[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 75 (Thursday, June 11, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H4540-H4541]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     NAGORNO KARABAGH PEACE PROCESS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to share with my 
colleagues and the American people some new ideas on how we can work to 
promote greater cooperation and stability in the Caucasus region of the 
former Soviet Union, and specifically how we can jump-start the peace 
process in Nagorno Karabagh. During the Memorial Day recess, the 
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy) and I had the opportunity to 
travel to the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh to meet with 
government officials from both countries as well as with U.S. officials 
in the region.
  As I have mentioned in the House on several occasions, the people of 
Nagorno Karabagh fought and won a war of independence against 
Azerbaijan. A tenuous cease-fire has been in place since 1994, but a 
more lasting settlement has been elusive. The U.S. has been involved in 
a major way in the negotiations intended to produce a just and lasting 
peace. Our country is a cochair, along with France and Russia, of the 
international negotiating group, commonly known as the Minsk Group, 
formed to seek a solution to the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.
  Mr. Speaker, this so-called Minsk process, under the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, a process of shuttle 
diplomacy whereby the American and other negotiators travel between the 
various capitals seeking agreement on a resolution of the conflict, has 
so far not been successful in trying to resolve the Nagorno Karabagh 
conflict. What is needed are some new ideas and more realistic 
approaches that will lead to a just and lasting settlement of this 
conflict.
  Unfortunately, the U.S. position has thus far sided with Azerbaijan's 
claim of so-called territorial integrity, despite the fact that this 
land has been Armenian land for centuries, and the borders which gave 
the land to Azerbaijan were imposed by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.
  It is time, Mr. Speaker, for the U.S. and our Minsk Group partners to 
forget about the idea of territorial integrity as the foundation for 
peacefully resolving this conflict. In addition, we should be pushing 
for direct negotiations involving Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan.
  Instead of sticking with the unworkable notion of Karabagh as an 
inseparable part of Azerbaijan, subordinate to the Azeri capital of 
Baku, I believe we should consider the idea of horizontal links, a 
federation among equals. This model has been used in resolving the 
Bosnia war and in the current negotiations aimed at resolving the 
Cyprus conflict.
  I am pleased to report, Mr. Speaker, some positive changes in the 
position of our State Department, including their apparent willingness 
to push for direct negotiations between Nagorno Karabagh and 
Azerbaijan. I am sensing a newfound flexibility by the State Department 
in terms of dropping the old adherence to the failed approaches of the 
Minsk Group in the past.
  I would stress the importance of strengthening the current, shaky 
cease-fire as a priority for the Minsk Group. The recent negotiations 
in Northern Ireland could provide a model where separate, direct 
negotiations were held on the issue of militia armaments. In the case 
of Karabagh, making a priority of securing the cease-fire would help 
end the violence, stop the continuing casualties and help build 
confidence for additional agreements between the parties.
  The other key is the need for ironclad security guarantees for 
Karabagh,

[[Page H4541]]

with the Republic of Armenia given a central role in the process. As I 
mentioned, Karabagh won the war and holds the strategic advantage. It's 
unrealistic and unfair to expect Karabagh to give up its gains on the 
battlefield for vague promises at the negotiating table.
  Another key point on the Karabagh negotiations. It is no secret that 
Azerbaijan has had the support of big oil interests in its corner. 
Azerbaijan's territory may have significant oil reserves beneath it in 
the Caspian Sea area, although some new studies question just how 
significant these resources may be. Unfortunately, powerful and well-
connected lobbyists for the oil industry have basically backed up 
Azerbaijan's intransigence in the negotiating process over Karabagh. I 
am afraid our administration's policy has tended to side with 
Azerbaijan because of the oil issue. I hope that Members of Congress 
who are involved in this issue can work with me in getting the 
administration to convince Azerbaijan and the oil industry that the 
development of those resources will continue to be complicated until 
the Karabagh issue is resolved.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, another very troubling aspect of this issue is 
the indications of possible illegal transfers of U.S. or NATO standard 
weapons and other military supplies being sent to Azerbaijan by Turkey. 
Turkey has long sided with Azerbaijan. One of the major complications 
of the conflict is the blockade of Armenia and Karabagh by Azerbaijan, 
and Turkey's blockade of Armenia, in support of Azerbaijan. These 
blockades have made life hard for the Armenian people, stopping vitally 
needed humanitarian relief supplies from the U.S. and other countries. 
Now there are growing indications that Turkey is funneling military 
equipment to Azerbaijan, something I have seen myself in a previous 
visit to the front lines in Nagorno Karabagh. As part of our efforts to 
resolve the conflict over Karabagh, we must restrain our NATO ally 
Turkey from contributing more fuel to the fire in the form of arms and 
other military supplies.
  Just a few weeks ago, I opposed the suggestion that appeared in the 
media that Turkey may want to transfer American F-16 fighter planes to 
Azerbaijan. That country already has air superiority because it 
inherited a lot more airplanes from the Soviet Union than did Armenia. 
F-16s would give Azerbaijan overwhelming air superiority.
  There are now suggestions that Turkey may transfer advanced NATO 
howitzer (cannon artillery) to Azerbaijan. The U.S. government cannot 
allow its military equipment to be used against our Armenian friends.
  I am currently working with some of my colleagues in this body to 
determine the level of Turkish support for Azerbaijan's military and in 
putting pressure on Turkey to be a partner in the search for a lasting 
peace in the region--not a contributor to a continuing cycle of 
violence and tensions.

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