing violation of the Federal right;
       ``(VII) the impact of the prospective relief on public 
     safety and the operation of any affected criminal justice 
     system; and
       ``(VIII) if the prospective relief requires the defendant 
     to violate State or local law, the reasons for which--

       ``(aa) Federal law requires the continuation of relief that 
     violates State or local law;
       ``(bb) the specific relief is necessary to correct the 
     violation of a Federal right; and
       ``(cc) no other relief will correct the violation of the 
     Federal right.
       ``(ii) Requirements for motions ordered before enactment of 
     prison litigation reform act.--In the case of a motion to 
     terminate prospective relief entered before the date of 
     enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in addition to 
     the requirements of clause (i), the court's written findings 
     shall also specify--

       ``(I)(aa) the portion of the complaint or amended complaint 
     that previously alleged that violation of Federal right;
       ``(bb) the findings the court made at the time it 
     originally entered the prospective relief concerning that 
     violation of Federal right; or
       ``(cc) both the findings specified in items (aa) and (bb), 
     if the violation was originally both alleged and established; 
     and
       ``(II) the prospective relief previously ordered to remedy 
     that violation.

       ``(iii) Requirements for motions ordered after enactment of 
     prison litigation reform act.--In the case of a motion to 
     terminate prospective relief originally ordered after the 
     date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in 
     addition to the requirements of clause (i), the court shall 
     also enter written findings specifying--

       ``(I) the findings required by subsection (e) made by the 
     court at the time the relief was originally entered 
     establishing that violation of Federal right; and
       ``(II) the prospective relief previously ordered to remedy 
     that violation.'';

       (5) in subsection (g), as redesignated--
       (A) by striking the subsection designation and heading and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(g) Special Masters for Civil Actions With Respect to 
     Prison Conditions.--'';
       (B) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``under this 
     subsection'';
       (C) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``institution''; and
       (ii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) Applicability.--
       ``(i) In general.--This paragraph shall not apply to any 
     special master appointed before the date of enactment of the 
     Prison Litigation Reform Act, unless their original 
     appointment expires on or after that date of enactment.
       ``(ii) Special masters covered.--This paragraph applies to 
     all special masters appointed or reappointed after the date 
     of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, regardless 
     of the cause of the expiration of any initial appointment.'';
       (D) in paragraph (3), by striking ``under this 
     subsection'';
       (E) in paragraph (4)--
       (i) by striking ``under this section'';
       (ii) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
       (iii) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by adding at 
     the end the following: ``In no event shall a court require a 
     party to pay the compensation, expenses, or costs of the 
     special master. Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
     (including section 306 of the Act entitled `An Act making 
     appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and 
     State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal 
     year ending September 30, 1997,' contained in section 101(a) 
     of title I of division A of the Act entitled `An Act making 
     omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year 
     ending September 30, 1997' (110 Stat. 3009201)) and except as 
     provided in subparagraph (B), the requirement under the 
     preceding sentence shall apply to the compensation and 
     payment of expenses or costs of a special master for any 
     action that is commenced before, on, or after the date of 
     enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.''; and
       (iv) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) The payment requirements under subparagraph (A) shall 
     not apply to the payment of a special master who was 
     appointed before the date of enactment of the Prison 
     Litigation Reform Act (110 Stat. 1321165 et seq.) of 
     compensation, expenses, or costs relating to activities of 
     the special master under this subsection that were carried 
     out during the period beginning on the date of enactment of 
     the Prison Litigation Reform Act and ending on the date of 
     enactment of this subparagraph.'';
       (F) in paragraph (5), by striking from ``In any civil 
     action'' and all that follows through ``subsection, the'' and 
     inserting ``The''; and
       (G) in paragraph (6)--
       (i) by striking ``appointed under this subsection'';
       (ii) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) may be authorized by a court to conduct hearings on 
     the record, and shall make any findings based on the record 
     as a whole;'';
       (iii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``communications;'' 
     and inserting ``engage in any communications ex parte; and''; 
     and
       (iv) by striking subparagraph (C) and redesignating 
     subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (C); and
       (6) in subsection (h), as redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``settlements'' and 
     inserting ``settlement agreements'';
       (B) in paragraph (3)--
       (i) by inserting ``Federal, State, local, or other'' before 
     ``facility'';
       (ii) by striking ``violations'' and inserting ``a 
     violation'';
       (iii) by striking ``terms and conditions'' and inserting 
     ``terms or conditions''; and
       (iv) by inserting ``or other post-conviction conditional or 
     supervised release,'' after ``probation,'';
       (C) in paragraph (5), by striking ``or local facility'' and 
     inserting ``local, or other facility'';
       (D) in paragraph (8) by striking ``inherent'';
       (E) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (F) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(10) the term `violation of a Federal right'--
       ``(A) means a violation of a Federal constitutional or 
     Federal statutory right;
       ``(B) does not include a violation of a court order that is 
     not independently a violation of a Federal statutory or 
     Federal constitutional right; and
       ``(C) shall not be interpreted to expand the authority of 
     any individual or class to enforce the legal rights that 
     individual or class may have pursuant to existing law with 
     regard to institutionalized persons, or to expand the 
     authority of the United States to enforce those rights on 
     behalf of any individual or class.''; and
       (G) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs 
     (9) and (8), respectively, and inserting paragraph (9), as 
     redesignated, after paragraph (8), as redesignated.
       (c) Technical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter C of chapter 229 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 3626.

     SEC. 16. LIMITATION ON FEES.

       Section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)--
       (A) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in--
       ``(i) proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's 
     Federal rights that resulted in an order for relief;
       ``(ii) successfully obtaining contempt sanctions for a 
     violation of previously ordered prospective relief that meets 
     the standards set forth in section 13, if the plaintiff made 
     a good faith effort to resolve the matter without court 
     action; or
       ``(iii) successfully obtaining court ordered enforcement of 
     previously ordered prospective relief that meets the 
     standards set forth in section 13, if the enforcement order 
     was necessary to prevent an imminent risk of serious bodily 
     injury to the plaintiff and the plaintiff made a good faith 
     attempt to resolve the matter without court action; and
       ``(B) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to 
     the court ordered relief for the violation.'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the last sentence and 
     inserting ``If a monetary judgment is the sole or principal 
     relief awarded, the award of attorney's fees shall not exceed 
     100 percent of the judgment.'';
       (C) in paragraph (3)--
       (i) by striking ``greater than 150 percent'' and inserting 
     ``greater than the lesser of--
       ``(A) 100 percent''; and
       (ii) by striking ``counsel.'' and inserting ``counsel; or
       ``(B) a rate of $100 per hour.''; and
       (D) in paragraph (4), by striking ``prisoner'' and 
     inserting ``plaintiff'';
       (2) in subsection (e), by striking ``Federal civil action'' 
     and inserting ``civil action arising under Federal law'' and 
     by striking ``prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 
     correctional facility'' and inserting ``prisoner who is or 
     has been confined in any prison'';
       (3) in subsection (f)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``action brought with 
     respect to prison conditions'' and inserting ``civil action 
     with respect to prison conditions brought'' and by striking 
     ``jail, prison, or other correctional facility'' and 
     inserting ``prison''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``facility'' and 
     inserting ``prison''; and
       (4) by striking subsections (g) and (h) and inserting the 
     following:

[[Page S6194]]

       ``(g) Waiver of Response.--Any defendant may waive the 
     right to respond to any complaint in any civil action arising 
     under Federal law brought by a prisoner. Notwithstanding any 
     other law or rule of procedure, such waiver shall not 
     constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the 
     complaint or waive any affirmative defense available to the 
     defendant. No relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless 
     a response has been filed. The court may direct any defendant 
     to file a response to the cognizable claims identified by the 
     court. The court shall specify as to each named defendant the 
     applicable cognizable claims.
       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `civil 
     action with respect to prison conditions', `prison', and 
     `prisoner' have the meanings given the terms in section 
     13(h).''.

     SEC. 17. NOTICE OF MALICIOUS FILINGS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 123 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 1915A(c)--
       (A) by striking ``(c) Definition.--As used in this 
     section'' and inserting the following:

     ``Sec. 1915C. Definition

       ``In sections 1915A and 1915B'';
       (B) by inserting ``Federal, State, local, or other'' before 
     ``facility'';
       (C) by striking ``violations'' and inserting ``a 
     violation'';
       (D) by striking ``terms and conditions'' and inserting 
     ``terms or conditions''; and
       (E) by inserting ``or other post-conviction conditional or 
     supervised release,'' after ``probation,''; and
       (2) by inserting after section 1915A the following:

     ``Sec. 1915B. Notice to State authorities of finding of 
       malicious filing by a prisoner

       ``(a) Finding.--In any civil action brought in Federal 
     court by a prisoner (other than a prisoner confined in a 
     Federal correctional facility), the court may, on its own 
     motion or the motion of any adverse party, make a finding 
     whether--
       ``(1) the claim was filed for a malicious purpose;
       ``(2) the claim was filed to harass the party against which 
     it was filed; or
       ``(3) the claimant testified falsely or otherwise knowingly 
     presented false allegations, pleadings, evidence, or 
     information to the court.
       ``(b) Transmission of Finding.--The court shall transmit to 
     the State Department of Corrections or other appropriate 
     authority any affirmative finding under subsection (a). If 
     the court makes such a finding, the Department of Corrections 
     or other appropriate authority may, pursuant to State or 
     local law--
       ``(1) revoke such amount of good time credit or the 
     institutional equivalent accrued to the prisoner as is deemed 
     appropriate; or
       ``(2) consider such finding in determining whether the 
     prisoner should be released from prison under any other State 
     or local program governing the release of prisoners, 
     including parole, probation, other post-conviction or 
     supervised release, or diversionary program.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 123 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1915A 
     the following:

``1915B. Notice to State authorities of finding of malicious filing by 
              prisoner.
``1915C. Definition.''.

     SEC. 18. LIMITATION ON PRISONER RELEASE ORDERS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Amendment to title 28.--Chapter 99 of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders

       ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 13 of the Civil 
     Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act or any other 
     provision of law, in a civil action with respect to prison 
     conditions, no court of the United States or other court 
     defined under section 610 shall have jurisdiction to enter or 
     carry out any prisoner release order that would result in the 
     release from or nonadmission to a prison, on the basis of 
     prison conditions, of any person subject to incarceration, 
     detention, or admission to a facility because of--
       ``(1) a conviction of a felony under the laws of the 
     relevant jurisdiction; or
       ``(2) a violation of the terms or conditions of parole, 
     probation, pretrial release, or a diversionary program, 
     relating to the commission of a felony under the laws of the 
     relevant jurisdiction.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the terms `civil action with respect to prison 
     conditions', `prisoner', `prisoner release order', and 
     `prison' have the meanings given those terms in section 13(h) 
     of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act; and
       ``(2) the term `prison conditions' means conditions of 
     confinement or the effects of actions by government officials 
     on the lives of persons confined in prison.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 99 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

``1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders.''.

       (b) Amendment to Title 18.--Section 3624(b) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking the fifth sentence and 
     inserting the following: ``Credit that has not been earned 
     may not later be granted, and credit that has been revoked 
     pursuant to section 3624A may not later be reinstated.''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting before the period at the 
     end the following: ``, and may be revoked by the Bureau of 
     Prisons for noncompliance with institutional disciplinary 
     regulations at any time before vesting''.

     SEC. 19. REPEAL OF SECTION 140.

       Section 140 of the joint resolution entitled ``A Joint 
     Resolution making further continuing appropriations for the 
     fiscal year 1982, and for other purposes'', approved December 
     15, 1981 (Public Law 97-92; 95 Stat. 1200; 28 U.S.C. 461 
     note) is repealed.

     SEC. 20. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this 
     Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any 
     person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the 
     remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and 
     the application of the provisions of such to any person or 
     circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Hatch in 
introducing the Judicial Improvement Act of 1998. Many of the 
provisions of this bill stem from a series of hearings I held in the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights last 
summer addressing the problem of judicial activism. The hearings 
focused on the problem of judicial activism and its impact. The 
Subcommittee heard testimony from a variety of individuals, from 
constitutional scholars to victims of activist judicial orders. The 
final hearing of the series focused on potential solutions to the 
problem of activism.
  That final hearing canvassed potential solutions ranging from 
proposed constitutional amendments, to increased public education 
efforts about the problem of judicial activism, to proposed statutory 
solutions. The hearings convinced me that, at a minimum, we needed to 
provide some procedural mechanisms to make it more difficult for any 
single judge to issue an activist order and to make it easier for 
litigants to force the reconsideration of activist orders.
  Since the close of the hearings, I have been working with others on 
the Judiciary Committee to fashion legislation that would accomplish 
these goals. Last fall, I circulated draft language concerning the 
three legislative proposals that remain my top priorities in this 
area--requiring a three-judge panel before a federal court can strike 
down a state initiative or an act of Congress as unconstitutional, 
expanding provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to cover other 
local and state institutions, and codifying a flat prohibition on 
federal court orders directly increasing taxes. With the help of 
Chairman Hatch, Senator Abraham and others on the Committee, we have 
added many additional provisions and drafted a comprehensive bill aimed 
at improving the federal judiciary. Although I would not have included 
every provision in the bill had I introduced my own bill, the bill 
reflects the collective work of the Committee and would substantially 
improve the workings of the federal judiciary.
  Let me take a few moments to discuss the provisions that are critical 
to addressing the problem of judicial activism. First and foremost, the 
bill addresses the problem of having a single federal judge strike down 
a state referendum as unconstitutional. Nothing highlights the 
undemocratic power of a federal judge more strikingly than when a 
single unelected federal judge invalidates a law passed by the general 
public through the initiative process. Even the Ninth Circuit, the 
epicenter of judicial activism in America, has acknowledged the strain 
that a single judge's nullification of an initiative places on our 
political system. As the court recently noted in an opinion reversing 
such a single-judge nullification: ``A system which permits one judge 
to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted 
to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional democracy.'' 
The Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th 
Cir.), (cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
  The three-judge panel ameliorates this problem by requiring that a 
three-judge panel be convened, and a majority of the panel agree, 
before a state initiative can be enjoined. The provision then addresses 
the problem of the popular will being preliminarily enjoined for long 
periods of time before a final appealable decision is issued by 
providing for an expedited review of the injunction.
  The three-judge panel provision recognizes that there may be 
situations in

[[Page S6195]]

which state initiatives run afoul of the Constitution and courts may 
need to declare them unconstitutional. But the bill also recognized 
that when a federal court takes such an action, it can cause 
considerable frustration and friction. The bill attempts to minimize 
such friction by ensuring that a federal court complies with a number 
of safeguards before taking such a drastic action.
  A second key provision in the bill extends some of the protections 
included in the Prison Litigation Reform Act to other state and local 
government institutions. During the hearings, I heard over and over 
about the frustration of state and local officials who are saddled with 
consent decrees entered into decades ago that allow unelected federal 
judges--rather than elected local officials--to run local institutions. 
The bill addresses this problem by requiring the periodic 
reconsideration of such consent decrees or structural injunctions to 
ensure that they remain necessary to remedy a constitutional violation. 
Once again, the bill recognizes that our federal Constitution and 
federal system of government may require federal courts to issue 
injunctions covering state and local institutions, but also 
acknowledges that such sweeping injunctions create friction with local 
officials. The best way to limit such friction is to provide a 
mechanism to ensure that the injunctions remain necessary to remedy a 
constitutional violation. This bill does that.
  Another key provision of particular importance to my constituents 
back in Missouri is the flat prohibition on federal court orders 
directly raising or imposing taxes. The people of Kansas City have 
suffered through the activism of federal District Judge Russell Clark, 
including his order directly ordering local authorities to increase 
taxes. This provision directly attacks such judicial tyranny. 
Importantly, however, the bill leave the federal court's power to order 
remedies that may lead a local or state government to raise taxes. But 
the ultimate decision of whether to raise taxes, raise revenue through 
other means or cut spending remains that the local authorities.
  A final point should be made about all three of these provisions: 
they apply only to federal courts. The procedures and remedial 
authority of state courts remain unaffected. During the Subcommittee 
hearings a number of people offered suggestions to make the federal 
courts more directly responsive to the people. In attempting to improve 
the federal courts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that under our 
federal system we have both federal courts and state courts of general 
jurisdiction which are fully capable of hearing federal claims. State 
courts, moreover, are much more responsible to the people--in the 
majority of States they are subject to direct elections or retention 
elections.
  This bill recognizes the comparative advantages of these two court 
systems and tries to limit the availability of those remedies that are 
the most intrusive in the courts that are least responsible to the 
people. If people are really convinced that courts must levy taxes and 
run state and local institutions in perpetuity (and I, for one, am not 
convinced such measures are every necessary), then at least the courts 
that do so should be relatively responsive state courts, rather than 
unelected, life-tenured federal judges.
  Before I close, let me mention a few other provisions of the bill 
that are of particular importance to me. First, the bill contains a 
provision that makes it clear that the same standards for judging the 
admissibility of confessions that Congress created for federal criminal 
trials should also apply when federal courts engage in collateral 
review of state and federal convictions. This provision reinforces that 
the touchstone for admissibility should be the voluntariness of the 
confession and that a technical violation should not free a convicted 
prisoner on collateral review.
  Second, the bill includes a provision similar to one in legislation 
introduced by Senator Specter, which I have co-sponsored, which 
prevents a federal court from barring local authorities for ordering a 
retrial of a convicted authority. The traditional remedy in a habeas 
proceeding is release from custody. Taking the further step of barring 
retrial goes beyond the traditional office of the writ and is an 
affront to state courts and prosecutors.
  Finally, the bill appropriately limits the practice of releasing 
prisoners early as a judicial remedy. Perhaps, the most poignant 
testimony in the Subcommittee hearings concerned family whose son, 
Danny Boyle, was killed by an arrested felon, who but for a prison 
release order would have been behind bars. Danny was a promising young 
police officer whose life and career were cut short--a victim of 
judicial activism. I am committed to working to ensure that another 
family does not have to come before a future Subcommittee hearing with 
similar testimony about a son or daughter.
  I want to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Abraham for working with 
me to get these provisions included in the bill. I look forward to 
working with them to ensure that this bill moves forward and that we 
take these modest steps to improve the federal judiciary.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of 
the Judicial Improvement Act. This legislation contains various 
important reforms of the judicial branch that will help keep the powers 
of the courts in check with the other branches of government and with 
the will of the people.
  This comprehensive bill contains provisions that are important to 
many senators, and I am especially pleased that two bills that I have 
introduced and advocated for years are included in this reform package. 
One would prohibit judges from imposing tax increases, and the other 
would clarify the retroactive application of legislation.
  This Act states that a Federal judge does not have the authority to 
order the Federal government or units of state or local governments to 
raise taxes as a legal remedy. In 1990, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the 
Supreme Court permitted a district court judge to order local 
authorities to impose a huge tax increase to pay for his plan to 
desegregate a school district.
  One may wonder why a desegregation plan would be so expensive as to 
warrant a massive tax increase. The reason is this plan was not simply 
an attempt to bring schools up to basic standards. Rather, it was an 
elaborate social experiment in the name of education. Money was no 
object. Among other mandates, the plan called for 15 computers in every 
classroom, a 2,000 square-foot planetarium, a 25-acre farm, a model 
United Nations, an art gallery, movie editing and screening rooms, and 
swimming pools.
  Money was no object because there was no control over the judge. 
There was no accountability. The only supervision was a higher court, 
and a slim majority of the Supreme Court gave the judge a free reign.
  The dissent in that case clearly explained what should have been 
obvious: it violates the Constitutional separation of powers for a 
judge to order that taxes be increased. In the Constitution, Article I 
contains the legislative powers. Article I, Section 8 begins by 
stating, ``The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect 
taxes.'' Article III provides for judicial power, and makes no mention 
of the power to tax. Therefore, a Federal judge does not have the power 
to tax under the Constitution.
  This is more than a matter of proper Constitutional interpretation. 
It is an essential check on power. The ability to tax is an awesome 
power. It is true that, as Justice John Marshall once wrote, ``the 
power to tax involves the power to destroy.'' This authority must be 
carefully checked, and the best source of control is the people. Thus, 
in the Constitution, the ability to tax was given to the legislative 
branch, which is directly accountable to the people through the ballot 
box.
  By design, the Judicial Branch is different. It is not responsible to 
the people. The Framers intentionally did not provide for judges to be 
elected by the people and even gave judges life tenure. They wanted 
judges to be insulated from the political climate and have the freedom 
to interpret the law appropriately, rather than make decisions based on 
the will of the majority at any given moment. It is entirely reasonable 
and appropriate that judicial power does not include the power to 
tax. As Justice Kennedy stated in his thoughtful dissent in Missouri v. 
Jenkins, the Supreme Court's ``casual embrace of taxation imposed by 
the unelected life-tenured Federal Judiciary disregards fundamental 
precepts

[[Page S6196]]

for the democratic control of public institutions.''

  The Framers of the Constitution fully intended to separate power in 
this manner and did not mean for judges to be involved in taxation. As 
Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist No. 78, ``The judiciary . . 
. has no influence over either the sword or the purse.'' In my view, 
judicial taxation is simply taxation without representation, no 
different from the complaints of the American colonists about taxation 
without representation during the days of the Stamp Act in 1765.
  Mr. President, if a judge can order a tax increase for a school, why 
not a similar social experiment for a prison? It is hard to imagine any 
limits on a Federal judge's power as expressed in Missouri v. Jenkins. 
I believe it is imperative that the Congress act to control the power 
of the judicial branch in this regard.
  Another provision of the bill that I have long advocated would 
clarify the retroactivity of legislation. Often the Congress will pass 
legislation but not state whether that legislation should be applied 
retroactively to conduct that occurred before the law was passed. An 
excellent example is the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It took years of 
litigation with decisions in over one hundred Federal courts throughout 
the country before the Supreme Court finally decided the question.
  The provision simply states that legislation is not retroactive 
unless the bill expressly says it is. This simple rule will eliminate a 
great deal of uncertainty. As a result, it will reduce litigation costs 
and help our judicial system better focus to reserve its limited 
resources.
  This clarification should not be controversial. The Judicial 
Conference of the Federal courts indicated in a report in 1995 that it 
did not oppose this legislative fix, and the Clinton Justice Department 
stated in a letter to me in 1996 that it did not object to this 
clarification. I hope both of these provisions are passed this year.
  The Judicial Improvement Act contains many other needed reforms that 
I will not attempt to detail, such as a requirement for a three-judge 
panel to enjoin the enforcement of certain laws. I hope my colleagues 
will join me in supporting the judicial reforms contained in this 
important legislation.
  I yield the floor.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. HUTCHISON:
  S. 2164. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to promote 
rail competition, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation.


                       the stb amendments of 1998

 Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, today I am introducing the 
Surface Transportation Board Amendments of 1998. This legislation 
proposes to expand the Surface Transportation Board's existing 
authority to address circumstances affecting rail service 
transportation in today's environment.
  First, I think most colleagues would agree that the STB has performed 
well since its inception in 1996. The industries it regulates have 
experienced a number of significant changes in the past few years. The 
STB has acted consistently with the authority Congress gave it, and 
clearly within the deregulatory intent with which it was created.
  This year's reauthorization gives us the first chance since we 
created the Board to review its practices and performance. My bill is 
based upon the principle that Congress sets government policy and the 
Executive Branch, through regulators such as the STB, executes that 
policy. During hearings in my Surface Transportation and Merchant 
Marine Subcommittee, I have consistently sought to identify the limits 
of STB authority to act in certain circumstances, and to identify those 
areas beyond which STB action would require a policy decision by 
Congress.
  It is very important that we pass a re-authorization bill this year. 
Doing that will require that we establish the middle ground between 
those who want to roll back the clock and begin to re-regulate the 
industry and those who think the board needs no additional authority to 
adequately address the many issues before it.
  I believe my bill does just that. However, I stand ready to work with 
my colleagues to further refine my proposals to move this bill through 
the legislative process. I welcome input from any interested members.
  My own personal view is that re-regulation is not called for. The 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 has had very positive results for both 
industry and shippers. But we must ensure the board has sufficient 
tools to ensure that deregulation has its intended effect of greater 
competition and better value to the consumer. The experiences of the 
past few years, and this year in particular, give us much to consider.
  Mr. President, our country has endured a critical rail service crisis 
for many, many months. My home State of Texas has felt this crisis as 
much as any other State, and more than most. Texas has sustained 
billions of dollars of economic losses as the goods bound to and from 
the State's ports, factories and refineries sit gridlocked on the 
rails. These service problems primarily have occurred in the West, but 
there has been a ripple effect throughout the entire rail system. 
Service problems continue today, and I know the railroads have been 
working night and day to alleviate service troubles.

  Mr. President, I will explain my bill at greater length in a moment, 
but I want to stress that I have worked to craft a bill that maintains 
the basic de-regulatory rules that the rail industry and shippers have 
played by since the 1980s. However, it is the shippers today who face a 
most challenging rail shipping environment.
  Therefore, I am proposing we take action to ensure that the Board's 
procedures are more readily accessible to small shippers. I also am 
proposing to expand the Board's authority with regard to maintaining 
and promoting rail competition in appropriate circumstances. And, I 
believe strongly that we can do this without jeopardizing the integrity 
of deregulation.
  The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has been 
working for many months on issues surrounding the rail service 
transportation. In that effort, the reauthorization of the Surface 
Transportation Board is a priority of our Committee.
  To date we have held four rail service hearings during this 
Congress--three field hearings along with a Subcommittee hearing on the 
Board's reauthorization. In addition, at Senator McCain's and my 
request, the STB held 2 days of hearings in April to address rail 
access and competition issues at which more than 60 witnesses 
testified.
  In response to the information gathered during these many hearings 
both by our Committee and the Board, today I am proposing legislation 
to address a number of areas which I believe warrant serious attention 
and in some cases, reform. I expect some will have a strong reaction to 
my proposals, as some in the rail industry have tended to tar any 
legislative proposals affecting their industry as ``re-regulation.'' At 
the same time, I suspect some shipper groups will report that these 
proposals do not go nearly as far as they believe we should go. If so, 
that sounds like we're at least within striking distance of the middle 
ground.
  I want to briefly explain the major provisions of this legislation:
  First, the bill establishes that promoting competition within the 
rail industry is one of the criteria the STB should use in performing 
its responsibilities.
  Second, the bill would extend the time period covering the Board's 
emergency service orders. The current 270-day emergency order authority 
would be extended to cover a total period of 18 months. In the event an 
emergency remains in effect beyond this time frame, the Board would be 
permitted to request and receive two 6-month extensions of an emergency 
service order. The Congress could disapprove the Board's requests and 
also take affirmative action to grant any further extensions as may be 
necessary.

  Third, the bill includes several features to simplify the regulatory 
process involving small rate cases. During every hearing before our 
Committee, shippers stressed their frustrations that for a small 
shipper, it is simply too time consuming and costly to ever bring a 
case to the Board. This bill seeks to acknowledge those concerns and 
proposes to foreclose discovery in small rate cases, absent a 
demonstration of compelling need. Further, it would direct the Board to 
establish an arbitration mechanism for small shipper cases. It would 
not require mandatory arbitration, but would allow for arbitration at 
one party's request.

[[Page S6197]]

  Fourth, my bill seeks to address concerns raised about the Board's 
market dominance standard. Some have advocated Congress statutorily 
eliminate product and geographic competition from the Board's market 
dominance analysis as it is a very time consuming process. Yet others 
contend these considerations remain necessary. My bill recognizes the 
Board's April 17th decision announcing it would initiate a proceeding 
to consider whether to maintain, change, or eliminate product and 
geographic competition from consideration in rate cases. I believe the 
Board's action is the proper route to follow.
  Fifth, my bill seeks to address another area of concern raised by 
shippers: revenue adequacy. At the Board's April hearings, rail and 
shipper representatives suggested referring this matter of considerable 
debate to one or more disinterested economists, which the Board 
initiated April 17th. My bill directs the Board to carry out its 
proposal in this area and direct rail and shipper representatives to 
select a panel of 3 disinterested economists to examine the Board's 
current standards for measuring revenue adequacy and to consider 
whether alternative measurements of a railroad's financial health are 
warranted.
  Sixth, my bill seeks to address the issue of bottleneck rates. There 
is considerable debate as to the correct approach in this area, with 
some strongly opposed to any change and others equally adamant about 
total reform. My proposal seeks to take a balanced approach, ensuring 
some needed boundaries remain. It would require a carrier to provide a 
shipper with a rate for a ``bottleneck'' line segment when requested to 
accommodate a transportation contract. The railroad would be required 
to provide the shipper with a rate over the ``bottleneck'' line segment 
as long as the interchange would be operationally feasible and the 
through route would not significantly impair the railroad's ability to 
serve its other shippers.
  Finally, my bill would remove the 3-year renewal requirement 
regarding antitrust immunity applicable to household goods carriers. 
While the continued propriety of collective actions by other types of 
motor carriers has been the subject of debate, no similar concerns have 
been voiced about the collective activities of household goods 
carriers. The repeal of the mandatory review requirement would relieve 
the carriers of an unnecessary regulatory burden, although it would 
have no effect on the STB's existing authority to modify or revoke 
collective actions when the STB determines such action is necessary to 
protect the public interest.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a copy of my bill be printed 
in the Record. I encourage my colleagues to look at this legislation 
and begin working with me now so that we may reauthorize the Surface 
Transportation Board this year and provide important policy guidance in 
regard to rail service matters.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2164

        Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
     of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Surface Transportation Board 
     Amendments of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. PROMOTION OF COMPETITION WITHIN THE RAIL INDUSTRY.

       Section 10101 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
     by--
       (1) redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as paragraphs 
     (2) through (8);
       (2) inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the 
     following:
       ``(1) to encourage and promote effective competition within 
     the rail industry;'';
       (3) redesignating paragraphs (9) through (16) as paragraphs 
     (10) through (17); and
       (4) inserting before paragraph (10), as redesignated, the 
     following:
       ``(9) to discourage artificial barriers to interchange and 
     car supply which can impede competition between shortline, 
     regional, and Class I carriers and block effective rail 
     service to shippers.

     SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF TIME LIMIT ON EMERGENCY SERVICE ORDERS.

       Section 11123 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
     by--
       (1) striking ``30'' in subsection (a) and inserting ``60'';
       (2) striking ``30'' in subsection (c)(1) and inserting 
     ``60'';
       (3) striking the second sentence of subsection (c)(1) and 
     inserting the following: ``An action taken by the Board under 
     subsection (a) of this section may not remain in effect 
     longer than 18 months (including the initial 60-day period), 
     unless the Board requests an extension under paragraph 
     (4).''; and
       (4) adding at the end of subsection (c) the following:
       ``(4) The Board may request up to 2 extensions, of not more 
     than 6 months each, of the 18-month period under subsection 
     (a) by submitting to the Congress a request in writing for 
     such an extension, together with an explanation of the 
     reasons for the request. Such a requested extension goes into 
     effect unless disapproved by the Congress by concurrent 
     resolution. Any other extension requested by the Board will 
     not go into effect unless the Congress approve it under the 
     procedure established by section 4 of the Surface 
     Transportation Amendments of 1998.''.

     SEC. 4. APPROVAL PROCEDURE.

       (a) In General.--Within 90 days (not counting any day on 
     which either House is not in session) after a request for a 
     third or subsequent extension is submitted to the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate by the Surface Transportation 
     Board under section 11123(c)(4) of title 49, United States 
     Code, an approval resolution shall be introduced in the House 
     by the Majority Leader of the House, for himself and the 
     Minority Leader of the House, or by Members of the House 
     designated by the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the 
     House; and shall be introduced in the Senate by the Majority 
     Leader of the Senate, for himself and the Minority Leader of 
     the Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the 
     Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate. The 
     approval resolution shall be held at the desk at the request 
     of the Presiding Officers of the respective Houses.
       (b) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--
       (1) Consideration of approval resolution.--After an 
     approval resolution is introduced, it is in order to move 
     that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole House 
     on the State of the Union for consideration of the 
     resolution. All points of order against the resolution and 
     against consideration of the resolution are waived. The 
     motion is highly privileged. A motion to reconsider the vote 
     by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be 
     in order. During consideration of the resolution in the 
     Committee of the Whole, the first reading of the resolution 
     shall be dispensed with. General debate shall proceed, shall 
     be confined to the resolution, and shall not exceed one hour 
     equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an opponent 
     of the resolution. The resolution shall be considered as read 
     for amendment under the five-minute rule. Only one motion to 
     rise shall be in order, except if offered by the manager. No 
     amendment to the resolution is in order. Consideration of the 
     resolution shall not exceed one hour excluding time for 
     recorded votes and quorum calls. At the conclusion of the 
     consideration of the resolution, the Committee shall rise and 
     report the resolution to the House. The previous question 
     shall be considered as ordered on the resolution to final 
     passage without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider 
     the vote on passage of the resolution shall not be in order.
       (2) Appeals of rulings.--Appeals from decision of the Chair 
     regarding application of the rules of the House of 
     Representatives to the procedure relating to an approval 
     resolution shall be decided without debate.
       (3) Consideration of more than one approval resolution.--It 
     shall not be in order to consider under this subsection more 
     than one approval resolution under this section, except for 
     consideration of a similar Senate resolution (unless the 
     House has already rejected an approval resolution) or more 
     than one motion to discharge described in paragraph (1) 
     with respect to an approval resolution.
       (c) Consideration in the Senate.--
       (1) Referral and reporting.--An approval resolution 
     introduced in the Senate shall be shall be placed directly 
     and immediately on the Calendar.
       (2) Implementing resolution from house.--When the Senate 
     receives from the House of Representatives an approval 
     resolution, the resolution shall not be referred to committee 
     and shall be placed on the Calendar.
       (3) Consideration of single approval resolution.--After the 
     Senate has proceeded to the consideration of an approval 
     resolution under this subsection, then no other approval 
     resolution originating in that same House shall be subject to 
     the procedures set forth in this subsection.
       (4) Motion nondebatable.--A motion to proceed to 
     consideration of an approval resolution under this subsection 
     shall not be debatable. It shall not be in order to move to 
     reconsider the vote by which the motion to proceed was 
     adopted or rejected, although subsequent motions to proceed 
     may be made under this paragraph.
       (5) Limit on consideration.--
       (A) After no more than 2 hours of consideration of an 
     approval resolution, the Senate shall proceed, without 
     intervening action or debate (except as permitted under 
     paragraph (9)), to vote on the final disposition thereof to 
     the exclusion of all motions, except a motion to reconsider 
     or table.
       (B) The time for debate on the approval resolution shall be 
     equally divided between the Majority Leader and the Minority 
     Leader or their designees.
       (6) No motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit an 
     approval resolution shall not be in order.

[[Page S6198]]

       (7) Disposition of senate resolution.--If the Senate has 
     read for the third time an approval resolution that 
     originated in the Senate, then it shall be in order at any 
     time thereafter to move to proceed to the consideration of an 
     approval resolution for the same special message received 
     from the House of Representatives and placed on the Calendar 
     pursuant to paragraph (2), strike all after the enacting 
     clause, substitute the text of the Senate approval 
     resolution, agree to the Senate amendment, and vote on final 
     disposition of the House approval resolution, all without any 
     intervening action or debate.
       (8) Consideration of house message.--Consideration in the 
     Senate of all motions, amendments, or appeals necessary to 
     dispose of a message from the House of Representatives on an 
     approval resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour. 
     Debate on each motion or amendment shall be limited to 30 
     minutes. Debate on any appeal or point of order that is 
     submitted in connection with the disposition of the House 
     message shall be limited to 15 minutes. Any time for debate 
     shall be equally divided and controlled by the proponent and 
     the majority manager, unless the majority manager is a 
     proponent of the motion, amendment, appeal, or point of 
     order, in which case the minority manager shall be in control 
     of the time in opposition.
       (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) Approval resolution.--The term ``approval resolution'' 
     means only a concurrent resolution of either House of 
     Congress which is introduced as provided in subsection (a) 
     with respect to the approval of a request from the Surface 
     Transportation Board under section 11123(a)(4) of title 49, 
     United States Code.
       (e) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--This 
     section is enacted by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such 
     they are deemed a part of the rules of each House, 
     respectively, but applicable only with respect to the 
     procedure to be followed in that House in the case of 
     approval resolutions described in subsection (c); and they 
     supersede other rules only to the extent that they are 
     inconsistent therewith; and
       (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 5. PROCEDURAL RELIEF FOR SMALL RATE CASES.

       (a) Discovery Limited.--Section 10701(d) of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended by--
       (1) inserting ``(A)'' in paragraph (3) before ``The 
     Board''; and
       (2) adding at the end thereof the following:
       ``(B) Unless the Board finds that there is a compelling 
     need to permit discovery in a particular proceeding, 
     discovery shall not be permitted in a proceeding handled 
     under the guidelines established under subparagraph (A).''.
       (b) Administrative Relief.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, the Surface Transportation 
     Board shall--
       (1) review the rules and procedures applicable to rate 
     complaints and other complaints filed with the Board by small 
     shippers;
       (2) identify any such rules or procedures that are unduly 
     burdensome to small shippers; and
       (3) take such action, including rulemaking, as is 
     appropriate to reduce or eliminate the aspects of the rules 
     and procedures that the Board determines under paragraph (2) 
     to be unduly burdensome to small shippers.
       (c) Legislative Relief.--The Board shall notify the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
     of the House of Representatives if the Board determines that 
     additional changes in the rules and procedures described in 
     subsection (b) are appropriate and require commensurate 
     changes in statutory law. In making that notification, the 
     Board shall make recommendations concerning those changes.

     SEC. 6. MARKET DOMINANCE STANDARD.

       The Surface Transportation Board shall complete a 
     rulemaking, as outlined in STB Ex Parte No. 575, to determine 
     whether and to what extent it should consider product and 
     geographic competition in making market dominance 
     determinations.

     SEC. 7. REVENUE ADEQUACY.

       The Surface Transportation Board shall reexamine, as 
     outlined in STB Ex Parte No. 575, its standards and 
     procedures for determining adequate railroad revenue levels 
     under section 10704(a)(2) of title 49, United States Code. In 
     carrying out it reexamination, the Board is directed to seek 
     recommendations of a panel of three disinterested economists 
     on the proper standards to apply. The panel shall submit its 
     report and recommendations simultaneously to the Surface 
     Transportation Board and to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure.

     SEC. 8. BOTTLENECK RATES.

       (a) Through Routes.--Section 10703 of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``Rail 
     carriers''; and
       (2) adding at the end thereof the following:
       ``(b) Connecting Carriers.--When a shipper and rail carrier 
     enter into a contract under section 10709 for transportation 
     that would require a through route with a connecting carrier 
     and there is no reasonable alternative route that could be 
     constructed without participation of that connecting carrier, 
     the connecting carrier shall, upon request, establish a 
     through route and a rate that can be used in conjunction with 
     transportation provided pursuant to the contract, unless the 
     connecting carrier shows that--
       ``(1) the interchange requested is not operationally 
     feasible; or
       ``(2) the through route would significantly impair the 
     connecting carrier's ability to serve its other traffic.
     The connecting carrier shall establish a rate and through 
     route within 21 days unless the Board has made a 
     determination that the connecting carrier is likely to 
     prevail in its claim under paragraph (1) or (2).''.
       (b) Board's Authority to Prescribe Division of Joint 
     Rates.--Section 10705(b) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``The Board shall'' and inserting 
     ``Except as provided in section 10703(b), the Board shall''.
       (c) Complaints.--Section 11701 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
       ``(c) Where transportation over a portion of a through 
     route is governed by a contract under section 10709, a rate 
     complaint must be limited to the rates that apply to the 
     portion of the through route not governed by such a 
     contract.''.

     SEC. 9. SIMPLIFIED DISPUTE RESOLUTION.

       Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     the Surface Transportation Board shall promulgate regulations 
     adopting a simplified dispute resolution mechanism with the 
     following features:
       (1) In general.--The simplified dispute resolution 
     mechanism will utilize expedited arbitration with a minimum 
     of discovery and may be used to decide disputes between 
     parties involving any matter subject to the jurisdiction of 
     the Board, other than rate reasonableness cases that would be 
     decided under constrained market pricing principles.
       (2) Applicable standards.--Arbitrators will apply existing 
     legal standards.
       (3) Mandatory if requested.--Use of the simplified dispute 
     resolution mechanism is required whenever at least one party 
     to the dispute requests.
       (4) 90-day turnaround.--Arbitrators will issue their 
     decisions within 90 days after being appointed.
       (5) Payment of costs.--Each party will pay its own costs, 
     and the costs of the arbitrator and other administrative 
     costs of arbitration will be shared equally between and among 
     the parties.
       (6) Decisions private; not precedential.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by the Board, decisions will remain 
     private and will not constitute binding precedent.
       (7) Decisions binding and enforceable.--Except as otherwise 
     provided in paragraph (8), decisions will be binding and 
     enforceable by the Board.
       (8) Right to appeal.--Any party will have an unqualified 
     right to appeal any decision to the Board, in which case the 
     Board will decide the matter de nova. In making its decision, 
     the Board may consider the decision of the arbitrator and any 
     evidence and other material developed during the arbitration.
       (9) Mutual modification.--Any procedure or regulation 
     adopted by the Board with respect to the simplified dispute 
     resolution may be modified or eliminated by mutual agreement 
     of all parties to the dispute.

     SEC. 10. PROMOTION OF COMPETITIVE RAIL SERVICE OPTIONS.

       Section 11324 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' in paragraph (4) of subsection (b);
       (2) by striking ``system.'' in paragraph (5) of subsection 
     (b) and inserting ``system; and'';
       (3) by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following:
       ``(6) means and methods to encourage and expand competition 
     between and among rail carriers in the affected region or the 
     national rail system.''; and
       (4) by inserting after the second sentence in subsection 
     (c) the following: ``The Board may impose conditions to 
     encourage and expand competition between and among rail 
     carriers in the affected region or the national rail system, 
     provided that such conditions do not cause substantial harm 
     to the benefits of the transaction to the affected carriers 
     or the public.''.

     SEC. 11. HOUSEHOLD GOODS COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 13703(d) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting ``(other than an agreement affecting 
     only the transportation of household goods, as defined on 
     December 31, 1995)'' after ``agreement'' in the first 
     sentence.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. GRASSLEY:
  S. 2165. A bill to amend title 31 of the United States Code to 
improve methods for preventing financial crimes, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.


                money laundering deterrence act of 1998

 Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, recently, we have seen the 
culmination of one of the most successful undercover operations in 
history by the

[[Page S6199]]

United States Customs Service. This effort, known as ``Operation 
Casablanca,'' has infiltrated and dismantled a group of international 
bankers, mostly in Mexico, who have been laundering drug money. The 
threat of drug trafficking is serious enough. But to have their 
financial advisors leading their effort to facilitate the smuggling of 
illicit narcotics is much worse. Complicit bankers devising schemes can 
make it much easier to move and hide the ill-gotten gains of drug 
cartels.
  As this latest law enforcement operation illustrates, we must be sure 
that we are taking the necessary steps to protect the citizens of our 
nation. We must prevent drug traffickers and organized crime groups 
from obtaining the profits of their illegal activities. Much has been 
done and said about the movement of illegal drugs into the United 
States. But the opposite side of the business does not always get the 
publicity, and is just as important. We need to go after the profits 
from drug sales and other illegal enterprises.
  Last week, Representative Leach, Chairman of the Committee on Banking 
and Financial Services introduced legislation to amend title 31, United 
States Code. The bill H.R. 4005, ``the Money Laundering Deterrence Act 
of 1998,'' would improve methods for preventing financial crimes. And 
as Operation Casablanca shows this legislation, is timely and needed. 
We need to tighten up our financial control capabilities to prevent 
criminal enterprises from abusing our financial and banking systems. 
The bill is supported by the American Banking Association (ABA), the 
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Reserve. Today, Chairman Leach's bill has already been marked up in the 
House.
  I call for my colleagues to help support this companion legislation. 
I hope this would be a continuation of efforts by Congress to go after 
the growing threat of money laundering not only to our nation, but 
worldwide.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. HARKIN (for himself, Mr. Leahy and Mr. Johnson):
  S. 2166. A bill to amend the National School Lunch Act and the Child 
Nutrition Act of 1966 to provide children with increased access to food 
and nutrition assistance, to simplify program operations and improve 
program management, to extend certain authorities contained in such 
Acts through fiscal year 2002, and for other purposes; to the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.


       CHILD NUTRITION AND WIC REAUTHORIZATION AMENDMENTS OF 1998

 Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I am introducing today, at the 
request of the Clinton Administration, the Child Nutrition and WIC 
Reauthorization Amendments of 1998. I am grateful to be joined in the 
introduction of this bill by Senator Leahy, the Ranking Member of the 
Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General Legislation, and by 
Senator Johnson. In my years serving on the Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry, and now as its Ranking Member, I have always 
placed a very high value on the child nutrition programs, including the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children 
(WIC). These programs have been critical in helping to meet the 
nutritional needs of millions of our nation's children.
  This bill is the first child nutrition reauthorization bill sent to 
Congress by an Administration in two decades. It is a very commendable 
effort, with many positive features, that we will be relying upon 
substantially as we fashion a child nutrition bill in the coming weeks 
in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and 
ultimately in conference. In addition to reauthorizing those programs 
that are expiring, the bill makes a number of improvements throughout 
the child nutrition programs. It is designed to be cost-neutral over 
the next five years, to simplify and streamline program operations, to 
reduce impediments to participation by eligible individuals, to reach 
certain children needing additional nutritional assistance, to 
strengthen program integrity and to enhance the nutrition provided by 
the programs.
  Earlier this year, I joined Chairman Lugar, Senator McConnell and 
Senator Leahy in introducing a measure, S. 1581, that would simply 
reauthorize the child nutrition programs for the next five years. That 
bill was recognized as a starting point for a careful review of the 
child nutrition programs leading to the development of a sound, well-
crafted and bipartisan reauthorization bill. I believe there is broad 
support for improving and modifying these programs to meet changing 
needs and demands within the overall spending limitations that we are 
committed to working within.
  One of the more important features of the bill is new authority for 
nutrition assistance in after-school programs through the Child and 
Adult Care Food Program for at risk youths between the ages of 12 and 
18. We know too well that the hours just after school are full of 
opportunities for teenagers to get into trouble, whether it involves 
crime, drug use or teen pregnancy. The availability of nutrition 
assistance can help to support organized after-school activities that 
are healthy and constructive alternatives to what might otherwise occur 
in those risky after-school hours.
  There are also provisions in the bill designed to improve the 
nutrition provided by the programs, including an emphasis on 
establishing adequate time for kids to eat school lunches in an 
atmosphere conducive to good nutrition and an authorization of 
Nutrition Education and Training grants based on $0.50 a child each 
year with a minimum of $75,000 per state.
  There are also provisions in the bill to improve access to the Summer 
Food Service Program by increasing the number of sites and the number 
of children that can be served by non-profit sponsors. Statistics 
continue to show that far fewer low income children are served in the 
Summer Food Service Program than during the school year in the National 
School Lunch Program, especially in rural areas. The provisions in this 
bill are designed to help address this gap.
  The bill also reauthorizes the WIC Program. Under Secretary Shirley 
Watkins was absolutely correct when she said at a recent Agriculture 
Committee Hearing that, ``WIC works.'' No other Federal-state program 
has the proven cost-effectiveness of WIC, which has been shown in study 
after study. This bill is designed to build upon the success of the 
current WIC program with improvements in program management and 
integrity.
  While I support a very high proportion of the provisions of this 
bill, I do not necessarily support every detail of it. I will also 
mention some of the areas in which I hope the final bill will take more 
substantial steps than are included in this bill. In my view, more 
should be done to increase participation in the School Breakfast 
Program, especially among low-income children, and in the Summer Food 
Service Program. I would also prefer further strengthening of after-
school and child care nutrition assistance. And additional steps should 
be taken to improve integrity and accountability in the WIC program 
while continuing the progress toward full participation.
  I look forward to working with my Congressional colleagues, the 
Administration and the entire child nutrition community, to design a 
final bill having broad bipartisan support.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in full 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2166

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Child 
     Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Amendments of 1998''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

               TITLE I--SCHOOL LUNCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS

Sec. 101. Technical amendments to commodity provisions.
Sec. 102. Availability of recovered funds for management activity.
Sec. 103. Elimination of administration of programs by regional 
              offices.
Sec. 104. Requirement for health and safety inspections.
Sec. 105. Elimination of food and nutrition projects and establishment 
              of an adequate meal service period.

[[Page S6200]]

Sec. 106. Buy American.
Sec. 107. Summer food service program for children.
Sec. 108. Commodity distribution program.
Sec. 109. Child and adult care food program.
Sec. 110. Transfer of homeless assistance programs to the child and 
              adult care food program.
Sec. 111. Elimination of pilot projects.
Sec. 112. Training and technical assistance.
Sec. 113. Food service management institute.
Sec. 114. Compliance and accountability.
Sec. 115. Information clearinghouse.
Sec. 116. Refocusing of effort to help accommodate the special dietary 
              needs of individuals with disabilities.

            TITLE II--SCHOOL BREAKFAST AND RELATED PROGRAMS

Sec. 201. Elimination of administration of programs by regional 
              offices.
Sec. 202. State administrative expenses.
Sec. 203. Special supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, 
              and children.
Sec. 204. Nutrition education and training.

               TITLE III--COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS

Sec. 301. Commodity distribution program reforms.
Sec. 302. Food distribution.

                        TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 401. Effective date.

               TITLE I--SCHOOL LUNCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS

     SEC. 101. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO COMMODITY PROVISIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 6 of the National School Lunch Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 1755) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as 
     subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--The National School Lunch Act 
     is amended by striking ``section 6(e)'' each place it appears 
     in sections 14(f), 16(a), and 17(h)(1)(B) (42 U.S.C. 
     1762a(f), 1765(a), 1766(h)(1)(B)) and inserting ``section 
     6(c)''.

     SEC. 102. AVAILABILITY OF RECOVERED FUNDS FOR MANAGEMENT 
                   ACTIVITY.

       Section 8 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1757) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(h) Retention and Use of Recovered Program Funds.--
       ``(1) Retention.--A State agency may retain up to 50 
     percent of any program funds recovered as a result of an 
     audit or review conducted by the State agency of school food 
     authorities, institutions, and service institutions 
     participating in food assistance programs authorized under 
     this Act or section 3 or 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 
     (42 U.S.C. 1772, 1773).
       ``(2) Use.--Funds retained by a State agency under this 
     subsection shall be used by the State agency for allowable 
     program costs to improve the management and operation of 
     programs described in paragraph (1) within the State, 
     including the cost of providing funds to school food 
     authorities, institutions, and service institutions 
     participating in the programs.''.

     SEC. 103. ELIMINATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAMS BY 
                   REGIONAL OFFICES.

       (a) Matching Requirement.--Section 7(b) of the National 
     School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1756(b)) is amended by striking 
     the second sentence.
       (b) Disbursement to Schools by the Secretary.--Section 10 
     of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1759) is amended 
     to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 10. DISBURSEMENT TO SCHOOLS BY THE SECRETARY.

       ``(a) Authority To Administer Programs.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), 
     until September 30, 2000, the Secretary shall withhold funds 
     payable to a State agency under this Act and disburse the 
     funds directly to school food authorities, institutions, and 
     service institutions within the State for the purposes 
     authorized by this Act to the extent that the Secretary has 
     so withheld and disbursed the funds continuously since 
     October 1, 1980.
       ``(2) Use of funds.--Any funds withheld and disbursed by 
     the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be used for the same 
     purposes and be subject to the same conditions as apply to 
     disbursing funds made available to States under this Act.
       ``(3) State administration.--If the Secretary is 
     administering (in whole or in part) any program authorized 
     under this Act in a State, the State may, on request to the 
     Secretary, assume administrative responsibility for the 
     program at any time before October 1, 2000.
       ``(b) Provision of Training and Technical Assistance.--The 
     Secretary shall provide a State agency that assumes 
     administrative responsibility for a program from the 
     Secretary on or before October 1, 2000, with training and 
     technical assistance to allow for an efficient and effective 
     transfer of the responsibility.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 11(a)(1)(A) of the 
     National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1759a(a)(1)(A)) is 
     amended by striking ``Except as provided in section 10 of 
     this Act, in'' and inserting ``In''.

     SEC. 104. REQUIREMENT FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY INSPECTIONS.

       Section 9 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1758) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(h) Health and Safety Inspections.--A school 
     participating in the school lunch program authorized under 
     this Act or the school breakfast program authorized under 
     section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773) 
     in which meals are prepared on site shall, at least twice 
     during each school year, obtain an inspection that indicates 
     that food service operations of the school meet State and 
     local health and safety standards.''.

     SEC. 105. ELIMINATION OF FOOD AND NUTRITION PROJECTS AND 
                   ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADEQUATE MEAL SERVICE 
                   PERIOD.

       Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1760) is amended by striking subsection (m) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(m) Length of Meal Service Period and Food Service 
     Environment.--A school participating in the school lunch 
     program authorized under this Act or the school breakfast 
     program authorized under section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act 
     of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773) shall, to the maximum extent 
     practicable, establish meal service periods that provide 
     children with adequate time to fully consume their meals in 
     an environment that is conducive to eating the meals.''.

     SEC. 106. BUY AMERICAN.

       Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1760) (as amended by section 105) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(n) Buy American.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall require that a 
     school purchase, to the maximum extent practicable, food 
     products that are produced in the United States.
       ``(2) Limitations.--Paragraph (1) shall apply only to--
       ``(A) a school located in the contiguous United States; and
       ``(B) a purchase of a food product for the school lunch 
     program authorized under this Act or the school breakfast 
     program authorized under section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act 
     of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773).''.

     SEC. 107. SUMMER FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN.

       (a) Adjustments to Reimbursement Rates.--Section 12 of the 
     National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1760) is amended by 
     striking subsection (f) and inserting the following:
       ``(f) Adjustments to Reimbursement Rates.--In providing 
     assistance for breakfasts, lunches, suppers, and supplements 
     served in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, 
     the Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
     Mariana Islands, the Secretary may establish appropriate 
     adjustments for each such State to the national average 
     payment rates prescribed under sections 4, 11, 13 and 17 of 
     this Act and section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 
     U.S.C. 1773) to reflect the differences between the costs of 
     providing meals in those States and the costs of providing 
     meals in all other States.''.
       (b) Establishment of Site Limitation.--Section 13(a)(7)(B) 
     of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761(a)(7)(B)) is 
     amended by striking clause (i) and inserting the following:
       ``(i) operate--
       ``(I) not more than 25 sites, with not more than 300 
     children being served at any 1 site; or
       ``(II) with a waiver granted by the State agency under 
     standards developed by the Secretary, with not more than 500 
     children being served at any 1 site;''.
       (c) Elimination of Indication of Interest Requirement, 
     Removal of Meal Contracting Restrictions, and Vendor 
     Registration Requirements.--Section 13 of the National School 
     Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(7)(B)--
       (A) by striking clauses (ii) and (iii); and
       (B) by redesignating clauses (iv) through (vii) as clauses 
     (ii) through (v) respectively; and
       (2) in subsection (l)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in the first sentence--

       (I) by striking ``(other than private nonprofit 
     organizations eligible under subsection (a)(7))''; and
       (II) by striking ``only with food service management 
     companies registered with the State in which they operate'' 
     and inserting ``with food service management companies''; and

       (ii) by striking the last sentence;
       (B) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in the first sentence, by striking ``shall'' and 
     inserting ``may''; and
       (ii) by striking the second and third sentences;
       (C) by striking paragraph (3); and
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (3) and (4), respectively.
       (d) Reauthorization of Summer Food Service Program.--
     Section 13(q) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1761(q)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting 
     ``2002''.

     SEC. 108. COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM.

       Section 14(a) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1762a(a)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting 
     ``2002''.

     SEC. 109. CHILD AND ADULT CARE FOOD PROGRAM.

       (a) Revision to Licensing and Alternate Approval for 
     Schools and Outside School Hours Child Care Centers.--Section 
     17(a) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(a)) is 
     amended in the fifth sentence by striking paragraph (1) and 
     inserting the following:

[[Page S6201]]

       ``(1) each institution (other than a school or family or 
     group day care home sponsoring organization) and family or 
     group day care home shall--
       ``(A)(i) have Federal, State, or local licensing or 
     approval; or
       ``(ii) be complying with appropriate renewal procedures as 
     prescribed by the Secretary and not be the subject of 
     information possessed by the State indicating that the 
     license of the institution or home will not be renewed;
       ``(B) in any case in which Federal, State, or local 
     licensing or approval is not available--
       ``(i) receive funds under title XX of the Social Security 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 1397 et seq.);
       ``(ii) meet any alternate approval standards established by 
     a State or local government; or
       ``(iii) meet any alternate approval standards established 
     by the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services; or
       ``(C) in any case in which the institution provides care to 
     school children outside school hours and Federal, State, or 
     local licensing or approval is not required, meet State or 
     local health and safety standards; and''.
       (b) Reinstatement of Categorical Eligibility for Even Start 
     Program Participants.--Section 17(c)(6)(B) of the National 
     School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(c)(6)(B)) is amended by 
     striking ``1997'' and inserting ``2002''.
       (c) Tax Exempt Status and Removal of Notification 
     Requirement for Incomplete Applications.--Section 17(d)(1) of 
     the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(d)(1)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting after the third sentence the following: 
     ``An institution moving toward compliance with the 
     requirement for tax exempt status shall be allowed to 
     participate in the child and adult care food program for a 
     period of not more than 180 days, except that a State agency 
     may grant a single extension of not to exceed an additional 
     90 days if the institution demonstrates, to the satisfaction 
     of the State agency, that the inability of the institution to 
     obtain tax exempt status within the 180-day period is due to 
     circumstances beyond the control of the institution.''; and
       (2) by striking the last sentence.
       (d) Distribution of Program Information.--Section 17(k) of 
     the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(k)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``A State'' and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--A State''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Distribution of program information.--
       ``(A) Definition of needy area.--In this paragraph, the 
     term `needy area' means a geographic area served by a school 
     enrolling elementary students in which at least 50 percent of 
     the total number of children enrolled are certified as 
     eligible to receive free or reduced price school meals under 
     this Act or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1771 
     et seq.).
       ``(B) Information.--At least once every 2 years, each State 
     agency shall provide notification of the availability of the 
     program, the requirements for program participation, and the 
     application procedures to be followed under the program to 
     each nonparticipating institution or family or group day care 
     home that--
       ``(i) is located in a needy area within the State; and
       ``(ii)(I) has received Federal, State, or local licensing 
     or approval; or
       ``(II) receives funds under title XX of the Social Security 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 1397 et seq.).''.
       (e) Elimination of Audit Funds, Establishment of Management 
     Support Funding, Participation by At-Risk Child Care 
     Programs, and WIC Outreach.--Section 17 of the National 
     School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (i);
       (2) by redesignating subsections (j) through (p) as 
     subsections (i) through (o), respectively; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(p) Management Funding.--
       ``(1) Technical and training assistance.--In addition to 
     the normal training and technical assistance provided to 
     State agencies under this section, the Secretary shall 
     provide training and technical assistance in order to assist 
     the State agencies in improving their program management and 
     oversight under this section.
       ``(2) Funding.--For fiscal year 1999 and each succeeding 
     fiscal year, the Secretary shall reserve to carry out 
     paragraph (1) \1/8\ of 1 percent of the amount made available 
     to carry out this section.
       ``(q) At-Risk Child Care.--
       ``(1) Definition of at-risk school child.--In this 
     subsection, the term `at-risk school child' means a child 
     who--
       ``(A) is not less than 12 nor more than 18 years of age; 
     and
       ``(B) lives in a geographical area served by a school 
     enrolling elementary students in which at least 50 percent of 
     the total number of children enrolled are certified as 
     eligible to receive free or reduced price school meals under 
     this Act or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1771 
     et seq.).
       ``(2) Participation in child and adult care food program.--
     Subject to the other provisions of this subsection, an 
     institution that provides care to at-risk school children 
     during after-school hours, weekends, or holidays during the 
     regular school year may participate in the program authorized 
     under this section.
       ``(3) Administration.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the other provisions of this section apply to an 
     institution described in paragraph (2).
       ``(4) Supplement reimbursement.--
       ``(A) Limitations.--An institution may claim reimbursement 
     under this subsection only for--
       ``(i) a supplement served to at-risk school children during 
     after-school hours, weekends, or holidays during the regular 
     school year; and
       ``(ii) 1 supplement per child per day.
       ``(B) Rate.--A supplement shall be reimbursed under this 
     subsection at the rate established for a free supplement 
     under subsection (c)(3).
       ``(C) No charge.--A supplement claimed for reimbursement 
     under this subsection shall be served without charge.
       ``(r) Information Concerning the Special Supplemental 
     Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide each State 
     agency administering a child and adult care food program 
     under this section with information concerning the special 
     supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, and 
     children authorized under section 17 of the Child Nutrition 
     Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786).
       ``(2) Requirements for state agencies.--A State agency 
     shall ensure that each participating child care center (other 
     than an institution providing care to school children outside 
     school hours)--
       ``(A) receives materials that include--
       ``(i) a basic explanation of the importance and benefits of 
     the special supplemental nutrition program for women, 
     infants, and children;
       ``(ii) the maximum State income eligibility standards, 
     according to family size, for the program; and
       ``(iii) information concerning how benefits under the 
     program may be obtained;
       ``(B) is provided updates of the information described in 
     subparagraph (A) at least annually; and
       ``(C) provides the information described in subparagraph 
     (A) to parents of enrolled children at least annually.''.
       (f) Permanent Authorization of Demonstration Project.--
     Section 17(o) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1766(o)) (as redesignated by subsection (e)) is amended by 
     striking paragraphs (4) and (5).

     SEC. 110. TRANSFER OF HOMELESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO THE 
                   CHILD AND ADULT CARE FOOD PROGRAM.

       (a) Summer Food Service Program for Children.--Section 
     13(a)(3)(C) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1761(a)(3)(C)) is amended--
       (1) in clause (i), by inserting ``or'' after the semicolon;
       (2) by striking clause (ii); and
       (3) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (ii).
       (b) Child and Adult Care Food Program.--Section 17 of the 
     National School Lunch Act (as amended by section 109(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the third sentence of subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``and public'' and inserting ``public''; 
     and
       (B) by inserting before the period at the following: ``, 
     and emergency shelters described in subsection (s)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(s) Participation by Emergency Shelters.--
       ``(1) Definition of emergency shelter.--In this subsection, 
     the term `emergency shelter' means a public or private 
     nonprofit emergency shelter (as defined in section 321 of the 
     Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
     11351)), or a site operated by the shelter, that provides 
     food service to homeless children and their parents or 
     guardians.
       ``(2) Administration.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the other provisions of this section shall apply 
     to an emergency shelter that is participating in the program 
     authorized under this section.
       ``(3) Institution and site licensing.--Subsection (a)(1) 
     shall not apply to an emergency shelter.
       ``(4) Health and safety standards.--To be eligible to 
     participate in the program authorized under this section, an 
     emergency shelter shall comply with applicable State and 
     local health and safety standards.
       ``(5) Meal reimbursement.--
       ``(A) Limitations.--An emergency shelter may claim 
     reimbursement under this subsection only for--
       ``(i) a meal served to children who are not more than 12 
     years of age residing at the emergency shelter; and
       ``(ii) not more than 3 meals, or 2 meals and 1 supplement, 
     per child per day.
       ``(B) Rate.--A meal shall be reimbursed under this 
     subsection at the rate established for a free meal under 
     subsection (c).
       ``(C) No charge.--A meal claimed for reimbursement under 
     this subsection shall be served without charge.''.
       (c) Homeless Children Nutrition Program.--Section 17B of 
     the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766b) is repealed.

     SEC. 111. ELIMINATION OF PILOT PROJECTS.

       Section 18 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1769) is amended by striking subsections (e) through (i).

[[Page S6202]]

     SEC. 112. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

       Section 21(e)(1) of the National School Lunch Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1769b-1(e)(1)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and 
     inserting ``2002''.

     SEC. 113. FOOD SERVICE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE.

       Section 21(e)(2)(A) of the National School Lunch Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1769b-1(e)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ``and 
     $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1996'' and inserting ``$2,000,000 
     for each of fiscal years 1996 through 1998, and $3,000,000 
     for fiscal year 1999''.

     SEC. 114. COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

       Section 22(d) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1769c(d)) is amended by striking ``1996'' and inserting 
     ``2002''.

     SEC. 115. INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE.

       Section 26 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1769g) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence of subsection (a), by striking 
     ``shall'' and inserting ``may'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``The'' and inserting 
     ``Except as provided in subsection (d), the''; and
       (3) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
       ``(d) Noncompetitive Contracts.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Secretary may, on a noncompetitive 
     basis, enter into a contract for the services of any 
     organization with which the Secretary has previously entered 
     into a contract under this section, if the organization has 
     performed satisfactorily under the contract and meets the 
     requirements of this section.
       ``(e) Funding.--The Secretary may provide to the 
     organization selected under this section an amount not to 
     exceed $150,000 for each of fiscal years 1999 through 
     2002.''.

     SEC. 116. REFOCUSING OF EFFORT TO HELP ACCOMMODATE THE 
                   SPECIAL DIETARY NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH 
                   DISABILITIES.

       Section 27 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1769h) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 27. ACCOMMODATION OF SPECIAL DIETARY NEEDS OF 
                   INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered program.--The term `covered program' means--
       ``(A) the school lunch program authorized under this Act;
       ``(B) the school breakfast program authorized under section 
     4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773); and
       ``(C) any other program authorized under this Act or the 
     Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (except section 17 of that Act) 
     that the Secretary determines is appropriate.
       ``(2) Eligible entity.--The term `eligible entity' means a 
     school food authority, institution, or service institution 
     that participates in a covered program.
       ``(3) Individuals with disabilities.--The term `individual 
     with disabilities' has the meaning given the term in section 
     7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 706) for 
     purposes of title VII of that Act (29 U.S.C. 796 et seq.).
       ``(b) Activities.--The Secretary may carry out activities 
     to help accommodate the special dietary needs of individuals 
     with disabilities who are participating in a covered program, 
     including--
       ``(1) developing and disseminating to State agencies 
     guidance and technical assistance materials;
       ``(2) conducting training of State agencies and eligible 
     entities; and
       ``(3) issuing grants to State agencies and eligible 
     entities.''.

            TITLE II--SCHOOL BREAKFAST AND RELATED PROGRAMS

     SEC. 201. ELIMINATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAMS BY 
                   REGIONAL OFFICES.

       Section 5 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 
     1774) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 5 DISBURSEMENT TO SCHOOLS BY THE SECRETARY.

       ``(a) Authority To Administer Programs.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), 
     until September 30, 2000, the Secretary shall withhold funds 
     payable to a State agency under this Act and disburse the 
     funds directly to school food authorities, institutions, and 
     service institutions within the State for the purposes 
     authorized by this Act to the extent that the Secretary has 
     so withheld and disbursed the funds continuously since 
     October 1, 1980.
       ``(2) Use of funds.--Any funds withheld and disbursed by 
     the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be used for the same 
     purposes and be subject to the same conditions as apply to 
     disbursing funds made available to States under this Act.
       ``(3) State administration.--If the Secretary is 
     administering (in whole or in part) any program authorized 
     under this Act in a State, the State may, on request to the 
     Secretary, assume administrative responsibility for the 
     program at any time before October 1, 2000.
       ``(b) Provision of Training and Technical Assistance.--The 
     Secretary shall provide a State agency that assumes 
     administrative responsibility for a program from the 
     Secretary on or before October 1, 2000, with training and 
     technical assistance to allow for an efficient and effective 
     transfer of administrative responsibility.''.

     SEC. 202. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.

       (a) Homeless Shelters.--Section 7(a)(5) of the Child 
     Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(a)(5)) is amended by 
     striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
       ``(B) Reallocation of funds.--
       ``(i) Return to secretary.--For each fiscal year, any 
     amounts appropriated that are not obligated or expended 
     during the fiscal year and are not carried over for the 
     succeeding fiscal year under subparagraph (A) shall be 
     returned to the Secretary.
       ``(ii) Reallocation by secretary.--The Secretary shall 
     allocate, for purposes of administrative costs, any remaining 
     amounts among States that demonstrate a need for the 
     amounts.''.
       (b) Elimination of Transfer Limitation.--Section 7(a) of 
     the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(a)) is 
     amended by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(6) Use of administrative funds.--Funds available to a 
     State under this subsection and under section 13(k)(1) of the 
     National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761(k)(1)) may be used 
     by the State for the costs of administration of the programs 
     authorized under the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1751 et seq.) or this Act (except for the programs authorized 
     under sections 17 and 21 of this Act) without regard to the 
     basis on which the funds were earned and allocated.''.
       (c) Reauthorization of Program.--Section 7(g) of the Child 
     Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(g)) is amended by 
     striking ``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.

     SEC. 203. SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, 
                   INFANTS, AND CHILDREN.

       (a) Additional Program Application Requirements.--Section 
     17(d)(3) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 
     1786(d)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) Physical presence.--An applicant shall be physically 
     present at each certification visit to receive program 
     benefits.
       ``(D) Income documentation.--An applicant shall provide 
     documentation of household income, or of participation in a 
     program described in clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph 
     (2)(A), at certification to be determined to meet income 
     eligibility requirements for the program.
       ``(E) Verification.--The Secretary shall issue regulations 
     under this subsection prescribing when and how verification 
     of income shall be required.''.
       (b) Distribution of Nutrition Education Materials.--Section 
     17(e)(3) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 
     1786(e)(3)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(3) The'' and inserting the following:
       ``(3) Nutrition education materials.--
       ``(A) In general.--The''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Sharing of materials with csfp.--The Secretary may 
     provide, in bulk quantity, nutrition education materials 
     (including materials promoting breastfeeding) developed with 
     funds made available for the program authorized under this 
     section to State agencies administering the commodity 
     supplemental food program authorized under sections 4(a) and 
     5 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 
     (Public Law 93-86; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) at no cost to that 
     program.''.
       (c) Reauthorization of Program.--Section 17 of the Child 
     Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786) is amended in 
     subsections (g)(1) and (h)(2)(A) by striking ``1998'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``2002''.
       (d) Infant Formula Procurement.--Section 17(h)(8)(A) of the 
     Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(h)(8)(A)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iii) Competitive bidding system.--A State agency using a 
     competitive bidding system for infant formula shall award a 
     contract to the bidder offering the lowest net price unless 
     the State agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 
     Secretary that the weighted average retail price for 
     different brands of infant formula in the State does not vary 
     by more than 5 percent.''.
       (e) Infrastructure and Breastfeeding Support and 
     Promotion.--Section 17(h)(10)(A) of the Child Nutrition Act 
     of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(h)(10)(A)) is amended by striking 
     ``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.
       (f) Spend-Forward Authority.--Section 17(i)(3) of the Child 
     Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(i)(3)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in clause (ii)--
       (i) by inserting ``nutrition services and administration'' 
     after ``amount of''; and
       (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iii) with the prior approval of the Secretary, not more 
     than 4 percent of the amount of funds allocated to a State 
     agency for nutrition services and administration for a fiscal 
     year under this section may be expended by the State agency 
     during the subsequent fiscal year for the costs of developing 
     electronic benefit transfer.'';
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``subparagraph 
     (A)(ii)'' and inserting ``clauses (ii) and (iii) of 
     subparagraph (A)'';
       (3) by striking subparagraphs (D) through (G); and
       (4) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (D).
       (g) Farmers Market Nutrition Program.--
       (1) Matching funds requirement.--Section 17(m)(3) of the 
     Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(3)) is amended 
     by striking ``total'' each place it appears and inserting 
     ``administrative''.

[[Page S6203]]

       (2) Ranking criteria for state plans.--Section 17(m)(6) of 
     the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(6)) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking subparagraph (F); and
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (F).
       (3) Funding.--Section 17(m)(9)(A) of the Child Nutrition 
     Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(9)(A)) is amended by striking 
     ``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.
       (h) Disqualification of Certain Vendors.--
       (1) In general.--Section 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of 
     1996 (42 U.S.C. 1786) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(o) Disqualification of Vendors Convicted of Trafficking 
     or Illegal Sales.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (4), a 
     State agency shall permanently disqualify from participation 
     in the program authorized under this section a vendor 
     convicted of--
       ``(A) trafficking in food instruments (including any 
     voucher, draft, check, or access device (including an 
     electronic benefit transfer card or personal identification 
     number) issued in lieu of a food instrument under this 
     section); or
       ``(B) selling firearms, ammunition, explosives, or 
     controlled substances (as defined in section 102 of the 
     Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) in exchange for 
     food instruments.
       ``(2) Notice of disqualification.--The State agency shall--
       ``(A) provide the vendor with notification of the 
     disqualification; and
       ``(B) make the disqualification effective on the date of 
     receipt of the notice of disqualification.
       ``(3) Prohibition of receipt of lost revenues.--A vendor 
     shall not be entitled to receive any compensation for 
     revenues lost as a result of disqualification under this 
     subsection.
       ``(4) Hardship exception in lieu of disqualification.--
       ``(A) In general.-- A State agency may permit a vendor 
     that, but for this paragraph, would be disqualified under 
     paragraph (1), to continue to redeem food instruments or 
     otherwise provide supplemental foods to participants if the 
     State agency determines, in its sole discretion according to 
     criteria established by the Secretary, that disqualification 
     of the vendor would cause hardship to participants in the 
     program authorized under this section.
       ``(B) Civil money penalty.--If a State agency authorizes a 
     vendor that, but for this paragraph, would be disqualified to 
     redeem food instruments or provide supplemental foods under 
     subparagraph (A), the State agency shall assess the vendor a 
     civil money penalty in lieu of disqualification.
       ``(C) Amount.--The State agency shall determine the amount 
     of the civil penalty according to criteria established by the 
     Secretary.''.
       (2) Regulations.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall 
     take effect on the date on which the Secretary of Agriculture 
     issues a final regulation that includes the criteria for--
       (A) making hardship determinations; and
       (B) determining the amount of a civil money penalty in lieu 
     of disqualification.

     SEC. 204. NUTRITION EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

       Section 19(i) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 
     1788(i)) is amended--
       (1) by striking the subsection heading and all that follows 
     through paragraph (3)(A) and inserting the following:
       ``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     such sums as are necessary to carry out this section for each 
     of fiscal years 1997 through 2002.''; and
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively.

               TITLE III--COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS

     SEC. 301. COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM REFORMS.

       (a) Commodity Specifications.--Section 3(a) of the 
     Commodity Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of 1987 
     (Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) is amended by 
     striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall apply to--
       ``(A) the commodity supplemental food program authorized 
     under sections 4(a) and 5 of the Agriculture and Consumer 
     Protection Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-86; 7 U.S.C. 612c 
     note);
       ``(B) the food distribution program on Indian reservations 
     authorized under section 4(b) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 
     (7 U.S.C. 2013(b)); and
       ``(C) the school lunch program authorized under the 
     National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.).''.
       (b) Customer Acceptability Information.--Section 3(f) of 
     the Commodity Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of 
     1987 (Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) is amended by 
     striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2) Customer acceptability information.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that 
     information with respect to the types and forms of 
     commodities that are most useful is collected from recipient 
     agencies participating in programs described in subsection 
     (a)(2).
       ``(B) Frequency.--The information shall be collected at 
     least once every 2 years.
       ``(C) Additional submissions.--The Secretary--
       ``(i) may require submission of information described in 
     subparagraph (A) from recipient agencies participating in 
     other domestic food assistance programs administered by the 
     Secretary; and
       ``(ii) shall provide the recipient agencies a means for 
     voluntarily submitting customer acceptability information.''.

     SEC. 302. FOOD DISTRIBUTION.

       (a) In General.--Sections 8 through 12 of the Commodity 
     Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of 1987 (Public 
     Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) are amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 8. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER COMMODITIES BETWEEN PROGRAMS.

       ``(a) Transfer.--Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary 
     may transfer any commodities purchased for a domestic food 
     assistance program administered by the Secretary to any other 
     domestic food assistance program administered by the 
     Secretary if the transfer is necessary to ensure that the 
     commodities will be used while the commodities are still 
     suitable for human consumption.
       ``(b) Reimbursement.--The Secretary shall, to the maximum 
     extent practicable, provide reimbursement for the value of 
     the commodities transferred under subsection (a) from 
     accounts available for the purchase of commodities under the 
     program receiving the commodities.
       ``(c) Crediting.--Any reimbursement made under subsection 
     (b) shall--
       ``(1) be credited to the accounts that incurred the costs 
     when the transferred commodities were originally purchased; 
     and
       ``(2) be available for the purchase of commodities with the 
     same limitations as are provided for appropriated funds for 
     the reimbursed accounts for the fiscal year in which the 
     transfer takes place.

     ``SEC. 9. AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE CLAIMS.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may determine the amount 
     of, settle, and adjust all or part of a claim arising under a 
     domestic food assistance program administered by the 
     Secretary.
       ``(b) Waivers.--The Secretary may waive a claim described 
     in subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that a waiver 
     would serve the purposes of the program.
       ``(c) Authority of the Attorney General.--Nothing in this 
     section diminishes the authority of the Attorney General 
     under section 516 of title 28, United States Code, or any 
     other provision of law, to supervise and conduct litigation 
     on behalf of the United States.

     ``SEC. 10. PAYMENT OF COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT OF 
                   COMMODITIES THAT POSE A HEALTH OR SAFETY 
                   HAZARD.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may use funds available to 
     carry out section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat. 
     774, chapter 641; 7 U.S.C. 612c), that are not otherwise 
     committed, for the purpose of reimbursing States for State 
     and local costs associated with commodities distributed under 
     any domestic food assistance program administered by the 
     Secretary if the Secretary determines that the commodities 
     pose a health or safety hazard.
       ``(b) Allowable Costs.--The costs--
       ``(1) may include costs for storage, transportation, 
     processing, and destruction of the hazardous commodities; and
       ``(2) shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary.
       ``(c) Replacement Commodities.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may use funds described in 
     subsection (a) for the purpose of purchasing additional 
     commodities if the purchase will expedite replacement of the 
     hazardous commodities.
       ``(2) Recovery.--Use of funds under paragraph (1) shall not 
     restrict the Secretary from recovering funds or services from 
     a supplier or other entity regarding the hazardous 
     commodities.
       ``(d) Crediting of Recovered Funds.--Funds recovered from a 
     supplier or other entity regarding the hazardous commodities 
     shall--
       ``(1) be credited to the account available to carry out 
     section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat. 774, 
     chapter 641; 7 U.S.C. 612c), to the extent the funds 
     represent expenditures from that account under subsections 
     (a) and (c); and
       ``(2) remain available to carry out the purposes of section 
     32 of that Act until expended.

     ``SEC. 11. AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT COMMODITIES DONATED BY FEDERAL 
                   SOURCES.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may accept donations of 
     commodities from any Federal agency, including commodities of 
     another Federal agency determined to be excess personal 
     property pursuant to section 202(d) of the Federal Property 
     and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483(d)).
       ``(b) Use.--The Secretary may donate the commodities 
     received under subsection (a) to States for distribution 
     through any domestic food assistance program administered by 
     the Secretary.
       ``(c) Payment.--Notwithstanding section 202(d) of the 
     Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 
     U.S.C. 483(d)), the Secretary shall not be required to make 
     any payment in connection with the commodities received under 
     subsection (a).''.
       (b) Effect on Prior Amendments.--The amendment made by 
     subsection (a) does not affect the amendments made by 
     sections 8 through 12 of the Commodity Distribution Reform 
     Act and WIC Amendments of 1987 (Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 
     612c note), as in effect on September 30, 1998.

[[Page S6204]]

                        TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE

     SEC. 401. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as provided in section 203(h)(2), this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act take effect on October 1, 
     1998.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself and Mr. Grassley):
  S. 2167. A bill to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.) to increase the efficiency and accountability of Offices of 
Inspector General within Federal departments, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.


                inspector general act amendments of 1998

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, since coming to the Senate and assuming 
the Chairmanship of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, one 
of my top priorities has been the seemingly never-ending fight to 
ferret out and eliminate waste, fraud and abuse in federal government 
programs. We've all heard the horror stories of $500 hammers and roads 
built to nowhere. The waste of scarce federal resources not only picks 
the pockets of the taxpayers but also places severe financial pressures 
on already overburdened programs, forcing cutbacks in the delivery of 
vital government services.
  Over the past year, I have seen this waste first-hand as the 
Subcommittee put a spotlight on massive fraud in the Medicare program. 
To cite just one example, the Subcommittee's investigation revealed 
that the federal government had been sending Medicare checks to 14 
health care companies whose address, if they had existed, was in the 
middle of the runway of the Miami International Airport. That fraud 
cost the taxpayers millions of dollars, diverting scarce resources from 
the elderly and legitimate health care providers.
  This example and others like it were uncovered by my Subcommittee 
working hand-in-hand with the Inspector General's Office, whose mission 
is to identify the eliminate waste, fraud and abuse in federal 
programs. In many ways, the Inspectors General are the eyes and ears of 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in particular, and the 
Congress, in general, as we strive to detect and prevent waste, fraud, 
abuse, and mismanagement in federal programs.
  Mr. President, this year marks the 20th anniversary of the Inspector 
General Act, the law that the Congress passed to create these guardians 
of the public purse. As we recognize this anniversary, it is important 
for Congress to take a close look at the IG system.
  During the past 20 years, the Inspector General community has grown 
from 12 in 1978 to 57 Inspectors General today. These offices receive 
more than $1 billion in annual funding and employ over 10,000 auditors, 
criminal investigators, and support personnel. The Office of Inspector 
General is charged with tremendous responsibilities and is given 
considerable authority to uncover waste and abuse within the 
government.
  By and large, the IG community has done an outstanding job. They have 
made thousands of recommendations to Congress, ultimately saving 
taxpayers literally billions of dollars. Investigations by Inspectors 
General have also resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars from 
companies and individuals who defrauded the federal government. These 
investigations have been the basis for thousands of criminal 
prosecutions, debarments, exclusions and suspensions.
  The Inspectors General have a demonstrated record of success over the 
past 20 years, but as with any government program, we must be vigilant 
to ensure that the program is well managed, accountable, and effective. 
With this goal in mind and drawing on my work with the Inspectors 
General over the past year and a half, I am introducing the ``Inspector 
General Act Amendments of 1998,'' a bill to improve the accountability 
and efficiency of the Inspectors General program. I am pleased to have 
my colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, as a cosponsor.

  The bill is designed to increase the accountability and independence 
of Inspectors General. It establishes a renewable nine-year term of 
office for each of the 26 Inspectors General who are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. This provision will also 
encourage Inspectors General to serve for longer periods of time so 
that their experience and judgment can be used to fight waste, fraud 
and abuse.
  This bill also takes steps to streamline the IG Offices themselves--
making them more efficient and flexible--by consolidating existing 
offices and by reducing the volume of the inspectors general reporting 
requirements.
  The number of OIGs has increased more than four-fold in twenty years, 
and many of these are small offices with just a handful of employees. 
These small OIGs can be made far more efficient and effective by 
transferring their functions to larger, department-wide IG offices. For 
example, my bill consolidates the current stand-alone office of the 
Peace Corps, with just 15 employees, into the State Department--
eliminating unnecessary overhead and bureaucracy but continuing 
thorough audit and oversight of the Peace Corps. Under this proposal, 
seven existing small IG offices are consolidated into the IG offices of 
major departments.
  Currently, Offices of Inspectors General are required by law to 
provide semi-annual reports to Congress. My bill would increase the 
value of the report process by reducing the requirement to a single 
annual report and streamlining the information required for each 
report. For example, the new reporting requirement would require the 
IGs to identify areas within their jurisdiction which are at highest 
risk for waste, fraud and abuse. In that way, the Congress can attack 
those weak areas before they get worse and before the problems become 
more difficult to solve.
  The Inspectors General have made valuable contributions to the 
efficient operation of the federal government, but their record is not 
without blemish. For example, this successful record was recently 
tarnished by the activities of the Treasury Department's Office of 
Inspector General. After an extensive investigation, my Subcommittee 
found that this office violated federal laws in the award of two sole-
source contracts, which wasted thousands of dollars. It was disturbing 
to find that this one Inspector General's Office was itself guilty of 
wasting resources--the very office charged with preventing fraud and 
abuse. At the conclusion of that investigation, the Subcommittee asked 
the question: who is watching the watchdogs?

  Let me stress that, in my view, problems like the ones in the 
Treasury Inspector General's office are not widespread in the Inspector 
General community. However, an Inspector General is not like any other 
government manager. Inspectors General are the very officials in 
government responsible for combating waste, fraud and abuse in Federal 
programs. And as such, Inspectors General should be held to a higher 
standard. To do their job effectively, Inspectors General must be above 
reproach, must set an example for other government managers to follow, 
and must not create situations where there is even the appearance of 
impropriety. Credibility and effectiveness are lost when the office 
charged with combating waste and abuse engages in the kind of activity 
that the Inspector General is responsible for deterring.
  To increase accountability, my bill requires independent external 
reviews of the Inspector General offices every three years. It gives 
each office the flexibility to choose the most efficient method of 
review, but it does require that the watchdogs themselves submit to 
oversight by a qualified third party. This provision will help ensure 
public confidence in the management and efficiency of the IG offices.
  Finally, Mr. President, one provision that is not included in this 
bill, but that deserves careful consideration, is the grant of 
statutory law enforcement authority for the Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The Medicare fraud 
investigation conducted by my Subcommittee revealed the dangers faced 
by HHS-IG Special Agents when they work with the FBI and others to 
investigate some cases of health care fraud. These agents work side by 
side with other federal law enforcement professionals, and the Congress 
should carefully examine the best way to provide them with tools 
necessary for them to do their jobs effectively.
  Mr. President, the bill I introduce today represents the first step 
in the process to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability of the Inspector General program. These offices

[[Page S6205]]

provide valuable assistance to the Congress so that we can exercise our 
duty to oversee the operation of the federal government and to make 
sure that the taxpayer's money is well spent and not wasted. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in this effort to strengthen and improve the 
Inspectors General program into the next century.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. INOUYE:
  S.J. Res. 53. A joint resolution to express the sense of the Congress 
that the President should award a Presidential Unit Citation to the 
final crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, which was sunk on July 30, 1945; 
to the Committee on Armed Services.
 Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, today I am introducing a joint 
resolution which calls upon the President to award a Presidential Unit 
Citation to the final crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA-35) that 
recognizes the courage, fortitude and heroism displayed by the crew in 
the face of tremendous hardship and adversity after their ship was 
torpedoed and sunk on July 30, 1945.

                          ____________________