[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 75 (Thursday, June 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6181-S6205]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. CLELAND (for himself, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr.
Lieberman):
S. 2157. A bill to amend the Small Business Act to increase the
authorized funding level for women's business centers; to the Committee
on Small Business.
small business administration women's business center authorization act
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am delighted to join the Senator from
Georgia, Senator Cleland, in introducing legislation with him to expand
the authorized level of the Small Business Administration's Women's
Business Centers. I appreciate the leadership of the Senator from
Georgia on this issue.
We must provide and over the last few years have provided strong
support to help women business owners meet their greatest potential. I
am happy to say this bill does just that. The additional funding that
would be authorized in the bill will ensure that the SBA is going to
achieve the goal of establishing the Women's Business Center in every
single State by the year 1999. It will also be used to expand the
existing very successful Women's Business Centers in the currently
underserved areas of their States.
Just 10 years ago Congress established a demonstration program to
help women-owned businesses gain access to capital and assistance,
technical assistance, in business development. This program has proven
to be a really remarkable success. It has served nearly 50,000 American
women, business owners, through 54 sites in 28 States and the District
of Columbia.
Women-owned businesses have made extraordinary gains over the past
decade, and everyone in America is sharing the economic advantage that
has resulted from their endeavors. Current calculations by the Small
Business Administration indicate that women now own one-third of all
U.S. firms--more than 8 million businesses. Women-owned businesses
employ one out of every five U.S. workers, a total of 18.5 million
employees, and more people than the Fortune 500 companies. Each year,
women-owned businesses now
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contribute more than $2.38 trillion into the national economy.
In Massachusetts, where 147,000 women-owned businesses account for
over one-third of all our companies, the Center for Women and Business
Enterprise has worked to empower women in becoming economically self-
sufficient through entrepreneurship. The center provides in-depth
courses, workshops, one-on-one counseling, and access to financing for
women.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding this extraordinary record of women-
owned business, credit has always been something that has been more
difficult for women because of credit standards, and frankly some
stereotyping that historically has taken place.
Since its inception in 1995, my State's Women's Business Center has
served more than 1,000 women business owners, 40 percent of whom are
minorities. One hundred cities and towns in eastern Massachusetts are
benefiting from the programs and the activities that are available at
the center.
I will share a couple of real stories of how this has worked and what
it has done. Renata Matsson came to the Center for Women and Enterprise
in October 1995 after she had developed a medical device to assist
people suffering from chronic eye problems. But Renata didn't know how
to transform her invention to a product in a small business. After
completing an 11-week class which taught her ``the language of
business,'' she developed a detailed business plan and applied for a
grant from the Small Business Administration's Small Business
Innovation Research Program through the National Institutes of Health.
She was recently awarded a grant of $100,000. Today she is using that
grant to commercialize her technology and start her own small business.
Another example: 16 years ago, Nancy Engel was a young mother on
welfare dreaming of giving her daughter the things that she never had--
a home, financial security, and a college education. Nancy took $30
from her last welfare check and bought spices, which she then
repackaged and sold at a flea market. She earned $200 from that
investment of her $30 from her check. She then used those proceeds to
develop a small business called the Sunny Window. In 1996, she enrolled
in the Center for Women and Enterprise's business planning course.
Since she completed the course, Sunny Window has grown and now
generates $250,000 in annual revenues selling spices, dried flower
arrangements and soaps throughout the world. It now employs seven women
with what Nancy calls ``part-time mothers' hours.'' Nancy was recently
named the U.S. Small Business Administration's first Welfare-to-Work
Entrepreneur of the Year for Massachusetts. Soon she will be
volunteering for the Center for Women and Enterprise, assisting other
women entrepreneurs who are trying to make the very difficult
transition from public assistance to running their own small business.
These are just two of a myriad of stories, wonderful stories, of
success as a result of our efforts at the Federal level to assist
women-owned businesses. These success stories are, however, juxtaposed
to the reality that far too many women still face unnecessary obstacles
to developing their own businesses, ranging from the lack of access to
capital to a lack of access to government contracts, to a lack of
access to business education or even to training opportunities, not to
mention some of the fundamental resistance that has, unfortunately,
existed with respect to women's efforts to try to engage in
entrepreneurial activities.
We need to expand on the policies and programs that allow women
entrepreneurs to grow and to thrive. In turn, it is clear their
successes will benefit our country and all of our communities. We know
that women entrepreneurs are now breaking records. Women-owned business
have a startup rate twice that of male-owned counterparts. Between 1987
and 1992, the number of women-owned businesses increased by 43 percent
while business overall grew only 26 percent.
Particularly notable, women-owned companies with 100 or more workers
increased employment by 158 percent, more than double the rate for all
U.S. firms of similar size. These accomplishments illustrate the
importance of women-owned businesses to our economy, and they
underscore why we in Congress should support their growth and
development.
Last year, I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Women's
Business Centers Act of 1997, which doubled the authorization of
funding for women business center programs to $8 million for each of
the next 3 years. I was extremely pleased that the major provision of
that bill, as well as a mandate for the SBA to conduct studies on how
women businesses fare in the contracting and finance areas, was
included in the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 and was
enacted into law with President Clinton's signature.
The legislation that I join Senator Cleland in introducing today
takes the next step in developing the women's business center program
by increasing the authorization to $9 million in fiscal year 1999,
$10.5 million in the year 2000, and $12 million in 2001. I underscore
that that is a remarkably small amount of money that we are seeking to
do a large job, a job which obviously is returning extraordinary
results to the Nation.
This increased funding will ensure that the SBA achieves the goal of
establishing at least one women's business center in each State by the
end of the year in 1999 and will strengthen and expand the existing
centers. I also continue to support the development of the women's on-
line center, which is a very useful tool for women businessowners--
especially those located in rural areas--who want to avail themselves
of the women's business center technical expertise.
The legislation that Senator Cleland and I introduce today is the
beginning of a new advancement for women-owned businesses, and I am
very proud to be a part of it. I hope that all of our colleagues will
join in this important effort. I would like to take the opportunity to
thank Senator Cleland and his staff, particularly John Johnson, for the
work they have done in the preparation of this legislation.
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts,
Senator Kerry, for his work on behalf of small businesses. We are both
members of the Small Business Committee here in the Senate.
Mr. President, I speak this morning to introduce legislation with my
colleague, the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, and fellow
cosponsors, including Senators Daschle, Lautenberg, Mikulski, Abraham,
D'Amato, Breaux, Dodd, Bingaman, Kohl, Landrieu, Torricelli, Leahy,
Grassley, Snowe, Harkin, Bumpers, and Feinstein. That is an impressive
bipartisan list of Senators.
This legislation, simply stated, recognizes the outstanding
contributions that women's business centers have made to women
entrepreneurs across the Nation. In light of this outstanding
achievement in the President's budget request, I am proud to offer this
measure expressing the findings of Congress that funding for these
centers, these women's business centers, should be increased. I note
that the centers are the only organization, nationally, that focus
exclusively on entrepreneurial training for women. Increased funding
would allow for new centers and subcenters to be established and for
continued funding for existing centers, including the on-line women's
business center. Increased funding would achieve the goal of expanding
centers to all 50 States. Our legislation would increase funding for
women's business centers under the SBA in steps, from the current level
of $8 million to $9 million for fiscal year 1999, $10.5 million for
fiscal year 2000, and $12 million for fiscal year 2001.
Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to talk about four focal
points of women's business centers. The first and most important focus
is the customer. These centers have responded to women's needs by
offering training, and during accessible hours at nights and on
weekends. In addition to regular training courses, special instructions
on starting at-home child care businesses have also been offered. As
the SBA Administrator Aida Alvarez points out, the number of clients
served in the second year of the program increased by 40 percent.
Approximately 44 percent of clients served were actually socially
disadvantaged. More than 33 percent of the clients were economically
disadvantaged,
[[Page S6183]]
nearly 40 percent were minorities, and 18 percent were actually on
public assistance at the time.
Then there is the community focus. Women's business centers are a
network of more than 60 community-based women's business centers
operating in 36 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each
center offers long-term training, networking, and mentoring to
potential and existing entrepreneurs, most of whom could not or would
not start businesses without substantial help, and each center tailors
its programs to the needs of the individual community it serves.
Next is the economic focus. In terms of job growth, significantly
high numbers of full- and part-time jobs were created at average hourly
wages at least double the minimum wage. In the area of loan growth, the
number of small loans received by clients has more than doubled since
the first year of the program. In terms of small business growth, 78
percent of all center clients were startup businessowners or aspiring
entrepreneurs. The centers taught them business basics and provided
practical support and realistic encouragement.
The last focus is that of technology. The on-line women's business
center, at www.onlinewbc.org, is an interactive state-of-the-art web
site that offers virtually everything an entrepreneur needs to start
and build a successful business, including on-line training, mentoring,
individual counseling, topic forums and news groups, market research, a
comprehensive State-by-State resource and information guide, and
information on all of the SBA's programs and services, plus links to
countless other resources. This site was developed by the North Texas
Women's Business Development Center in cooperation with more than 60
women's business centers and several corporate sponsors. This summer,
information will be available in nine different languages.
Mr. President, I want to conclude my statement by thanking the
Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry. I think this legislation
offers small businesses and entrepreneurs in America hope, particularly
women businessowners and potential women businessowners. It is the hope
of a better life for oneself, one's family and community, which
actually drives entrepreneurs and also drives the economic engine in
this country, which is so vital to our well-being as a Nation. Women's
business centers are a distributor of that hope. We in Congress need to
recognize that this program works. It makes a positive difference in
the lives of so many women and the countless citizens they employ.
I hope all of my colleagues will join me in cosponsoring our
bipartisan legislation. I look forward to its future and timely
consideration in the Senate Committee on Small Business. I thank my
colleagues for the opportunity to be here this morning to present this
legislation, which I think will serve the needs of so many.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
legislation increasing the authorization for the Small Business
Administration's Women's Business Center program from $9 million in
1999 to $12 million in 2001. These centers provide management,
marketing, and financial advice to women-owned small businesses.
Mr. President, the Small Business Administration's Women's Business
Center program finances a number of very important initiatives at the
state and local levels; initiatives that have proven crucial to women
struggling to enter the job world and to start their own businesses.
These initiatives have changed the lives of a significant number of
women in Michigan and throughout the United States.
For example, Mr. President, Ann Arbor's Women's Initiative for Self-
Employment or WISE program was started in 1987 as a means by which to
provide low-income women with the tools and resources they need to
begin and expand businesses. The WISE program provides a comprehensive
package of business training, personal development workshops, credit
counseling, start-up and expansion financing, business counseling, and
mentoring. In addition to helping create and expand businesses, WISE
fights poverty, increases incomes, stabilizes families, develops skills
and sparks community renewal.
In addition, Mr. President, Grand Rapids' Opportunities for Women or
GROW provides career counseling and training for women in western
Michigan. This nonprofit group serves about 250 women per year. GROW
helps women get jobs by providing them with basic training and helping
them get funds for more specialized training. In addition, they help
women obtain appropriate clothing so that they can start work in a
professional manner.
I salute the good people at WISE and GROW for their hard work helping
the women of Michigan. They provide the kind of services we need to
revitalize troubled areas and empower women to build productive lives
for themselves and their families.
Because the Small Business Administration's Women's Business Centers
program makes these kinds of efforts possible, I believe it deserves
our full support, and merits the increase in funding called for in this
legislation. I urge my colleagues to support this important bill.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased today to join with my
colleagues, Senators Cleland and Kerry, in introducing legislation that
will bring the resources of SBA's Women's Business Center program much
closer to those seeking this help as they work to start their own
businesses. This bill does more than recognize the contributions that
women make as business owners. This bill tangibly supports and
encourages more women to become entrepreneurs.
The Office of Women's Business Ownership recently released a report
to Congress on the success of Women's Business Centers. This report
officially confirms what we already informally know: Women are
interested in owning their own businesses, and women appreciate the
targeted help the Centers offer that relates directly to the unique
opportunities and challenges that women face in creating a business.
While existing Small Business Administration offices and Small Business
Development Centers help women entrepreneurs, this report found that
more than three-fourths of the women who have turned to a Women's
Business Center appreciate its special focus. SBA offices and SBDCs do
not have the resources available to offer the same kind of help.
Our legislation will supply resources needed to establish a Women's
Business Center in each of the fifty states, including in my home state
of Vermont. Passage of this bill would give women in Vermont and in
other states direct access to information on financing, marketing and
managing their own business ventures. Under the provisions of this
bill, Vermonters would have access to the wide range of resources that
already are available to citizens in 36 other states.
The bill will also extend additional resources for the online Women's
Business Center. This resource, located at www.onlinewbc.org, provides
assistance to women who are unable to travel long distances to Centers.
With this online resource, women have access to much of the same
information that is available at the Centers, and they can ask
questions of specialists, all with the click of a mouse. Our bill would
enable the Center to expand its online services to women in business.
Even without the resources of a Women's Business Center, Vermont is a
leader in women-owned businesses. The number of women entrepreneurs in
Vermont has almost doubled over the last ten years. Women now own more
than thirty-eight percent of all businesses in Vermont, which is above
the national average of thirty-six percent. Women also employ thirty
percent of Vermont's workers, which also exceeds the national average.
Women have faced unique obstacles and challenges in starting and
growing businesses. Some obstacles have been lowered in recent years,
and we can all hope that this progress will continue. One step we can
take to promote continued progress is by bringing the resources of
Women's Business Centers to more women entrepreneurs. We must encourage
more Vermont women to tap into this incredible growth. An SBA Women's
Business Center in Vermont will do just that by providing women with
the framework and support necessary to thrive and excel as business
owners.
______
By Mr. THOMPSON (for himself and Mr. Breaux):
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S. 2161. A bill to provide Government-wide accounting of regulatory
costs and benefits, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs.
regulatory right-to-know act of 1998
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I am introducing the
``Regulatory Right-to-Know Act'' of 1998. I believe that this
legislation will serve as an important tool to promote the public's
right to know about the benefits and burdens of regulation; to increase
the accountability of government to the people it serves; and,
ultimately, to improve the quality of our government.
This continues the effort begun by Senator Stevens, then the Chairman
of the Governmental Affairs Committee, when he passed the Stevens
Regulatory Accounting Amendment in 1996. This legislation would not
change any statutory or regulatory standard; it simply would provide
information to help the public, Congress and the President to
understand the scope and performance of our regulatory system. As OMB
stated in its first report under the Stevens Amendment, ``Over time,
regulation . . . has become increasingly prevalent in our society, and
the importance of our regulatory activities cannot be overstated.'' It
is my hope that more information on the benefits and costs of
regulation will help us make smarter decisions to get more of the good
things that sensible regulation can deliver, and reduce needless waste
and redtape at the same time. That's plain common sense.
Regulations have played an important role in improving our quality of
life--cleaner air, quality products, safer workplaces, and reliable
economic markets--to name a few of the good things that sensible
regulation can produce. Achieving these benefits does not come without
cost. In its first regulatory accounting report, OMB estimated that the
annual cost of regulation of the environment, health, safety and the
economy is about $300 billion. Other studies, which include the full
costs of paperwork and economic transfers, estimate that regulation
costs about $700 billion annually. Those costs are passed on to
American consumers and taxpayers through higher prices, diminished
wages, increased taxes, or reduced government services. The tab for the
average American household is thousands of dollars each year--$7,000
per year by some estimates. At the same time, the public wants and
deserves better results from our regulatory system. As the costs of
regulation rise with public expectations of better results, the need is
greater than ever to get a handle on how regulatory programs are
performing, so we can find ways for our government to perform better.
It's no surprise that the seriousness of this need is not widely
appreciated, because the costs of regulation are not as obvious as many
other costs of government, such as the taxes we pay each year; and the
benefits of regulation often are diffuse. But there is substantial
evidence that the current regulatory system often misses opportunities
for greater benefits and lower costs. As noted by the President's chief
spokesperson on regulatory policy, Sally Katzen:
Regrettably, the regulatory system that has been built up
over the past five decades . . . is subject to serious
criticism . . . [on the grounds] that there are too many
regulations, that many are excessively burdensome, [and] that
many do not ultimately provide the intended benefits.
Our regulatory goals are too important, and our resources are too
precious, to miss out on opportunities to do better.
It's time to move toward a more open and accountable regulatory
system. I am pleased to be introducing this bill with Senator Breaux.
It's important that members from both sides of the aisle work together
to solve these problems. I appreciate that Chairman Tom Bliley
introduced a similar bill in the House last fall, and I look forward to
working with him. Finally, I appreciate the effort that a few dedicated
professionals put into OMB's first regulatory accounting report. While
this report is certainly not perfect, it shows that regulatory
accounting is doable and can help us better understand the benefits and
burdens of regulation. Now let's do better. This bill will promote some
important improvements, including:
Making regulatory accounting a permanent requirement.
Adding requirements for a more complete picture, including, to the
extent feasible, the costs and benefits of particular programs, not
just an aggregate picture, as well as an analysis of regulation's
impacts on the State and local government, the private sector, and the
federal government.
Ensuring higher quality of information. Requirements for OMB
guidelines and peer review should improve future reports.
Ensuring better compliance with basic legislative requirements which
the first report neglected. These deficiencies include failing to
recommend improvements to current programs; failing to assess the
indirect effects of regulation; failing to provide information on
specific programs where feasible; and failing to provide a full
accounting of all mandates. This bill will help address these problems.
As OMB said in their first regulatory accounting report,
``regulations (like other instruments of government policy) have
enormous potential for both good and harm.'' I believe that better
information will help us to increase the benefits of regulation and
decrease unnecessary waste and red tape. I think we need to work
together to contribute to the success of government programs the public
values, while enhancing the economic security and well-being of our
families and communities.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the ``Regulatory Right-
to-Know Act'' be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2161
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Regulatory Right-to-Know Act
of 1998''.
SEC. 2. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are to--
(1) promote the public right-to-know about the costs and
benefits of Federal regulatory programs and rules;
(2) improve the quality of Federal regulatory programs and
rules;
(3) increase Government accountability; and
(4) encourage open communication among Federal agencies,
the public, the President, and Congress regarding regulatory
priorities.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any executive
department, military department, Government corporation,
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in
the executive branch of the Government (including the
Executive Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency, but shall not include--
(A) the General Accounting Office;
(B) the Federal Election Commission;
(C) the governments of the District of Columbia and of the
territories and possessions of the United States, and their
various subdivisions; or
(D) Government-owned contractor-operated facilities,
including laboratories engaged in national defense research
and production activities.
(2) Benefit.--The term ``benefit'' means the reasonably
identifiable significant favorable effects, quantifiable and
nonquantifiable, including social, health, safety,
environmental, economic, and distributional effects, that are
expected to result from implementation of, or compliance
with, a rule.
(3) Cost.--The term ``cost'' means the reasonably
identifiable significant adverse effects, quantifiable and
nonquantifiable, including social, health, safety,
environmental, economic, and distributional effects, that are
expected to result from implementation of, or compliance
with, a rule.
(4) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, acting through the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs.
(5) Major rule.--The term ``major rule'' means a rule
that--
(A) the agency proposing the rule or the Director
reasonably determines is likely to have an annual effect on
the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably
quantifiable costs; or
(B) is otherwise designated a major rule by the Director on
the ground that the rule is likely to adversely affect, in a
material way, the economy, a sector of the economy, including
small business, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or
tribal governments, or communities.
(6) Program element.--The term ``program element'' means a
rule or related set of rules.
(7) Rule.--The term ``rule'' has the same meaning given
such term in section 551(4) of title 5, United States Code,
except that such term shall not include--
(A) administrative actions governed by sections 556 and 557
of title 5, United States Code;
[[Page S6185]]
(B) rules issued with respect to a military or foreign
affairs function of the United States; or
(C) rules related to agency organization, management, or
personnel.
SEC. 4. ACCOUNTING STATEMENT.
(a) In General.--
(1) Administration.--The President, acting through the
Director, shall be responsible for implementing and
administering the requirements of this Act.
(2) Accounting statement.--Not later than January 2000, and
each January every 2 years thereafter, the President shall
prepare and submit to Congress an accounting statement that
estimates the costs and corresponding benefits of Federal
regulatory programs and program elements in accordance with
this section.
(b) Years Covered by Accounting Statement.--Each accounting
statement (other than the initial accounting statement)
submitted under this Act shall cover, at a minimum, the costs
and corresponding benefits for each of the 5 fiscal years
preceding October 1 of the year in which the report is
submitted. Each statement shall also contain, at a minimum, a
projection of the costs and corresponding benefits for each
of the next 10 fiscal years, based on rules in effect or
projected to take effect. The statement may cover any fiscal
year preceding such fiscal years for the purpose of revising
previous estimates.
(c) Timing and Procedures.--
(1) Notice and comment.--The President shall provide notice
and opportunity for comment, including consultation with the
Comptroller General of the United States, for each accounting
statement.
(2) Timing.--The President shall propose the first
accounting statement under this section no later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act. Such statement shall
cover, at a minimum, each of the preceding fiscal years
beginning with fiscal year 1997.
(d) Contents of Accounting Statement.--
(1) Estimates of costs.--An accounting statement shall
estimate the costs of all Federal regulatory programs and
program elements, including paperwork costs, by setting
forth, for each year covered by the statement--
(A) the annual expenditure of national economic resources
for each regulatory program and program elements; and
(B) such other quantitative and qualitative measures of
costs as the President considers appropriate.
(2) Estimates of benefits.--An accounting statement shall
estimate the corresponding benefits of Federal regulatory
programs and program elements by setting forth, for each year
covered by the statement, such quantitative and qualitative
measures of benefits as the President considers appropriate.
Any estimates of benefits concerning reduction in health,
safety, or environmental risks shall be based on sound and
objective scientific practices and shall present the most
plausible level of risk practical, along with a statement of
the reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
(3) Presentation of results.--
(A) Costs and benefits categories.--To the extent feasible,
the costs and benefits under this subsection shall be listed
under the following categories:
(i) In the aggregate.
(ii) By agency, agency program, and program element.
(iii) By major rule.
(B) Quantification.--To the extent feasible, the Director
shall quantify the net benefits or net costs under
subparagraph (A).
(C) Cost estimates.--In presenting estimates of costs in
the accounting statement, the Director shall provide
estimates for the following sectors:
(i) Private sector costs.
(ii) Federal sector administrative costs.
(iii) Federal sector compliance costs.
(iv) State and local government administrative costs.
(v) State and local government compliance costs.
SEC. 5. ASSOCIATED REPORT TO CONGRESS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Submission.--In each year following the year in which
the President submits an accounting statement under section
4, the President, acting through the Director, shall, after
notice and opportunity for comment, submit to Congress a
report associated with the accounting statement (hereinafter
referred to as an ``associated report'').
(2) Content.--The associated report shall contain, in
accordance with this section--
(A) analyses of impacts;
(B) identification and analysis of jurisdictional overlaps,
duplications, and potential inconsistencies among Federal
regulatory programs; and
(C) recommendations for reform.
(b) Analyses of Impacts.--The President shall include in
the associated report the following:
(1) Analyses.--Analyses prepared by the president of the
cumulative impact of Federal regulatory programs covered in
the accounting statement. Factors to be considered in such
report shall include impacts on the following:
(A) The ability of State and local governments to provide
essential services, including police, fire protection, and
education.
(B) Small business.
(C) Productivity.
(D) Wages.
(E) Economic growth.
(F) Technological innovation.
(G) Employment and income distribution.
(H) Consumer prices for goods and services.
(I) Such other factors considered appropriate by the
President.
(2) Summary.--A summary of any independent analyses of
impacts prepared by persons commenting during the comment
period on the accounting statement.
(c) Recommendations for Reform.--The President shall
include in the associated report the following:
(1) Presidential recommendations.--A summary of
recommendations of the President for reform or elimination of
any Federal regulatory program or program element that does
not represent sound use of national economic resources or
otherwise is inefficient.
(2) Recommendations from commenters.--A summary of any
recommendations for such reform or elimination of Federal
regulatory programs or program elements prepared by persons
commenting during the comment period on the accounting
statement.
SEC. 6. GUIDANCE FROM OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in consultation
with the Council of Economic Advisers, issue guidelines to
agencies--
(1) to standardize measures of costs and benefits in
accounting statements prepared pursuant to this Act,
including guidance on estimating the costs and corresponding
benefits of regulatory programs and program elements; and
(2) to standardize the format of the accounting statements.
(b) Review.--The Director shall review submissions from
agencies to assure consistency with the guidelines under this
section.
SEC. 7. PEER REVIEW.
(a) In General.--
(1) Scope.--The Director shall provide for independent and
external peer review of--
(A) the guidelines issued under section 6; and
(B) each accounting statement and associated report.
(2) Use of comments.--The Director shall use the peer
review comments in preparing the final statement and report.
(b) Review.--Peer review under subsection (a) shall--
(1) involve participants who--
(A) have expertise in the economic and technical issues
germane to regulatory accounting and economic and scientific
analysis; and
(B) are independent of the Government;
(2) be completed in a timely manner, consistent with
applicable deadlines;
(3) provide written comments to the Director containing a
balanced presentation of all considerations; and
(4) not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.).
(c) Response.--The Director shall provide a written
response to all significant peer review comments. Such
comments and responses shall be made available to the public.
SEC. 8. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE.
After each accounting statement and associated report is
submitted to Congress, the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office shall make recommendations to the President--
(1) for improving agency compliance with this Act and the
guidelines under section 6; and
(2) for improving accounting statements and associated
reports prepared under this Act, including recommendations on
level of detail, accuracy, and quality of analysis.
______
By Mr. MACK (for himself and Mr. Grams):
S. 2162. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to more accurately codify the depreciable life of printed
wiring board and printed wiring assembly equipment; to the
Committee on Finance.
printed circuit investment act of 1998
Mr. MACK. Mr. President, today Senator Grams and I introduce
the Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1998. This bill would allow
manufacturers of printed wiring boards and assemblies, known as the
electronic interconnection industry, to depreciate their production
equipment in 3 years rather than the 5 year period under current law.
As we approach the 21st Century, our Nation's Tax Code should not
stand in the way of technological progress. Printed wiring boards and
assemblies are literally central to our economy, as they are the nerve
centers of nearly every electronic device from camcorders and
televisions to medical devices, computers and defense systems. But the
Tax Code places U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage relative to their
Asian competitors, because of different depreciation treatment. This
disadvantage is particularly difficult for U.S. firms to bear, as the
interconnection industry consists overwhelmingly of small firms that
cannot easily absorb the costs inflicted by an irrationally-long
depreciation schedule.
[[Page S6186]]
As technology continues to advance at light speed, the exhilaration
of competition in a dynamic market is dampened by the effects of a Tax
Code that has not kept pace with these changes. Obsolete
interconnection manufacturing equipment is kept on the books long after
this equipment has gone out the door. Companies with the competitive
fire to enter such a rapidly-evolving industry must constantly invest
in new state-of-the-art equipment, replacing obsolete equipment every
18 to 36 months just to remain competitive. U.S. investments in new
printed wiring board and assembly manufacturing equipment have nearly
tripled since 1991--growing from $847 million to an estimated $2.4
billion.
But this investment is taxed at an artificially-high rate, because
deductions for the cost of the equipment are spread over a period that
is several years longer than justified. The industry is at the mercy of
tax laws passed in the 1980s, which were based on 1970s-era electronics
technology. It is no wonder that the market share of U.S.
interconnection companies has been cut in half over this period. Our
Tax Code should not continue to undermine the competitiveness of
American businesses. The opportunity is before us to correct the tax
laws that dictate how rapidly board manufacturers and electronics
assemblers can depreciate equipment needed to fabricate and assemble
circuit boards.
The Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1998 will provide modest tax
relief to the electronics interconnection industry and the 250,000
Americans, residing in every state of the Union, whose jobs rely on the
success of this industry. This industry should get fair and accurate
tax treatment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2162
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Printed Circuit Investment
Act of 1998''.
SEC. 2. 3-YEAR DEPRECIBLE LIFE FOR PRINTED WIRING BOARD AND
PRINTED WIRING ASSEMBLY EQUIPMENT.
(a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 168(e)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to classification
of property) is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of
clause (ii), by striking the period at the end of clause
(iii) and inserting ``, and'', and by adding at the end the
following new clause:
``(iv) any printed wiring board or printed wiring assembly
equipment.''
(b) 3-Year Class Life.--Subparagraph (B) of section
168(g)(3) of such Code is amended by inserting after the item
relating to subparagraph (A)(iii) the following new item:
``(A)(iv)....................................................3''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to equipment placed in service after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Thurmond, Mr.
Sessions, and Mr. Kyl):
S. 2163. A bill to modify the procedures of the Federal courts in
certain matters, to reform prisoner litigation, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
judicial improvement act of 1998
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with
Senators Thurmond, Abraham, and Ashcroft, the Judicial Improvement Act
of 1998; legislation that will restore public confidence in our
democratic process by strengthening the constitutional division of
powers between the Federal government and the States and between
Congress and the Courts. On the whole, our federal judges are
respectful of their constitutional roles, yet a degree of overreaching
by some dictates that Congress move to more clearly delineate the
proper role of Federal judges in our constitutional system.
Increasingly, judges forget that the Constitution has committed to them
the power to interpret law, but reserved to Congress the power to
legislate.
This careful balancing of legislative and judicial functions is vital
to our constitutional system. Regardless of how much we, as
individuals, may approve of the results of a certain judge's decision,
we must look beyond short-term political interests and remember the
importance of preserving our Constitution.
Attempts by certain jurists to encroach upon legislative authority
deeply concern me. I have taken the floor in this chamber on numerous
occasions to recite some of the more troubling examples of judicial
overreaching. I will not revisit them today. Suffice it to say that
activism, and by that I mean a judge who ignores the written text of
the law, whether from the right or the left, threatens our
constitutional structure.
As an elected official, my votes for legislation are subject to voter
approval. Federal judges, however, are unelected, hence they are, as a
practical matter, unaccountable to the public. While tenure during good
behavior, which amounts to life tenure, is important in that it frees
judges to make unpopular, but constitutionally sound, decisions, it can
become a threat to liberty when placed in the wrong hands. Alexander
Hamilton, in the 78th Federalist, warned of the problem when judges
``substitute their own pleasures to the constitutional intentions of
the legislature.'' [Federalist No. 78, A. Hamilton]. Hamilton declared
that ``The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise Will instead of Judgment, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
legislative body.'' [Ibid.]. And substituting the will of life-tenured
federal judges for the democratically elected representatives is not
what our Constitution's framers had in mind.
In an effort to avoid this long-contemplated problem, the proposed
reform legislation we are introducing today will assist in ensuring
that all three branches of the federal government work together in a
fashion contemplated by, and consistent with, the Constitution. In
addition, this legislation will ensure that federal judges are more
respectful of the States.
This bill is not, as some would claim, an assault on the Federal
Judiciary. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of our Federal judges
would find repugnant the idea of imposing their personal views on the
people in lieu of Federal or State law. However, there are currently
some activist Federal judges improperly expanding their roles to quash
the will of the people. These individuals view themselves as so-called
platonic guardians, and believe they know what is in the people's best
interest. Judges, however, are simply not entitled to deviate from
their roles as interpreters of the law to create new law from the
bench. If they believe otherwise, they are derelict in their duties and
should resign to run for public office--at least then they would be
accountable for their actions. It is time that we pass legislation that
precludes any Federal judge from blurring the lines separating the
legislative and judicial functions.
It is important to note that the effort to reign in judicial activism
should not be limited simply to opposing potential activist nominees.
While the careful scrutiny of judicial nominees is one important step
in the process, a step reserved to the Senate alone, Congress itself
has an obligation to the public to ensure that judges fulfill their
constitutionally assigned roles and do not encroach upon those powers
delegated to the legislature. Hence, the Congress performs an important
role in bringing activist decisions to light and, where appropriate,
publicly criticizing those decisions. Some view this as an assault upon
judicial independence. That is untrue. It is merely a means of engaging
in debate about a decision's merits or the process by which the
decision was reached. Such criticism is a healthy part of our
democratic system. While life tenure insulates judges from the
political process, it should not, and must not, isolate them from the
people.
In addition, the Constitution grants Congress the authority, with a
few notable limitations, to set federal courts' jurisdiction. This is
an important tool that, while seldom used, sets forth the circumstances
in which the judicial power may be exercised. A good example of this is
the 104th Congress' effort to reform the statutory writ of habeas
corpus in an attempt to curb the seemingly endless series of petitions
filed by convicted criminals bent on thwarting the demands of justice.
Legislation of this nature, actually called for by the Chief Justice
and praised in his recent annual report, is an important means of
curbing activism.
[[Page S6187]]
To this end, I have chosen to introduce the Federal Judicial
Improvement Act. It is a small, albeit meaningful, step in the right
direction. Notably, this legislation will change the way federal courts
review constitutional challenges to State and federal laws. The
existing process allows a single federal judge to hear and grant
applications regarding the constitutionality of State and federal laws
as well as state ballot initiatives. In other words, a single federal
judge can impede the will of a majority of the voters merely by issuing
an order halting the implementation of a state referendum.
This proposed reform will accomplish the twin goals of fighting
judicial activism and preserving the democratic process. This bill
modestly proposes to respond to the problem of judicial activism by:
1. Requiring a three judge district court panel to hear
appeals and grant interlocutory or permanent injunctions
based on the constitutionality of the state law or
referendum.
2. Placing time limitations on remedial authority in any
civil action in which prospective relief or a consent
judgment binds State or local officials.
3. Prohibiting a Federal court from having the authority to
order State or local governments to increase taxes as part of
a judicial remedy.
4. Preventing a Federal court from prohibiting State or
local officials from reprosecuting a defendant. AND
5. Preventing a Federal court from ordering the release of
violent offenders under unwarranted circumstances.
This reform bill is a long overdue effort to minimize the potential
for judicial activism in the federal court system. Americans are
understandably frustrated when they exercise their right to vote and
the will of their elected representatives is thwarted by judges who
enjoy life tenure. It's no wonder that millions of Americans don't
think their vote matters when they enact a referendum only to have it
enjoined by a single district court judge. By improving the way federal
courts analyze constitutional challenges to laws and initiatives,
Congress will protect the rights of parties to challenge
unconstitutional laws while at the same time reduce the ability of
activist judges to abuse their power and stifle the will of the people.
I want to take a few moments to describe how this legislation will
curb the ability of federal judges to engage in judicial activism. The
first reform would require a three judge panel to hear and issue
interlocutory and permanent injunctions regarding challenged laws at
the district court level. The current system allows a single federal
judge to restrain the enforcement, operation and execution of
challenged federal or state laws, including initiatives. There have
been many instances where an activist judge has used this power to
overturn a ballot initiative only to have his or her order overturned
by a higher court years later.
For example, this change would have prevented U.S. District Court
Judge Thelton Henderson from issuing an injunction barring enforcement
of Proposition 209, a ballot initiative which prohibited affirmative
action in California. Judge Henderson's order was subsequently
overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the
law was constitutional and that Judge Henderson thwarted the will of
the people. A three judge panel would have prevented Henderson from
acting on his own, and perhaps would have ruled correctly in the first
place.
Now, I have no problem with a court declaring a law unconstitutional
when it violates the written text of the Constitution. It is, however,
inappropriate when a judge, like Judge Henderson, attempts to act like
a super-legislator and imposes his own policy preference on the
citizens of a State. Such an action weakens respect for the federal
judiciary, creates cynicism in the voting public, and costs the
government millions of dollars in legal fees. By requiring a three
judge panel, the proposed law would eliminate the ability of one
activist judge to unilaterally bar enforcement of a law or ballot
initiative through an interlocutory or permanent injunction.
In addition, new time limits on injunctive relief would be imposed. A
temporary restraining order would remain in force no more than 10 days,
and an interlocutory injunction no more than 60 days. After the
expiration of an interlocutory injunction, federal courts would lack
the authority to grant any additional interlocutory relief but would
still have the power to issue a permanent injunction. These limitations
are designed to prevent the federal judiciary from indefinitely barring
implementation of challenged laws by issuing endless injunctions, and
facilitate the appeals process by motivating courts to speedily handle
constitutional challenges.
We need only to look at the legal wrangling over Proposition 187 to
see the need for these time constraints. The California initiative was
overwhelmingly approved in 1994 with almost 60 percent of the vote and
was designed to end all social services and other benefits to illegal
aliens. The referendum was supported by voters who felt that they as
taxpayers didn't have the ability to provide those who break
immigration laws with free health, education and welfare. Opponents who
lost at the ballot box went to federal court the next day and obtained
an injunction prohibiting enforcement of 187, and to this day it has
never been the law of the state of California.
U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer issued a preliminary injunction
soon after the 1994 election and ruled way back in 1995 that part of
187 was unconstitutional. The injunction stayed in effect and she
finally ruled on the rest of the initiative in March of this year, when
she found that an additional portion of the initiative was
unconstitutional. The proposed time limitation on injunctions would
have been an incentive for the judge to rule promptly on the issues at
hand, and precluded her from indefinitely delaying enforcement of the
proposition without ruling. What this reform essentially does is
encourage the federal judiciary to rule on the merits of a case, and
not use injunctions to keep a challenged law from going into effect or
being heard by an appeals court through the use of delaying tactics.
The bill also proposes to require that a notice of appeal must be
filed not more than fourteen days after the date of an order granting
an interlocutory injunction and the appeals court would lack
jurisdiction over an untimely appeal of such an order. The court of
appeals would apply a de novo standard of review before reconsidering
the merits of granting relief, but not less than 100 days after the
issuance of the original order granting interlocutory relief. If the
interlocutory order is upheld on appeal, the order would remain in
force no longer than 60 days after the date of the appellate decision
or until replaced by a permanent injunction.
The bill also proposes limitations on the remedial authority of
federal courts. In any civil action where prospective relief or a
consent judgment binds state and local officials, relief would be
terminated upon the motion of any party or intervener:
a) five years after the date the court granted or approved the
prospective relief;
b) two years after the date the court has entered an order denying
termination of prospective relief; or
c) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment
of this act, two years after the date of enactment.
Parties could agree to terminate or modify an injunction before
relief is available if it otherwise would be legally permissible.
Courts would promptly rule on motions to modify or terminate this
relief and in the event that a motion is not ruled on within 60 days,
the order or consent judgment binding State and local officials would
automatically terminate.
However, prospective relief would not terminate if the federal court
makes written findings based on the record that relief remains
necessary to correct an ongoing violation of a federal right, extends
no further than necessary to correct the violation and is the least
intrusive means available to correct the violation of a federal right.
This measure would also prohibit a federal court from having the
authority to order a unit of state or local government to increase
taxes as part of a judicial remedy. When an unelected Federal judge has
the power to order tax increases, this results in taxation without
representation. Americans have fought against unfair taxation since the
Revolutionary War, and this bill would prevent unfair judicial taxation
and leave the power to tax to elected representatives of the people.
[[Page S6188]]
The bill would not limit the authority of a Federal court to order a
remedy which may lead a unit of local or State government to decide to
increase taxes. A Federal court would still have the power to issue a
money judgment against a State because the court would not
be attempting to restructure local government entities or mandating a
particular method or structure of State or local financing. This bill
also doesn't limit the remedial authority of State courts in any case,
including cases raising issues of federal law. All the bill does is
prevent Federal courts from having the power to order elected
representatives to raise taxes. This is moderate reform which prevents
judicial activism and unfair taxation while preserving the Federal
courts power to order remedial measures.
Another important provision of the bill would prevent a federal court
from prohibiting State or local officials from re-prosecuting a
defendant. This legislation is designed to clarify that federal habeas
courts lack the authority to bar retrial as a remedy.
This part of the legislation was co-sponsored by Congressman Pitts
and Senator Specter in response to a highly-publicized murder case in
the Congressman's district. Sixteen year old Laurie Show was harassed,
stalked and assaulted for six months by the defendant, who had a
vendetta against Show for briefly dating the defendant's boyfriend.
After luring Show's mother from their residence, the defendant and an
accomplice forcefully entered the Show home, held the victim down, and
slit her throat with a butcher knife, killing her. After the defendant
was convicted in State court, she filed a habeas petition in which she
alleged prosecutorial misconduct and averred her actual innocence.
Federal district court judge Stewart Dalzell not only accepted this
argument and released the defendant, but he also took the extraordinary
step of barring state and local officials from reprosecuting the woman.
Judge Dalzell stated that the defendant was the ``first and foremost
victim of this affair.''
Congress has long supported the ability of a Federal court to fashion
creative remedies to preserve constitutional protections, but the
additional step of barring state or local officials from reprosecution
is without precedent and an unacceptable intrusion on the rights of
states. This bill, if enacted, will prevent this type of judicial
activism from ever occurring again.
This bill also contains provisions for the termination of prospective
relief when it is no longer warranted to cure a violation of a federal
right. Once a violation that was the subject of a consent decree has
been corrected, a consent decree must be terminated unless the court
finds that an ongoing violation of a federal right exists, the specific
relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and no
other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right. The party
opposing the termination of relief has the burden of demonstrating why
the relief should not be terminated, and the court is required to grant
the motion to terminate if the opposing party fails to meet its burden.
These provisions prevent consent decrees from remaining in effect once
a proper remedy has been implemented, thereby preventing judges from
imposing consent decrees that go beyond the requirements of law.
The proposed reform law also includes provisions designed to dissuade
prisoners from filing frivolous and malicious motions by requiring that
the complainant prisoner pay for the costs of the filings. These
provisions will undoubtedly curb the number of frivolous motions filed
by prisoners and thus, relieve the courts of the obligation to hear
these vacuous motions designed to mock and frustrate the judicial
system.
Finally, the bill proposes to prevent federal judges from entering or
carrying out any prisoner release order that would result in the
release from or nonadmission to a prison on the basis of prison
conditions. This provision will effectively preclude activist judges
from circumventing mandatory minimum sentencing laws by stripping the
federal judges of jurisdiction to enter such orders. This will ensure
that the tough sentencing laws approved by voters to keep murderers,
rapists, and drug dealers behind bars for lengthy terms will not be
ignored by activist judges who improperly use complaints of prison
conditions filed by convicts as a vehicle to release violent offenders
back on our streets.
For an example of this activism, I offer the rulings of a jurist whom
I have mentioned before, Federal Judge Norma Shapiro, who sits on the
Federal bench in Philadelphia. Judge Shapiro has a different view of
what prison life should be: a view completely divergent from the view
of the general public and, most importantly, the law.
Judge Shapiro used complaints filed by inmates to impose her activist
views and wrestle control of the prison system by setting a cap on the
number of prisoners that can be incarcerated in Pennsylvania. When
faced with the opportunity to extend her judicial powers and seize
control of the prison system, Judge Shapiro jumped at the chance and
the results have been disastrous.
The cap imposed by Judge Shapiro forced the release of 500 prisoners
a week. Because of this cap, in a time period of 18 months alone, 9,732
arrestees were released on Philadelphia. Of course, many were re-
arrested on other charges, including 79 murders, 90 rapes, 701
burglaries, 959 robberies, 1,113 assaults, 2,215 drug offenses and
2,748 thefts. [Philadelphia Inquirer]. Releasing dangerous criminals on
to the streets to reek havoc and violence is the ultimate slap in the
faces of law enforcement and justice. How can we expect law enforcement
to provide protection and safe streets if at every turn there is a
Judge Shapiro waiting anxiously for the chance to release lawlessness
on our communities? This reform bill will prevent Judge Shapiro and
other like-minded judges from ever endangering families and children in
our communities again by preventing these Judges from releasing
prisoners based on prison conditions.
Prison life is not supposed to be pleasant or comfortable; rather, it
is supposed to serve as a deterrent to future crime. I would be worried
if no prisoners were filing complaints because they actually found
prison life to be acceptable. But it seems that some activist judges
are willing to believe any prisoner complaint equates or rises to the
level of a constitutional violation. It seems that in some courtrooms,
if a prisoner simply files a complaint alleging prison conditions
aren't laudable or praiseworthy, chances are good that that prisoner,
and many others, will be released from custody early, sometimes
immediately, thanks to the misguided activism of the judge hearing the
complaint. This is absolutely unacceptable and this proposed law will
put a stop to the agendas of some activist judges who believe every
argument that the ACLU and guilty, but bored, convicts offer up.
This overdue legislation is a measured effort to improve the way the
federal judiciary works. It fights judicial activism and actually
improves the way constitutional appeals are handled. This reform bill
is a sensible, balanced attempt to promote judicial efficiency and to
prevent egregious judicial activism. I encourage my colleagues to act
swiftly on this needed reform.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this measure be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2163
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Judicial
Improvement Act of 1998''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Procedures for certain injunctions.
Sec. 3. Limitations on remedial authority.
Sec. 4. Interlocutory appeals of court orders relating to class
actions.
Sec. 5. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction of district courts.
Sec. 6. Appeals of Merit Systems Protection Board.
Sec. 7. Extension of Judiciary Information Technology Fund.
Sec. 8. Authorization for voluntary services.
Sec. 9. Offsetting receipts.
Sec. 10. Sunset of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans.
Sec. 11. Creation of certifying officers in the judicial branch.
Sec. 12. Limitation on collateral relief.
Sec. 13. Laurie Show victim protection.
Sec. 14. Rule of construction relating to retroactive application of
statutes.
[[Page S6189]]
Sec. 15. Appropriate remedies for prison conditions.
Sec. 16. Limitation on fees.
Sec. 17. Notice of malicious filings.
Sec. 18. Limitation on prisoner release orders.
Sec. 19. Repeal of section 140.
Sec. 20. Severability.
SEC. 2. PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN INJUNCTIONS.
(a) Requirement of 3-Judge Court.--
(1) In general.--No interlocutory or permanent injunction
restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of a
State law adopted by referendum or an Act of Congress shall
be granted by a United States district court or judge thereof
upon the ground that the State law conflicts with the United
States Constitution, Federal law, or a treaty of the United
States unless the application for the injunction is heard and
determined by a court of 3 judges in accordance with section
2284 of title 28, United States Code.
(2) Appeals.--Any appeal of a determination on such
application shall be to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
(3) Designation of judges.--In any case to which this
section applies, the additional judges who will serve on the
3-judge court shall be designated under section 2284(b)(1) of
title 28, United States Code, as soon as practicable, and the
court shall expedite the consideration of the application for
an injunction.
(4) Denial of request.--Nothing in this subsection shall
prevent a district court judge from denying a request for
interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief.
(b) Time Limits on Injunctive Relief.--
(1) Temporary restraining order.--Section 2284(b)(3) of
title 28, United States Code, is amended in the second
sentence by inserting before the period, the following: ``,
but in no event shall the order remain in force for longer
than 10 days''.
(2) Interlocutory injunction.--Any interlocutory injunction
restraining the enforcement or operation of a State law
adopted by referendum or an Act of Congress shall remain in
force for not longer than 60 days. The Federal courts shall
lack the authority to grant any additional interlocutory
relief after the expiration of an interlocutory injunction.
Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the court's authority
to issue a permanent injunction after an interlocutory
injunction has expired. If the order granting the
interlocutory injunction is appealed, the time limits of
paragraph (4) apply.
(3) Filing of appeal.--A notice of appeal from an order
granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the
enforcement or operation, of a State law adopted by
referendum or an Act of Congress shall be filed not later
than 14 days after the date of the order. The Courts of
Appeals lack jurisdiction over an untimely appeal of such an
order.
(4) Consideration of appeal.--If an appeal is filed from an
order granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the
enforcement or operation of a State law adopted by referendum
or an Act of Congress, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider
the merits of granting interlocutory relief applying a de
novo standard of review. The Court of Appeals shall dispose
of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, but in any event
within 100 days after the issuance of the original order
granting interlocutory relief. If the interlocutory order is
upheld on appeal, the interlocutory order shall remain in
force no longer than 60 days after the date of the appellate
decision or until replaced by a permanent injunction.
(c) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``State'' means each of the several States and
the District of Columbia;
(2) the term ``State law'' means the constitution of a
State, or any statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or other
measure of a State that has the force of law, and any
amendment thereto; and
(3) the term ``referendum'' means the submission to popular
vote of a measure passed upon or proposed by a legislative
body or by popular initiative.
(d) Effective Date.--This section applies to any injunction
that is issued on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 3. LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIAL AUTHORITY.
(a) Termination of Prospective Relief.--
(1) In general.--In any civil action in which prospective
relief is issued which binds State or local officials or in
any civil action in which the parties entered a consent
judgment binding State or local officials, such relief shall
be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener--
(A) 5 years after the date the court granted or approved
the prospective relief;
(B) 2 years after the date the court has entered an order
denying termination of prospective relief under this
paragraph; or
(C) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of
enactment of this Act, 2 years after the date of enactment.
(2) Limitation.--Prospective relief shall not terminate if
the court makes written findings based on the record that
prospective relief--
(A) remains necessary to correct current and ongoing
violation of a Federal right;
(B) extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of a Federal right; and
(C) is the least intrusive means available to correct the
violation of a Federal right.
(3) Termination and modification authority otherwise
unaffected.--Nothing in this section shall prevent any party
or intervener from seeking modification or termination before
relief is available under paragraph (1), to the extent that
modification or termination would otherwise be legally
permissible, and nothing in this section shall prevent the
parties from agreeing to terminate or modify an injunction
before such relief is available under paragraph (1).
(4) Conformity with other laws.--Nothing in this section
shall affect the rules governing prospective relief in any
civil action with respect to prison conditions.
(5) Procedure for motion to terminate.--
(A) In general.--The court shall rule promptly on any
motion to modify or terminate relief.
(B) Automatic termination.--In the event a court does not
rule on a motion to terminate filed under paragraph (1)
within 60 days, the order or consent judgment binding State
or local officials will automatically terminate and be of no
further legal force.
(b) Special Masters.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Appointment.--In any civil action in a Federal court,
the Federal court may appoint a special master who shall be
disinterested and objective.
(B) Remedial phase.--The court shall appoint a special
master under this subsection only during the remedial phase
of the action and only upon a finding that the remedial phase
will be sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment.
(2) Appointment.--
(A) Submission of list.--If the court determines that
appointment of a special master is necessary, the court shall
request that the defendant (or group of defendants) and the
plaintiff (or group of plaintiffs) each submit a list of not
more than 5 persons to serve as a special master.
(B) Removal.--Each party shall have the opportunity to
remove up to 3 persons from the opposing party's list.
(C) Selection.--The court shall select the special master
from the remaining names on the lists after the operation of
subparagraph (B).
(3) Compensation.--The compensation to be paid to a special
master shall be based on an hourly rate not greater than the
hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18,
United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel,
and costs reasonably incurred by the special master. Such
compensation and costs shall be paid with funds appropriated
to the Judiciary.
(4) Regular review of appointment.--The court shall review
the appointment of the special master every 6 months to
determine whether the services of the special master
continued to be justified under the standards of paragraph
(1).
(5) Limitations on powers and duties.--A special master
appointed under this subsection--
(A) shall not make any finding or communication ex parte;
and
(B) may be removed by the judge at any time, but shall be
relieved of the appointment upon termination of relief.
(c) Judicial Taxation Prohibited.--
(1) In general.--No Federal court shall have the authority
to order a unit of Federal, State, or local government to
increase taxes as part of a judicial remedy.
(2) Remedial authority otherwise unaffected.--Nothing in
paragraph (1) shall be construed to limit the authority of a
Federal court to order a remedy that may lead a unit of local
or State government to decide to increase taxes.
(d) State Court Remedies Unaffected.--Nothing in this
section shall limit the remedial authority of State courts in
any case, including cases raising issues of Federal law.
SEC. 4. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF COURT ORDERS RELATING TO
CLASS ACTIONS.
(a) Interlocutory Appeals.--Section 1292(b) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) The court of appeals which would have jurisdiction
over a final order in an action may, in its discretion,
permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting
or denying class action certification made to it within 10
days after the entry of the order. An appeal under this
paragraph shall not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the court of appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
applies to any action commenced on or after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT
COURTS.
(a) Basis of Jurisdiction.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction
``(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action involving minimal diversity between
adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where at
least 25 natural persons have either died or incurred injury
in the accident at a discrete location and, in the case of
injury, the injury has resulted in damages which exceed
$50,000 per person, exclusive of interest and costs, if--
``(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part
of the accident took place in another State or other
location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a
resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place;
[[Page S6190]]
``(2) any 2 defendants reside in different States,
regardless of whether such defendants are also residents of
the same State or States; or
``(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in
different States.
``(b) For purposes of this section--
``(1) minimal diversity exists between adverse parties if
any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a
citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a foreign
state, or a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a);
``(2) a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State,
and a citizen or subject of any foreign state, in which it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business, and is
deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business;
``(3) the term `injury' means--
``(A) physical harm to a natural person; and
``(B) physical damage to or destruction of tangible
property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph
(A) exists;
``(4) the term `accident' means a sudden accident, or a
natural event culminating in an accident, that results in
death or injury incurred at a discrete location by at least
25 natural persons; and
``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States.
``(c) In any action in a district court which is or could
have been brought, in whole or in part, under this section,
any person with a claim arising from the accident described
in subsection (a) shall be permitted to intervene as a party
plaintiff in the action, even if that person could not have
brought an action in a district court as an original matter.
``(d) A district court in which an action under this
section is pending shall promptly notify the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.''.
(b) Venue.--Section 1391 of title 28, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district
court is based upon section 1369 may be brought in any
district in which any defendant resides or in which a
substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action
took place.''.
(c) Multidistrict Litigation.--Section 1407 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(i)(1) In actions transferred under this section when
jurisdiction is or could have been based, in whole or in
part, on section 1369, the transferee district court may
retain actions so transferred for the determination of
liability and punitive damages notwithstanding any other
provision of this section. An action retained for the
determination of liability shall be remanded to the district
court from which the action was transferred, or to the State
court from which the action was removed, for the
determination of damages, other than punitive damages, unless
the court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice, that the action should be
retained for the determination of damages.
``(2) Any remand under paragraph (1) shall not be effective
until 60 days after the transferee court has issued an order
determining liability and has certified its intention to
remand some or all of the transferred actions for the
determination of damages. An appeal with respect to the
liability determination and the choice of law determination
of the transferee court may be taken during that 60-day
period to the court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction
over the transferee court. In the event a party files such an
appeal, the remand shall not be effective until the appeal
has been finally disposed of. Once the remand has become
effective, the liability determination and the choice of law
determination shall not be subject to further review by
appeal or otherwise.
``(3) An appeal with respect to determination of punitive
damages by the transferee court may be taken, during the 60-
day period beginning on the date the order making the
determination is issued, to the court of appeals with
jurisdiction over the transferee court.
``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand
for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
``(5) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the
authority of the transferee court to transfer or dismiss an
action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
(d) Removal of Actions.--Section 1441 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (e) by striking ``(e) The court to which
such civil action is removed'' and inserting ``(f) The court
to which a civil action is removed under this section''; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e)(1)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(b), a defendant in a civil action in a State court may
remove the action to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where the
action is pending if--
``(i) the action could have been brought in a United States
district court under section 1369; or
``(ii) the defendant is a party to an action which is or
could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section
1369 in a United States district court and arises from the
same accident as the action in State court, even if the
action to be removed could not have been brought in a
district court as an original matter.
``(B) The removal of an action under this subsection shall
be made in accordance with section 1446, except that a notice
of removal may also be filed before trial of the action in
State court within 30 days after the date on which the
defendant first becomes a party to an action under section
1369 in a United States district court that arises from the
same accident as the action in State court, or at a later
time with leave of the district court.
``(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection
and the district court to which it is removed or transferred
under section 1407(i) has made a liability determination
requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district
court shall remand the action to the State court from which
it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless
the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should
be retained for the determination of damages.
``(3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective
until 60 days after the district court has issued an order
determining liability and has certified its intention to
remand the removed action for the determination of damages.
An appeal with respect to the liability determination and the
choice of law determination of the district court may be
taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with
appellate jurisdiction over the district court. In the event
a party files such an appeal, the remand shall not be
effective until the final disposition of the appeal. Once the
remand has become effective, the liability determination and
the choice of law determination shall not be subject to
further review by appeal or otherwise.
``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand
for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
``(5) An action removed under this subsection shall be
deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in
which jurisdiction is based on section 1368 of this title for
purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1660, 1697, and
1785.
``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the
authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an
action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
(e) Choice of Law.--
(1) Determination by the court.--Chapter 111 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Sec. 1660. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions
``(a)(1) In an action which is or could have been brought,
in whole or in part, under section 1369, the district court
in which the action is brought or to which it is removed
shall determine the source of the applicable substantive law,
except that if an action is transferred to another district
court, the transferee court shall determine the source of the
applicable substantive law. In making this determination, a
district court shall not be bound by the choice of law rules
of any State, and the factors that the court may consider in
choosing the applicable law include--
``(A) the place of the injury;
``(B) the place of the conduct causing the injury;
``(C) the principal places of business or domiciles of the
parties;
``(D) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for
forum shopping; and
``(E) whether the choice of law would be reasonably
foreseeable to the parties.
``(2) The factors set forth in paragraph (1) (A) through
(E) shall be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular action. If good cause is shown
in exceptional cases, including constitutional reasons, the
court may allow the law of more than 1 State to be applied
with respect to a party, claim, or other element of an
action.
``(b) The district court making the determination under
subsection (a) shall enter an order designating the single
jurisdiction whose substantive law is to be applied in all
other actions under section 1369 arising from the same
accident as that giving rise to the action in which the
determination is made. The substantive law of the designated
jurisdiction shall be applied to the parties and claims in
all such actions before the court, and to all other elements
of each action, except where Federal law applies or the order
specifically provides for the application of the law of
another jurisdiction with respect to a party, claim, or other
element of an action.
``(c) In an action remanded to another district court or a
State court under section 1407(i)(1) or 1441(e)(2), the
district court's choice of law under subsection (b) shall
continue to apply.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``1660. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.
(f) Service of Process.--
(1) Other than subpoenas.--
(A) In general.--Chapter 113 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
[[Page S6191]]
``Sec. 1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions
``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in
whole or in part upon section 1369, process, other than
subpoenas, may be served at any place within the United
States, or anywhere outside the United States if otherwise
permitted by law.''.
(B) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 113 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.
(2) Service of subpoenas.--
(A) In general.--Chapter 117 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions
``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in
whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, a subpoena
for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if authorized by
the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such
terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at
any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the
United States if otherwise permitted by law.''.
(B) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 117 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.
(g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to
the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6. APPEALS OF MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD.
(a) Appeals.--Section 7703 of title 5, United States Code,
is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``30'' and inserting
``60''; and
(2) in the first sentence of subsection (d), by inserting
after ``filing'' the following: ``, within 60 days after the
date the Director received notice of the final order or
decision of the Board,''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and apply to
any administrative or judicial proceeding pending on that
date or commenced on or after that date.
SEC. 7. EXTENSION OF JUDICIARY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUND.
Section 612 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``equipment'' each place it appears and
inserting ``resources'';
(2) by striking subsection (f) and redesignating subsequent
subsections accordingly;
(3) in subsection (g), as so redesignated, by striking
paragraph (3); and
(4) in subsection (i), as so redesignated--
(A) by striking ``Judiciary'' each place it appears and
inserting ``judiciary'';
(B) by striking ``subparagraph (c)(1)(B)'' and inserting
``subsection (c)(1)(B)''; and
(C) by striking ``under (c)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``under
subsection (c)(1)(B)''.
SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICES.
Section 677 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(c)(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, the
Administrative Assistant, with the approval of the Chief
Justice, may accept voluntary personal services for the
purpose of providing tours of the Supreme Court building.
``(2) No person may volunteer personal services under this
subsection unless the person has first agreed, in writing, to
waive any claim against the United States arising out of or
in connection with such services, other than a claim under
chapter 81 of title 5.
``(3) No person volunteering personal services under this
subsection shall be considered an employee of the United
States for any purpose other than for purposes of--
``(A) chapter 81 of title 5; or
``(B) chapter 171 of this title.
``(4) In the administration of this subsection, the
Administrative Assistant shall ensure that the acceptance of
personal services shall not result in the reduction of pay or
displacement of any employee of the Supreme Court.''.
SEC. 9. OFFSETTING RECEIPTS.
For fiscal year 1999 and thereafter, any portion of
miscellaneous fees collected as prescribed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States pursuant to sections 1913,
1914(b), 1926(a), 1930(b), and 1932 of title 28, United
States Code, exceeding the amount of such fees in effect on
September 30, 1998, shall be deposited into the special fund
of the Treasury established under section 1931 of title 28,
United States Code.
SEC. 10. SUNSET OF CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
PLANS.
Section 103(b)(2)(A) of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (Public Law 101-650; 104 Stat. 5096; 28 U.S.C. 471
note), as amended by Public Law 105-53 (111 Stat. 1173), is
amended by inserting ``471,'' after ``sections''.
SEC. 11. CREATION OF CERTIFYING OFFICERS IN THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH.
(a) Appointment of Disbursing and Certifying Officers.--
Chapter 41 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 613. Disbursing and certifying officers
``(a)(1) The Director may designate in writing officers and
employees of the judicial branch of the Government, including
the courts as defined in section 610 other than the Supreme
Court, to be disbursing officers in such numbers and
locations as the Director considers necessary.
``(2) Disbursing officers shall--
``(A) disburse moneys appropriated to the judicial branch
and other funds only in strict accordance with payment
requests certified by the Director or in accordance with
subsection (b);
``(B) examine payment requests as necessary to ascertain
whether such requests are in proper form, certified, and
approved; and
``(C) be held accountable for their actions as provided by
law, except that such a disbursing officer shall not be held
accountable or responsible for any illegal, improper, or
incorrect payment resulting from any false, inaccurate, or
misleading certificate for which a certifying officer is
responsible under subsection (b).
``(b)(1)(A) The Director may designate in writing officers
and employees of the judicial branch of the Government,
including the courts as defined in section 610 other than the
Supreme Court, to certify payment requests payable from
appropriations and funds.
``(B) Certifying officers shall be responsible and
accountable for--
``(i) the existence and correctness of the facts recited in
the certificate or other request for payment or its
supporting papers;
``(ii) the legality of the proposed payment under the
appropriation or fund involved; and
``(iii) the correctness of the computations of certified
payment requests.
``(2) The liability of a certifying officer shall be
enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as
provided by law with respect to the enforcement of the
liability of disbursing and other accountable officers. A
certifying officer shall be required to make restitution to
the United States for the amount of any illegal, improper, or
incorrect payment resulting from any false, inaccurate, or
misleading certificates made by the certifying officer, as
well as for any payment prohibited by law or which did not
represent a legal obligation under the appropriation or fund
involved.
``(c) A certifying or disbursing officer--
``(1) has the right to apply for and obtain a decision by
the Comptroller General on any question of law involved in a
payment request presented for certification; and
``(2) is entitled to relief from liability arising under
this section in accordance with title 31.
``(d) Nothing in this section affects the authority of the
courts with respect to moneys deposited with the courts under
chapter 129.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for
chapter 41 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``613. Disbursing and certifying officers.''.
(c) Duties of Director.--Paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of
section 604 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``(8) Disburse appropriations and other funds for the
maintenance and operation of the courts;''.
SEC. 12. LIMITATION ON COLLATERAL RELIEF.
(a) In General.--No writ of habeas corpus or other post-
conviction remedy under section 2241, 2244, 2254, or 2255 of
title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of
Federal law, shall lie to challenge the custody or sentence
of a person on the ground that the custody or sentence of the
person is the result in whole or in part of the voluntarily
given confession of the person.
(b) Determinations Regarding Post-Conviction Remedies.--For
purposes of subsection (a), in determining whether any post-
conviction remedy lies under any provision of law described
in subsection (a), as well as in determining whether any such
remedy should be granted--
(1) the court shall apply the standards set forth in
section 3501(b) of title 18, United States Code; and
(2) in applying the standards described in paragraph (1) in
any case seeking a post-conviction remedy from a State court
conviction, the court shall apply the standards set forth in
section 2254(d) of title 28, United States Code.
(c) Definition of Confession.--In this section, the term
``confession'' has the same meaning as in section 3501(e) of
title 18, United States Code.
(d) No Effect on Other Law.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to modify or otherwise affect any requirement
under Federal law relating to the obtaining or granting of
post-conviction relief.
SEC. 13. LAURIE SHOW VICTIM PROTECTION.
Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(j) No Federal court shall specifically bar the retrial
in State court of a person filing the writ of habeas
corpus.''.
SEC. 14. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF STATUTES.
(a) In General.--Chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
[[Page S6192]]
``Sec. 8. Rules for determining the retroactive effect of
legislation
``(a) Any Act of Congress enacted after the effective date
of this section shall be prospective in application only
unless a provision included in the Act expressly specifies
otherwise.
``(b) In applying this section, a court shall determine the
relevant retroactivity event in an Act of Congress (if such
event is not specified in such Act) for purposes of
determining if the Act--
``(1) is prospective in application only; or
``(2) affects conduct that occurred before the effective
date of the Act.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
sections for chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 7 the
following:
``8. Rules for determining retroactive effect of legislation.''.
SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES FOR PRISON CONDITIONS.
(a) Transfer and Redesignation.--Section 3626 of title 18,
United States Code, is--
(1) transferred to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq.);
(2) redesignated as section 13 of that Act; and
(3) inserted after section 12 of that Act (42 U.S.C.
1997j).
(b) Amendments.--Section 13 of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, as redesignated by subsection
(a) of this section, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(3), by adding at the end the
following: ``Noncompliance with an order for prospective
relief by any party, including the party seeking termination
of that order, shall not constitute grounds for refusal to
terminate the prospective relief, if the party's
noncompliance does not constitute a current and ongoing
violation of a Federal right.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (e) through (g) as
subsections (f) through (h), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Procedure for Entering Prospective Relief.--
``(1) In general.--In any civil action with respect to
prison conditions, a court entering an order for prospective
relief shall enter written findings specifying--
``(A) the Federal right the court finds to have been
violated;
``(B) the facts establishing that violation;
``(C) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who suffered
actual injury caused by that violation;
``(D) the actions of each defendant that warrant and
require the entry of prospective relief against that
defendant;
``(E) the reasons for which, in the absence of prospective
relief, each defendant as to whom the relief is being entered
will not take adequate measures to correct the violation of
the Federal right;
``(F) the reasons for which no more narrowly drawn or less
intrusive prospective relief would correct the current and
ongoing violation of the Federal right; and
``(G) the estimated impact of the prospective relief on
public safety and the operation of any affected criminal
justice system.
``(2) Conflict with state law.--If the prospective relief
ordered in any civil action with respect to prison conditions
requires or permits a government official to exceed his or
her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates
State law, the court shall, in addition to the findings
required under paragraph (1), enter findings regarding the
reasons for which--
``(A) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in
violation of State or local law;
``(B) the specific relief is necessary to correct the
violation of a Federal right; and
``(C) no other relief will correct the violation of the
Federal right.'';
(4) in subsection (f), as redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (3), in the first sentence, by inserting
before the period at the end of the sentence the following:
``, including that the case requires the determination of
complex or novel questions of law, or that the court plans to
order or has ordered a hearing under paragraph (5)(E) or
discovery under paragraph (5)(F)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) Termination of prospective relief.--
``(A) Contents of answer to motion to terminate.--
``(i) In general.--In the answer to the motion to terminate
prospective relief, the plaintiff may oppose termination in
accordance with this subparagraph, on the ground that the
prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and
ongoing violation of a Federal right.
``(ii) Relief entered before enactment of prison litigation
reform act.--If the prospective relief sought to be
terminated was entered before the date of enactment of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, the answer opposing termination
under clause (i) shall allege--
``(I) the specific Federal right alleged to be the object
of a current violation;
``(II) specific facts that, if true, would establish that
current violation;
``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are
currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation;
``(IV) the actions of each named defendant that constitute
that violation of the particular plaintiff's or plaintiffs'
right;
``(V)(aa) the portion of the complaint or amended complaint
filed prior to the original entry of the prospective relief
sought to be retained that alleged the violation of that
Federal right;
``(bb) the portion of the court order originally ordering
the prospective relief that found the violation of that
Federal right; or
``(cc) both the materials specified in items (aa) and (bb),
if the violation of right was both alleged and established;
``(VI) the manner in which the current and ongoing
violation can be remedied by maintaining the existing
prospective relief; and
``(VII) the reasons for which, in the absence of
prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief
would be maintained would not take adequate measures to
correct the violation of the Federal right.
``(iii) Relief entered after enactment of prison litigation
reform act.--If the prospective relief was entered after the
date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
answer opposing termination under clause (i) shall allege--
``(I) the specific Federal right alleged to be the object
of a current violation;
``(II) specific facts that, if true, would establish that
current violation;
``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are
currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation;
``(IV) the current actions of each named defendant that
constitute that violation of the particular plaintiff's or
plaintiffs' right;
``(V) the findings required by subsection (e) made by the
court at the time of the original entry of the prospective
relief that established that the right had been violated and
that the prospective relief was necessary to correct the
violation;
``(VI) the manner in which the current and ongoing
violation can be remedied by maintaining the existing
prospective relief; and
``(VII) the reasons for which, in the absence of
prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief
would be maintained would not take adequate measures to
correct the violation of the Federal right.
``(iv) The answer shall be accompanied by affidavits,
references to the record, and any other materials on which
the plaintiff relies to support the allegations required to
be contained in the answer under clause (ii) or (iii).
``(B) Contents of response to answer.--
``(i) In general.--If the defendant disputes plaintiff's
factual allegations, defendant shall file a response to the
answer setting forth the factual allegations the defendant
challenges.
``(ii) Additional requirements.--In any case where the
defendant seeks termination of the relief on the ground that
it is not narrowly tailored, overly intrusive, or poses too
great a burden on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system, or that it requires the defendant to
violate State or local law without meeting the requirements
of subsection (a)(1)(B)--
``(I) the defendant shall set forth the factual basis for
these claims in its response; and
``(II) the defendant shall also set forth alternative
relief that would correct the violation of the Federal right
and that is more narrowly tailored, less intrusive, less
burdensome to public safety or the operation of the affected
criminal justice system, or does not require a violation of
State or local law.
``(iii) Supporting documentation.--The defendant's response
shall be accompanied by affidavits, references to the record,
and any other materials on which the defendant relies to
support its challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations
or the factual basis for its claims regarding the propriety
or scope of the relief.
``(C) Burden of persuasion.--The plaintiff shall have the
burden of persuasion with respect to each point required to
be contained in the answer. The defendant shall have the
burden of persuasion with respect to whether the relief
extends further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, is not narrowly drawn nor the least
intrusive means to correct the violation of the Federal
right, excessively burdens public safety or the operation of
a prison system, or requires the defendant to violate State
or local law without meeting the requirements of subsection
(a)(1)(B).
``(D) Summary determination.--The court shall grant the
motion to terminate if the plaintiff's answer fails to
satisfy the requirements of subparagraph (A) or if the
materials accompanying the plaintiff's answer together with
the materials accompanying the defendant's response fail to
carry the plaintiff's burden of persuasion or fail to create
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the relief
should be maintained.
``(E) Evidentiary hearing.--If the court determines that
there is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes it
from making a summary determination concerning the motion on
the basis of the materials filed by the parties, the court
may conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve any
disputed material facts identified by the court.
``(F) Discovery.--If the court determines that the
plaintiff's answer meets the requirements of paragraph
(5)(A), that there are genuine issues of material fact that
preclude it from making a summary determination concerning
the motion based on the material filed by the parties, and
that discovery would assist in resolving these issues, the
court may permit limited, narrowly tailored, and expeditious
discovery relating to the disputed material facts identified
by the court.
``(G) Findings.--
[[Page S6193]]
``(i) In general.--If the court denies the motion to
terminate prospective relief, the court shall enter written
findings specifying--
``(I) the Federal right the court finds to be currently
violated;
``(II) the facts establishing that the violation is
continuing to occur;
``(III) the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs who are
currently suffering actual injury caused by that violation;
``(IV) the actions of each defendant that warrant and
require the continuation of the prospective relief against
that defendant;
``(V) the reasons for which, in the absence of continued
prospective relief, each defendant as to whom the relief is
continued will not take adequate measures to correct the
violation of the Federal right;
``(VI) the reasons for which no more narrowly drawn on less
intrusive prospective relief would correct the current and
ongoing violation of the Federal right;
``(VII) the impact of the prospective relief on public
safety and the operation of any affected criminal justice
system; and
``(VIII) if the prospective relief requires the defendant
to violate State or local law, the reasons for which--
``(aa) Federal law requires the continuation of relief that
violates State or local law;
``(bb) the specific relief is necessary to correct the
violation of a Federal right; and
``(cc) no other relief will correct the violation of the
Federal right.
``(ii) Requirements for motions ordered before enactment of
prison litigation reform act.--In the case of a motion to
terminate prospective relief entered before the date of
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in addition to
the requirements of clause (i), the court's written findings
shall also specify--
``(I)(aa) the portion of the complaint or amended complaint
that previously alleged that violation of Federal right;
``(bb) the findings the court made at the time it
originally entered the prospective relief concerning that
violation of Federal right; or
``(cc) both the findings specified in items (aa) and (bb),
if the violation was originally both alleged and established;
and
``(II) the prospective relief previously ordered to remedy
that violation.
``(iii) Requirements for motions ordered after enactment of
prison litigation reform act.--In the case of a motion to
terminate prospective relief originally ordered after the
date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in
addition to the requirements of clause (i), the court shall
also enter written findings specifying--
``(I) the findings required by subsection (e) made by the
court at the time the relief was originally entered
establishing that violation of Federal right; and
``(II) the prospective relief previously ordered to remedy
that violation.'';
(5) in subsection (g), as redesignated--
(A) by striking the subsection designation and heading and
inserting the following:
``(g) Special Masters for Civil Actions With Respect to
Prison Conditions.--'';
(B) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``under this
subsection'';
(C) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``institution''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) Applicability.--
``(i) In general.--This paragraph shall not apply to any
special master appointed before the date of enactment of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, unless their original
appointment expires on or after that date of enactment.
``(ii) Special masters covered.--This paragraph applies to
all special masters appointed or reappointed after the date
of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, regardless
of the cause of the expiration of any initial appointment.'';
(D) in paragraph (3), by striking ``under this
subsection'';
(E) in paragraph (4)--
(i) by striking ``under this section'';
(ii) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
(iii) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by adding at
the end the following: ``In no event shall a court require a
party to pay the compensation, expenses, or costs of the
special master. Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(including section 306 of the Act entitled `An Act making
appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1997,' contained in section 101(a)
of title I of division A of the Act entitled `An Act making
omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1997' (110 Stat. 3009201)) and except as
provided in subparagraph (B), the requirement under the
preceding sentence shall apply to the compensation and
payment of expenses or costs of a special master for any
action that is commenced before, on, or after the date of
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.''; and
(iv) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) The payment requirements under subparagraph (A) shall
not apply to the payment of a special master who was
appointed before the date of enactment of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (110 Stat. 1321165 et seq.) of
compensation, expenses, or costs relating to activities of
the special master under this subsection that were carried
out during the period beginning on the date of enactment of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act and ending on the date of
enactment of this subparagraph.'';
(F) in paragraph (5), by striking from ``In any civil
action'' and all that follows through ``subsection, the'' and
inserting ``The''; and
(G) in paragraph (6)--
(i) by striking ``appointed under this subsection'';
(ii) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the
following:
``(A) may be authorized by a court to conduct hearings on
the record, and shall make any findings based on the record
as a whole;'';
(iii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``communications;''
and inserting ``engage in any communications ex parte; and'';
and
(iv) by striking subparagraph (C) and redesignating
subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (C); and
(6) in subsection (h), as redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``settlements'' and
inserting ``settlement agreements'';
(B) in paragraph (3)--
(i) by inserting ``Federal, State, local, or other'' before
``facility'';
(ii) by striking ``violations'' and inserting ``a
violation'';
(iii) by striking ``terms and conditions'' and inserting
``terms or conditions''; and
(iv) by inserting ``or other post-conviction conditional or
supervised release,'' after ``probation,'';
(C) in paragraph (5), by striking ``or local facility'' and
inserting ``local, or other facility'';
(D) in paragraph (8) by striking ``inherent'';
(E) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon;
(F) by adding at the end the following:
``(10) the term `violation of a Federal right'--
``(A) means a violation of a Federal constitutional or
Federal statutory right;
``(B) does not include a violation of a court order that is
not independently a violation of a Federal statutory or
Federal constitutional right; and
``(C) shall not be interpreted to expand the authority of
any individual or class to enforce the legal rights that
individual or class may have pursuant to existing law with
regard to institutionalized persons, or to expand the
authority of the United States to enforce those rights on
behalf of any individual or class.''; and
(G) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs
(9) and (8), respectively, and inserting paragraph (9), as
redesignated, after paragraph (8), as redesignated.
(c) Technical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of subchapter C of chapter 229 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to
section 3626.
SEC. 16. LIMITATION ON FEES.
Section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)--
(A) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B) and inserting the
following:
``(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in--
``(i) proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's
Federal rights that resulted in an order for relief;
``(ii) successfully obtaining contempt sanctions for a
violation of previously ordered prospective relief that meets
the standards set forth in section 13, if the plaintiff made
a good faith effort to resolve the matter without court
action; or
``(iii) successfully obtaining court ordered enforcement of
previously ordered prospective relief that meets the
standards set forth in section 13, if the enforcement order
was necessary to prevent an imminent risk of serious bodily
injury to the plaintiff and the plaintiff made a good faith
attempt to resolve the matter without court action; and
``(B) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to
the court ordered relief for the violation.'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the last sentence and
inserting ``If a monetary judgment is the sole or principal
relief awarded, the award of attorney's fees shall not exceed
100 percent of the judgment.'';
(C) in paragraph (3)--
(i) by striking ``greater than 150 percent'' and inserting
``greater than the lesser of--
``(A) 100 percent''; and
(ii) by striking ``counsel.'' and inserting ``counsel; or
``(B) a rate of $100 per hour.''; and
(D) in paragraph (4), by striking ``prisoner'' and
inserting ``plaintiff'';
(2) in subsection (e), by striking ``Federal civil action''
and inserting ``civil action arising under Federal law'' and
by striking ``prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility'' and inserting ``prisoner who is or
has been confined in any prison'';
(3) in subsection (f)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``action brought with
respect to prison conditions'' and inserting ``civil action
with respect to prison conditions brought'' and by striking
``jail, prison, or other correctional facility'' and
inserting ``prison''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``facility'' and
inserting ``prison''; and
(4) by striking subsections (g) and (h) and inserting the
following:
[[Page S6194]]
``(g) Waiver of Response.--Any defendant may waive the
right to respond to any complaint in any civil action arising
under Federal law brought by a prisoner. Notwithstanding any
other law or rule of procedure, such waiver shall not
constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the
complaint or waive any affirmative defense available to the
defendant. No relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless
a response has been filed. The court may direct any defendant
to file a response to the cognizable claims identified by the
court. The court shall specify as to each named defendant the
applicable cognizable claims.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `civil
action with respect to prison conditions', `prison', and
`prisoner' have the meanings given the terms in section
13(h).''.
SEC. 17. NOTICE OF MALICIOUS FILINGS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 123 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1915A(c)--
(A) by striking ``(c) Definition.--As used in this
section'' and inserting the following:
``Sec. 1915C. Definition
``In sections 1915A and 1915B'';
(B) by inserting ``Federal, State, local, or other'' before
``facility'';
(C) by striking ``violations'' and inserting ``a
violation'';
(D) by striking ``terms and conditions'' and inserting
``terms or conditions''; and
(E) by inserting ``or other post-conviction conditional or
supervised release,'' after ``probation,''; and
(2) by inserting after section 1915A the following:
``Sec. 1915B. Notice to State authorities of finding of
malicious filing by a prisoner
``(a) Finding.--In any civil action brought in Federal
court by a prisoner (other than a prisoner confined in a
Federal correctional facility), the court may, on its own
motion or the motion of any adverse party, make a finding
whether--
``(1) the claim was filed for a malicious purpose;
``(2) the claim was filed to harass the party against which
it was filed; or
``(3) the claimant testified falsely or otherwise knowingly
presented false allegations, pleadings, evidence, or
information to the court.
``(b) Transmission of Finding.--The court shall transmit to
the State Department of Corrections or other appropriate
authority any affirmative finding under subsection (a). If
the court makes such a finding, the Department of Corrections
or other appropriate authority may, pursuant to State or
local law--
``(1) revoke such amount of good time credit or the
institutional equivalent accrued to the prisoner as is deemed
appropriate; or
``(2) consider such finding in determining whether the
prisoner should be released from prison under any other State
or local program governing the release of prisoners,
including parole, probation, other post-conviction or
supervised release, or diversionary program.''.
(b) Technical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 123 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1915A
the following:
``1915B. Notice to State authorities of finding of malicious filing by
prisoner.
``1915C. Definition.''.
SEC. 18. LIMITATION ON PRISONER RELEASE ORDERS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Amendment to title 28.--Chapter 99 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders
``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 13 of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act or any other
provision of law, in a civil action with respect to prison
conditions, no court of the United States or other court
defined under section 610 shall have jurisdiction to enter or
carry out any prisoner release order that would result in the
release from or nonadmission to a prison, on the basis of
prison conditions, of any person subject to incarceration,
detention, or admission to a facility because of--
``(1) a conviction of a felony under the laws of the
relevant jurisdiction; or
``(2) a violation of the terms or conditions of parole,
probation, pretrial release, or a diversionary program,
relating to the commission of a felony under the laws of the
relevant jurisdiction.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the terms `civil action with respect to prison
conditions', `prisoner', `prisoner release order', and
`prison' have the meanings given those terms in section 13(h)
of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act; and
``(2) the term `prison conditions' means conditions of
confinement or the effects of actions by government officials
on the lives of persons confined in prison.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections for
chapter 99 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders.''.
(b) Amendment to Title 18.--Section 3624(b) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking the fifth sentence and
inserting the following: ``Credit that has not been earned
may not later be granted, and credit that has been revoked
pursuant to section 3624A may not later be reinstated.''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting before the period at the
end the following: ``, and may be revoked by the Bureau of
Prisons for noncompliance with institutional disciplinary
regulations at any time before vesting''.
SEC. 19. REPEAL OF SECTION 140.
Section 140 of the joint resolution entitled ``A Joint
Resolution making further continuing appropriations for the
fiscal year 1982, and for other purposes'', approved December
15, 1981 (Public Law 97-92; 95 Stat. 1200; 28 U.S.C. 461
note) is repealed.
SEC. 20. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this
Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any
person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and
the application of the provisions of such to any person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Hatch in
introducing the Judicial Improvement Act of 1998. Many of the
provisions of this bill stem from a series of hearings I held in the
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights last
summer addressing the problem of judicial activism. The hearings
focused on the problem of judicial activism and its impact. The
Subcommittee heard testimony from a variety of individuals, from
constitutional scholars to victims of activist judicial orders. The
final hearing of the series focused on potential solutions to the
problem of activism.
That final hearing canvassed potential solutions ranging from
proposed constitutional amendments, to increased public education
efforts about the problem of judicial activism, to proposed statutory
solutions. The hearings convinced me that, at a minimum, we needed to
provide some procedural mechanisms to make it more difficult for any
single judge to issue an activist order and to make it easier for
litigants to force the reconsideration of activist orders.
Since the close of the hearings, I have been working with others on
the Judiciary Committee to fashion legislation that would accomplish
these goals. Last fall, I circulated draft language concerning the
three legislative proposals that remain my top priorities in this
area--requiring a three-judge panel before a federal court can strike
down a state initiative or an act of Congress as unconstitutional,
expanding provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to cover other
local and state institutions, and codifying a flat prohibition on
federal court orders directly increasing taxes. With the help of
Chairman Hatch, Senator Abraham and others on the Committee, we have
added many additional provisions and drafted a comprehensive bill aimed
at improving the federal judiciary. Although I would not have included
every provision in the bill had I introduced my own bill, the bill
reflects the collective work of the Committee and would substantially
improve the workings of the federal judiciary.
Let me take a few moments to discuss the provisions that are critical
to addressing the problem of judicial activism. First and foremost, the
bill addresses the problem of having a single federal judge strike down
a state referendum as unconstitutional. Nothing highlights the
undemocratic power of a federal judge more strikingly than when a
single unelected federal judge invalidates a law passed by the general
public through the initiative process. Even the Ninth Circuit, the
epicenter of judicial activism in America, has acknowledged the strain
that a single judge's nullification of an initiative places on our
political system. As the court recently noted in an opinion reversing
such a single-judge nullification: ``A system which permits one judge
to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted
to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional democracy.''
The Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th
Cir.), (cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
The three-judge panel ameliorates this problem by requiring that a
three-judge panel be convened, and a majority of the panel agree,
before a state initiative can be enjoined. The provision then addresses
the problem of the popular will being preliminarily enjoined for long
periods of time before a final appealable decision is issued by
providing for an expedited review of the injunction.
The three-judge panel provision recognizes that there may be
situations in
[[Page S6195]]
which state initiatives run afoul of the Constitution and courts may
need to declare them unconstitutional. But the bill also recognized
that when a federal court takes such an action, it can cause
considerable frustration and friction. The bill attempts to minimize
such friction by ensuring that a federal court complies with a number
of safeguards before taking such a drastic action.
A second key provision in the bill extends some of the protections
included in the Prison Litigation Reform Act to other state and local
government institutions. During the hearings, I heard over and over
about the frustration of state and local officials who are saddled with
consent decrees entered into decades ago that allow unelected federal
judges--rather than elected local officials--to run local institutions.
The bill addresses this problem by requiring the periodic
reconsideration of such consent decrees or structural injunctions to
ensure that they remain necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.
Once again, the bill recognizes that our federal Constitution and
federal system of government may require federal courts to issue
injunctions covering state and local institutions, but also
acknowledges that such sweeping injunctions create friction with local
officials. The best way to limit such friction is to provide a
mechanism to ensure that the injunctions remain necessary to remedy a
constitutional violation. This bill does that.
Another key provision of particular importance to my constituents
back in Missouri is the flat prohibition on federal court orders
directly raising or imposing taxes. The people of Kansas City have
suffered through the activism of federal District Judge Russell Clark,
including his order directly ordering local authorities to increase
taxes. This provision directly attacks such judicial tyranny.
Importantly, however, the bill leave the federal court's power to order
remedies that may lead a local or state government to raise taxes. But
the ultimate decision of whether to raise taxes, raise revenue through
other means or cut spending remains that the local authorities.
A final point should be made about all three of these provisions:
they apply only to federal courts. The procedures and remedial
authority of state courts remain unaffected. During the Subcommittee
hearings a number of people offered suggestions to make the federal
courts more directly responsive to the people. In attempting to improve
the federal courts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that under our
federal system we have both federal courts and state courts of general
jurisdiction which are fully capable of hearing federal claims. State
courts, moreover, are much more responsible to the people--in the
majority of States they are subject to direct elections or retention
elections.
This bill recognizes the comparative advantages of these two court
systems and tries to limit the availability of those remedies that are
the most intrusive in the courts that are least responsible to the
people. If people are really convinced that courts must levy taxes and
run state and local institutions in perpetuity (and I, for one, am not
convinced such measures are every necessary), then at least the courts
that do so should be relatively responsive state courts, rather than
unelected, life-tenured federal judges.
Before I close, let me mention a few other provisions of the bill
that are of particular importance to me. First, the bill contains a
provision that makes it clear that the same standards for judging the
admissibility of confessions that Congress created for federal criminal
trials should also apply when federal courts engage in collateral
review of state and federal convictions. This provision reinforces that
the touchstone for admissibility should be the voluntariness of the
confession and that a technical violation should not free a convicted
prisoner on collateral review.
Second, the bill includes a provision similar to one in legislation
introduced by Senator Specter, which I have co-sponsored, which
prevents a federal court from barring local authorities for ordering a
retrial of a convicted authority. The traditional remedy in a habeas
proceeding is release from custody. Taking the further step of barring
retrial goes beyond the traditional office of the writ and is an
affront to state courts and prosecutors.
Finally, the bill appropriately limits the practice of releasing
prisoners early as a judicial remedy. Perhaps, the most poignant
testimony in the Subcommittee hearings concerned family whose son,
Danny Boyle, was killed by an arrested felon, who but for a prison
release order would have been behind bars. Danny was a promising young
police officer whose life and career were cut short--a victim of
judicial activism. I am committed to working to ensure that another
family does not have to come before a future Subcommittee hearing with
similar testimony about a son or daughter.
I want to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Abraham for working with
me to get these provisions included in the bill. I look forward to
working with them to ensure that this bill moves forward and that we
take these modest steps to improve the federal judiciary.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
the Judicial Improvement Act. This legislation contains various
important reforms of the judicial branch that will help keep the powers
of the courts in check with the other branches of government and with
the will of the people.
This comprehensive bill contains provisions that are important to
many senators, and I am especially pleased that two bills that I have
introduced and advocated for years are included in this reform package.
One would prohibit judges from imposing tax increases, and the other
would clarify the retroactive application of legislation.
This Act states that a Federal judge does not have the authority to
order the Federal government or units of state or local governments to
raise taxes as a legal remedy. In 1990, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the
Supreme Court permitted a district court judge to order local
authorities to impose a huge tax increase to pay for his plan to
desegregate a school district.
One may wonder why a desegregation plan would be so expensive as to
warrant a massive tax increase. The reason is this plan was not simply
an attempt to bring schools up to basic standards. Rather, it was an
elaborate social experiment in the name of education. Money was no
object. Among other mandates, the plan called for 15 computers in every
classroom, a 2,000 square-foot planetarium, a 25-acre farm, a model
United Nations, an art gallery, movie editing and screening rooms, and
swimming pools.
Money was no object because there was no control over the judge.
There was no accountability. The only supervision was a higher court,
and a slim majority of the Supreme Court gave the judge a free reign.
The dissent in that case clearly explained what should have been
obvious: it violates the Constitutional separation of powers for a
judge to order that taxes be increased. In the Constitution, Article I
contains the legislative powers. Article I, Section 8 begins by
stating, ``The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes.'' Article III provides for judicial power, and makes no mention
of the power to tax. Therefore, a Federal judge does not have the power
to tax under the Constitution.
This is more than a matter of proper Constitutional interpretation.
It is an essential check on power. The ability to tax is an awesome
power. It is true that, as Justice John Marshall once wrote, ``the
power to tax involves the power to destroy.'' This authority must be
carefully checked, and the best source of control is the people. Thus,
in the Constitution, the ability to tax was given to the legislative
branch, which is directly accountable to the people through the ballot
box.
By design, the Judicial Branch is different. It is not responsible to
the people. The Framers intentionally did not provide for judges to be
elected by the people and even gave judges life tenure. They wanted
judges to be insulated from the political climate and have the freedom
to interpret the law appropriately, rather than make decisions based on
the will of the majority at any given moment. It is entirely reasonable
and appropriate that judicial power does not include the power to
tax. As Justice Kennedy stated in his thoughtful dissent in Missouri v.
Jenkins, the Supreme Court's ``casual embrace of taxation imposed by
the unelected life-tenured Federal Judiciary disregards fundamental
precepts
[[Page S6196]]
for the democratic control of public institutions.''
The Framers of the Constitution fully intended to separate power in
this manner and did not mean for judges to be involved in taxation. As
Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist No. 78, ``The judiciary . .
. has no influence over either the sword or the purse.'' In my view,
judicial taxation is simply taxation without representation, no
different from the complaints of the American colonists about taxation
without representation during the days of the Stamp Act in 1765.
Mr. President, if a judge can order a tax increase for a school, why
not a similar social experiment for a prison? It is hard to imagine any
limits on a Federal judge's power as expressed in Missouri v. Jenkins.
I believe it is imperative that the Congress act to control the power
of the judicial branch in this regard.
Another provision of the bill that I have long advocated would
clarify the retroactivity of legislation. Often the Congress will pass
legislation but not state whether that legislation should be applied
retroactively to conduct that occurred before the law was passed. An
excellent example is the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It took years of
litigation with decisions in over one hundred Federal courts throughout
the country before the Supreme Court finally decided the question.
The provision simply states that legislation is not retroactive
unless the bill expressly says it is. This simple rule will eliminate a
great deal of uncertainty. As a result, it will reduce litigation costs
and help our judicial system better focus to reserve its limited
resources.
This clarification should not be controversial. The Judicial
Conference of the Federal courts indicated in a report in 1995 that it
did not oppose this legislative fix, and the Clinton Justice Department
stated in a letter to me in 1996 that it did not object to this
clarification. I hope both of these provisions are passed this year.
The Judicial Improvement Act contains many other needed reforms that
I will not attempt to detail, such as a requirement for a three-judge
panel to enjoin the enforcement of certain laws. I hope my colleagues
will join me in supporting the judicial reforms contained in this
important legislation.
I yield the floor.
______
By Mrs. HUTCHISON:
S. 2164. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to promote
rail competition, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation.
the stb amendments of 1998
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, today I am introducing the
Surface Transportation Board Amendments of 1998. This legislation
proposes to expand the Surface Transportation Board's existing
authority to address circumstances affecting rail service
transportation in today's environment.
First, I think most colleagues would agree that the STB has performed
well since its inception in 1996. The industries it regulates have
experienced a number of significant changes in the past few years. The
STB has acted consistently with the authority Congress gave it, and
clearly within the deregulatory intent with which it was created.
This year's reauthorization gives us the first chance since we
created the Board to review its practices and performance. My bill is
based upon the principle that Congress sets government policy and the
Executive Branch, through regulators such as the STB, executes that
policy. During hearings in my Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Subcommittee, I have consistently sought to identify the limits
of STB authority to act in certain circumstances, and to identify those
areas beyond which STB action would require a policy decision by
Congress.
It is very important that we pass a re-authorization bill this year.
Doing that will require that we establish the middle ground between
those who want to roll back the clock and begin to re-regulate the
industry and those who think the board needs no additional authority to
adequately address the many issues before it.
I believe my bill does just that. However, I stand ready to work with
my colleagues to further refine my proposals to move this bill through
the legislative process. I welcome input from any interested members.
My own personal view is that re-regulation is not called for. The
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 has had very positive results for both
industry and shippers. But we must ensure the board has sufficient
tools to ensure that deregulation has its intended effect of greater
competition and better value to the consumer. The experiences of the
past few years, and this year in particular, give us much to consider.
Mr. President, our country has endured a critical rail service crisis
for many, many months. My home State of Texas has felt this crisis as
much as any other State, and more than most. Texas has sustained
billions of dollars of economic losses as the goods bound to and from
the State's ports, factories and refineries sit gridlocked on the
rails. These service problems primarily have occurred in the West, but
there has been a ripple effect throughout the entire rail system.
Service problems continue today, and I know the railroads have been
working night and day to alleviate service troubles.
Mr. President, I will explain my bill at greater length in a moment,
but I want to stress that I have worked to craft a bill that maintains
the basic de-regulatory rules that the rail industry and shippers have
played by since the 1980s. However, it is the shippers today who face a
most challenging rail shipping environment.
Therefore, I am proposing we take action to ensure that the Board's
procedures are more readily accessible to small shippers. I also am
proposing to expand the Board's authority with regard to maintaining
and promoting rail competition in appropriate circumstances. And, I
believe strongly that we can do this without jeopardizing the integrity
of deregulation.
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has been
working for many months on issues surrounding the rail service
transportation. In that effort, the reauthorization of the Surface
Transportation Board is a priority of our Committee.
To date we have held four rail service hearings during this
Congress--three field hearings along with a Subcommittee hearing on the
Board's reauthorization. In addition, at Senator McCain's and my
request, the STB held 2 days of hearings in April to address rail
access and competition issues at which more than 60 witnesses
testified.
In response to the information gathered during these many hearings
both by our Committee and the Board, today I am proposing legislation
to address a number of areas which I believe warrant serious attention
and in some cases, reform. I expect some will have a strong reaction to
my proposals, as some in the rail industry have tended to tar any
legislative proposals affecting their industry as ``re-regulation.'' At
the same time, I suspect some shipper groups will report that these
proposals do not go nearly as far as they believe we should go. If so,
that sounds like we're at least within striking distance of the middle
ground.
I want to briefly explain the major provisions of this legislation:
First, the bill establishes that promoting competition within the
rail industry is one of the criteria the STB should use in performing
its responsibilities.
Second, the bill would extend the time period covering the Board's
emergency service orders. The current 270-day emergency order authority
would be extended to cover a total period of 18 months. In the event an
emergency remains in effect beyond this time frame, the Board would be
permitted to request and receive two 6-month extensions of an emergency
service order. The Congress could disapprove the Board's requests and
also take affirmative action to grant any further extensions as may be
necessary.
Third, the bill includes several features to simplify the regulatory
process involving small rate cases. During every hearing before our
Committee, shippers stressed their frustrations that for a small
shipper, it is simply too time consuming and costly to ever bring a
case to the Board. This bill seeks to acknowledge those concerns and
proposes to foreclose discovery in small rate cases, absent a
demonstration of compelling need. Further, it would direct the Board to
establish an arbitration mechanism for small shipper cases. It would
not require mandatory arbitration, but would allow for arbitration at
one party's request.
[[Page S6197]]
Fourth, my bill seeks to address concerns raised about the Board's
market dominance standard. Some have advocated Congress statutorily
eliminate product and geographic competition from the Board's market
dominance analysis as it is a very time consuming process. Yet others
contend these considerations remain necessary. My bill recognizes the
Board's April 17th decision announcing it would initiate a proceeding
to consider whether to maintain, change, or eliminate product and
geographic competition from consideration in rate cases. I believe the
Board's action is the proper route to follow.
Fifth, my bill seeks to address another area of concern raised by
shippers: revenue adequacy. At the Board's April hearings, rail and
shipper representatives suggested referring this matter of considerable
debate to one or more disinterested economists, which the Board
initiated April 17th. My bill directs the Board to carry out its
proposal in this area and direct rail and shipper representatives to
select a panel of 3 disinterested economists to examine the Board's
current standards for measuring revenue adequacy and to consider
whether alternative measurements of a railroad's financial health are
warranted.
Sixth, my bill seeks to address the issue of bottleneck rates. There
is considerable debate as to the correct approach in this area, with
some strongly opposed to any change and others equally adamant about
total reform. My proposal seeks to take a balanced approach, ensuring
some needed boundaries remain. It would require a carrier to provide a
shipper with a rate for a ``bottleneck'' line segment when requested to
accommodate a transportation contract. The railroad would be required
to provide the shipper with a rate over the ``bottleneck'' line segment
as long as the interchange would be operationally feasible and the
through route would not significantly impair the railroad's ability to
serve its other shippers.
Finally, my bill would remove the 3-year renewal requirement
regarding antitrust immunity applicable to household goods carriers.
While the continued propriety of collective actions by other types of
motor carriers has been the subject of debate, no similar concerns have
been voiced about the collective activities of household goods
carriers. The repeal of the mandatory review requirement would relieve
the carriers of an unnecessary regulatory burden, although it would
have no effect on the STB's existing authority to modify or revoke
collective actions when the STB determines such action is necessary to
protect the public interest.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a copy of my bill be printed
in the Record. I encourage my colleagues to look at this legislation
and begin working with me now so that we may reauthorize the Surface
Transportation Board this year and provide important policy guidance in
regard to rail service matters.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2164
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Surface Transportation Board
Amendments of 1998''.
SEC. 2. PROMOTION OF COMPETITION WITHIN THE RAIL INDUSTRY.
Section 10101 of title 49, United States Code, is amended
by--
(1) redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as paragraphs
(2) through (8);
(2) inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the
following:
``(1) to encourage and promote effective competition within
the rail industry;'';
(3) redesignating paragraphs (9) through (16) as paragraphs
(10) through (17); and
(4) inserting before paragraph (10), as redesignated, the
following:
``(9) to discourage artificial barriers to interchange and
car supply which can impede competition between shortline,
regional, and Class I carriers and block effective rail
service to shippers.
SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF TIME LIMIT ON EMERGENCY SERVICE ORDERS.
Section 11123 of title 49, United States Code, is amended
by--
(1) striking ``30'' in subsection (a) and inserting ``60'';
(2) striking ``30'' in subsection (c)(1) and inserting
``60'';
(3) striking the second sentence of subsection (c)(1) and
inserting the following: ``An action taken by the Board under
subsection (a) of this section may not remain in effect
longer than 18 months (including the initial 60-day period),
unless the Board requests an extension under paragraph
(4).''; and
(4) adding at the end of subsection (c) the following:
``(4) The Board may request up to 2 extensions, of not more
than 6 months each, of the 18-month period under subsection
(a) by submitting to the Congress a request in writing for
such an extension, together with an explanation of the
reasons for the request. Such a requested extension goes into
effect unless disapproved by the Congress by concurrent
resolution. Any other extension requested by the Board will
not go into effect unless the Congress approve it under the
procedure established by section 4 of the Surface
Transportation Amendments of 1998.''.
SEC. 4. APPROVAL PROCEDURE.
(a) In General.--Within 90 days (not counting any day on
which either House is not in session) after a request for a
third or subsequent extension is submitted to the House of
Representatives and the Senate by the Surface Transportation
Board under section 11123(c)(4) of title 49, United States
Code, an approval resolution shall be introduced in the House
by the Majority Leader of the House, for himself and the
Minority Leader of the House, or by Members of the House
designated by the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the
House; and shall be introduced in the Senate by the Majority
Leader of the Senate, for himself and the Minority Leader of
the Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the
Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate. The
approval resolution shall be held at the desk at the request
of the Presiding Officers of the respective Houses.
(b) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--
(1) Consideration of approval resolution.--After an
approval resolution is introduced, it is in order to move
that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for consideration of the
resolution. All points of order against the resolution and
against consideration of the resolution are waived. The
motion is highly privileged. A motion to reconsider the vote
by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be
in order. During consideration of the resolution in the
Committee of the Whole, the first reading of the resolution
shall be dispensed with. General debate shall proceed, shall
be confined to the resolution, and shall not exceed one hour
equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an opponent
of the resolution. The resolution shall be considered as read
for amendment under the five-minute rule. Only one motion to
rise shall be in order, except if offered by the manager. No
amendment to the resolution is in order. Consideration of the
resolution shall not exceed one hour excluding time for
recorded votes and quorum calls. At the conclusion of the
consideration of the resolution, the Committee shall rise and
report the resolution to the House. The previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the resolution to final
passage without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider
the vote on passage of the resolution shall not be in order.
(2) Appeals of rulings.--Appeals from decision of the Chair
regarding application of the rules of the House of
Representatives to the procedure relating to an approval
resolution shall be decided without debate.
(3) Consideration of more than one approval resolution.--It
shall not be in order to consider under this subsection more
than one approval resolution under this section, except for
consideration of a similar Senate resolution (unless the
House has already rejected an approval resolution) or more
than one motion to discharge described in paragraph (1)
with respect to an approval resolution.
(c) Consideration in the Senate.--
(1) Referral and reporting.--An approval resolution
introduced in the Senate shall be shall be placed directly
and immediately on the Calendar.
(2) Implementing resolution from house.--When the Senate
receives from the House of Representatives an approval
resolution, the resolution shall not be referred to committee
and shall be placed on the Calendar.
(3) Consideration of single approval resolution.--After the
Senate has proceeded to the consideration of an approval
resolution under this subsection, then no other approval
resolution originating in that same House shall be subject to
the procedures set forth in this subsection.
(4) Motion nondebatable.--A motion to proceed to
consideration of an approval resolution under this subsection
shall not be debatable. It shall not be in order to move to
reconsider the vote by which the motion to proceed was
adopted or rejected, although subsequent motions to proceed
may be made under this paragraph.
(5) Limit on consideration.--
(A) After no more than 2 hours of consideration of an
approval resolution, the Senate shall proceed, without
intervening action or debate (except as permitted under
paragraph (9)), to vote on the final disposition thereof to
the exclusion of all motions, except a motion to reconsider
or table.
(B) The time for debate on the approval resolution shall be
equally divided between the Majority Leader and the Minority
Leader or their designees.
(6) No motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit an
approval resolution shall not be in order.
[[Page S6198]]
(7) Disposition of senate resolution.--If the Senate has
read for the third time an approval resolution that
originated in the Senate, then it shall be in order at any
time thereafter to move to proceed to the consideration of an
approval resolution for the same special message received
from the House of Representatives and placed on the Calendar
pursuant to paragraph (2), strike all after the enacting
clause, substitute the text of the Senate approval
resolution, agree to the Senate amendment, and vote on final
disposition of the House approval resolution, all without any
intervening action or debate.
(8) Consideration of house message.--Consideration in the
Senate of all motions, amendments, or appeals necessary to
dispose of a message from the House of Representatives on an
approval resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour.
Debate on each motion or amendment shall be limited to 30
minutes. Debate on any appeal or point of order that is
submitted in connection with the disposition of the House
message shall be limited to 15 minutes. Any time for debate
shall be equally divided and controlled by the proponent and
the majority manager, unless the majority manager is a
proponent of the motion, amendment, appeal, or point of
order, in which case the minority manager shall be in control
of the time in opposition.
(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) Approval resolution.--The term ``approval resolution''
means only a concurrent resolution of either House of
Congress which is introduced as provided in subsection (a)
with respect to the approval of a request from the Surface
Transportation Board under section 11123(a)(4) of title 49,
United States Code.
(e) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--This
section is enacted by the Congress--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such
they are deemed a part of the rules of each House,
respectively, but applicable only with respect to the
procedure to be followed in that House in the case of
approval resolutions described in subsection (c); and they
supersede other rules only to the extent that they are
inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.
SEC. 5. PROCEDURAL RELIEF FOR SMALL RATE CASES.
(a) Discovery Limited.--Section 10701(d) of title 49,
United States Code, is amended by--
(1) inserting ``(A)'' in paragraph (3) before ``The
Board''; and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following:
``(B) Unless the Board finds that there is a compelling
need to permit discovery in a particular proceeding,
discovery shall not be permitted in a proceeding handled
under the guidelines established under subparagraph (A).''.
(b) Administrative Relief.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Surface Transportation
Board shall--
(1) review the rules and procedures applicable to rate
complaints and other complaints filed with the Board by small
shippers;
(2) identify any such rules or procedures that are unduly
burdensome to small shippers; and
(3) take such action, including rulemaking, as is
appropriate to reduce or eliminate the aspects of the rules
and procedures that the Board determines under paragraph (2)
to be unduly burdensome to small shippers.
(c) Legislative Relief.--The Board shall notify the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
of the House of Representatives if the Board determines that
additional changes in the rules and procedures described in
subsection (b) are appropriate and require commensurate
changes in statutory law. In making that notification, the
Board shall make recommendations concerning those changes.
SEC. 6. MARKET DOMINANCE STANDARD.
The Surface Transportation Board shall complete a
rulemaking, as outlined in STB Ex Parte No. 575, to determine
whether and to what extent it should consider product and
geographic competition in making market dominance
determinations.
SEC. 7. REVENUE ADEQUACY.
The Surface Transportation Board shall reexamine, as
outlined in STB Ex Parte No. 575, its standards and
procedures for determining adequate railroad revenue levels
under section 10704(a)(2) of title 49, United States Code. In
carrying out it reexamination, the Board is directed to seek
recommendations of a panel of three disinterested economists
on the proper standards to apply. The panel shall submit its
report and recommendations simultaneously to the Surface
Transportation Board and to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.
SEC. 8. BOTTLENECK RATES.
(a) Through Routes.--Section 10703 of title 49, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``Rail
carriers''; and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following:
``(b) Connecting Carriers.--When a shipper and rail carrier
enter into a contract under section 10709 for transportation
that would require a through route with a connecting carrier
and there is no reasonable alternative route that could be
constructed without participation of that connecting carrier,
the connecting carrier shall, upon request, establish a
through route and a rate that can be used in conjunction with
transportation provided pursuant to the contract, unless the
connecting carrier shows that--
``(1) the interchange requested is not operationally
feasible; or
``(2) the through route would significantly impair the
connecting carrier's ability to serve its other traffic.
The connecting carrier shall establish a rate and through
route within 21 days unless the Board has made a
determination that the connecting carrier is likely to
prevail in its claim under paragraph (1) or (2).''.
(b) Board's Authority to Prescribe Division of Joint
Rates.--Section 10705(b) of title 49, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``The Board shall'' and inserting
``Except as provided in section 10703(b), the Board shall''.
(c) Complaints.--Section 11701 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
``(c) Where transportation over a portion of a through
route is governed by a contract under section 10709, a rate
complaint must be limited to the rates that apply to the
portion of the through route not governed by such a
contract.''.
SEC. 9. SIMPLIFIED DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Surface Transportation Board shall promulgate regulations
adopting a simplified dispute resolution mechanism with the
following features:
(1) In general.--The simplified dispute resolution
mechanism will utilize expedited arbitration with a minimum
of discovery and may be used to decide disputes between
parties involving any matter subject to the jurisdiction of
the Board, other than rate reasonableness cases that would be
decided under constrained market pricing principles.
(2) Applicable standards.--Arbitrators will apply existing
legal standards.
(3) Mandatory if requested.--Use of the simplified dispute
resolution mechanism is required whenever at least one party
to the dispute requests.
(4) 90-day turnaround.--Arbitrators will issue their
decisions within 90 days after being appointed.
(5) Payment of costs.--Each party will pay its own costs,
and the costs of the arbitrator and other administrative
costs of arbitration will be shared equally between and among
the parties.
(6) Decisions private; not precedential.--Except as
otherwise provided by the Board, decisions will remain
private and will not constitute binding precedent.
(7) Decisions binding and enforceable.--Except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (8), decisions will be binding and
enforceable by the Board.
(8) Right to appeal.--Any party will have an unqualified
right to appeal any decision to the Board, in which case the
Board will decide the matter de nova. In making its decision,
the Board may consider the decision of the arbitrator and any
evidence and other material developed during the arbitration.
(9) Mutual modification.--Any procedure or regulation
adopted by the Board with respect to the simplified dispute
resolution may be modified or eliminated by mutual agreement
of all parties to the dispute.
SEC. 10. PROMOTION OF COMPETITIVE RAIL SERVICE OPTIONS.
Section 11324 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' in paragraph (4) of subsection (b);
(2) by striking ``system.'' in paragraph (5) of subsection
(b) and inserting ``system; and'';
(3) by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following:
``(6) means and methods to encourage and expand competition
between and among rail carriers in the affected region or the
national rail system.''; and
(4) by inserting after the second sentence in subsection
(c) the following: ``The Board may impose conditions to
encourage and expand competition between and among rail
carriers in the affected region or the national rail system,
provided that such conditions do not cause substantial harm
to the benefits of the transaction to the affected carriers
or the public.''.
SEC. 11. HOUSEHOLD GOODS COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES.
Section 13703(d) of title 49, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``(other than an agreement affecting
only the transportation of household goods, as defined on
December 31, 1995)'' after ``agreement'' in the first
sentence.
______
By Mr. GRASSLEY:
S. 2165. A bill to amend title 31 of the United States Code to
improve methods for preventing financial crimes, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
money laundering deterrence act of 1998
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, recently, we have seen the
culmination of one of the most successful undercover operations in
history by the
[[Page S6199]]
United States Customs Service. This effort, known as ``Operation
Casablanca,'' has infiltrated and dismantled a group of international
bankers, mostly in Mexico, who have been laundering drug money. The
threat of drug trafficking is serious enough. But to have their
financial advisors leading their effort to facilitate the smuggling of
illicit narcotics is much worse. Complicit bankers devising schemes can
make it much easier to move and hide the ill-gotten gains of drug
cartels.
As this latest law enforcement operation illustrates, we must be sure
that we are taking the necessary steps to protect the citizens of our
nation. We must prevent drug traffickers and organized crime groups
from obtaining the profits of their illegal activities. Much has been
done and said about the movement of illegal drugs into the United
States. But the opposite side of the business does not always get the
publicity, and is just as important. We need to go after the profits
from drug sales and other illegal enterprises.
Last week, Representative Leach, Chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Financial Services introduced legislation to amend title 31, United
States Code. The bill H.R. 4005, ``the Money Laundering Deterrence Act
of 1998,'' would improve methods for preventing financial crimes. And
as Operation Casablanca shows this legislation, is timely and needed.
We need to tighten up our financial control capabilities to prevent
criminal enterprises from abusing our financial and banking systems.
The bill is supported by the American Banking Association (ABA), the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Reserve. Today, Chairman Leach's bill has already been marked up in the
House.
I call for my colleagues to help support this companion legislation.
I hope this would be a continuation of efforts by Congress to go after
the growing threat of money laundering not only to our nation, but
worldwide.
______
By Mr. HARKIN (for himself, Mr. Leahy and Mr. Johnson):
S. 2166. A bill to amend the National School Lunch Act and the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966 to provide children with increased access to food
and nutrition assistance, to simplify program operations and improve
program management, to extend certain authorities contained in such
Acts through fiscal year 2002, and for other purposes; to the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
CHILD NUTRITION AND WIC REAUTHORIZATION AMENDMENTS OF 1998
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I am introducing today, at the
request of the Clinton Administration, the Child Nutrition and WIC
Reauthorization Amendments of 1998. I am grateful to be joined in the
introduction of this bill by Senator Leahy, the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General Legislation, and by
Senator Johnson. In my years serving on the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, and now as its Ranking Member, I have always
placed a very high value on the child nutrition programs, including the
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children
(WIC). These programs have been critical in helping to meet the
nutritional needs of millions of our nation's children.
This bill is the first child nutrition reauthorization bill sent to
Congress by an Administration in two decades. It is a very commendable
effort, with many positive features, that we will be relying upon
substantially as we fashion a child nutrition bill in the coming weeks
in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and
ultimately in conference. In addition to reauthorizing those programs
that are expiring, the bill makes a number of improvements throughout
the child nutrition programs. It is designed to be cost-neutral over
the next five years, to simplify and streamline program operations, to
reduce impediments to participation by eligible individuals, to reach
certain children needing additional nutritional assistance, to
strengthen program integrity and to enhance the nutrition provided by
the programs.
Earlier this year, I joined Chairman Lugar, Senator McConnell and
Senator Leahy in introducing a measure, S. 1581, that would simply
reauthorize the child nutrition programs for the next five years. That
bill was recognized as a starting point for a careful review of the
child nutrition programs leading to the development of a sound, well-
crafted and bipartisan reauthorization bill. I believe there is broad
support for improving and modifying these programs to meet changing
needs and demands within the overall spending limitations that we are
committed to working within.
One of the more important features of the bill is new authority for
nutrition assistance in after-school programs through the Child and
Adult Care Food Program for at risk youths between the ages of 12 and
18. We know too well that the hours just after school are full of
opportunities for teenagers to get into trouble, whether it involves
crime, drug use or teen pregnancy. The availability of nutrition
assistance can help to support organized after-school activities that
are healthy and constructive alternatives to what might otherwise occur
in those risky after-school hours.
There are also provisions in the bill designed to improve the
nutrition provided by the programs, including an emphasis on
establishing adequate time for kids to eat school lunches in an
atmosphere conducive to good nutrition and an authorization of
Nutrition Education and Training grants based on $0.50 a child each
year with a minimum of $75,000 per state.
There are also provisions in the bill to improve access to the Summer
Food Service Program by increasing the number of sites and the number
of children that can be served by non-profit sponsors. Statistics
continue to show that far fewer low income children are served in the
Summer Food Service Program than during the school year in the National
School Lunch Program, especially in rural areas. The provisions in this
bill are designed to help address this gap.
The bill also reauthorizes the WIC Program. Under Secretary Shirley
Watkins was absolutely correct when she said at a recent Agriculture
Committee Hearing that, ``WIC works.'' No other Federal-state program
has the proven cost-effectiveness of WIC, which has been shown in study
after study. This bill is designed to build upon the success of the
current WIC program with improvements in program management and
integrity.
While I support a very high proportion of the provisions of this
bill, I do not necessarily support every detail of it. I will also
mention some of the areas in which I hope the final bill will take more
substantial steps than are included in this bill. In my view, more
should be done to increase participation in the School Breakfast
Program, especially among low-income children, and in the Summer Food
Service Program. I would also prefer further strengthening of after-
school and child care nutrition assistance. And additional steps should
be taken to improve integrity and accountability in the WIC program
while continuing the progress toward full participation.
I look forward to working with my Congressional colleagues, the
Administration and the entire child nutrition community, to design a
final bill having broad bipartisan support.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in full
in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2166
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Child
Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Amendments of 1998''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--SCHOOL LUNCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS
Sec. 101. Technical amendments to commodity provisions.
Sec. 102. Availability of recovered funds for management activity.
Sec. 103. Elimination of administration of programs by regional
offices.
Sec. 104. Requirement for health and safety inspections.
Sec. 105. Elimination of food and nutrition projects and establishment
of an adequate meal service period.
[[Page S6200]]
Sec. 106. Buy American.
Sec. 107. Summer food service program for children.
Sec. 108. Commodity distribution program.
Sec. 109. Child and adult care food program.
Sec. 110. Transfer of homeless assistance programs to the child and
adult care food program.
Sec. 111. Elimination of pilot projects.
Sec. 112. Training and technical assistance.
Sec. 113. Food service management institute.
Sec. 114. Compliance and accountability.
Sec. 115. Information clearinghouse.
Sec. 116. Refocusing of effort to help accommodate the special dietary
needs of individuals with disabilities.
TITLE II--SCHOOL BREAKFAST AND RELATED PROGRAMS
Sec. 201. Elimination of administration of programs by regional
offices.
Sec. 202. State administrative expenses.
Sec. 203. Special supplemental nutrition program for women, infants,
and children.
Sec. 204. Nutrition education and training.
TITLE III--COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
Sec. 301. Commodity distribution program reforms.
Sec. 302. Food distribution.
TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 401. Effective date.
TITLE I--SCHOOL LUNCH AND RELATED PROGRAMS
SEC. 101. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO COMMODITY PROVISIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 6 of the National School Lunch Act
(42 U.S.C. 1755) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as
subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--The National School Lunch Act
is amended by striking ``section 6(e)'' each place it appears
in sections 14(f), 16(a), and 17(h)(1)(B) (42 U.S.C.
1762a(f), 1765(a), 1766(h)(1)(B)) and inserting ``section
6(c)''.
SEC. 102. AVAILABILITY OF RECOVERED FUNDS FOR MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITY.
Section 8 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1757)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Retention and Use of Recovered Program Funds.--
``(1) Retention.--A State agency may retain up to 50
percent of any program funds recovered as a result of an
audit or review conducted by the State agency of school food
authorities, institutions, and service institutions
participating in food assistance programs authorized under
this Act or section 3 or 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966
(42 U.S.C. 1772, 1773).
``(2) Use.--Funds retained by a State agency under this
subsection shall be used by the State agency for allowable
program costs to improve the management and operation of
programs described in paragraph (1) within the State,
including the cost of providing funds to school food
authorities, institutions, and service institutions
participating in the programs.''.
SEC. 103. ELIMINATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAMS BY
REGIONAL OFFICES.
(a) Matching Requirement.--Section 7(b) of the National
School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1756(b)) is amended by striking
the second sentence.
(b) Disbursement to Schools by the Secretary.--Section 10
of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1759) is amended
to read as follows:
``SEC. 10. DISBURSEMENT TO SCHOOLS BY THE SECRETARY.
``(a) Authority To Administer Programs.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3),
until September 30, 2000, the Secretary shall withhold funds
payable to a State agency under this Act and disburse the
funds directly to school food authorities, institutions, and
service institutions within the State for the purposes
authorized by this Act to the extent that the Secretary has
so withheld and disbursed the funds continuously since
October 1, 1980.
``(2) Use of funds.--Any funds withheld and disbursed by
the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be used for the same
purposes and be subject to the same conditions as apply to
disbursing funds made available to States under this Act.
``(3) State administration.--If the Secretary is
administering (in whole or in part) any program authorized
under this Act in a State, the State may, on request to the
Secretary, assume administrative responsibility for the
program at any time before October 1, 2000.
``(b) Provision of Training and Technical Assistance.--The
Secretary shall provide a State agency that assumes
administrative responsibility for a program from the
Secretary on or before October 1, 2000, with training and
technical assistance to allow for an efficient and effective
transfer of the responsibility.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 11(a)(1)(A) of the
National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1759a(a)(1)(A)) is
amended by striking ``Except as provided in section 10 of
this Act, in'' and inserting ``In''.
SEC. 104. REQUIREMENT FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY INSPECTIONS.
Section 9 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1758)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Health and Safety Inspections.--A school
participating in the school lunch program authorized under
this Act or the school breakfast program authorized under
section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773)
in which meals are prepared on site shall, at least twice
during each school year, obtain an inspection that indicates
that food service operations of the school meet State and
local health and safety standards.''.
SEC. 105. ELIMINATION OF FOOD AND NUTRITION PROJECTS AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADEQUATE MEAL SERVICE
PERIOD.
Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1760) is amended by striking subsection (m) and inserting the
following:
``(m) Length of Meal Service Period and Food Service
Environment.--A school participating in the school lunch
program authorized under this Act or the school breakfast
program authorized under section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act
of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773) shall, to the maximum extent
practicable, establish meal service periods that provide
children with adequate time to fully consume their meals in
an environment that is conducive to eating the meals.''.
SEC. 106. BUY AMERICAN.
Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1760) (as amended by section 105) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(n) Buy American.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall require that a
school purchase, to the maximum extent practicable, food
products that are produced in the United States.
``(2) Limitations.--Paragraph (1) shall apply only to--
``(A) a school located in the contiguous United States; and
``(B) a purchase of a food product for the school lunch
program authorized under this Act or the school breakfast
program authorized under section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act
of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773).''.
SEC. 107. SUMMER FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN.
(a) Adjustments to Reimbursement Rates.--Section 12 of the
National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1760) is amended by
striking subsection (f) and inserting the following:
``(f) Adjustments to Reimbursement Rates.--In providing
assistance for breakfasts, lunches, suppers, and supplements
served in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Secretary may establish appropriate
adjustments for each such State to the national average
payment rates prescribed under sections 4, 11, 13 and 17 of
this Act and section 4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42
U.S.C. 1773) to reflect the differences between the costs of
providing meals in those States and the costs of providing
meals in all other States.''.
(b) Establishment of Site Limitation.--Section 13(a)(7)(B)
of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761(a)(7)(B)) is
amended by striking clause (i) and inserting the following:
``(i) operate--
``(I) not more than 25 sites, with not more than 300
children being served at any 1 site; or
``(II) with a waiver granted by the State agency under
standards developed by the Secretary, with not more than 500
children being served at any 1 site;''.
(c) Elimination of Indication of Interest Requirement,
Removal of Meal Contracting Restrictions, and Vendor
Registration Requirements.--Section 13 of the National School
Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(7)(B)--
(A) by striking clauses (ii) and (iii); and
(B) by redesignating clauses (iv) through (vii) as clauses
(ii) through (v) respectively; and
(2) in subsection (l)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in the first sentence--
(I) by striking ``(other than private nonprofit
organizations eligible under subsection (a)(7))''; and
(II) by striking ``only with food service management
companies registered with the State in which they operate''
and inserting ``with food service management companies''; and
(ii) by striking the last sentence;
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in the first sentence, by striking ``shall'' and
inserting ``may''; and
(ii) by striking the second and third sentences;
(C) by striking paragraph (3); and
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs
(3) and (4), respectively.
(d) Reauthorization of Summer Food Service Program.--
Section 13(q) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1761(q)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting
``2002''.
SEC. 108. COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM.
Section 14(a) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1762a(a)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting
``2002''.
SEC. 109. CHILD AND ADULT CARE FOOD PROGRAM.
(a) Revision to Licensing and Alternate Approval for
Schools and Outside School Hours Child Care Centers.--Section
17(a) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(a)) is
amended in the fifth sentence by striking paragraph (1) and
inserting the following:
[[Page S6201]]
``(1) each institution (other than a school or family or
group day care home sponsoring organization) and family or
group day care home shall--
``(A)(i) have Federal, State, or local licensing or
approval; or
``(ii) be complying with appropriate renewal procedures as
prescribed by the Secretary and not be the subject of
information possessed by the State indicating that the
license of the institution or home will not be renewed;
``(B) in any case in which Federal, State, or local
licensing or approval is not available--
``(i) receive funds under title XX of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1397 et seq.);
``(ii) meet any alternate approval standards established by
a State or local government; or
``(iii) meet any alternate approval standards established
by the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services; or
``(C) in any case in which the institution provides care to
school children outside school hours and Federal, State, or
local licensing or approval is not required, meet State or
local health and safety standards; and''.
(b) Reinstatement of Categorical Eligibility for Even Start
Program Participants.--Section 17(c)(6)(B) of the National
School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(c)(6)(B)) is amended by
striking ``1997'' and inserting ``2002''.
(c) Tax Exempt Status and Removal of Notification
Requirement for Incomplete Applications.--Section 17(d)(1) of
the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(d)(1)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting after the third sentence the following:
``An institution moving toward compliance with the
requirement for tax exempt status shall be allowed to
participate in the child and adult care food program for a
period of not more than 180 days, except that a State agency
may grant a single extension of not to exceed an additional
90 days if the institution demonstrates, to the satisfaction
of the State agency, that the inability of the institution to
obtain tax exempt status within the 180-day period is due to
circumstances beyond the control of the institution.''; and
(2) by striking the last sentence.
(d) Distribution of Program Information.--Section 17(k) of
the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766(k)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``A State'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--A State''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Distribution of program information.--
``(A) Definition of needy area.--In this paragraph, the
term `needy area' means a geographic area served by a school
enrolling elementary students in which at least 50 percent of
the total number of children enrolled are certified as
eligible to receive free or reduced price school meals under
this Act or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1771
et seq.).
``(B) Information.--At least once every 2 years, each State
agency shall provide notification of the availability of the
program, the requirements for program participation, and the
application procedures to be followed under the program to
each nonparticipating institution or family or group day care
home that--
``(i) is located in a needy area within the State; and
``(ii)(I) has received Federal, State, or local licensing
or approval; or
``(II) receives funds under title XX of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1397 et seq.).''.
(e) Elimination of Audit Funds, Establishment of Management
Support Funding, Participation by At-Risk Child Care
Programs, and WIC Outreach.--Section 17 of the National
School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (i);
(2) by redesignating subsections (j) through (p) as
subsections (i) through (o), respectively; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(p) Management Funding.--
``(1) Technical and training assistance.--In addition to
the normal training and technical assistance provided to
State agencies under this section, the Secretary shall
provide training and technical assistance in order to assist
the State agencies in improving their program management and
oversight under this section.
``(2) Funding.--For fiscal year 1999 and each succeeding
fiscal year, the Secretary shall reserve to carry out
paragraph (1) \1/8\ of 1 percent of the amount made available
to carry out this section.
``(q) At-Risk Child Care.--
``(1) Definition of at-risk school child.--In this
subsection, the term `at-risk school child' means a child
who--
``(A) is not less than 12 nor more than 18 years of age;
and
``(B) lives in a geographical area served by a school
enrolling elementary students in which at least 50 percent of
the total number of children enrolled are certified as
eligible to receive free or reduced price school meals under
this Act or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1771
et seq.).
``(2) Participation in child and adult care food program.--
Subject to the other provisions of this subsection, an
institution that provides care to at-risk school children
during after-school hours, weekends, or holidays during the
regular school year may participate in the program authorized
under this section.
``(3) Administration.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the other provisions of this section apply to an
institution described in paragraph (2).
``(4) Supplement reimbursement.--
``(A) Limitations.--An institution may claim reimbursement
under this subsection only for--
``(i) a supplement served to at-risk school children during
after-school hours, weekends, or holidays during the regular
school year; and
``(ii) 1 supplement per child per day.
``(B) Rate.--A supplement shall be reimbursed under this
subsection at the rate established for a free supplement
under subsection (c)(3).
``(C) No charge.--A supplement claimed for reimbursement
under this subsection shall be served without charge.
``(r) Information Concerning the Special Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide each State
agency administering a child and adult care food program
under this section with information concerning the special
supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, and
children authorized under section 17 of the Child Nutrition
Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786).
``(2) Requirements for state agencies.--A State agency
shall ensure that each participating child care center (other
than an institution providing care to school children outside
school hours)--
``(A) receives materials that include--
``(i) a basic explanation of the importance and benefits of
the special supplemental nutrition program for women,
infants, and children;
``(ii) the maximum State income eligibility standards,
according to family size, for the program; and
``(iii) information concerning how benefits under the
program may be obtained;
``(B) is provided updates of the information described in
subparagraph (A) at least annually; and
``(C) provides the information described in subparagraph
(A) to parents of enrolled children at least annually.''.
(f) Permanent Authorization of Demonstration Project.--
Section 17(o) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1766(o)) (as redesignated by subsection (e)) is amended by
striking paragraphs (4) and (5).
SEC. 110. TRANSFER OF HOMELESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO THE
CHILD AND ADULT CARE FOOD PROGRAM.
(a) Summer Food Service Program for Children.--Section
13(a)(3)(C) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1761(a)(3)(C)) is amended--
(1) in clause (i), by inserting ``or'' after the semicolon;
(2) by striking clause (ii); and
(3) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (ii).
(b) Child and Adult Care Food Program.--Section 17 of the
National School Lunch Act (as amended by section 109(e)) is
amended--
(1) in the third sentence of subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``and public'' and inserting ``public'';
and
(B) by inserting before the period at the following: ``,
and emergency shelters described in subsection (s)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(s) Participation by Emergency Shelters.--
``(1) Definition of emergency shelter.--In this subsection,
the term `emergency shelter' means a public or private
nonprofit emergency shelter (as defined in section 321 of the
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
11351)), or a site operated by the shelter, that provides
food service to homeless children and their parents or
guardians.
``(2) Administration.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the other provisions of this section shall apply
to an emergency shelter that is participating in the program
authorized under this section.
``(3) Institution and site licensing.--Subsection (a)(1)
shall not apply to an emergency shelter.
``(4) Health and safety standards.--To be eligible to
participate in the program authorized under this section, an
emergency shelter shall comply with applicable State and
local health and safety standards.
``(5) Meal reimbursement.--
``(A) Limitations.--An emergency shelter may claim
reimbursement under this subsection only for--
``(i) a meal served to children who are not more than 12
years of age residing at the emergency shelter; and
``(ii) not more than 3 meals, or 2 meals and 1 supplement,
per child per day.
``(B) Rate.--A meal shall be reimbursed under this
subsection at the rate established for a free meal under
subsection (c).
``(C) No charge.--A meal claimed for reimbursement under
this subsection shall be served without charge.''.
(c) Homeless Children Nutrition Program.--Section 17B of
the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766b) is repealed.
SEC. 111. ELIMINATION OF PILOT PROJECTS.
Section 18 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1769) is amended by striking subsections (e) through (i).
[[Page S6202]]
SEC. 112. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
Section 21(e)(1) of the National School Lunch Act (42
U.S.C. 1769b-1(e)(1)) is amended by striking ``1998'' and
inserting ``2002''.
SEC. 113. FOOD SERVICE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE.
Section 21(e)(2)(A) of the National School Lunch Act (42
U.S.C. 1769b-1(e)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ``and
$2,000,000 for fiscal year 1996'' and inserting ``$2,000,000
for each of fiscal years 1996 through 1998, and $3,000,000
for fiscal year 1999''.
SEC. 114. COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Section 22(d) of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1769c(d)) is amended by striking ``1996'' and inserting
``2002''.
SEC. 115. INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE.
Section 26 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1769g) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence of subsection (a), by striking
``shall'' and inserting ``may'';
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``The'' and inserting
``Except as provided in subsection (d), the''; and
(3) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
``(d) Noncompetitive Contracts.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary may, on a noncompetitive
basis, enter into a contract for the services of any
organization with which the Secretary has previously entered
into a contract under this section, if the organization has
performed satisfactorily under the contract and meets the
requirements of this section.
``(e) Funding.--The Secretary may provide to the
organization selected under this section an amount not to
exceed $150,000 for each of fiscal years 1999 through
2002.''.
SEC. 116. REFOCUSING OF EFFORT TO HELP ACCOMMODATE THE
SPECIAL DIETARY NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES.
Section 27 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1769h) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 27. ACCOMMODATION OF SPECIAL DIETARY NEEDS OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered program.--The term `covered program' means--
``(A) the school lunch program authorized under this Act;
``(B) the school breakfast program authorized under section
4 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1773); and
``(C) any other program authorized under this Act or the
Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (except section 17 of that Act)
that the Secretary determines is appropriate.
``(2) Eligible entity.--The term `eligible entity' means a
school food authority, institution, or service institution
that participates in a covered program.
``(3) Individuals with disabilities.--The term `individual
with disabilities' has the meaning given the term in section
7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 706) for
purposes of title VII of that Act (29 U.S.C. 796 et seq.).
``(b) Activities.--The Secretary may carry out activities
to help accommodate the special dietary needs of individuals
with disabilities who are participating in a covered program,
including--
``(1) developing and disseminating to State agencies
guidance and technical assistance materials;
``(2) conducting training of State agencies and eligible
entities; and
``(3) issuing grants to State agencies and eligible
entities.''.
TITLE II--SCHOOL BREAKFAST AND RELATED PROGRAMS
SEC. 201. ELIMINATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAMS BY
REGIONAL OFFICES.
Section 5 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C.
1774) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 5 DISBURSEMENT TO SCHOOLS BY THE SECRETARY.
``(a) Authority To Administer Programs.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3),
until September 30, 2000, the Secretary shall withhold funds
payable to a State agency under this Act and disburse the
funds directly to school food authorities, institutions, and
service institutions within the State for the purposes
authorized by this Act to the extent that the Secretary has
so withheld and disbursed the funds continuously since
October 1, 1980.
``(2) Use of funds.--Any funds withheld and disbursed by
the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be used for the same
purposes and be subject to the same conditions as apply to
disbursing funds made available to States under this Act.
``(3) State administration.--If the Secretary is
administering (in whole or in part) any program authorized
under this Act in a State, the State may, on request to the
Secretary, assume administrative responsibility for the
program at any time before October 1, 2000.
``(b) Provision of Training and Technical Assistance.--The
Secretary shall provide a State agency that assumes
administrative responsibility for a program from the
Secretary on or before October 1, 2000, with training and
technical assistance to allow for an efficient and effective
transfer of administrative responsibility.''.
SEC. 202. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.
(a) Homeless Shelters.--Section 7(a)(5) of the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(a)(5)) is amended by
striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
``(B) Reallocation of funds.--
``(i) Return to secretary.--For each fiscal year, any
amounts appropriated that are not obligated or expended
during the fiscal year and are not carried over for the
succeeding fiscal year under subparagraph (A) shall be
returned to the Secretary.
``(ii) Reallocation by secretary.--The Secretary shall
allocate, for purposes of administrative costs, any remaining
amounts among States that demonstrate a need for the
amounts.''.
(b) Elimination of Transfer Limitation.--Section 7(a) of
the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(a)) is
amended by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the
following:
``(6) Use of administrative funds.--Funds available to a
State under this subsection and under section 13(k)(1) of the
National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1761(k)(1)) may be used
by the State for the costs of administration of the programs
authorized under the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C.
1751 et seq.) or this Act (except for the programs authorized
under sections 17 and 21 of this Act) without regard to the
basis on which the funds were earned and allocated.''.
(c) Reauthorization of Program.--Section 7(g) of the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1776(g)) is amended by
striking ``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.
SEC. 203. SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR WOMEN,
INFANTS, AND CHILDREN.
(a) Additional Program Application Requirements.--Section
17(d)(3) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C.
1786(d)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Physical presence.--An applicant shall be physically
present at each certification visit to receive program
benefits.
``(D) Income documentation.--An applicant shall provide
documentation of household income, or of participation in a
program described in clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph
(2)(A), at certification to be determined to meet income
eligibility requirements for the program.
``(E) Verification.--The Secretary shall issue regulations
under this subsection prescribing when and how verification
of income shall be required.''.
(b) Distribution of Nutrition Education Materials.--Section
17(e)(3) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C.
1786(e)(3)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(3) The'' and inserting the following:
``(3) Nutrition education materials.--
``(A) In general.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Sharing of materials with csfp.--The Secretary may
provide, in bulk quantity, nutrition education materials
(including materials promoting breastfeeding) developed with
funds made available for the program authorized under this
section to State agencies administering the commodity
supplemental food program authorized under sections 4(a) and
5 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973
(Public Law 93-86; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) at no cost to that
program.''.
(c) Reauthorization of Program.--Section 17 of the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786) is amended in
subsections (g)(1) and (h)(2)(A) by striking ``1998'' each
place it appears and inserting ``2002''.
(d) Infant Formula Procurement.--Section 17(h)(8)(A) of the
Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(h)(8)(A)) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) Competitive bidding system.--A State agency using a
competitive bidding system for infant formula shall award a
contract to the bidder offering the lowest net price unless
the State agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the weighted average retail price for
different brands of infant formula in the State does not vary
by more than 5 percent.''.
(e) Infrastructure and Breastfeeding Support and
Promotion.--Section 17(h)(10)(A) of the Child Nutrition Act
of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(h)(10)(A)) is amended by striking
``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.
(f) Spend-Forward Authority.--Section 17(i)(3) of the Child
Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(i)(3)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in clause (ii)--
(i) by inserting ``nutrition services and administration''
after ``amount of''; and
(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) with the prior approval of the Secretary, not more
than 4 percent of the amount of funds allocated to a State
agency for nutrition services and administration for a fiscal
year under this section may be expended by the State agency
during the subsequent fiscal year for the costs of developing
electronic benefit transfer.'';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``subparagraph
(A)(ii)'' and inserting ``clauses (ii) and (iii) of
subparagraph (A)'';
(3) by striking subparagraphs (D) through (G); and
(4) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (D).
(g) Farmers Market Nutrition Program.--
(1) Matching funds requirement.--Section 17(m)(3) of the
Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(3)) is amended
by striking ``total'' each place it appears and inserting
``administrative''.
[[Page S6203]]
(2) Ranking criteria for state plans.--Section 17(m)(6) of
the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(6)) is
amended--
(A) by striking subparagraph (F); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (F).
(3) Funding.--Section 17(m)(9)(A) of the Child Nutrition
Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786(m)(9)(A)) is amended by striking
``1998'' and inserting ``2002''.
(h) Disqualification of Certain Vendors.--
(1) In general.--Section 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of
1996 (42 U.S.C. 1786) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(o) Disqualification of Vendors Convicted of Trafficking
or Illegal Sales.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (4), a
State agency shall permanently disqualify from participation
in the program authorized under this section a vendor
convicted of--
``(A) trafficking in food instruments (including any
voucher, draft, check, or access device (including an
electronic benefit transfer card or personal identification
number) issued in lieu of a food instrument under this
section); or
``(B) selling firearms, ammunition, explosives, or
controlled substances (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) in exchange for
food instruments.
``(2) Notice of disqualification.--The State agency shall--
``(A) provide the vendor with notification of the
disqualification; and
``(B) make the disqualification effective on the date of
receipt of the notice of disqualification.
``(3) Prohibition of receipt of lost revenues.--A vendor
shall not be entitled to receive any compensation for
revenues lost as a result of disqualification under this
subsection.
``(4) Hardship exception in lieu of disqualification.--
``(A) In general.-- A State agency may permit a vendor
that, but for this paragraph, would be disqualified under
paragraph (1), to continue to redeem food instruments or
otherwise provide supplemental foods to participants if the
State agency determines, in its sole discretion according to
criteria established by the Secretary, that disqualification
of the vendor would cause hardship to participants in the
program authorized under this section.
``(B) Civil money penalty.--If a State agency authorizes a
vendor that, but for this paragraph, would be disqualified to
redeem food instruments or provide supplemental foods under
subparagraph (A), the State agency shall assess the vendor a
civil money penalty in lieu of disqualification.
``(C) Amount.--The State agency shall determine the amount
of the civil penalty according to criteria established by the
Secretary.''.
(2) Regulations.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date on which the Secretary of Agriculture
issues a final regulation that includes the criteria for--
(A) making hardship determinations; and
(B) determining the amount of a civil money penalty in lieu
of disqualification.
SEC. 204. NUTRITION EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
Section 19(i) of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C.
1788(i)) is amended--
(1) by striking the subsection heading and all that follows
through paragraph (3)(A) and inserting the following:
``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated
such sums as are necessary to carry out this section for each
of fiscal years 1997 through 2002.''; and
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively.
TITLE III--COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
SEC. 301. COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM REFORMS.
(a) Commodity Specifications.--Section 3(a) of the
Commodity Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of 1987
(Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) is amended by
striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall apply to--
``(A) the commodity supplemental food program authorized
under sections 4(a) and 5 of the Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-86; 7 U.S.C. 612c
note);
``(B) the food distribution program on Indian reservations
authorized under section 4(b) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977
(7 U.S.C. 2013(b)); and
``(C) the school lunch program authorized under the
National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.).''.
(b) Customer Acceptability Information.--Section 3(f) of
the Commodity Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of
1987 (Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) is amended by
striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2) Customer acceptability information.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that
information with respect to the types and forms of
commodities that are most useful is collected from recipient
agencies participating in programs described in subsection
(a)(2).
``(B) Frequency.--The information shall be collected at
least once every 2 years.
``(C) Additional submissions.--The Secretary--
``(i) may require submission of information described in
subparagraph (A) from recipient agencies participating in
other domestic food assistance programs administered by the
Secretary; and
``(ii) shall provide the recipient agencies a means for
voluntarily submitting customer acceptability information.''.
SEC. 302. FOOD DISTRIBUTION.
(a) In General.--Sections 8 through 12 of the Commodity
Distribution Reform Act and WIC Amendments of 1987 (Public
Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C. 612c note) are amended to read as
follows:
``SEC. 8. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER COMMODITIES BETWEEN PROGRAMS.
``(a) Transfer.--Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary
may transfer any commodities purchased for a domestic food
assistance program administered by the Secretary to any other
domestic food assistance program administered by the
Secretary if the transfer is necessary to ensure that the
commodities will be used while the commodities are still
suitable for human consumption.
``(b) Reimbursement.--The Secretary shall, to the maximum
extent practicable, provide reimbursement for the value of
the commodities transferred under subsection (a) from
accounts available for the purchase of commodities under the
program receiving the commodities.
``(c) Crediting.--Any reimbursement made under subsection
(b) shall--
``(1) be credited to the accounts that incurred the costs
when the transferred commodities were originally purchased;
and
``(2) be available for the purchase of commodities with the
same limitations as are provided for appropriated funds for
the reimbursed accounts for the fiscal year in which the
transfer takes place.
``SEC. 9. AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE CLAIMS.
``(a) In General.--The Secretary may determine the amount
of, settle, and adjust all or part of a claim arising under a
domestic food assistance program administered by the
Secretary.
``(b) Waivers.--The Secretary may waive a claim described
in subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that a waiver
would serve the purposes of the program.
``(c) Authority of the Attorney General.--Nothing in this
section diminishes the authority of the Attorney General
under section 516 of title 28, United States Code, or any
other provision of law, to supervise and conduct litigation
on behalf of the United States.
``SEC. 10. PAYMENT OF COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT OF
COMMODITIES THAT POSE A HEALTH OR SAFETY
HAZARD.
``(a) In General.--The Secretary may use funds available to
carry out section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat.
774, chapter 641; 7 U.S.C. 612c), that are not otherwise
committed, for the purpose of reimbursing States for State
and local costs associated with commodities distributed under
any domestic food assistance program administered by the
Secretary if the Secretary determines that the commodities
pose a health or safety hazard.
``(b) Allowable Costs.--The costs--
``(1) may include costs for storage, transportation,
processing, and destruction of the hazardous commodities; and
``(2) shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary.
``(c) Replacement Commodities.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary may use funds described in
subsection (a) for the purpose of purchasing additional
commodities if the purchase will expedite replacement of the
hazardous commodities.
``(2) Recovery.--Use of funds under paragraph (1) shall not
restrict the Secretary from recovering funds or services from
a supplier or other entity regarding the hazardous
commodities.
``(d) Crediting of Recovered Funds.--Funds recovered from a
supplier or other entity regarding the hazardous commodities
shall--
``(1) be credited to the account available to carry out
section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat. 774,
chapter 641; 7 U.S.C. 612c), to the extent the funds
represent expenditures from that account under subsections
(a) and (c); and
``(2) remain available to carry out the purposes of section
32 of that Act until expended.
``SEC. 11. AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT COMMODITIES DONATED BY FEDERAL
SOURCES.
``(a) In General.--The Secretary may accept donations of
commodities from any Federal agency, including commodities of
another Federal agency determined to be excess personal
property pursuant to section 202(d) of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483(d)).
``(b) Use.--The Secretary may donate the commodities
received under subsection (a) to States for distribution
through any domestic food assistance program administered by
the Secretary.
``(c) Payment.--Notwithstanding section 202(d) of the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40
U.S.C. 483(d)), the Secretary shall not be required to make
any payment in connection with the commodities received under
subsection (a).''.
(b) Effect on Prior Amendments.--The amendment made by
subsection (a) does not affect the amendments made by
sections 8 through 12 of the Commodity Distribution Reform
Act and WIC Amendments of 1987 (Public Law 100-237; 7 U.S.C.
612c note), as in effect on September 30, 1998.
[[Page S6204]]
TITLE IV--EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 401. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Except as provided in section 203(h)(2), this Act and the
amendments made by this Act take effect on October 1,
1998.
______
By Ms. COLLINS (for herself and Mr. Grassley):
S. 2167. A bill to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) to increase the efficiency and accountability of Offices of
Inspector General within Federal departments, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
inspector general act amendments of 1998
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, since coming to the Senate and assuming
the Chairmanship of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, one
of my top priorities has been the seemingly never-ending fight to
ferret out and eliminate waste, fraud and abuse in federal government
programs. We've all heard the horror stories of $500 hammers and roads
built to nowhere. The waste of scarce federal resources not only picks
the pockets of the taxpayers but also places severe financial pressures
on already overburdened programs, forcing cutbacks in the delivery of
vital government services.
Over the past year, I have seen this waste first-hand as the
Subcommittee put a spotlight on massive fraud in the Medicare program.
To cite just one example, the Subcommittee's investigation revealed
that the federal government had been sending Medicare checks to 14
health care companies whose address, if they had existed, was in the
middle of the runway of the Miami International Airport. That fraud
cost the taxpayers millions of dollars, diverting scarce resources from
the elderly and legitimate health care providers.
This example and others like it were uncovered by my Subcommittee
working hand-in-hand with the Inspector General's Office, whose mission
is to identify the eliminate waste, fraud and abuse in federal
programs. In many ways, the Inspectors General are the eyes and ears of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in particular, and the
Congress, in general, as we strive to detect and prevent waste, fraud,
abuse, and mismanagement in federal programs.
Mr. President, this year marks the 20th anniversary of the Inspector
General Act, the law that the Congress passed to create these guardians
of the public purse. As we recognize this anniversary, it is important
for Congress to take a close look at the IG system.
During the past 20 years, the Inspector General community has grown
from 12 in 1978 to 57 Inspectors General today. These offices receive
more than $1 billion in annual funding and employ over 10,000 auditors,
criminal investigators, and support personnel. The Office of Inspector
General is charged with tremendous responsibilities and is given
considerable authority to uncover waste and abuse within the
government.
By and large, the IG community has done an outstanding job. They have
made thousands of recommendations to Congress, ultimately saving
taxpayers literally billions of dollars. Investigations by Inspectors
General have also resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars from
companies and individuals who defrauded the federal government. These
investigations have been the basis for thousands of criminal
prosecutions, debarments, exclusions and suspensions.
The Inspectors General have a demonstrated record of success over the
past 20 years, but as with any government program, we must be vigilant
to ensure that the program is well managed, accountable, and effective.
With this goal in mind and drawing on my work with the Inspectors
General over the past year and a half, I am introducing the ``Inspector
General Act Amendments of 1998,'' a bill to improve the accountability
and efficiency of the Inspectors General program. I am pleased to have
my colleague from Iowa, Senator Grassley, as a cosponsor.
The bill is designed to increase the accountability and independence
of Inspectors General. It establishes a renewable nine-year term of
office for each of the 26 Inspectors General who are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. This provision will also
encourage Inspectors General to serve for longer periods of time so
that their experience and judgment can be used to fight waste, fraud
and abuse.
This bill also takes steps to streamline the IG Offices themselves--
making them more efficient and flexible--by consolidating existing
offices and by reducing the volume of the inspectors general reporting
requirements.
The number of OIGs has increased more than four-fold in twenty years,
and many of these are small offices with just a handful of employees.
These small OIGs can be made far more efficient and effective by
transferring their functions to larger, department-wide IG offices. For
example, my bill consolidates the current stand-alone office of the
Peace Corps, with just 15 employees, into the State Department--
eliminating unnecessary overhead and bureaucracy but continuing
thorough audit and oversight of the Peace Corps. Under this proposal,
seven existing small IG offices are consolidated into the IG offices of
major departments.
Currently, Offices of Inspectors General are required by law to
provide semi-annual reports to Congress. My bill would increase the
value of the report process by reducing the requirement to a single
annual report and streamlining the information required for each
report. For example, the new reporting requirement would require the
IGs to identify areas within their jurisdiction which are at highest
risk for waste, fraud and abuse. In that way, the Congress can attack
those weak areas before they get worse and before the problems become
more difficult to solve.
The Inspectors General have made valuable contributions to the
efficient operation of the federal government, but their record is not
without blemish. For example, this successful record was recently
tarnished by the activities of the Treasury Department's Office of
Inspector General. After an extensive investigation, my Subcommittee
found that this office violated federal laws in the award of two sole-
source contracts, which wasted thousands of dollars. It was disturbing
to find that this one Inspector General's Office was itself guilty of
wasting resources--the very office charged with preventing fraud and
abuse. At the conclusion of that investigation, the Subcommittee asked
the question: who is watching the watchdogs?
Let me stress that, in my view, problems like the ones in the
Treasury Inspector General's office are not widespread in the Inspector
General community. However, an Inspector General is not like any other
government manager. Inspectors General are the very officials in
government responsible for combating waste, fraud and abuse in Federal
programs. And as such, Inspectors General should be held to a higher
standard. To do their job effectively, Inspectors General must be above
reproach, must set an example for other government managers to follow,
and must not create situations where there is even the appearance of
impropriety. Credibility and effectiveness are lost when the office
charged with combating waste and abuse engages in the kind of activity
that the Inspector General is responsible for deterring.
To increase accountability, my bill requires independent external
reviews of the Inspector General offices every three years. It gives
each office the flexibility to choose the most efficient method of
review, but it does require that the watchdogs themselves submit to
oversight by a qualified third party. This provision will help ensure
public confidence in the management and efficiency of the IG offices.
Finally, Mr. President, one provision that is not included in this
bill, but that deserves careful consideration, is the grant of
statutory law enforcement authority for the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services. The Medicare fraud
investigation conducted by my Subcommittee revealed the dangers faced
by HHS-IG Special Agents when they work with the FBI and others to
investigate some cases of health care fraud. These agents work side by
side with other federal law enforcement professionals, and the Congress
should carefully examine the best way to provide them with tools
necessary for them to do their jobs effectively.
Mr. President, the bill I introduce today represents the first step
in the process to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and
accountability of the Inspector General program. These offices
[[Page S6205]]
provide valuable assistance to the Congress so that we can exercise our
duty to oversee the operation of the federal government and to make
sure that the taxpayer's money is well spent and not wasted. I urge my
colleagues to join me in this effort to strengthen and improve the
Inspectors General program into the next century.
______
By Mr. INOUYE:
S.J. Res. 53. A joint resolution to express the sense of the Congress
that the President should award a Presidential Unit Citation to the
final crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, which was sunk on July 30, 1945;
to the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, today I am introducing a joint
resolution which calls upon the President to award a Presidential Unit
Citation to the final crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA-35) that
recognizes the courage, fortitude and heroism displayed by the crew in
the face of tremendous hardship and adversity after their ship was
torpedoed and sunk on July 30, 1945.
____________________